Download Contemporary Civilization and Women

Attributed To: Contemporary Civilization Instructor Staff
Date: Electronic Version, August 1998
Contemporary Civilization and Women: Plato, Aristotle, Livy and Machiavelli
Plato and Aristotle:
As Susan Moller Okin notes in her book, Women in Western Political Thought
(Princeton University Press, 1979), till very recently social and political thought has been
written for men, about men, and by men. One of the reasons for this, Okin argues, is that
this tradition of thought is flawed at its very roots by assumptions concerning the
naturalness of hierarchy and inequality -- between classes, races and nations) but also
between the two sexes. Both Plato and Aristotle formulated arguments that have had
powerful and enduring consequences. So there are a number of ways in which the utility
of examining Plato’s Republic and Aristotle’s Politics can be justified in terms of the
current debate concerning feminism and the ‘nature’ and ‘proper place’ of women.
Firstly as Okin does most directly, we can see the philosophical roots of both the de jure
and de facto subordination of women in Western society. And furthermore, we can
understand why, when women’s de jure position has been formally equalized with that of
men, the de facto situation of subordination and inequality largely remains. That is to say
woman as household manager and bearer/raiser of children has relegated her to the
private, familial sphere, and to virtues and a nature appropriate to this role and function.
Secondly, and a corollary of the first, an examination of Plato’s and Aristotle’s thought
injects us into the mainstream of the fundamental debate about nature and convention.
Here, the debate over the naturalness as against the historically (conventionally) of the
family, and thus the proper sphere of women: (public or private?), is central to the
thought of both Plato and Aristotle.
Thirdly, one can come to appreciate the extent to which sexist attitudes have been
constantly reproduced by reputable scholars --sometimes even importing a more intense
sexism into their interpretations of thinkers (like Plato) than is in fact there. Here I am
thinking particularly of Strauss’ and Bloom’s deformations of Plato.
Fourthly, and most generally. attention to the portrayal of women in the tradition of
Western socio-political thought can fundamentally transform the way we see not only
that tradition, but also Western history itself.
Plato's Republic
(It may be useful to note that Plato’s ideas do not just come bolting out of the blue, and
that by the 4th. C. BCE the status of women was a live issue in Greek politics and
thought).
The first mention of women in the guardian class is made in Book IV 423e/424a.
Socrates’ friends remind him of this in Book V 449c and press him on the necessity to
elaborate this proposal. This discussion continues till 466e. Along the way, even in Book
V, there are some paradoxes to resolve, e.g. at 469d where stripping a corpse slain in
battle is described as "womanish and small-minded". Such comments can -– though need
not necessarily nor convincingly -- be resolved by treating them as references to the way
women were in contemporary Athenian society -- subordinate (and distorted and
stunted)--and have no necessary bearing on their potential, or intrinsic nature; or as
merely literary devices, a matter of the quasi- ‘novelistic’ structure.
References to women in the Republic other than in Book V which are less than flattering
to women/femaleness, can be found at 387d/e; 388; 395d; 398e; 431c; 579b/c; 557a-c;
563b; There is one major affirmation of the presence of women in the guardian class
outside of Book V to balance the above disparaging passages at 540 c/d, which stresses
the difficulty of such a proposal, but that it is "somehow possible".
There have been various approaches to Plato that have been taken on this issue:
1.Plato is making absurd proposals just to show in fact that the ideal city à la Republic is
impossibly utopian (Bloom, Strauss)
2.Plato’s logic and philosophy here suffer "lapses." (Cornford)
3.Plato fully shared the misogynistic tradition of classical Greece but the nature and
momentum of his argument in the Republic in re communal property and wives, and the
abolition of the family, both enabled and forced him to make a step forward concerning
women--but which remained consistent in general terms with the ‘misogynistic tradition’:
i.e. Plato gives women ‘equal opportunity’, even though they are usually inferior to men.
