An Infinitely Farsighted Stable Set
... Another problem is that firms 2 and 3 are assumed to divide their $36,000 profit ...
... Another problem is that firms 2 and 3 are assumed to divide their $36,000 profit ...
Branches of imperfect information - Institute for Logic, Language and
... Crucially, one has to see to it that the logics give rise, in the game-theoretic semantics sense, to one and two-player games. Then, we compare the complexity of the logics that give rise to one-player games with the complexity of the logics that give rise to two-player games. Here, the complexity o ...
... Crucially, one has to see to it that the logics give rise, in the game-theoretic semantics sense, to one and two-player games. Then, we compare the complexity of the logics that give rise to one-player games with the complexity of the logics that give rise to two-player games. Here, the complexity o ...
Context$Dependent Forward Induction Reasoning
... 1.1. Let us understand forward induction reasoning within this structure. Begin with rationality. This is a property of a strategy-type pair, i.e., (sa ; ta ) is rational if sa is sequentially optimal under the CPS a (ta ). In our example, there are rational strategy-type pairs (sa ; ta ), where sa ...
... 1.1. Let us understand forward induction reasoning within this structure. Begin with rationality. This is a property of a strategy-type pair, i.e., (sa ; ta ) is rational if sa is sequentially optimal under the CPS a (ta ). In our example, there are rational strategy-type pairs (sa ; ta ), where sa ...
A Consistent Bargaining Set
... so that the consistent bargaining set is sandwiched between the core and the bargaining set. Recall that if x belongs to B(V) but not to C(V), then there exist chains of x of positive length and all such chains must be at least of length 2. We shall now show that if (Al)-(A3) are satisfied, then the ...
... so that the consistent bargaining set is sandwiched between the core and the bargaining set. Recall that if x belongs to B(V) but not to C(V), then there exist chains of x of positive length and all such chains must be at least of length 2. We shall now show that if (Al)-(A3) are satisfied, then the ...
Computing the Nondominated Nash Points of a Normal Form Game
... It is a well-known fact that a normal form game can have a single Nash equilibrium, multiple but a finite number of Nash equilibria, or even an infinite number of Nash equilibria. When a normal form game has an infinite number of Nash equilibria, the set of all Nash equilibria can still be completel ...
... It is a well-known fact that a normal form game can have a single Nash equilibrium, multiple but a finite number of Nash equilibria, or even an infinite number of Nash equilibria. When a normal form game has an infinite number of Nash equilibria, the set of all Nash equilibria can still be completel ...
The Stochastic Response Dynamic: A New Approach to Learning
... assured to uniquely converge. The convergence however is no longer to a single state of the game, but rather to a probability distribution over the possible states of the game. In the language of Markov chains, the stochastic response dynamic is uniquely ergodic and converges strongly (in total var ...
... assured to uniquely converge. The convergence however is no longer to a single state of the game, but rather to a probability distribution over the possible states of the game. In the language of Markov chains, the stochastic response dynamic is uniquely ergodic and converges strongly (in total var ...
Gambit Documentation
... tools center primarily around Nash equilibrium, and related concepts of bounded rationality such as quantal response equilibrium. Gambit does not at this time provide any representations of, or methods for, analyzing games written in cooperative form. (It should be noted that some problems in cooper ...
... tools center primarily around Nash equilibrium, and related concepts of bounded rationality such as quantal response equilibrium. Gambit does not at this time provide any representations of, or methods for, analyzing games written in cooperative form. (It should be noted that some problems in cooper ...
Stochastic Learning Dynamics and Speed of Convergence in
... with respect to the underlying game G. This definition does not require that everyone in the population play an -equilibrium, but it does require that if some players’ behaviors are far from equilibrium they must constitute a small fraction of the whole population. Section 3 introduces the class of ...
... with respect to the underlying game G. This definition does not require that everyone in the population play an -equilibrium, but it does require that if some players’ behaviors are far from equilibrium they must constitute a small fraction of the whole population. Section 3 introduces the class of ...
Stochastic stability in a learning dynamic with best
... University of Innsbruck Working Papers in Economics and Statistics The series is jointly edited and published by - Department of Banking and Finance - Department of Economics - Department of Public Finance - Department of Statistics Contact address of the editor: Research platform “Empirical and Ex ...
