Download Week 18: Peace Processes and International Intervention

PO377 ETHNIC CONFLICT AND
POLITICAL
VIOLENCE
Week 18: Peace Processes and
International Intervention
Question to take home from today’s and next
week’s lecture


Are the prospects for sustainable peace lower after ethnic
civil wars compared to other types of civil war?
What might this mean for our case studies?
Lecture Outline
I.
II.
Introduction: Data and definitions
 Data on civil war termination
 Definitions of peace
 More definitions
Theorising the prospects for peace after large-scale ethnic violence
 Is (the recurrence of) violent ethnic conflict inevitable?
 Why do peace processes fail?
Lecture Outline
III.
IV.
V.
Peace processes and conditions for sustainable peace
 Possible conflict outcomes
 Third-party intervention and mediation
 Levels (“Tracks”) of intervention and mediation
 The two-step approach to ethnic conflict resolution
 Step 1: Questions of “ripeness”
 Step 2: Essential criteria for a successful peace accord
 Step 2: The trade-off between efficacy and sustainability
The role of international intervention
 Why should external actors care?
 Forms of international intervention
 International intervention as a “critical barrier” for peace
 International intervention as a problem
 Dilemmas of international intervention
Summary
Part I:
Introduction:
Data and definitions
Data on civil war termination




Only 20-25% of civil wars that have ended, ended in negotiated
settlements (Licklider 1995; Mason and Fett 1996; Walter 2002 and
1997; Hartzell 1999; Sambanis 2000).
Removing the 5 year requirement produces about 42% (Hartzell,
Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001: 194).
No real difference in this respect between identity-based civil wars
and non-identity wars (Licklider 1995; Walter 2002, 1997).
BUT only a third of identity-based civil wars ending in negotiated
settlement ultimately remain peaceful (much lower than non-identity
civil wars) (Licklider 1995).
Definitions of peace


Negative peace: absence of direct or personal violence
(Galtung 1969; 1985); most often conceptualised as the
absence of war (armed hostilities);
Positive peace: absence of structural violence (ibid.). According
to Barnes (2009) positive peace has been achieved “where
democratic governance is established, where human rights are
protected, and where sustained progress can be made towards
development” (ibid.:18).
More definitions


Peace processes are “persistent peace initiatives involving the
main antagonists in a protracted conflict” (Darby and MacGinty
2002: 2).
[Darby and MacGinty distinguish four phases in peace
processes: pre-negotiation; the management of the process,
including negotiations and violence; peace accords; and postaccord reconstruction.]
While peacemaking is concerned with bringing hostile parties
to an agreement (Barnes 2009), “peacebuilding is more
comprehensive, involving sustained and multidimensional efforts
to address the structural causes of conflict … and to reconcile
relationships affected by conflict” (ibid.: 14).
More definitions (2)


“Conflict settlement aims at establishing an institutional
framework in which the conflicting interests of the different
principal conflict parties … can be accommodated to such an
extent that incentives for cooperation and the non-violent
pursuit of conflicts of interest through compromise outweigh any
benefits that might be expected from violent confrontation”
(Wolff 2006: 134-135).
“Conflict management is an attempt to contain or limit the
effects of an ongoing ethnic conflict” (ibid.: 134).
[Both of the above are distinct from conflict resolution, conflict
transformation and reconciliation – we will come back to this.]
Part II:
Theorising the prospects for peace after large-scale
ethnic violence
Is (the recurrence of) violent ethnic conflict
inevitable?


From the three broad approaches to studying ethnicity and ethnic
conflict – primordialism, instrumentalism and constructivism –
primordialism is most pessimistic about the prospects of peace in
divided societies:
“Wherever ethnic nationalism has taken hold of populations, there
one may expect to find powerful assertions of national selfdetermination that, if long opposed, will embroil whole regions in
bitter and protracted ethnic conflict. Whether the peace and stability
of such regions is better served in the short term by measures of
containment, federation, mediation, or even partition, in the long run
there can be little escape from the many conflagrations that the
unsatisfied yearnings of ethnic nationalism are likely to kindle” (Smith
1993: 40 cited in Lake and Rothchild 1998: 5).
Is (the recurrence of) violent ethnic conflict
inevitable? (2)


Instrumentalists and constructivists, on the other hand, argue
that ethnic violence is contingent upon elite behaviour
(instrumentalism) or the wider social, political and economic
circumstances (constructivism).
Hence, they are more optimistic about the prospects of
peacebuilding endeavours if these manage to reconstruct
ethnic identities.
Is (the recurrence of) violent ethnic conflict
inevitable? (3)