(Okin)
4."It is quite wrong to think of Plato as ‘the first feminist his arguments are
unacceptable...and the proposals made in Republic Book V are irrelevant to the
contemporary debate." Julia Annas ‘Plato’s Republic arid Feminism’ Philosophy 51 1976
(p.307)
5."The feminism of Plato is exemplary and unparalleled in philosophy or political
theory." A. Rosenthal Monist ‘Feminism Without Contradictions’ 1973
The Bloom/Strauss interpretation seems basically to be one to save Plato from the
common charge of making utopian, impractical, irrational, or, more usually, unnatural
proposals here. Given the obvious defensiveness of Plato, it is easy to see how Strauss
and Bloom came up with their thesis--which yet betrays a sexism greater than Plato’s!
See Okin’s critique, esp. pp. 40, 305-8; also Christine Pierce ‘Equality: Republic V’
Monist vol. 57, No. 1 Jan. 1973. Essentially, to accept Bloom’s and Strauss’ overly
gymnastic arguments you have to see Plato as saying one thing but really meaning
something quite different. The problem with this is that Plato is continually having
Socrates stress how his ideas may seem new and strange, but that they indeed possible to
implement.
It seems to me that Okin and Pierce effectively impugn the Bloom/Strauss thesis that
Plato has merely contrived an elaborate and subtle joke in the Republic. It is concluded
that Plato is serious and sincere in his proposals. But what is the true nature of these
proposals? Here Annas’ article is useful. She ridicules the idea of Plato as a feminist,
while conceding that he made some important steps forward in this respect. She stresses
how Plato’s argument for allowing women into the guardian class is cast entirely in
utilitarian terms, and that Plato has no conception of rights; nor is he concerned with the
happiness or fulfillment of women, or that liberating them from the (stifling) confines of
the conventional Athenian role can be a sufficient motive here.(Of course, it is not
surprising that Plato doesn’t talk of Women’s rights, because he doesn't have a theory of
rights at all--he doesn’t talk of men’s rights either). Annas notes, too, amongst other
points repeated by Okin that outside of the guardian class, Plato leaves women in their
traditional subordination (and household/procreative roles) even in his ideal state. Annas’
conclusion is that: "Mill begins the subjection of women with the statement that the
subordination of one sex to the other is wrong in itself. It seems...[to me] that to be a
feminist one has to begin from this point. But it is a point that Plato never reaches. And it
is not surprising that he never reaches it, for he is not going in that direction at all."
Okin’s treatment of Plato (and Aristotle) and women is the fullest we have: she argues, in
effect, that Plato could have been a feminist if only he had followed his own
fundamental, general principles through to their logical conclusions. That is to say, Plato
does not follow his own admonitions in his discussions of women: his warning that
superficial appearances often don’t indicate the essence of something; and that to
discover the nature of something we have to disentangle the impact of environment from
nature. According to 0kin, the important point is that Plato accorded greater weight to
education and the environment over innate qualities. Given Plato’s priority on nurture,
why does he not then argue that) due to the injustices etc. of contemporary Athenian
society, no one knows what the essential nature of women really is. This clearly is the
logical implication of Plato’s general argument in re the impact of education and
environment i.e. Plato does not employ his ‘environmentalist’ argument to win over his
skeptical audience.
Why is this? Okin’s cake-and-eat-it-too thesis. Plato can (a) retain the misogynistic
tradition (b) yet still admit women to the guardian class on the basis of equal opportunity
(c) retain the sympathies of his audience -- concede something to deeply-felt traditional
attitudes so he could avoid being dismissed as a completely ridiculous crank. More
importantly,(d) the power and momentum of his communistic argument carry him to a
conclusion that he had not foreseen and which he is somewhat uncomfortable with.
0kin adduces support for this view from: (1) the inconsistencies and paradoxes of Plato’s
thought here, and (2) the general context of classical Greece’s patriarchal, elitist and
misogynistic culture.
It should be noted, nevertheless, that according to Okin, Plato is distinctive in the
classical tradition in that he applied a single standard of human morality and excellence
to all, regardless of their role and position in society (Okin, p. 66) And here 0kin is
prepared to say that the "importance" of Plato’s passages in the Republic on arete and the
irrelevance of gender to it(to an extent "in the gradual universalizing of ethical values
must not be underestimated."
