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The Problem of Proportionalism, Formation of Correct Conscience and
The Moral Act Applied to Contraception
By
Daniel Gannon
[email protected]
Copyright © 2011 Deacon Daniel Gannon
Introduction
The great encyclical of Pope John Paul II, Veritatis Splendor, sets out the teaching of
the Catholic Church regarding the morality of human acts and the formation of correct
conscience, noting that the relationship between God’s law and man’s freedom, “which
has its intimate and living center in the moral conscience, is manifested and realized in
human acts.”1 It is through such human acts that, “man attains perfection as man”.2 The
purpose of the encyclical was to set forth moral teaching based on Sacred Scripture and
Apostolic Tradition, in response to dissent, and to, “shed light on the presuppositions and
consequences of the dissent which that teaching has met.”3 We will briefly highlight the
Church’s teaching on the morality of human acts and correct formation of conscience and
attempt, with the mind of the Church, to illuminate the consequences of Proportionalism,
with reference to the issue of contraception.4
Conscience and the Moral Act
We should begin by making two important observations: First, it is important to
understand the sources and authority by which the Catholic Church sets forth her
teaching regarding the morality of human acts and the rightly formed conscience. The
Church looks to the sacred sources of Sacred Scripture, revealed by God; Tradition,
which is guided by the Holy Spirit; and the Magisterium of the Church, “whose authority
is exercised in the name of Jesus Christ. This teaching office is not above the word of
God, but serves it.”5 These sacred sources communicate God’s law, His saving love and
life to man in his fallen human nature, who is in need of Revelation as an effective means
of knowing moral truths.6 Second, the Church explains the moral act as “human”
specifically because it is an act which proceeds from free will with a knowledge of the
end.7 Given these two fundamental starting points, we see the Church’s moral teaching as
articulating God’s law (Revelation or via “natural law”) and man’s free response to
God’s law in his moral conscience – as a critical focal point for examining how moral
actions are construed as good or evil.8 Conscience is where the link between freedom and
truth is realized.9
Deep within his conscience man discovers a law which he has not laid upon himself but which he
must obey. Its voice, ever calling him to love and to do what is good and to avoid evil, sounds in
his heart at the right moment. . . . For man has in his heart a law inscribed by God. . . . His
conscience is man's most secret core and his sanctuary. There he is alone with God whose voice
echoes in his depths.10
Man’s freedom and conscience must be grounded in objective truth. Conscience does
not invent truth, but is correctly formed when it conforms to the truth of God’s law to
make a practical judgment in a particular case.11 Some modern ethicists view God’s law
or authority as limiting human freedom, but in fact, God’s law and truth and promotes
true freedom.12 While Catholic teaching moves from objective norms and laws to
subjective intention, the erroneous theories, above, reverse this and begin with subjective
intent, and work back to describe the moral quality of objective actions.13 Certain modern
ethicists’ assertions of such a ‘false autonomy’ suggest not the ‘truth which sets free,’ but
freedom from the truth; reducing man to his subjectivity does not liberate, but enslaves.14
Veritatis Splendor explains, “It is always from the truth that the dignity of conscience
derives. In the case of a correct conscience, it is a question of the objective truth received
by man; in the case of the erroneous conscience, it is a question of what man, mistakenly,
subjectively considers to be true.”15 Cardinal Newman called Truth the ‘middle term’
between authority and subjectivity, and Cardinal Ratzinger observed that subjective
conviction and lack of doubts and scruples therefrom do not justify man.16 In sum, a
correct, truly free conscience is founded on and conformed to objective truth, via the
sacred sources and natural law, and through man’s ‘connaturality’17 (loving, virtueinspired knowledge) with the Supreme Good.18
Moving from these fundamental principles of freedom, truth and conscience leads us to
consider the relevant factors in predicating good or evil actions. “A morally good act
requires the goodness of the object, of the end, and of the circumstances together.").19
The “object”(finis operas) denotes the kind of act, the “what” in “What is going on here,
