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Crucial Decision 3 – Should Japan attack Pearl Harbor?
Inside Yamamoto’s Mind
SOURCE ONE
Isokoru Yamamoto, the son of a schoolmaster, was born in Japan on 4th April
1884. He attended the Japanese Naval Academy and graduated as seventh in
his class. He joined the Japanese Navy and as an ensign he took part in the
Russo-Japanese War. Yamamoto was on board a cruiser during the destruction
of the Russian Fleet at Tshushima in 1905.
Yamamoto was opposed the signing of the Tripartite Pact with Nazi Germany as
he feared it would lead to war with the United States. He told the Japanese prime
minister, Fumimaro Kondoye, that the navy would do well during the first six
months but did not believe the country could win a long-term war.
In the early months of 1941, Yamamoto, under instructions from his government,
began planning the war with the United States. Yamamoto feared that he did not
have the resources to win a long war and therefore advocated a surprise attack
on the US Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. Yamamoto's plan was eventually agreed
by the Japanese Imperial Staff and the strike force under the command of Vice
Admiral Chuichi Nagumo sailed from the Kurile Islands on 26th November, 1941.
http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/2WWyamamoto.htm
SOURCE TWO
Fearing that the U.S. Pacific Fleet would pose a
formidable obstacle to Japanese conquest of Southeast
Asia, Admiral Isoruko Yamamoto, the Commander-inChief of the Japanese Combined Fleet, visualized a
bold attack on the Pacific Fleet while it lay at anchor at
Pearl Harbor. Such a "surprise strategical" attack, bold
and daring in its execution, would secure the Pacific and
initiate the war, following in the tradition of the Japanese
naval victory over the Russians at Port Arthur in 1904
and the opening maneuvers in Japan's invasion of
China. Although nationalistic and militaristic pride was
driving Japan inexorably toward war with the United
States, some military leaders were concerned about the
long-range implications of a protracted war with an industrial giant. Yamamoto
expressed doubt, apprehension and disgust over Japan's headlong push toward
conflict. In January 1941 he wrote to Ryoichi Sasakawa, who was the president
of Japan's rightist nationalistic organization Kokusai Domei and one of
Yamamoto's staunch supporters:
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Crucial Decision 3 – Should Japan attack Pearl Harbor?
. . . if there should be a war between Japan and America, then our aim, of
course, ought not to be Guam or the Philippines, nor Hawaii or Hong Kong, but a
capitulation at the White House, in Washington itself. I wonder whether the
politicians of the day really have the willingness to make sacrifices, and the
confidence, that this would entail?
Thus the admiral, who was about to initiate the opening attack of the war,
revealed his personal attitude. Although he was reluctant to push toward war, he
possessed a strong sense of duty. With Japanese policy indicating that war was
now inevitable, Yamamoto took a hard look at the navy and Japan's chances,
noting he expected to "run wild" for six months, with the outcome after that up in
the air. In order to hit U.S. forces so hard that America would seek a quick peace,
Yamamoto explained to Navy Minster Koshiro Oikawa, "We should do our very
best . . . to decide the fate of the war on the very first day." He described his
operational plan to attack Pearl Harbor.
http://www.pastfoundation.org/Arizona/PearlHarborAttack.htm
SOURCE THREE
In his prison diary Hideki Tojo explained why Japan decided to attack Pearl
Harbor on 7th December 1941.
The main American naval forces were shifted to the Pacific region and an
American admiral made a strong declaration to the effect that if war were to
break out between Japan and the United States, the Japanese navy could be
sunk in a matter of weeks. Further, the British Prime Minister (Churchill) strongly
declared his nation's intention to join the fight on the side of the United States
within 24 hours should war break out between Japan and the United States.
Japan therefore faced considerable military threats as well.
Japan attempted to circumvent these dangerous circumstances by diplomatic
negotiation, and though Japan heaped concession upon concession, in the hope
of finding a solution through mutual compromise, there was no progress because
the United States would not retreat from its original position. Finally, in the end,
the United States repeated demands that, under the circumstances, Japan could
not accept: complete withdrawal of troops from China, repudiation of the Nanking
government, withdrawal from the Tripartite Pact (signed by Germany, Italy and
Japan on September 27, 1940).
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Crucial Decision 3 – Should Japan attack Pearl Harbor?
