Metaphysical Dependence and Set Theory
... conception, in general, things that are members of sets do not metaphysically depend on the sets that they are members of. When it comes to sets and their members, metaphysical dependence is in most cases asymmetric. The claim that sets metaphysically depend on their members may strike you as odd. I ...
... conception, in general, things that are members of sets do not metaphysically depend on the sets that they are members of. When it comes to sets and their members, metaphysical dependence is in most cases asymmetric. The claim that sets metaphysically depend on their members may strike you as odd. I ...
just what is vagueness?
... definitions on offer. Most of these, however, presuppose some kind of gappiness. For example, it is often claimed that a borderline case is one to which the predicate in question neither applies nor does its complement. Notice that on this account, if a is a borderline case of adult, say, then ‘a is ...
... definitions on offer. Most of these, however, presuppose some kind of gappiness. For example, it is often claimed that a borderline case is one to which the predicate in question neither applies nor does its complement. Notice that on this account, if a is a borderline case of adult, say, then ‘a is ...
Reading the Identity of Dramatis Personae Through the
... the same time, in different historical periods and for related cognitive reasons, the degree of accessibility varies. (Elam 107). The semantics of possible worlds adheres to its principle that fictional worlds are not reproductions or representations of the real (realia) but dominant kingdoms of the ...
... the same time, in different historical periods and for related cognitive reasons, the degree of accessibility varies. (Elam 107). The semantics of possible worlds adheres to its principle that fictional worlds are not reproductions or representations of the real (realia) but dominant kingdoms of the ...
Pascal`s Wager is a Lie: An Epistemic Interpretation of the
... In entertaining and evaluating all of these objections scholars treat the Wager as an isolated, mathematical proposition and subject it to the logical and mathematical rigor associated with modern mathematics and rationality. However, this is not how Pascal intended the passage to be treated. As Jam ...
... In entertaining and evaluating all of these objections scholars treat the Wager as an isolated, mathematical proposition and subject it to the logical and mathematical rigor associated with modern mathematics and rationality. However, this is not how Pascal intended the passage to be treated. As Jam ...
The Logic of Logical Revision
... the case that P,’ ([]P) to, ‘It is possible that it is not the case that P,’ (<>P) is equivalent to saying that if it is not the case that for every possible world w, P is true in w, then it is the case that there exists a world w, such that P is not true in w. But the form of this inference (fro ...
... the case that P,’ ([]P) to, ‘It is possible that it is not the case that P,’ (<>P) is equivalent to saying that if it is not the case that for every possible world w, P is true in w, then it is the case that there exists a world w, such that P is not true in w. But the form of this inference (fro ...
Getting Priority Straight
... Priority theory opposes ontological radicals, who deny (MODESTY). Radicals reject (MODESTY) on the basis of a wide variety of disparate arguments.14 On the basis of one or another of these arguments, they think it would be better if our ontology weren’t so crowded. For instance, some radicals sugges ...
... Priority theory opposes ontological radicals, who deny (MODESTY). Radicals reject (MODESTY) on the basis of a wide variety of disparate arguments.14 On the basis of one or another of these arguments, they think it would be better if our ontology weren’t so crowded. For instance, some radicals sugges ...
A unified account of causal relata
... Secondly, just as there may be several definite descriptions standing for the same physical object, so there may be several definite descriptions standing for the same event. To take one of Davidson's early examples (1963, p. 4), my flipping the switch, my turning on the light, my illuminating the r ...
... Secondly, just as there may be several definite descriptions standing for the same physical object, so there may be several definite descriptions standing for the same event. To take one of Davidson's early examples (1963, p. 4), my flipping the switch, my turning on the light, my illuminating the r ...
Scepticism with regard to Reason* David Owen, University of
... demonstrative argument, not just that it might be unsound, but that it actually turns into a probable argument. Fogelin (Fogelin 1993) argues that this is a consequence of Hume’s claim that “knowledge degenerates into probability”. Against Hume, Fogelin argues that “the fact that there may be some c ...
... demonstrative argument, not just that it might be unsound, but that it actually turns into a probable argument. Fogelin (Fogelin 1993) argues that this is a consequence of Hume’s claim that “knowledge degenerates into probability”. Against Hume, Fogelin argues that “the fact that there may be some c ...
