Download Do capital based persectives help to conceptualise the potetial of

Do capital based perspectives help to conceptualise the potential of lifelong learning?
Ralf St.Clair
University of Glasgow
Paper presented at the 35th Annual SCUTREA Conference July 5-July 7 2005,
University of Sussex, England, UK
There a number of applications of the term ‘capital’ in lifelong learning and in social theory
more generally. In this discussion I examine these uses, with an emphasis upon social capital,
and suggest that not only are capital-based approaches to educational analysis not as
progressive as they may appear, they represent a specific example of the colonisation of the
social sciences by economic thinking.
Forms of capital
The classic form of capital is, of course, economic capital. Those in possession of economic
capital have a wide field of activity open to them because of these resources, and are in a
position to perpetuate their accumulative activities (most analysts accept that the family is a
crucial vector for this activity). Since Marx, the creation, accumulation, and reproduction of
economic capital has been analysed by thinkers of every political persuasion. The idea is
foundational to our understanding of Western society—enough that it appears as an intuitive
and obvious idea to many people.
By the middle of the twentieth century there was growing awareness that the economic
version of capital was failing to explain a number of phenomena, such as importance of
education and experience. In the 1960s Becker (1993) and others developed the concept of
human capital. This idea originally applied to country level analysis, and suggested that the
productivity of a particular nation was due to both economic capital, including equity such a
manufacturing equipment, and human capital, including the education levels of the
population. The two forms of capital could be calculated and compared using similar
analytical tools.
Over time, the idea of human capital changed, and instead of being applicable at the level of
the nation it was used more often as a way to examine the productivity of individuals
(Marginson, 1997). By attending university, for example, an individual could enhance their
human capital, and companies could also invest in the human capital of their workers by
supporting employee development schemes. The idea of human capital is not as intuitive as
economic capital, and is often seen as less acceptable by people who balk at the idea of
reducing human knowledge to terms so strongly reminiscent of economics.
Over the last twenty years a third form of capital has become widely discussed. Social capital
is one of those terms that currently seems to be everywhere: in government planning
documents, research proposals, and learned journals. It has made its way from the specialised
language of sociology (Bourdieu, 1986) to the working papers of the European Community,
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the World Bank. However,
its meaning has changed along the way, and any discussion of social capital does well to bear
the evolution of the idea in mind. I will devote more space to this capital form than to others
because it is still relatively incompletely understood.
Bourdieu (1986) originally developed the idea of social capital to provide insights into the
process of capital accumulation in a late capitalist society. He was interested in the factors
that influenced accumulation but that were not themselves strictly economic, and he proposed
that it is useful to consider economic, cultural, and social forms of capital. Put extremely
simply, cultural capital is knowing how to achieve your goals and social capital is knowing
the people who could help you to do so. Economic capital is self-explanatory.
Bourdieu (1986) saw the three forms of capital as running together in class formations—if
you possess a lot of one of the forms you tend to possess a great deal of the others too. To
some extent this is because, he suggested, the forms are convertible, and if you have enough
of one form you can gain the others by exchange. For example, the upper classes convert
economic capital into cultural and social capital by sending their children to private schools.
Social and cultural capital gain their value because people with status recognise the value of
each other’s capital, so even though these capitals are utilised by individuals (and individual
families) they have collective effects. For Bourdieu, these three forms of capital come
together to shape the permissible actions in any particular field of operation. If you have
sufficient capital you can operate a lot more freely than those with less.
At around the same time, the idea of social capital was attracting the attention of a different
group of theorists. These writers were struggling with the notion of human capital, which
seemed to explain many features of a developed industrial society, but also left many gaps.
There were aspects of people’s lives that had value, but were not captured in the standard,
credential based human capital models. The notion of social capital, the value of an
individual’s placement within social networks, seemed to offer a way to conceptualise these
factors. The idea developed, then, in a completely different context from Bourdieu’s (1986)
notional mechanism for replicating privilege. Instead it was a resource that, theoretically, was
available to any and all members of society in the right circumstances.
Coleman (1988) was instrumental in developing this view of social capital, with more
emphasis on the collective aspects of social capital and less on social capital as a tool of
social control. He argued that ‘social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity
but a variety of different entities, with two elements in common: they all consist of some
aspect of social structures, and they facilitate certain actions of actors’ (p. S98). This
functionalist view of social capital rings true on many levels, but raises substantial questions
about what the concept includes and what it does not. Coleman outlines three aspects of
social capital: obligations and expectations, information flow capability, and norms
accompanied by sanctions. The most obvious common ground between Coleman and
Bourdieu is the notion that social capital can be converted into other forms of capital, and
Coleman also uses the example of private schools to illustrate his ideas. For Coleman and
Bourdieu, education is a critical nexus for social capital.