SOURCE FOUR
The decision to attack Pearl Harbor was reached after five months of
deliberations that included numerous official conferences. It was a gradual
process in which more sympathetic, albeit firm, US engagement might have
helped sway Japan in a different direction. In fact, Japanese government opinion
was so divided that it is surprising that it was able to unite in the end.
Many in the Japanese army initially regarded the Soviet Union as the main threat
facing the country. Others saw the US as the primary enemy. Some were
concerned with more abstract, ideological enemies, such as communism and
"Americanism", while there were also voices highlighting the menace of the
"white race" (including Japan's allies, Germany and Italy) against the "yellow
race".
Then there were those who preferred not to fight any enemy at all, particularly
the US, whose long-term war-making power, the government knew, far
surpassed Japan's own. The tactical mastermind of the Pearl Harbor operation,
Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, was one of them.
Over the course of the summer of 1941, events slowly tilted Japan toward the
possibility of war with the west. But Pearl Harbor was in no way inevitable.
Germany's attack on the Soviet Union compelled Japan in July 1941 to prepare a
plan of attack. Although it made clear Japan's desire to take advantage of the
European conflict and gain a foothold in the European colonies in southeast Asia,
the plan was not clear about who constituted Japan's true enemy.
Japan's military thrust into southeast Asia led President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt's administration to impose sanctions. The US froze Japanese assets,
an example followed by Britain and the Dutch East Indies. When Japan
responded by taking over southern French Indochina, the US retaliated by
imposing an embargo on oil exports to Japan. Rather than telling Japan that the
US was determined to search for a diplomatic solution, America's categorical
reaction confirmed it to the Japanese as an arrogant and conceited enemy.
Moreover, by transferring its Pacific fleet from San Diego to Pearl Harbor, the US
encouraged the Japanese understanding that the US fully anticipated war with
Japan.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2008/dec/07/us-japanpearl-harbor-anniversary
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Crucial Decision 3 – Should Japan attack Pearl Harbor?
Weapons and Troops
SOURCE ONE
To block Japanese ambitions, the United States Army had scant resources. Two
small forces constituted the heart of the American land defenses in the Pacific -the garrison in the Territory of Hawaii and General Douglas MacArthur's
command in the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Both were peacetime
organizations, whose days were given to rounds of ceremonies, inspections, and
languid training. Officers and their wives occupied evenings and weekends with
rounds of social activities and golf, while the soldiers enjoyed more earthy
pleasures in the bars and brothels of Honolulu or Manila.
Yet these forces would face overwhelming odds in the event of war. The
thousands of islands that comprised the Philippines lay 8,000 miles from the
American west coast, but only 200 miles from Japanese-held Formosa. To
defend them, General MacArthur had the equivalent of two divisions of regular
troops -- 16,000 U.S. regulars and 12,000 Philippine Scouts. He could call on
additional thousands of Philippine militia, but they were untrained and ill
equipped. Lt. Gen. Walter C. Short's Hawaiian command held 43,000 Army
troops, including two infantry divisions, coast artillery, air corps, and support
troops. Thus, in ground forces, the United States had the equivalent of three
divisions in the Pacific to stand in the path of the Imperial Japanese Army.
SOURCE TWO
in the 1920s the Japanese Army expanded rapidly and by 1937 had a force of
300,000 men. Unlike western countries it enjoyed a great deal of independence
from government. In fact, Japanese administrations needed the support of the
army in order to survive. The army controlled the appointment of the war minister
and in 1936 a law was passed that stipulated that only a serving officer could
hold the post.
The Japanese Army also had a considerable influence over domestic policy. This
was reinforced in October 1941 when Emperor Hirohito appointed General Hideki
Tojo as prime minister. Once in power Tojo gave his approval of the attack on the
US Navy at Pearl Harbor.
In 1941 the Japanese Army had 51 divisions and various special-purpose
artillery, cavalry, anti-aircraft and armored units. This amounted to 1,700,000
men. The basic rifle was the Model 38 6.5 mm. The submachine-gun was the
Model 11 6.5 mm holding 30 rounds and firing at 500 rpm.
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Crucial Decision 3 – Should Japan attack Pearl Harbor?