COMPOSITION, IDENTITY, AND EMERGENCE
... The three parts considered collectively are the kingdom, the kingdom just is them2 . When he gives them away, he gives it away, as the Fool actually seems to imply. McDaniel [2008] argues against CAI on the grounds that it is incompatible with emergent properties. The argument has been criticized in ...
... The three parts considered collectively are the kingdom, the kingdom just is them2 . When he gives them away, he gives it away, as the Fool actually seems to imply. McDaniel [2008] argues against CAI on the grounds that it is incompatible with emergent properties. The argument has been criticized in ...
Two Interpretations of Two Stoic Conditionals
... and always will be the case that p materially implies q’. This omits the fact that p D q should also include ‘and it has always been the case that p materially implies q’. Prior has translated D(p ⊃ q); however, as we have already remarked, the Diodorean conditional is stronger than the necessitat ...
... and always will be the case that p materially implies q’. This omits the fact that p D q should also include ‘and it has always been the case that p materially implies q’. Prior has translated D(p ⊃ q); however, as we have already remarked, the Diodorean conditional is stronger than the necessitat ...
An Argument For A Neutral Free Logic
... The argument I consider appears in Vagueness (New York, Routledge, 1994): 188. For example, Graham Priest mentions it in An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic (New York, Cambridge, 2001): ...
... The argument I consider appears in Vagueness (New York, Routledge, 1994): 188. For example, Graham Priest mentions it in An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic (New York, Cambridge, 2001): ...
Ruinous Arguments: Escalation of disagreement and the dangers of
... costs steadily increase as a function of argument duration: the more we argue, the more resources we have to commit to it. The benefits of arguing, however, often do not have the same dynamics. Take persuasion as a case in point: if I stand to gain something from persuading you, whatever benefit I h ...
... costs steadily increase as a function of argument duration: the more we argue, the more resources we have to commit to it. The benefits of arguing, however, often do not have the same dynamics. Take persuasion as a case in point: if I stand to gain something from persuading you, whatever benefit I h ...
penultimate draft - U
... make these distinctions is to say that things are some way or another — to hang different rubber bands on the pegs, as it were. But as an ontological pluralist, I hold that thinking of reality as having a single ontological structure — a single pegboard — is a mistake, as is thinking of ontological ...
... make these distinctions is to say that things are some way or another — to hang different rubber bands on the pegs, as it were. But as an ontological pluralist, I hold that thinking of reality as having a single ontological structure — a single pegboard — is a mistake, as is thinking of ontological ...
Dennett and Phenomenology - Center for Subjectivity Research
... subjects’ expressed beliefs, and he argues that this maneuver amounts to a third-person version of Husserl’s famous epoché (Dennett 2003, 22). Why is the neutrality required? Dennett provides different reasons. Occasionally, he compares the neutrality in question with the neutrality that is required ...
... subjects’ expressed beliefs, and he argues that this maneuver amounts to a third-person version of Husserl’s famous epoché (Dennett 2003, 22). Why is the neutrality required? Dennett provides different reasons. Occasionally, he compares the neutrality in question with the neutrality that is required ...
SI L56 (upload) - Amitabha Buddhist Centre
... The AMWS and the CMWS differ in what constitutes the object of negation. Because of this difference, while the AMWS divides conventionalities into real conventionalities and unreal conventionalities, the CMWS does not make such a distinction. The Position of the AMWS According to the AMWS, the objec ...
... The AMWS and the CMWS differ in what constitutes the object of negation. Because of this difference, while the AMWS divides conventionalities into real conventionalities and unreal conventionalities, the CMWS does not make such a distinction. The Position of the AMWS According to the AMWS, the objec ...
Persons in time - The Open University
... If this argument works, it excludes both the eirenic and the inclusive responses by showing that not all facts are equally “deep”, and that the facts that are deepest are the ones that the reductionist appeals to. However, the argument does not work. One obvious problem with it is the almost unanswe ...
... If this argument works, it excludes both the eirenic and the inclusive responses by showing that not all facts are equally “deep”, and that the facts that are deepest are the ones that the reductionist appeals to. However, the argument does not work. One obvious problem with it is the almost unanswe ...
Introduction: Varieties of Disjunctivism
... Inspired by the writings of J. M. Hinton (1967a, 1967b, 1973), but ushered into the mainstream by Paul Snowdon (1980–1, 1990–1), John McDowell (1982, 1986), and M. G. F. Martin (2002, 2004, 2006), disjunctivism is currently discussed, advocated, and opposed in the philosophy of perception, the theor ...
