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Optimism, Pessimism, Realism, or Idealism: Implications of Peak Fossil Fuels and
Climate Stabilization for the US Economy in the 21st Century
Abstract
This paper develops an analytical framework that evaluates the implications of peak fossil
fuels consumption and the requirement of climate stabilization for the US economic growth
in the 21st century. The US fossil fuels consumption is projected to have peaked in 2007 and
decline in the rest of the century. Despite the natural depletion of fossil fuels, the US will
emit far more carbon dioxide than is required to meet its global obligation of climate
stabilization. Only with a commitment to zero economic growth does the US have any
chance to reduce its emissions to acceptable levels.
Keywords
Peak Fossil Fuels; Climate Change; Limits to Growth
There is a growing body of evidence suggesting that the world oil production is likely
to have peaked or will peak very soon. Moreover, studies have suggested that the world
natural gas and coal production will peak in the coming decades. The US domestic oil
production peaked in 1970 and domestic natural gas production peaked in 1971. The US
annual energy imports now amount to about 700 million tonnes of oil equivalent or 8 percent
of the rest of the world’s total fossil fuels production.
As fossil fuels account for about 95 percent of the US energy consumption and energy
consumption is indispensable for economic activities, the decline of the fossil fuels
consumption will impose serious limits on the US economic growth. Moreover, the future
fossil fuels consumption is also limited by the necessity to reduce greenhouse gas emissions
in order to prevent global climate catastrophes.
This paper attempts to develop an analytical framework that evaluates the potential
implications of the peak fossil fuels consumption and the requirement of climate stabilization
for the US economic growth. The basic technique used is Hubbert Linearization, which was
used by American geologist Marion King Hubbert to predict the US oil production peak.
This paper applies Hubbert Linearization to analyze not only the potentials of nonrenewable
resources, but also the potentials of renewable resources and energy efficiency.
The
framework developed in this paper could be updated using new data that will be available in
the future.
The next section discusses the Hubbert Linearization and its application to the
analysis of nonrenewable resources, renewable resources, and energy efficiency. Section 3
discusses the projections of fossil fuels production in the world and in the US. Section 4
discusses the potential of nuclear and renewable energies. Section 5 presents the projections
of the US energy consumption and economic growth. Section 6 argues that despite the
predicted decline of the US fossil fuels consumption, the US will fail to meet its global
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obligation of climate stabilization. The last section concludes the paper by advocating a
commitment to zero economic growth.
The historical data of the US energy production and consumption used in this paper
are from EIA (2008a, 2008b) and Rutledge (2007a). The historical data of the world energy
production and consumption are from BP (2008a) and Rutledge (2007a).
Fuel ethanol
production data are from BP (2008b).
Hubbert Linearization: Applying to Nonrenewable Resources, Renewable Resources,
and Energy Efficiency
“Hubbert Linearization” is a statistical technique, which is now commonly used in
“peak oil”, “peak gas”, and “peak coal” studies (that is, studies that attempt to find out when
the production of oil, gas, or coal is likely to peak in the future or if the peak has already
happened). In 1956, Marion King Hubbert, an American geologist who worked for the Shell
Oil Company, predicted that the US oil production would peak around 1970, a prediction that
was later confirmed by the actual trajectory of the US oil production (see Heinberg, 2004, 8792).
The basic assumption of Hubbert Linearization is that the annual production trajectory
of a nonrenewable resource can be described by a logistic equation. The annual production is
likely to first grow at an accelerating rate. The annual production reaches the peak when
about half of the ultimate recoverable resource has been depleted. After the peak, the annual
production declines at an accelerating pace until the resource approaches complete depletion.1
As the production level approaches the peak, a linear relationship is likely to be
formed between the growth rate of the cumulative production of the resource (that is, the ratio
of the current annual production over the cumulative production from all previous years) and
2
the cumulative production. The horizontal intercept of the linear function would indicate the
ultimate recoverable amount. This can be described by the following equation:
qt / Qt = a – a (Qt / Qu)
(1)
Where Qt represents the cumulative amount that has been produced up to year “t”, “qt” is the
current annual production in year “t” or the growth of the cumulative production, “a” is the
intrinsic growth rate that determines how rapidly Qt grows or how rapidly the ultimate
recoverable amount is depleted, and Qu stands for the ultimate recoverable amount of the
resource. Estimating equation (1) through linear regression would allow one to determine the
value of “a” and Qu.