Naval Strength at Pearl Harbor
USA
Japan
Mobile Unit:
6 aircraft carriers,
2 battleships,
8 battleships,
2 heavy cruisers,
8 cruisers,
1 light cruiser,
30 destroyers,
9 destroyers,
4 submarines,
8 tankers,
49 other ships,[1]
23 fleet submarines,
~390 aircraft
5 midget
submarines,
414 aircraft
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_on_Pearl_Harbor
SOURCE THREE
Japanese Navy
By 1941 Japan had the third largest navy in the world, after the US Navy and the
Royal Navy. However in the field of naval aviation it was considered to be the
best in the world. It had ten large aircraft carriers with specially built aircraft and
highly trained crews.
The Japanese Navy also had 12 battleships, 100 destroyers, 18 heavy cruisers
and 18 light cruisers. Most destroyers and cruisers were fitted with the 24-inch
Long Lance torpedo. This oxygen-powered weapon could deliver a 1,000lb
warhead at 49 knots over almost 11 miles.
At the outbreak of the Second World War the Japanese Navy was disadvantaged
by not possessing operational radar. Other problems included the breaking of the
Japanese codes by the US Navy and the dependence on imported oil.
http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/2WWnavyJ.htm
Japanese Air Force
In 1934 the Japanese built around 445 aircraft. This increased to 952 (1935),
1,181 (1936), 1,511 (1937), 3,201 (1938), 4,467 (1939) and 4,768 (1940). This
included fighters, torpedo-bombers and dive-bombers. The most important of
these were the fighters Mitsubishi A5M, Nakajima Ki-27, and the Mitsubishi A6M
and the bombers Mitsubishi ki-21 and Mitsubishi G3M.
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Crucial Decision 3 – Should Japan attack Pearl Harbor?
By 1941 the Japanese Army Air Force had about 1,500 aircraft ready to attack
land targets. This was backed up by the Japanese Navy Air Force that had over
1,400 planes.
On Sunday, 7th December, 1941, 105 high-level bombers, 135 dive-bombers
and 81 fighter aircraft attacked the the US Fleet at Pearl Harbor.
http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/2WWjapanair.htm
Japanese Army
In 1941 the Japanese Army had 51 divisions and various special-purpose
artillery, cavalry, anti-aircraft and armoured units. This amounted to 1,700,000
men. The basic rifle was the Model 38 6.5 mm. The submachine-gun was the
Model 11 6.5 mm holding 30 rounds and firing at 500 rpm.
At the beginning of the Second World War most of the Japanese Army was
stationed in China and Manchuria. However, in 1942 they began to be deployed
in the Pacific War. Soldiers were sent to Hong Kong (23rd Army), the Philippines
(14th Army), Thailand (15th Army), Burma (15th Army), Dutch East Indies (16th
Army) and Malaya (25th Army).
http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/2WWjapanA.htm
SOURCE FOUR
United States Navy
In 1939 the US Navy had 15 battleships, 5 aircraft carriers, 18 heavy cruisers
and 19 light cruisers. Since the 1920s the US Navy was based on the view that
the Japanese Navy posed the main threat to the United States. As a result, the
US Navy was the only country capable of rivaling Japan in the field of naval
aviation. The Lexington and Saratoga aircraft carriers had appeared in 1927. The
navy also retained control over specialist carrier aircraft such as the Grumman
Hellcat and Douglas SBD-3.
After the outbreak of the Second World War the US government became
concerned about the dangers posed by Japan. Congress passed the Two
Oceans Navy Bill in July 1940 allowed for the building of 1,325,000 tons of new
warships. The following year eight battleships and three aircraft carriers were
added to the strength of the US Navy.
http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/2WWusaN.htm
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Crucial Decision 3 – Should Japan attack Pearl Harbor?
Strategy and Tactics 1
SOURCE ONE
Goals of Japan
Japan's goals during the beginning of the 20th century were to industrialize their
nation and to expand the territory they controlled as quickly as possible. The
major target of influence they looked to meet these goals was China. Japan’s
imperialist goals in China were to maintain a secure supply of natural resources
for booming factories in their home country and to have puppet governments in
China that would not act against Japanese interests. Although Japanese actions
would not have seemed out of place among European colonial powers in the
19th century, by 1930, notions of Wilsonian self-determination meant military
force in support of colonialism was no longer seen as appropriate behavior by the
international community.
Hence Japanese actions in when they took over Manchuria were roundly
criticized and led to Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations. During the
1930s, China and Japan reached a stalemate with one another as to who
controls the territory. While the fight for communism rose among the Chinese
population, Japan capitalized on that conflict and began to seize more land.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pacific_War
SOURCE TWO
Special Attack Units- Japanese Strategy
A considerable number of Special Attack Units were built and stored in coastal
hideouts for the desperate defense of the Home islands, with the potential to
destroy or damage thousands of enemy warships. The solution was obvious.
