Modern Principles of Economics
... Apple, it will be difficult for them to work together and their payoffs will be low (3,3). • Alex and Tyler receive the highest payoffs when both are using the same software. If Alex chooses Apple, then Tyler should choose Apple as well since the payoffs are high (11,11). ...
... Apple, it will be difficult for them to work together and their payoffs will be low (3,3). • Alex and Tyler receive the highest payoffs when both are using the same software. If Alex chooses Apple, then Tyler should choose Apple as well since the payoffs are high (11,11). ...
Natural Monopoly
... • One firm achieves a lower cost of production than multiple firms would and MES is not reached. ...
... • One firm achieves a lower cost of production than multiple firms would and MES is not reached. ...
Simple Formulas for Stationary Distributions and Stochastically
... (1997), Young (1998, Sec. 4.5) and Benaim and Weibull (2003): we fix the noise level in the agents’ choice rules, and consider the limit of the stationary distributions as the population size grows large. In doing so, we adopt Binmore and Samuelson’s (1997) view that economic agents make mistakes at ...
... (1997), Young (1998, Sec. 4.5) and Benaim and Weibull (2003): we fix the noise level in the agents’ choice rules, and consider the limit of the stationary distributions as the population size grows large. In doing so, we adopt Binmore and Samuelson’s (1997) view that economic agents make mistakes at ...
Bounded Rationality :: Bounded Models
... business cards. If ever the other player does not play as expected then the agent goes into a state of perpetual defection. The construction is such that the players must use all states to play the strategy and thus do not have any states remaining to count and apply backward induction. In fact, eve ...
... business cards. If ever the other player does not play as expected then the agent goes into a state of perpetual defection. The construction is such that the players must use all states to play the strategy and thus do not have any states remaining to count and apply backward induction. In fact, eve ...
Playing Large Games using Simple Strategies
... games to three and more, this is not the case for approximate equilibria. Computing -equilibria is important since they behave almost as well as exact Nash equilibria in several scenarios. In Section 3.2 we provide an interesting example based on the recent work by Vetta [31]. A second result (Sect ...
... games to three and more, this is not the case for approximate equilibria. Computing -equilibria is important since they behave almost as well as exact Nash equilibria in several scenarios. In Section 3.2 we provide an interesting example based on the recent work by Vetta [31]. A second result (Sect ...
P X
... Suppose each decision node is a day of the week. On the third day (the decision node on the right), firm K decides between abiding (a) and cheating (c). K will choose c, because it yields a higher pay-off compared to a (3 > 2). On day 2, firm L therefore expects a pay-off of 3 if it abides (α) by th ...
... Suppose each decision node is a day of the week. On the third day (the decision node on the right), firm K decides between abiding (a) and cheating (c). K will choose c, because it yields a higher pay-off compared to a (3 > 2). On day 2, firm L therefore expects a pay-off of 3 if it abides (α) by th ...
Comparing the Notions of Optimality in Strategic Games and Soft... Krzysztof R. Apt F. Rossi and K. B. Venable
... 1997), model problems with preferences using c-semirings. A c-semiring is a tuple hA, +, ×, 0, 1i, where: • A is a set, called the carrier of the semiring, and 0, 1 ∈ A; • + is commutative, associative, idempotent, 0 is its unit element, and 1 is its absorbing element; • × is associative, commutativ ...
... 1997), model problems with preferences using c-semirings. A c-semiring is a tuple hA, +, ×, 0, 1i, where: • A is a set, called the carrier of the semiring, and 0, 1 ∈ A; • + is commutative, associative, idempotent, 0 is its unit element, and 1 is its absorbing element; • × is associative, commutativ ...
Evolutionary Game Theory: The Game of Life
... What about Sahar's choice? If Tina plays one finger, a payoff of 2 is better than 0, so Sahar would be better off picking one finger. Similarly, if Tina plays two fingers, a payoff of 1 is better than 0, so Sahar would again be better off picking one finger. Just like Tina, Sahar has a dominant stra ...
... What about Sahar's choice? If Tina plays one finger, a payoff of 2 is better than 0, so Sahar would be better off picking one finger. Similarly, if Tina plays two fingers, a payoff of 1 is better than 0, so Sahar would again be better off picking one finger. Just like Tina, Sahar has a dominant stra ...
NECTAR: Nash Equilibrium Computation Algorithms
... other equilibrium points in games. Strategic Form Game: G=(N,(Si)iЄN,(ui)iЄN), where N = {1,2,…,n} is set of players, Si is strategy set for player i and ui is utility function for player i. Dominant Strategy Equilibrium: It is a strategy profile, consisting of one strategy per each player, in which ...
... other equilibrium points in games. Strategic Form Game: G=(N,(Si)iЄN,(ui)iЄN), where N = {1,2,…,n} is set of players, Si is strategy set for player i and ui is utility function for player i. Dominant Strategy Equilibrium: It is a strategy profile, consisting of one strategy per each player, in which ...
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... it comes to dealing with iterated admissibility (i.e., iterated deletion of weaklhy dominated strategies). As Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green [1995, p. 240] put in their textbook when discussing iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies: [T]he argument for deletion of a weakly dominated strat ...
... it comes to dealing with iterated admissibility (i.e., iterated deletion of weaklhy dominated strategies). As Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green [1995, p. 240] put in their textbook when discussing iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies: [T]he argument for deletion of a weakly dominated strat ...