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It was the greatest war in American history. Three million fought – over 600,000 died. It
was the only war fought on American soil by Americans. The Civil War, between the
northern and southern sections of the United States, which began with the bombardment
of Fort Sumter on the 12th of April 1861, and came to an end, in the last days of April
1865, at Appomattox, with the surrender of the Confederates, was one of the greatest
struggles known to history. Its field of operation spread over thousands of miles, and not
only were the number of men deployed in the warfare vast so too were the numbers of
battles, with some two thousand four hundred recorded. It stood on the border between
old and modern warfare.
“More that 150,000 Irishmen served in the US army, most notably with the Irish Brigade,
and some 50,000 more worn the grey of the Confederacy. During the American Civil
War, six grandsons of George McCook, a United Irishmen, were Union Generals and
another six were field officers. Irish-born Meagher, Corcoran and Shields were Union
Generals and for the Confederacy, Corkman Patrick Cleburne was one of their finest
commanders.” 1. Some 1,008 officers, on both sides, were appointed to the various ranks
of general during the Civil War, of these there were 425 Confederate generals and 583
Union generals. Patrick Ronanye Cleburne would rise to the rank of major general and
thus become the highest ranking Irishman on both sides as well as the highest ranking
officer of foreign birth in the Civil War. Fighting on the Western front Cleburne would
achieve less glory and recognition than other Confederate generals, despite this he would
become the most respected of all Confederate generals, after Robert E. Lee, and would
earn the accolade “Stonewall of the West” from Jefferson Davis.
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Patrick Ronayne Cleburne was born on 16th March 1828 in Ovens, Co Cork. He was the
second son of Dr Joseph and Mary Ann Ronanye Cleburne and was named after his
maternal grandfather, Patrick Ronayne. The Ronayne heritage in Cork and Waterford
dated back to before the Norman invasion while the Cleburne’s had arrived in Ireland
during the early 1600’s. William Cleburne bought land in Tipperary, in the early 1600’s,
where the Cleburne family estate would remain until the death of William Cleburne,
Patrick’s grandfather, in 1833.
Joseph Cleburne was born in Rock Cottage, Co. Tipperary, in 1792, the son of William
Cleburne. While still a very young physician Joseph moved to Ovens, near Ballincollig,
and here he met and married Mary Anne Ronanye the daughter of Patrick Ronanye of
Great Island, Cobh. Dr Cleburne became the contract surgeon for the army barracks and
Royal Gunpowder Mill at Ballincollig as well as the local physician. When he was a year
old Patrick’s mother died, but his father remarried soon after to a Miss Stuart. Patrick
was to gain not only a mother’s love but soon another four siblings – one of whom,
Christopher, was to fall at the battle of Cloyd’s Farm, West Virginia, on 10th of May 1864
aged only 21. Educated at home, by a tutor, until the age of twelve Patrick was then sent
to a private school which was run by the Reverend Spedden of the Church of Ireland ( the
Cleburne’s themselves were of Quaker stock ). When Patrick’s father died in 1844
Patrick became apprentice assistant surgeon to Mr Justin a physician in Mallow a
neighbouring town.
Having failed to pass an entrance exam to enter Trinity College, in February 1846, a
disheartened Patrick immediately joined the 41st Regiment (Welch) of Infantry, which
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was stationed in the Royal Barracks, at Ship Street in Dublin having just returned from a
tour of India. Omitting to mention that he had several relatives who were surgeons in the
British Army or that he was from the landowning class, Pat signed up for life and found
himself #2242 Private Cleburne. Stationed, not as he had hoped in India, or some other
far flung post of the Empire, but in Mullingar, Co. Westmeath, and with Ireland in the
harsh grip of the Potato Famine the regiment would be seconded to aid the civil powers to
quell the riots and civil disorder that wracked the country. Finding himself in the ranks
of what was nothing but an occupying army, as the potato famine worsened, and with the
daily routine of army life proving monotonous, Patrick wearied of the whole experience,
and so with part of his inheritance, he purchased his discharge, in September 1849, for
the princely sum of £20. This was not before Patrick had been demoted from the rank of
corporal, to which he had been promoted in July 1849, a rank he held only for a very
short while, for one day having been ordered out on yet another drill he had filled his
knapsack with pillows. Hours later he would be horrified to hear the order “inspection
knapsacks” and the pillows being found he was once more a private. After nearly three
and a half years in the army Patrick along with his brothers, Christopher and William, and
sister, Anne, set sail on the vessel Bridgetown arriving in New Orleans on Christmas Eve
of 1849.
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Irish immigration into America began as early as the seventeenth century and by 1720 it
could have been deemed a mass emigration with some 150,000 to 200,000 Irish, mainly
young Catholic men, having arrived. Most, being rootless and single, would swiftly be
absorbed into the American way of life with no separate ethnic group being established
during this early period. The first big wave of Ulster Scot emigration was in the period of
1717 to 1719. “Between 1717 and 1775 alone, an estimated 250,000 Ulster Scots left
Ireland for the American colonies.”2. Unlike previous emigrants to America, from
Ireland, these were not single young men but rather families and even whole settlements.
America offered the Ulster Scot Presbyterian much, but most especially it offered the
promise of economic and religious freedoms. While these Ulster Presbyterians had
suffered religious persecution this factor alone did not push them into emigrating. What
was the determining factor was the level of poverty these men and women lived under.
In the early eighteenth century extremely bad weather conditions had seen the failure of
all types of crops and famine was rife. By the late eighteenth century the decline in the
linen industry meant hardship for most in Ulster, affecting as it did almost every person
from tenant farmer to those working in the mills. Most Presbyterians worked the land,
renting this from landowners as under the Penal Laws they were barred from owning
land. The amount of land that these farmers could rent was minute as rents were high and
profitability low, so farmers from the same family group or even the same church group
would amalgamate their land farming it in one large unit which was certainly more viable
but still they just eked out a living. Thus it was that the lure of land and of religious
freedom drew the Presbyterians of Ulster to America, seeing whole families and even
whole communities leaving together. Arriving in Boston they soon became known as
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Scots-Irish and found that their strict brand of Protestantism wasn’t popular with the
Puritans. “The Scots-Irish quickly became almost as unpopular among New Englanders
as their Catholic counterparts would be in the nineteenth century. The principal sources
of conflict were religion and the manners, lifestyle and frequent poverty of the
newcomers.”3. Unwelcome they moved on with Pennsylvania becoming a centre for
settlement but it was the South and the more remote backcountry areas of Kentucky and
Tennessee that would see the majority of Scots-Irish settlement, the Blue Ridge and
Appalachian Mountains regions. Wherever the Scots-Irish settled they would quickly
distance themselves from less respectable Irishmen and by the early nineteenth century
were being accepted as American, this often due to the role they had played in the
American Revolution where they had sided with the Americans against the British.
“While Irish emigrants to America in the eighteenth century had been mainly Protestant,
the emigrants of the nineteenth century were overwhelmingly Catholic. By the 1830’s,
Catholics exceeded Protestants in the transatlantic migration from Ireland for the first
time since 1700. As mass emigration from Catholic Ireland got underway in the prefamine era (1800-44), Irish Americans of Protestant descent loudly proclaimed their
difference from the newcomers, calling themselves Scotch-Irish rather than Irish and
assimilating rapidly into the mainstream of Protestant America.4.
Even before the stream of Catholic Irish emigration to America became a torrent, the
issue of religion had come to the forefront in American politics. The Aliens Act of 1798
had attempted to curtail the rights of immigrants who were not naturalised. In the 1830s,
however, nativists began focusing their attacks on Catholic immigrants, asserting that
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America's republican form of government could not be sustained with a large Catholic
population. Pamphleteers, such as Samuel Morse, began linking immigration with
Catholicism outweighing the benefits of immigration with the potential threat to
Protestantism by Catholicism. Nativists began to transform this anti-immigrant, antiCatholic sentiment into a political movement and the Know-Nothings soon became the
largest of such movements. The dramatic rise in immigration, resulting from the Irish
potato famine and German economic distress, disputes between Protestants and Catholics
over the use of the Protestant King James Bible in public schools, attracted more than 1
million members to the Know-Nothing party. Changing their name in 1855, to the
American Party, they would have by the end of that year carried elections in a dozen
states and elected more than one hundred congressmen. Many believed they would elect
the next president, but their 1856 presidential candidate, Millard Fillmore, carried only
Maryland. This embarrassing performance hastened the party's decline, and by 1860, the
Know-Nothings had disappeared. Divisions over the slavery issue drove many of its
northern members into the new Republican Party.
The population explosion in Ireland during the late eighteenth century had put immense
pressure on its food resources. By the time of the Great Famine (1845 -1851) the poor
were finding life extremely difficult and with their crop turning black, from the blight,
rents would soon become unpaid.
The exodus to America would start late in 1845.
“Choosing between starvation and flight, the famine Irish emigrated to North America in
their hundreds of thousands. The two million men, women and children who crossed the
Atlantic from Ireland in the decade after 1845 represented one-quarter of the pre-famine
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population and accounted for the largest European mass migration, in proportion terms,
in nineteenth century history.”5.
These new immigrants, unlike the farming Scots-Irish,
would stay mainly in the cities and towns. Even in the non-industrialised South the
newly arrived Irish tended to stay in urban areas. In this famine era the new immigrants
gained a reputation for violence and criminality, the latter often caused by the poverty
which they found themselves in. During this period the Irish consolidated their control of
the Catholic Church an action that made them even more disliked and mistrusted.
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It was into this era, in America, of dislike and mistrust of the Irish immigrant that Patrick
Cleburne and the Cleburne family would arrive. However, unlike others who were
fleeing famine Ireland, the Cleburnes were relatively well off as the family had been left
in a fairly sound financial position when their father died and possessed a degree of
learning, something that most of the newly arrived Irish didn’t. Also their religion set
them apart. Being relatively well off, educated and Protestant the Cleburnes, while not
received with open arms, were very quickly accepted. The Cleburne family set out for
Ohio, but after only a short time there Patrick grew restless and headed south west finally
settling, in 1850, in Helena, Arkansas, a swampy Mississippi River town just below
Memphis. The Helena that Patrick arrived at in 1849 was a thriving community of some
1700 souls, of whom 75 were Irish. “Arkansas was still a rather new state in 1849 when
he got there. A large percentage of Arkansas's people had ties to Ireland/Scotland in
ancestry.”6. Saying this “here a man was not so much judged by his ancestral beginnings
(with exception of the slaves at that time) as he was by what he stood for and
represented”7. Patrick would very soon be assimilated into the society of Helena being
recognised for the gentleman he was.
