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Unity, diversity and ties
On concentration and integration of minority groups in the Netherlands
The Netherlands Council for social development
The Hague, February 2005
Recommendation 35
The Netherlands Council for Social Development (RMO) is the advisory board to the
government and parliament on participation in society and stability. The RMO provides
both solicited and unsolicited advice on the main features of policy. The RMO has nine
independent Crown-appointed members: Prof. H.P.M. Adriaansens (chair), Ms Y.
Koster-Dreese (vice-chair), Prof. J.M. Barendrecht, Prof. T. Blokland-Potters, Prof. J.
van Doorne-Huiskes, Prof. P.H.A. Frissen, Mr S. Harchaoui, Ms J.G. Manshanden and
Prof. M. de Winter.
Mr K.W.H. van Beek is general secretary of the Council.
Parnassusplein 5
P.O. Box 16139
2500 BC The Hague
Tel. +31 (70) 340 52 94
Fax +31 (70) 340 54 46
[email protected]
www.adviesorgaan-rmo.nl
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© Netherlands Council for Social Development, The Hague 2005
© Sdu Uitgevers, The Hague 2005
No part of this document may be published or reproduced, stored in a computer system,
or transmitted in any form by printing, photocopying, microfilm or by any other means
whatsoever without permission from RMO.
2
Foreword
The Dutch government has requested the Netherlands Council for Social Development
(RMO) to provide its opinion on the relationship between concentration of minority
groups and integration (see Appendix 1 for the request for opinion). The request for
opinion refers to concentration in different domains, such as housing, education and in
social organizations. With this request for opinion, the government is addressing one of
the most controversial subjects of recent years. The emergence of concentration
neighbourhoods and what are known as black schools and the spread of ethnic minority
interest groups are creating a degree of social unrest. Furthermore, there is room for
considerable differences of opinion on how public authorities can respond to the
increasing concentration of ethnic minorities in Dutch society.
The central issues in the RMO recommendations are concerned with participation in
society and stability. The integration of minority groups is addressed directly or
indirectly from this perspective in the majority of RMO recommendations. The RMO
has made some relatively ‘minor’ contributions specifically on integration in recent
years, in the form of appendices to reports from other advisory bodies.1 The Council's
last ‘major’ integration report was published in 1998 (Integratie in perspectief
(Integration in perspective)).
In elaborating the advisory theme, the RMO made grateful use of the expertise of many
people (see Appendix 5 for a list). The Council first visited Amersfoort, Amsterdam,
Deventer, Enschede and Rotterdam, where discussions were held with local
policymakers, social organizations, city residents and researchers. We also had
exploratory discussions with various national policymakers. Furthermore, Paul
Jungbluth gave an introduction on ‘inequality in primary education’ in the council
meeting of 30 June 2004. Two external investigations were also carried out in support
of these recommendations, the first written by Justus Uitermark and Jan Willem
Duyvendak and the second by Paul Scheffer. These investigations were published
previously in the working document Over insluiting en vermijding Twee essays over
segregatie en integratie (On inclusion and avoidance. Two essays on segregation and
integration) and are also attached to these recommendations as appendices. Finally, the
Council made grateful use of the knowledge of a focus group, comprising Jaco
Dagevos, Fatoş Ipek-Demir, Sadik Harchaoui, Henk Molleman and Rabiaa Bouhalhoul.
The focus group met three times to comment on the plan of action and drafts of this
recommendation.
We are extremely grateful to these people for making their time and insights available to
us.
1
Some examples of RMO recommendations on integration that have appeared as an appendix to
reports from other advisory bodies are: Inburgering als educatieve opdracht (Integration as an
educational assignment) (2003), for the Advisory Committee on Aliens Affairs (ACVZ); Samen
naar de taalschool (Together to the language school) (2001), for the Education Council;
Eigenheid in diversiteit (Individuality in diversity) (2001), for the Council for Public
Administration (ROB).
3
Henk Molleman, whose contribution to this report as a member of the focus group was
significant, sadly died between the conclusion of the recommendation and its
publication. His sudden death was a great shock to us all. We will sorely miss his
critical involvement.
The Committee that drafted the recommendations comprised:
Ms Z.A. Arda (Chair of committee, until 01-01-2005, Council)
Prof. H.P.M. Adriaansens (from 01-10-2004, Council)
Prof. M. de Winter (Council)
Drs. T. Schillemans (secretariat)
Drs. S.M. Verhagen (from 01-10-2004, secretariat)
Ms M.R.J.R.S. van San (until 01-10-2004, secretariat)
Drs. C. Smissaert (until 01-09-2004, secretariat)
The responsibility for the recommendation resides with the Council.
Prof. H.P.M. Adriaansens
Chairman
Dr. K.W.H. van Beek
secretary
4
Table of contents
1
SUMMARY ........................................................................................................................... 7
2
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 10
2.1
2.2
3
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
5
5.1
5.2
6
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
REQUEST FOR OPINION AND CENTRAL QUESTION .......................................................... 10
GUIDE TO THE READER .................................................................................................... 11
DEFINITIONS AND FACTS ............................................................................................ 12
TERMS ............................................................................................................................... 12
FACTS AND FIGURES ON CONCENTRATION ..................................................................... 14
THE VARIABLE ASSESSMENT OF DIFFERENT FORMS OF CONCENTRATION .................. 16
SOCIAL POSITION OF MINORITY GROUPS ........................................................................ 17
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 18
MAIN FEATURES AND EVALUATION OF GOVERNMENT POLICY .................. 19
BROAD DISAPPROVAL OF CONCENTRATION AND GROUP FORMATION ......................... 19
‘NO, UNLESS’ POLICY ....................................................................................................... 20
EXISTING AND NEW POLICY IN THREE AREAS ................................................................ 21
LIMITED EFFECTIVENESS ................................................................................................. 25
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 26
FROM THE BALANCED COMMUNITY TO A CULTURE OF DIFFERENCE...... 28
THE OLD IDEAL: THE BALANCED COMMUNITY .............................................................. 28
THE RECOMMENDATION: A CULTURE OF DIFFERENCE ................................................. 34
THE TASK: UNITY, DIVERSITY AND TIES ............................................................... 36
UNITY ................................................................................................................................ 37
DIVERSITY ......................................................................................................................... 40
TIES ................................................................................................................................... 44
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 47
Appendix 1: Request for opinion
Appendix 2: Desegregation policies in the Netherlands. Opportunities and restraints on national and local
levels.
Drs C. Smissaert, Drs. T. Schillemans, Drs. S.M. Verhagen and Dr M.R.J.R.S. van San
Appendix 3: Beyond avoidance. Eight assertions on segregation and integration.
Prof. P.J. Scheffer
5
Appendix 4: The road to social inclusion. On segregation, desegregation and social capital.
Drs J.L. Uitermark and Prof. W.G.J. Duyvendak
Appendix 5: Experts consulted
List of recommendations
6
1
SUMMARY
The growth of the numbers of ethnically segregation schools, concentration
neighbourhoods and ethnic organizations has given rise to social unrest in recent years.
The RMO shares the fears of many that the increasing segregation of minority groups in
schools, neighbourhoods and social life is to the detriment of the cohesion of society as
a whole. However, the RMO concludes that a direct approach to concentrations is
possible and effective only to a limited extent. This finding raises the question of how
the government might organize social cohesion in a society where there are
concentration trends along ethnic lines.
There are two opposite positions in the thinking on integration. In the past, government
policy was strongly imbued with what we call a laissez faire multiculturalism. The
policy was based on the apparently false assumption that fostering cultural diversity
would automatically lead to integration and emancipation. After the attacks of 11
September and nourished by internal tensions, an opposite position is emerging. Social
differences are becoming a source of increasing concern and it now sometimes seems
that the government should and must eliminate them. This position has too little regard
for the inevitability of differences and too little appreciation for the actual positive value
of most differences.
Neither position helps the government deal with concentration trends. A new model is
therefore needed, which combines attention for social cohesion with room for
differences. The elements unity, diversity and ties are the pillars of this model. The
government should arrange for an inviolable framework, which both bounds and creates
space for differences. The government then invests in links between population groups.
Analysis
The Council observes that concentration is a robust trend in various domains.
Politicians, policymakers and the public are often averse to segregation in schools,
neighbourhoods and ethnic organizations. Public authorities therefore attempt to oppose
the concentration of minority groups by deconcentrating the various population groups
over neighbourhoods, schools and organizations. Because a direct deconcentration
policy would run up against legal, constitutional and practical objections, most public
authorities conduct an indirect policy. They take measures to entice or coerce the public
into mixed housing, work, schools or recreation. Drastic restructuring in spatial
planning is serving to rebalance the one-sided housing stock in urban neighbourhoods.
Mixing is encouraged in education policy by such measures as providing information to
parents and agreements between school boards. Finally, the main thrust in influencing
the spread of ethnic organizations is through subsidy policy.
In the RMO's opinion, the deconcentration policy is having only a slight effect and at
best will be only partially effective in the future. There are strict legal limits to the scope
of deconcentration policy. There are political immovables, immutable political
compromises, which impede deconcentration policies. Some examples are Article 23 of
7
the Constitution for education2 and the autonomization of housing associations.
Furthermore, the deconcentration policy in the major cities is now outdated because of
demographic developments. In the major Dutch cities 60% of the pupils in primary
schools belong to ‘minority groups’.
The opportunities for a deconcentration policy are therefore limited, but that makes the
problems no less real. Research has revealed that segregated education and residential
patterns increase the socio-cultural distance between minority groups and the
surrounding society. Furthermore, large learning disadvantages exist in concentration
schools and there is an element of degradation and poor social cohesion in concentration
neighbourhoods. Finally, there are groups and organizations of minorities that have
turned their backs on society, or even organize terrorist opposition.
A new model
Because concentration is therefore a real problem, but concentration itself offers too few
handles for policy, the RMO argues for a new model. The basis is unity, which creates
space for diversity under the condition that ties are made. The primary issue is to create
social cement and to promote the socio-cultural integration of minority groups –
regardless of whether the minority groups concerned now live in concentration
neighbourhoods. Additional details are presented below on each of these three elements.
Unity
In a society that exhibits concentration trends, it is necessary to provide a firm
foundation for community in the form of a set of clearly defined boundaries. These
boundaries are inviolable. The framework relies on the Constitution, other legislation
and the Dutch language. In addition, the standards of democracy, such as equality of
citizens under the law, freedom of religion, freedom of speech and the principle of
nondiscrimination. The basic democratic values also offer the public rules for dealing
with differences. The RMO advises the government as follows in this connection.
•
•
•
2
Basic democratic values
o Strengthen the communication of basic democratic values and conduct in
education, religion and community work.
Dutch language
o Invest in the command of the Dutch language.
o Improve the quality of early and preschool education and make it more
accessible.
Communal stories
o Reassess communal stories or histories and include all the population in
this process.
Article 23 of the Constitution guarantees the freedom of education, with respect for religious
convictions and other principles. In the Netherlands both private and public schools are funded
by central government, both types of schools operate within the framework of national policies
and the quality of education of both public and private schools is inspected by the national
School Inspection Service. People are free to choose the public or private school they think is
best for their children.
8
Diversity
If the government provides a communal and inviolable framework, space will be
created within it for differences between people and groups. This space is compatible
with the instinct of individuals and public institutions to distinguish themselves. The
government invests in the quality and livability of schools and neighbourhoods, while
retaining the diversity and forms of individuality that are present in each of these
domains. The specific recommendations are:
•
•
•
•
Individuality of the neighbourhood in the heterogeneous district
o Aim in spatial policy for more individuality of neighbourhoods in the
heterogeneous district.
o Encourage home ownership, while protecting private sector tenants.
o Let residents influence changes in their neighbourhood.
o Increase the choice on the housing market for all income categories.
Quality at school and in the neighbourhood
o Promote the quality and the livability of deprived areas and
concentration schools.
o Mobilize public initiatives to this end.
Transparency of social organizations
o Ensure that ‘migrant organizations’ are transparent and approachable.
Dutch Islam
o Set up Dutch imam training.
o Encourage precedence for Dutch-trained imams in the mosque. The
Dutch language should also be used in the mosque.
Ties
Finally, it is necessary to forge bonds between groups and individuals. The government
can increase the probability of population groups coming into contact with each other.
The firm recommendations are:
•
•
•
Contact and interaction
o Aim, where separate contexts exist, to encourage links on various scales.
This aim can be achieved by organizing joint projects and activities in
various fields, as well as by building up interchange and friendly
relationships between schools and organizations.
o It is in concentration neighbourhoods and concentration schools that
communal sport and recreational facilities are most needed.
Bridging leadership
o Because leadership figures can have a significant influence on whether or
not ethnic minorities focus on the surrounding society, it is important to
encourage ‘bridging leadership’ in all groups. This encouragement could
be moral (expressing appreciation), but could equally be financial (by
providing support), or organizational (by working together with 'bridging
leaders').
Improving the socio-economic position
o From the viewpoint of social cohesion, reducing the disadvantages
encountered by minority groups is urgent. Therefore, improve the labour
9
market position of minority groups and set ambitious targets, in
particular for the more highly-trained members of minority groups.
o Reintroduce effective policy from the past, possibly in a new guise. The
SME covenant and the incentive projects for migrant groups (SPAG) are
among the examples. Also encourage entrepreneurship among minority
groups.
2
INTRODUCTION
2.1
Request for opinion and central question
The increasing segregation of ethnic minorities in Dutch society in recent years has
given rise to a degree of public unrest. Public authorities, political parties,
policymakers, opinion leaders and academics have expressed unease about the rise and
development of segregation in schools, concentration neighbourhoods and inward
looking organizations of minority groups (i.e. interest groups). Anyone leafing through
the political and public responses to the Blok committee's final report will notice a
considerable consensus on this point: ‘living in isolation’ and ‘segregated schooling’ are
undesirable phenomena, according to many. More in general, there is a fear that these
phenomena create social tensions and that they will accentuate existing polarizations.
The recent murder of Theo van Gogh is a stark illustration of how real and justified this
fear can be.
