Does Moral Theory Corrupt Youth?
... minimal weight to simplicity or power, accepting complex explanations without attempting to extend them into novel ground.6 Still, even theorists of this kind try to avoid gratuitous complexity. More commonly, appeals to simplicity and power are allowed to put pressure on our intuitive beliefs. We ...
... minimal weight to simplicity or power, accepting complex explanations without attempting to extend them into novel ground.6 Still, even theorists of this kind try to avoid gratuitous complexity. More commonly, appeals to simplicity and power are allowed to put pressure on our intuitive beliefs. We ...
A Comparative Study of the Epistemology of Immanuel Kant and that
... metaphysicians … who held that the highest knowledge was to be had by rational argument and speculation bases on their faith in or acceptance of premises;” (3) “the contemplatives, who believed that the highest knowledge was personal and intuitional … by extrasensory perception … depended ultimately ...
... metaphysicians … who held that the highest knowledge was to be had by rational argument and speculation bases on their faith in or acceptance of premises;” (3) “the contemplatives, who believed that the highest knowledge was personal and intuitional … by extrasensory perception … depended ultimately ...
Counterfactuals and Modal Epistemology
... actually hold in the world (and, at least to a large extent, in nearby worlds). This is fine as far as it goes, but so far there has been no explanation as to how we are supposed to be able to pick out scenarios which are in fact metaphysically possible. It seems that our imagination may easily prod ...
... actually hold in the world (and, at least to a large extent, in nearby worlds). This is fine as far as it goes, but so far there has been no explanation as to how we are supposed to be able to pick out scenarios which are in fact metaphysically possible. It seems that our imagination may easily prod ...
Knowledge and the curriculum - Brunel University Research Archive
... can any longer just turn to philosophy – and more specifically to this subfield of philosophy called epistemology – for an answer, as the idea that philosophy can provide us with a deeper truth about what it means to know and what it means to have knowledge, has also reached its limits. Does that me ...
... can any longer just turn to philosophy – and more specifically to this subfield of philosophy called epistemology – for an answer, as the idea that philosophy can provide us with a deeper truth about what it means to know and what it means to have knowledge, has also reached its limits. Does that me ...
Introduction: Varieties of Disjunctivism
... she makes, from this reason, to p. Exactly how we are to understand the idea of noninferential justification is another matter; but one consequence is clear: that one sees that p is not ‘‘something . . . of which one can assure oneself independently of the claim’’ that p is so. This ‘‘flouts an idea ...
... she makes, from this reason, to p. Exactly how we are to understand the idea of noninferential justification is another matter; but one consequence is clear: that one sees that p is not ‘‘something . . . of which one can assure oneself independently of the claim’’ that p is so. This ‘‘flouts an idea ...
Session 1 Rationalism –v
... • …as we shall see! • Hence this course of philosophy will NOT give you final answers to these questions • But rather present it as a series of debates/issues (4 of them) • Covering the foundational aspects of the disputes and some of the main arguments • With an AIM of getting you into reading this ...
... • …as we shall see! • Hence this course of philosophy will NOT give you final answers to these questions • But rather present it as a series of debates/issues (4 of them) • Covering the foundational aspects of the disputes and some of the main arguments • With an AIM of getting you into reading this ...
Disagreement and Skepticism
... argument from relativity but would only take it into consideration as a possible account of the existence of widespread and long-running moral disputes. He would point out that, just as there are metaethicists who believe that there is a fact of the matter about disputed moral issues, so too are the ...
... argument from relativity but would only take it into consideration as a possible account of the existence of widespread and long-running moral disputes. He would point out that, just as there are metaethicists who believe that there is a fact of the matter about disputed moral issues, so too are the ...
Carlo Penco Dipartimento di Filosofia Università di Genova via Balbi
... de re senses as developed by McDowell (1984) and also provides a tool to criticize both direct reference theories and descriptive theories of meaning. McDowell, following Evans, suggests that we have to keep the basic intuition that some thoughts – “singular” thoughts – are dependent on the object t ...
... de re senses as developed by McDowell (1984) and also provides a tool to criticize both direct reference theories and descriptive theories of meaning. McDowell, following Evans, suggests that we have to keep the basic intuition that some thoughts – “singular” thoughts – are dependent on the object t ...
12 Desire-Like Imagination
... does not consist in the adoption of those beliefs. When Yangjie points to her stuffed penguin and says, “She’s my copilot,” she is not reporting a belief. Rather, she is reporting a state that imaginatively stands in for a belief to that effect – a state that we normally refer to simply as an imagin ...
