Download About the World Environment Organization

THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND
SUSTAINABILITY
EDUARDO VIOLA (*)
ABSTRACT
The climate regime is the more comprehensive and ambitious of all environmental regimes,
linking in a very direct way one the most crucial economic issue, the use of energy and energy
efficiency with the strongest environmental threaten. Climate change is closely related to
sustainability because greenhouse gases emissions result from such a wide variety of sources
and human activities. Many of the options for reaching a sustainable society are the same as
those to minimize the effects of climate change: moving from fossil fuel to renewables,
curving deforestation, promoting public transportation. This article has two parts. In the first
part, the author discusses the main features of globalization and global governance and the
major players in the global arena of climate change: neo-liberals (strong support for economic
globalization and moderate resistance to the climate regime), neo-social-democratics (strong
support for economic globalization and moderate support for the climate regime), greens
(strong support for globalization and climate), nationalists (strong resistance against
globalization and climate) and radicals (strong resistance against economic globalization and
moderate support for the climate regime). In the second part, the article discusses the climate
change regime focussing in its present impasses and the differentiation and alignments of
social-economic forces in relation to the ratification and implementation of the Kyoto
Protocol. The author elaborates a typology of nine kind of countries according to theirs
standing in the climate regime.
Key words: Globalization, Governance, Transnational Social-economic Forces,
Sustainability, International Environmental Regimes, Carbon Emissions, Kyoto Protocol
(*) Full Professor, Department of International Relations and Center for Sustainable
Development, University of Brasilia, Brazil
E-mail: [email protected]
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The climate regime is the more comprehensive and ambitious of all environmental regimes,
linking in a very direct way one the most crucial economic issue, the use of energy and energy
efficiency with the strongest environmental threaten. Climate change is closely related to
sustainability because greenhouse gases emissions result from such a wide variety of sources
and human activities. Many of the options for reaching a sustainable society are the same as
those to minimize the effects of climate change: moving from fossil fuel to renewables,
curving deforestation, promoting public transportation. This does not imply to equalize
stopping climate change with reaching a sustainable society. Actually moving to a sustainable
society is a more deep process that stopping global warming because a sustainable society
would imply changing patterns of consumption, eliminating poverty and overcoming the
materialist value system. This article has two parts. In the first part, the author discusses the
main features of globalization and global governance and the major players in the global
arena of climate change: neo-liberals (strong support for economic globalization and
moderate resistance to the climate regime), neo-social-democratics (strong support for
economic globalization and moderate support for the climate regime), greens (strong support
for globalization and climate), nationalists (strong resistance against globalization and
climate) and radicals (strong resistance against economic globalization and moderate support
for the climate regime). In the second part, the article discusses the climate change regime
focussing in its present impasses and the differentiation and alignments of social-economic
forces in relation to the ratification and implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. The author
elaborates a typology of nine kind of countries according to theirs standing in the climate
regime.
NEW SOCIO-ECONOMIC FORCES PRODUCED BY GLOBALIZATION
AND THE ENVIRONMENT
Since 1989 the process of globalization has intensified and the booming of the high tech
economy since middle 1990’s has condensed these gigantic transformations. To provide a
framework for the discussion some organizing ideas are presented here. First, the world is
shrinking metaphorically-speaking through, for example, wider access to and use of
information communication technologies, the growing trade and investment linkages among
countries, the growth in cross-border business alliances and mergers and acquisitions, and the
spread of product brand names recognizable world-wide. However, globalization is not
homogenization. The limits between the national and international are increasingly blurred, as
is the differentiation between internal-external linkages within individual countries.
Second, there is a movement from the international to the transnational/global system in
international relations. The international system was State-centric and based on the balance of
power among States. The transnational/global system is simultaneously State-centric (with the
U.S. as a clearly defined hegemonic power) and multi-centric (high diversity of social forces
and actors, such as transnational corporations, stock and bond markets, NGOs, intergovernmental organizations, industry and issue-specific interest groups and media opinionformers) (Rosenau 1990).
Third, there is a new dynamic in the microsocial/macrosocial relationship. Until the 1980s
modern social theory associated the macrosocial with national society, the microsocial with
the local level, and the international was considered as a context. With the intensification of
the process of globalization, the macrosocial has extended to encompass global society, the
meso level is related to national/regional societies, while the microsocial remains associated
with the local level (North 1990). However the meso and microsocial are deeply influenced
by the macrosocial so that it is also globalized to varying degrees. Globalized macroeconomic
parameters prevail over all national states in so far as they want to belong to the world
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economy: fluctuating exchange rates, convertibility of national currencies, trade liberalization,
fiscal equilibrium, free circulation of capitals, absence of State-owned corporations, rule of
law. Even the U.S., which was at the foundation of those globalized parameters, has curb to
them. Some cities or metropolitan corridors prevail because of the transnational character of
their political, economic and social-cultural links.
Fourth, there is partial and heterogeneous erosion of the nation-state as the regulating center
of social life and identity-definer/builder. At the same time, the complex asymmetrical
interdependence between countries is increasing, sometimes reflected in the fragmentation of
national societies (Rosenau 1997). Today there are many types of states in terms of their
capacity of regulating social life, enforcing the rule of law (according to the country
constitution) and defining identities: democratic states (USA, Germany, Japan, Australia);
transitional states (Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, India, South Korea, Israel, South Africa,
Turkey); authoritarian states (China, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt), threatened states
(Indonesia, Russia, Sri Lanka) and collapsing states (Congo, Yugoslavia, Iraq, Haiti) (Viola
1998). The best definition of what are the relevant/powerful states of the world by the turn of
the century was probably defined by the formation of the G20 (consultative group for
coordinating the managing of financial crisis) in December 1999: USA, Germany, UK,
France, Italy, Japan, Canada, Russia, China, India, Indonesia, South Korea, Australia, Saudi
Arabia, Turkey, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico and South Africa.