Patrick obtained a position with Grant and Nash, as a prescription clerk, and was so
successful that after a mere two years he bought out Mr Grant’s share of the business. He
so immersed himself into life in his adopted home that he began to join local groups and
organisations such as the Freemasons (Lafayette #16), which he joined in 1852. "He was
particularly committed, never missed a meeting, and quickly became a leader in the local
lodge. He was elected master in early 1853, and later that year he 'took the sublime
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degree of Royal Arch Mason' conferred upon him at a special ceremony by Arkansas
luminary Albert Pike." He was also elected in 1853 to deliver the keynote speech at an
annual convention of Arkansas and Mississippi freemasons, where, "In a forceful and
direct style, he offered a talk dominated by high-minded platitudes about the principles of
the Masonic order, 'Brotherly love, friendship, charity, and truth'..." 8.
Being extremely
religious Patrick was also a frequent and regular attendee at his local Presbyterian church.
Patrick’s religious observance, and overall sober demeanour (he was a member of the
Sons of Temperance, and as well he was never known to utter a profanity), meant that he
quickly became accepted, as well as assimilated, into Southern society, unlike the Irish
Catholics. Selling out his share of the drugstore, in April 1854, Patrick used the money to
embark on the study of law, after qualifying, in 1856, he joined the practise of Scaife and
Magnum. Patrick had become a naturalised citizen, in February 1855.
Patrick had developed a strong interest in politics, during his time in America, involving
himself so deeply as to be wounded by a member of the Know-Nothings, once described
by Thomas C. Hindman as “pestilent fanatics”. Soon Hindman, a Tennessee lawyer now
living in Helena, and Cleburne would become close friends and it was with Hindman that
Patrick became involved in a street fight with members of the Know-Nothings, in 1856,
both being wounded, Patrick so badly he almost died, but not before he managed to kill
their attacker. Later in that year Patrick would become Hindman’s best man when
Thomas Hindman and Mary Watkins Biscoe wed. By 1860 Patrick had become senior
partner in the law firm which was by now called Cleburne, Scaife and Magnum. And it
was in the summer of 1860 that he enlisted in the local militia group the Yell Rifles, the
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members of which came from the cream of local society. Starting as a private Patrick
would soon be elected by his fellow militiamen to the rank of captain. This was no doubt
due in part to his time spent in the British army and also partly due to the magnetism of
his personality, for Patrick, despite his ignorance of the social mores of the ante-bellum
South, was well liked and respected.
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On Tuesday, November 6th 1860 Abraham Lincoln was elected President of the United
States of America, with just a third of the popular vote, and on the 20th December 1860,
before Lincoln was even sworn in, South Carolina seceded from the Union. They would
be followed in January 1861 by Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia and Louisiana,
Texas would follow suit on February 1st. On 12th April 1861 with the firing on of Fort
Sumter in Charleston Harbour the Civil War broke out. According to these states the
decision to secede was based on states rights, in that having joined the Union voluntarily
they had the right to withdrawn from it. President Buchanan had said that neither he nor
Congress had the power to prevent a state from leaving the Union and so did nothing to
prevent the rebel states from breaking away. However, when Lincoln was finally sworn
in, on March 4th, he declared that no state had the legal right to withdraw from the Union,
(Appendix I, Lincoln’s inauguration speech). Likening the Union to a marriage he said
that while a couple may divorce and go out of the presence of each other, the different
parts of the country could not do this, they could not physically separate.
In the 120 days between Lincoln’s election and his inauguration the Confederates tried to
impose sovereignty over those forts that remained in the hands of the Southern states.
Fort Sumter, in Charleston Harbour, and Fort Pickens, at Pensacola, Florida, along with
two other forts remained in federal hands with the South putting increasing military
pressure on them to hand over the forts. When the Union tried to resupply and reinforce
Fort Sumter on January 9, 1861 the vessel Star of the West was fired upon and forced to
turn back. The Union forces remained firm despite the fact that the Confederates held a
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tight noose, figuratively, around the man made island holding as they did forts Johnson,
Moultrie and Castle Pinckney. Public attention was swiftly drawn to the situation at
Sumter, and it rapidly became a symbol of sovereignty and honour. Edmund Ruffin fired
the first shot of the conflict at 4.30am on the morning of April 12th, thus the siege of Fort
Sumter began. While public attention focused on the shelling of Fort Sumter and the
outbreak of Civil War United States troops were landed at Pickens. The fort was secured,
thereby offsetting the loss of the other naval fortifications at Pensacola Harbour. Fort
Pickens and the surrounding island remained in Union hands throughout the Civil War.
In strictly military terms, the battle between Union and Confederate forces at Fort Sumter
scarcely merits attention. After a relatively brief bombardment, the small Union garrison
surrendered a position of questionable military value to either side. Not a single human
life was lost during the fighting at Fort Sumter, but it would unleash four years of
bloodshed. The precarious peace that had existed after the secession of the seven deep
South states, and the formation of the Confederacy, was irredeemably shattered.
Virginia seceded from the Union on April 17th to be followed in May by Arkansas,
Tennessee and North Carolina. In Arkansas, in late January and early February of 1861,
while a convention had not been held and thus Arkansas had not seceded from the Union,
its citizens were fired up. The election of Lincoln as President had sent the state into
turmoil and everyone was restless so when a steamship tied up at the jetty at Little Rock,
in December 1860, and some 76 Federal soldiers came ashore and headed towards the
towns arsenal it was no wonder that the people of Arkansas were wary. The arsenal was
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after years of minimal occupancy again active. Then in February rumour had it that a
steamboat was headed for Little Rock with further Federal soldiers. Governor Rector
ordered cannons be placed at the river to repel the reinforcements but they were later
withdrawn when the soldiers did not materialise. Before this, however, the newly strung
telegraph wires were abuzz with the message that more Federal troops were expected in
Little Rock, one of the lines ran through to Helena where it was decided that the arsenal
in little Rock had to be neutralised. “In Helena, Patrick R. Cleburne prepared himself
for war by purchasing a saddle horse and various articles: a comfort, a box of wads and
two pounds of shot, a box of percussion caps, and for his uniform, a pair of sleeve
buttons. The Yell Rifles and another company which had been organized in the county,
the Phillips County Guards, prepared to depart for Little Rock. With Captain Cleburne
on horseback at the head of the command, the two companies marched along Ohio and
Rightor streets to the wharf. By steamboat they went down the Mississippi to Napoleon,
and then up the Arkansas River, arriving at Little Rock on February 5.”
9.
In order to
prevent the unnecessary loss of civilian life should the surrounded arsenal be fired upon,
the commander at the arsenal withdrew his troops and the arsenal passed from Federal to
State control. Arkansas finally seceded from the Union on May 6th (see Appendix I) and
the Yell Rifles (see Appendix II) were assigned to the 1st Regiment of the Arkansas State
troops, becoming Company F. On May 14, 1861, the First Regiment, Arkansas State
Troops, was organized at Mound City, six miles above Memphis on the Mississippi
River. “The Yell Rifles joined with other militia companies from Arkansas to form the 1st
Arkansas Infantry (which later became the 15th Arkansas). On May 14, Patrick
Cleburne's qualifications for military command were recognized again, and he was
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elected colonel. In the ensuing months, he drilled them into a unit that many said was the
finest Confederate regiment beyond the Eastern states.”
10.
On July 23, 1861, the
regiment was enrolled in Confederate service at Pittman’s Ferry, Arkansas. Redesignated
as the First Regiment, Arkansas Volunteers, with the Yell Rifles now becoming
Company B. However, when it was learned that Colonel James Fleming Fagan’s
regiment had also been designated as the First Regiment, Cleburne’s regiment was
redesignated as the Fifteenth Regiment, Arkansas Volunteers, on December 31, 1861, and
the Yell Rifles once again had its company designation changed, this time to Company
C. It would retain this designation to the end of the war.
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The Civil War was not fought in one arena between two contending forces. Rather,
operations were conducted in two distinct theatres: the East, extending from the Atlantic
to the Appalachian Mountains and the West, stretching from the windward side of the
Appalachians to the Mississippi River.
It was in this Western theatre that Patrick
Cleburne and his men would see action. The state of Missouri was a prize much desired
by both the Union and Confederate governments at the beginning of hostilities in 1861.
In nearly every category, including industrial production, mining, agricultural
productivity, and in population, Missouri had no peer west of the Mississippi. Thus
Missouri was indeed a prize worth contending for by North and South. The secessionist
governor of Missouri was Claiborne Fox Jackson, who was convinced that Missourians
desired to align with the south, despite of all of the evidence to the contrary, and so
sought military assistance from the Confederacy to accomplish that goal. Major General
Leonidas Polk was in charge of the force that was sent to bring into the Confederacy.
Since Arkansas bordered Missouri the troops in that state were obviously the most salient
to Polk’s plan for warfare in Missouri. As Polk did not command these troops he could
only advise what the Arkansas troops should do, and so one of the most ill conceived
campaigns started.
Late July 1861 saw Pat Cleburne and the 1st Regiment of the
Arkansas Volunteers, under the command of Brigadier General Hardee, camped at
Pittman’s Creek. Hardee and his fellow general, Pillow, began almost immediately to
work at cross purposes, the two generals could never agree on a plan of action. Thus
Polk’s vaunted campaign into southeast Missouri, and beyond, soon bogged down in a
morass of unmatched stubbornness and a woefully inadequate system of command. This
would become a feature of the campaign in the Western theatre with the generals here
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often failing to exercise a chain of command. Pat Cleburne’s first entry into the arena of
warfare was an exercise in sheer futility. Despite this, his ability to lead was again
recognised and on the 4th March 1862 he was promoted to Brigadier General.
Soon all would change as Hardee was despatched to Shiloh in Kentucky. During the
winter of 1861-62 Federal forces pushing southward from St. Louis captured Forts Henry
and Donelson on the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers.
With the capture of Fort
Donelson, and its 17,000 inhabitants, the whole Confederate defensive line stretching
from the Appalachians to the Mississippi was severed.
Albert Sidney Johnston
scrambled to rally his stunned, demoralized troops before the Federals could exploit their
advantage and, possibly, end the war very soon. Forces from all over the South - from
even as far away as the Gulf Coast - gravitated toward the small railroad junction of
Corinth, Mississippi, in the north-eastern part of the state. Realizing that he could not
wait for another Federal advance, Johnston began concentrating forces at Corinth,
Mississippi, where he hoped to take the offensive and destroy General Grant's Army of
Tennessee before it could be joined by General Don Carlos Buell's Army of Ohio. The
march from Corinth to Pittsburg Landing was longer than anticipated so Johnston’s
troops did not arrive there till the evening of the 5th. When Johnston’s men attacked the
Union forces on the morning of the 6th they achieved total surprise. The Rebels took
Union position after another. Hardee was attacking Sherman and McClerand, Cleburne's
Brigade was on the left flank of Hardee's Corps with Cleburne's 15th Arkansas was out
front as skirmishers. Including Cleburne's Brigade, the front line was three miles in
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length and consisted of Woods, Hindman's Brigades and Gladden's from Bragg's Corps.