The peak year of the annual production can be determined by the following equation:
Qt = Qu / {1 + exp [-a (t – tm)]}
(2)
Where “t” is the current year and “tm” is the peak year (Korpela 2005).
Hubbert linearization has certain limitations. The identification of the linear trend
(and therefore the decision regarding what data points should enter into the regression) is up
to the analyst and is somewhat arbitrary. However, when the annual production of a resource
approaches the peak or has passed the peak, usually a stable linear relationship would form
between the variables and the model would deliver reasonably reliable results. The model
also allows one to use the latest available data to continuously update the estimated
coefficients, so that the accuracy of the model’s prediction tends to improve over time as
more data have been accumulated.
3
Equation (1) and (2) allow one to estimate the ultimate recoverable amount of a
resource and its peak production year. But Hubbert linearization may also be used to project
the future production trajectory if the ultimate recoverable amount is already known or can be
otherwise estimated. If the ultimate recoverable amount of a resource is already known, “a”
can be estimated by regressing (qt / Qt) on (1 – Qt / Qu), imposing the constant term being
zero.
Hubbert linearization is usually used to analyze the production trajectory of
nonrenewable resources. But, with some re-interpretations, it could also be used to analyze
the production trajectory of renewable resources and energy efficiency.
If renewable resources and energy efficiency are subject to certain ultimate physical
limits, then one would expect that the annual increase in the production of a renewable
resource or energy efficiency is likely to first grow at an accelerating pace. Beyond certain
point (when about half of the ultimate physical potential is realized), the annual increase will
start to fall. But the overall production or efficiency will continue to grow (at an increasingly
slower pace) until the ultimate physical potential is realized.
When equation (1) and (2) are applied to renewable resources or energy efficiency,
then Qt represents the annual production of a renewable resource or the current level of
energy efficiency, “qt” stands for the annual increase of renewable resource production or
energy efficiency, “a” is the intrinsic growth rate that determines how rapidly Qt grows or
how rapidly the ultimate physical potential is realized, Qu stands for the ultimate physical
potential, and “ tm” now stands for the “half potential” year (the year when half of the
ultimate physical potential is realized).
Peak Fossil Fuels
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A consensus is now emerging that the world oil production either has already passed
the peak or will peak very soon. The US used to be the world’s largest oil producer. Its oil
production peaked in 1970.
The two most important European producers, Britain and
Norway, peaked in 1999 and 2001, respectively. Mexico, which was the world’s fifth largest
producer, peaked in 2004. Russia, the world’s second largest producer, is likely to have
peaked in 2007.
Colin J. Campbell, an Irish petroleum geologist, conducted a detailed study of the
world’s oil discovery history and pointed out that the world oil discoveries peaked in the
1960s (Campbell, 2005). In a recent research report, the German Energy Watch Group
argued that the world oil production peak was imminent (Energy Watch Group, 2007a). The
Association for the Study of Peak Oil and Gas Ireland now estimates that the world oil
production is likely to have peaked in 2008 (ASPO, 2008).
Laherrere (2004) predicted that the world natural gas production would peak around
2030. Campbell (2005, 209-216) expected the world natural gas production to grow until
2025, staying on a high plateau until 2045, and then decline precipitously. The US natural
gas production peaked in 1971 and has been on a high plateau since 1993.
Dave Rutledge, chair of the Division of Engineering and Applied Science at
California Institute of Technology, studied the historical series of world oil and natural gas
production and concluded that about one-third of the world’s ultimate recoverable resources
of oil and natural gas have already been exploited, implying a peak of the world total
production of oil and natural gas around 2015 (Rutledge, 2007b).
The Energy Watch Group (2007b) predicted that the world coal production would
peak in 2025. China is the world’s largest coal producer, accounting for 40 percent of the
world production.
In a recent study, Tao and Li (2007) projected that China’s coal
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production would peak in 2029, based on China’s official coal reserve (187 billion tonnes).
In term of energy content, the US coal production peaked in1998.
Table 1 and Table 2 present the results of Hubbert linearization exercises applied to
the world and US fossil fuels production. These results are used in this paper’s projections.
[Table 1 is about here]
[Table 2 is about here]
Nuclear and Renewable Energies
The generation of nuclear electricity uses uranium, which is a nonrenewable resource.