Fifth, there is partial erosion in national democratic systems because of the greater and more
mobile financial power of market players, be they transnational corporations, investment
funds, and currency speculators. This is reflected in an increasing discrepancy between the
territorial national-based system of representation and the transnational social forces-based
system (Chayes and Handler Chayes 1995).
The globalization of the economy expanded in the 1950s with the emergence of the first
multinational corporations. By the 1980s, these corporations had become transnational in
reach with operations and strategic partnerships that spanned the globe. Also in the 1980s
several medium-sized enterprises became transnational in operation but not size. Economic
productivity increased tremendously as a result of new technologies (e.g. computer hardware
and software, robotics, new materials, biotechnology) and management innovations (e.g. total
quality control, ‘just-in-time’ manufacturing). The increased role of knowledge-based service
industries in economic activity has reduced the demand for low and medium-skilled labor,
resulting in high unemployment in many countries and encouraging new thinking on labor
policies and human resource management. At the same time, there is an emerging
differentiation between those countries that are active participants in the process of economic
globalization and those that are becoming marginalized. Intensified competition among
countries is creating stronger pressures for clearer ‘rules of the game’ concerning trade and
investment at the global and regional levels. This is reflected in the creation of the World
Trade Organization in 1994 and the formation of regional economic blocs such as the
European Single Market, NAFTA, APEC, MERCOSUR, etc. Capital markets and electronic
commerce growth and spread. The diversity of financial products and the speed at which
financial transactions occur pose severe challenges for regulatory authorities. A diverse range
of actors participate in the financial markets, including international financial institutions such
as the World Bank, private banks, pension funds, investment funds and even municipal
authorities. The volatility of speculative money flows is a concern for the stability and
predictability of the global financial system. The information revolution has reached a second
stage since 1996 powered by the Internet and the biotechnology economic sectors (Held et al
1999).
The consolidation of globalization in the 1990’s differentiates the countries into three main
types according to its insertion in the system: developed, emergent and stagnant. Developed
countries are based on knowledge-intensive production and services, strong attractiveness to
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investors, high level of governance and per capita income, and strong rule of law: USA,
Canada, European Union, Norway, Switzerland, Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea,
Taiwan, Australia, New Zealand and Israel. Among the developed countries the U.S. has a
unique status as superpower because of the strongest development of the high tech economy
and the global military capacity. Emergent countries have economic dynamism, medium per
capita income, good medium-term potential for investors and different/variable degree of
limitations to the rule of law: Mexico, Costa Rica, Panama, Trinidad and Tobago, Brazil,
Venezuela, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Thailand, Malaysia, China, India, Philippines,
Indonesia, Brunei, South Africa, Turkey, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Baltic States, Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait and United Arab Emirates. Stagnant countries have low economic dynamism,
low or medium income per capita, low attractiveness to investors, strong problems of
governance and severe limitations to the rule of law: Guyana, Surinam, Colombia, Peru,
Ecuador, Bolivia, Paraguay, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala, Dominican
Republic, Haiti, Cuba, Ukraine, Armenia, Burma, Ira, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Kenya,
Nigeria. Russia is a country in a very unique situation: from the point of view of the situation
of most of its population it is a stagnant country, from the point of view of its military
capabilities it is a Developed country and from the point of view of the technological
development and the rate of growth of some economic niches Russia is an emergent country.
In a very tentative way, Russia is classified overall as an emergent country.
The hegemony of the U.S. in the present world is clearly defined in all the dimensions:
military, economic, political and social-cultural. The world is clearly unipolar from a military
point of view and it is multipolar from an economic point of view because the European
Union, Japan and China constitute geo-economic realities with some pretension of present or
future equivalence with the U.S. In spite of being unipolar the present world is relatively
stable since there is no credible threaten, in the foreseeable future, to the hegemony of the
U.S. and because its hegemony is exercised through the “demonstration” of the civilizational
superiority (economic productivity, well functioning of market mechanisms, cultural industry,
attractiveness of democracy, attraction of immigrants from all over the world) and not through
coercion like previous empires in the past.
As a consequence of globalization, national societies tend to become divided into four social
segments: the global innovator, the global adopter, the national and the marginal. For
elaborating this classification, I used as one of the inputs, the recent map of the world
produced by Jeffrey Sachs. He produced this map in order to show how crucial is technology
in understanding the differences among countries and regions in contemporary world (Sachs
2000). The first social segment is formed by individuals and organizations that have
qualifications (particularly digital) and productivity that enable them to compete globally, and
are at the forefront of technological innovation: between 10 and 25% of the population in
developed countries, less than 5% of the population in emergent countries are in the global
innovator segment. The global adopter segment is formed by individuals and organizations
that have qualifications that enable them to compete globally but are not capable of
technological innovation: between 60% and 30% of the population of developed countries,
between 25% and 10% of the population in emergent countries, less than one per cent of the
population in stagnant countries are in the global adopter segment. The national segment is
formed by individuals and organizations with restricted capabilities that are protected by
political structures or geography from global competitiveness, and this is a transitory situation
with tendency to disappear in the long term: from one half to one fourth of the population in
developed and emergent countries, from one third to one tenth of the population in stagnated
countries are in the national segment. The marginal segment is formed by a population that
suffers increasing material and psychological deprivation and are excluded from the modern
economy: less than 5% in developed countries, from one fourth to one half of the population
in emergent countries, more than a half of the population in stagnated countries are in the
marginal segment. The distribution of segments across the world’s population by the turn of
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the century is approximately the following: 5% globalized-innovators, 15% globalizedadopters, 40% nationals and 40% marginalized.
