Download Discuss the significance of the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin incident in the

Explain the importance of the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin incident in the
growth of US intervention in Vietnam in the period 1954-1968.
The Gulf of Tonkin incident marked the turning point in US policy towards
Vietnam. Up until then, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations had been wavering
between the desire to stop the spread of communism in Indochina and the
determination to keep American ground troops out of the region. The events of
August 1964 set the US on a path which led, almost inexorably, to war. Within seven
months, marines were storming the beaches of Da Nang. Within a year, a veritable
army was on its way.
South Vietnam was a creation of the United States – brought into being by the
Eisenhower Administration with the sole intention of preventing Ho Chi Minh from
seizing all of Vietnam. At that time, world politics were seen entirely in the context of
the Cold War – the ideological, political, economic and military struggle between the
capitalist and communist worlds. As such, Ho Chi Minh was seen by the US as an
instrument of Soviet aggression, rather than a nationalist leader with strong domestic
support. The US became convinced that a Vietminh victory would unleash a wave of
communist revolutions across Asia – a view known as the Domino Theory. In
response, President Eisenhower provided economic, political and military support to
Ngo Dinh Diem’s regime in South Vietnam.
When these efforts proved ineffective, the Kennedy Administration was reluctant to
accept defeat. Such an outcome would mean a significant loss of face, reducing the
ability of the United States to defend its interests in other, more vital, parts of the
world. This fear explains why Kennedy sent 16,000 US advisers to South Vietnam,
despite having reservations about the importance of the region to America’s interests.
President Johnson faced a similar dilemma when he assumed office, following
Kennedy’s assassination in 1963. The US advisers had failed to stabilise the South. If
anything, their presence only played into the NLF’s hands, allowing it to portray the
conflict as a struggle against foreign intervention. The situation continued to
deteriorate until August 2nd 1964, when North Vietnamese gunboats fired on the USS
Maddox. The ship was in international waters, allowing the US government to portray
the attack as unprovoked aggression. In fact, the North Vietnamese were retaliating
against a series of raids on their coastal facilities, carried out by South Vietnamese
navy commandos, under the supervision of the CIA. As far as they were concerned,
the Maddox was a part of these raids, so they had good reason to attack the ship.
Two days after the attack, the Maddox and another US warship (the Turner Joy)
reported being attacked again. The US Navy itself was doubtful as to whether this
second attack had taken place, but Johnson used it as a pretext to send a message to
his enemies in North Vietnam and to his political rivals in Washington (in particular,
Senator Barry Goldwater, the Republican candidate for president). He did not want to
look weak in the face of “communist aggression”.
The president‘s first action was to present Congress with a resolution giving him the
power to “respond instantly and with appropriate force” if US personnel were
attacked. This was the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. Then he authorised a series of air
strikes against North Vietnam.
Politically, the plan worked precisely as Johnson had hoped, and his domestic critics
were silenced. He went on to win the November election in a landslide. However, the
bombing and Johnson’s bold declaration that he would retaliate against any attacks on
American personnel in Southeast Asia locked him into having to defend South
Vietnam against further incursions by the Viet Cong. The reason is that any such
incursions would almost certainly result in American casualties, given that there were
25,000 ‘advisers’ in South Vietnam (many of whom were carrying out combat
missions).
Matters came to a head in January 1965, when the president’s advisers
recommended a round-the-clock bombing campaign against the North – Operation
Rolling Thunder – as a means of persuading Ho Chi Minh to end his support for the
insurgency in the South. If anything, however, this had the opposite effect. Guerrilla
attacks on US airfields increased, forcing Johnson to send in Marines to defend the
planes. These troops now found themselves under attack, and were soon given
permission to conduct offensive operations against the Viet Cong. Of course, their
numbers were insufficient for the new role they were assigned, so Johnson was
obliged to send more troops to provide support.
Johnson now found himself on a slippery slope, having to escalate the war just to
avoid defeat. Within two years, he had authorised the dispatch of half a million men
to South Vietnam, with no means of retreat short of victory or humiliating defeat.
Hence it can be seen that the Gulf of Tonkin incident was pivotal in America’s
intervention in Vietnam, by locking President Johnson into a policy that precluded
military retreat.