Ethnic minority groups with an unbalanced composition in schools,
neighbourhoods and organizations hamper the socio-economic and socio-cultural
integration of minority groups, at any rate according to the much heard and widelysupported wisdom. The concentration of ethnic minorities is said to have a negative
influence on matters such as command of the language and opportunities in education
and on the labour market. Concentration is moreover said to impede a familiarization
with the attitudes, norms and values of Dutch society. In addition, concentration is said
to have a negative effect on the perception of minority groups and Dutch nationals of
each other. In other words, concentration is said to have various unfavourable impacts
on the integration of ethnic minorities. This is why the government requested the
Netherlands Council for Social Development (RMO) for its opinion on the relationship
between concentration and the process of integration.
The government's Outline Agreement states that the emergence of concentration
neighbourhoods is thought to be a direct consequence of poor integration. In accordance
with the provisional integration ladder, which the Research and Documentation Centre
(WODC) is developing for the Ministry of Justice, living in a concentration
neighbourhood is risky by definition, from the viewpoint of integration (Van Rijn et al.
2004). However, the RMO wishes to emphasize that a certain degree of concentration is
a fact in current Dutch society, and is moreover inevitable in the near future. This is the
result of the demographic fact that ethnic minorities form a sizeable population group.
For instance, of the 60,000 primary school pupils in Rotterdam, 60% are from minority
groups. In Amsterdam, The Hague and Utrecht too, more than half of these
schoolchildren have a non-Western, ethnic minority background. Concentrations of
like-minded people are furthermore largely ‘normal’. People like to live, relax and meet
10
in the company of like-minded people, with similar attitudes, lifestyles, backgrounds, or
socio-economic circumstances. For instance, there are also organizations for highly
educated and unskilled people, for men and women, for people from Limburg in
Amsterdam, Norwegians in Brabant and Turkish women in Europe. Concentration may
sometimes be seen as undesirable, but it exists in all countries and among diverse
groups.
The RMO has opted to approach the issue of concentration and integration from
the broad perspective of social cohesion. The Council considers that measures are
needed for encouraging the dynamism of social cohesion and for undermining social
isolation. These measures have repercussions on micro, meso and macro levels, with a
constructive role for both minority groups and Dutch nationals. Although the
government cannot control the behaviour of minority groups and Dutch nationals, it can
develop policies for creating significant links and forms of community between these
population groups. This will promote the social cohesion between groups of citizens.
The central question behind these recommendations is therefore:
How can the government promote social cohesion in a society in which
concentration trends are developing along ethnic lines?
The Council emphatically distinguishes in these recommendations individuals and
groups that demonstrate a willingness to contribute to social integration and those who
strive to undermine this willingness by opposing Dutch or Western society. The national
government, the police, the judicial authorities and the General Intelligence and
Security Service (AIVD) must forcefully oppose every form of antidemocratic and
integration-impeding conduct. Only in this way can they guarantee the safety of the
population, including that of opinion leaders and politicians. The violent and illegal
objectives of the likes of religious fundamentalists, left-wing radicals and right-wing
extremists demand a repressive and preventive approach. The RMO considers an
approach of this kind to be urgent, but does not address terrorism in these
recommendations.
2.2
Guide to the reader
Chapter 2 gives the definitions of the most important terms in this report. A number of
facts and figures are also mentioned to demonstrate that concentration is on the increase
in neighbourhoods, schools and social organizations. Chapter 3 addresses current
government policy, which is predominantly oriented to the (often indirect) mixing of
groups in residential neighbourhoods, schools and organizations. Chapter 3 also
addresses the effectiveness of this policy. Chapter 4 provides more details of the vision
of society that underlies the deconcentration policy. We will demonstrate that this vision
is based on assumptions that are only partly sustainable. We therefore put forward the
RMO's alternative perspective. Chapter 5 presents the three elementary policies
identified by the RMO, which policymakers may elaborate and apply in specific
situations. The lines of policy are oriented to creating a framework of community, with
room for individuality and variety on the one hand and links between the different
population groups on the other. The final point is about creating social cement and
promoting the socio-cultural integration of minority groups – whether or not they now
live in concentration neighbourhoods.
11
3
DEFINITIONS AND FACTS
This chapter starts by defining the most important terms used in this report, before
providing a statistical summary the degree of concentration in neighbourhoods, schools
and organizations. We continue by explaining the differences that exist in how the
various forms of concentration are assessed. We finally provide a brief impression of
the current social position of minority groups.
3.1 Terms
Clear communication on integration and social cohesion is helped by a concise
definition of the most important terms connected with the subject. Definitions of the
terms ‘minority groups’, ‘integration’ and ‘concentration’ are therefore given below.
3.1.1 Minority groups
This document refers wherever possible to ‘minority groups’, for want of a better term.
It is taken to include socially disadvantaged ethnic minority groups that have become
the target group of minorities policy. The term ‘member of an ethnic minority’, which
was introduced by the Advisory Council on Government Policy (WRR,1989), is valid
fairly broadly, but has negative connotations. Terms such as ‘newly arrived
immigrants’, ‘settled immigrants’ and ‘migrant’ also have drawbacks. Although the
same applies to some extent to the term ‘minority groups’, it is, as stated, the one used
in the policy. The minority groups we focus on already live here and, on average, have
relatively meagre social opportunities as a result of a low educational level and a low
position on the labour market. We are therefore considering some of the people that
Statistics Netherlands (CBS) refers to as ‘members of non-Western ethnic minorities’.i
We focus in these recommendations on the integration of minority groups that
are already in the Netherlands. We do not discuss the issue of immigration policy,
which the Council dealt with in its recommendations on integration (RMO 2003). The
assertion in those recommendations is that immigration policy has been dominated for
too long by the perspective of immigration as an undesirable phenomenon. It is
necessary instead to conduct a policy based on desired immigration, beneficial to
society and potential and existing citizens. We do not discuss this subject further.
It must be observed that the emphasis in this report is on disadvantages and
disturbing developments. We therefore disregard all the indisputably positive
developments that can also be observed in society. We subscribe to the Blok
committee's conclusion that the integration of most members of minority groups has
been successful, at least in part3. However, the remainder of the document concentrates
on the problems and disadvantages that undeniably still exist. We are aware that social
reality has more shades of grey than may be apparent in these recommendations.
We also pay scant attention in these recommendations to the differences between
groups, although the differences between minority groups from different countries are
often considerable. Even within one group, for example the Surinamese, there are
important differences in matters such as labour market participation, command of the
language and educational level.
3
The Blok-Committee is the Dutch Temporary Investigation Committee on Integration Policy, chaired by
Member of Parliament Stef Blok
12
3.1.2 Integration
The literature distinguishes two dimensions of integration: socio-economic and sociocultural (Dagevos 2001; Engbersen and Gabriëls 1995).
Socio-economic integration means integration in the labour market, as
manifested by a paid job and, as a precondition, educational qualifications. Socioeconomic integration is concerned with the social position of minority groups and can
be assessed through income position, participation in the labour process, educational
level and employment level and the differences in this regard between ethnic minorities
and Dutch nationals.
Socio-cultural integration relates on the one hand to the extent to which a group
distinguishes itself in customs, standards, values and language from the surrounding
society. The informal pattern of contacts with the Dutch national population or within
their own group also plays a role. On the other hand, it is about identification with their
own group. The socio-cultural integration of ethnic minorities can be assessed through
their command of the Dutch language and their observance of the values and standards
that are central to the ‘modernization process’ of Western societies, such as on the
division of roles between man and woman, individualization, secularization and
sexuality.
It is moreover often emphasized in the political and academic debate that there
are two sides to the integration process between the newly arrived immigrant and the
host society (Blok committee 2004; Appendix 3). That there are two sides to the process
does not mean that both parties make identical or equally great efforts. It may be
expected of minority groups that they aim to succeed here and that they abide by central
legal standards and other norms. Minority groups are entitled to expect that the society
will be open to them. The newly arrived immigrant and the host society therefore have
different responsibilities in the integration process.
3.1.3 Concentration
The request for opinion uses the terms heterogeneity and homogeneity, which are
complex concepts: many of the associations they call up are certainly unintended. We
therefore replace this pair of terms below by ‘concentration’, the advantage of which is
that it lends itself to use in a progressive sense. In other words, there are degrees of
concentration. A characteristic of a concentrated social context is that most of the
people often to be found in it share a strong common feature. Ethnic criteria frequently
come to mind, but that is not necessarily the case. The distinction can also be based on
religion, sex, age, socio-economic status, and so on. However, in these
recommendations, ‘concentration’ always refers to ethnic concentration in one of the
three social domains that we address here. Firstly, there may be an element of spatial
concentration, or segregation in housing. To what extent do ‘the same kind of people’
live together? Secondly, there may be an element of educational concentration. Do ‘the
same kind of children’ go to the same school? Thirdly, we address social concentration,
which is concerned with people's friendly relations and personal networks and the social
organizations in which they participate.
13
3.2
Facts and figures on concentration
Concentration is a robust trend in many domains, in particular in the four major cities.
Sometimes large proportions of ethnic minorities are appearing in schools,
neighbourhoods and organizations as a result of international migration flows, the pull
of the major cities, the spatial distribution of social housing, the specific settlement
history of specific minority groups, the white flight to the neighbouring municipalities
and the socio-psychological need to form groups and for security. An illustration of the
sometimes fast pace of concentration developments is the municipality of Rotterdam's
attempts to implement an active deconcentration policy (Bolt 2004: 61-2), which first
happened in 1972. The target for minority group numbers in a neighbourhood was then
just 5%. There was a second attempt seven years later, when the ‘critical standard’ was
already 16%. However, the plan known as ‘Rotterdam zet door’ (Rotterdam presses on)
published in 2004 called for deconcentration to the neighbouring municipalities: the
proportion of minority groups in Rotterdam itself was then so high that deconcentration
within the city was hardly feasible. We present below the most important figures on
concentration with respect to the domains of neighbourhoods, schools and
organizations. For a more comprehensive examination, we refer to Appendix 2.
3.2.1 Neighbourhoods
International migration flows have increased the number of non-Western minority
groups in Dutch society in the past decade (SCP 2003). Despite the drastic decline in
asylum migration in recent years, this number will continue to rise in the future. For
instance, 8.3% of the population was of non-Western origin in 1990, whereas the
proportion is currently 10.0%. This percentage is expected to have risen by 2020 to
14.1%. Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese and Antilleans form the four largest groups
involved. With over a million people, they jointly constitute two thirds of the group of
non-Western minority groups.
However, the spatial spread of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands is extremely
irregular (CBS 2004). The Hague, Amsterdam and Rotterdam are confronted with the
greatest numbers of non-Western minority groups, ranging from 30 to 34% of the total
urban population. More than half the population in these cities up to the age of fourteen
years has a non-Western, ethnic minority background. Other cities with a relatively
large number of minority groups are: Schiedam (22%), Almere (22%), Diemen (21%),
Utrecht (20%) and Lelystad (17%). To a certain extent, the size of the cities determines
the degree of concentration. The larger the city, the stronger the concentration, in
general. However, concentration trends manifest themselves mainly inside the cities.
For instance, in the four major cities, there are 32 neighbourhoods or postcode areas
with more than 50% non-Western minority groups (SCP 2003).
3.2.2 Schools
The term ‘concentration school’, in Dutch also often referred to as ‘black school’, is
defined as a school with at least 50% pupils from minority groups. The proportion of
concentration schools in primary education has risen in the course of time. Whereas the
proportion in 1985 was only 3.8%, it is now over 7%. Therefore, in one in fourteen
Dutch primary schools, half or more of the pupils are from ethnic minority
disadvantaged groups (RIEM 2003; Driessen and Vergeer 2001). However, the
concentration process is most advanced in the four major cities, although the other cities
are also increasingly confronted with high concentrations of minority schoolchildren.
14
47% of schools in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht have more than 50%
ethnic minority disadvantaged pupils (SCP 2003). In Amsterdam, for example, 127 of
the 201 primary schools are concentration schools. Half of these schools teach
concentrations of over 70% minority groups. As a rule: the more urban the municipality,
the greater the probability that there will be primary schools with a large number of
pupils from minority groups (Driessen and Vergeer 2001).
Concentration and segregation have different meanings. Research in recent years
has revealed that ethnic, spatial segregation in the Netherlands has not increased
significantly (see Appendices 3 and 4). However, the spatial concentration of minority
groups is on the increase. The source of the difference is that in calculating the spatial
segregation, the number from minority groups in the neighbourhood is set off against
the number from minority groups in the entire city. When the proportion of minority
groups doubles in a given period and the newly arrived immigrants distribute over the
city in the same proportions as the settled migrants, the urban segregation is unchanged,
because the ratio between the neighbourhood and the city is the same. However, the
total number from minority groups in the city has doubled, the minority groups are
therefore more tightly packed, and the concentration figure increases.
Finally, in secondary education, vocational education and higher education,
concentration has repercussions for the division into different school types (SCP 2003).
Pupils from minority groups are more likely to attend pre-vocational education or
practical training, or receive learning support, than Dutch national pupils. This is not to
say that the occasional black school does not also occur within the various types of
school. As a consequence of the spatial concentration and white flight, the schools in
the major cities accommodate more minority groups than those in the smaller
municipalities.
3.2.3 Organizations
In the course of time, ethnic minority groups in the Netherlands have set up all manner
of interest groups and other organizations. Among the examples are ethnic sport clubs,
cultural societies, dance clubs, veterans' associations, religious foundations, specialinterest groups and numerous other organizations in a wide variety of fields. In absolute
terms, the numbers are considerable. Furthermore, these numbers have increased since
the 1990s. An ongoing investigation by the Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies
(IMES) shows that the Netherlands currently has 244 Chinese, 399 Moluccan, 720
Moroccan, 881 Surinamese and 1,125 Turkish interest groups (Rijkschroeff and
Duyvendak 2004). Most of them are oriented to religious and socio-cultural activities.