The environmental dimension of Globalization is defined by the dramatic intensification of
global risks and the strong interdependence between the Biosphere and the Tecnosfera:
climate change, depletion of the ozone layer, radioactive contamination, erosion of
Biodiversity, emergent virus, Antarctic, the outer-space, and international trade in toxic waste.
Once reached the perception of the environmental globalization we have been forced to move
from the concept of International system (that just refers to social realities) to the concept of
Global system because this allow us to integrate the social and natural realities on a planetary
scale (North 1990; Stern, Young and Druckman 1992; Vogler et al 1996)
National concern about environmental problems has been intensifying since the mid-1960s
when the “environmental revolution” gained force in the US. In the 1970s concern about
environmental issues spread throughout Canada, Western Europe, Japan, New Zealand and
Australia and in the 1980s it embraced Latin America, central and Eastern Europe, the former
Soviet Union and East and South Asia. The work of the Brundtland Commission and its
report “Our Common Future” in the mid 1980s raised the profile of the environment and the
concept of sustainable development. In the 1990s, as a result of the preparatory process
leading up to UNCED, an increased number of countries began to examine and debate
seriously environmental issues. This included China and some countries in Africa and the
Middle East. The evolution of national consciousness-raising concerning the environment has
been one of an upward curve with short plateau periods followed by a renewed rise in the
curve (Inglehart 1997, Kamieniecki 1993).
The process of globalization has dramatically redefined the cleavages and political alignments
(Miranda 1997). The principal social-political forces are defined by its position in relation to
globalization. Globalists have their interests and value systems shaped by the global scale.
Nationalists have their interests and value systems shaped by the nation-state and are against
globalization. Besides this central cleavage between globalists and nationalists it is also
necessary to differentiate inside both forces according to considerations of support to socialpolitical progressiveness and environmental sustainability. Realigning the relevant
differentiations and combinations we can consider the existence of five principal social
forces: globalist-conservative or neo-liberals, globalist-progressive or neo-socialdemocratics,
globalist-sustainable or greens, nationalists and radicals.
Neo-liberals defend national economies increasingly open to the world market, a central role
for transnational corporations, the continuity of the non regulated expansion of financial
markets, an accelerated expansion of intellectual Property rights, a stabilization of defense
budget, an invigoration of the World Trade Organization, and a freezing of the UN, the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Neo-liberals value system’s place markets
first, national security second, democracy third and (eventually) environmental protection in
the fourth place. Examples of neo-liberalism are: predominant sectors of Republicans and
Democrats in the U.S.; Conservative parties in the E.U. and Japan; modern sectors of liberal
parties in Russia, Eastern Europe and Latin America; and radical reformers inside and outside
the Chinese Communist Party.
Neo-social-democratics defend national economies open to the world market; a central role
for transnational corporations; the reform and invigoration of the IMF with a new mission of
regulating global financial markets, a selective disarmament, a reform and invigoration of the
U.N., based on combination of the criteria of population size and economic power, and, the
invigoration of the World Trade Organization and the other international regimes (Guidens
2000). A significant part of neo-social-democratics support the Tobin tax which could raise
$250 billion a year and would significantly calm volatile markets, while providing huge funds
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for fighting poverty. In a very relevant dynamic, Canada proved that a speculation tax is a
realistic political goal when its parliament voted to support the Tobin Tax, on April 1999, by a
majority of two-to-one, attracting wide public support. Neo-social-democratics have a value
system according to which markets combined with democracy comes in first place, national
security comes in second place, and environmental sustainability comes in third place.
Examples of Neo-socialdemocratics are: sectors of the American Democratic Party; the
social-democratic parties in the E.U. and Japan; modern sectors of the social-democratic
parties in Latin America and Eastern Europe; modern sectors of the Congress Party in India;
and, the underground opposition in China.
Greens consider non-viable the consumerist way of life and the polluting/inefficient
productive systems, and they advocate for deep reforms in the international order. Greens are
defenders of environmentally sustainable and socially equitable development at the national
and world scale. Greens support an active integration of national economies in the world
market and subsidized transfers of sustainable technologies from developed to emergent and
stagnant countries. Greens strongly support the Tobin tax and the fast building up of Global
Governance institutions combining principles of population size, economic power and
environmental relevance. From a normative point of view the Greens defend a democratic
road for construction of global governance, but they are willing to accept a more oligarchic
path since it accelerates the process. Greens have a value system according to which global
governance combined with environmental sustainability comes in first place, and democracy
combined with markets comes in second place. Examples of greens are: predominant sectors
of the Green Parties in the E.U., Canada and Australia; minorities of the Green Parties in
Brazil, Chile and Costa Rica; a minority sector of the European Social-democracy and the
Canadian New Democratic Party (O’Riordan et al 1996).
Nationalists defend protected national economies, powerful armed forces, and a strong role
for the nation-state as the superior entity of the international order. The nationalists are
apprehensive of the transnational corporations and contrary to the global circulation of
financial capital. The nationalists defend the freezing of the UN system and the undermining
of the IMF, the WTO and other international regimes. A great variety of nationalists exist,
with different values and programs. According to the value systems of nationalists the
national state and security comes first, markets come in second place, though with
considerable variance in their importance, and democracy comes (eventually) in the third
place. Examples of nationalists are: the far right of the Republicans (USA), the National
Front (France), the North League (Italy); the Neo-communists (Russia and Eastern Europe);
the traditional sectors of the left parties in Latin America; the conservatives of the Chinese
Communist Party, the religious fundamentalists groups in the Islamic countries; the radical
ethnic parties in the Balkans, and, sectors of the Hindi party in India.
