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Transnational Security Challenges
Threats without Enemies, Security without Borders
Ramesh Thakur
Eric Fawcett Forum and Dinner [sponsored by Canadian Pugwash and Science for Peace]
Toronto, Canada - November 13, 2010
The world is interdependent in areas as diverse as financial markets, infectious diseases,
climate change, terrorism, nuclear safety and security, product safety, food supply and
water tables. In addition to their potential for provoking interstate military conflict, these
are all drivers of human insecurity in the threat they pose to individual lives. According
to the International Rescue Committee, a US-based private aid agency, the death toll
from actual fighting on all sides in the Democratic Republic of Congo was ‘a few
hundred thousand’ by 2001. By contrast, the number of people killed by disease,
deprivation and starvation in the 32-month conflict (until then) was three million.1 In
some historical civilizations, too, there was over-exploitation of land, forest or water in
different parts of the world to the point where the civilizations died out. In the
industrialized countries today, the by-products of business and farming enterprises
poison soils and waterways. In developing countries, growing populations, shrinking
ecosystems, deforestation, industrialization and urbanization are all contributing to
massive environmental degradation from which industrialized countries are not immune.
The changing security discourse has thus moved beyond protection of a state’s territorial
integrity, political independence and sovereignty to embrace such issues as failed states,
internal social cohesion, the plight of children and women in armed conflict, terrorism,
trafficking in arms, narcotics and people, the spread of infectious diseases, and crossborder environmental depredations.
1
Karl Vick, ‘Toll of Congo War is Called Apocalyptic’, International Herald Tribune, 5 May 2001.
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The security problematique has morphed from defeating national security threats to risk
assessment and management and being prepared – intellectually, organisationally and
operationally – to cope with strategic complexity and uncertainty. Most contemporary
global perils do not fit neatly into the traditional security paradigm of threat and defence
organised around territorial borders. For example, the failure of a poor or fragile state to
contain an emerging mass infectious disease can have a devastating impact on the life
and security of the citizens of the most affluent and powerful state. – hence the subtitle of
my talk tonight. Collective security and global governance are necessary because today’s
threats cannot be contained within national boundaries, because they are interconnected
and because they have to be addressed simultaneously at all levels.
Terrorism is never an acceptable tactic, even for the most defensible of causes and must
be condemned clearly and unequivocally by all. Tackling international terrorism requires
a good balance between immediate threats and root causes, short term tactics and
comprehensive strategies, assistance and sanctions, local, national, regional and global
efforts. It also calls for a balance between military and police action against those who
put their questionable causes and skewed priorities before the lives of civilians, on the
one hand, and nation-building through repairing and stabilizing war-torn countries,
establishing the institutions and structures of government and the rule of law,
consolidating civil society, and building markets. I could make an argument that the war
on terror, which makes an enemy of a tactic, has actually posed a bigger threat to our
security than the problem it was meant to address.
Terrorism backed by nuclear weapons is a particularly frightening nightmare. Marrying
realism to idealism, we must combine the nonproliferation and disarmament agenda by
skilfully integrating minimization of numbers, role and visibility of nuclear weapons in
the short and medium term with their elimination in the long – but not indefinite – term
through a nuclear weapons convention. The task is to delegitimize their possession,
deployment and use; to require no first use and sole purpose commitments; to reduce
their numbers drastically over the next decade; to reduce reliance on them and their
inherent risks by introducing further degrees of separation between their possession,
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deployment and use, for example by physically separating warheads from delivery
systems and lengthening the “decision-making fuse” for the launch of nuclear weapons;
to bring into force the CTBT and a new fissile materials cut-off treaty; to strengthen the
IAEA’s authority and capacity; to establish a multilateral fuel cycle; to toughen up
supply side restrictions; etc. But then, for once I am preaching tonight to the already
converted.