... does not consist in the adoption of those beliefs. When Yangjie points to her stuffed penguin and says, “She’s my copilot,” she is not reporting a belief. Rather, she is reporting a state that imaginatively stands in for a belief to that effect – a state that we normally refer to simply as an imagin ...
Reasons and Beliefs
... normally assumed to be true, perhaps even obviously so. To insist that reasons are what we believe, and yet should be identified with states of affairs, then, is certainly an idiosyncratic view that requires an explicit argument. However, Dancy does not provide such an argument. The same would be tr ...
... normally assumed to be true, perhaps even obviously so. To insist that reasons are what we believe, and yet should be identified with states of affairs, then, is certainly an idiosyncratic view that requires an explicit argument. However, Dancy does not provide such an argument. The same would be tr ...
PAUL SNOWDON VIRTUAL ISSUE NO. 1 Strawson`s Truth
... analysis would have lead him to deny Austin had even got the ‘when’ question right. The third remark amounts to a question; is Strawson really entitled to be sure that in the relevant philosophical sense of what we are saying, that we are not saying what Austin proposes? I am myself not offering an ...
... analysis would have lead him to deny Austin had even got the ‘when’ question right. The third remark amounts to a question; is Strawson really entitled to be sure that in the relevant philosophical sense of what we are saying, that we are not saying what Austin proposes? I am myself not offering an ...
Not Every Truth Can Be Known (at least, not all
... omniscience [1, 5], these answers do not address the question I take to be asked by Fitch’s paradox. I say this because upon reflection, the principles motivating a knowability thesis in fact undercut its application in a case such as p ∧ ¬Kp. Consider any truth p, of which we are ignorant. Given th ...
... omniscience [1, 5], these answers do not address the question I take to be asked by Fitch’s paradox. I say this because upon reflection, the principles motivating a knowability thesis in fact undercut its application in a case such as p ∧ ¬Kp. Consider any truth p, of which we are ignorant. Given th ...
The Importance of Being Earnest: Scepticism and the Limits of
... Even without recalling Peirce’s famous critique of Cartesianism contained in his 1868 Journal of Speculative Philosophy papers, this schematic survey already suffices to show that, initially, Peirce’s understanding of scepticism was closely coupled with his discussion of Cartesian epistemology, but ...
... Even without recalling Peirce’s famous critique of Cartesianism contained in his 1868 Journal of Speculative Philosophy papers, this schematic survey already suffices to show that, initially, Peirce’s understanding of scepticism was closely coupled with his discussion of Cartesian epistemology, but ...
Virtue, Knowledge, and Goodness
... reliabilists accounts of knowledge. More generally, I argue that character intellectual virtues are not good candidates for reliabilist virtues because their telos is not simply aimed at achieving warranted true beliefs. The second part of this thesis addresses an interpretive puzzle in Plato’s Thea ...
... reliabilists accounts of knowledge. More generally, I argue that character intellectual virtues are not good candidates for reliabilist virtues because their telos is not simply aimed at achieving warranted true beliefs. The second part of this thesis addresses an interpretive puzzle in Plato’s Thea ...
Kant`s Distinction Between Theoretical and Practical Knowledge
... ural here to conceive of the relation between practical knowledge and its cognitive object in the way it was viewed by the rational intuitionists of the seventeenth century (for example, Ralph Cudworth and Samuel Clarke). According t o these philosophers, as they are commonly understood, reason is ...
... ural here to conceive of the relation between practical knowledge and its cognitive object in the way it was viewed by the rational intuitionists of the seventeenth century (for example, Ralph Cudworth and Samuel Clarke). According t o these philosophers, as they are commonly understood, reason is ...
INTELLECTUAL AUTONOMY
... the divine will rather than the divine reason. Duns Scotus was one of the earliest proponents of the latter view.3 The shift from reason to will as the ground of authority had significant consequences since the relation between the divine and human wills is quite different from the relation between ...
... the divine will rather than the divine reason. Duns Scotus was one of the earliest proponents of the latter view.3 The shift from reason to will as the ground of authority had significant consequences since the relation between the divine and human wills is quite different from the relation between ...
Relativism, Vagueness and What is Said
... at which it will make explicit syntactic features that contribute to determine semantic features; at that level, sentences by means of which assertions are made will be analyzed into a force-marker and a sentence-radical. The same sentenceradical occurs with different force-makers (John will be home ...