Likewise, institutionalists believe that “suitable” political
institutions – however defined – can help solve or at least
manage violent ethnic conflict and prevent its recurrence (cp.
weeks 14 to 17 of the module).
Is (the recurrence of) violent ethnic conflict
inevitable? (4)


Neorealist explanations focus on conditions of anarchy and the
security dilemma (cp. Kaufmann 1996; Posen 1993), so their
prescriptions for conflict resolution are either restoring state
authority through victory on the battlefield, or partition.
Rationalist explanations focus on “the reasons actors have for
being unable to resolve a disagreement short of conflict”
(Hoddie and Hartzell 2005: 24), so their prescriptions for
conflict resolution are largely focused on the external
enforcement of peace settlements.
Why do peace processes fail?
According to these different approaches, the failure of peace
processes could thus – in very simplistic terms – be explained by:


Primordialism: the inherently conflictual nature of ethnic identities;
instrumentalism and constructivism: the lack of elite commitment to
peace and failure to reconstruct ethnic identities;

institutionalism: the establishment of “unsuitable” institutions;

realism: the pervasiveness of the ethnic security dilemma;

rationalism: the failure to overcome commitment problems.
Part III:
Peace processes and conditions for sustainable peace
Possible conflict outcomes



Parties to conflicts see their interests as diametrically
opposed; possible outcomes are win-lose or compromise. In
violent conflicts usually lose-lose.
Task of conflict resolution is to help parties who perceive
their situation as zero-sum conflict to re-perceive it as nonzero-sum and then assist them to move towards positive-sum
outcomes.
Prisoners’ Dilemma in Game Theory is representation of
tendency of competing strategies to end in lose-lose
outcomes, but also of potential for cooperation to end in winwin outcomes.
Third party intervention and mediation


Third party intervention and mediation is often needed to
break a deadlock. Third party changes conflict structure
and allows different pattern of communication.
Post-Cold War broadening in scope of third party
interventions. Much wider view of timing of intervention.
Bottom-up processes and roles of internal third parties
and indigenous peacemakers now seen as more significant
too.
Levels (“Tracks”) of intervention and
mediation



Track I: governmental or inter-governmental representatives.
Negotiation, peacekeeping, arbitration, “mediation with
muscle”. (UN, international and regional organisations,
governments, international financial institutions.)
Track II: unofficial mediators. Conciliation, problem-solving,
mediation. (International NGOs, churches, academics, private
business.)
Track III: building social cohesion and common ground.
(Grassroots, indigenous resources and local actors.)
The two-step approach to ethnic conflict
resolution
1.
2.

Establishing preconditions for effective intergroup dialogue
and negotiations (through Track 1 or Track 2 procedures);
the negotiation of specific constitutional and other
arrangements to reach a conflict settlement.
Each of these steps faces its own challenges.
(See Ross 2000)
Step 1: Questions of “ripeness”

Zartman: some political, social and economic moments are “ripe” for
negotiation and dialogue and a move from violence to non-violence;
others are not:
“Parties resolve their conflict only when they are ready to do so –
when alternative, usually unilateral, means of achieving a
satisfactory result are blocked and the parties feel that they are
in an uncomfortable and costly predicament. At that ripe moment,
they grab onto proposals that usually have been in the air for a
long time and that only now appear attractive” (Zartman 2002:
19).

This moment of ripeness is determined by the contending parties’
perception of a mutually hurting stalemate (MHS), involving both
objective evidence and subjective perception.
Step 1: Questions of “ripeness” (2)



When a MHS is reached, parties to conflict realise status quo is
a negative-sum situation; zero-sum outcomes are now
considered impossible; positive-sum outcome must be
attempted.
This also requires a perceived way out and strong leadership.
May be aided by presence of mutually enticing opportunities
(MEO).
Step 1: Questions of “ripeness” (3)
Challenge to “ripeness” metaphor:
“Quick fixes to long-standing violent conflict are like
growing a garden with no understanding of seeds, soils
and sweat…. I believe in cultivation. Cultivation as a
metaphor suggests that the core of the peacebuilding
work – fostering and sustaining committed, authentic
relationships across the lines of conflict over time – does
not rise and fall with the temporal ups and downs of the
conflict cycles. It answers the question – is it possible to
pursue peace when things are bad – with a resounding
‘Yes!’ Just as it also suggests that when things are
suddenly headed towards an agreement the work is
hardly over. It has only begun” (Lederach 2002).
Step 2: Essential criteria for a successful peace
accord
1)
The protagonists are willing to negotiate in good faith;
2)
the key actors are included in the process;
3)
the negotiations address the central issues in dispute;
4)
force is not used to achieve objectives;
5)
negotiators are committed to a sustained process.
(See Darby and MacGinty 2000)
Step 2: The trade-off between efficacy and
sustainability