Radicals defend sustainable development on a local and national scale commanded by a state
strongly promoting social justice. The Radicals are favorable to freezing the UN and the
WTO, and they are also against transnational corporations, the IMF, global finance markets
and international regimes. Radicals believe strongly in grassroots organizations, and radical
pacifism, and reject globalization, consumerism and all mega structures. The value system of
Radicals has at its top communities and local sustainability and in second place they value
democracy and the state at the national level. Examples of the Radicals are: minority sectors
of the Green Party in the E.U., Chile and Brazil; the bio-regional and deep ecology
movements in North America, Australia and Scandinavia; and minority sectors of the
Workers Party in Brazil.
The common sense associate globalization with economy. It seems more difficult to grasp the
transformations of politics in a global world. Today politics has all kind of ramifications,
inside and outside the national frontiers, the global politics has increased its sites and actors
beyond the states, governments and political parties. The political actions come to society
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through complex networks of actors and decision-making processes that include along the
"full time" political actors a new group of very effective "partial time" political actors coming
from the civil society and the economy. In other words, politics today is something more (or
less) than politics yesterday. This is not an effect of globalization; this is globalization in
itself. Not only global political, but also global economy implies an intensification of
interactions among actors, processes and functions of economy, politics and civil society, in
all directions (Held et al 1999, Keohane et al 1996).
The fact that global governance is based in a polyarchic mixed actor system does not provide
support to the societal version of “governance without government”. This interpretation led to
the wrong hierarchy of civil society’s actors and utopian perspectives against states actors and
realistic perspectives. It is a mistake to exclude or under dimension governments as well as
multinational corporations or NGOs from governance. Global governance supposed an
effective mixed actors and values system that cannot be confused by ideological approaches
(Commission on Global Governance 1995). The international regimes are good examples to
understand this point. They do not exist in any political vacuum of states. It is true that
regimes are elements of a decentralized system of public order that have affected the
sovereignty of nation-states. But regimes are firmly tied to states; they cannot exist out of
them. There is no doubt that regimes are supported by the international society of states as
well by the global society and the multinational corporations (Young, 1997). Regimes do not
exist on behalf of states, civil society or corporations; they exist to deal with specific and
concrete global problems. It does not matter who is officially in charge or who is primarily
responsible by the problem. What really matters is to establish correct rules and relationships
among all the actors related with the problem, in order to deal efficiently with the solutions in
the public global arena. Regimes means governance at work. Governments, corporations and
civil society are deeply associated each other when and where the regimes are at work.
The existing mechanisms for Global Environmental Governance are very limited for multiple
reasons: lack of coordination among mechanism, overlap of institutions, contradictions
between environmental sustainability and social integration creating a strong problem of
legitimacy, and, supremacy of economic institutions or regimes like the World Trade
Organization, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (Haas, Keohane and Levy
1993; Young 1997).
UNEP has had a mixed record in terms of global environmental governance. It succeeded to a
certain extent in its catalytic role, with notable achievements in the fields of ozone depletion,
toxic waste, biodiversity and regional seas. But it has been a failure in the role of coordinating
global environmental action (Gehring 1994). More than 200 Multilateral Environmental
Agreements (MEA) now exist, forming a central part of the framework of global
environmental governance (Brown et al 2001, Clark et al 1998). Some have been initiated by
UNEP, such as the Ozone and Biodiversity, while others as the UN fish stock agreement had
their beginnings elsewhere in the system. MEA vary significantly in nature, from narrowly
focused agreements such as CITES or the Convention on Migratory Species of Wild Animals
to MEAs with broad coordination functions, such as the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. In
general, the more recent MEAs, such as the Montreal Protocol, the Kyoto Protocol and the
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, have dealt with increasingly important areas of economic
activity, in contrast to many earlier MEAs, which were much more limited in their coverage,
often dealing with the protection of a single species in a limited geographical area (Porter and
Brown 1996; Weiss Brown et al 1998).
The MEAs currently in place and under negotiation cover many of the key environmental
issues but there is a lot of room for improvement in coordination of the MEAs and their
institutions. Roles, responsibilities and priorities are fragmented and functions duplicated to
an unnecessary extent. The proliferation of MEAs and their COPs and interim meetings
makes it difficult for small and poorer countries to become effectively involved in the real
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decision-making. On the other hand, many MEA regimes have proved themselves dynamic
and innovative, not being constrained by existing institutional structures.
NEO-SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC/GREEN TRANSNATIONAL COALITION:
THE DRIVING FORCE IN THE CLIMATE REGIME
The climate regime is the more comprehensive and ambitious of all environmental regimes,
linking in a very direct way one the most crucial economic issue, the use of energy and energy
efficiency with the strongest environmental threaten (Soroos 1997, Rayner and Malone 1998).
Climate change is closely related to sustainability because GHG emissions result from such a
wide variety of sources and human activities. Many of the options for reaching a sustainable
society are the same as those to minimize the effects of climate change: moving from fossil
fuel to renewables, curving deforestation, promoting public transportation. This does not
imply to equalize stopping climate change with reaching a sustainable society. Actually
moving to a sustainable society is a more deep process that stopping global warming because
a sustainable society would imply changing patterns of consumption, eliminating poverty and
overcoming the materialist value system (Inglehart 1997).