The extent to which this happens differs from one ethnic group to another (Penninx and
Schrover 2001). Political and socio-economic objectives are far less common for all
groups. The case studies conducted by Van Heelsum, which the Blok committee (2004)
summarized, show that the organization forming process of the Turkish and Moroccan
communities in Amsterdam has taken off since the 1990s. The number of organizations
in these two communities has risen in ten years by 245% and 179%, respectively.
Conversely, the organization forming conduct of the Surinamese, which occurred
mainly before 1990, declined by 19% (Tillie and Fennema 1997; Alink et al. 1998;
Berger et al. 1998).
Table 1: The ethnic degree of organization of five minority groups
15
Population in the
Number of
Netherlands
organizations
Surinamese
308,625
881
Turks
319,600
1,125
Moroccans
272,000
720
Moluccans
40,000
399
Chinese
62,400
244
Source: Van Heelsum. In: Rijkschroeff and Duyvendak (2004)
Org/res * 1000
2.9
3.5
2.7
9.9
3.9
The way in which minority groups organize depends not only on their own cultural
orientation and identification, but also on the opportunities and obstacles that Dutch
society presents to them (Penninx and Slijper 1999). Furthermore, it changes according
to the integration and settlement phase in which these minority groups find themselves.
The first generation of migrant workers was relatively strongly oriented to their country
of origin, which led to the foundation of religious, cultural and political organizations,
strongly resembling counterparts in Morocco or Turkey, for example. When the families
were reunited and the second generation came of age, the spectrum of organizations
became more diverse. There was also a tendency for a greater social orientation on
Dutch society. For example, alongside religious and political organizations,
recreational, educational and artistic organizations were created. Within these
organizations the young people born in the Netherlands in particular have a need for a
combination of a specific ethnic and a general Dutch approach (Penninx and Slijper
1999).
3.3 The variable assessment of different forms of concentration
Black neighbourhoods and black schools are often raised for discussion in the political
debate. What is striking here is that there is no element of ‘true’ ethnic concentration.
The ethnic origin of the pupils of a black school or the residents of a concentration
neighbourhood are usually extraordinarily varied. The main determinant of public
opinion would appear to be the combination of social disadvantage and non-Western
minority groups. Indeed communal issues among Antilleans, Surinamese, Turks and
Moroccans, other than their ‘communal’ contrast with the native Dutch mean, are few
and far between. Therefore, where black schools are concerned, we are not talking about
ethnically segregated contexts. The ethnic origin of the children at most of these schools
is actually extremely diverse.
What is striking in the discussions on mixing and deconcentration is the
‘inconsistent’ assessment of concentration. Income imbalance would appear to be a
problem only if it concerns neighbourhoods with a concentration of disadvantaged
residents. When talking about expensive neighbourhoods inhabited only by wealthy
residents, the disapproval appears to be far more muted, although, there too, the
neighbourhoods are unmixed. Also with respect to ethnic imbalance, concentration
seems to be a problem only if disadvantaged minority groups are overrepresented.
Districts or neighbourhoods where mainly more prosperous immigrants live, for
example Jewish neighbourhoods, ‘Chinatowns’ and ‘Little Italies’ in the major cities
everywhere in the world, are defined less as a problem (Kleinhans et al. 2000). The
same can be said of schools and societies. When only white children from middle-class
families attend a school or organization, there would appear to be little reason for
concern. However, if a school or association is attended mainly by the children of
16
disadvantaged families from minority groups, the situation is generally seen as
‘problematic’.
3.4 Social position of minority groups
The social situation of minority groups is characterized by disadvantages. These
disadvantages are generally serious and long term. In its response to the Blok committee
report, the government gives a terse summary of the current situation (Parliament 28
689, no. 17).
-
-
Around the new millennium, it was established that some 500,000 members of
ethnic minorities of the first generation have an inadequate command of the
Dutch language to succeed in the various social markets.
It was recently calculated that more than 180,000 women of Turkish, Moroccan,
Surinamese and Antillean origin are in a disadvantaged position in social terms.
When they finish primary education, Turkish and Moroccan pupils born in the
Netherlands still lag behind in language proficiency by approximately two
school years.
More than two thirds of Turks and Moroccans do not achieve the basic
qualification in terms of education.
Young people from minority groups are far better trained than their older
counterparts, but, among them too, the proportion without a basic qualification
is approximately 20 percentage points higher than among young Dutch
nationals.
The net labour market participation of minority groups is 15 percentage points
lower than the total participation level (65%). The participation of 15 - 24-yearold members of minority groups is 36 percentage points lower than the total.
The proportion of welfare recipients under minority groups is twice as large as
among the Dutch native population.
The majority of second generation Turks and Moroccans choose a partner from
the country of origin.
The prospects of marriages between Turks and Moroccans and Dutch nationals
are not particularly auspicious, with the majority ending in divorce.
There is also evidence of limited social integration in data on social contacts.
Turks and Moroccans have contacts predominantly with people from their own
group.
Young people from ethnic minorities are overrepresented among crime suspects
(these young people are represented 1.5 to 6 times more often in the crime
figures than young Dutch nationals).
The great majority of the minority groups live in concentration neighbourhoods,
and duly have relatively few social contacts with Dutch nationals. The living
conditions in the neighbourhoods concerned are on average relatively
unfavourable.
The overview shows that the social disadvantages of minority groups manifest
themselves in different dimensions at the same time and over a wide area. The problems
are also stubborn.
17
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we presented the background to these recommendations. We first defined
the most important terms used in this report: ‘minority groups’, ‘integration’ and
‘concentration’. We then showed that concentration is a robust trend in the domains of
neighbourhoods, schools and organizations. We also remarked on an ‘inconsistent’
assessment of concentration in the discussions on the subject. Finally, we provided a
concise summary of the social disadvantages of minority groups.
18
4
MAIN FEATURES AND EVALUATION OF GOVERNMENT
POLICY
This chapter addresses current government policy (deconcentration policy), which
focuses mainly on the common, often indirect, mixing of groups in residential districts,
schools and organizations. We also evaluate the effectiveness of this policy.
4.1 Broad disapproval of concentration and group formation
Concentration is seldom assessed positively. The media amplify the associated
problems. Subjects related with Islam and black schools in particular are currently
regularly recurring items. There is also agreement among Dutch political parties and the
government that the concentration of minority groups in neighbourhoods, schools and
organizations is an undesirable development. In response to the final report of the Blok
committee, most Dutch political parties published new integration memoranda.ii The
main discovery of anyone reading through these memoranda would be that politicians
are united against concentration. Politicians are making an implicit and partly correct
assumption: ethnic minority groups with an excessively unbalanced constitution in
schools, neighbourhoods and organizations hinder the integration of the minority groups
concerned.
Three levels recur constantly in the political discussion on concentration:
neighbourhoods, schools and organizations. With respect to issue of concentration
neighbourhoods, some political parties already consider it to be unfavourable for people
with the same ethnic background to live together (liberals), while others think that the
problem starts only when this is accompanied by socio-economic disadvantage
(Greens). All parties put forward a wide spectrum of measures to oppose spatial
concentration. Some argue for deconcentrating disadvantaged people (liberals), others
for deconcentrating minority groups (LPF, party of Pim Fortuyn), while yet others see
no point at all in deconcentration (Greens). Where almost all parties agree, is that the
Netherlands must rectify the imbalance in the housing stock (i.e. the relatively large
quantity of social rented housing in a limited number of neighbourhoods) in various
cities, because one of the causes of concentration neighbourhoods is imbalance in the
housing stock.
In education too, the political parties are putting forward a predominantly
consistent message, with all parties arguing for mixed schools. The arguments stress
that an accumulation of disadvantaged children leads to educational disadvantage. The
perceived problem is therefore not so much the ethnic background of the children.
Consistent with the above, the parties consider that the lack of command of the
language of children from minority groups is the cause of the poor school performance.
As ways of opposing black and white schools, they mention a duty to accept for white
schools, and a freeze on accepting disadvantaged pupils from minority groups for black
schools.
Finally, the parties do not specifically address mixed and segregated social
organizations in their recent integration memoranda. Only the democrats (D66) says that
it sees mixed sport clubs as an important means of integration. Furthermore, this party
considers that organizations only have a right to a grant if they are able to show that
they contribute substantially to the integration of their members.
19
In summary: the national political consensus against concentration is
conspicuous. This consensus is based on the premise that minority groups integrate
more poorly if their housing is segregated, they are taught ‘separately’ and participate in
isolation in ethnic interest groups. These practices are considered to lead to forms of
isolation. Isolation is held to have a negative impact on the contacts that minority
groups maintain with the host society. Isolation is also held to interfere with the
command of the Dutch language. Because this perspective is unattractive from the
viewpoint of encouraging the integration of minority groups, we deal below with the
limited opportunities available to the government for influencing the degree of
concentration or isolation in neighbourhoods, schools and organizations.
4.2 ‘No, unless’ policy
The question of which opportunities are available to the government for deconcentrating
people on grounds of ethnicity, is easily answered in the first instance. When the
question was asked by LPF member of parliament Nawijn, the Minister for Alien affairs
and Integration, Verdonk, answered that Article 1 of the Constitution and Article 1 of
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
permit no distinction on grounds of race, skin colour, or national or ethnic origin when
the government allows them their right to housing. She also quoted Directive
2000/43/EC, which forbids discrimination on racial or ethnic origin grounds in the
access to and supply of goods and services that are publicly available. On top of this is
the Equal Treatment Act (AWGB), which stipulates that where race, ethnic origin or
nationality are concerned, there may be no direct distinguishing criterion when goods or
services are provided and contracts concluded, executed or terminated. In other words,
the government cannot legitimately distinguish between people on ethnic grounds.
Nevertheless, the government may take a number of indirect measures that
might deconcentrate the ethnic minorities more. These measures would have to be taken
under a condition: measures that affect mainly people of a certain race or ethnicity, for
example in the form of a language requirement, are permissible only if there is an
objective justification. All government measures that make a possible indirect ethnic
distinction must be subject to this condition. Two requirements are significant for
justification:
1. The purpose of making the distinction is sufficiently important and
nondiscriminatory.
2. The means are proportionate and more appropriate than other means of achieving
the objective.
It is therefore impossible to make a direct distinction on ethnic grounds. In a general
sense, a ‘no, unless’ principle applies to deconcentration: the government is unable and
unwilling to deconcentrate people directly among schools, neighbourhoods and
organizations, but sets out to influence the constraints in the hope of increasing the mix
of social contexts. The question then arises of how the government has translated these
measures into the various policy areas. We answer this question below.
20
4.3
Existing and new policy in three areas
4.3.1 Housing
The way to counter spatial concentration is through housing policy. There has been
agreement for at least fifteen years on the intention to increase the mix of population
groups through indirect spatial policy. Uitermark and Duyvendak state: “Building
owner-occupied housing in deprived areas and social housing in suburbs and expansion
areas must create more mixed neighbourhoods and cities. This policy of mixed building
has been conducted since 1990 and has been intensified over the years. An ambitious
urban renewal was proposed in 1997 with the restructuring policy: in the
neighbourhoods selected by the policy, the percentage of social rented housing must be
reduced from 65 to 42 while the percentage of owner-occupied housing must rise from
18 to 45 (Appendix 4).
Restructuring the deprived areas in the major cities involves major investments.
The current government has reserved approximately 1.4 billion euros for this objective
for the 2005 - 2009 period in the Urban Renewal Investment Budget (ISV). The major
cities themselves and the housing associations are also investing in the renewal of the
neighbourhoods.
In simple terms, restructuring involves demolishing smaller and ‘poorer’
housing and replacing it with larger and more up-market housing. This can serve two
purposes (Van der Laan Bouma-Doff 2005). Firstly it may entice the Dutch national
middle class to buy housing in a neighbourhood with a damaged image, thereby
stemming the white flight. Secondly, it is a way of keeping the emerging middle class of
the minority group in the neighbourhood by allowing them to progress through a
‘housing career’ in their own neighbourhood. The intention in both cases is to have
more middle class residents in the neighbourhood.
In its advice on integration policy, the Blok committee remarked on the
opportunities for opposing concentration on the housing market. The committee largely
adhered to the consensus that has existed in recent decades. The committee reaffirmed
that it would be a good thing for neighbourhoods to gain a more varied housing supply.
Socio-economically weak neighbourhoods should also be better maintained, and
nuisance and crime related issues dealt with more effectively.
The Blok committee's major innovation is that bordering municipalities and the
region should also facilitate people with a low income in finding housing. It is currently
still the case that the four major cities in particular have an extremely large proportion
of low-skilled, low-income minority groups. In the committee's opinion, the bordering
municipalities should play a more prominent role in housing minority groups. This aim
could be achieved by ‘opening up’ the housing market in bordering municipalities. They
should build more affordable rented and owner-occupied housing. They should also
build more differentiated housing in VINEX locations (i.e. housing developments
designated in the Fourth Policy Document on Physical Planning-Plus).
The municipality of Rotterdam subsequently set to work on the theme of
deconcentrating minority groups over the bordering municipalities. In the ‘Rotterdam
presses on’ memorandum, the city requested the legal freedom to manoeuvre to conduct
a direct deconcentration policy for minority groups towards the bordering municipalities
and elsewhere. Rotterdam wants to prevent semi-skilled, unskilled, low-income and
non-earning members of minority groups settling in the city. The municipality also
wants more opportunities to play an active role in allocating people to areas around the
21
city and moreover wants the bordering municipalities to absorb more minority groups
(Rotterdam 2004).
The government responded to the Rotterdam document in a letter to the
municipal executive (BZK 2004). The government makes some promises in this letter,
the most important of which was the announced Collective and Exceptional Act. The
minister promised to send the legislative proposal to Parliament in 2004, but this proved
infeasible. The new law was to enable two things that are still unlawful under the
existing Housing Allocation Act (Hw). Firstly it was to enable regulating the admission
of disadvantaged home seekers from outside the region into the urban housing market to
a greater extent. The regulation could take the form of income requirements on a home
seeker wishing to settle. The possibility is also being investigated of applying the same
forms of positive selection in the private sector as in the social sector.