According to the Energy Watch Group (2006), the world’s proved uranium reserves will be
exhausted in 30 years at the current rate of consumption and all possible resources of uranium
will be exhausted in 70 years. Breeder reactors could potentially increase the lifetime of the
uranium resource by 50-100 times, but have serious safety problems. Nuclear fusion has the
theoretical possibility to provide an unlimited energy supply.
But so far its long-term
prospect has remained uncertain (Trainer, 2007, 119-124).
EIA (2009) projects that the US nuclear energy production will increase at an annual
rate of 0.5 percent from now to 2030. This paper uses EIA’s projection and optimistically
assumes that the US nuclear energy will grow at the same rate from now to 2100.
Renewable energies (hydro, other renewable electricity, and fuel ethanol) now
account for 2 percent of the US total energy consumption.2 EIA (2009) projects that the US
hydro electricity production will increase at an annual rate of 0.8 percent from now to 2030.
This paper assumes that the US hydro electricity will grow at this rate from now to 2100.
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The American Solar Energy Society estimates that the US has a long-term physical
potential of concentrated solar power of 7,000 giga-watts, a long-term potential of solar
photovoltaic power of 1,000 giga-watts, and a long-term potential of geothermal power of
100 giga-watts (Kutscher, 2007). Trainer (2007, 15-17, 74) estimated that the US wind
power physical potential would be equivalent to 600 giga-watts of coal-fired power plants (or
about 1,800 giga-watts of wind power) and the long-term potential of the US biomass
production would be 10 EJ (corresponding to a liquid fuel production of about 100 million
tonnes of oil equivalent).
Taking into account all of the above estimates, this paper assumes that the long-term
potential of the US non-hydro renewable energy production will be 2,000 million tonnes of
oil equivalent, comparable to the present US total energy consumption.3
This assumption is likely to be too optimistic as it fails to take into account various
technical and practical limits to renewable energies. Solar and wind are intermittent energy
sources. Given the existing electric grids, wind and solar electricity can penetrate up to 20
percent of the installed electricity generating capacity or 10 percent of the actual electricity
production without causing serious problems. Beyond these limits, further increase in solar
and wind electricity will have to require large-scale storage of electricity (Lightfoot and
Green, 2002). The development of “smart grids” using update technologies could alleviate
these problems but cannot eliminate them. There are serious difficulties to store electricity
on very large scales and substantial energy loss will occur due to conversion inefficiencies.
Biomass is limited by the availability of land and fresh water (Green, et al., 2007). The
manufacturing of the solar and wind equipment consumes massive amounts of nonrenewable
mineral resources (Prieto 2008).
Table 3 presents this paper’s projection of the US non-hydro renewable energy
production.
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[Table 3 is about here]
Peak Fossil Fuels and Economic Growth: Case for Optimism?
Figure 1 presents the historical and projected US total primary energy consumption
from 1950 to 2100. The total consumption equals the sum of the domestic coal production,
domestic oil production, domestic natural gas production, nuclear energy, renewable energies,
and energy imports. Energy imports are defined as the difference between total fossil fuels
consumption and total fossil fuels domestic production. After 2010, energy imports are
assumed to be 7.5 percent of the rest of the world’s total production of fossil fuels.
The US fossil fuels consumption is projected to have peaked in 2007. The US energy
imports will continue to grow to about 2025. But it will not be sufficient to offset the decline
of domestic fossil fuels production. By 2100, the US fossil fuels consumption will fall to
about 650 million tonnes of oil equivalent or about 30 percent of its 2007 level. On the other
hand, rapid growth of renewable energies will keep the overall US energy consumption on a
plateau until about 2050. Beyond 2050, the US energy consumption will again increase,
rising to near 2,700 million tonnes of oil equivalent towards the end of the century.
[Figure 1 is about here]
All economic activities have to consume some energy. In the long run, there is an
ultimate limit to energy efficiency (that is, the ratio of economic output to energy
consumption) as is determined by physical laws. Lightfoot and Green (2001) estimated the
long-term physical potential of world energy efficiency and concluded that in the long run,
the world energy efficiency could rise up to 250 percent of the 1990 level.
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Lightfoot and Green first estimated the efficiency improvement potential in each
energy consumption sector (electricity generation, the transportation sector, the residential
sector, the industrial sector, and the commercial sector) and then used the share of each sector
in world energy consumption to calculate the weighted average, resulting in the world
efficiency improvement potential.