Staying with the religious metaphor, it remains an enduring mystery to me why those
who worship the most devoutly at the altar of nuclear weapons are the fiercest in
denouncing as heretics anyone else wanting to join their sect. If nuclear weapons did not
exist, they could not proliferate; because they do, they will. As long as any country has
them, others will want them. As long as they exist, they will be used one day again, by
design, accident or miscalculation. We must make the transition from a world in which
the role of nuclear weapons is seen as central to maintaining national and international
security, to one where they become progressively marginal and eventually entirely
unnecessary.
Either we aim for controlled nuclear reduction and abolition or we learn to live with
slow but certain nuclear proliferation and die with the use of nuclear weapons. In
public debate, we must confront all who dismiss us as naive and utopian dreamers to
confront this stark reality. If, rather than commit to nuclear abolition, they are prepared to
sign on to a world of cascading proliferation with many more countries acquiring nuclear
weapons, including North Korea, Iran, Saudi Arabia and others as their preferred
alternative, let them say so publicly and accept the resulting public opprobrium. If not,
force them into the corner of asking: so who is being unrealistic? The idea that a selfselecting group of five can keep an indefinite monopoly on the most destructive class of
weapons ever invented defies logic, defies common sense, defies all of human history.
With realists like these...
Pandemics
To the poorest people in the poorest countries, the risk of being attacked by terrorists or
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with weapons of mass destruction is far removed from the pervasive reality of the socalled soft threats – hunger, lack of safe drinking water and sanitation, endemic diseases
and lack of good and affordable health care – that kill millions every year, far more than
the so-called ‘hard’ or ‘real’ threats to security.
The rapidity with which some diseases can spread to become global pandemics, the
emergence of new, deadly, and highly contagious diseases, the lack of border defences to
protect against them, and the greater vulnerability of poor countries and poor people
owing to risible preventive and negligible therapeutic care are among the ‘dark’ sides of
globalization. The back-and-forth movement of people in large numbers as business
travellers, tourists, traders, soldiers, migrants, internally displaced, and refugees; the
modes of transport they use; the incubation periods which ensure that most outbreaks
develop symptoms only after borders have been crossed; and the jump across plant, bird,
and animal species of some diseases all add up to a deadly cocktail of exotic diseases that
cross borders free of passport and visa regulations.
HIV/AIDS is a particularly good example of how the planet is ‘united by contagion’.2 It’s
a human security issue because of the vicious chain of infection, communal devastation,
and social-national disintegration. It is a personal security issue in that as prevalence
rates reach 5-20 percent, gains in health, life expectancy, and infant mortality are wiped
out, agricultural production and food supply fall, and families and communities start
breaking apart. In sub-Saharan Africa women make up the majority of victims and face
additional risks of poverty, stigmatisation and social ostracism. It is an economic
security issue in that a 10 percent HIV/AIDS prevalence rate can reduce the growth of
national income by one-third. It damages communal security by breaking down national
and social institutions and decimating the ranks of the educated and mobile, such as civil
servants, teachers, health professionals, and police. It damages national security by
enfeebling the security forces and corroding the pillars of economic growth and
institutional resilience that protect nations against external and internal conflict. And it is
2
Mark W. Zacher and Tania J. Keefe, The Politics of Global Health Governance: United by Contagion
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).
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an international security issue both in its potential to exacerbate international security
challenges (disintegration of any one state has potential cross-border implications for
neighbours through economic dislocation, refugee flows, and communal violence), and
to undermine international capacity for conflict resolution, for example with respect to
peacekeeping.
Poverty contributes to epidemics of infection and curtails access to health professionals
and medicines. More than half a million women die every year in pregnancy and
childbirth, 99 percent in developing countries. Failing health in turn exacerbates family
poverty and retards national development, thereby fuelling a vicious cycle that destroys
the lives and livelihoods of millions around the world every year. These are failures not
of science but of policy, politics, and governance.