Suddenly there was a swamp in the middle of the front line, Cleburne and his men were
forced to find a way around it. When they had traversed the swampy land the brigade
was met with massed volleys and they had to fall back having suffered huge losses.
Finally the Union troops managed to hold an area of sunken road, with the bullets
whipping about, the area would become known as “the hornets nest”. With eleven
assaults on the area repelled the Confederates bought in cannon, sixty two of them!
Along with other brigades, Cleburne was ordered to attack the “the hornets nest” and
under the covering fire of the cannons the Rebels managed to take the hornets nest after
six hours of fighting. Mere yards from the sunken road was a peach orchard, General
Johnston led the last charge on the peach orchard.
“Governor Isham Harris of
Tennessee, who had volunteered to serve as his aid during the battle, saw him reel in the
saddle. “General are you hurt?” he cried. “Yes and I fear seriously,” Johnston said.”11.
Johnston bleed to death his femoral artery had been severed. That night rain began to fall
on the battlefield which took its name from a church there called Shiloh. As men, on
both sides, slept Buell and his troops arrived. The battle the next day would be a
bloodbath like that of the day before. On the morning of April 7, Cleburne counted only
800 men present out of the 2,700 who had entered the battle the previous day. That day
had been a disaster in many ways. He noted, "Hundreds of his best men were dead or in
hospitals." With the gallant few that remained, the brigade advanced and formed line of
battle, once again facing the units of McClernard in the vicinity of Cavalry field. At
midmorning Cleburne was ordered to advance, but realised he had no artillery support
and that McClenard easily outflanked his left. An advance would be suicidal, and
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Cleburne so reported to Breckenridge, who replied that his orders were positive and to
move out. The advance was halted temporarily by an artillery duel fought over the
brigades’ head. With Cleburne’s men caught in the middle, tree limbs and splinters
began falling among the men killing and wounding may. The glade soon came under rifle
fire as well. Captain Cowley, acting as major for the fallen Harris, fell with a bullet in
the head. The fire was too much for the Tennessee’s of the brigade, and they fled to the
rear. When the firing ceased, the line charged forward. Cleburne’s brigade could not
engage the enemy but was subject to a withering fire of bullets and artillery shot as it
moved through a thick undergrowth. This time the entire brigade was repulsed and broke.
He reported that to his knowledge " the 15th Arkansas was the only regiment rallied
anywhere near the scene of the disaster". Despite the fiasco of the attack, Cleburne
demonstrated the tenacity he had shown the day before. Trying to make the best of a bad
situation, Cleburne ordered the 15th Arkansas, all that he had left, to take and hold some
abandoned cannon. The federals soon began to advance, and Cleburne seeing that
reinforcements were on the way, gathered what remained of his old regiment and led it in
a charge against the federals. The charge caused the federals to flee and bought time for
the reinforcements to come into the line, but it cost a heavy price. Lieutenant Colonel
Patton, the last field officer of the 15th, lay dead along with many others. Cleburne’s men
continued to fire until they ran out of ammunition then fell back. By then only 58 men
were still with the unit. Cleburne’s brigade was completely scattered and disorganised.”
12.
There were 13,047 missing or dead on the Confederate side and 10,694 on the Union
side, up till that time in the Civil War Shiloh was the fiercest battle fought and it shocked
everyone.
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The battle of Richmond, Kentucky, would see Pat Cleburne receive his first major wound
of the war, so far. “In Maj.Gen. Kirby Smith's 1862 Confederate offensive into Kentucky,
Brig. Gen. Patrick R. Cleburne led the advance with Col. John S. Scott's cavalry out in
front. The Rebel cavalry, while moving north from Big Hill on the road to Richmond,
Kentucky, on August 29, encountered Union troopers and began skirmishing. After noon,
Union artillery and infantry joined the fray, forcing the Confederate cavalry to retreat to
Big Hill. At that time, Brig. Gen. Mahlon D. Manson, who commanded Union forces in
the area, ordered a brigade to march to Rogersville, toward the Rebels. Fighting for the
day stopped after pursuing Union forces briefly skirmished with Cleburne's men in late
afternoon. That night, Manson informed his superior, Maj. Gen. William Nelson, of his
situation, and he ordered another brigade to be ready to march in support, when
required. Kirby Smith ordered Cleburne to attack in the morning and promised to hurry
reinforcements (Churchill's division). Cleburne started early, marching north, passed
through Kinston, dispersed Union skirmishers, and approached Manson's battle line near
Zion Church.” 13. While shouting a command to his men Cleburne had a minnie ball go
through his mouth removing with it five of his front, bottom, teeth. With his cheek badly
scarred from this wound Pat was prompted into growing a beard.
Patrick had recovered from this injury in time to fight at the Battle of Perryville,
Kentucky, on the 8th of October 1862. Perryville was to be the end of General Braxton
Braggs “Kentucky invasion”. Bragg along with fellow general Edmund Kirby Smith
devised plans to invade Kentucky in the summer of 1862. Bragg had routed the Union
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army at Richmond and Kirby Smith had taken one of their garrisons at Munfordville.
The Confederate armies having taken Lexington and Frankfort, now controlled most of
central Kentucky. Northern forces were quick to react to the threat posed by the South
and General Buell rushed to Bardstown, this action forced Bragg to remove his men to
eastward to Perryville. The battle began at 3am, by 2pm the battle had begun in earnest.
Cleburne and his men were held in reserve till nearly 4pm when they then moved forward
and engaged in battle moving back the Union troops and taking higher ground. The high
hills had caused problems for the Confederates with these highs being held by the
artillerists and so it was that Patrick had his horse shot from under him being injured in
the leg in the process. The battle was a Confederate success but still Bragg withdrew his
army from Kentucky and into East Tennessee. Buell retained Kentucky by default. More
than 15,000 Confederate soldiers would be struck down with typhoid, dysentery, scurvy
and pneumonia during the 200 mile march. Braggs army would be renamed the army of
Tennessee. The Army of the Tennessee was divided into two corps, one under General
Hardee, the other under the command of General Polk.
Cleburne’s division would
become part of Hardee’s corps and a life long friendship would spring up between the
two men.
On December 31 1862 Bragg’s army of 38,000 would face up to the 43,000 men of the
Army of Cumberland led by General Rosecrans, at Murfreesboro, Tennessee, on the
banks of the Stone River. Over night the Rebels had moved into position ready to begin
battle the instant that the sun came up.
“Hardee had sent one of his divisions, under
John C. Breckinridge, to extend the north end of the line east of the Stone's River to meet
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a possible flanking attack. Hardee took command of McCown's division to use it in
partnership with one of Hardee's own divisions under Major General Pat Cleburne for
the dawn charge on the Yankees.”14. Patrick had been promoted to Major General a few
days earlier on December 20th. About 6am, on the morning of the 31st, Hardee sent in his
two divisions, 11,000 strong, forward in lines six deep. “Two Federal brigades ceased
to exist and the survivors did not stop running until they were far in the rear. A
Confederate prisoner who had been captured before the battle, Private Joseph T.
McBride, was so disgusted at the rout of the Federals that he called out to the fleeing
Union men: "What are you running for?! Why don't you stand and fight like men?!" A
fellow prisoner roared at him: "For God's sake, Joe, don't try to rally the Yankees! Keep
'em on the run!" General Jeff Davis heard all the ruckus on his right, and ordered one
of his brigades to turn 90 degrees to face the assault. One of Johnson's reserve brigades
moved up among boulders and trees to extend the line. Four of Cleburne's brigades hit
them hard, but the Union men, though outnumbered, poured fire into their attackers; one
Federal regiment even countercharged the rebels.”15. Cleburne had unexpectedly found
himself in the front line though his brigade had started some 500 yards to the rear. With
the battle less than an hour old five Union brigades were in retreat. “The first indication
Bragg had that his attack was not going as planned came just moments after McCown
struck Johnson’s picket line. A courier from Hardee brought word that Cheatham had
yet to advance and that, as a consequence, Cleburne’s right was exposed.”16. Exposed to
the fire of the Union troops the Confederates were mowed down. Then Cheatham moved
his four brigades forward to meet Davis’s men and Cleburne’s division was able to move
around the Union troops so that by 10am the line of Union troops had been forced into a
22
“V” shape.
By mid-morning, Bragg's army had suffered severely in the constant
battering of the Union line. Hardee's Corps had lost one-third in killed or wounded. The
Union soldiers were also being decimated and Sheridan’s men had run out of ammunition
causing a break in the Union lines which the Confederates tried to exploit but Rosecrans
moved his artillery forward causing two Confederate brigades to fall back after
experiencing huge casualties. Soon with ammunition again restored to Sheridan’s men
Rosecrans had secured the Union right flank. Four o’clock that afternoon saw the last
offensive take place with Polk sending in four brigades of his division against Hazen’s
Unionists, but only two of the brigades arrived but still they went in and were fired upon
by the Union artillery. The Confederates were torn to pieces. This was to be the last
skirmish of the day.
New Years day arrived in cold, wet and miserable. Bodies lay where they had fallen the
previous day and the night had been rent with the cries of the wounded begging for water
or to be put out of their misery. “Bragg woke up on New Year's Day 1863 to the shock
of finding that the Federals were still where they had been the night before. Never very
decisive, Bragg didn't know what to make of it and spent the day doing nothing
particularly important, though after the bloodletting of the day before his army wasn't in
condition to do much anyway. His men scavenged the litter of Federal weapons and
equipment on the battlefield. Polk moved troops into the abandoned Round Forest, made
contact with the Yankees, and decided it would be unwise to advance further.
Breckinridge moved back into his positions on the right of the Confederate line. There
23
was no more than skirmishing all day long. Just before sundown, heavy firing broke out,
but it died out quickly.”17.
January 2nd was grey and wet, this later turning to sleet. “Bragg at last accepted that
only a determined assault would dislodge Rosecrans, who showed no intention of leaving
without a fight.”18. All afternoon the Army of the Tennessee moved into position in
preparation for the 4pm offensive. The Unionists had noticed the activity and began
moving their men into position. When the Confederates attacked they came under fire of
the Union artillery but despite this they managed to break the Union line and force the
Yankees to withdraw. It was another extremely cold, wet night. Rosecrans throughout
the night had begun to receive reinforcements and by the time the sun had started to rise
on January 3rd Bragg had been informed of this and decided to withdraw.
“Ironically it was Bragg himself who finally released the latent hostility of his generals.
On January 11, he sent Hardee, Beckinridge, Cleburne and Cheatham what was perhaps
the most incredible document addressed by a commander to his lieutenants during the
war. It was a circular letter, in which Bragg solicited their views on the propriety of the
retreat from Murfreesboro and (although there was doubt among its recipients as to
whether the intent of the note was to raise this second issue) Bragg’s fitness for continued
command of the Army of Tennessee…Three days later, Cleburne responded.
The
24
Irishman recommended only that Bragg resign, evading the issue of the withdrawal from
Murfreesboro altogether.19.