Aristotle’s Politics
To Aristotle, women are not merely conventionally --factually, actually -- deprived of the
highest good. but also constitutionally--naturally, by their very make-up, intrinsically-unfitted for and incapable of that good. They are the "monstrous regiment... [of] infertile
males."
Book I and the opening pages of Book II have much that is directly relevant to this issue.
Aristotle’s examination of various associations and their internal authority structures has
him employing the central-idea of a compound and the naturalness of its division into
ruling and ruled elements for the benefit of both. Throughout, Aristotle is committed to
the idea of the naturalness of the family -- unlike Plato who regarded it as merely an
institution existing by convention and the abolition of which both freed and forced him to
open up the guardian class to women. It is vital to note here, then, the crucial linkage
between the idea of the naturalness of the family and women’s subordination to men, the
assumption of their intrinsic (incorrigible) inferiority, and their relegation to the private
and familial sphere.
Aristotle describes the husband’s rule over his wife as "that of a statesman over fellow
citizens", which he distinguishes from the father’s relationship to his children which is
more like that of a "monarch over subjects". Aristotle continues: "The male is naturally
fitter to command than the female, except where there is some departure from nature."
etc. Such views are subsumed within Aristotle’s well-known views on the variegated,
functional nature of goodness. and the naturalness of the hierarchy based on ruling and
ruled elements as a "general law"(I, Ch. XIII #6). See also 1277b #16-18, 1278b #7 from
Bk. II.
In Book II Aristotle focuses on rejecting Plato’s proposals in the Republic -- natural
enough given the arguments and conclusions he had reached in Book I. Aristotle is not
always accurate or fair in his criticisms of Plato here. Okin stresses that Aristotle’s
counter-arguments are weak, and thus that their significance lies in the fact that Aristotle
finds them sufficient , and thence he is able to conclude that the private household and
family is the natural and necessary base for social life. Like Plato, Aristotle assumes that
once this is settled, so is woman’s natural/required place and role. Hence, he feels it
unnecessary (and doesn't) to address the issue of equal education and opportunities for
women of Plato’s Book V.
It is essential to note too that Aristotle is firmly within the classical Greek tradition of a
variable application of terms and standards. People are capable of a goodness and
excellence consonant with their natures. And, in particular, women are not capable of the
highest arete was entirely masculine, noble and leisured). This was the powerful tradition
that Plato(via Socrates) was challenging in the Republic. It is the tradition which Aristotle
fully accepts.
See also 1269b #5-13; 1270a #11; 1278b #7; Thereafter, direct references to women are
few and far between till Book V, Ch. XI 1313b #7; 1314b #23 Book VI, Ch. IV 1319b;
See also Aristotle’s discussion of marriage, procreation and the foetus: Book VII, Ch.
XVI. esp. 1335a #6, #8
Okin writes in some detail about the difference in temper between Aristotle -and Plato:
the latter critical, questioning, capable of quite radical proposals, the former seeking to
find out how the world is and why, and tending to see what is as what must be and could
only be. This attitudes pervades all of Aristotle’s thought--natural ethical, political.
Aristotle’s assumptions and inclinations are conservative and function not merely to
explain but also to justify the status quo(Okin pp. 73-4, 80-i). Why? 0kin sees Aristotle as
pushing an essentially functionalist argument: if something exists it must have a purpose,
if it continues to exist it must be performing its proper function.
The guiding conviction and assumption of Aristotle that leads to all his subsequent
reasoning here is that the good life is attainable only by a small minority of one sex.
Why? One needs the requisite intrinsic capacity and sufficient possessions to enable
leisure and the cultivation of reason: i.e. riches, friends, leisure, noble birth etc. This
elitism is defined not merely in terms of gender but class(artisans etc) and nature
independent of gender(slaves).
Okin is useful also for the context and tradition in which Aristotle’s thought is imbedded
and for some of his important and revealing ideas in sources other than the Politics.
