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Download 41 Leassons Learned At Cowskin Prairie
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Echoes From the Past LESSONS LEARNED AT COWSKIN PRAIRIE Many of the battles of the Civil War have been criticized by experts as being fought with modern weapons but outdated strategies. Celebrated generals such as Grant and Lee continually used battle formations that resulted in enormous casualties by lining up exposed companies or battalions of soldiers 100 – 150 yards apart. Another tactic was to order an advance directly into cannon fire. One recent publication credits Lee with over 240,000 casualties in 26 battles and Grant with 190,000 in 15. These professional military icons could have taken a lesson from a citizen soldier, Confederate General Stand Watie. As noted, the “difference maker” in the Civil War as opposed to previous wars fought on American soil was the weaponry. The range of distance and accuracy of rifles or cannons had dramatically increased over the years since the Revolution. During this war sharpshooters on both sides routinely picked off hapless targets as far as a mile away and cannon balls could be propelled for miles. These were facts that didn’t go unheeded in Indian Territory and almost from the beginning Stand Watie adopted the use of different tactics. By 1862, as a junior officer, Watie and his troops had participated in two major battles fought in the conventional style, The Confederates had won the first at Wilson’s Creek, Missouri, but lost the second at Pea Ridge, Arkansas. In both instances he had witnessed traditional maneuvers, cannons pounding the opposition, followed by waves of soldiers marching out, lining up and shooting at each other as if in some choreographed dance. In addition, the Confederates, although not always outmanned, were usually out gunned. The North’s superior industrial complex routinely provided more weapons and ammunition compared to the South’s minimal resources. Now, at Cowskin Prairie, northeast of Grove on June 5, 1862, Watie and his troops were again victims of the same strategy. As the summer progressed, the results were repeated. A battle at Locust Grove and a series of skirmishes along the Grand River, concluding with the rout of Confederates at the October battle for Old Fort Wayne, convinced Colonel Watie and his associates that a different strategy was necessary. When the Federal troops withdrew to Kansas late that fall, officers took advantage of the lull to reconsider their plan of attack. First, they concluded that the northerners were forced to supply their troops by wagon trains from Kansas or Missouri and that made them vulnerable to “hit and run” tactics. Second, they were fighting on their own territory so they knew the terrain and could pick their battle ground. And of most importance, as often as possible they would attack where cover was available to minimize their casualties. As the war progressed, so did the positive results. Unlike his eastern counterparts, Watie utilized tactics that took maximum advantage of the terrain and the mobility of his troops. For one example, during June of 1864, he was informed that a steamer, the J.R. Williams, would be ferrying supplies from Fort Smith to Fort Gibson. He stationed three cannons at Pleasant Bluff approximately 100 yards apart and as the vessel passed fired upon it. Disabling the vessel, his troops quickly boarded and, as they had done so many times, confiscated the supplies, including regulation Yankee uniforms. This was a precursor to his crowning efforts at “concealment, hit and run” when, the following July he captured his most renown prize, the one and one half million dollar wagon train at Cabin Creek. While eastern generals continued to feed the war machine with human flesh, (40,000 at Gettysburg and 28,000 at Chickamauga,) western commanders won battles with less spectacular losses. Following the war, professional soldiers and students of military tactics took note of how differently battles had been fought on the eastern and western front and the resulting casualties. Clearly, exposing large numbers of troops to modern weapons on open ground had proven to be devastating. Later, different methods of protection of troops became vogue, for example the deployment of troops in trenches during World War I, followed by even more refinements in protecting troops during subsequent conflicts. Over 612,000 Union and Confederate soldiers died in four years of civil war, One can only speculate what fewer numbers might have been lost if eastern commanders had taken an early lesson from their western counterparts. Without a doubt, the battle techniques used by General Stand Watie and his associates obtained results with comparatively less casualties. The strategic lessons learned, beginning with Cowskin Prairie, set the stage for future wars.