The climate change convention signed in Rio in 1992, settled as a generic goal for all
countries the reduction of GHG emissions, particularly for developed countries, which should
stabilize GHG emissions in 2000 by the level of 1990. By the middle of the 1990s it was clear
that none developed country would reach the goal. At the Kyoto Conference of the Parties in
December 1997 there was a significant progress with the agreement of a Protocol. The Kyoto
Protocol was approved with Neo-socialdemocratics as the key supporters. Greens were
fighting for a much more strict Protocol but facing the possibility of a total defeat moved to
support Neo-socialdemocratics position (Grubb 1999). A key and very difficult challenge
now is to ensure ratification and implementation of the Protocol as well as to increase
international co-operation, particularly between developed and emergent countries, but also in
relation to stagnant countries, in preparing national response policies and measures.
The importance of the Kyoto Protocol is hard to overstate. Although 150 countries agreed in
principle to reduce global warming pollution at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, it wasn't until
Kyoto that they agreed to legally binding limits. If ratified by enough countries, the Kyoto
Protocol will require developed countries to reduce their combined output of six greenhouse
gases by a modest 5 percent below 1990 levels by 2010. This is a small step toward protecting
the Earth from the risks of global warming, but it is a vital one. The impasses of the climate
change regime are product of the weakness of the Neo-socialdemocratics/Green coalition and
its difficulties coping with the veto coalition between neo-liberals and nationalists (very
strong in the U.S. and some crucial emergent countries).
Some transnational corporations like British Petroleum Amoco, DuPont, Microsoft, Cisco
Systems, Oracle, General Electric, Toyota, Honda support the Kyoto Protocol and have
committed to reduce emissions from their own operations by more than the agreement would
require. The Pew Center on Climate Change has been successfully acting as a coordinator of
corporations supporting Kyoto. Corporate opposition to Kyoto is diminishing at an increasing
rate over the past two years. While continuing to express doubts about the Kyoto agreement
itself, Ford Motor and DaimlerChrysler (among many others corporations) withdrew in 2000
from the virulently Anti-Kyoto Global Climate Coalition, citing the desire to take a more
constructive approach to the global warming problem.
The Kyoto treaty includes excellent mechanisms (emissions trading, joint implementation and
clean development mechanism) to make it less rigid, but in practice it is not easy to
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implement them. Emissions trading would allow developed countries to buy excess emission
permits from Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, which have a large surplus because their
economies have collapsed and emissions are likely to be much lower than their targets. Such
transfers will help countries like United States and Canada to reach their obligations but they
may also enrich Russian/ Ukrainian/Belarus ruling elites by around US$100 billion without
improving the lives of millions of strong losers from Communist collapse. A second
mechanism would let developed countries buy credits from developing countries that reduce
their emissions through Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). It would offer an incentive
for energy intensive corporations to invest in projects that reduce emissions from developing
countries. That is an excellent idea, but working out rules for the CDM is proving
complicated and time-consuming. In COP6 around 90% of the rules defining the CDM have
been agreed but the still remaining 10% is going to be very hard to work on.
In spite of years of intense negotiations the Kyoto Protocol is far away from being ratified.
This could be attributed to the combination of three major factors; the first being the weak
leadership by major greenhouse gas emitting countries and lack of progress in meeting
stabilization targets settled in the Kyoto Protocol in crucial developed countries. Compared
with the baseline of 1990, in 1999 carbon emissions were the following: United States
(commitment 7% lower by 2010) was 14% higher; Canada (commitment 6% lower by 2010)
was 17% higher; United Kingdom (commitment 12% lower by 2010) was 15% lower;
Germany (commitment 21% lower by 2010) was 17% lower; The Netherlands (commitment
6% lower by 2010) was 17% higher; Japan (commitment 6% lower by 2010) was 4% higher
(Gummer et al 2000). Among developed countries only U.K, Germany, Sweden and Denmark
were in a trend of compliance with the commitments by 2010. Even countries like The
Netherlands and Austria, which have been for decades at the world vanguard in
environmental policies, are having strong difficulties in addressing their commitments.
A second factor would be the reluctance on the part of large (and fast growing carbon
emissions) emerging countries (China, India, Mexico, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Thailand) to commit to reduction in the future rate of growth of their emissions;
and, the third factor would be the disagreement among the scientific and economic
community about respectively, the pace and extent of climate change, and the costs and
benefits of alternative response strategies, though this disagreement seems to start to narrow
after the publication of the 3rd IPCC Report in January 2001.
As a tool for helping to analyze climate change politics, we elaborate a classification of
country position on the Climate Regime as of the year 2000.
First, we have the high carbon intensive developed countries (HCIDC), in which the energy
matrix is strongly based on fossil fuels (particularly coal and oil) and/or are continental
countries with high-energy consumption in transportation (U.S., Canada, Australia, New
Zealand). In these countries the society is highly divided in relation to the implementation of
the Kyoto Protocol: most of neo-liberals and nationalists are strongly against, but they have a
sector of neo-socialdemocratic and the Greens who are strongly in favor. In these societies
there is strong support for demanding voluntary commitments from the emergent countries
and for giving a major role to the flexibility mechanism of the Protocol. Because these are
countries with large amount of land and forest they strongly support the inclusion of carbon
sinks in the accounting of emissions.
By the beginning of 1997 the situation of the U.S. is very difficult in relation to reaching the
commitments settled in Kyoto in 1997. If the U.S. stays on its present track, by 2010 the
country's greenhouse gas emissions will be around 25% higher than 1990 levels, a far cry
from the 7 percent cut required by Kyoto. From the other side, recent data show that robust
economic growth in the United States during 1998-2000 has not been accompanied by a
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corresponding increase in greenhouse gas emissions. This development, fueled in part by
efficiencies resulting from the Internet economy, undermines claims that meeting the Kyoto
targets would severely damage the U.S. economy.