Okin concludes with her fundamental point: the circularity of Aristotle’s reasoning
"proving" the inferiority of women. He begins from the initial assumption that the free,
leisured male is the top of the human scale and all other humans are defined by their
function in relation to him. These hierarchical, patriarchal, and functionalist assumptions
then lead ipso facto to proving what he wanted to prove ab_initio. What Okin sees
Aristotle doing is (ahistorically) arguing the naturalness of the Athenian socio-political
structure and the familial basis it rested on --and thus concluding the natural inferiority of
women.
Okin’s fundamental theses
The conception of women formulated by Aristotle and Plato derives from their
conceptions of the woman’s relationship to the family. If the family is regarded as natural
or necessary they define woman according to her sexual, procreative, child-rearing and
household functions. This produces a code of morality and a conception of ‘rights’
distinctly different from that prescribed for men. Biological differences via the
naturalness or necessity of the family produce and legitimate conventional and
institutional differences according to gender. (See Barber’s review of Okin’s book
attached).
See also William J. Booth’s ‘Politics and the Household: A Commentary on Aristotle’s
Politics Book One’ History of Political, Vol. II No. 2 Summer June 1981. Booth explains
at length how Aristotle’s conception of the naturalness of the family and of the authority
structures within--which involves the natural, permanent condition of slavery the natural,
permanent condition of being ruled for the wife and daughters; the natural, temporary
condition of being ruled for the male children -- is crucial for his reaching a solution to
the political problem: who should have authority, and why.
SOME ADDITIONAL NOTES ON PLATO, ARISTOTLE,AND WOMEN
It should now be clear that a substantial historiographical debate emerged, especially in
the seventies, as to (a) whether Republic V reveals Plato as a precocious feminist,and/or
(b) the nature and extent of this alleged feminism. While this historiography varies in
tone and intent, it largely falls within the ‘Greeks as misogynists’ approach, with Plato as
the best of a less than desirable bunch-- Arlene Saxonhouse’s articles are interesting
exceptions here.
The following articles continue the debate:
Brian Calvert ‘Plato and the Equality of Women’ Phoenix 28-29 1974-75
An article of general usefulness, more immediately accessible than some, which
concentrates on Republic V. .Rejects the Grote, Barker, Bloom claim that Plato envisages
even the best women as inevitably inferior to the best men, since Calvert argues this
would make the inclusion of women in the guardian class as logically contradictory to
Plato’s own definition of justice. Calvert concedes that Plato says that men as a class are
superior to women but he understands Plato as also arguing that some women are as
worthy as the best men, and hence deserve inclusion in the guardian class. Though
rescuing Plato from the charge of inconsistency here, Calvert nevertheless concludes that,
overall, Plato is inconsistent, hesitant, and vacillating in his attitudes toward women, and
that his reasoning suffers "backsliding" and lapses": Plato cannot fully break away from
his chauvinist society: novel and traditional views are intertwined, eg. women can be
guardians, but they are owned as communal property by the male guardians (see the
debate on this point between Pomeroy and Fortenbaugh, reference below). In his overall
thesis Calvert is, I think, somewhat vulnerable.
Dorothea Wender ‘Plato: Misogynist, Paedophile, and Feminist’ Arethusa vol. 6,
(1973)1.
Witty, even cheeky, speculative. Plato as the "woman-hater who championed women",
and yet was "extraordinarily full of the tension of ambivalence". Wender’s thesis centres
directly on Plato’s homosexuality: Since he disliked women he was not averse to
schemes to change them; and he was not particularly afraid of them, since they couldn’t
use their sexuality against him. Plato, as a homosexual, was temperamentally subversive
(!) hence the congeniality to him of revolutionary proposals in-re Women. Thus, Wender
sees Plato as a feminist because he was a misogynist. Wender develops this argument
rather sketchily.
S.B. Pomeroy ‘Feminism in Book V of Plato’s Republic’ Apeiron VIII (1974) No. 1
W. Fortenbaugh ‘On Plato’s Feminism in Republic V’ Apeiron IX: (1975) No. 2
In two very brief articles, Pomeroy claims, and Fortenbaugh rejects. that women
guardians are owned as communal property by the men guardians. If Pomeroy is correct-and this can only by judged by those with the appropriate language skills--this would
threaten Okin’s thesis of the connection between private property, monogamous
marriage, and the inferior status of women.