Of the eight who reached the position of full general in the Confederate army, General
Braxton Bragg was the most controversial. Graduating from West point in 1837 Bragg
served in the Seminole Wars and the Mexican War. Serving in the army till 1856 when
he retired to his plantation, in Louisiana, Bragg had earned a reputation as a strict
disciplinarian. After secession, he was commissioned Brigadier General CSA on 7
March 1861, and promoted to Major General on 12 September 1861. He was finally
promoted to full general on 12 April 1862 and was given the command of the Army of
the Tennessee on 27 June in the same year, a position he would hold till November 1863.
His defects were that not only was he was hell bent on following rules to the point of
absurdity he was also an old school commander who had been taught at West Point that a
frontal assault makes for the best strategy, but this was not a strategy suited to the
conditions that would be encountered in the Civil War.
“Technological advances
relating to weapons had served to make defense much easier and straight-on charges
much more perilous. Bragg, like many of his contemporaries, never realized that a
change of tactics was in order.”20. Jefferson Davis had one great weakness and that was
excessive loyalty to his friends which was why Braxton Bragg retained command of the
Army of the Tennessee as long as he did.
Pat Cleburne became antagonistic towards
Bragg as Cleburne was a man who hated to lose and Bragg would lose more battles than
he won.
25
With the coming of spring military action started up again. The Union army began its
advance on June 24th and several days later they moved through Hoovers Gap,
threatening Pat Cleburne’s flank rear. At this Cleburne and his men were ordered to fall
back to Tullahoma, Bragg decided to retreat further behind the Elk River eventually
stopping in Chattanooga. With Rosecrans regrouping west of Chattanooga Bragg was
forced to withdraw from Chattanooga in order to protect his supply line. Bragg would
consolidate his troops at Lafayette, Georgia, some 26 miles from Chattanooga; Rosecran
began then to concentrate his troops along the Lafayette Road. On September 18th Bragg
would post his Army of the Tennessee on the west bank of Chickamauga Creek. Fighting
began on the morning on the 19th. Bragg had a plan to attack the Unionists on their left
flank thus cutting it off from Chattanooga. Hill’s corps, with Cleburne’s division was to
spearhead the attack. That afternoon the division marched eight miles to the point of
attack and at 6pm Cleburne gave the order to advance. Breaking through the lines they
captured three guns and two regimental standards. With darkness falling the division
camped for the night. The next morning Cleburne’s division resumed the battle on a mile
wide front against the federal forces. Getting to within 175 yards of the Union position
they could not advance further and at 11am, having suffered staggering loses Cleburne
pulled his men back. One in every three men in the division was either wounded or
killed. The next morning, at 9am, Cleburne’s division was ordered into the fray – the
battle having started at dawn – but the Union soldiers had by now had time to build a line
of barricades using everything available to them. Cleburne’s men were repulsed, with
heavy losses again. The fighting shifted to other parts of the field. At this critical
26
moment the soldiers in Polk's Tennessee and Arkansas Brigade ran out of ammunition.
Cleburne, seeing this, reacted quickly by having ammunition rushed forward. Then he
and members of his staff began breaking open the boxes and passing out the ammunition,
thus prolonging the attack. Finally, the Union line began to withdraw and Cleburne's
men rushed forward, claiming the barricades. By sunset the Army of Tennessee had won
its first battle and Pat Cleburne had shown that he was a true soldier’s soldier having
shared every dangerous minute with his men at the front lines.
After the defeat of the Union Army at Chickamauga Rosecrans fortified Chattanooga,
rather than attack Bragg decided to starve out Rosecrans. At this time Bragg was
preoccupied trying to quell the insubordination in the ranks as feuding had broken out
among his generals with Cleburne signing a petition, addressed to President Davis,
requesting that Bragg be relieved of his command. Cleburne had joined with the other
generals in this as he felt it the right thing to do to back the other generals in trying to get
Bragg relieved. Davis backed Bragg and told him to do whatever necessary to restore
unity among his generals. This resulted in Polk being transferred and General Hill
relieved of his command. Longstreet had been seconded to the Army of the Tennessee
arriving on the eve of the Battle of Chickamauga, expecting to be named as Bragg’s
replacement he had become an unruly element. In order to placate Longstreet Bragg gave
him the entire left flank at Chattanooga. Disobeying Braggs orders entirely Longstreet
managed to give away the entire left flank to the union forces. With this he lobbied
Davis to be sent back to Virginia. Davis agreed and Bragg concurred so Longstreet set
27
back from whence he had come, and in doing so hopefully drawing away some of the
attention of the Federal forces from Chattanooga by attacking their forces in Knoxville.
November 24th and Sherman crossed the Tennessee River and Cleburne was ordered to
engage his army. The biggest mistake Sherman made now was not to set his entire
strength against Cleburne’s lone division, this cost him seven hours of fighting. Finally
Thomas and his Unionists attacked the rebels winning the day for Sherman.
Now
Cleburne acted as rearguard for the Army of the Tennessee during their retreat. He was
then ordered to hold Ringgold Gap at all cost. Then General Hooker attacked, after four
hours, out numbered three to one, then “Cleburne received a dispatch stating that the
Confederate trains were safe, and he could withdraw his command. By 2:00 P.M. the
Confederate rear guard had retreated one mile to the south. At a cost of 221 casualties
Cleburne saved the wagon trains and much of the artillery of the Army of Tennessee and
earned the thanks of the Confederate Congress.”
21.
As a mark of recognition for his
actions Cleburne was allowed to retain his distinctive blue flag with its white moon in the
middle – from May 1863 all Confederates units had to carry the National Flag.
Cleburne’s division would be the only one in the whole of the Army of Tennessee to be
accorded such an honour. Now Cleburne and his troops would go to winter camp. Bragg
at last sent in his resignation to Davis, who accepted it and placed Hardee in temporary
command. Cleburne was delighted with the change in command.
28
By the time Patrick had arrived in America the country was already starting to ferment
with anti-slavery and pro-tariff agitation. The Southern states which depended on slaves
for labour for their cotton crops (upon which the Southern economy depended) were
opposed to the anti-slavery laws that abolitionists wanted to implement while the
industrialised North heavily favoured such laws. The North was growing at a fast rate,
due to immigration, while the population of the South remained fairly static. “Always
aware that the North was the faster growing- section, the South foresaw the day when the
North would control the government.
Then Southerners believed, there would be
legislation – a stiff high-tariff law, for instance – that would ruin the South.”
22..
The
Fugitive Slave Act saw Northerners coming to the aid of runaway slaves and Harriet
Beecher Stowes book, “Uncle Toms Cabin”, would tug at the heartstrings of many a
Northerner. The Kansas-Nebraska Act which saw these two new territories given the
right to permit or abolish slavery themselves rather than by an act of the Union set the
issue at a new high. Extremists began to whip up peoples emotions, feelings over the
issue of slavery ran even higher than before, “the antagonism between the sections came
finally and tragically, to express itself through the slavery issue. It was not the only cause
of the Civil War, but it was unquestionably the one cause without which the war would
not have taken place.”23. Certainly Pat had never entered the war because of the issue of
slavery for as he wrote to his brother “I am with the South in life or in death, in victory or
defeat. I never owned a negro and care nothing for them, but these people have been my
friends and have stood up to me on all occasions. In addition to this, I believe the North
is about to wage a brutal and unholy war on a people who have done them no wrong, in
violation of the constitution and the fundamental principals of the government. They no
29
longer acknowledge that all government derives its validity from the consent of the
governed.”24. For Cleburne the issue was not slavery, it was the right to secede that
mattered, political independence meant more than anything else to him. Maybe this lack
of understanding of the South’s emotional and economic commitment to the institution of
slavery made him less cautious than he should have been when it came to proposing that
slaves should be enlisted into the Confederate army. With the Confederates having lost
so many men on the battlefields and with so many more having suffered terrible wounds
by 1864 the South was experiencing a serious lack of men in its ranks. Cleburne felt the
answer lay in the enlistment of slaves.
The North had already black soldiers and
Cleburne felt that here lay the answer to the South’s problems. Drafting a proposal,
which he got thirteen fellow officers to sign, (see appendix III), Cleburne had written
"The necessity for more fighting men is upon us. We can only get a sufficiency by
making the Negro share the danger and hardship of the war. If we arm him and train him
and make him fight for his country, every consideration of principle and policy demands
that we shall set him and his whole race, who side with us, free."
Cleburne presented
this to General Joseph Johnston on January 2nd 1864. General Johnston having replaced
Hardee as the commander of the Army of the Tennessee, it was at his headquarters in
Dalton, Georgia, that Cleburne tabled his proposal that slaves should be enlisted in the
army and if they survived the war should be rewarded with their freedom. Believing that
the proposal was beyond the scope of the military in that it dealt with political issues
Johnston refused to forward the proposal to Davis in Richmond. However, Jefferson
Davis did receive Cleburne’s proposal and it was returned to him, from the President, on
January 31st with the request that it be suppressed in case of possible public outrage.
30
Robert E. Lee would advocate, in January 1865, the enlistment of slaves and on March
13th of that year the Confederate Congress finally authorised the enlistment of slaves to
provide additional forces. It would be too little too late as the South would surrender in
April.
Cleburne’s championing of the proposal probably put an end to any thoughts he may
have had of further promotion. Over a period of eight months Cleburne was passed over
for the following assignments to corps command in the Army of Tennessee:
- General Breckinridge to General D H Hill’s Corps;
- General J B Hood to General Breckinridge’s Corps;
- General A P Stewart to General Polk’s Corps on the latter’s
death at Pine Mountain;
- General Stephen D Lee to General Hood’s Corps on his
elevation to command of the Army in mid-July 1864;
- General B F Cheatham to General Hardee’s Corps on the latter’s
transfer.
Any hopes that Cleburne had of advancement had been totally shattered.
31
During that January of 1864 Hardee had confided to his good friend Cleburne that he was
getting married and asked Cleburne to be his best man. Hardee and Cleburne traveled to
Mobile, Alabama and it was at the marriage, on January 13th, that Cleburne met twenty
four year old Susan Tarleton the maid of honour. Pat was smitten and before he returned
to his division he asked Susan to marry him. She would not answer but instead gave him
permission to write to her. A month later Pat too leave and went back to Mobile again
asking Susan Tarleton to marry him and at last she agreed.
In early May 1864, Sherman began his offensive against Atlanta by making a probe at
Mill Creek Gap and Dug Gap where Cleburne’s troops faced the Union troops. Within
two weeks Sherman had marched his army half the distance between Chattanooga and
Atlanta, outflanking Johnston’s positions at Dalton and Resaca, and forcing him to retreat
from his entrenched positions. Cleburne’s division fought their opponents almost daily in
a series of encounters; the skirmishing between the two armies never seemed to cease.
They were not defeated and had not been driven from their positions, but nevertheless
they fell back. While the conflict was going on Cleburne kept up his correspondence with
his fiancée and was obviously looking forward to his future marriage.