Guided weapons provide dramatically greater accuracy and lethality than
unguided weapons, producing much greater damage per weapon unit. Such
weapons already existed and were operational for over a year then, but not in
Japan. The German Air Force successfully used large radio-guided Fritz-X
bombs against battleships and cruisers since September 1943, but Japan had no
such weapon, and therefore Admiral Onishi suggested that volunteer pilots will
guide their bomb-carrying aircraft all the way to an explosive suicide collision with
their American warship targets, acting as a living guidance system, literally
becoming "smart bombs".
The new tactic was adopted immediately. Large numbers of pilots, initially
qualified and experienced pilots and later air cadets with minimal training who
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Crucial Decision 3 – Should Japan attack Pearl Harbor?
were asked to volunteer, were assigned to "Special Attack" air wings, the official
name of the Kamikaze units. Their goal and motto was "One man - one ship".
The attack had several major aims. First, it was supposed to destroy American
fleet units, thereby preventing the Pacific Fleet from interfering with Japanese
conquest of the Dutch East Indies. Second, it was a means to buy time for Japan
to consolidate her position and increase her naval strength, before the
shipbuilding of the Vinson-Walsh Act erased any chance of victory.[26][27] Finally, it
was intended as a blow against American morale, which might discourage further
fighting and enable Japan to conquer Southeast Asia without interference.[26]
Making battleships the main target was a means of striking at morale, since they
were the prestige ships of any navy at the time.[26] Because both Japanese and
American strategic thinking and doctrine was derived from the work of Captain
Alfred Mahan,[28] which held battleships were decisive in naval warfare,[29] it was
also a means of striking at the fighting power of the Pacific Fleet; if it succeeded,
it meant the ultimate Pacific battle ("decisive battle", in Japanese Navy thinking),
which would inevitably be fought by battleships, would be postponed, if not
prevented entirely. With that in mind, Yamamoto intended the Pacific Fleet
should be sought and attacked "wherever it might be found in the Pacific". [30] A
14 November 1941 tabletop exercise suggested alert defenders could sink two
carriers and damage two more, even with providential weather,[31] which
amounted to all the strength Naval General Staff had wanted to allocate to the
operation.[32] Nevertheless, Yamamoto pressed ahead.
Japanese confidence in their ability to achieve a short, victorious war also meant
other targets in the harbor, especially the Navy Yard, oil tank farms, and
Submarine Base, could safely be ignored, since the war would be over before the
influence of these facilities would be felt.[33]
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_on_Pearl_Harbor
SOURCE THREE
Strategic Background: Why Pearl Harbor?
By the beginning of the twentieth century, Japan's emergence as the leading
power in the western Pacific made it a natural political and economic competitor
of the United States of America. Rivalry between the two countries over
commercial and territorial interests in the region grew from this time. As early as
1907, both nations could foresee the possibility of war with the other.
Any conflict, at least initially, would be a naval war. Japan realised that its navy
was not, and never would be, the equal of the United States Navy. The Japanese
expected the American fleet to move west and attack. To counter any such
move, in the 1920s and 1930s, the Japanese planned a defensive strategy of
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Crucial Decision 3 – Should Japan attack Pearl Harbor?
attrition. Starting west of Hawaii, submarines, carrier-borne and land-based
aircraft and light naval forces would attempt to destroy as many US ships as
possible (up to 30% of the fleet it was hoped) as it sailed west before Japanese
battleships moved in to win a decisive victory in home waters. When the Second
World War broke out, the Japanese Navy enjoyed local superiority in the Pacific
as America had not constructed the maximum number of ships allowed it by
current international agreements. However, in the face of continuing Japanese
aggression in Asia and crushing German victories in Europe, in July 1940 the
USA decided upon a massive naval expansion. Within a few years, Japan's
advantage would have disappeared.
By 1940, the Japanese Army's campaign in China was making no progress. The
navy offered an alternative strategy of a southward advance into Indo-China and
the oil-rich Dutch East Indies. The execution of this policy from September 1940
onwards severely antagonised the USA and brought great risk of war. When, in
July 1941, the US imposed a total oil embargo on Japan, the Japanese saw
conflict as inevitable and began planning accordingly.