Putnam’s writing (1993) is probably the most well-known contribution to the popularisation
of the concept of social capital. He explained the perceived loss of mutual concern within
American society using a model derived from a study of Italian local government, with social
capital as the central factor. Social capital, in Putnam’s view, consists of the ‘features of
social organisation such as networks, norms, and trust that facilitate coordination and
cooperation for mutual benefit’ (p.1). While Coleman does not fully address the social policy
implications of social capital, Putnam was particularly careful that his version of social
capital should not be seen as a substitute for economic capital. People living in poverty
cannot emerge with social capital alone. He argued in support of social spending, for
example, that ‘social capital is not a substitute for effective public policy but rather a
prerequisite for it and, in part, a consequence of it’ (p.5). This does, however, appear to
confuse the issue of convertibility between the forms of capital. Putnam’s arguments
anticipate one of the applications of social capital theory, where policymakers justify reduced
public spending on the basis that social capital is the crucial form of capital, and cannot be
reinforced by financial support.
These three foundational views of social capital have much in common, but are also very
different in their philosophy. Bourdieu’s conception of social capital is relatively sinister—it
is clearly a tool of oppression. Putnam’s view is far friendlier, and seems to regard
association between people as positive in its own right. Coleman’s perspective, while
viewing social capital as more neutral, emphasises the use of social capital as a precursor of
human capital. These differences are challenging to a mechanistic application of the social
capital notion—it is far more insightful when used as a magnifying glass than as a scalpel.
The three forms of capital are often treated as if they were convertible—human capital, as in
educational qualifications, leads to social capital, as in a productive and enabling social
network, which in turn leads to economic capital. So logically an argument can be made that
material derivation can be addressed through the enhancement of social capital. While this is
clearly a problematic argument, it underpins a great deal of policy making around lifelong
learning.
The value of capital-based perspectives
The idea of capital appears to have great potential as an explanatory tool. If a particular
initiative, such as a community-based ICT programme, works in one area and not another,
capital explanations can be invoked. The programme was attempting to bring human capital
to the people of each area, but only one area had sufficient social capital for it to work, for
example. In the area where it does not work, the computers may have been continually stolen,
illustrating a lack of social capital in the form of trust. The question of how one could
empirically justify this argument remains open, and really social (and even human) capital
seems more useful as a conceptual catch-all than a well-defined analytical category. It is
particularly important to avoid all too easy reification of the concepts, and resist the
temptation to imagine that there really is something resembling human and social capital ‘out
there.’ Capital-based models, for all their utility, contain the potential for mis-understanding.
One of the most interesting aspects of social capital is the degree to which it appears to have
become a desirable object for policy-making in recent years. Policy can aim to increase social
capital with little risk of criticism—as with the related ideas of ‘school improvement’ and
‘social inclusion,’ social capital is viewed as an undisputed good. To be against any policy
with social capital as an outcome is to be against people. On a more theoretical level, social
capital can be conceived as a potential bridge across the age-old sociological dichotomy of
structure and agency (Coleman, 1988). It represents one of the points of interaction between
individual and society, since social capital allows the individual to act in certain ways, but
only within a collectively defined and supported area of freedom. When social capital is used
by writers one of two approaches is generally used. One is to view it as a literal form of
capital, and attempt to devise instruments to measure it in absolute and relative terms (Van
Der Gaag & Snijders, 2003). Economists often take this perspective. The second approach is
to view it as a metaphorical form of capital, and approach it through highly descriptive
methods (Preece & Houghton, 2000). While this conceptual flexibility is appealing to
theorists, it also indicates just how problematic the term can be.
Overall, capital-based models offer a vocabulary to policy makers and others containing a
number of benefits. By invoking the concept of capital, complex and essentially
unquantifiable facets of social interaction can be made to appear intuitive and even fiscally
accountable. The language of community development as a tool to increase the social and
human capital of a given area may be far easier for a politician to understand than discussions
about empowerment or political engagement. Viewed from this perspective, capital-based
models are a useful communication tool pressed into service for the good of educational
ends. But is there more to them than this?
The sinister side of capital!
Even though capital based models have expanded a great deal from the purely economic,
they can still hardly be viewed as innocent when applied in the educational arena. There are a
number of general and specific concerns it is important to take into account.
The first is the overarching issue of the appropriateness of models derived from economic
analysis for educational and social endeavours. When economic models such as capital are
used as explanatory mechanisms in other areas they bring a number of assumptions with
them, without which they are untenable. Fine (1999) argues that one of the most troubling is
the assumption of individual optimization, the notion that people make decisions based on
their own judgement of how to maximise their return. There is little evidence to suggest that
this is how people make decisions about educational involvement, either before or after their
learning. This perspective, however, normalises economic ways of thinking about education,
and makes cost/benefit analysis appear not only virtuous but potentially the only reasonable
way to assess educational interventions.
Fine (1999) places this within an overall process of economics colonising the social sciences,
and uses social capital as a primary example. He argues that economic structures are being
used to understand areas of life that are not themselves economic. In the case of human
capital, he suggests that the idea is being used in the non-economic social sciences without
full understanding of its philosophical origins and implications, that it is not treated as
cautiously as within economics, and that it is being used in a heavily reductionist way.
