Equilibrium payoffs in a Bertrand-Edgeworth model
... in the presence of capacity constraints and product differentiation. This is precisely the aim of the present note. We consider a Hotelling duopoly model pricing game with fixed locations. We assume that one firm is possibly capacity constrained while the other holds an abritrarily large capacity. F ...
... in the presence of capacity constraints and product differentiation. This is precisely the aim of the present note. We consider a Hotelling duopoly model pricing game with fixed locations. We assume that one firm is possibly capacity constrained while the other holds an abritrarily large capacity. F ...
1 Chapter 12 Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly (Part 2) Price
... other player uses. We will explain these concepts with the classic example of Prisoner’s Dilemma. Example: Prisoner’s Dilemma The story: Ann and Bob have been caught stealing a car. The police suspect that they have also robbed the bank, a more serious crime. The police has no evidence for the rob ...
... other player uses. We will explain these concepts with the classic example of Prisoner’s Dilemma. Example: Prisoner’s Dilemma The story: Ann and Bob have been caught stealing a car. The police suspect that they have also robbed the bank, a more serious crime. The police has no evidence for the rob ...
Section 9
... If a given entry in a payoff matrix corresponds to a Nash equilibrium, then we know that any other value in that column must be less than or equal to the entry value, so that any other pure strategy choices for Player A would be worse or tied compared to A’s equilibrium strategy, given that Player B ...
... If a given entry in a payoff matrix corresponds to a Nash equilibrium, then we know that any other value in that column must be less than or equal to the entry value, so that any other pure strategy choices for Player A would be worse or tied compared to A’s equilibrium strategy, given that Player B ...
Class Project (Project 2) - University of Arizona Math
... Is Strategy 4 optimal ? • No • This is the real world of business, where we expect our competitors to be well-managed companies • other 18 companies are sitting in their offices and boardrooms making the same calculations that we have just performed. Given the results, other companies will also ele ...
... Is Strategy 4 optimal ? • No • This is the real world of business, where we expect our competitors to be well-managed companies • other 18 companies are sitting in their offices and boardrooms making the same calculations that we have just performed. Given the results, other companies will also ele ...
Nash equilibrium, rational expectations, and heterogeneous beliefs
... has two types, and each type of each player has two actions. Essential to the example is a particular kind of pooling: each type of a player cannot perfectly identify the conditional distribution over the other’s types, conditional on the action that she is taking, but she could identify this condi ...
... has two types, and each type of each player has two actions. Essential to the example is a particular kind of pooling: each type of a player cannot perfectly identify the conditional distribution over the other’s types, conditional on the action that she is taking, but she could identify this condi ...
Toward the fair sharing of profit in a supply network formation
... acceptable to all of them and guarantees coalitional stability. In cooperative game theory, several concepts have been introduced for approaching the stability issue. A necessary condition for the stability of a coalition is that no set of players is able to increase its members’ profits by forming ...
... acceptable to all of them and guarantees coalitional stability. In cooperative game theory, several concepts have been introduced for approaching the stability issue. A necessary condition for the stability of a coalition is that no set of players is able to increase its members’ profits by forming ...
Evolution leads to Kantian morality
... matter how small its population share, there is some (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium in which the latter goal function materially outperforms the former one. A key feature of our model is that it allows the random matching to be assortative in the sense that individuals who are of a vanishingly rare (“m ...
... matter how small its population share, there is some (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium in which the latter goal function materially outperforms the former one. A key feature of our model is that it allows the random matching to be assortative in the sense that individuals who are of a vanishingly rare (“m ...
Noncooperative Convex Games: Computing
... http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/4167/ Working Papers on work of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis receive only limited review. Views or opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the Institute, its National Member Organizations, or other organizations supporting t ...
... http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/4167/ Working Papers on work of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis receive only limited review. Views or opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the Institute, its National Member Organizations, or other organizations supporting t ...
chapter
... Prisoners’ dilemma is a game based on two premises: (1) Each player has an incentive to choose an action that benefits him or herself at the other player’s expense. (2) When both players act in this way, both are worse off than if they had chosen different actions. ...
... Prisoners’ dilemma is a game based on two premises: (1) Each player has an incentive to choose an action that benefits him or herself at the other player’s expense. (2) When both players act in this way, both are worse off than if they had chosen different actions. ...
Nash equilibrium, rational expectations, and heterogeneous beliefs
... particular kind of pooling: each type of a player cannot perfectly identify the conditional distribution over the other’s types, conditional on the action that she is taking, but she could identify this conditional distribution had she taken the other action. This is true for each type of each play ...
... particular kind of pooling: each type of a player cannot perfectly identify the conditional distribution over the other’s types, conditional on the action that she is taking, but she could identify this conditional distribution had she taken the other action. This is true for each type of each play ...
Repeated Games with Differential Time Preferences
... the players’ overall utility outside the feasible set of the stage-game. Therefore, the set of all feasible payoffs of the repeated game is typically larger than that of the stage-game. The second fact, that not every feasible payoff can be sustained by an equilibrium, is due to individual rationali ...
... the players’ overall utility outside the feasible set of the stage-game. Therefore, the set of all feasible payoffs of the repeated game is typically larger than that of the stage-game. The second fact, that not every feasible payoff can be sustained by an equilibrium, is due to individual rationali ...
a game-theoretic approach - Security and Cooperation in Wireless
... Nodes do not know the sniffing cost Instead, they have a probability distribution on cost’s type ...
... Nodes do not know the sniffing cost Instead, they have a probability distribution on cost’s type ...
What Is Oligopoly?
... If both players are rational and choose their actions in this way, the outcome is an equilibrium called Nash equilibrium—first proposed by John Nash. Finding the Nash Equilibrium The following slides show how to find the Nash equilibrium. ...
... If both players are rational and choose their actions in this way, the outcome is an equilibrium called Nash equilibrium—first proposed by John Nash. Finding the Nash Equilibrium The following slides show how to find the Nash equilibrium. ...