The Clinton administration had a leadership role in designing the Kyoto Protocol, since COP1
(Berlin 1995) until middle 1997. But in the final negotiations of Kyoto the Clinton
administration withdraw to a more defensive position (commitments of GHG emissions
reduction as low as possible, strong importance of the flexibility mechanism, emphases in
commitments for emergent countries) due to the severe criticism of the Republican majority
in the Senate. After some technical studies and conflictive domestic deliberations, finally, in
June 2000 the Clinton administration decided in favor of the inclusion of carbon sinks in the
account of the emissions of the countries. This decision created the conditions for the
subsequent clash with the European Union that had defined, since 1998, against the inclusion
of carbon sinks.
As a candidate Bush expressed opposition to Kyoto and as a president is moving in a direction
consistent with his previous standing. One of the main flags of the Bush administration is
energy security conceived in a way that is contradictory with Kyoto since it implies strong
promotion of fossil fuel exploration and refining in the U.S. By March 2001 the Bush
administration was likely going in the direction of freezing the negotiations of the Kyoto
Protocol.
Canada, Australia and New Zealand have more powerful neo-social-democratic and green
forces than USA, but in all the three countries emissions have growth faster than in the U.S.
during the 1990’s (Australia and New Zealand due to the strong importance of coal in the
energy matrix and Canada because of insufficient modernization in building insulation) and
for this reason the three countries have kept close support of the U.S. positions during COPs
4, 5 and 6. However, because of the importance of green/neo-social-democratic forces in
those societies it is unlikely that they would support the inclination of the Bush administration
to freeze Kyoto.
Second, we have the European Union, in which the carbon intensity of the energy matrix is
significantly lower than in the first group because of a combination of factors (importance of
renewables or nuclear power and very efficient system of public transportation). In these
societies there is a growing consensus, led by Greens and Neo-socialdemocratics in favor of
the implementation of Kyoto. Because the amount of land and forest in the E.U. is limited
they are against the inclusion of carbon sinks. Also because they are committed to strength the
climate regime since the beginning most E.U. countries propose restrictions for the utilization
of the flexibility mechanisms. Also in these societies there is strong support for demanding
voluntary commitments from Emergent countries (Grubb 1999).
The U.K. is the only developed country that has had a very good performance in cutting
greenhouse gases emissions. The switch from coal and the fulfillment of manifesto pledge for
20% reduction in greenhouse gas for by 2010 will pay off with US$150 million in carbon
credits to sell to USA if the Kyoto Protocol is implemented. The U.K. is pushing strongly for
Europe to ratify the Kyoto Protocol because this will be a major boost in the climate change
regime and would allow international carbon trading to begin. Among the domestic
initiatives announced by the Blair government in February 2000 were revised energy
efficiency targets in homes, the creation of an internal carbon trading market, and the phase
out of hydrochlorofluorocarbons (the successors to chlorofluorocarbons in refrigeration)
during this decade, since they too are a powerful global warming gas. The situation of the
U.K. is remarkably in favor to the Kyoto Protocol: major progress in the energy matrix, strong
support among Neo-socialdemocratic and Greens and almost non-opposition (at least in the
short term) from Neo-liberals.
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Germany shares with the U.K. the leadership in pushing for the ratification of Kyoto because
of the institutional strength of the Neo-socialdemocratic/Green coalition (the Neo-liberals do
not oppose to Kyoto) and because the dramatic reduction in carbon emissions coming from
the former Eastern Germany gives the country a lot of room to reach its commitments.
Sweden, Denmark, France, Finland, Austria, The Netherlands and Italy have also had strong
pro Kyoto standing since 1997. Some countries like Spain, Portugal and Greece are less
supportive of the Kyoto Protocol but they benefit from the E.U. bubble which allows them to
increase their emissions as they will be compensated with further reductions in the other E.U.
countries.
Third, we have the middle carbon intensive developed countries (MCIDC) with an energy
matrix similar to the European Union but with less flexibility for reducing emissions because
they do not have available the compensation bubble of the EU and because eventually they
have already increased dramatically their energy efficiency previous to the baseline of 1990,
after the first (1973) and second (1979) oil shocks (Japan, Norway, Iceland, Switzerland).
Japan is the crucial country of this group since it is responsible for 6% of the global carbon
emissions. Japan is having difficulties for reducing its emissions because it is already a highly
energy efficient country. For this reason and also because of its traditional pos-1945 foreign
policy alignment, Japan have supported the U.S. positions since 1997, disappointing many
analysts that had forecast a leading role for Japan in the climate regime.
Fourth, we have the former communist countries (FCC), whose economies have dramatically
declined during the 1990’s (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Romania, Bulgaria). These countries
have a strong interest in the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol because they have
emission credits they can profit from. In those societies there is a strong consensus in favor of
Kyoto, just as a means of getting cash in the middle term, but generally without concern about
the carbon emissions profile of the country in the long term.
Fifth, we have the high carbon intensive emergent countries (HCIEC), in which the energy
matrix is strongly based on fossil fuels and the export of oil is more than a half of the total
(Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arabs Emirates, Iran, Venezuela, Mexico, Nigeria). In these
societies most people are against Kyoto, though in some of them, such us Mexico and
Venezuela, there are significant Greens and neo-social-democratic sectors in favor of Kyoto.