Fewer parties and issues involved in peace negotiations may be
easier to manage and may make it easier to reach agreement
(efficacy argument).
BUT more inclusive and more comprehensive peace processes
are more likely to be sustainable (sustainability argument)
(Barnes 2009).
See in this context also the dilemmas of public participation in
peacemaking (ibid.).
Part IV:
The role of international intervention
Why should external actors care?
Because of:
 their own hegemonic ambitions;
 concerns for regional stability;
 sympathy for oppressed groups [or oppressors??];
 sense of international responsibility;
 humanitarianism (Cooper and Berdal 1993 cited in Rothchild and
Lake 1998: 217).

“The paradox of the post-Cold War world, however, is that in the
absence of the bipolar competition that drove them into the far
reaches of the globe, the United States and other powers now lack
the political will necessary to make a sustained commitment to the
role of external guarantor.” (Rothchild and Lake 1998: 218).
[This is probably even more the case now in our post-Afghanistan
and Iraq world.]
Forms of international intervention

Non-coercive intervention;

Coercive intervention (Rothchild and Lake 1998);

Third party intervention can be formal or informal,
need not be constant over time (Carment and
Rowlands 2004).
International intervention as “critical barrier”
for peace
External actors can help bring security and stability to war-torn countries
by:




making conflict either extremely difficult or unnecessary (Carment and
Rowlands 2004);
bringing representatives of contending groups together for peace
negotiations (Barnes 2009);
enforcing peace settlements and providing necessary security assurances
(Walter 1997);
encouraging opponents to design new institutional arrangements to
manage conflict (Hartzell et al. 2002; Sisk 1996).
International intervention as a problem




External actors can be driven by belligerent motives (cp. Gurr
2000);
if external actors are biased or lack commitment to enforce
conflict settlements, they can exacerbate rather than resolve
conflict (Rothchild and Lake 1998);
where external actors aim to rush peace negotiations or avoid
difficult issues, the conflict is likely to recur (Barnes 2009);
peace processes that neglect the conditions or interests of local
communities increase dependence on external guarantees for
peace (Darby and MacGinty 2002).
Dilemmas of international intervention (for the
intervening party)

1.
Dilemmas faced by the intervening party:
The need to engage in confidence-building vs. efforts to punish
particular groups;
2.
the politicisation of international intervention;
3.
information failures;
4.
problems of regional or global organisations to agree on a
course of action (Rothchild and Lake 1998).
Part V:
Summary
Summary


Whether or not we believe that violent ethnic conflict can be
truly resolved – rather than merely managed or settled –
depends to a large degree on the theoretical framework we
adopt (cp. Kaufmann 1996; Lake and Rothchild 1996).
These frameworks notwithstanding, sustainable peace is
unlikely to be achieved if the structural causes of ethnic
violence and the challenges specific to each step of the
peace process are not addressed (hence, a positive
conceptualisation of peace as well as flexibility and constant
innovation in the peace process are crucial).
Summary


Many of the issues to do with getting violent actors to the stage
of peace negotiation are debated within the literature (no
consensus): timing, ‘ripeness’, hurting stalemates, inclusion versus
exclusion, the utility (and forms) of external intervention.
Negotiations are extremely difficult and raise a host of issues
regarding interpretation and implementation.
Summary


The usefulness of international intervention in ending ethnonational conflicts or mediating negotiations depends on a
variety of contextual factors and is often limited, not least due
to the lack of political will to intervene as external actor.
Peace processes, just like the emergence of violent ethnic
conflict, need not – and do not – follow the same trajectories,
so that it is crucial to bear country-specific differences in mind.
Summary
Case Studies:


Rwanda and Sri Lanka show problems that arise when political
leaders do not have genuine commitment to peace process.
Rwanda shows how difficult peace is to establish where
agreement is coerced rather than organic (hard to force an
MHS). Bosnia and Kosovo also show this.
Summary
Case Studies:



Yugoslavia illustrates how the break-up of a multi-ethnic state is
not necessarily a solution to ethno-political strife, even though it
may bring about negative peace.
Sri Lanka shows how difficult it can be in a long-running internal
conflict to get warring parties to move beyond zero-sum
attitudes.
However, Northern Ireland shows us that as difficult as this is, it
is possible – though it is only the first step in an even harder
process of implementation/consolidation.