morally?’ Veritatis Splendor states, “The morality of the human act depends primarily
and fundamentally on the ‘object’ rationally chosen by the deliberate will … it is the
proximate end of a deliberate decision which determines the act of willing on the part of
the acting person.”20 Because it is the source of every action and determines it by its end,
intention “is an element essential to the moral evaluation of an action.”21 A good moral
act requires a right intention, viz. ordered to God’s law and His glory.22 However, the
intention of the person (which denotes ‘why’ or for what purpose or end one acts) is not
sufficient for an act to be good, but a “correct choice of actions” is needed with regard to
the object – viz. “whether that object is capable or not of being ordered to God.”23 The
Catechism explains that, “circumstances, including the consequences are secondary
elements of the moral act. They contribute to increasing or diminishing the moral
goodness or evil of human acts. Circumstances of themselves cannot change the moral
quality of acts themselves; they can make neither good nor right an action that is in itself
evil.”24
The elucidation of the three key elements for evaluating the morality of an act brings us
to another critical point of clarity. That is, “The primary and decisive element for moral
judgment is the object of the human act … reason attests that there are objects of the
human act which are by their nature incapable of being ordered to God, because they
radically contradict the good of the person made in his image.”25 Such acts are called
“intrinsically evil” (intrinsece malum) acts, which are “always and per se…on account of
their very object, and quite apart from the ulterior intentions of the one acting and the
circumstances.”26 Intent and circumstances cannot, in themselves, be dispositive of the
moral quality of an act. Some intrinsically evil acts (e.g. adultery, abortion, contraception,
murder) may be deemed evil – apart from the consideration of intention or
circumstances.27 This is not to say that intent or circumstances do not importantly affect
the imputability of a moral act – a person may subjectively be more or less guilty (ie.
culpa - mortal vs. venial sin) depending on the presence of mitigating circumstances or
intention, but the act itself remains a malum in itself.28 While the actor’s guilt may be
diminished in a given intrinsically evil act, a good intention or mitigating circumstances
never make behavior, which is intrinsically evil by virtue of its object, good or just.29
The Error of Proportionalism
As stated above, the essential purpose of Veritatis Splendor was to set forth authentic
teaching on the morality of acts (which we have summarized, above), but also to respond
to dissenting “teleological ethical theories”, specifically, proportionalism and
consequentialism.30 We will examine the error of proportionalism in light of the Church
teaching set forth in Veritatis Splendor and the Catechism.
Proportionalists error is, in essence, the denial of the existence of universal negative
norms.31 Contrary to the Church’s teaching that some acts are “always and per se” evil by
their object, they aver that it is “impossible to qualify as morally evil according to its
species – its ‘object’… specific acts, apart from a consideration of the intention … or the
totality of the foreseeable consequences [or circumstances] of that act….”32 They assert
one may not deem an action good or evil until one considers all dimensions of an act,
including the circumstances and intention which leads one to, for example, use
contraception.33 Proportionalists’ argument can be described as holding an intrinsically
evil act, such as contraception, could be a morally good choice if some greater good
(consequence) is achievable by the act or some proportionate reason is present to justify
the choice.34 While holding certain ‘formal norms’ are true and universal in nature,
proportionalists maintain ‘material’ (concrete) norms are different – they are not
universally true, but in particular, concrete acts, one must leave open the potential that a
normally moral evil may not be so if it may bring about greater goods justified by
proportionate reasons for doing so.35
Proportionalists like Richard McCormick claim Pope John Paul II misrepresented their
position, stating they do not deny the object is the basis for moral judgment in some
cases, but they merely “insist on looking in all dimensions of the act before saying it is
morally wrong.”36 McCormick also claims Veritatis Splendor falsely characterizes
proportionalists as attempting “to justify morally wrong actions by a good intention.”