However, by treating electricity generation as an
independent sector, Lightfoot and Green committed an accounting error. They took into
account the efficiency improvement potential in the process of electricity generation but
failed to take into account the efficiency improvement potential in the process of electricity
consumption. Correcting for this error, the implied efficiency potential should be 380 percent
of the 1990 level rather than 250 percent.
The current US energy efficiency is about the same as the world average energy
efficiency. In this paper, the long-term US energy efficiency potential is assumed to be about
four times the current US energy efficiency or about five times the world’s average energy
efficiency in 1990. Table 3 presents the projection of the US energy efficiency. The energy
efficiency is defined as the ratio of GDP over primary energy consumption, with GDP
measured by 2005 purchasing power parity dollars. By 2050, the US is projected to have an
energy efficiency that is about one-third higher than the current energy efficiency in Germany
or Japan (currently the most energy efficient economies in the world).
The US GDP is projected simply by multiplying the projected primary energy
consumption with the projected energy efficiency.
Figure 2 presents the historical and
projected US economic growth rate from 1951 to 2100. Historical data of GDP in purchasing
power parity dollars are from Maddison (2003) and World Bank (2008). The US economic
growth rates in 2008, 2009, and 2010 are based on the projections of the IMF (2009).
Historical economic growth rates are presented in three-year averages to smooth out year-toyear fluctuations.
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Based on this paper’s projections, from 2010 to 2070, the US economic growth rate
will vary between 1.5 percent and 2 percent a year. This is a performance that is roughly
comparable to what historically happened in periods of mild recession (such as in the early
1990s and early 2000s). Beyond 2070, the US economic growth rate will trend downwards
and approach zero by the end of the century.
Overall, the US is likely to experience
economic stagnation (that is, very sluggish economic growth) throughout the 21st century.
On the other hand, by the end of the century, the US economy will be about four times as
large as it is today. Given the optimistic assumptions of renewable energy production and
energy efficiency, the US economy could eventually stabilize at a high-income equilibrium.
This is by no means a scenario of economic disaster.
However, as is to be discussed in the rest of this paper, what does not make an
economic disaster turns out to be a recipe for global environmental catastrophes.
[Figure 2 is about here]
Peak Fossil Fuels and Climate Change: Case for Pessimism?
The human consumption of fossil fuels results in emissions of carbon dioxide which,
along with other greenhouse gases, has contributed to global warming that could potentially
lead to unprecedented ecological catastrophes threatening the survival of civilization. On the
other hand, this paper presents projections suggesting that the US fossil fuels consumption is
likely to decline in the rest of the 21st century due to resources depletion. Thus, even without
climate stabilization actions, the US carbon dioxide emissions will decline. This raises the
question how the decline of the fossil fuels consumption will affect the future trajectory of
carbon dioxide emissions and whether additional actions are required for climate stabilization.
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In the current Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) models, an
atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide equivalent (taking into account carbon dioxide
and other greenhouse gases) at about 450 ppm (parts per million) is roughly associated with a
global warming by 2 degrees Celsius relative to the pre-industrial times, and an atmospheric
concentration of carbon dioxide of 550 ppm roughly corresponds to a global warming of 3
degrees (IPCC 2007a). However, James Hansen, one of the world’s leading climate scientists,
now argues that IPCC has seriously underestimated the long-term climate sensitivity.
According to Hansen, to prevent global warming of more than 2 degrees, atmospheric
concentration of carbon dioxide equivalent must not exceed 350 ppm (Hansen, et al., 2008).
Since 2000, global carbon dioxide emissions have grown at a much more rapid pace
than previously expected. In a recent paper, Anderson and Bows (2008) argue that it is
increasingly unlikely for the world to radically reverse the emission trend on a sufficient scale
to meet the 450 ppm target and even the 550 ppm target could be out of reach.
There are three major sources of greenhouse gas emissions: carbon dioxide emissions
from fossil fuels consumption and industrial processes, carbon dioxide emissions from
deforestation, and non-carbon dioxide greenhouse gas emissions.
discussed two scenarios of deforestation emissions.