Regarding the regional deconcentration of minority groups, the national
government has indicated its sympathy for Rotterdam's initiative, but sees no point, at
any rate at present, in measures for compelling bordering municipalities to open up their
housing market. The ball in the first instance is in the municipalities' court. It should be
possible to achieve a degree of cooperation between the city and the surrounding area.
Only when this cooperation really fails to materialize should the national government
consider intervening in regional restructuring.
Finally, the government points out that the current Housing Allocation Act
already provides some opportunity for municipalities to apply differentiation in their
housing allocation policy. For entire complexes, housing associations and other owners
have some freedom in setting requirements on the residents and making distinctions
according to lifestyles. This would also already appear to be customary in some places.
For instance, various sources point out that, in the housing allocation system, housing
associations actually conduct a veiled deconcentration policy (Veldboer and Duyvendak
2004: 40-1). According to Bolt, there is even an element of a ‘disguised deconcentration
policy’ on the part of the corporations. “Formally it is not so, but in fact all manner of
rules of thumb are applied with only one goal: to keep the proportion of minority groups
at a certain level” (Bolt 2004: 63). In an interview, the municipal executives of the four
major cities confirmed that this is indeed the case (Mijnheer 2004: 14-15). The Blok
committee also observes that legal obstacles notwithstanding, a de facto deconcentration
policy is being conducted (Blok committee 2004: 353, 362 and 370).
4.3.2 Education
Like the mainly indirect deconcentration element in spatial policy, the same is true in
education. There are legal provisions in education that severely limit the government's
influence. Two rights determine the limits of the deconcentration policy for
schoolchildren: parents' freedom to send their children to the school of their choice and
the freedom of education, which is set down in Article 23 of the Constitution. However,
this does not alter the fact that local authorities in particular do attempt to conduct
certain forms of deconcentration policy.
There are various strategies for avoiding concentration schools. Vermeulen in
2001 distinguished two general strategies, the compulsory deconcentration of pupils
over schools and a general policy for disadvantaged people (Vermeulen 2001; WRR
2001; Smink 2002). The first strategy, the deconcentration policy, can take two different
forms:
22
1) compelling pupils to deconcentrate over schools through agreements between
municipalities and school boards;
2) compelling schools to enforce the deconcentration of pupils on the basis of
ethnic criteria.
Both these forms involve the use of double waiting listsiii. The central question in
Vermeulen's investigation was whether a compulsory deconcentration policy was
legally acceptable. He came to the conclusion that it was not, among other things
because it would contravene the Primary Education Act (WPO) and the Equal
Treatment Act (AWGB). On an international level too, it would be in breach of the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and
of EC law. Most notably, the basic principle underlying the Dutch system, the parents'
freedom to send their children to the school of their choice, is incompatible with
compulsory deconcentration. This freedom is backed by constitutional guarantees of the
availability of diverse educationiv.
Smink also identifies a softer form of deconcentration policy, in which parents
are encouraged by means of advice and the provision of information. This form of
policy is oriented to giving parents information such that their choices of schools for
their children will result in less concentration. The expectation for policy of this kind is
that the ‘black children’ will more readily attend the ‘white’ school, while the ‘white
children’ will be less inclined to leave the ‘mixed school’. There are no legal objections
to this form of policy. However, the question remains as to whether this form of policy
is effective enough and not too permissive. The approach was tried in Gouda, where it
was unsuccessful. Amersfoort too has been conducting a deconcentration policy for
schools since 1999 (see Appendix 2), the objective of which is to bring the school norm
in line with the neighbourhood norm. In other words: the proportion from minority
groups in the school must correspond with the proportion from minority groups in the
neighbourhood. The policy has released much energy both in the schools and the
municipality, and in this sense is an administrative success. Relations between the
various public bodies involved in education have improved considerably. However, the
policy has had no noticeable effect on the populations of the schools involved. The fact
is that it has not led to more or less concentration (see Appendix 2).
This finding is consistent with the view of ITS researcher Jungbluth (2003), who
considers the above informational form of deconcentration policy to be
counterproductive. Jungbluth holds that informing the parents on the choice of school in
relation to the ethnic composition of the school will actually increase the concentration
in education. The underlying idea is that parents will then opt with a greater awareness
than otherwise for a school in keeping with their own preferences. Without this
awareness, children would actually be more likely to attend the neighbourhood school.
The policy of the national government to date has been reticent regarding concentration
schools. The government's opinion was that the next move was mainly up to the
municipalities and the schools themselves, although, on this point too, attitudes have
shifted in the past couple of years.
The Blok committee suggested that the government treat this subject with
greater urgency, saying that there were two ways open for achieving this aim. The most
important remark on this subject in the report was that “concentration in education
would be countered by increasing the available choice. Municipalities can make firm
agreements with schools to this end.” This somewhat unclear message invites the
23
municipalities and schools, while observing the freedom of education and the parents'
freedom to send their children to the school of their choice, to attempt to disperse the
minority pupils a little more over the schools. The ‘firm agreements’ would then be
accompanied by targets, which would reflect the percentages of minority groups and
Dutch national pupils as set down by the schools.
The second of the Blok committee's recommendations is more general. The
committee suggests building incentives into the funding system, the municipality's
educational accommodation policy and other supporting measures in order to encourage
integration. The government elaborates this topic in its response.
In her response to the report, the Minister of Education indicates that the
education system can help the minority groups to integrate better by encouraging
children with different backgrounds to grow up alongside each other. The minister
mentions three tools for achieving this aim. Firstly, the minister proposes adapting the
weighting rule. Schools currently receive higher funding for pupils who are classified as
disadvantaged on the basis of details of their background. However, future funding
should be based on the actual language and other disadvantage of individual pupils
(Ministry of Education, Culture and Science (OCW) 2004a)v.
Secondly, the minister proposed setting new requirements on founding a school.
A condition for founding a new school is that no more than 80% of the enrolled children
may have a characteristic of disadvantage. This measure would appear to be intended
mainly to hamper the foundation of Islamic schools. The minister's third proposal is to
bring about more explicit interactions between schools, including through joint sport
and cultural activities on a municipal level.
The above measures apply only to primary education. Given the fact that most of
the children of minority groups attend pre-vocational secondary education (VMBO) and
most Dutch national pupils do not, a substantial degree of concentration in secondary
education in the major cities is currently inevitable.
4.3.3 Organizations
Whereas the education and social housing themes still involve a clear public and
collectively financed task, participation in social organizations of a religious, social or
recreational nature is emphatically a private matter. People cannot choose whether to
attend school, but they can decide whether or not they want to play hockey. This fact
greatly restricts the government's legal opportunities for influencing this area.
This is not to say that the government cannot influence the formation of
organizations in an indirect way. The opportunities for public authorities to influence
the spread within social organizations, is to run mainly along the following three lines.
Firstly, the municipality can exert influence by setting conditions to awarding grants to
associations. Secondly, the municipality can directly support the cultural or sporting
activities of certain residents, financially or otherwise. Thirdly, the municipality plays
an important role in managing and allocating many cultural and sporting venues and
premises.
If we look at the total opportunities available to the government, we have to
observe that they are limited. Janssens and Van Bottenburg therefore summarize the
situation by saying that the ‘formal rules that guarantee individual freedoms also
impede an effective deconcentration policy in the sport sector too’ (Janssens and Van
Bottenburg 1999: 95). At the same time, international comparative research has shown
that the grounds on which members of the public join organizations definitely can in
24
part be influenced by government policy (Koopmans and Stratham 2003; Rijkschroeff
and Duyvendak 2004). The research shows that the organizational foundation for
interest groups has to be strongly ascribed to the policy and the political opportunity
structure that exists in a country. Examples of where this applies are in setting up
consultative bodies and recreational organizations. One aspect, in all European
countries, seems largely to escape policy influence: organization on the basis of
religion, in particular Islam.
4.4 Limited effectiveness
The above suggests that a policy against concentration must necessarily be conducted in
the margin. Because of practical obstacles, technical restrictions and legal constraints,
the effect of this policy is only limited. In general, deconcentration policy meets the
following obstacles.
4.4.1 Deconcentration policy runs up against the limits of legislation and regulation
The legal margins for a deconcentration policy are narrow. Firstly, Article 1 of the
Constitution and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination oppose a distinction on grounds of race, skin colour, or national or
ethnic origin in allowing a person the right to housing. Furthermore, Directive
2000/43/EC bans distinguishing between people on the basis of racial or ethnic origin in
the access to and availability of publicly available services and goods. The same applies
to the Equal Treatment Act. The concentration policy for schools must meet statutory
provisions concerned with parents' freedom to send their children to the school of their
choice and the freedom of education. Freedom of education is set down in Article 23 of
the Constitution. The concentration policy for interest groups and other organizations
also has a marginal influence. The activities within ethnic sport clubs, educational
organizations, cultural societies, ethnic women's groups, religious foundations etc., are
all essentially in the private domain, where it is hard for the government to enter. In
other words, various laws impede the opportunities of public authorities to conduct a
deconcentration policy.
4.4.2 Deconcentration policy runs up against political immovables
The opportunities for conducting a deconcentration policy are further restricted by what
we here refer to as political immovables, which are political attitudes and compromises
that have come into existence through a tortuous process, discussion of which is now as
good as closed. It goes without saying that the most important is Article 23 of the
Constitution, which guarantees the freedom of education. In other words: special and
public education are set equal. This right has (provisionally?) been used on a modest
scale in the founding of Islamic schools. By their nature, they will be black schools.
However, there are also specific school types in the school system (including Reformed
Church schools, free schools and Montessori schools) that are almost exclusively
attended by ‘white children’.
4.4.3 ‘Adjoining policy’ impedes deconcentration policy
It was stated above that for integration policy in general the effects of general policy on
the integration of minority groups is often greater than the effects of specific policy
(RMO 2000; Blok committee 2004). This is also true for deconcentration policy. For
example, the relative privatization of housing associations ensures that the municipal
25
influence in spatial planning is limited. In education, conversely, the relatively recent
merging of school types into the pre-vocational secondary (VMBO) school has led to
the creation of more large-scale concentration schools in the major cities.
4.4.4 Deconcentration policy is (sometimes) outdated
The large numbers of minority pupils in the major cities means that concentration there,
at any rate in education, is a fait accompli. Deconcentration in education in the major
cities is no longer much of a serious option. In spatial policy too, deconcentration within
the city has now become so difficult that Rotterdam, for example, is proposing regional
deconcentration.
4.4.5 The choices the public makes are thwarting deconcentration policy
The last, but not least important, obstacle to deconcentration policy is the public itself.
They often take independent decisions that thwart policymakers' intentions. For
example, the government did conduct an obligatory policy for new groups of migrants
who settled after decolonization. This happened for immigrants from both the former
Dutch Indies and Surinam (Veldboer and Duyvendak 2004; Trappenburg 2003). This
policy was successful in the short term for Surinamese and Antilleans in the 1970s. For
a short time, the many newly arrived immigrants from the former colony lived dispersed
around the country and in smaller municipalities. However, in the subsequent years,
they took advantage of the opportunities for freedom of establishment for residents and
moved: many departed to the big city to be closer to family and acquaintances. In this
way, an originally reasonably successful deconcentration policy failed to have the
desired effect as time passed. Also in the cases of ‘education’ and ‘sport’, parents
showed themselves willing to overcome considerable distances and obstacles to sidestep
attempts at deconcentration policy.
Incidentally, this phenomenon also occurs in other countries. The United States,
for example, has experience with obligatory deconcentration, in which children were
bussed to schools outside a segregated neighbourhood. This was an attempt to give
children growing up in a mono-ethnic environment an education in a context that
reflected the structure of society. However, experience with bussing in the United States
was not positive. Rutten (2004) points to the flight response, especially among white
middle class parents. Dagevos (2003) also states that, apart from the effect of Article 23,
a considerable number of drawbacks adhere to measures for deconcentrating
schoolchildren. For instance, they are often not entirely feasible in practice or are
extraordinarily expensive, as was the case with bussing. Furthermore, the measures tend
to stigmatize the category of schoolchildren being deconcentrated.
4.5 Conclusion
The government's deconcentration opportunities are restricted, and within these limits
they are only moderately effective. Most measures are oriented to opposing the
concentration of minority groups indirectly, in particular in view of the
antidiscrimination principle, the government's increasing attempts to push back the
boundaries notwithstanding. The fact that administrators and politicians are seeking the
extreme limits of the existing legal opportunities, does not alter the fact that the main
policy is one of ‘no, unless’. On a local level of municipalities, schools, corporations,
clubs, etc., not residing directly, if at all, under national political responsibility, the
26
effect of the policy may indeed be relatively large, but these local organizations also
depend primarily on indirect deconcentration measures.
27
5
FROM THE BALANCED COMMUNITY TO A CULTURE OF
DIFFERENCE
The objective of many national and local government measures is to oppose the
concentration of minority groups in neighbourhoods, schools and clubs. The thinking
behind these measures is the wish to prevent the isolation of minority groups. This leads
to a variety of measures that, for better or worse, set out to reduce concentration as such.
It is a strategy that is likely to lead to disappointment. It is to be hoped that these
measures will alleviate some of the problems that do occur with concentration. They
may also offer people a little more choice (in particular in housing). Nonetheless, these
measures have a limited effect at best, which is also actually the conclusion of studies
conducted by the Social and Cultural Planning Office (SCP) (2003) and the Netherlands
Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) (2001). The demographic
composition of the population of the major cities (see also Scientific Council for
Amsterdam 2003) is such that concentrations of minority groups are inevitable, despite
the great efforts and the large amounts of money spent by the government.
A deadlock thus threatens, since the concern for social cohesion that underlies
the debate on deconcentration is justified. Social cohesion may be put under strain in a
society in which concentration movements can be observed along ethnic lines. This is a
topical question. The RMO shares the concerns regarding the progress of the integration
process. However, the measures that deal with concentrations directly are at best
partially effective. Furthermore, the fixation on opposing concentration stands in the
way of a positive valuation of the various ways of forming groups and of concentration
that actually does contribute to the development, integration, or both, of minority
groups.