However, the encyclical doesn’t say this. It says, in essence, “proportionalism is a theory
by which , in concrete cases, you can justify as morally right what the Church teaches to
be universally, semper et pro semper, wrong.”37 The Pope rejects proportionalism for
denying some negative precepts which refer universally to certain kinds of behavior one
may never choose.38 Fr. Brian Mullady effectively points out that McCormick’s saying
“all dimensions” (viz. including intent and circumstances) must be considered before
declaring what the Church calls an ‘intrinsically evil’ act – “wrong”… is to essentially
deny the Church’s assertion that the, “primary and decisive element for moral judgment
is the object of the human act, which establishes whether it is capable of being ordered to
the good and to the ultimate end, which is God.”39
Thus, the proportionalist ethic shows itself to be unfaithful to the teaching of the
Church, since, as explained above, the Church teaches some actions are “always and per
se” evil, before one even considers intent or circumstances surrounding an act.
Proportionalism, contrary to Church teaching about objective moral norms, reduces all
morality to a person’s subjective calculations, rejecting universal negative norms. This is
radically opposed to what we alluded to at the beginning – viz. that only God decides
what is good or evil, and this is communicated via Scripture, Tradition and the
Magisterium. Proportionalism is also a relativistic theory, in that, moral good or evil is
always relative to the person’s subjective calculations regarding the consequences of an
action; it is an extrinsic theory as there is nothing intrinsic to the act which determines its
moral quality – only extrinsic dimensions such as consequence or proportionate
reasons.40 At the root of this error is the invention of a “double status of moral truth”,
which separates and even opposes the universal, general norm and the particular norm of
individual conscience, the latter becoming the final determinant of the good.41 As noted
above, John Paul II explained how the dignity of conscience derives from the truth about
the good, and that conscience bears witness to the authority of divine and natural law.
Conscience rightly formed must conform to and reflect the truth about the good, not
invent its own autonomous standards of judgment and action.42 Acceptance of the
authority of the Magisterium and its standing with Scripture and Tradition is at the root of
the problem of proportionalism.43
Application to Contraception
Regarding contraception, Pope Paul VI clearly noted that conscience should be
conformed to the Magisterium of the Church, which is the definitive authority conscience
must look to for guidance. Consistent with our analysis above, he states that Church
teaching is “founded on the natural law, illuminated and enriched by divine revelation.”44
Humanae Vitae acknowledges the relationship of responsible parenthood “to the
objective moral order established by God, of which a right conscience is the faithful
interpreter.”45 Paul VI lays down that conscience does not invent moral order or truth, but
correctly receives its formation from the Church – as a preface to his saying that parents
“are not free to proceed completely at will, as if they could determine in a wholly
autonomous way the honest path to follow, but they must conform their activity to the
creative intention of God…”46 Contraception is described definitively as being,
“intrinsically disorder”, that is, intrinsically evil because it is “in contradiction with the
design constitutive of marriage and with the will of the Author of life.”47 Hence,
consistent with the moral teaching of the Church summarized above, Paul VI repudiates
the error of revisionists, relativists and proportionalists when he clarifies that:
To justify conjugal acts made intentionally infecund, one cannot invoke as valid reasons the lesser
evil … it is not licit, even for the gravest reasons, to do evil so that good may follow therefrom,
that is, to make into the object of a positive act of the will something which is intrinsically
disorder… even when the intention is to safeguard…family or social well-being.48
The language of Humanae Vitae could not be clearer: it is unfaithful to Church
teaching, and thus the will of God, for one to assert with the proportionalists,
subjectivists, and relativist ethicists that proportionate reasons may exist such that
contraception may be a morally correct choice. The issue of contraception presents a
plethora of circumstances or ends one might put forward for illicitly regulating birth –
financial crisis, marital problems, living situation, and various other external or emotional
factors.49 Humanae Vitae addresses the situations where, “serious motives” may exist to
space births, and permits the taking into account of natural rhythms of the female cycle
(NFP).50 “The Church is coherent with herself” when she allows this because there are
“essential differences” which distinguish NFP from the intrinsically evil act of
contraception.51 The difference is that NFP works harmoniously with God’s natural
disposition, always leaving the openness to procreation undisturbed by not impeding the
natural process by which we participate with God in the creation of new life.