Anderson and Bows
Both optimistically assume active
climate policies and a near complete end of deforestation by 2100. This paper uses the
average of the two scenarios, implying 266 billion tonnes of cumulative carbon dioxide
emissions from deforestation from 2000 to 2100. For non-carbon dioxide emissions, this
paper uses the “mid-action” scenario developed by Anderson and Bows, resulting in 883
billion tonnes of cumulative emissions of carbon dioxide equivalent.
According to IPCC (2007b) and Anderson and Bows (2008), taking into account
climate carbon cycle feedbacks, to stabilize atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide
equivalent at 450 ppm, the cumulative emissions of greenhouse gases over the 21st century
11
should be no more than 1,800 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (median value).
After subtracting the non-carbon dioxide emissions and emissions from deforestation, the
remaining budget for emissions from fossil fuels amount to only 650 billion tonnes. Taking
into account the emissions that have already taken place from 2000 to 2009, the remaining
emission budget (consistent with the 450 ppm target) is only 360 billion tonnes.
According to Anderson and Bows (2008), to stabilize atmospheric concentration of
carbon dioxide equivalent at 550 ppm, the cumulative emissions of greenhouse gases over the
21st century should be no more than 2,400 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent. This
implies a carbon budget from fossil fuel emissions for 2010-2100 being 960 billion tonnes.
What would be the US emission budget if the US were to meet its global obligation of
climate stabilization? The US now has less than 5 percent of the world population but is
responsible for about one-fifth of the world’s carbon dioxide emissions (and more than a
quarter of the historical cumulative emissions). In accordance with the principle of global
equity, the US share of the global emission budget should be the same as its population share.
From a geopolitical point of view, it is very unlikely for the rest of the world to accept a
climate stabilization arrangement that assigns the US an emission budget share bigger than its
population share. This is especially because many big developing countries (such as China,
India, Brazil, Russia) will rely upon carbon-intensive industrialization to raise income and
consumption levels. Thus, this paper assumes that the US emission budget in the 21st
century will be 5 percent of the world total.
Based on this assumption, to meet the 450 ppm target, the US should emit a
cumulative amount that is no more than 18 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide from 2010 to
2100. To meet the 550 ppm target, the US should emit a cumulative amount that is no more
than 48 billion tonnes. The US now emits about 6 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide a year.
12
Thus, the 450 ppm target clearly cannot be met. To meet the 550 ppm target, the US
emissions must fall at an annual rate of 10 percent from 2009 to 2100.
This is a far more drastic reduction than what is suggested by IPCC (2007a) or what
many have presumed. For example, President Obama proposed to reduce US emissions by
80 percent from now to 2050. This represents an annual average rate of reduction of less than
4 percent. The discrepancy is likely to have resulted from the following factors.
First, since 2000, the global emissions have grown far more rapidly than the IPCC
models have predicted, thus leaving a smaller emission budget for the rest of the century.
Secondly, the emission reduction schedules presented by IPCC refer to the reduction of total
emissions. As there are limits to how rapidly non-fossil fuels emissions could fall, after
making allowances for these emissions, the fossil fuels emissions will have to fall more
rapidly than the total emissions (Anderson and Bows, 2008). Finally, as the US present and
historical per capita emissions are four to five times higher than the world average, the US
must bear a disproportionately large burden in emission reduction.
Is it at all possible for the US to meet even the 550 ppm target in a way that is
consistent with the principle of global equity? Consider first how much of carbon dioxide the
US would emit over the rest of the century if no additional climate stabilization action is
taken. The emissions-to-energy ratios for oil, natural gas, and coal are calculated from the
“2006 fuel shares of CO2 emissions” in IEA (2008). The US emissions from fossil fuels are
projected by multiplying these ratios with the projected consumption of oil, natural gas, and
coal (energy imports are treated as oil consumption). Thus, under “business as usual”, the US
is projected to emit 398 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide from 2010 to 2100, or 350 billion
tonnes more than what would be required to meet the 550 ppm target.
Could the 350 billion tonnes of extra emissions be avoided if the US undertakes a
massive development of renewable energies? The projections presented in Table 3 and
13
Figure 1 have already assumed ambitious development of renewable energies. The US
renewable energy production is projected to rise to 480 million tonnes of oil equivalent by
2050. In term of electrical energy, this represents 5,580 trillion-watt hours or the annual
production of 2,550 giga-watts of wind and solar electricity (assuming 25 percent capacity
utilization).