... University of Innsbruck Working Papers in Economics and Statistics The series is jointly edited and published by - Department of Banking and Finance - Department of Economics - Department of Public Finance - Department of Statistics Contact address of the editor: Research platform “Empirical and Ex ...
Gambit Documentation
... tools center primarily around Nash equilibrium, and related concepts of bounded rationality such as quantal response equilibrium. Gambit does not at this time provide any representations of, or methods for, analyzing games written in cooperative form. (It should be noted that some problems in cooper ...
... tools center primarily around Nash equilibrium, and related concepts of bounded rationality such as quantal response equilibrium. Gambit does not at this time provide any representations of, or methods for, analyzing games written in cooperative form. (It should be noted that some problems in cooper ...
Morris RepeatedGameswithAlmostPublicMonitoring
... Green and Porter [17] and Abreu et al. [2]). Moreover, if the public signals satisfy an identifiability condition, a folk theorem holds: if the discount rate is sufficiently close to one, any individually rational payoff can be supported as the average payoff of an equilibrium of the repeated game ( ...
... Green and Porter [17] and Abreu et al. [2]). Moreover, if the public signals satisfy an identifiability condition, a folk theorem holds: if the discount rate is sufficiently close to one, any individually rational payoff can be supported as the average payoff of an equilibrium of the repeated game ( ...
Context$Dependent Forward Induction Reasoning
... particular (extensive-form) epistemic type structure studied. (See Section 3.4 in [7, 2002].) To see this, let’s again consider BoS with an Outside Option, now played in a society that has come to form a “lady’s choice convention.” Loosely: Everyone in society thinks that, if the lady gets to move i ...
... particular (extensive-form) epistemic type structure studied. (See Section 3.4 in [7, 2002].) To see this, let’s again consider BoS with an Outside Option, now played in a society that has come to form a “lady’s choice convention.” Loosely: Everyone in society thinks that, if the lady gets to move i ...
Openness of the set of games with a unique correlated equilibrium
... is, that the set of games having these properties is open. We investigate here whether the set of finite normal-form games with a unique equilibrium is open, for Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, and variants of Nash equilibrium such as symmetric Nash equilibrium in symmetric games. For two- ...
... is, that the set of games having these properties is open. We investigate here whether the set of finite normal-form games with a unique equilibrium is open, for Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, and variants of Nash equilibrium such as symmetric Nash equilibrium in symmetric games. For two- ...
Coalition Formation and Price of Anarchy in
... observing traffic patterns, selects the route which minimizes his own delay. The resulting total delay can be much greater than that of the optimal flow. In a seminal paper in 1999, Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [18] initiated the investigation of the so-called price of anarchy which measures the ra ...
... observing traffic patterns, selects the route which minimizes his own delay. The resulting total delay can be much greater than that of the optimal flow. In a seminal paper in 1999, Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [18] initiated the investigation of the so-called price of anarchy which measures the ra ...
Coalition-Proof Equilibrium
... The game does not have a CPNE, as each of the Nash equilibria is upset by a deviation of the coalition of players 1 and 2; in the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium where players 1 and 2 both choose heads, they each obtain a payoff of y1. By jointly deviating Žboth choosing tails instead. players 1 and ...
... The game does not have a CPNE, as each of the Nash equilibria is upset by a deviation of the coalition of players 1 and 2; in the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium where players 1 and 2 both choose heads, they each obtain a payoff of y1. By jointly deviating Žboth choosing tails instead. players 1 and ...
Non-Additive Beliefs in Solvable Games
... note is to investigate how the introduction of non-additive probabilities affects the solvability of strategic games. In many cases, it turns out, solvability of games is destroyed, if one allows for nonadditive probabilities. Although strict dominance is preserved, dominance solvability is not. A n ...
... note is to investigate how the introduction of non-additive probabilities affects the solvability of strategic games. In many cases, it turns out, solvability of games is destroyed, if one allows for nonadditive probabilities. Although strict dominance is preserved, dominance solvability is not. A n ...
coalitional approaches to collusive agreements in oligopoly games
... mergers literature, the stability of an agreement is examined in a context in which a deviating coalition and the remaining …rms of the industry act simultaneously. In such a literature, the sequential approach typical of the price-leadership model is thus lost. It may be questioned if the defection ...
... mergers literature, the stability of an agreement is examined in a context in which a deviating coalition and the remaining …rms of the industry act simultaneously. In such a literature, the sequential approach typical of the price-leadership model is thus lost. It may be questioned if the defection ...