Breaking this deadlock demands addressing a deeper question. In the Council's
opinion, the public debate on group formation, concentration and segregation
concentrates too much on the instrumental level of the effect, justifiability and
possibility of deconcentration policy. This focus is leading to black-and-white
discussions. Supporters of deconcentration measures point one-sidedly to the
seriousness of social concentrations and search for grounds to justify deconcentration.
Opponents, conversely, emphasize only the moral objections and practical difficulties.
This discussion is doomed to end in stalemate. However, this distracts from deeper
questions: what sort of society do we want to live in? How can we organize social
cohesion in a society where relatively large-scale immigration has left new contrasts?
By focusing on the issue of social cohesion, the Council believes that it will become
clearer what this debate is actually about: creating a communal framework, with room
for individuality and variety and in which links are forged between individuals or
groups and the surrounding society.
5.1 The old ideal: the balanced community
The almost proverbial aversion to concentration betrays a predisposition to the
‘balanced community’, as the American sociologist Herbert Gans (1968) referred to it in
his standard work on the problems of major cities. The balanced community is a society
in which all population groups, income groups and age groups live, work and go to
school together and join the same clubs. The small community of the neighbourhood,
the school, or the club in this perspective is an almost literal reflection of the larger
28
community. It is a society that reproduces the complex constitution of the whole on a
small, local level. It is also a society that is held together by the various groups that
meet each other on the small scale of the housing, employment or recreational
environment. Conversely, if groups do not mix in their activities, this is a society at risk
of disintegration.
From this point of view, ‘migrant’ organizations, institutions and residences are
actually always undesirable. From the idea of the balanced commuinty, group formation
and concentration are therefore a problem by definition. It would be absurd to say that
this perspective determines the thinking on the concentration of minority groups
exclusively. It goes without saying that other perspectives can be found. Nonetheless, it
is not hard to identify this picture of the balanced community in many public
discussions. For example, the neighbourhood with a balanced structure has been central
to policy for many years. In a neighbourhood of this kind, young and old, poor and
wealthy, disadvantaged and privileged live in complete harmony with each other. The
dominant elements of this image of the neighbourhood are equality and an extremely
high level of mutual support and identification. This ideal balanced community is also
embodied in the discussions on public participation in social organizations and on the
composition of schools (see Appendix 2).
The image of the balanced community rests on four assumptions.
-
The first assumption is that a balanced community is consistent with what the
public actually wants.
The second assumption is that social mixing of population groups is beneficial
to the relatively weak, because they can rely on stronger people.
The third assumption is that the balanced community is a good thing on every
level, whether in parliament, the neighbourhood or the school.
The fourth and final assumption is that concentration leads to the isolation of
population groups and is therefore a problem as such.
We elaborate on these four assumptions below. We will show that all four are simplistic
and partially incorrect. For this reason, the balanced community cannot be the desired
policy perspective. The balanced community is unrealistic, and incompatible with
current society. The final section of this chapter therefore outlines a new perspective,
the crux of which is the organization of unity in diversity on the one hand and adding
cement between the various contexts on the other.
5.1.1 The balanced community is not an ideal
The first assumption is that the balanced community is consistent with the wishes of the
public. It is often claimed that people would prefer to live in mixed neighbourhoods,
and rather send their children to mixed schools. Among the arguments put forward to
support this position is that minority groups from concentration neighbourhoods do not
welcome the influx of more minority groups. What is more: they themselves would
prefer to live in a mixed neighbourhood (see e.g. Blok committee 2004: 382 ff.; Lindner
2002; Gijsberts and Dagevos 2004). This preference appears to be confirmed by
minority groups as they rise up the social ladder. Like the Dutch national middle
classes, they move away in relatively large numbers from the urban districts of the
major cities and settle in more spacious housing in bordering municipalities. For
29
example, 67% of the Amsterdam residents who moved to Almere in 2003 were
members of ethnic minorities. Those involved were largely Surinamese (Municipality of
Amsterdam Research and Statistics Department 2004).
However, these data are only one side of the story. The most significant
omission is that this discussion fails to make a proper distinction between the factor
‘disadvantage’ and the factor ‘minority group’. As long as concentration
neighbourhoods are largely deprived areas, with an excess of social problems and with
more crime-related issues and nuisance than elsewhere (RMO 2004), it is hardly
surprising that minority groups would prefer not to live in concentration
neighbourhoods. However, if people have positive associations with their housing or
living environment, their need to move evaporates. They then become proud of the
special character of their neighbourhood and put effort into retaining this special
identity. This is true in well-off neighbourhoods, but also in Moluccan neighbourhoods.
Investigation into people's housing preferences indicate that the choice of a given living
environment is determined by such things as status. Housing is a form of identity
perception, and people like to live near people that they associate with in a positive
sense (Buys and Van der Schaar 2004; Musterd and Ostendorf 2000b; Yerden 2003).
There is a clear conflict between people's answers to questionnaires and the
decisions they take when faced with important choices, such as moving house or
choosing a school for their children. The majority of people say they are in favour of
reflection, but in practice they vote with their feet. The aggregate choice of Dutch
national citizens in choosing a school for their child or buying a house leads to ‘white
flight’. Dutch nationals move away from colouring neighbourhoods and colouring
schools (Den Brok et al. 2004).
If people urge for the balanced community, they do not usually do so because
they deplore the absence of minority groups in their own environment. For twenty years
at least, approximately half the Dutch national population has preferred not to live
alongside ethnic minorities (SCP 2004: 159). They associate the concentration of
minority groups with numerous undesirable social phenomena. Mixing is supposed to
solve the problems. Achieving a balanced community, in other words, seems first and
foremost a negative ideal (Hilhorst 2004). Mixing is popular as a means of alleviating
problems, but is seldom a goal in its own right. We conclude that achieving balanced
community is mainly a rhetorical and socially desirable ideal that has scant influence on
people's important choices, such as moving house or choosing a school.
5.1.2 The balanced community does not reduce disadvantages
The second assumption is that an environment that is the balanced community has a
positive impact on the position of the relatively weak. They are supposed to be able to
rely on stronger people, and find positive role models among them. Arguments for
mixed schools and mixed neighbourhoods are usually based on this perspective. Mixing
is supposed to bring different population groups together and actually help the
development of neighbourhood residents with a relatively low socio-economic position.
Where there is no mixing, the opposite mechanism is supposed to take effect and the
relatively weak end up in a negative spiral. The American scenario of urban ghettos
supposedly typifies this phenomenon (see Appendices 3 and 4).
Nonetheless, research has shown that concentration neighbourhoods and
concentration schools do not hamper the socio-economic integration of minority groups.
Much research has been carried out in recent years on the relationship between the
30
spatial concentration and socio-economic integration of minority groups. The
investigation conducted by the social geographers Musterd and Ostendorf is well known
in this connection. They investigated the factors that strengthen the socio-economic
position of minority groups (Musterd and Ostendorf 2000a and 2003, Musterd 2003).
They concluded that personal characteristics are the main determining factors for the
socio-economic development of individuals. The neighbourhood plays hardly any role.
Other researchers arrive at similar conclusions (see Appendices 3 and 4; see also
Dagevos 2004; Social and Cultural Planning Office (SCP 2003).
In educational performance too, there is no sign of a clear negative correlation
between socio-economic position and concentration schools. The available research
shows that the educational performance at black schools may indeed be lower than at
other schools, but that this has little to do with the concentration itself. Minority groups
in general have a far lower educational level than Dutch nationals. A majority of the
Turks and Moroccans have a pre-vocational (VBO) or junior general secondary
(MAVO) qualification, or even only primary education. This level has risen rapidly in
the past fourteen years. Whereas the proportion of members of minority groups with a
secondary education and vocational education qualification has risen sharply, the
proportion with only primary education has fallen considerably. For example,
Moroccans attended a school for senior general secondary education (HAVO) or preuniversity education (VWO) twice as frequently in 2002 than six years earlier. Their
influx into the professional education colleges and universities has also doubled.
The below-par performance of minority groups can be attributed only a small
extent to concentration effects. What is more important is the low socio-economic
background of the children at concentration schools (which is known as the SES factor).
In addition, the educational performance at black schools has improved considerably in
recent years. Furthermore, this investigation reveals that disadvantaged pupils at
concentration schools book greater learning gains than at mixed schools (SCP 2003).
The conclusion is therefore that the balanced community contributes little to the
social opportunities of minority groups. Although the restructuring of neighbourhoods
changes their population composition (which can be beneficial to safety and livability),
it does not improve the individual opportunities of the residents. In other words, the
balanced community does not eliminate socio-economic disadvantage.
5.1.3 Both separate and together is possible
The third assumption is that the balanced community is a good thing on all levels.
However, a certain concentration on the local level, in the immediate housing or living
environment, can actually have a positive effect.
From the perspective of social cohesion, ethnic neighbourhood, school, or
organization networks can provide minority groups with the instruments with which to
integrate. From these networks, they can derive the informal support and a social safety
net, which provide the tools for participating in society as a whole (cf. Putnam 2000).
For instance, living in concentration neighbourhoods can lead to ethnic entrepreneurship
and ‘own’ customer groups, with all the socio-economic benefits and future prospects
for the children of the entrepreneurs that this entails (Kloosterman and Van der Leun
1998; Noordhoff 2004). Furthermore, ethnic organizations can contribute positively to
the integration of minority groups in the Dutch political system. Fennema et al. (2000)
have made a case that interest groups, leadership figures and networks of ethnic
minorities are important incentives for the political participation of minority groups.
31
Active members of interest groups are furthermore in a situation where they win either
way: the administrative experience, self-confidence and external contacts they gain in
their own group ease the entrance into established social organizations. This might
manifest itself, for example, in a role in a political party (Rijkschroeff and Duyvendak
2004: 25; Fennema et al. 2000). However, this applies only to a small proportion of the
members. For the others, the ‘ordinary members’, interest groups mainly fulfil a refuge
function, certainly in the period immediately after arrival
The importance of this human need for small-scale individuality also has some
mention in the existing policy. An example is the Rotterdam corporation
WoonbronMaasoever (Scheffer 2004). This corporation is attempting to create
“distinguished residential environments, where people with comparable lifestyles can
live together in a more harmonious way”. The corporation wishes to give tenants
housing options based on information about lifestyles. They write: “This information
[on lifestyles, RMO] is provided when housing is offered, so that potential tenants can
make a better choice in line with their lifestyle. The hope is that greater social cohesion
can be achieved in this way. Tenants are then seen as contributors in the formation of
their living environment, including by (…) facilitating domestic agreements, where
existing residents determine rules for their own block. Newly arrived immigrants are
welcome, provided they subscribe to the agreements. The above will not lead to
completely homogeneous municipal districts, but smaller homogeneous areas are not
ruled out” (taken from Scheffer 2004).
The example from Rotterdam is consistent with what the RMO envisages.
Homogeneity on a small scale can offer opportunities, provided it is linked at another
level with the surrounding society. However, these opportunities remain out of view if
politicians think only from the perspective of the balanced community.
5.1.4 Does concentration lead to isolation?
The fourth assumption is that society as a whole would disintegrate if it was not
reflected in the underlying parts. According to this thinking, the existence of
concentration neighbourhoods, migrant organizations and black and white schools leads
to isolation of the groups concerned relative to the wider society. From this point of
view, concentrations of ethnic minorities are a problem in their own right, because they
are thought to be detrimental to the socio-cultural integration of minority groups, the
contact between groups and their perception of each other.
Recent research has shown that spatial concentrations and educational
concentrations are indeed detrimental to the socio-cultural integration of minority
groups. Investigations give the firm impression that segregated housing, living and
educational patterns contribute to the socio-cultural distance between minority groups
and the surrounding society (Dagevos 2001; Van der Laan Bouma-Doff and Van der
Laan Bouma 2005; Weijters and Scheepers 2003). The degree of contact between
minority groups and Dutch nationals seems to be crucial for matters such as command
of the language and the acceptance of modern, Western values. Whereas there is hardly
any neighbourhood effect on socio-economic integration, there is a definite effect on
socio-cultural integration. Living in a concentration neighbourhood mainly influences
the social networks of minority groups. Minority groups have significantly more
frequent contact with Dutch nationals if they live in a mixed neighbourhood than if they
live in a concentration neighbourhood (Dagevos 2004: 5-6; Van der Laan Bouma-Doff
32
2005). Albeit that this effect occurs in particular with Surinamese and Antilleans and
less with the two groups that are attracting most public interest: Turks and Moroccans.
It is striking that the degree of informal contact of Turks and Moroccans with
Dutch nationals has declined across the board, irrespective of the neighbourhood in
which they live. In recent years, they have started to mix socially more within their own
group. One reason is marriage migration and another is that the probability of contact is
simply greater within their own group because of the swollen numbers (SCP 2003).
Anyone with a preference for social contacts ‘in their own circle’ will find ever more
opportunities.
This declining contact is a cause for concern in the light of the deteriorating
perception that Dutch nationals and in particular Islamic minority groups have of each
other. Research has shown that Dutch nationals' perception of minority groups has
deteriorated in recent years. The perception has deteriorated in particular among the less
educated, men and young people. It is otherwise true, by and large, that the traditional
minority groups (Antilleans, Moroccans, Surinamese and Turks) have correspondingly
more negative views of Dutch nationals than before, albeit in this case it is actually the
higher educated and women with the most negative view of Dutch nationals (SCP
2003). If Dutch nationals are asked whether they want minority groups as neighbours,
the majority say ‘no’. When asked about their expectations for the future in relation to
minority groups, then most Dutch are pessimistic (SCP 2004).
Although the proportions of minority groups in a neighbourhood as such have no
influence on reciprocal negative attitudes, a rapid colouring of the neighbourhood does.
Analyses have shown that neighbourhoods where the proportion of minority groups has
increased rapidly are the ones where there is less social contact between Dutch nationals
and minority groups. Another aspect for Dutch nationals is that they feel more
threatened by ethnic minorities in these neighbourhoods than in neighbourhoods that
have not changed colour so rapidly (Gijsberts and Dagevos 2004).