Sixth, we have the middle carbon intensive emergent countries (MCIEC), in which the energy
matrix is based on fossil fuels and/or have strong carbon emissions derived from land use
change and deforestation (China, India, Thailand, Malaysia, South Africa, Turkey, Brazil). In
these societies there is strong support for Kyoto, in so far as Kyoto does not imply
commitments for theirs countries and because they expect to have benefits from the Clean
Development Mechanism. In those societies there is strong rejection of voluntary
commitments for emergent countries. In some of these countries (Brazil, India) there are
significant Green and neo-social-democratic sectors which are in favor of diminishing the
importance of carbon in the energy matrix, fight strongly against deforestation, and promote
some kind of commitments for emergent countries.
Seventh, we have the low carbon intensive emergent countries (LCIEC), in which the energy
matrix is based mostly in renewables or nuclear and/or have an efficient system of public
transportation (South Korea, Taiwan, Poland, Check Republic, Hungary, Baltic states,
Philippines, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Costa Rica). In these societies there is significant
support for Kyoto for the same reasons as is the case with the MCIEC countries. In most of
these societies Greens and neo-social-democratics are strong. In some of these societies
(Argentina, Costa Rica) there is significant support for voluntary commitment for emergent
countries.
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Since the signing of the Kyoto Protocol, the Clean Development Mechanism has started to
have a prominent place in the emergent countries’ agendas, particularly because of its
voluntary character, and its capacity to be a catalyst for new sustainable foreign investments.
This has strengthened support for the Kyoto Protocol in emergent countries. The combination
of the developed countries’ obligations to domestic reduction of emissions and the CDM
produced a shift in many emergent countries diplomacy, like Brazil and India, which had
previously been militantly against the joint implementation mechanism. For most emergent
countries, the CDM is considered just as a very important instrument capable to offer
increasing in emissions reduction at a cheaper cost, and consequently beneficial for
everybody as a market mechanism of resource transfer to emergent and stagnant countries and
capable to establish cleaner development patterns. On the other side, in an issue crucial for the
fate of the Kyoto Protocol, most emergent countries have retained their stands against
committing to themselves voluntary commitments and this lack of response by the emerging
countries has reinforced the rejection of Kyoto among American Senators. Brazil and
Argentina are very important emergent countries not highly dependent in fossil fuels, and
consequently in favorable situation for assuming commitments for reducing the rate of
increase of their carbon emissions. In COP 4, in Buenos Aires, Argentina proposed that
emerging countries should assume voluntary commitments. This proposition was introduced
without prior consultation with Brazil (something non-expectable because of Mercosur). The
G77 lead by China and India strongly rejected the Argentinean proposition. Only South Korea
and Kazakh accepted the proposal. In a situation of polarization Brazil was constrained to
follow the G77 in spite of some sympathies by the Argentinean position. In October 1999,
Argentina formally announced that was assuming commitments for reducing its carbon
emissions by 12% by 2010, compared with what would be its business as usual profile of
emissions in that year. According to the announcement, most of the emissions reduction
would come from strengthening energy efficiency. There are many doubts about the precision
of the Argentinean calculations and about its readiness to effectively implement the
commitments, but there is consensus that the formal announcement has had strong political
and symbolic impact. Brazil is in a more difficult situation than Argentina for assuming
voluntary commitments: from one side, the energy matrix is more based on renewables than
in Argentina (more than 90% of the electricity in Brazil is produced from hydropower and the
average gas consumed by cars has a mix of 22% of ethanol from sugar cane), but from the
other side, the rate of deforestation and land conversion is considerable higher than in
Argentina (Viola 1997).
There is always a major opportunity for Brazil to assume global leadership in the climate
change regime based on accepting of voluntary commitments. The Brazilian standing on
voluntary commitments is derived from a combination of vulnerability and ideology. In order
to assume voluntary commitments Brazil would have to shift to a policy of cracking down on
deforestation. In order for reduced rates of deforestation to be significant in the national
carbon balance, deforestation in the Amazon would need be reduced about 70% of the present
annual rate (from around 0.45% of the Amazonian forest per year to around 0.15%). Brazil
produces 3.5% of the global carbon emissions: only 0.7% coming from industry, energy and
transportation and a large 2.8% coming from land use and deforestation. Though there is
strong public support for curving deforestation, it is difficult to assess how deep that support
could go if there is a need for a strong confrontation with the coalition of interests supporting
deforestation in the Amazon (Fearnside 1999). These interests form a powerful and diverse
network that defends the deforestation status quo (even if they are opponent in other issues):
most of the timber industry, big and small landowners, land-less people’s movements,
goldminers and urban ruling elites. Because of the peculiarity of the Brazilian Federative
Arrangements all of these pro-deforestation interests are strongly represented in the Brazilian
Congress. A second major implication of a potential shift in Brazilian policy related to
voluntary commitments would be to depart from the G77, in the United Nations arena. There
is significant support for this change in Brazilian society because of the moving from a
nationalist to a neo-liberal/neo-socialdemocratic economic policy in the 1990s (Onis 2000).
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However, there is a significant sector of the Foreign policy establishment that still support the
continuity of the belonging to the G77, because of ideological reasons (to continuos being a
leader of the South in negotiating with the North) and because they suppose that continuity in
G77 would be crucial for getting a Brazilian permanent place in the Security Council, in case
there eventually is reform of the UN. The opposite is the case with Argentina (country in
which environmentalism is significantly weaker than in Brazil): its environmental Foreign
policy is shaped by its not belonging to the G77 and its commitment to take positions that are
as consistent as is possible with those of Western countries in any global multilateral forum.