In other words, to deliver the projected renewable energy production, the US needs to
build in average 60 giga-watts of renewable electricity a year from now to 2050.
By
comparison, from 2000 to 2007, the US average annual net installation rate for all types of
power plants was only 27 giga-watts. Therefore, just to meet the objective set by the existing
projection, the US needs to at least double the construction rate in its power sector and
maintain this rate for the next four decades, and use all of this construction capacity to build
only renewable electricity projects. This is already very difficult to accomplish considering
that wind and solar electricity, being intermittent sources of power, will need to have
substantial amounts of conventional fossil fuel plants serving as backup power.
If the US fossil fuels consumption were to fall by 10 percent a year, then by 2050, it
would be nearly completely phased out. If the missing fossil fuels in 2050 (1,600 million
tonnes of oil equivalent) were to be replaced by renewable energy, it would require 8,500
giga-watts of wind and solar electricity (in addition to the projected 2,550 giga-watts).4
Moreover, much of the economy’s energy, transportation, and industrial infrastructure need
to be electrified and fundamentally transformed so that they can be powered by renewable
electricity. Can all of these be achieved at an annual rate that allows 10 percent of fossil fuels
consumption to be replaced each and every year from now to 2050?
Alternatively, the US could choose to develop and massively deploy carbon capture
and storage technology. Carbon capture and storage processes are highly capital intensive
and consume large amounts of energy and resources. It is estimated that carbon capture and
14
storage applied to electricity generation would result in a 10-40 percent energy loss. Carbon
capture costs 15-75 dollars per tonne of carbon dioxide, and carbon transport and storage cost
an additional 2-16 dollars per tonne (Greenpeace 2008). Taking an average, suppose carbon
capture and storage costs about 50 dollar per tonne of carbon dioxide, the total cost for
capturing and storing 350 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide would amount to 17.5 trillion
dollars or nearly 200 billion dollars a year for each year from 2010 to 2100.
But more importantly, the carbon capture and storage technology is currently
immature. Large-scale deployment is unlikely to take place before 2030. By then, 120
billion tonnes of additional carbon dioxide would have been emitted if the US fossil fuels
consumption follows the projected trajectory of natural depletion.
Zero Economic Growth: Political Idealism or Climate Change Realism?
If the global average temperature rises by more than 2 degrees Celsius relative to the
pre-industrial time, there are likely to be widespread crop failures, drought, desertification,
and flooding throughout Asia, Africa, Europe, North and South America, and Australia. 1540 percent of plant and animal species are likely to go extinct. But more importantly, a 2degree warming will constitute a “dangerous anthropogenic interference” as it will initiate a
series of climate feedbacks that are likely to take the earth beyond a set of “tipping points.”
Beyond these tipping points, global warming could become a self-sustaining process out of
the human control, leading to massive catastrophes that could wipe out most of the species on
the earth.
If global warming approaches 3 degrees Celsius, the Amazon rainforest may turn to
savannah as it is destroyed by drought and mega-fires. Significant and increasingly large
areas of the terrestrial environment will become uninhabitable. World food supplies will be
critically endangered. Between hundreds of millions and billions of refugees will move from
15
the sub-tropics to the mid-latitudes.
In the Pliocene, about three million years ago,
temperatures were about 3 degrees higher than our pre-industrial levels.
The northern
hemisphere was completely free of ice-sheets and the sea levels were 25 meters higher. The
atmospheric carbon dioxide levels were 360-400 ppm (parts per million), similar to today’s
levels (Spratt and Sutton 2007).
According to James Lovelock, the ninety-year old world famous scientist, if the
atmospheric carbon dioxide rises above 500 ppm, algae, which comprise most of the ocean’s
plant life and are the world’s largest carbon sink, will start to die out. As the earth’s selfregulation fails, the global temperatures could suddenly rise by 6 degrees and would be about
8 degrees higher than the pre-industrial level. In that case, only Canada, Siberia, Northern
Europe, and a few places near Antarctica will remain inhabitable (Lovelock 2006).
In a recent interview, Lovelock (2009) suggested that if the global temperature were
to rise by 4 degrees Celsius relative to the pre-industrial times, world population could fall by
up to 90 percent. Can the humanity avoid such a massive self-destruction?