The research results provide modest support to the assumption that concentration leads
to isolation. We have to make two remarks on these findings.
The first is that whereas residents of concentration neighbourhoods do have less
contact with Dutch nationals, changing the composition of neighbourhoods does not
automatically lead to heterogeneous contacts among the residents. Mixed
neighbourhoods are actually the ones where the residents have little to do with each
other. Uitermark and Duyvendak (Appendix 4) show the difficulty of creating mixed
neighbourhoods and that moreover mixed housing barely encourages the social
integration of disadvantaged minority groups. They write: “People usually maintain few
contacts in the neighbourhood. And, if they do, they would tend to seek out people with
the same ethnic or socio-economic background. In this sense, mixed neighbourhoods
are deceitful: the homogeneity of the social networks is the same as elsewhere.” The
‘white parents’ themselves work elsewhere and take their children on the back seat of
the car to the sports club and school in a different neighbourhood. Loopmans (2000)
also refers to the misleading ideal of mixed neighbourhoods. Restructuring leads mainly
to wealthy islands in the otherwise homogeneously disadvantaged neighbourhoods.
The second remark is that the deteriorating perceptions that minority groups and
Dutch nationals have of each other is related to the increasingly heated debate on
integration. The problematic aspects of integration have in recent years been brought
into the open increasingly often, each time more categorically and more harshly.
33
Newspapers and television programmes report with great regularity on integration
problems. The political polarization surrounding Islam on both a national and an
international scale obviously plays its part. The threat of international terrorism and the
tensions between groups in society have indeed increased. It is therefore probably
inevitable that the tone of the integration debate has become more strident. It is
necessary above all to identify and discuss problems. However, the drawbacks in
practice of the fierce integration debate are that it leads to increasing polarization and
that this increases the risk that young Muslims in particular turn away from Dutch and
Western society. Various investigations have shown a relationship between Muslims
turning away from this society and the current climate of opinion. For example, the
2004 Socio-cultural report states: “The stigmatization of the Moroccan group in
particular has already demonstrably led to this group withdrawing into its own circle:
the identification with their own group has increased for second generation Moroccans”
(SCP 2004:157). The General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) reported in
early 2004 that the current climate of opinion was helping to incline some young people
to radical Islam (Parliament, 27 925, no. 10).
In the RMO's opinion, the various findings in this section legitimize the current aim of
public authorities to bring groups into contact with each other through housing policy
and education policy, which in principle is a good thing. It is important to observe at the
same time that deconcentration policy has a limited scope. The question as to whether
people and groups become isolated from society is influenced far more strongly by
factors other than where they live or attend school. The deconcentration policy therefore
must be part of a more comprehensive strategy oriented to setting up links in society.
5.2 The recommendation: a culture of difference
In the RMO's opinion, policy should not be founded on the balanced community, which
is based on the unlikely expectation that people will always establish contact with each
other. It is an ideal that is far from reality and does not lead to a realistic approach to
real problems. Instead, the RMO argues for assuming a ‘culture of difference’. A culture
of difference is founded on a sharply delineated framework of community with room for
individuality and variation. The individual aim for distinct identity is recognized in a
culture of difference, at least in so far as it is supported by a shared and obligatory
foundation and as long as effective links exist between individuals and groups and the
surrounding society. The government's role is mainly oriented to safeguarding this
central framework. When the frameworks have been clearly established, productive
space will also be created for differences. The government does aim to bring about links
between individuals and groups.
The starting point for a culture of difference is, as mentioned above, the
communal framework. In a society in which concentration trends proceed along ethnic
lines, and in which there are increasing tensions and hatred between groups, it is
necessary to have a firm foundation for community, with defined boundaries. It is the
government's task to establish these frameworks. The Dutch language and the basic
values of democracy are the essential ingredients.
Within this framework of community, the second important point is to provide
room for differences, to value them and utilize them for organizing social cohesion. If
the boundaries are clearly marked and monitored, it will also be possible to tolerate and
accept inconsistencies within. In the recent past, the excessive value attached to
34
differences led to a sort of laissez faire attitude that uncritically supported the
cultivation of difference. There was too little regard for the necessity of social cohesion
and too much attention to the acknowledgment of cultural identities. In recent years,
after the World Trade Centre attack and the increasing domestic tensions, a movement
in the opposite direction has been seen. It would sometimes now seem that the
government might eliminate social differences. There is too little regard in the current
debate for the inevitability of differences and too little appreciation for the inherent
positive value. A model is needed that both avoids the pitfalls and combines attention
for social cohesion with room for differences.
Finally, it is important to forge links between the various organizations, places,
groups and people. This point clearly involves the government and other public
institutions. It is necessary to invest in reciprocal contacts, in trust and in links in society
oriented to bridging differences. One way of achieving this is by reducing the degree of
concentration in neighbourhoods and schools, for better or worse. This is consistent
with the outline of the recent spatial policy in the major cities. However, its limited
effectiveness necessitates supplementary policies. There are a variety of opportunities in
spatial, social, educational and economic policy for encouraging contact and interaction
between people and groups.
The term ‘culture of difference’ could be seen as a cultural relativistic argument
for cultivating differences. The Council hastens to add that this is certainly not what is
intended. Not all differences are valuable by definition. The values from the communal
framework bound the space that exists for differences. For example, the equality of men
and women and the principle of nondiscrimination on the basis of religion, ethnic origin
or sexual orientation belong in the communal framework. Room for differences exist
only in so far as people and groups do not violate these frameworks.
By assuming a culture of difference, we are shifting the perspective in the
deconcentration debate from the practical level (is it possible and permissible?) to the
level of principle: what kind of society do we consider to be desirable and possible?
How can the government contribute to social cohesion in a society in which
concentration trends are proceeding along ethnic lines? In the Council's opinion, it is
time to do away with what can be called the concentration fixation. The point is to focus
attention on the key question: organizing social cohesion in a diverse society.
35
6
THE TASK: UNITY, DIVERSITY AND TIES
The central issue in these recommendations is: How can the government promote social
cohesion in a society in which concentration trends are proceeding along ethnic lines?
The RMO's answer to this question is that the government must base its policy on the
principle of a culture of difference. If we assume a culture of difference, then there are
three main tasks for integration policy. To start with, it is about creating, developing and
safeguarding a communal framework. It is then important to allow room for the internal
differences, to assess their value and where possible to utilize them. Finally, it is about
forging effective links between these differences. The role of the government differs on
these three lines. On the first level, the government's role is mainly to create and enforce
the framework. On the second level, the government's role is modest. The government
should mainly make room for social forces. However, the government should monitor
the constraints and the frameworks within which this takes place. On the third level the
government invests, so promoting the contacts and links in society.
It is important to realize that the above represents a broad policy agenda.
Although the starting point of these recommendations is the social unrest surrounding
concentration schools, neighbourhoods and organizations, this does not imply that
concentrations as such are the best point of application for policy. The fact that
problems with the socio-cultural integration of minority groups are to be found in
concentration neighbourhoods and schools, does not necessarily mean that these
problems should be tackled there exclusively.
These recommendations were written against the background of the ambitious
proposals of the national government and municipalities to thoroughly restructure the
urban housing stock and so to alter the composition of the population of
neighbourhoods. In elaborating the strategy favoured by the RMO, we combine
measures that intervene directly on the level of concentration schools and
neighbourhoods with structural measures. Structural measures do not influence
concentration directly, but can ensure that certain negative consequences of
concentration are countered. This distinction between direct and structural measures
will not always be strictly stated below, in the interests of readability.
The statement of the recommendations is concise and concentrates on the main
points. They are pointers rather than ready-made measures. Policymakers may detail
and apply these proposals in specific situations. Jointly they form the elements of a
culture of difference.
The Council's recommendations are summarized below. The rest of this chapter
provides details of the various elements individually.
Figure 1: the three aspects of a culture of difference
Unity
Diversity
Ties
Basic democratic values
Quality at school and in the
neighbourhood
Contact and interaction
36
Dutch language
Individuality of the
neighbourhood in the
heterogeneous district
Bridging leadership
Communal stories
Transparency of social
organizations
Improving the socioeconomic position
Dutch Islam
6.1 Unity
A culture of difference, as proposed by the RMO, is possible only within clear limits.
Not everything that is different is automatically valuable, as the Minister for Alien
Affairs and Integration rightly points out (see Appendix 3). The starting point of a
culture of difference is neither a culture of turning a blind eye nor of relativism.
Differences are possible only within the limits of the law and with observance of the
applicable legal norms (see also WRR 2003).
The increasing differences in society are forcing us to reconsider the question:
what binds us together? The objective of this reconsideration cannot be to define away
existing differences. The issue is to establish and confirm a communal framework for
differences, and where necessary to protect or develop them. The limits of this
framework are inviolable. The government has the task of sharply defining and
guarding these limits, and to take action if these limits are transgressed. The government
is also making room for differences precisely by keenly guarding these limits and
insisting that the entire population adapts to this standard.
Three crucial elements of this communal foundation:
•
•
•
the basic democratic values;
command of the Dutch language;
access for all the population to communal stories.
Other elements are conceivable besides these three. We do not pretend to have been
exhaustive. However, these are currently the three most important areas for reinforcing
the communal framework of society. The communal elements can thus be defended
(e.g. if the rule of law is eroded), developed (e.g. where language is concerned) and
created (e.g. communal stories in a mixed society). If the government devotes its effort
to these three components, it will be able to create the communal foundation of a culture
of difference. We outline these components below.
6.1.1 Basic democratic values
The modus vivendi for dealing with social differences is the democratic constitutional
state. This constitutional state determines the formal relationships between the
government and citizens, supplies rules of the game for dealing with social differences,
and in this sense provides a clear and defined integration framework. The democratic
constitutional state has repercussions in both the various institutions of our state system
and the way in which citizens live together within that system.
Democratic conduct is not congenital and cannot be taken for granted.
Democracy as a form of living together needs to be maintained. The democratic
37
institutions are embodied within social ethics, or in a democratic way of life, as the
American philosopher Dewey called it. When these social ethics are eroded, there is a
danger that the effectiveness of the democratic values will be undermined (De Winter
2004: 11 and 61). This situation currently seems to be occurring. Firstly, the public
appears to be increasingly focused on self-interest and less on the public issue. De
Winter describes this phenomenon as ‘the risk of the implosion of democracy’. Because
the public is less oriented to the communal interest, the social support for the system
declines, which in the worst scenario could lead to collapse. Secondly, antidemocratic
sentiments are on the rise, possibly accompanied by an intentional undermining of the
constitutional state. This can be described as attempts to cause democracy to explode.
The government must defend itself against these forces. We stated in the introduction
that the government must deal forcefully with all violent forms of fundamentalism.
Furthermore, in the RMO's opinion, they must do more to familiarize people and
children in particular with the substance and importance of basic democratic values and
conduct.
It is striking that all Dutch citizens have automatic access to democratic
institutions and can appeal to democratic freedoms, but that hardly any energy is
devoted to maintaining and teaching the underlying basic democratic values (De Winter
2004; cf. SCAA 1996; Van den Brink 2004). This is a missed opportunity. The fact is
that democracy is founded on important values, such as the equality of citizens under
the law, freedom of religion, freedom of speech and the principle of nondiscrimination
on the basis of race, sex, religious beliefs, etc.. These values can be used as rules of the
game in dealing with social conflicts. An example is the freedom of speech. This
freedom exists because of the fact that others have the same freedom, and this
reciprocity in expectations creates space and sets limits to the discussion. Other
examples of rules of the game are exchanging arguments, showing respect, refraining
from violence and showing tolerance for others' positions.
Democratic conduct is not congenital. Professionals in, for example, education,
religion and community work can actively contribute to maintaining and propagating
this conduct. In this way the government is actively promoting citizenship with respect
for the constitutional state as an elementary part. Teachers can integrate the value and
meaning of the collective interest into the curriculum, conduct and the rules at school,
with greater emphasis. Imams, the clergy, priests and all other religious professionals
must articulate that, in the democratic constitutional state, religious freedom is
accompanied by a duty to respect this freedom on the part of others. In addition, they
should communicate that although decisions in the public space may be prompted by
belief, the government ultimately decides. Community workers can, more emphatically
than is now the case, focus on conveying democratic skills to young people. Community
workers can also encourage juveniles to be led by and to orient on the general interest.
In each of these examples, it is important to emphasize that it is the Constitution that
gives the citizen freedom, equality and opportunities to develop. At the same time, it
goes without saying that it is necessary to convey and articulate the limits of the
constitutional state.
6.1.2 Dutch language
The ‘outer rules of social dealings’ are determined by the democratic constitutional
state, within which a proper command of the Dutch language is necessary to make
living together possible. The socio-cultural integration of minority groups is hard to
38
imagine if these minority groups have no proper command of the Dutch language. It is
therefore important to ensure that the Netherlands remains a single-language society: all
citizens have a proper command of Dutch, which the government encourages. In
addition, being able to speak several languages also has obvious benefits. The
government will therefore have to promote the Dutch language, without opposing the
migrant languages. The government communicates in Dutch and requires people who
settle here also to have a proper command of the language.
Special attention is necessary for the children in minority groups. Early
Childhood Education, which starts with language lessons as early as the preschool
playgroup, would currently appear to be the most appropriate way to make up lost
ground in linguistic and cognitive development for children from minority groups
(RMO 2002; SCP 2003). It is clear that an early command of the Dutch language can
benefit the social opportunities of minority groups and their orientation on Dutch
society. However, it is equally clear that there are problems in Early Childhood
Education policy, both in its reach (it is proving difficult to reach the most vulnerable
groups) and its quality. Therefore the government must invest in the quality of Early
Childhood Education and in the teachers. Adult education can moreover also reduce the
language disadvantage of these children's parents. Because reaching the Early
Childhood Education target group is a significant problem area in practice, it will be a
good thing if the clinics could play a role.