The campaign resumed. At Pickett’s Mill Cleburne positioned his brigades so well that
when the Federals attacked, thinking that they had overlapped the enemy’s flank; they
encountered the veterans of Missionary Ridge and Ringgold Gap. The Confederate’s line
held but if the Unionists had broken the line or managed to get around the flank then it
was probable that the Rebels would have been routed. The fighting continued until well
32
past sundown. At 10:00pm Granbury, one of Cleburne’s brigade commanders, suggested
that he should attack with his brigade and Cleburne approved. Granbury’s men charged,
broke the Federals who fled the field leaving hundreds of dead and many prisoners.
Pickett’s Mill was another clear victory for Cleburne’s Division. For the third time his
men had repelled attacks by larger forces and for a third time saved the Army from
potential disaster.
For the next month there were no major battles but continual skirmishing began to
weaken the effectiveness of the Confederates. Again, at Kennesaw Mountain, Cleburne
and Cheatham’s divisions repulsed eight thousand Federal troops with great loss.
Regardless of the victories at Pickett’s Mill and Kennesaw Mountain, the Army of
Tennessee was retreating again after Sherman had outflanked Johnston, crossing the
Chattahoochee River and threatening the Confederates communications with Atlanta. On
July 17, Johnston was dismissed from command and ordered to turn the Army over to
Hood. The elevation of Hood was a snub for Hardee who was the senior corps
commander. Now the fate of Atlanta was in the hands of General Hood who had been
successful in his undermining of Johnston, by secretly corresponding with Richmond
complaining about what he perceived was a lack of aggression by Johnston. Hood’s
appointment was a fateful move. For Cleburne, it would be, ultimately, a fatal one.
On July 22, there was fierce fighting at Bald Hill near Atlanta. There was no decisive
outcome of the encounter but the Confederates suffered cruelly with casualties numbering
33
between 5,500 and 8,000. During the engagement at Bald Hill the commander of the
Unionists, Major General James McPherson, was killed in front of Cleburne’s division. It
failed to halt or even slow Sherman’s tightening noose on the city. For the balance of July
and throughout August, Cleburne’s men were on the move almost constantly. On August
31, the Federals repelled the Rebels’ attack at Jonesboro and on the following day broke
through the defenses, capturing Govan and 600 of the men in his brigade. That night
Hood ordered the evacuation of Atlanta.
After a period of rest the Army arrived at Palmetto on September 20. Hardee applied to
the President for a transfer and left the Army on September 27. Cleburne himself applied
to Hood for two weeks leave to return to Mobile to be married, his application was
refused. The Army proceeded north to Dalton then crossed into Alabama and arrived in
Florence over the Tennessee River on November 13. Here, Hood unveiled his grand
scheme. He would march the Army north and retake Nashville. After a brief skirmish at
Spring Hill on November 29, the Federals at night had slipped away to Franklin. Next
day Hood was furious placing blame on Cheatham and Cleburne for the fiasco. At a
meeting at headquarters Hood announced his decision to make an immediate frontal
attack and asked for comments. General Forrest objected, saying that he did not believe
that the Union entrenchments could be taken without great loss of life. He went on further
to say that the Unionists could be flanked from their works without much trouble.
Cheatham and Cleburne agreed but Hood had made up his mind. The assault at Franklin
would be a severe lesson in what he would demand in aggressive action. It was no
accident that Generals Brown and Cleburne were posted to the front rank and told to
34
attack along the Columbia Pike, where the Federal lines were the strongest.
“As
Cleburne mounted his horse to leave, Hood gave strict orders for the assault. Cleburne
responded, ‘We will take the works or fall in the attempt.’”24. Cleburne rode back to his
command and gave his brigade commanders their orders. General Govan saw that he was
depressed and remarked to Cleburne that few of them would ever return to Arkansas to
tell of the battle. Cleburne said, "Well Govan, if we are to die, let us die like men."
15,000 men charged the fortifications with General Cleburne in the forefront. Soon his
horse was shot from under him, a boy offered his mare to the General but it was shot
down as he mounted it. General Govan then recounted that General Cleburne turned
toward the enemy, drew his sword, and marched into the smoke waving his cap. His
body was found lying about 40 yards in front of the entrenchments. This historic site is
now a Pizza Hut parking lot.
35
The next day Cleburne’s body was interred in Rose Hill Cemetery. Shortly after he
would be reburied in Ashwood Cemetery, behind St. John’s Church, Colombia,
Tennessee, a place he had passed by a few days before on his way to Franklin remarking
it would be a lovely place to be buried in. In 1870 his body was returned to Helena,
Arkansas, Generals Lucius Polk, and Frank Cheatham, the former governor of Tennessee,
Isham Harris and Jefferson Davis himself, walked in a public procession that
accompanied Cleburne’s coffin to the docks at Memphis for the trip downriver. Pat
Cleburne’s final resting place was to be Evergreen Cemetery overlooking Helena.
Patrick Cleburne entered into the American Civil War as an American, what was to
follow in the coming years was an American tragedy played out on American soil, but he
was always an Irishman at heart. His conviction in his duty sprang from his love for his
adopted country and his determination to protect the Confederacy. This determination
came from the struggles his own far flung country had fought for and would keep on
fighting for, the struggle for freedom. Along with his friends and neighbours he entered
into a war of freedom and liberty. He fought as hard as he trained, his men were the best
drilled in the Army of the Tennessee, and he fought like the man he was honest and loyal,
truthful and valiant, and he died in the same manner. Cleburne achieved lasting fame for
his brilliant tactical command. It was said of him that where he attacked, no force could
defend, and where he defended, no force could overcome save only once, and there you’ll
find his grave. Cleburne lived and died for the cause of nationalism, having absorbed
Southern nationalism he willing accepted the struggle for Confederate nationhood.
36
In May 1891, at a dedication of a monument erected at Cleburne’s grave site, General
George W Gordon who had fought and been captured at Franklin gave the memorial
address:
“A truer patriot or knightlier soldier never fought and never died. Valor
(sic) never lost a braver son or freedom a nobler champion…He was a
patriot by instinct and a soldier by nature. He loved his country, its
soldiers, its banners, its battleflags, its sovereignty, its independence.
For these he fought, for these he fell.”25.
The only statue of a general at the American Museum of Immigration, in the base of the
Statue of Liberty, is that of Patrick Cleburne. A fitting epitaph for this Irish immigrant
who espoused the cause of liberty, and who remained an Irish Rebel to the last.
37
APPENDIX I
Arkansas Secession
May 6, 1861
AN ORDINANCE to dissolve the union now existing between the State of Arkansas and
the other States united with her under the compact entitled "The Constitution of the
United States of America."
Whereas, in addition to the well-founded causes of complaint set forth by this convention,
in resolutions adopted on the 11th of March, A.D. 1861, against the sectional party now
in power in Washington City, headed by Abraham Lincoln, he has, in the face of
resolutions passed by this convention pledging the State of Arkansas to resist to the last
extremity any attempt on the part of such power to coerce any State that had seceded
from the old Union, proclaimed to the world that war should be waged against such
States until they should be compelled to submit to their rule, and large forces to
accomplish this have by this same power been called out, and are now being marshaled to
carry out this inhuman design; and to longer submit to such rule, or remain in the old
Union of the United States, would be disgraceful and ruinous to the State of Arkansas:
Therefore we, the people of the State of Arkansas, in convention assembled, do hereby
declare and ordain, and it is hereby declared and ordained, That the "ordinance and
acceptance of compact" passed and approved by the General Assembly of the State of
Arkansas on the 18th day of October, A.D. 1836, whereby it was by said General
Assembly ordained that by virtue of the authority vested in said General Assembly by the
provisions of the ordinance adopted by the convention of delegates assembled at Little
Rock for the purpose of forming a constitution and system of government for said State,
the propositions set forth in "An act supplementary to an act entitled `An act for the
admission of the State of Arkansas into the Union, and to provide for the due execution of
the laws of the United States within the same, and for other purposes,'" were freely
accepted, ratified, and irrevocably confirmed, articles of compact and union between the
State of Arkansas and the United States, and all other laws and every other law and
ordinance, whereby the State of Arkansas became a member of the Federal Union, be,
and the same are hereby, in all respects and for every purpose herewith consistent,
38
repealed, abrogated, and fully set aside; and the union now subsisting between the State
of Arkansas and the other States, under the name of the United States of America, is
hereby forever dissolved.
And we do further hereby declare and ordain, That the State of Arkansas hereby resumes
to herself all rights and powers heretofore delegated to the Government of the United
States of America; that her citizens are absolved from all allegiance to said Government
of the United States, and that she is in full possession and exercise of all the rights and
sovereignty which appertain to a free and independent State.
We do further ordain and declare, That all rights acquired and vested under the
Constitution of the United States of America, or of any act or acts of Congress, or treaty,
or under any law of this State, and not incompatible with this ordinance, shall remain in
full force and effect, in nowise altered or impaired, and have the same effect as if this
ordinance had not been passed.
Adopted and passed in open convention on the 6th day of May, A.D. 1861.
39
APPENDIX II
The following roster lists the original members of the Yell Rifles who enrolled in the
company on April 8, 1861.
Bailey, Charles H—Private.
Bailey, Ralph N—Fifth Sergeant.
Barksdale, Robert E—Fourth Corporal.
Barlow, J C—Private; transferred to the Dallas Artillery, promoted to first lieutenant and
captain.
Blankenship, Willis P—Private.
Blount, Francis B—Private.
Booth, Robert P—Private.
Brodnax, William G—Private.
Brown, James M—Private.
Burgess, Vardry M—Private; transferred to regimental band.
Carr, H L—Private; discharged, did not enter Confederate service.
Chandler, Charles P—Private.
Clark, M B L—Private; discharged, did not enter Confederate service.
40
Cleburne, Patrick Ronayne—Captain; promoted colonel, brigadier-general and
major-general; killed in action at Franklin, Tennessee, November 30, 1864.
Clopton, James W—Third Sergeant.
Cowley, Edward H—First Lieutenant; promoted captain.
Dade, Louis G—Private.
Delaney, Thomas J—Private.
Dodge, Lemuel P—Private; appointed second lieutenant of Co. D, 15th Arkansas
Infantry.
Dowty, Thomas J—Private.
Duval, Elmore D—Private.
Edmondson, William—Private.
Elliott, Quinton H—First Corporal.
Essop, John W—Private.
Gilbreath, David M—Private.
Gillen, James—Private.
Goff, J—Private; discharged, did not enter Confederate service.
Gray, James C—Private.
Green, John—Private.
Hall, J W—Private; discharged, did not enter Confederate service.
Hall, James P—Private.
Harrison, Thomas—Private.
Hickey, Preston G—Private.
Hicks, Malcomb L—Private.
Hill, William A B—Private.
41
Jackson, Owen T—Private.
Jones, Thompson L—Private.
