The Missing Formal Proof of Humanity`s Radical Evil in Kant`s
... held responsible only for things that we freely choose, and if we freely choose something, we must have been free not to choose it. So Kant seems to be claiming that we necessarily freely choose one way rather than another, whereas freedom and necessity surely exclude one another. Richard Bernstein ...
... held responsible only for things that we freely choose, and if we freely choose something, we must have been free not to choose it. So Kant seems to be claiming that we necessarily freely choose one way rather than another, whereas freedom and necessity surely exclude one another. Richard Bernstein ...
Evil for freedom`s sake? David Lewis
... recoil from that name for his subject. He has taught us to distinguish 'theodicy' from 'defence'.5 'Theodicy', for Plantinga, means an audacious claim to know the truth about why God permits evil. And not just a trivial bit of the truth - God permits evil for the sake of some good or other - but som ...
... recoil from that name for his subject. He has taught us to distinguish 'theodicy' from 'defence'.5 'Theodicy', for Plantinga, means an audacious claim to know the truth about why God permits evil. And not just a trivial bit of the truth - God permits evil for the sake of some good or other - but som ...
God Must Be Evil - Sarah`s ePortfolio
... three choices, two are morally good and the other morally bad. In morally significant free will the person has the ability choose any of the options, be it good or bad. If there were an all good world (free of evil) where the person did not have the ability to choose the morally bad option, then thi ...
... three choices, two are morally good and the other morally bad. In morally significant free will the person has the ability choose any of the options, be it good or bad. If there were an all good world (free of evil) where the person did not have the ability to choose the morally bad option, then thi ...