The lessons for global governance include globally interlinked national surveillance
systems of infectious diseases, emergency medical controls over outbreaks, rules that
inhibit the spread of diseases across borders, financial and material assistance to facilitate
long-term health programs, and speedy resolution of negotiating deadlocks on
intellectual property rights to provide access to health programs and affordable medicines
to the poor people in the poorest countries.
Environmental Security and Climate Change
Environmental damage can aggravate food, water and health insecurities; this can
generate restiveness against the government and outbreaks of instability; the deteriorating
food and political situation can provoke an outflow of large numbers of people; if the
exodus is sufficiently large, the burden on receiving countries can be heavy enough to
raise cross-border tensions to the point of armed conflict; in the resulting war, food,
water and other environmental assets can become tools and targets of fighting, as the
multidimensional crisis gets trapped in a self-perpetuating cycle.
Water – which is both indispensable and unsubstitutable – can cause warfare. Over 150
river systems are shared by at least two countries. As water tables and stocks of arable
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land fall, disputes over them could multiply, intensify and provoke conflict. Upstream
states can use water as a tool of warfare by manipulating shared river basins to inflict
pain on other riparian states. The infrastructure of water supplies – dams, irrigation
systems, desalination plants and reservoirs – can be the targets of attack in times of war.
In the other direction, responsible stewardship of shared resources, ecosystems and
physical environments can be impeded by interstate tensions. In South Asia, for example,
regional bodies to regulate waterways, manage river systems, establish water usage and
distribution norms, monitor water tables and pollution indices, control deforestation and
oversee reforestation, encourage biodiversity, preserve ecosystems, etc. are held hostage
to intractable political conflicts.
Based on scale, magnitude, and irreversibility, climate change constitutes a critical
security issue. There is a need for action by all and a need for action now. Delay in acting
on climate change now will mean that the costs of addressing it later will be significantly
greater. The technical challenges will also mount with growing complexity. Along with
steps to combat climate change, action is also needed urgently on energy efficiency,
conservation and diversification.
There is no scientific certainty with respect either to the magnitude of the problem of
environmental degradation, for example global warming; or to the anthropogenic causes
of the problem. But the overwhelming majority of scientists agree that we do have a
serious problem, that the causes of the problem lie at least in significant part in human
activity, and that on the precautionary principle efforts to resolve the problem must be
undertaken now, for it might be too late to undo irreversible damage if we wait until we
are certain of it all. Moreover, scientific uncertainty goes both ways: the problem could
be more acute than we fear. And the earth’s climate system may be nonlinear, so that
small changes could trigger sudden and large changes to the ecosystem.
Unfortunately, agreement on climate science does not compute into agreement on climate
policy nor trump climate politics. Those who question the fine details, highlight the
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occasional errors, or impugn the motives of scientists do neither themselves nor their
cause any favour. But it is not unreasonable to ask for a full cost-benefit analysis of
taking effective action on climate change ahead of other policy priorities.
Policy makers are required to make choices and establish priorities among many
competing demands. They need to examine the different issues, the resources that will be
required to tackle the different problems, the timescales involved, the opportunity costs
of alternative allocation of resources, and the diminishing versus increasing marginal
returns of allocating resources to the different problems.
This is true firstly with respect to different goals: climate change, education, health,
growth, poverty eradication, energy and national security, and so on. It is true secondly
with respect to alternative strategies for tackling an agreed goal, including climate
change. What is the best mix of adaptation and mitigation? Should there be voluntary
guidelines or binding emission targets and, if so, for all countries or variable targets for
different groups? How generous should industrialized countries be on technology and
financial transfers to developing countries? How do we choose between cap and trade, an
emissions trading scheme, carbon capture and sequestration? Between investing in
cleaner technology for existing fuel sources versus alternative, renewable clean and green
fuels? Nuclear power?
Even among those who agree on the science, there are significant differences on policy.
The benefits of action taken now will not flow through for some considerable time.