It was in this context that Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, Commander-in-Chief of the
Combined Fleet, suggested an air attack on the US Pacific Fleet, which had
moved from its usual base at San Diego on the American west coast to a midPacific location at Pearl Harbor in May 1940.
Yamamoto's plan was a development of the traditional Japanese defensive
strategy. He gambled on a surprise attack to destroy the American naval
capability in the Pacific, including its all-important aircraft carriers, and create
enough time, perhaps six months, to enable Japan to complete its territorial
conquests. Simultaneous attacks by the army on Hong Kong, Malaya, the
Philippines, Guam and the Dutch East Indies would capture the strategically
important bases and areas rich in raw materials Japan felt was vital for its
national survival and would also now be needed to sustain its war with America.
A long struggle was expected, but it was hoped that the inevitable American
onslaught would founder on the fortified defensive ring the Japanese would
create around their empire.
http://www.iwm.org.uk/upload/package/25/pearl_harbour/strategic_bg.htm
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Crucial Decision 3 – Should Japan attack Pearl Harbor?
Strategy and Tactics 2
SOURCE ONE
Reasons for Japan’s expansion
Japan, largely devoid of natural resources to feed its industries, looked overseas
for supplies of strategic materials such as ores and petroleum. Before 1939 the
United States was Japan's major supplier. But President Roosevelt and
Secretary of State Cordell Hull shut off American supplies in an effort to force the
Japanese to end hostilities against China. The Japanese had long coveted the
resource-rich British and Dutch colonies of Southeast Asia, and as the U.S. trade
embargo tightened, the Japanese increasingly looked southward for raw
materials and strategic resources.
Only the United States stood in Japan's path. The U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl
Harbor was the only force capable of challenging Japan's navy, and American
bases in the Philippines could threaten lines of communications between the
Japanese home islands and the East Indies. Every oil tanker heading for Japan
would have to pass by American-held Luzon in the Philippine Islands. From
these needs and constraints, Japan's war plans emerged.
Expecting war, and seeing an opportunity in the forward basing of the US Pacific
Fleet at Hawaii, the Japanese began planning in early 1941 for an attack on
Pearl Harbor. For the next several months, planning, and organizing a
simultaneous attack on Pearl Harbor and invasion of British and Dutch colonies
to the South occupied much of the Japanese Navy's time and attention. The
Pearl Harbor attack planning arose out of the Japanese expectation the U.S.
would be inevitably drawn into the war after a Japanese attack against Malaya
and Singapore.[16]
The intent of a preemptive strike on Pearl Harbor was to neutralize American
naval power in the Pacific, thus removing it from influencing operations against
American, British, and Dutch colonies to the south. Successful attacks on
colonies were judged to depend on successfully dealing with the American
Pacific Fleet. Planning had long anticipated that a battle between the two Fleets
would happen in Japanese home waters after the US Fleet traveled across the
Pacific, under attack by submarines and other forces all the way. The US Fleet
would be defeated in a climactic battle, just as had the Russian Fleet in 1905. A
surprise attack posed a twofold difficulty compared to long standing expectations.
First, the US Pacific Fleet was a formidable force, and would not be easy to
defeat or to surprise. Second, for aerial attack, Pearl Harbor's shallow waters
made using conventional air-dropped torpedoes ineffective. On the other hand,
Hawaii's isolation meant a successful surprise attack could not be blocked or
quickly countered by forces from the continental U.S.
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Crucial Decision 3 – Should Japan attack Pearl Harbor?