Kendall, Joseph W—Private.
King, Stanhope H—Private; appointed major and assistant commissary in Preston
Smith’s Tennessee Brigade.
Kinsey, William H—Private.
Knowlton, Robert—Private.
Lambert, Alexander P—Second Corporal.
Langford, James F—Second Lieutenant; discharged, did not enter Confederate service.
Langford, Robert C—Private; discharged, did not enter Confederate service.
Langford, William H—Private; discharged, did not enter Confederate service.
Lemon, Joseph—Private.
Littell, Philander—Private.
Locke, William J—Private; transferred to Co. H, 2nd Tennessee Infantry.
McCrary, Francis O—Private.
McGonigle, James H—Private.
Mangum, Leonard Henderson—First Sergeant; wounded at Shiloh.
Moncrief, Thomas B—Private; transferred to Co. H, 2nd Arkansas Infantry.
Moore, Charles L—Private; appointed third lieutenant; appointed captain and assistant
quartermaster, 15th Arkansas Infantry.
Moore, Peter—Private.
Morrison, William H—Private.
Mulkey, James I—Private.
Murphy, James M—Private.
42
Newman, Joshua—Private.
O’Neil, Samuel—Private.
Pearce, William H—Private.
Phillips, Stephen H—Private.
Polk, Lucius Eugene—Third Lieutenant; promoted first lieutenant; promoted colonel,
15th Arkansas Infantry; appointed brigadier-general; wounded at Kennesaw Mountain,
June 10, 1864.
Quarte, Angus—Private.
Randle, Angus P—Private.
Ross, Canada—Private; also served in the Helena Artillery.
Ross, James A—Private.
Rambo, Parmeseas F—Private.
Sale, George W—Private.
Sale, Henry A—Private.
Sale, Melville W—Private.
Scott, Arthur M—Private.
Sellers, William W—Private.
Simpson, David H—Private.
Smith, Henry H—Private.
Smith, Henry L—Private.
Smith, John W L—Private.
Smith, Moses E—Private.
Stansell, J Walker—Private; appointed commissary, 15th Arkansas Infantry.
Stone, William H—Private; also served in the Appeal Battery.
43
Taylor, Phillip H—Fourth Sergeant.
Terry, John F—Second Sergeant.
Thorn, Thomas S—Private.
Tollison, William P—Private.
Wellborn, Elias—Private.
West, John H—Private.
Yerby, Robert N—Private.
2001 -copyright -The above information may be used for non-commercial historical and
genealogical purposes only and with the consent of the page owner may be copied for the
same purposes so long as this notice remains a part of the copied material. EDWARD G.
GERDES
44
Appendix III
Pat Cleburne's Negro Enlistment Proposal
Confederate Correspondence, Orders, And Returns Relating To Operations In Southwestern
Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama, West Florida, And Northern Georgia.--#24
O.R.--SERIES I--VOLUME LII/2 [S# 110]
[JANUARY 2, 1864.]
COMMANDING GENERAL, THE CORPS, DIVISION, BRIGADE, AND REGIMENTAL COMMANDERS
OF THE ARMY OF TENNESSEE:
GENERAL: Moved by the exigency in which our country is now placed, we take the
liberty of laying before you, unofficially, our views on the present state of affairs. The
subject is so grave, and our views so new, we feel it a duty both to you and the cause that
before going further we should submit them for your judgment and receive your
suggestions in regard to them. We therefore respectfully ask you to give us an expression
of your views in the premises. We have now been fighting for nearly three years, have
spilled much of our best blood, and lost, consumed, or thrown to the flames an amount of
property equal in value to the specie currency of the world. Through some lack in our
system the fruits of our struggles and sacrifices have invariably slipped away from us and
left us nothing but long lists of dead and mangled. Instead of standing defiantly on the
borders of our territory or harassing those of the enemy, we are hemmed in today into less
than two-thirds of it, and still the enemy menacingly confronts us at every point with
superior forces. Our soldiers can see no end to this state of affairs except in our own
exhaustion; hence, instead of rising to the occasion, they are sinking into a fatal apathy,
growing weary of hardships and slaughters which promise no results. In this state of
things it is easy to understand why there is a growing belief that some black catastrophe
is not far ahead of us, and that unless some extraordinary change is soon made in our
condition we must overtake it. The consequences of this condition are showing
themselves more plainly every day; restlessness of morals spreading everywhere,
manifesting itself in the army in a growing disregard for private rights; desertion
spreading to a class of soldiers it never dared to tamper with before; military
commissions sinking in the estimation of the soldier; our supplies failing; our firesides in
ruins. If this state continues much longer we must be subjugated. Every man should
endeavor to understand the meaning of subjugation before it is too late. We can give but a
faint idea when we say it means the loss of all we now hold most sacred--slaves and all
other personal property, lands, homesteads, liberty, justice, safety, pride, manhood. It
means that the history of this heroic struggle will be written by the enemy; that our youth
45
will be trained by Northern school teachers; will learn from Northern school books their
version of the war; will be impressed by all the influences of history and education to
regard our gallant dead as traitors, our maimed veterans as fit objects for derision. It
means the crushing of Southern manhood, the hatred of our former slaves, who will, on a
spy system, be our secret police. The conqueror's policy is to divide the conquered into
factions and stir up animosity among them, and in training an army of negroes the North
no doubt holds this thought in perspective. We can see three great causes operating to
destroy us: First, the inferiority of our armies to those of the enemy in point of numbers;
second, the poverty of our single source of supply in comparison with his several sources;
third, the fact that slavery, from being one of our chief sources of strength at the
commencement of the war, has now become, in a military point of view, one of our chief
sources of weakness.
The enemy already opposes us at every point with superior numbers, and is
endeavoring to make the preponderance irresistible. President Davis, in his recent
message, says the enemy "has recently ordered a large conscription and made a
subsequent call for volunteers, to be followed, if ineffectual, by a still further draft." In
addition, the President of the United States announces that "he has already in training an
army of 100,000 negroes as good as any troops," and every fresh raid he makes and new
slice of territory he wrests from us will add to this force. Every soldier in our army
already knows and feels our numerical inferiority to the enemy. Want of men in the field
has prevented him from reaping the fruits of his victories, and has prevented him from
having the furlough he expected after the last reorganization,, and when he turns from the
wasting armies in the field to look at the source of supply, he finds nothing in the
prospect to encourage him. Our single source of supply is that portion of our white men
fit for duty and not now in the ranks. The enemy has three sources of supply: First, his
own motley population; secondly, our slaves; and thirdly, Europeans whose hearts are
fired into a crusade against us by fictitious pictures of the atrocities of slavery, and who
meet no hindrance from their Governments in such enterprise, because these
Governments are equally antagonistic to the institution. In touching the third cause, the
fact that slavery has become a military weakness, we may rouse prejudice and passion,
but the time has come when it would be madness not to look at our danger from every
point of view, and to probe it to the bottom. Apart from the assistance that home and
foreign prejudice against slavery has given to the North, slavery is a source of great
strength to the enemy in a purely military point of view, by supplying him with an army
from our granaries; but it is our most vulnerable point, a continued embarrassment, and in
some respects an insidious weakness. Wherever slavery is once seriously disturbed,
whether by the actual presence or the approach of the enemy, or even by a cavalry raid,
the whites can no longer with safety to their property openly sympathize with our cause.
The fear of their slaves is continually haunting them, and from silence and apprehension
many of these soon learn to wish the war stopped on any terms. The next stage is to take
the oath to save property, and they become dead to us, if not open enemies. To prevent
raids we are forced to scatter our forces, and are not free to move and strike like the
enemy; his vulnerable points are carefully selected and fortified depots. Ours are found in
every point where there is a slave to set free. All along the lines slavery is comparatively
valueless to ns for labor, but of great and increasing worth to the enemy for information.
It is an omnipresent spy system, pointing out our valuable men to the enemy, revealing
46
our positions, purposes, and resources, and yet acting so safely and secretly that there is
no means to guard against it. Even in the heart of our country, where our hold upon this
secret espionage is firmest, it waits but the opening fire of the enemy's battle line to wake
it, like a torpid serpent, into venomous activity.
In view of the state of affairs what does our country propose to do? In the words of
President Davis "no effort must be spared to add largely to our effective force as
promptly as possible. The sources of supply are to be found in restoring to the army all
who are improperly absent, putting an end to substitution, modifying the exemption law,
restricting details, and placing in the ranks such of the able-bodied men now employed as
wagoners, nurses, cooks, and other employés, as are doing service for which the negroes
may be found competent." Most of the men improperly absent, together with many of the
exempts and men having substitutes, are now without the Confederate lines and cannot be
calculated on. If all the exempts capable of bearing arms were enrolled, it will give us the
boys below eighteen, the men above forty-five, and those persons who are left at home to
meet the wants of the country and the army, but this modification of the exemption law
will remove from the fields and manufactories most of the skill that directed agricultural
and mechanical labor, and, as stated by the President, "details will have to be made to
meet the wants of the country," thus sending many of the men to be derived from this
source back to their homes again. Independently of this, experience proves that striplings
and men above conscript age break down and swell the sick lists more than they do the
ranks. The portion now in our lines of the class who have substitutes is not on the whole a
hopeful element, for the motives that created it must have been stronger than patriotism,
and these motives added to what many of them will call breach of faith, will cause some
to be not forthcoming, and others to be unwilling and discontented soldiers. The
remaining sources mentioned by the President have been so closely pruned in the Army
of Tennessee that they will be found not to yield largely. The supply from all these
sources, together with what we now have in the field, will exhaust the white race, and
though it should greatly exceed expectations and put us on an equality with the enemy, or
even give us temporary advantages, still we have no reserve to meet unexpected disaster
or to supply a protracted struggle. Like past years, 1864 will diminish our ranks by the
casualties of war, and what source of repair is there left us? We therefore see in the
recommendations of the President only a temporary expedient, which at the best will
leave us twelve months hence in the same predicament we are in now. The President
attempts to meet only one of the depressing causes mentioned; for the other two he has
proposed no remedy. They remain to generate lack of confidence in our final success, and
to keep us moving down hill as heretofore. Adequately to meet the causes which are now
threatening ruin to our country, we propose, in addition to a modification of the
President's plans, that we retain in service for the war all troops now in service, and that
we immediately commence training a large reserve of the most courageous of our slaves,
and further that we guarantee freedom within a reasonable time to every slave in the
South who shall remain true to the Confederacy in this war. As between the loss of
independence and the loss of slavery, we assume that every patriot will freely give up the
latter--give up the negro slave rather than be a slave himself. If we are correct in this
assumption it only remains to show how this great national sacrifice is, in all human
probabilities, to change the current of success and sweep the invader from our country.