Prisoner`s Dilemma with Talk∗
... to cooperate with players who cooperate with them and defect against players who defect against them. Standard game theory tends to ignore the fact that in strategic situations people often have the opportunity to communicate before choosing their actions. When communication is included it is taken ...
... to cooperate with players who cooperate with them and defect against players who defect against them. Standard game theory tends to ignore the fact that in strategic situations people often have the opportunity to communicate before choosing their actions. When communication is included it is taken ...
Graduate School of Economics Waseda University Waseda University
... characterizations respectively for ordinal and exact potential games as follows. A sequence of action profiles (x1 , x2 , . . . ) ⊆ X is said to be a path if for any k there exists a unique deviator, i.e. for all k, xk and xk+1 differs in only one coordinate. If a path (x1 , ..., xm ) satisfies x1 = xm ...
... characterizations respectively for ordinal and exact potential games as follows. A sequence of action profiles (x1 , x2 , . . . ) ⊆ X is said to be a path if for any k there exists a unique deviator, i.e. for all k, xk and xk+1 differs in only one coordinate. If a path (x1 , ..., xm ) satisfies x1 = xm ...
XX On the Complexity of Approximating a Nash Equilibrium
... For all ∈ [0, 1) and N0 ∈ N there exists a two-player game with N ≥ N0 pure strategies per player such that in all relative -Nash equilibria of this game the mixed strategies of both players have support of size at least α · N , where α ∈ (0, 1) is some absolute constant that does not depend on ...
... For all ∈ [0, 1) and N0 ∈ N there exists a two-player game with N ≥ N0 pure strategies per player such that in all relative -Nash equilibria of this game the mixed strategies of both players have support of size at least α · N , where α ∈ (0, 1) is some absolute constant that does not depend on ...
An Introduction to Game Theory
... So, what should Ali do? What do you expect would happen in this situation? At this point we do not have enough information in our model to provide an answer. First we have to describe Ali and Beril’s objectives, i.e., their preferences over the set of possible outcomes. One possibility, economists’ ...
... So, what should Ali do? What do you expect would happen in this situation? At this point we do not have enough information in our model to provide an answer. First we have to describe Ali and Beril’s objectives, i.e., their preferences over the set of possible outcomes. One possibility, economists’ ...
Symmetric Nash equilibria
... provide a number of hardness proofs as well as algorithms altered to handle the requirement that every player must use the same strategy for a number of different objectives. In these problems we obtain the same upper and lower bounds as in the non-symmetric case. We then proceed to define concurren ...
... provide a number of hardness proofs as well as algorithms altered to handle the requirement that every player must use the same strategy for a number of different objectives. In these problems we obtain the same upper and lower bounds as in the non-symmetric case. We then proceed to define concurren ...
Repeated Games with Differential Time Preferences
... the stage-game. In other cases, every feasible and individually rational repeatedgame payoff is sustainable in equilibrium. What characterizes the set of equilibrium payoffs? Which factors determine whether there are equilibrium payoffs outside the stage-game’s feasible set? When are there feasible ...
... the stage-game. In other cases, every feasible and individually rational repeatedgame payoff is sustainable in equilibrium. What characterizes the set of equilibrium payoffs? Which factors determine whether there are equilibrium payoffs outside the stage-game’s feasible set? When are there feasible ...
iese07 VanZandt 5034778 en
... The interim formulation of a Bayesian game and of a BNE is the correct one for interpreting a game as one of incomplete rather than imperfect information. Furthermore, as we will now remark, the class of interim games is broader than the class of ex ante games (with a mild restriction) and the notio ...
... The interim formulation of a Bayesian game and of a BNE is the correct one for interpreting a game as one of incomplete rather than imperfect information. Furthermore, as we will now remark, the class of interim games is broader than the class of ex ante games (with a mild restriction) and the notio ...
Coordination Mechanisms∗
... There are three important classes of congestion games: the single-commodity or symmetric, the multi-commodity, and the general congestion games. In the most restricted class, the singlecommodity congestion game, there are n selfish players that want to establish a path from a fixed node s to a fixed ...
... There are three important classes of congestion games: the single-commodity or symmetric, the multi-commodity, and the general congestion games. In the most restricted class, the singlecommodity congestion game, there are n selfish players that want to establish a path from a fixed node s to a fixed ...