Despite these concerns, Fine believes that ideas of ‘personal capital’ (p.414) have
spearheaded the colonisation process. These arguments are entirely consistent with
Habermas’ (1984) description of interactions between the lifeworld and the systemsworld,
where the internal lifeworld is being colonised by the economically rooted systemsworld.
There is surely a cause for some concern here. If capital metaphors inevitably bring with
them a set of values based in classical economic theory we may have to be a great deal more
cautious about their application. It seems ironic that some of the strongest supporters of
social and human capital models of education are individuals who would strongly resist the
reduction of education to economic terms, as well as administrations and bodies who would
rather consider themselves to be progressive. There is the potential for a Trojan horse effect,
where economic mindsets are smuggled into the city disguised as a way to add rigour to
social concerns.
However, this is not the only reason for concern about capital based concepts. Even if the
ideas could be sanitised of their unsavoury (to many social scientists) reductionism and
hyper-rationality, the ideas themselves have got some way to go before they can be
considered truly useful. The first of the internal challenges is the enormous fuzziness of the
terms involved, and indeed the questions of whether they really are a set of separate ideas.
There is an interesting argument that if economic, human, and social capital are convertible
and co-terminous, tending to run together and accrue in the same people, do they actually
represent different aspects of structure? There is a need to consider carefully what is gained
by separating them analytically both on the theoretical level and in practice.
Related to these issues is the lack of clarity regarding how education and capital forms
interact. Clearly there is a strong relationship between human capital and education, since
that is what human capital is designed to capture. But it is unclear how education can provide
social capital, and economic capital remains outside the remit of education. It would be really
helpful in thinking through lifelong learning for marginalised groups in particular to have
some clear conceptions of what education can—and can’t—contribute to the amelioration of
structural inequities. What do metaphors of capital suggest that a more unified, and less
economically grounded, idea of privilege does not?
A second area of concern about capital based models is their innate conservatism. Rarely do
these approaches go beyond the forms of capital that are already valuable to consider what
other formations might be desirable. In the case of human capital, for example, there is little
consideration of factors beyond the conventional educational progression, and the vast
majority of analysis examines ‘years of schooling’. In the case of social capital, networks
with privileged people capable of bringing about desired ends are unproblematically assigned
high value. However, it is likely that a majority of people would find less conventional
relationship networks more relevant to, and useful for, their lived experience.
Some of this conservatism is moral. There has been very little work looking at the social
capital of groups like burglars and fences, or drug consumers and suppliers. In many ways
these would represent potentially invaluable special cases where social capital has to be
maintained in the face of social and legal disapproval—creating a social group with a degree
of siege mentality. It is quite feasible that the patterns of social capital in these contexts are
closer to those of marginalised learners than the networks approached through questions
enquiring into personal knowledge of doctors and lawyers.
Finally, capital based models have the potential of blaming the individual, albeit implicitly,
for lacking the particular capital asset. Analysis often uses the individual as its focus, as do
many educational interventions designed to ameliorate the disparities of capital, which tends
to obscure the essentially social nature of all forms of capital as well as the arbitrariness of
their distribution. This is even more the case when the convertibility of capital forms is taken
as granted. In this case, where lack of economic capital can be overcome by at least two other
routes, surely it can only be the fault of the individual if they are not prosperous?
Conclusion
Capital based analyses of lifelong learning have become increasingly popular over the last
few years, often framed in such a way as to suggest that they take the analysis of education
beyond economic imperatives. In this discussion I have tried to suggest that capital-based
approaches require some care. They bring with them some specific constructions about the
nature of education and the way educational decisions are made. As well as that over-arching
concern, I have shown some other reasons to resist the glib application of these ideas. They
are not fully developed, and yet they are not as innocent as they appear.
The title of this paper is a question, and I will end by answering it. Capital is an effective
metaphor for some aspects of lifelong learning, but cannot be universalised. The discourse of
lifelong learning as a means to develop social and human capital contains within it the
intrinsic tendency to economistic thinking, and educators who are interested in more critical
models cannot accept it wholesale. Nonetheless, the concepts of human and social capital
point towards important ideas deserving of our consideration even though the tools to
understand and incorporate those ideas fully are not yet available.
References
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reference to education, Chicago, University of Chicago.
Bourdieu, P. (1983). The forms of capital. In J.G. Richardson (Ed.) Handbook of theory and
research for the sociology of education. Westport, CT: Greenwood.
Coleman, J.S. (1988). Social capital in the creation of human capital. American Journal of
Sociology, 94 (supplement).
Fine, B. (1999). A question of economics: Is it colonizing the social sciences? Economy and
Society, 28(3).
Habermas, J. (1984). The theory of communicative action. Vol 1: Reason and the
rationalization of society (T. McCarthy, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Marginson, S. (1997). Markets in education. St. Leonards, NSW, Australia: Allen & Unwin.
Preece, J. & Houghton, A. (2000). Nurturing social capital in excluded communities: A kind
of higher education. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Putnam, R.D. (1993). The prosperous community: Social capital and public life. American
Prospect, 4(13).
Van Der Gaag, M. & Snijders, T.A.B. (2003). A comparison of measures for individual
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