... at which it will make explicit syntactic features that contribute to determine semantic features; at that level, sentences by means of which assertions are made will be analyzed into a force-marker and a sentence-radical. The same sentenceradical occurs with different force-makers (John will be home ...
philbasisdialethism
... falsification transcendent) it is completely unclear how we could possibly communicate information with them. Thus, pending an answer to this challenge, the anti-realist’s commitment to the Recognition Thesis and Verificationist Canonicity Requirement also commit her to the nonexistence of absolutel ...
... falsification transcendent) it is completely unclear how we could possibly communicate information with them. Thus, pending an answer to this challenge, the anti-realist’s commitment to the Recognition Thesis and Verificationist Canonicity Requirement also commit her to the nonexistence of absolutel ...
To be submitted to Vincent Hendricks` Synthese
... pragmatic story of some phenomenon does not make the phenomenon pragmatic. We need a good reason to prefer the pragmatic story to the semantic one. Here is a related concern. One might worry that the intuitions we have about counterpossibles extend to indicative conditionals. Consider, for instance ...
... pragmatic story of some phenomenon does not make the phenomenon pragmatic. We need a good reason to prefer the pragmatic story to the semantic one. Here is a related concern. One might worry that the intuitions we have about counterpossibles extend to indicative conditionals. Consider, for instance ...
problemsofphilosophy
... want to know what they are; but the philosopher's wish to know this is stronger than the practical man's, and is more troubled by knowledge as to the difficulties of answering the question. To return to the table. It is evident from what we have found, that there is no colour which pre-eminently app ...
... want to know what they are; but the philosopher's wish to know this is stronger than the practical man's, and is more troubled by knowledge as to the difficulties of answering the question. To return to the table. It is evident from what we have found, that there is no colour which pre-eminently app ...
The evolutionary debunking of morality
... of environmental conditions, nor that this capacity will be universally present, nor that it is essential for being human, nor that there is a “gene for moral judgment.” Nor should moral nativism be confused with the claim that humans are by nature good. To put the point provocatively: It is entirel ...
... of environmental conditions, nor that this capacity will be universally present, nor that it is essential for being human, nor that there is a “gene for moral judgment.” Nor should moral nativism be confused with the claim that humans are by nature good. To put the point provocatively: It is entirel ...
Disagreement and the Ethics of Belief
... neither makes prescriptions for what I should believe in the future. Further still, each is concerned with what I should believe now regarding the disputed proposition in question, and with respect to the goal of believing it if it is true and disbelieving it if it is false. Each has the same target ...
... neither makes prescriptions for what I should believe in the future. Further still, each is concerned with what I should believe now regarding the disputed proposition in question, and with respect to the goal of believing it if it is true and disbelieving it if it is false. Each has the same target ...
What Can We Know A Priori?1 C.S.I. Jenkins Draft only. Please
... Moreover, there are various other motivations for believing in the a priori which Devitt does not address. I shall not attempt an exhaustive list of these here; many depend on the details of particular epistemological views that Devitt presumably rejects. For example, Field’s nonfactualism about epi ...
... Moreover, there are various other motivations for believing in the a priori which Devitt does not address. I shall not attempt an exhaustive list of these here; many depend on the details of particular epistemological views that Devitt presumably rejects. For example, Field’s nonfactualism about epi ...
Epistemology Dehumanized
... is evidence for the former. We seldom call the premises of a valid deductive argument evidence for its conclusion, even if they are evident and the argument has a form as simple as modus ponens. Rather, we speak of evidence when what we want to know is neither evident nor seen to follow from anythin ...
... is evidence for the former. We seldom call the premises of a valid deductive argument evidence for its conclusion, even if they are evident and the argument has a form as simple as modus ponens. Rather, we speak of evidence when what we want to know is neither evident nor seen to follow from anythin ...
The central argument is simple:
... a proxy for it) and the property of being pretty are both parts of the proposition that Paris is pretty, whereas the city of Santa Monica is not. Of course, this initial response is too simplistic because it doesn’t distinguish the proposition that Mary killed John from the proposition that John kil ...
... a proxy for it) and the property of being pretty are both parts of the proposition that Paris is pretty, whereas the city of Santa Monica is not. Of course, this initial response is too simplistic because it doesn’t distinguish the proposition that Mary killed John from the proposition that John kil ...