Owing to emissions already released, the climate will continue to warm for several
decades still. In terms of the mix of known and unpredictable risks, the likely
consequences, the timescales and resources required, and the costs and benefits involved,
one could make a plausible argument that we will achieve greater gains at less pain by
focussing on nuclear abolition as a higher priority goal.
Which takes us into the politics – domestic and global – of climate change. The US
system in particular leaves the process open to capture by a determined minority of
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spoilers and rejectionists against the majority wishes. Current US politics seems
especially dysfunctional in terms of making long-term strategic decisions in the public
interest against vested interests with deep pockets. Politicians the world over prefer gain
now and pain later for their successors in office. Climate change requires them to reverse
the equation.
The global politics is even more complicated. How do the Chinese and Indian
governments persuade citizens to accept permanently lower lifestyles compared to
Westerners? How do Western governments convince citizens to accept substantial drops
in living standards when the developing countries are contributing the most to emission
growth but are not prepared to accept binding emission targets?
Western countries refuse to acknowledge culpability for failures to honour Kyoto and
Bali pledges, instead pointing a collective finger at developing countries’ rejection of
binding emission cuts. The latter blame the present crisis on the West’s past
industrialization. Westerners highlight present and future growth in energy consumption
by China and India as the main factors taking us to and beyond the tipping point.
Developed countries talk of net national emissions, developing countries of per capita
emissions.
Western leaders and commentators pinned the blame for the Copenhagen fiasco on China
and, to a lesser extent, India. Yet like China, the US came not to negotiate but to sign an
agreement on its terms. Both were equally constrained by domestic growth requirements
and political compulsions.
The problem of global warming was created by the developed countries who have deeper
carbon footprints and greater financial and technological capabilities for mitigation and
adaptation. Their per capita emissions are substantially higher than that of developing
countries, with an American emitting fifteen times as much CO2 as an Indian.
Unfortunately, the deadly impacts of climate change – with regard to weather extremes,
natural and environmental disasters, rising sea levels and food and water scarcities – will
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not be distributed in proportion to those responsible for global warming. The poorest will
suffer the most.
Moreover, while per capita emissions have been falling slightly in the industrial
countries, they have risen steeply in developing countries. The problem will worsen not
because developing countries aspire to Western affluence but to affordable food,
housing, clean water, sanitation and electricity. Westerners must change lifestyles and
support international redistribution. Developing countries must reorient growth in cleaner
and greener directions.
Eliding the science of climate change with its policy and politics correlates is not helpful.
Global Governance
Finally, the global governance challenge is simply stated. Like several other pressing
problems – financial crisis, pandemics, nuclear weapons, terrorism, food, water and
energy scarcity – climate change is global in scope and impact and requires global
solutions. But the policy authority for tackling it is still vested in sovereign states, as is
the capacity to mobilize the necessary resources. The result is that states have the
capacity to disable decision making by global bodies like the UN, but generally lack the
vision and will to empower and enable their own global problem-solving and coordinated
collective action that is timely, decisive and effective. This is why the key decisions
impacting on climate change will be made, not by the UN Secretary-General, but by the
finance – not environment – ministers of China and India.
Our overriding challenge is to structure national, regional, functional and international
governance institutions such as to make them:
 robust, so they can withstand both exogenous and endogenous shocks;
 resilient, so they can bounce back even when they do sometimes buckle in the
face of some particularly severe shocks;
 equitable, incorporating a balance of privileges and responsibilities between those
who caused the problem, those most impacted, and those who can contribute the
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most to its solution; and
 flexible and adaptable, so they can deal with the rapidly changing nature and
source of threats. At the time of the first UN Conference on Human Environment
in Stockholm in 1972, for example, neither global warming nor ozone depletion
was on the international agenda. We cannot be prepared, but we should expect, as
yet unknown ecological surprises in the next 20–30 years of comparable
magnitude and gravity, or the so-called black swans: unpredictable, unavoidable,
and with large systemic consequences.