6.1.3 Communal stories
The third binding foundation of the culture of difference is what we refer to as access to
communal stories. Where the previous two ‘uniting elements’ demand maintaining,
defending and strengthening the framework, with this third element we are identifying a
development task. In a society that is changing in composition, it is necessary jointly to
consider what binds us together. Scheffer rightly states in Appendix 3 that integration in
principle comes down to migrants being able to say for themselves: “This is now also
our country.”vi This is calling for a quest for the narratives which minority groups can
also identify with. A society where there is space for diversity, is one in which it is
important to bind this diversity in shared stories.
It is striking to see that Dutch society itself currently also has a need for creating
narratives of this kind. For a considerable time, Dutch individuality could not be
mentioned, or that individuality would manifest itself only in the (typically Dutch)
denial that it exists. However, there is currently a definite reassessment in progress in
this area. For example, consider the Week of History, the increasing attention for
cultural heritage, the election of the greatest Dutch person of all time, the public debate
on the desirability of a National Historical Museum and the Night of History in
Madurodam. Requests for opinion from the government on what communal values unite
Dutch society (WRR 2003) and on creating a collection of communal knowledge (NRC
Handelsblad 19-01-05) point in this direction.
The RMO approves this attempt at reassessment. In earlier reports too, the
Council observed that within space for ethnic identities there must be plenty of room for
a communal identity (RMO 1999). However, it cannot be the intention that this
reassessment of the past results only in what could be called the ‘Hansje Brinker model’
(after the legendary hero who plugged the dike with his finger): a historical role model
of the Dutch citizen that most ethnic minorities would be quite unable to identify with.
In other words, the communal reassessment must have an inclusive as opposed to an
39
exclusive effect. This means that both Dutch nationals and minority groups must take
part in the discussion on the content of communal stories.
Where sharing communal stories can lead, can be seen in the experiences of a local school in the Brick
Lane district of
London.
In this
neighbourhood“(…)
the originalor(white)
residents(e.g.
and the
the large
Communal
stories
about
society,
in history, literature
the cinema
film group
Shoufof
newly arrived Bangladeshi immigrants just did not get along. Racial tensions were rife (…). The local
Shouf Habibi!), ensure that citizens perceive and understand society together. This
secondary school then decided to involve fourteen-year-old schoolchildren in the neighbourhood in a
collective
involve
the history
of the Dutch
colonies
and people
the migration
positive wayproduction
(…). In smallshould
interview,
investigation
and photography
groups,
the young
went into
that
this history gave
riseofto.
Scheffer
says: “When
we fail
toBybroaden
the story
the neighbourhood
in search
Brick
Lane's memories
and stories.
(…)
sharing their
storiesofand those
of the neighbourhood,
old, Islamiteinand
got to know
other and they
history
and give no young
place and
to migration
all Jew
its forms,
theneach
the eloquence
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that story the
communal
element
in
their
stories.
Reciprocal
understanding
and
respect
were
what
emerged”
will deteriorate. This is why it is so vital to deal with the past: anyone wanting to(Mercken
2002: 13)
understand
the power and vulnerability of an open society cannot escape it”(Appendix
3).
6.2 Diversity
If the government arranges for a communal and inviolable framework (as described
above), a larger space will be created within it for differences between people and
groups. This space is compatible with people's instinct to distinguish themselves. This
need for distinction can also be observed in public bodies such as educational
institutions. It is therefore not a process that the government has to encourage.
However, social differences, in a context of what Parliament describes as a failed
integration policy and against the background of a worldwide political polarization
around Islam, are currently causing considerable unrest and dissatisfaction. Differences
between groups mainly foster distrust or even fear. The task is therefore to embody the
social diversity that simply exists into the democratic constitutional state in a way that is
natural and acceptable. The inviolable framework described above regulates the space
for differences and enables opposition to cultural customs that transgress this communal
framework, for example. The issue is to make diversity possible, tolerable for outsiders
and, where possible, usable in the integration process. Diversity can cause a closing of
society, or a connection with society. Government policy can help to ensure that the
balance is in favour of the latter.
The translation of this task into various areas leads to a wide range of questions.
We state the most important below.
•
•
•
•
In the living environment, the government can stimulate the individuality of
neighbourhoods and the sense of responsibility among residents in
heterogeneous neighbourhoods.
On the level of schools and neighbourhoods, the government can guarantee
quality and livability. In addition, the government can encourage residents and
schoolchildren to take their share of responsibility.
On the level of social organizations the government requires organizations to be
approachable and transparent.
Finally, the government makes a case for Islam ‘taking root’ in Dutch society.
Although the impact on these areas differs, the objective is clear: to ensure quality on
various levels, in order to do justice to differences and make them tolerable for the
wider society.
40
6.2.1 Individuality of the neighbourhood in the heterogeneous district
The spatial policy conducted by the major cities in recent years, was oriented mainly to
mixing population groups in the neighbourhood. This occurred in particular by
restructuring old city districts: old and small dwellings disappeared to be replaced by
new and larger accommodation. This new housing usually also brought in new residents
(with higher incomes) into the neighbourhood. The restructuring serves various
purposes. In part, it involves physically necessary interventions to prevent housing
succumbing to signs of old age. Some of the physical changes serve to realize social
objectives: integration, livability or social cohesion.
From the perspective of social cohesion, it is necessary for the physical
redevelopment to be linked to the desired social development. We demonstrated above
that bringing different income groups together in a neighbourhood does not mean that
there will be much interaction between these groups. Neighbourhoods with a
heterogeneous composition are ones in which residents are most likely to live without
real contact. A process of ‘moving the pieces’ will not enable us to achieve the desired
social changes in this case.
In the RMO's opinion, what is more attractive than the picture of the
heterogeneous neighbourhood is therefore that of the homogeneous neighbourhood in
the heterogeneous district. A concentration of lifestyles around the living environment
encourages a sense of responsibility for the surroundings and can coexist with good
links with society on other levels. The RMO argues for complying with the wishes of
residents in this regard. The fact is that they appreciate the neighbourhood, school or
organization having their ‘own’ character. This character can be determined by various
factors, including ethnicity, life phase (students or families), age, religious orientation
and lifestyle. This would reinforce the identification of residents with the
neighbourhood and therefore also their involvement in the ups and downs of the
neighbourhood and other residents. The various homogeneous neighbourhoods and
communities do then need to be placed within the framework of a heterogeneous
district. Through design and planning, the government can encourage the creation on a
higher district level of a range of mechanisms in which people from different
neighbourhoods can come into contact with each other. We return to this point in the
following section.
If neighbourhoods of this kind are created in heterogeneous districts, there will
be a greater probability of residents having a sense of responsibility for their
environment and actively preventing deterioration of the neighbourhood. This selfreliance of residents also needs to be reinforced in another way. To start with, it is good
to make people also literally the owners of their housing. The current turnaround in
policy, in which the large proportion of social housing in the major cities is being run
down, should be continued. However, the Council remarks that the sale of this housing
must not expose a growth market for unregulated private renting. If social renting is
reduced, the process must be accompanied by effective rent protection on the private
market. When neighbourhoods are redeveloped, it must not happen over the heads of
the sitting residents. It is therefore good to give residents an opportunity to contribute
ideas and share in the decisions on how their neighbourhood is to develop (see
Appendix 4).
A final remark is on the availability of housing. Within the framework of
restructuring, housing in the lowest segment is disappearing on a large scale while
housing in more expensive price classes is being built. This can have benefits for the
41
composition of neighbourhoods. However, the government must ensure that housing in
lower-priced classes is then built elsewhere, which will increase the freedom of choice
for everyone on the housing market.
6.2.2 Quality at school and in the neighbourhood
Differences between neighbourhoods or between schools can be a source of pride and
self-respect for those involved. People are often attached to their neighbourhood and
environment. We would generally reject changes in the composition that have an impact
on the developed character of the familiar environment. A certain individuality of
school (or class) and neighbourhood (or street) can therefore have a positive value for
residents, schoolchildren and teachers.
However, this positive value can exist only if people also view the special
character of their environment positively (and not as run-down) and if all those involved
support this individuality. Individual responsibility for one's own environment is
possible only if it calls up positive associations. Who could possibly be proud of his
run-down neighbourhood or school covered in graffiti? The government must therefore
simultaneously guarantee the quality of the public space and public services and
mobilize people's own responsibility for their environment.
This means that the government has to promote the livability of the
neighbourhood and oppose nuisance and deterioration. A basic level of order and safety
is necessary for the proper development of neighbourhoods. In view of the fact that
many concentration neighbourhoods have problems of this kind, this must be a first
priority. Specific livability problems are therefore the point for attention, not the
concentration as such. In the case of major usability problems and problematic
concentrations, restructuring may be a measure, albeit drastic, for bringing relief
(Appendix 4).
The approach to deterioration and crime-related issues in concentration
neighbourhoods would preferably be accompanied by civilian initiatives like
‘Opzoomering’ in Rotterdam (see Duyvendak and Van der Graaf 2001). In this
example, the public plays an active role in maintaining the neighbourhood. This
approach promotes livability, but mainly ensures social cohesion in the neighbourhood.
By also encouraging owner occupation, the government reinforces the people's
individual sense of responsibility for their own environment.
It is moreover necessary to continue to invest in disadvantaged schools and
segrgated schools. Currently, there is too much talk of the composition of schools and
too little of their quality. As far as the RMO is concerned, it is more productive in the
long term to examine how ‘good’ the school actually is than precisely how ‘black’ it is.
The issue must be quality, not quantity. The onus of proof resides with the schools
themselves in this regard. Can they demonstrate that they are capable of providing good
education? And, if not, how can the government ensure that the schools raise their
level?
At the time of writing these recommendations, the government was
reconsidering the question of how schools are to be financed in the future. The existing
policy with the weighting rule, which means that schools receive more money for
disadvantaged pupils from minority groups, is under pressure because it is said to
contribute to a growth in educational segregation. At the time of writing it was unknown
whether there was to be a new funding system and what form it might take. It would be
42
beyond the scope of this report to comment on how schools should be financed.
However, one aim should at any rate be realized: investment must be made in
disadvantaged schools. An outcome that results in reduced funding for disadvantaged
schools would be a backward step.
6.2.3 Transparency of social organizations
‘Migrant’ organizations and groups can be a vehicle for individual development and can
strengthen individuals' sense of responsibility. On the other hand, some ‘migrant’
organizations oppose Dutch society or the Western world, and in extreme cases even
organize terrorist opposition to the surrounding society. From the outside, it is not
always clear which of these two types of organizations one is dealing with. This is a
dilemma for policymakers, because the first type is a necessary part of the socio-cultural
integration of minority groups, while the second type is a threat to society. It is also a
dilemma for many organizations themselves, because they are constantly taken to task
for others' conduct and are therefore always under suspicion.
In the 1980s the government's main assumption was that organizations of
minority groups were of the first type. ‘Migrant’ organizations were generously
supported on the incorrect assumption that they would contribute to emancipation, in
line with the pacification strategy of pillarization (Koopmans 2003a; 2003b). For some
years, policymakers have tended to the other extreme and ‘migrant’ organizations are
seen mainly as obstacles to integration (Rijkschroeff and Duyvendak 2004). In doing so,
the policymakers are failing to recognize the emancipatory potential of these
organizations and a development (i.e. the creation of organizations) is being defined as a
problem that is irrevocably taking shape.
It is in the joint interest of government and social organizations to clarify what
organizations stand for, through transparency and approachability. After the murder of
Theo van Gogh, some mosques have entered into a ‘social contract’ in which they claim
a sense of responsibility for opposing radicalization among their own supporters. As a
complement to this imaginary contract, the government safeguards the safety of these
mosques. This example came about in an extreme situation, but does show a
constructive direction. Along paths of this kind, organizations can actually gain
validated space for their activities while being able to demonstrate their relationship
with the surrounding society.
The government can promote this orientation to society on the part of social
organizations through agreements, covenants, contracts and, possibly, subsidy policy.
The principle of reciprocity is applicable here. In other words: open and transparent
organizations may claim generous political and social acceptance. Just as societyopposing ‘migrant organizations’ should count on active prosecution.
6.2.4 Dutch Islam
The position and role of Islam in Dutch society in recent years has grown into a political
and social issue of the first order. Tension is developing around Islam between isolation
from and connecting with Dutch society. On the one hand it is evident that political
Islam is being used by people and organizations who oppose, and sometimes actively
fight against, Dutch and Western society. On the other hand, this religion is held in
esteem by very many of the minority groups in the Netherlands. In a horror scenario,
Islam in the Netherlands will develop in the coming years in opposition to the
43
surrounding society. However, if a good link with Dutch society is created in which
Islam acquires a natural position, then Muslims and non-Muslims will have gained
considerably.
Islam has become a major Dutch religion. The religious perception of Muslims
may be declining somewhat in a practical sense, but their religious identification
continues to be of great importance to them (Phalet 2004). Islam will therefore
inevitably play a role in public life in the coming period. It is therefore important that
this religion acquires a natural, which is to say accepted, place in society. International
terrorism perpetrated by Muslim extremists is hampering this development, but is
making it all the more essential.
The initiative for improving the position of Dutch Islam is in the first instance
with the mosques, Imams and other believers themselves. They themselves can
demonstrate that they will structure and practice their belief in this society, and not in
opposition to it. There are considerable differences between mosques, religious
foundations and imams. An investigation conducted by the Centre for Research and
Statistics of the municipality of Rotterdam reveals that some mosques are oriented to
integrating into Dutch society and linking with it. However, other mosques are not
occupied in this way (Canatan et al. 2003). The government has to accept this reality.
The task is firstly to forcefully oppose hostility and hatred towards society, such as
terrorism. Conversely, the task is to actively encourage links being made by mosques
with this society.
The government can play an active role in making these links.vii Firstly by firmly
tackling extremism from Islamic organizations while warmly welcoming organizations
oriented to society. Then by making a strong case for a Dutch imam training to ensure
that imams do not constantly have to be flown in, but are also trained here. This would
make it possible for the language used in the mosque to be Dutch.