Our country has already some friends in England and France, and there are strong
47
motives to induce these nations to recognize and assist us, but they cannot assist us
without helping slavery, and to do this would be in conflict with their policy for the last
quarter of a century. England has paid hundreds of millions to emancipate her West India
slaves and break up the slave trade. Could she now consistently spend her treasure to
reinstate slavery in this country? But this barrier once removed, the sympathy and the
interests of these and other nations will accord with our own, and we may expect from
them both moral support and material aid. One thing is certain, as soon as the great
sacrifice to independence is made and known in foreign countries there will be a
complete change of front in our favor of the sympathies of the world. This measure will
deprive the North of the moral and material aid which it now derives from the bitter
prejudices with which foreigners view the institution, and its war, if continued, will
henceforth be so despicable in their eyes that the source of recruiting will be dried up. It
will leave the enemy's negro army no motive to fight for, and will exhaust the source
from which it has been recruited. The idea that it is their special mission to war against
slavery has held growing sway over the Northern people for many years, and has at
length ripened into an armed and bloody crusade against it. This baleful superstition has
so far supplied them with a courage and constancy not their own. It is the most powerful
and honestly entertained plank in their war platform. Knock this away and what is left? A
bloody ambition for more territory, a pretended veneration for the Union, which one of
their own most distinguished orators (Doctor Beecher in his Liverpool speech)openly
avowed was only used as a stimulus to stir up the anti-slavery crusade, and lastly the
poisonous and selfish interests which are the fungus growth of the war itself. Mankind
may fancy it a great duty to destroy slavery, but what interest can mankind have in
upholding this remainder of the Northern war platform? Their interests and feelings will
be diametrically opposed to it. The measure we propose will strike dead all John Brown
fanaticism, and will compel the enemy to draw off altogether or in the eyes of the world
to swallow the Declaration of Independence without the sauce and disguise of
philanthropy. This delusion of fanaticism at an end, thousands of Northern people will
have leisure to look at home and to see the gulf of despotism into which they themselves
are rushing.
The measure will at one blow strip the enemy of foreign sympathy and assistance,
and transfer them to the South; it will dry up two of his three sources of recruiting; it will
take from his negro army the only motive it could have to fight against the South, and
will probably cause much of it to desert over to us; it will deprive his cause of the
powerful stimulus of fanaticism, and will enable him to see the rock on which his so
called friends are now piloting him. The immediate effect of the emancipation and
enrollment of negroes on the military strength of the South would be: To enable us to
have armies numerically superior to those of the North, and a reserve of any size we
might think necessary; to enable us to take the offensive, move forward, and forage on
the enemy. It would open to us in prospective another and almost untouched source of
supply, and furnish us with the means of preventing temporary disaster, and carrying on a
protracted struggle. It would instantly remove all the vulnerability, embarrassment, and
inherent weakness which result from slavery. The approach of the enemy would no
longer find every household surrounded by spies; the fear that sealed the master's lips and
the avarice that has, in so many cases, tempted him practically to desert us would alike be
removed. There would be no recruits awaiting the enemy with open arms, no complete
48
history of every neighborhood with ready guides, no fear of insurrection in the rear, or
anxieties for the fate of loved ones when our armies moved forward. The chronic
irritation of hope deferred would be joyfully ended with the negro, and the sympathies of
his whole race would be due to his native South. It would restore confidence in an early
termination of the war with all its inspiring consequences, and even if contrary to all
expectations the enemy should succeed in overrunning the South, instead of finding a
cheap, ready-made means of holding it down, he would find a common hatred and thirst
for vengeance, which would break into acts at every favorable opportunity, would
prevent him from settling on our lands, and render the South a very unprofitable
conquest. It would remove forever all selfish taint from our cause and place independence
above every question of property. The very magnitude of the sacrifice itself, such as no
nation has ever voluntarily made before, would appal our enemies, destroy his spirit and
his finances, and fill our hearts with a pride and singleness of purpose which would
clothe us with new strength in battle. Apart from all other aspects of the question, the
necessity for more fighting men is upon us. We can only get a sufficiency by making the
negro share the danger and hardships of the war. If we arm and train him and make him
fight for the country in her hour of dire distress, every consideration of principle and
policy demand that we should set him and his whole race who side with us free. It is a
first principle with mankind that he who offers his life in defense of the State should
receive from her in return his freedom and his happiness, and we believe in
acknowledgment of this principle. The Constitution of the Southern States has reserved to
their respective governments the power to free slaves for meritorious services to the
State. It is politic besides. For many years, ever since the agitation of the subject of
slavery commenced, the negro has been dreaming of freedom, and his vivid imagination
has surrounded that condition with so many gratifications that it has become the paradise
of his hopes. To attain it he will tempt dangers and difficulties not exceeded by the
bravest soldier in the field. The hope of freedom is perhaps the only moral incentive that
can be applied to him in his present condition. It would be preposterous then to expect
him to fight against it with any degree of enthusiasm, therefore we must bind him to our
cause by no doubtful bonds; we must leave no possible loophole for treachery to creep in.
The slaves are dangerous now, but armed, trained, and collected in an army they would
be a thousand fold more dangerous: therefore when we make soldiers of them we must
make free men of them beyond all question, and thus enlist their sympathies also. We can
do this more effectually than the North can now do, for we can give the negro not only
his own freedom, but that of his wife and child, and can secure it to him in his old home.
To do this, we must immediately make his marriage and parental relations sacred in the
eyes of the law and forbid their sale. The past legislation of the South concedes that large
free middle class of negro blood, between the master and slave, must sooner or later
destroy the institution. If, then, we touch the institution at all, we would do best to make
the most of it, and by emancipating the whole race upon reasonable terms, and within
such reasonable time as will prepare both races for the change, secure to ourselves all the
advantages, and to our enemies all the disadvantages that can arise, both at home and
abroad, from such a sacrifice. Satisfy the negro that if he faithfully adheres to our
standard during the war he shall receive his freedom and that of his race. Give him as an
earnest of our intentions such immediate immunities as will impress him with our
sincerity and be in keeping with his new condition, enroll a portion of his class as soldiers
49
of the Confederacy, and we change the race from a dreaded weakness to a position of
strength.
Will the slaves fight? The helots of Sparta stood their masters good stead in battle.
In the great sea fight of Lepanto where the Christians checked forever the spread of
Mohammedanism over Europe, the galley slaves of portions of the fleet were promised
freedom, and called on to fight at a critical moment of the battle. They fought well, and
civilization owes much to those brave galley slaves. The negro slaves of Saint Domingo,
fighting for freedom, defeated their white masters and the French troops sent against
them. The negro slaves of Jamaica revolted, and under the name of Maroons held the
mountains against their masters for 150 years; and the experience of this war has been so
far that half-trained negroes have fought as bravely as many other half-trained Yankees.
If, contrary to the training of a lifetime, they can be made to face and fight bravely
against their former masters, how much more probable is it that with the allurement of a
higher reward, and led by those masters, they would submit to discipline and face
dangers.
We will briefly notice a few arguments against this course. It is said Republicanism
cannot exist without the institution. Even were this true, we prefer any form of
government of which the Southern people may have the molding, to one forced upon us
by a conqueror. It is said the white man cannot perform agricultural labor in the South.
The experience of this army during the heat of summer from Bowling Green, Ky., to
Tupelo, Miss., is that the white man is healthier when doing reasonable work in the open
field than at any other time. It is said an army of negroes cannot be spared from the fields.
A sufficient number of slaves is now administering to luxury alone to supply the place of
all we need, and we believe it would be better to take half the able bodied men off a
plantation than to take the one master mind that economically regulated its operations.
Leave some of the skill at home and take some of the muscle to fight with. It is said
slaves will not work after they are freed. We think necessity and a wise legislation will
compel them to labor for a living. It is said it will cause terrible excitement and some
disaffection from our cause. Excitement is far preferable to the apathy which now exists,
and disaffection will not be among the fighting men. It is said slavery is all we are
fighting for, and if we give it up we give up all. Even if this were true, which we deny,
slavery is not all our enemies are fighting for. It is merely the pretense to establish
sectional superiority and a more centralized form of government, and to deprive us of our
rights and liberties. We have now briefly proposed a plan which we believe will save our
country. It may be imperfect, but in all human probability it would give us our
independence. No objection ought to outweigh it which is not weightier than
independence. If it is worthy of being put in practice it ought to be mooted quickly before
the people, and urged earnestly by every man who believes in its efficacy. Negroes will
require much training; training will require time, and there is danger that this concession
to common sense may come too late.
P. R. Cleburne, major-general, commanding division;
D. C. Govan, brigadier-general;
John E. Murray, colonel Fifth Arkansas;
G. F. Baucum, colonel Eighth Arkansas;
Peter Snyder, lieutenant-colonel, commanding Sixth and Seventh Arkansas;
50
E. Warfield, lieutenant-colonel, Second Arkansas;
M. P. Lowrey, brigadier-general; A. B. Hardcastle, colonel Thirty-second and Forty-fifth
Mississippi;
F. A. Ashford, major Sixteenth Alabama;
John W. Colquitt, colonel First Arkansas;
Rich. J. Person, major Third and Fifth Confederate;
G. S. Deakins, major Thirty-fifth and Eighth Tennessee;
J. H. Collett, captain, commanding Seventh Texas;
J. H. Kelly, brigadier-general, commanding Cavalry Division.
Walker-Hindman Correspondence (Cleburne Proposal)
Confederate Correspondence, Orders, And Returns Relating To Operations In Southwestern
Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama, West Florida, And Northern Georgia.--#24
O.R.--SERIES I--VOLUME LII/2 [S# 110]
HEADQUARTERS,
Near Dalton, January 9, 1864.
Major-General HINDMAN,
Commanding Corps:
GENERAL: I wrote to General Cleburne asking him for a copy of the article he read
at our meeting on the night of the 2d. I informed him that I felt it my duty to forward the
documents to the War Department, which I intend to do. He has sent it and avowed
himself its author. Will you please inform me whether you favor the proposition and
sentiments of the document in any form. A similar letter to this I shall address to each of
the gentlemen who were at the meeting, and their answer will be sent with this document,
for I don't like to misrepresent any one. You will oblige me by sending an answer today,
as I wish to send up the article tomorrow.
I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
W. H. T. WALKER,
Major-General, Commanding Division.
CONFEDERATE CORRESPONDENCE, ORDERS, AND RETURNS RELATING TO
OPERATIONS IN KENTUCKY, SOUTHWEST VIRGINIA, TENNESSEE, MISSISSIPPI,
ALABAMA, AND NORTH GEORGIA, FROM JANUARY 1, 1864, TO FEBRUARY 29, 1864.--#2
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXXII/2 [S# 58]
HDQRS. HINDMAN'S CORPS, ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
Dalton, Ga., January 9, 1864.