Contraception does artificially impede this natural process, which is related to the natural
law.52 The objects of these moral acts are different in their orientation toward (NFP) and
against (contraception) God. Therefore, there is no incoherence in this teaching.
Summary
The problem with proportionalism and the formation of correct conscience in light of
Magisterial teaching, while summarized in terms of moral theology, above, boils down
to, as Fr. Pinckaers observes, “the resurgence of the question that was put to St. Paul and
that has been put to the Church throughout its history, in the confrontation between
Gospel and world, between Christian faith and human wisdom, science and culture.”53
Church teaching on intrinsically evil acts, especially on contraception, is resisted
sometimes due to ignorance, but it is essentially due to the weakness of sin and the
temptations of the ‘world’. “Accepting… the disproportion between the law and human
ability (that is, the capacity of the moral forces of man left to himself) kindles the desire
for grace and prepares one to receive it ”, as Pope John Paul says. “Who will deliver me
from this body of death? Asks the Apostle Paul. And in an outburst of joy and gratitude –
he replies: Thanks be to God through Jesus Christ our Lord! ” (Rom 7:24-25)
Endnotes
1
John Paul II, Encyclical Letter, Veritatis Splendor, (August 6th, 1993), n. 71.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid., n. 5 (italics mine)
4
We will do this using Veritatis Splendor, Humanae Vitae and the Catechism of the Catholic Church as our
primary guides to elucidate Church teaching, along with other theologians who are faithful to Magisterial
moral teaching.
5
Second Vatican Ecumenical Council, Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation, Dei Verbum, Ed.
Austin Flannery, O.P., (Dublin, Ireland: Dominican Publications, 1975), n. 10; Cf. Ibid. “It is clear,
therefore, that sacred tradition, Sacred Scripture and the teaching authority of the Church, in accord with
God's most wise design, are so linked and joined together that one cannot stand without the others, and that
all together and each in its own way under the action of the one Holy Spirit contribute effectively to the
salvation of souls.” (Mention morality based on natural law and divine law? Pinckaers?)
6
Cf. Very Rev. William Smith, The Moral Magisterium of John Paul II, Lecture Notes: Holy Apostles
College & Seminary; [Web Mentor Online]; available from http://home.comcast.net/~icuweb/c01302.htm;
Lesson II:4.
7
Cf. Catechism of the Catholic Church, (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1994), 1731-36; Cf.
Ibid.,1731: “Freedom is the power, rooted in reason and will, to act or not to act, to do this or that, and so to
perform deliberate actions on one's own responsibility. By free will one shapes one's own life.”; Cf. Ibid.,
1730: "God willed that man should be 'left in the hand of his own counsel,' so that he might of his own
accord seek his Creator and freely attain his full and blessed perfection by cleaving to him." (citing Sir.
15:14); Cf. Ibid., 1733: “Freedom makes man responsible for his acts to the extent that they are voluntary.”
The significance of free will is connected to the notion of imputability or responsibility. Ethical predication
rests on freely willed action so that the goodness or badness of an act is attributed to the acting person.
Thus, 1732 states: “there is the possibility of choosing between good and evil, and thus of growing in
perfection or of failing and sinning. This freedom characterizes properly human acts. It is the basis of praise
or blame, merit or reproach.”
8
Cf. Those with the gift of faith in Divine Revelation look to Scripture, Tradition and the Church for
guidance regarding God’s law. However, the faithful as well as those who do not believe in Scripture or
God still have that law which is inscribed in their hearts (cf. Rom 2:15), the “natural law”, which is
“nothing other than the light of understanding infused in us by God, whereby we understand what must be
done and what must be avoided. God gave this light and this law to man at creation.” (VS, n. 12); Cf. VS, n.