Most of the Argentina’s ruling elite supposes that the alignment with the West would enhance
their role in the global arena. The Brazilian situation is very dynamic and two driving forces
push in the direction of following Argentina’s climate regime position: because of the
continuous trend of huge foreign direct investment and strong development of the new
information economy, Amazonian deforestation is becoming more and more dissonant with
the mainstream of the Brazilian economy; and support for curving deforestation continues to
grow in public opinion as was showed in 2000, during the high profile debate about the new
Forestry Law. The Cardoso administration is a very complex and unstable coalition among
neo-social-democratics, neo-liberals and some nationalists. The strengthening of neo-socialdemocratics, and the eventual entrance of greens (a much wider segment of the society than
just people who vote in the Green Party) substituting for the nationalists, in the governmental
coalition, is likely a prerequisite for a shifting in the Brazilian position in favor of voluntary
commitments.
Eighth, we have the Island/Low Continental Countries (ILCC), which are extremely
vulnerable to climate change (Fiji, Malta, Jamaica, Barbados, Bangladesh). In these countries
there is massive support for Kyoto since virtually all sectors will benefited from Kyoto and
also because of Kyoto commitments to emergent countries. Indonesia is on a very
contradictory situation because as an island-nation it is highly vulnerable to climate change,
but its economy strongly depends on oil exportation
Ninth, we have the stagnant or less developed countries (SC) which are very vulnerable to
natural disasters because of the high level of poverty but do not perceive themselves as
immediately threaten as the ILCC countries. These countries are strongly in favor of Kyoto,
as they perceive that they will benefit from the Clean Development Mechanism.
During COP6 (The Hague, November 2000) the neo-social-democratic/green transnational
coalition behaved in a very powerful way, eventually contributing to the failure of the
conference due to the restricted commitment of the American delegation. The main locus of
the neo-social-democratic/green coalition was the official delegation of the countries of the
European Union (particularly Germany, France, UK, Italy, The Netherlands and Sweden), but
it had important ramifications in the whole NGO and scientific communities and beyond that
had reached the sympathy of some parts of the business representatives. The weakness of the
neo-social-democratic/green coalition was in two fronts: its poor capacity of influencing some
crucial countries of the umbrella group (Japan, Switzerland, Norway) that could eventually
shift away from the American position in relation to carbon sinks and its limited work with
some middle and low carbon intensive emergent countries in order to gain some support for
voluntary commitments.
The failure of COP6 to reach an agreement could prove tragic for the fate of Kyoto since the
situation in the U.S. is more difficult with the Bush administration. In my view, there are four
major causes for the failure of COP6. The first and most important one was the insufficient
commitment to Kyoto by the U.S. delegation in a conjuncture in which it was likely that the
new administration would be against Kyoto. The second one was the rigid standing of the
European Union with relation to flexibility mechanism and carbon sinks: the combination
13
between a French presidency of the E.U. (with a prejudice against the U.S.) and two minister
of the environment belonging to the French and German Green Parties in a leadership role did
not favor the possibilities of agreement with the U.S. The third one was the weak
involvement and commitment from emergent countries; they pushed excessively in relation to
new funding and technology transfer without any counterpart in some availability to assume
voluntary commitments for emissions reduction. The fourth one was due to the inability of the
UNFCCC’s multilateral decision making process to deal with the complexity of ruling a
Protocol involving so many technical and political variables.
CONCLUSIONS
As a legally binding regulatory agreement, the Kyoto Protocol is in a very difficult situation
after the failure of COP6 in The Hague, in November 2000. Even with all the difficulties
above mentioned, Kyoto is far away from being dead as a source of ideas and models for the
future. Most environmentalists all over the world will keep fighting the battle over
implementing Kyoto, a battle that becomes more difficult to win as we move closer to 2010.
During 2000 some scientists and policy maker have begun to focus on how to build a better
structure that will be needed if the Kyoto Protocol collapses. A second major consequence of
Kyoto is its fast becoming as a crucial source of soft law. Even with all the obstacles to
become a binding mechanism, the Kyoto Protocol is already shaping technological
development in favor of de-carbonizing the world economy. In the expectations of the
optimistic within the scientific community and corporations, wind and hydrogen powers
sources are rapidly moving to the main stream of the energy matrix. The recent agreement
among the Iceland government from one side, and some auto-makers and energy corporations
from the other side in order to develop a large scale test of hydrogen powered cars is a clear
demonstration of that shifting expectations.
Beyond the specific fate of the Kyoto Protocol, there is little doubt that climate change is the
greatest threat to the future of humankind. In the last year the intensity of severe storms and
floods in different parts of the world has intensified, probably as a reflection of the fact that
we have already entered in the soft version of climate change: the increase in numbers of
extreme meteorological events. These events show dramatically how vulnerable societies are
if they are poor: stronger than historically recorded floods in China, Mozambique, Venezuela
and India, devastating drought and famine in Central Asia and the Horn of Africa. But also
the extreme weather related events hit affluent societies causing significant material losses:
severe storms in England, France and Italy, severe drought and fire in the West of United
States.
The neo-social-democratic/green forces already prevail in the European Union, and they are
strong in Norway, Switzerland, Japan, New Zealand, U.S. Canada, Australia and some key
emergent countries (Brazil, Argentina, Chile, South Korea, Poland). The ratification of Kyoto
and the deepening of the climate regime depend upon the capacity of Neosocialdemocratics/Greens to become the prevailing forces in the countries where they are
already strong, and to increase their strength in other key Emergent countries, where they are
already significant (India, Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines, Mexico, Turkey). Also the fate of
the climate regime depends upon some development of Neo-socialdemocratics and Greens
groups in China and Russia.
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