The following well-known formula explains the relationship between carbon dioxide
emissions and economic growth:
Carbon dioxide emissions = (emissions / energy consumption) * (energy consumption
/ GDP) * GDP
= Emission intensity of energy consumption * energy efficiency * GDP
Virtually all of the existing climate policies focus on reduction of emission intensity
of energy consumption and improvement of energy efficiency. All of the existing policies
implicitly or explicitly assume that GDP will keep growing. However, it does not take a
16
rocket scientist to see that so long as the economy keeps growing at exponential rates, it is
very difficult to achieve rapid reductions of emissions.
Consider the US economy. The trend growth rate of the US economy has been about
3 percent a year. The US energy efficiency has tended to improve at 2 percent a year and
there has been little change in emissions intensity. As a result, the US emissions have kept
growing at about 1 percent a year. Suppose there is a doubling of the US energy efficiency
improvement rate, and suppose the emissions intensity falls at 4 percent a year. Even with
such heroic and plainly unrealistic assumptions, so long as the economy grows at 3 percent a
year, the US emissions would only fall at 5 percent a year, half of what is required to meet
the 550 ppm target.
In his latest book, James Gustave Speth convincingly argued that so long as the
economic system is committed to perpetual growth, there is little chance for ecological
sustainability to be achieved. Moreover, as far as the advanced capitalist countries are
concerned, a large body of evidence now suggests that growing GDP no longer in any
meaningful sense improves people’s quality of life (Speth, 2008).
If an economic activity no longer delivers any “good” (or delivers very little) but
carries the clear risk of destroying humanity and its civilization, would it not be logical to
stop it immediately?
Suppose the US people and government are both wise and determined enough to be
committed to zero economic growth in the coming decades, what would be the outcome?
With zero economic growth (from 2010 to 2100), and based on the energy efficiency and
renewable energy production projected in this paper, the US fossil fuels consumption will fall
rapidly and be completely phased out by 2060 without any additional policy.
The US would still emit 154 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide from 2010 to 2060. But,
the post-2030 emissions could probably be addressed with large-scale deployment of carbon
17
capture and storage (at a total cost of about 3 trillion dollars). From 2010 to 2030, the total
emissions are projected to be 93 billion tonnes, exceeding the 48 billion tonne budget by 45
billion tonnes. The extra emissions could probably be offset through a massive program of
bio-sequestration (absorbing atmospheric carbon dioxide through plants and then turning
plants into bio-charcoal) in the rest of the 21st century.
Even with zero economic growth in the rest of the century, it remains a difficult task
for the US to meet its global obligation of climate stabilization. But at least the task would be
within reach. There would be a reasonable chance for the humanity to save itself and for the
US to contribute its proper share.
Do all of these seem to be politically too idealistic? However, if the humanity does
not want to commit a collective suicide, is this not the only realistic option?
18
Footnotes
1
At any particular point of time, the production of a nonrenewable resource can be affected
by many factors, including political influences, market conditions, world economic
conditions, as well as geological factors. However, in the long run, the influences of other
factors are likely to cancel out and geological factors should predominate.
For recent
applications of Hubbert Linearization to fossil fuels in global and national contexts, see
Rutledge (2008b). For applications to mineral resources, see Bardi (2008).
2
In this paper, primary electricity (such as nuclear and renewable electricity) is counted by its
electrical energy (1 trillion-watt hour = 0.086 million tonne of oil equivalent) rather than
thermal equivalent (1 trillion-watt hour = 0.226 million tonne of oil equivalent). Under the
current technology, it takes about 2.5 units of fossil energy to generate one unit of electrical
energy. Thus, thermal equivalent is sometimes used in the comparison between electricity
generated from fossil fuels and primary electricity. However, this paper assumes that in the
long run energy efficiency will approach its physical potential and electricity generation
efficiency will approach 100 percent (to be discussed in the next section). This implicitly
assumes that thermal equivalent will converge towards electrical energy.
3
Wind and solar power are assumed to have a capacity utilization rate of 0.25. Geothermal
power is assumed to have a capacity utilization rate of 0.75. Biomass is counted by the
amount of liquid fuel it can make.
4
If one counts renewable electricity by its thermal equivalent, it would take 3,200 giga-watts
of additional wind and solar electricity. However, if renewable electricity is measured by
thermal equivalent, then the projected energy efficiency should be adjusted downwards
accordingly.
19
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