59, 60: It is in man’s moral conscience that he applies the “objective law” through making a practical
judgment “to a particular case… conscience thus formulates moral obligation in the light of the natural
law…”.
9
Cf. VS, n. 61.
10
CCC, 1776.
11
Cf. VS, n. 59; The Church thus sets itself against the dissenting moral relativists, subjectivists,
consequentialists and proportionalists, who measure the good or evil of actions, not against objective,
certain moral truths, but ultimately – by the individual’s subjective intention or certain circumstances. ; Cf.
n. 60: “The judgment of conscience does not establish the law; rather it bears witness to the authority of the
natural law and of the practical reason with reference to the supreme good.”; Cf. n. 61: “The maturity and
responsibility of these judgments … are not measured by the liberation of the conscience from objective
truth, in favor of an alleged autonomy in personal decisions, but, on the contrary, by an insistent search for
truth and by allowing oneself to be guided by that truth in one’s actions.”
Cf. VS. n. 35 Further, “In contrast, however, some present-day cultural tendencies have given rise to
several currents of thought in ethics which center upon an alleged conflict between freedom and law…
[where the individual have] the right to determine what is good or evil. Human freedom would thus be able
to create values and would enjoy a primacy over truth to the point that truth itself would be considered a
creation of freedom.” ; Cf. Ibid. One need only look to the account of the fall of man in Genesis 2:16-17 to
understand that, “the power to decide what is good and what is evil does not belong to man, but to God
alone.”
12
13
Cf. Smith, op. cit., Lecture II:3
14
Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, Conscience and Truth, www.ewtn.com/library/curia/ratzcons.htm. Such a
view enslaves because any action which is not in conformity with God’s law and truth – steeps one more
and more in the slavery of sin and the slavery of conscience which is increasingly darkened and
desensitized to the truth. Grace helps us see the truth, despite our concupiscence and darkened conscience.
Cf. VS, n. 59, 63: Pope John Paul II continues, “It is never acceptable to confuse a ‘subjective’ error
about moral good with the ‘objective’ truth rationally proposed to man in virtue of his end, or to make the
moral value of an act performed with a true and correct conscience equivalent to the moral value of an act
performed by following the judgment of an erroneous conscience.”; Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, De Veritate,
q. 17, a. 4.;
15
16
Cf. Ratzinger, op. cit., describes two levels of conscience: anamnesis and conscientia. The former is
represented in St. Paul’s characterization of the law with regard to the Gentiles: “When Gentiles who have
not the law do by nature what the law requires, they are a law to themselves, even though they do not have
the law. They show that what the law requires is written on their hearts, while their conscience also bears
witness and their conflicting thoughts accuse or perhaps excuse them on that day when, according to my
gospel, God judges the secrets of men by Christ Jesus.” Thus the commandments of God are not imposed
from without, so much as they are received interiorly from God as a disposition, as St. Augustine held.
Ratzinger makes the insightful comment that the Petrine office is incomprehensible today because we think
of authority in terms which do not allow for bridges between subject and object. Without conscience, there
would be no papacy; the Pope does not impose, “he elucidates the Christian memory and defends it. All the
power the papacy has is the power of conscience.”
17
Cf. VS. n. 63.
Cf. Summa, q. 45 a. 2: It is not just knowledge of God’s law that makes people good – it is necessary but
not sufficient. It requires connaturality with the good – rooted in virtue. St. Thomas states, “Now rectitude
of judgment is twofold: first, on account of perfect use of reason, secondly, on account of a certain
connaturality with the matter about which one has to judge. Thus, about matters of chastity, a man after
18
inquiring with his reason forms a right judgment, if he has learnt the science of morals, while he who has
the habit of chastity judges of such matters by a kind of connaturality. Accordingly, it belongs to the
wisdom that is an intellectual virtue to pronounce right judgment about Divine things after reason has made
its inquiry, but it belongs to wisdom as a gift of the Holy Ghost to judge aright about them on account of
connaturality with them: thus Dionysius says (De Divinis Nominibus ii) that "Hierotheus is perfect in
Divine things, for he not only learns, but is patient of, Divine things."