Maj. Gen. W. H. T. WALKER,
Comdg. Div. Hardee's Corps, Army of Tennessee:
51
GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of this date,
and to decline complying with your request. Whenever my proper superiors see fit to
propound any interrogatories to me touching matters as to which they are entitled to
inquire, it will be my duty to answer directly, and I shall do so. I have no opinions to
conceal and will evade no responsibility that belongs to me. But I do not choose to admit
any inquisitorial rights in you. Permit me also to say that, according to my understanding,
the course you propose to take conflicts with a distinct agreement of privacy among the
officers consulted by General Cleburne, which agreement none of them can waive
without the consent of all.
I am, general, with high respect, your obedient servant,
T. C. HINDMAN,
Major-General.
Walker's Letter to Davis (Cleburne's Proposal)
Confederate Correspondence, Orders, And Returns Relating To Operations In Southwestern
Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama, West Florida, And Northern Georgia.--#24
O.R.--SERIES I--VOLUME LII/2 [S# 110]
HEADQUARTERS DIVISION,
Near Dalton, January 12, 1864.
His Excellency JEFFERSON DAVIS,
President of Confederate States:
I feel it my duty as an officer of the Army to lay before the Chief Magistrate of the
Southern Confederacy the within document, which was read on the night of the 2d of
January, 1864, at a meeting which I attended in obedience to the following order:
HEADQUARTERS HARDEE'S CORPS,
Dalton, Ga., January 2, 1864.
Major-General WALKER,
Commanding Division :
GENERAL: Lieutenant-General Hardee desires that you will meet him at General Johnston's headquarters
this evening at 7 o'clock.
52
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
D. H. POOLE,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
Having, after the meeting adjourned, expressed my determination to apply to
General Cleburne for a copy of the document to forward to the War Department, some of
the gentlemen who were present at that meeting insisted upon their sentiments on so
grave a subject being known to the Executive. I informed them that I would address a
letter to each of the gentlemen present at the meeting, which I did. I addressed a note to
General Cleburne, asking him for a copy of the document, informing him that I felt it my
duty to forward it to the War Department; that should he do so I would, of course, give
him a copy of the indorsement I made on it. He furnished me with a copy, and avowed
himself its author. I applied to the commanding general for permission to send it to the
War Department through the proper official channel, which, for reasons satisfactory to
himself, he declined to do; hence the reason for it not reaching you through the official
channel. The gravity of the subject, the magnitude of the issues involved, my strong
convictions that the further agitation of such sentiments and propositions would ruin the
efficacy of our Army and involve our cause in ruin and disgrace constitute my reasons for
bringing the document before the Executive.
W. H. T. WALKER,
Major-General.
Seddon to Johnston Correspondence (Cleburne Proposal)
Confederate Correspondence, Orders, And Returns Relating To Operations In Southwestern
Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama, West Florida, And Northern Georgia.--#25
O.R.--SERIES I--VOLUME LII/2 [S# 110]
WAR DEPARTMENT, C. S. A.,
Richmond, Va., January 24, 1861.
General JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON,
Dalton, Ga. :
GENERAL: Major-General Walker has communicated directly to the President
copies of a memorial prepared by Major-General Cleburne, lately the subject of
consultation among the generals of division in your command, as also of a letter
subsequently addressed by himself to the Generals present, asking the avowal of the
opinions entertained by them in relation to such memorial, with their replies. I am
instructed by the President to communicate with you on the subject. He is gratified to
infer, from your declining to forward officially General Walker's communication of the
memorial, that you neither approved the views advocated in it, nor deemed it expedient
that, after meeting as they happily did the disapproval of the council, they should have
further dissemination or publicity. The motives of zeal and patriotism which have
prompted General Walker's action are, however, fully appreciated, and that action is
probably fortunate, as it affords an appropriate occasion to express the earnest conviction
53
of the President that the dissemination or even promulgation of such opinions under the
present circumstances of the Confederacy, whether in the Army or among the people, can
be productive only of discouragement, distraction, and dissension. The agitation and
controversy which must spring from the presentation of such views by officers high in
public confidence are to be deeply deprecated, and while no doubt or mistrust is for a
moment entertained of the patriotic intents of the gallant author of the memorial, and such
of his brother officers as may have favored his opinions, it is requested that you will
communicate to them, as well as all others present on the occasion, the opinions, as
herein expressed, of the President, and urge on them the suppression, not only of the
memorial itself, but likewise of all discussion and controversy respecting or growing out
of it. I would add that the measures advocated in the memorial are considered to be little
appropriate for consideration in military circles, and indeed in their scope pass beyond
the bounds of Confederate action, and could under our constitutional system neither be
recommended by the Executive to Congress nor be entertained by that body. Such views
can only jeopard among the States and people unity and harmony, when for successful
co-operation and the achievement of independence both are essential.
With much respect, very truly, yours,
JAMES A. SEDDON,
Secretary of War.
Johnston To Seddon Correspondence (Cleburne Proposal)
Confederate Correspondence, Orders, And Returns Relating To Operations In Southwestern
Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama, West Florida, And Northern Georgia.--#25
O.R.--SERIES I--VOLUME LII/2 [S# 110]
DALTON, February 2, 1864.
Hon. JAMES A. SEDDON,
Secretary of War:
SIR: I had the honor to receive the letter in which you express the views of the
President in relation to the memorial of Major-General Cleburne on the 31st ultimo, and
immediately transmitted his instructions in your own language to the officers concerned.
None of the officers to whom the memorial was read favored the scheme; and Major
General Cleburne, as soon as that appeared, voluntarily announced that he would be
governed by the opinion of those officers, and put away his paper. The manner of
strengthening our armies by using negroes was discussed, and no other thought
practicable than that which I immediately promised to the President. I regarded this
discussion as confidential, and understood it to be so agreed before the party separated.
This and General Cleburne's voluntary promise prevented any apprehension in my mind
of the agitation of the subject of the memorial. I have had no reason since to suppose that
it made any impression.
54
Most respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. E. JOHNSTON,
General.
Jefferson Davis's Letter to Walker (Cleburne's Proposal)
Confederate Correspondence, Orders, And Returns Relating To Operations In Southwestern
Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama, West Florida, And Northern Georgia.--#24
O.R.--SERIES I--VOLUME LII/2 [S# 110]
RICHMOND, VA., January 13, 1864.
General W. H. T. WALKER,
Army of Tennessee, Dalton, Ga.:
GENERAL: I have received your letter, with its inclosure, informing me of the
propositions submitted to a meeting of the general officers on the 2d instant, and thank
you for the information. Deeming it to be injurious to the public service that such a
subject should be mooted, or even known to be entertained by persons possessed of the
confidence and respect of the people, I have concluded that the best policy under the
circumstances will be to avoid all publicity, and the Secretary of War has therefore
written to General Johnston requesting him to convey to those concerned my desire that it
should be kept private. If it be kept out of the public journals its ill effect will be much
lessened.
Very respectfully and truly, yours,
JEFFERSON DAVIS.
Source: Official Records of the War of the Rebellion
55
Photo Gallery
Cleburne at Chickamauga
www.bostickhouseart.com
www.southernhistorical.com
Cleburne Memorial
www.geocities.com
Cleburne at Franklin
www.framery.com
56
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. http://www.wildgeeseband.com/history.html
2. Kevin Kenny. The American Irish: A History, Pearson Education, Harlow, Essex,
2000. Page 14
3. Kevin Kenny. The American Irish: A History, Pearson Education, Harlow, Essex,
2000. Page 23
4. Kevin Kenny. The American Irish: A History, Pearson Education, Harlow, Essex,
2000. Page 45
5. Kevin Kenny. The American Irish: A History, Pearson Education, Harlow, Essex,
2000. Pages 103/104
6. Private conversation with Anthony Rushing, Arkansas
7. Private conversation with Anthony Rushing, Arkansas
8. http://www.bessel.org/cwgfconf.htm
9. http://www.geocities.com/capitalguards/arsenal.html
10. http://www.thewildgeese.com/pages/cleburne.htm
11. Shelby Foote. The Civil War: A Narrative; Fort Sumter to Perryville, Pimlico,
London, 1992. Page 339
12. http://www.patcleburne.com/fighting_15th.htm
13. http://www.civilwarhistory.com/Kentucky%20Civil%20War%20Battle%20Rich
mond%20American%20Civil%20War.htm
14. http://www.vectorsite.net/twcw36.html
15. http://www.vectorsite.net/twcw36.html
16. Peter Cozzens. The Battle of Stones River: No Better Place to Die, University of
Illinois Press, Urbana and Chicago, 1990. Page 118
17. http://www.vectorsite.net/twcw36.html
18. Shelby Foote. The Civil War: A Narrative; Fredericksburg to Meridan, Pimlico,
London, 1992. Pages 170/171
19. Peter Cozzens. The Battle of Stones River: No Better Place to Die. University of
Illinois Press, Urbana and Chicago, 1990. Page 209.
20. http://civilwar.org/historyclassroom/hc_bragg.htm
21. http://college.hmco.com/history/readerscomp/civwar/html/cw_007202_ringgoldg
apg.htm
22. Bruce Catton. The Civil War, Houghton Mifflin Company by arrangement with
The American Heritage Library, USA, 1987. Page 10
23. Bruce Catton. The Civil War, Houghton Mifflin Company by arrangement with
The American Heritage Library, USA, 1987. Page 10
24. http://www.carter-house.org/TheBattle.htm
25. http://groups.msn.com/MasonDixonChatForum/sonsoferintheirishinthecivilwar.m
snw
Additional Reading Sources:
Larry J. Daniel. Soldiering in the Army of the Tennessee: A Portrait of Life in a
Confederate Army, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill and London.
57
James MacPherson. The Battle Cry of Freedom. Oxford University Press Inc, New
York, 1985.
Robert F. Durden. The Gray and the Black: The Confederate Debate on Emancipation..
Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 1972.
Joe H. Kirchberger. The Civil War and Reconstruction: An Eye Witness History, Facts
on File Ltd, New York and Oxford, 1991
William C. Davis (ed). Touched by Fire: A Photographic Portrait of the Civil War,
Volume two, Little, Brown and Co., Boston and Toronto, 1990.
Peter Batty. The Divided Union, the story of the American Civil War 1861-65, Viking
Press, Kent 1987.
Shelby Foote. The Civil War, A narrative 3. Red River to Appomattox, The Bodley Head
Ltd, London, 1991.
Thomas Lawrence Connelly and Archer Jones. The Politics of Command: Factions and
Ideas in Confederate Strategy. Louisiana University State Press, Baton Rouge, 1982.
Nathaniel C. Hughes, Jr. General William J. Hardee: Old Reliable, Louisiana State
University Press, Baton Rouge, 1965.
http://militaryhistory.about.com/gi/dynamic/offsite.htm?site=http%3A%2F%2Fhome.eart
hlink.net%2F%7Erggsibiba%2Fhtml%2Fsib%2Fsib3.htm
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb1996/n02051996_9602053.html
http://members.aol.com/dlharvey/flag.htm
http://www.borgerkrigen.info/7thtexas/english/7th_texas_brief_history.htm
http://216.219.254.78/
http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/treasures/trt039.html