6.3 Ties
The third effect of the principle of a culture of difference is the forging of links between
groups and people. It is not sufficient only to create a communal basis (e.g. in basic
democratic values and the Dutch language) and making differences possible within it.
There must also be links between groups, people and institutions. A society in which
people and groups live with no real contact at all is clearly undesirable.
The obvious chosen path selected for linking groups is by mixing them spatially
or institutionally. This is the deconcentration policy that we have discussed in these
recommendations. The conclusion of our discussion is that it appears to be hard in
practice to bring groups (which consider themselves to be different) into contact with
each other. Neither can it be taken for granted in mixed schools that different groups
will spend time together or have reciprocal contacts (see Appendix 3). We assume that
public authorities will continue this policy in the coming years. In that case, it is
necessary to augment this policy with other means of forging links. We mention here
three of the main ways of forging links.
•
Contact and interaction can be organized between organizations and institutions,
such as schools. This approach is appropriate in particular in areas where the
deconcentration policy has little chance of success in the foreseeable future
because of demographic structure, so that the existence of strong concentrations
in these areas is a fait accompli.
44
•
•
On the level of organizations, leadership figures can fulfil an important
integrational role.
The socio-economic position of minority groups is an important vehicle for
increasing contact between groups. This last point calls for some explanation.
Improving the socio-economic position of minority groups is clearly a goal in its
own right. However, by and large, the social progress of minority groups is
accompanied by a better command of the Dutch language, greater support for
modern values and more interethnic contacts. Improving the socio-economic
position of minority groups therefore also promotes contacts and interaction
across ethnic boundaries.
6.3.1 Contact and interaction
Research (SCP 2003; Van der Laan Bouma-Doff and Van der Laan Bouma 2005)
indicates strongly that the saying 'unknown, unloved' contains an element of truth.
When social groups encounter each other in daily life, this improves the perception they
have of each other. This is why it is sensible to organize contact and interaction between
groups. This wish usually translates in the policy into attempts to deconcentrate people
over neighbourhoods and schools. This ‘hard’ deconcentration policy may well increase
the contact between different groups somewhat, but miracles should not be expected. It
is therefore important also to use ‘soft’ instruments to strengthen certain links between
population groups.
For example, where concentration schools exist, the government can organize
partnership and exchange between different schools in the same or in adjoining
neighbourhoods. These schools can share facilities, for example for sports or culture, so
that schoolchildren come into contact with each other in the process. Comparable
initiatives are also conceivable on a city level. Projects such as People Make the City
(De Meere et al. 2004) and Football has More than Two Goals
(www.zestienmiljoenmensen.nl), for bringing people into contact with each other, the
first oriented to street residents and the second to sportspeople, are illustrative in this
connection. The government should emphatically support related public initiatives. This
aspect of encounter should be given a place in developing or redeveloping areas. The
government therefore aims to arrange public services such that people come into contact
with each other more. The government can use design and planning to encourage the
creation at a higher district level of mechanisms in which people from different
neighbourhoods can meet each other. Opportunities include schools, district health
centres and sports facilities.
6.3.2 Bridging leadership
Within organizations of minority groups, the role of leadership figures can have an
important influence on the question of whether or not the group and the members are
oriented to the surrounding society (Canatan et al. 2003; Van Westerloo 2004).
Organizations can be a bridging vehicle towards society, but this requires bridging
leadership. Both positive and negative examples are to be found in research in this area.
A good example of bridging leadership can be found in the research of Fennema et al.
(2000) which shows that the presence and attitude of (among others) leadership figures
in interest groups contributes to minority groups actively participating in local and
national decision-making. Anyone who is strong in their own circle, seems subsequently
to be able to use this power in the established society. Clearly this does not necessarily
45
have to happen, but if it does, it must be valued positively from the perspective of
integration.
‘Bridging leaders’ and ‘bridging organizations’ ensure that their own circle does
not become closed. For instance, neighbourhood migrant workers, sports coaches,
directors or leaders of interest groups can play an informational or supporting role for
their supporters in the field of education, labour, welfare and society. Homework
assistance, language lessons, computer courses and creating opportunities for helping
low skilled and unskilled workers find and keep a job, are of great importance in the
integration of minority groups. Socially oriented mosques and other interest groups that
invest time in their relationship with the neighbourhood or in the school career of young
people, play a bridging role in the process.
Because the attitude of leadership figures has authority and influence among a
broad group of supporters, the national government should encourage bridging
leadership as much as possible. This form of this support could be moral, financial, or
psychological. Moral support could be through expressing appreciation for the projects
and activities of individuals, groups and organizations that promote integration.
Financial support could be through, for example, making ‘outward’ looking sports
federations, religious movements or cultural societies eligible for grants. Psychological
support could be provided by the government being aware of its example function. If
well-qualified leaders from minority groups were to be represented in national
government and other functions, that would lead to forms of positive recognition and
identification in their ‘own’ group. This could be a counterbalance to the negative tone
in which minority groups are so often discussed in newspapers or on television.
6.3.3 Improving the socio-economic position
It is important from the perspective of social cohesion that minority groups achieve
higher educational qualifications on average than they do now, and subsequently move
on to senior positions. Progress of this kind will generally also promote the awareness
of and orientation on Dutch society among minority groups. Better educated members
of minority groups often have more and better contacts with the Dutch native
‘majority’. An additional advantage is that the government has much experience with
instruments for improving the position of minority groups. If it proves possible to use
these instruments with greater success, then better links will be forged between groups
through education and the workplace.
The educational performance of minority groups has improved considerably in
recent years, although considerable disadvantage still exists. However, the situation on
the labour market gives more cause for concern. The great unemployment among
minority groups in the early 1990s has fortunately disappeared, but in the past year
unemployment, certainly among younger minority groups, has increased again rapidly
in relative terms (SCP 2003). Direct and indirect discrimination in recruitment and
selection has blocked the influx of ethnic minorities into the labour market (SCP 2003).
For example, almost 40% of small and medium-sized companies employ no members of
non-Western minority groups (Stichting Trendmeter 2004). Of particular concern is that
the more highly educated members of minority groups are relatively unsuccessful in
finding good jobs after their education.
It is striking that in recent years the government has terminated much labour
market policy that was oriented specifically to minority groups, in spite of this policy's
partial effectiveness. Among the examples are the incentive projects for migrant groups
46
(SPAG), in which minority groups were helped into the labour market through intensive
one-to-one mediation. Another is the SME covenant, which according to the evaluation
has helped as many as 70,000 job-seekers (including 62,000 from minority groups) to
find work (Dagevos 2003). Another example is the cutback in entry level and step-up
jobs, known as 'ID jobs', which provide opportunities for social motivation to the
bottom layer of the labour market, which contains relatively many members of minority
groups. We finally mention the announced amendment to the weighting rule in
education. If this continues, there is a risk that less money will be available for schools
with many disadvantaged pupils from minority groups.
The policy task is therefore: improve the socio-economic position of minority
groups. There are various ways in which the government can achieve this aim. The
government could formulate ambitious targets for educational performance and labour
market participation, and then especially of more highly trained members of minority
groups. This measure could also promote the entrepreneurship of minority groups. A
further recommendation is to continue, possibly in a new guise, properly evaluated
measures from the past, such as the SME covenant and the incentive projects for
migrant groups (SPAG).
6.4 Conclusion
The question behind these recommendations was: how can we organize social cohesion
in a society that is characterized by concentration trends in various domains? The
standard answer to this question would be: through a deconcentration policy. In these
recommendations, the RMO has pointed out the limitations of this deconcentration
policy. We then outlined the contours of a broader strategy, a central part of which is the
concept of the culture of difference. This principle calls on the government to develop
three successive policy directions in harmony. To start with, it is important to establish
and maintain a clear communal framework. This framework then creates the space
within which differences between groups, people and institutions can be both
productive and tolerable. The boundaries of this framework determine the space for
differences. Thirdly, it is necessary to organize links between organizations and people
and the surrounding society. We then translated these three lines of development into
general and specific recommendations, which are summarized briefly below. These are
outline recommendations, which can be elaborated in specific situations .
Unity
• Basic democratic values
o Strengthen the communication of basic democratic values and conduct in
education, religion and community work.
• Dutch language
o Invest in the command of the Dutch language.
o Improve the quality of early and preschool education and make it more
accessible.
• Communal stories
o Reassess communal stories or histories and include all the population in
this process.
Diversity
• Individuality of the neighbourhood in the heterogeneous district
47
•
•
•
Ties
•
•
•
o Aim in spatial policy for more individuality of neighbourhoods in the
heterogeneous district.
o Encourage home ownership, while protecting private sector tenants.
o Let residents influence changes in their neighbourhood.
o Increase the choice on the housing market for all income categories.
Quality at school and in the neighbourhood
o Promote the quality and the livability of deprived areas and
concentration schools.
o Mobilize public initiatives to this end.
Transparency of social organizations
o Ensure that ‘migrant organizations’ are transparent and approachable.
Dutch Islam
o Set up Dutch imam training.
o Encourage precedence for Dutch-trained imams in the mosque. The
Dutch language should also be used in the mosque.
Contact and interaction
o Aim, where separate contexts exist, to encourage links on various scales.
This aim can be achieved by organizing joint projects and activities in
various fields, as well as by building up interchange and friendly
relationships between schools and organizations.
o It is in concentration neighbourhoods and concentration schools that
communal sport and recreational facilities are most needed.
Bridging leadership
o Because leadership figures can have a significant influence on whether or
not ethnic minorities focus on the surrounding society, it is important to
encourage ‘bridging leadership’ in all groups. This encouragement could
be moral (expressing appreciation), but could equally be financial (by
providing support), or organizational (by working together with 'bridging
leaders').
Improving the socio-economic position
o From the viewpoint of social cohesion, reducing the disadvantages
encountered by minority groups is urgent. Therefore, improve the labour
market position of minority groups and set ambitious targets, in
particular for more highly-trained minority groups.
o Reintroduce effective policy from the past, possibly in a new guise. The
SME covenant and the incentive projects for migrant groups (SPAG) are
among the examples. Also encourage entrepreneurship among minority
groups.
48
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Notes
i
The RMO does not address the group of Western ethnic minorities, which is approximately equal in size
to the group of non-Western ethnic minorities (SCP 2004: 135). Neither do we address the temporary,
highly qualified migrant workers who are being admitted into the Netherlands.
ii
ChristenUnie (2004), Kiezen voor Nederland. Notitie integratiebeleid (Christian Party, Choosing for the
Netherlands. Integration policy document); D66 (2004), De anderen, dat zijn wij. Een sociaal-liberaal
tegengeluid (Democrats, The others, that's us. a social-liberal voice of dissent; GroenLinks (2004), Nota
over de multiculturele samenleving (The Greens, Memorandum on the multicultural society); Lijst Pim
Fortuyn (2004), Deltaplan integratie. De moeite waard om Nederlander te zijn (the party founded by
populist Pim Fortuyn, who was murdered in 2002, Integration national emergency plan. Worthwhile
being Dutch); Partij van de Arbeid (2004), Integratie en immigratie: Aan het werk! Standpunten voor het
partijdebat in de vorm van 35 stellingen (Labour Party, Integration and immigration: set to work! Points
of view for the party debate in the form of 35 assertions); SP (2004), Van apart naar samen. Deltaplan
voor een geïntegreerde samenleving (Socialists, From separate to together. A national emergency plan
for an integrated society); VVD (2004),Beleidsnotitie integratie van niet-westerse migranten in
Nederland (Liberals, Policy memorandum on the integration of non-Western migrants in the
Netherlands); Wetenschappelijk Instituut voor het CDA (2003), Investeren in integratie. Reflecties
rondom diversiteit en gemeenschappelijkheid (Christian Democrats, Investing in integration. Reflections
on diversity and community).
iii
In 2004 the municipality of Rotterdam expressed a wish to conduct a deconcentration policy for schools
on the basis of double waiting lists. The response of the minister of Education, Culture and Science
(OCW) to this initiative was to ask the Education Council for its opinion on the legal feasibility, the
possible desirability of double waiting lists of this kind and any alternatives for countering educational
segregation (Ministry of Education, Culture and Science (OCW) 2004c).
iv
However, Vermeulen observes that although the law is indeed incompatible with compulsory
deconcentration, it ultimately acquiesces to the facts, for example under the pressure of circumstances, or
in anticipation of criticism and interventions (Vermeulen 2001: 210).
v
In November 2003, the minister issued a document outlining the changes in the funding of the policy on
eliminating educational disadvantage. Among the objectives of the changes was to combine resources for
policy on eliminating educational disadvantage and weighting rules in a single new regulation, the
criterion of which would be the actual disadvantage of the pupil (Ministry of Education, Culture and
Science (OCW) 2003).
vi
It would be even better if newly arrived immigrants were able to say ‘this is now also my country’.
vii
Arguments for incorporating Islam in Dutch society, as here, are often interpreted as arguing for
establishing an Islamic pillar in the best tradition of pillarization (see e.g. Cliteur 2003 or Scheffer in
Appendix 3). This is definitely not what we are proposing. A case for developing a pillar for Islam is
neither possible nor desirable in the current circumstances. The differences in the position of minority
groups now relative to the pillared population groups in the past are, as also explained in Appendix 3,
such as to render a repetition of the relative success of pillarization (in the social incorporation of
minority groups) impossible. One characteristic of the pillared population groups of the previous century
was that all social layers were represented in each of the pillars. The top layers of the pillars maintained
intensive reciprocal contact, so that conflicts were defused. The pillars at any rate did have an identifiable
and widely accepted top layer. Finally, the pillars, despite all the differences, did promote communal
matters, such as language and participation in the political process. All the above is far removed from
Islam in the Netherlands. The vast majority of Dutch Muslims currently have a low educational level. An
Islamic pillar would therefore represent only one social layer. It is also true that large national and local
differences exist within the Islamic community. There is no question of a single community, with clear
57
leaders and central institutions. An Islamic pillar would furthermore be rather lonely in the bare Dutch
post-pillarization landscape.
58