Now this sympathy or connaturality for Divine things is the result of charity, which unites us to God,
according to 1 Corinthians 6:17: "He who is joined to the Lord, is one spirit." Consequently wisdom which
is a gift, has its cause in the will, which cause is charity, but it has its essence in the intellect, whose act is
to judge aright…”
VS. n. 84: “Only the freedom which submits to the Truth leads the human person to his true good. The
good of the person is to be in the Truth and to do the Truth.”
19
Cf. CCC, 1750, 1755. The object of the choice can by itself vitiate an act in its
entirety. There are some concrete acts - such as fornication – that it is always wrong to choose, because
choosing them entails a disorder of the will, that is, a moral evil.; VS n. 73-83; Cf. CCC, 1752: Intention:
“In contrast to the object, the intention resides in the acting subject. Because it lies at the voluntary source
of an action and determines it by its end, intention is an element essential to the moral evaluation of an
action. The end is the first goal of the intention and indicates the purpose pursued in the action. The
intention is a movement of the will toward the end: it is concerned with the goal of the activity.”; Cf. CCC,
1753: Circumstances: “The circumstances, including the consequences, are secondary elements of a moral
act. They contribute to increasing or diminishing the moral goodness or evil of human acts (for example,
the amount of a theft). They can also diminish or increase the agent's responsibility (such as acting out of a
fear of death). Circumstances of themselves cannot change the moral quality of acts themselves; they can
make neither good nor right an action that is
in itself evil.
VS. n. 78. ; Cf. CCC, 1751: “The object chosen is a good toward which the will deliberately directs itself.
It is the matter of a human act. The object chosen morally specifies the act of the will, insofar as reason
recognizes and judges it to be or not to be in conformity with the true good. Objective norms of morality
express the rational order of good and evil, attested to by conscience.”
20
21
CCC, 1752.
VS, n. 78 supports this as well: “As the Patron of moral theologians and confessors teaches: [St.
Alphonsus de Ligouri] ‘It is not enough to do good works; they need to be done well. For our works to be
good and perfect, they must be done for the sole purpose of pleasing God.” It is also important to note the
opposite scenario where a good act (in its object) is done, but for the wrong intention or end. In such a case,
“an evil end corrupts the action, even if the object is good in itself (such as praying and fasting "in order to
be seen by men).” (cf. CCC, 1755)
22
23
VS. n. 78; Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, (New York: Benziger Brothers, 1947), q. 18, a.
2: “The primary goodness of a moral action is derived from its suitable object.”
24
CCC, 1755.
VS, n. 79 ; Cf. “And why not do evil that good may come?--as some people slanderously charge us with
saying. Their condemnation is just.” (Rom. 3:8)
25
Cf. VS, n. 80. ; Cf. CCC, 1756 “There are acts which, in and of themselves, independently of
circumstances and intentions, are always gravely illicit by reason of their object; such as blasphemy and
26
perjury, murder and adultery. One may not do evil so that good may result from it.” NOTE: It is important
to recall that the authority and source of the Church declaring such acts as intrinsically evil, derives from
the Church’s authorization from Christ and guidance of the Holy Spirit to communicate and interpret
Sacred Scripture, Tradition and the natural law as well.
27
Cf. Ibid.