... Inspired by the writings of J. M. Hinton (1967a, 1967b, 1973), but ushered into the mainstream by Paul Snowdon (1980–1, 1990–1), John McDowell (1982, 1986), and M. G. F. Martin (2002, 2004, 2006), disjunctivism is currently discussed, advocated, and opposed in the philosophy of perception, the theor ...
Fighting Without Hatred: Hannah Arendt`s Agonistic
... actually did was to make public, in discourse, the thinking process" (Lectures 37). Pitkin summarizes this point: "Arendt says that the heroism associated with politics is not the mythical machismo of ancient Greece but something more like the existential leap into action and public exposure" (175-7 ...
... actually did was to make public, in discourse, the thinking process" (Lectures 37). Pitkin summarizes this point: "Arendt says that the heroism associated with politics is not the mythical machismo of ancient Greece but something more like the existential leap into action and public exposure" (175-7 ...
The Evidence of the Senses
... Driving in Barn Façade County . . . I am directly aware of the barn, its location, the colour of its roof, its approximate dimensions, and so on . . . Yet . . . I [don’t] know that there is a barn up the road, of such-and-such approximate dimensions, and with such-and-such a colour of roof . . . Dir ...
... Driving in Barn Façade County . . . I am directly aware of the barn, its location, the colour of its roof, its approximate dimensions, and so on . . . Yet . . . I [don’t] know that there is a barn up the road, of such-and-such approximate dimensions, and with such-and-such a colour of roof . . . Dir ...
RETRANSMITTABILITY AND EMPIRICAL PROPOSITIONS
... sense experience and a proposition which is to count as genuine knowledge must be derivable from basic or atomic propositions whose truth is guaranteed by sense experience. Anti-justificationists, by contrast, do not attempt to give a precise and exact definition of knowledge. Unlike justificationis ...
... sense experience and a proposition which is to count as genuine knowledge must be derivable from basic or atomic propositions whose truth is guaranteed by sense experience. Anti-justificationists, by contrast, do not attempt to give a precise and exact definition of knowledge. Unlike justificationis ...
Intentional psychologism - California State University, Los Angeles
... responsible for its expressing the proposition it does. That is, I held that a thought’s phenomenal content—viz., its intrinsic phenomenal features—determines its intentional content—which proposition it expresses. (I did not attempt to explain how phenomenal content determines propositional content ...
... responsible for its expressing the proposition it does. That is, I held that a thought’s phenomenal content—viz., its intrinsic phenomenal features—determines its intentional content—which proposition it expresses. (I did not attempt to explain how phenomenal content determines propositional content ...
James Hill`s `Descartes` Dreaming Argument and why we might be
... Thomas Hobbes thought that one distinguishing mark of dreams was the absence of a sense of the absurd. In dreaming, he claimed, we take in all kinds of bizarre happenings without batting an eyelid. It does not occur to us that what we are experiencing is so crazy that it can only be an illusion. In ...
... Thomas Hobbes thought that one distinguishing mark of dreams was the absence of a sense of the absurd. In dreaming, he claimed, we take in all kinds of bizarre happenings without batting an eyelid. It does not occur to us that what we are experiencing is so crazy that it can only be an illusion. In ...
Reid`s defense of common sense - Scholars Archive
... Understood in this way, Reid’s position is that common sense is justified because it reliably leads to true belief. Common sense would be justified regardless of whether or why we accepted it, but there is this further question: Why should we believe that common sense is justified? It is justified i ...
... Understood in this way, Reid’s position is that common sense is justified because it reliably leads to true belief. Common sense would be justified regardless of whether or why we accepted it, but there is this further question: Why should we believe that common sense is justified? It is justified i ...
Jani Hakkarainen. Hume`s Scepticism and Realism: His Two
... belief that its food is in the bag; the ostrich that hides its head when it does not want to be seen is not a Relativist about perception. If a “two Hume” view is to present us with an account that makes him a consistent thinker, the “everyday” Hume (anti-skeptical on both Hakkarainen’s interpretati ...
... belief that its food is in the bag; the ostrich that hides its head when it does not want to be seen is not a Relativist about perception. If a “two Hume” view is to present us with an account that makes him a consistent thinker, the “everyday” Hume (anti-skeptical on both Hakkarainen’s interpretati ...