Several Japanese naval officers had been impressed by the British Operation
Judgement, in which 21 obsolete Fairey Swordfish disabled half the Regia
Marina. Admiral Yamamoto even dispatched a delegation to Italy, which
concluded a larger and better-supported version of Cunningham's strike could
force the U.S. Pacific Fleet to retreat to bases in California, thus giving Japan the
time necessary to establish a "barrier" defense to protect Japanese control of the
Dutch East Indies. The delegation returned to Japan with information about the
shallow-running torpedoes Cunningham's engineers had devised.[citation needed]
Japanese strategists were undoubtedly influenced by Admiral Togo's surprise
attack on the Russian Pacific Fleet at Port Arthur in 1905, and may have been
influenced by U.S. Admiral Harry Yarnell's performance in the 1932 joint ArmyNavy exercises, which simulated an invasion of Hawaii. Yarnell, as commander
of the attacking force, placed his carriers northwest of Oahu and simulated an air
attack. The exercise's umpires noted Yarnell's aircraft were able to inflict serious
"damage" on the defenders, who for 24 hours after the attack were unable to
locate his force.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Events_leading_to_the_attack_on_Pearl_Harbor
SOURCE TWO
Military leaders of the Axis countries, Germany, Italy and Japan, were hell-bent
on world domination by military force. Japan needed natural resources,
especially oil, for its planned expansion. The Japanese had successfully invaded
Manchuria in 1931 and China in 1937. Japan's antipathy toward America had
been seething for a long time. The United States' occupation of the Philippines
during the Spanish-American War and America's refusal to acknowledge Japan's
authority in occupied China fueled Japanese resentment. Imperial Japan's
sphere of interest in the far western Pacific was being threatened by America's
incursions into the Pacific at the very point in history when Japan itself was vying
for dominance in the region.
It is a myth to maintain that strategists of both nations considered Pearl Harbor
too shallow, with an average depth of 45 feet, for an attack by torpedoes dropped
from airplanes, which usually required about 75 feet of depth. While it seemed
improbable, a Hawaiian Chief of Naval Operations memo states that no harbor is
to be considered safe from attack. Sabotage by Japanese agents was
considered to be the greater threat. The Japanese had developed the
technology, attack strategy and skill to successfully accomplish the impossible.
The idea to attack Pearl Harbor had been conceived six months before. The
American fleet was perceived as an obstacle to access the oil fields in Java, so
the plan was conceived to affect a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor to destroy
America's Pacific Fleet. Additional targets included warehouses, docks, airfields
and aircraft.
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Crucial Decision 3 – Should Japan attack Pearl Harbor?
The Japanese had developed a shallow running torpedo that would skim the
surface of the water in the harbor after being dropped from a low-flying aircraft.
The primary targets were the aircraft carriers and battleships that were among 92
naval vessels at anchor in the harbor. With data gathered and reported by
Japanese spies on Oahu and Maui, the Japanese admiralty knew the location
and quantity of vessels of each type in the harbor.
http://www.u-s-history.com/pages/h1649.html
SOURCE THREE
The Opponent - Pearl Harbor in 1940-1941
By May 1940, when the main part of the United States Fleet was transferred there from the west
coast, Pearl Harbor had long been under development as a major naval base. Its Navy Yard had a
dry dock capable of holding the largest warships, a marine railway for smaller ones, and an
industrial plant for repairing and maintaining these ships. There were abundant mooring and
docking locations for ships, including a berthing area along the eastern side of Ford Island that
was commonly called "Battleship Row". Ford Island, dominating the center of Pearl Harbor, held
a Naval Air Station for combat landplanes and patrol seaplanes. Across Southeast Loch from the
Navy Yard was a submarine base and nearby was a large "farm" of fuel oil tanks. The base also
included a Naval Hospital and other facilities.
This was still not nearly enough to support the Fleet. Pearl Harbor's area was limited, preventing
the dispersal of its warships, and its opening to the sea was but a single narrow channel. Both of
these elements were clearly dangerous from a security perspective. The base's supply and
industrial capacity was too small to meet the Fleet's needs, and transportation from the west coast
was slow and of insufficient carrying capacity. There were not enough tugs and other services to
keep the Fleet operational and in good fighting practice. Housing and recreational facilities for
the Fleet's thousands of Sailors and Marines were grossly inadequate for men who were to be
long separated from their families. Nearby Honolulu was oversaturated with Navy and Army
personnel, and its citizens, none-too-happy about the influx, did not welcome the new arrivals.
Accordingly, Fleet readiness was handicapped, its security was well below optimum levels, and
its morale was impaired.
During 1940-41, construction of new facilities was undertaken to address some of these
problems. The supply depot, on a peninsula across the channel from "Battleship Row", was
greatly expanded, other locations were developed for basing aircraft, new permanent dry-docks
were begun, a floating dry-dock was brought over from the mainland, and many other
improvements were prepared or started. The Army and Army Air Corps, responsible for the
defense of Hawaii and the Pearl Harbor base, also built new facilities and brought in more forces.
However, other deficiencies were either inherent to the physical location or simply could not be
corrected within the limits of time, competing requirements and available resources. These had to
be borne as best they could.
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Crucial Decision 3 – Should Japan attack Pearl Harbor?
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