28
Cf. Janet Smith, Veritatis Splendor, Proportionalism and Contraception, online at:
http://www.archdioceseofdetroit.org/aodonlinesqlimages/shms/faculty/SmithJanet/Publications/MoralPhilo
sophy/VeritatisSplendor.pdf, p. 12; Cf. CCC, 1735: “Imputability and responsibility for an action can be
diminished or even nullified by ignorance, inadvertence, duress, fear, habit, inordinate attachments, and
other psychological or social factors.” Even if an intrinsically evil act is significantly mitigated by
ignorance, circumstances, and the like …it is important to note the act is not making the person more
virtuous, it is not moving the person towards God, but draws the person further away from the true good in
favor of the apparent good.
Cf. VS, n. 81 “If acts are intrinsically evil, a good intention or particular circumstances can diminish their
evil, but they cannot remove it. They remain ‘irremediably’ evil acts; per se and in themselves they are not
capable of being ordered to God and to the good of the person … ‘As for acts which are themselves sins …
St. Augustine writes … who would dare affirm that, by doing them for good motives (causis bonis) they
would no longer be sins, or, what is even more absurd, that they would be sins that are justified?’ …
Circumstances or intentions can never transform an act intrinsically evil by virtue of its object into an act
‘subjectively’ good or defensible as a choice.” ; Cf. CCC, 1753-6.
29
VS, n. 75; Janet Smith, op. cit., p. 2 notes: “Veritatis Splendor was not written as an academic response to
proportionalism. Rather, it was written to clarify Church teaching and to assert some fundamental Catholic
moral principles that proportionalists have called into question…indeed, it will often appear that there is
some distortion of the views of proportionalists because Veritatis Splendor resolutely speaks in the
terminology of the Magisterium, a terminology that proportionalism has to some extent redefined.”
30
31
Cf. William May, An Introduction to Moral Theology, (Huntington, Indiana: Our Sunday Visitor, 2003),
p. 292.
32
VS, n. 79.
33
Cf. Rev. Brian Mullady, O.P., Both a Servant and Free, Federation of Catholic Scholars Newsletter, v.
17, #1 (Dec. 1993) pp. 20-24, available online at: http://home.comcast.net%7Eicuweb/servfree/htm p. 3
(printed from online version).
34
Cf. Smith, op. cit., Lesson II:6.
Cf. Ibid. Fr. Smith continues to elucidate the proportionalist view: “Thus in the concrete, one must
always leave open the possibility that in some given set of circumstances, what would normally be a moral
35
evil is not truly so, rather … only a ‘physical’ or ‘ontic’ evil when it brings about greater goods or is
justified by a proportionate reason for doing so.”
Ibid., p. 4, quoting Richard McCormick, “Killing the Patient”, In: The London Tablet, October 30, 1993,
p. 1411.
36
37
May, op. cit., p. 291, citing: Martin Rhonheimer, International Actions and the Meaning of Object: A
Reply to Richard McCormick, (reprinted from The Thomist in Veritatis Splendor and the Renewal of Moral
Theology, p. 241-270);
Cf. J. Smith, op. cit., p. 4-12: Janet Smith observes in her paper, supra, citing various passages from
McCormick, that the proportionalists may feel misrepresented in Veritatis Splendor due to equivocation on
the term “intrinsic evil” – viz. to her, McCormick seems to interpret “intrinsic evil” as meaning “moral
evil”, that is, culpa (sin), rather than malum. I take her to mean McCormick is claiming his position is more
akin to the teaching of the Church on imputability, rather than a dispute about the object of a moral act.
Thus, for McCormick, it would be morally right to do something the Church teaches to be intrinsically evil
if one’s conscience has determined it to be for a greater good. Hence, his error remains, as still boils down
to “Who is doing the judging about what is intrinsically evil?” McCormick sides with conscience, the
Church sides with the Magisterium, Tradition and Scripture. In the final analysis, it is a dispute about
authority and freedom. McCormick, Charles Curran, and the other relativists simply deny the Magisterium
has the authority to define an act as intrinsically evil, apart from intent and circumstances.
Cf. VS, n. 76: “Such theories [proportionalism and consequentialism], however, are not faithful to the
Church’s teaching, when they believe that they can justify, as morally good, deliberate choices of kinds of
behavior contrary to the commandments of the divine and natural law.”
38
39
Cf. Ibid., p. 4-5; Cf. VS, n. 79; Among other points, Fr. Mullady distinguishes between the universal vs.
particular norms of proportionalism, (with reference to Karl Rahner, and Richard McCormick) and notes
they would admit the truth that the prohibition of contraception is true in the universal sense, but in the
particular circumstances of one making a practical judgment – is where their error lies. It is in the
particular circumstances the proportionalists erroneously hold that circumstances and intention may make a
moral act, otherwise ‘evil’ in the universal, objective sense – ‘good’ from a subjective, but equally real
standpoint. McCormick holds proportionalists, “insist on looking in all dimensions of the act before saying
it is morally wrong”, but Fr. Mullady asserts there is no separation between the universal and particular,
and provides this summary insight, repelling McCormick’s assertion as, “begging the question. What is the
difference between saying that an act in the universal or simply as an object cannot be judged without all
the dimensions and saying it is a cadaver until the circumstances and intention are considered? They are the
same.” Hence, the proportionalists do, in fact, deny that some acts are evil per se, by reason of the object
itself, regardless of intent and circumstances.
40
Cf. Smith, op. cit., II:6
41
Cf. VS, n. 56; Cf. Smith, op. cit., Lesson III:8.
42
Cf. VS. n. 61;
43
Cf. Rev. Servais Pinckaers, O.P., The Sources of Christian Ethics, (Washington, D.C.: Catholic
University of America Press, 1995), p. 161-2. Fr. Pinckaers offers a very fresh and insightful perspective
regarding the relationship between the notions of moral obligation and the desire for happiness. He notes
with Augustine that the origin of ethics, “originates with the question of happiness, not obligations.” Noting
the rather myopic view of Ockham, which has been all to prevalent, where God’s will is simply exerting
pressure and constraint on man, imposing itself on man’s freedom as ‘obligation and limitation’. This
attitude is to be avoided when looking at the Church’s moral teaching. The Sermon on the Mount and the
Beatitudes are the perfect model for Christian living as they are patterned after, “Christ, the last Adam, who
fully discloses man to himself and unfolds his noble calling by revealing the mystery of the Father and the
Father’s love.” (VS, n. 2) It is in this sense Pinckaers says, “The Sermon must once again become the basic
text and primary source of moral theology.” Man must see in the Magisterial teaching of the Church
(including universal negative moral norms) – his path to perfection and happiness, which “demands that
maturity in self-giving to which human freedom is called.” (VS. n.17)
44
Paul VI Encyclical Letter Humanae Vitae, n. 4
45
HV, n. 10
46
Ibid.
47
Ibid., n. 13. Inherent in this teaching, is found the acknowledgement of the natural law in the two
inseparable aspects of conjugal act in marriage: the unitive and procreative. The natural law is alluded to
when Pope Paul VI says the conjugal act, “capacitates them for the generation of new lives, according to
the laws inscribed in the very being of man and woman.”
48
Ibid., n. 14.
Cf. Ibid., n. 16: “Some may ask: in the present case, is it not reasonable in many circumstances to have
recourse to artificial birth control if, thereby, we secure the harmony and peace of the family, and better
conditions for the education of the children already born? … the Church is the first to praise and
recommend the intervention of intelligence in a function which so closely associates the rational creature
with his Creator; but she affirms that this must be done with respect for the order established by God.” That
is to say – no, it is not reasonable even in these circumstances to use contraception, as it is intrinsically evil,
but making use of natural rhythms in such circumstances, may be permissible. Even then, the reasons
should not be trivial, but serious and honest.
49
50
Ibid.
51
Ibid.
52
Ibid.
53
Pinckaers, op. cit., p. 305.
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