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When Stephen Walsh stepped into the position of CEO of Providian, he assumed a
number of logistical and political problems formerly handled by his predecessor,
including the ongoing project to reorganize the Providian Trust offices. From reading the
case study, it is apparent that Walsh is possibly not very confident in his abilities in his
new position as he has yet to settle into his new roles.
Still, his unwillingness to become too involved with the project is indicative of a
fundamental problem at Providian, being that no single person who had influence within
the project had a real idea of the true risks and problems with the system conversion.
Individuals with power, like Michael LeBlanc, lacked ability regarding project
management. Those with foresight, like Peter Storey, lacked political clout or personal
ability to affect change at Providian regarding the project.
Walsh seems to have been content to let LeBlanc control the project and to retain the
status quo that existed before he stepped in as CEO. Since LeBlanc was the appointed
project manager and had been with Providian longer, such a decision was not uncalled
for, although Walsh’s decision to dismiss Peter Storey can be viewed as out of hand, as
Storey had also been with the company longer than Walsh and it is not clear that Walsh
ever corresponded with Storey as directly as he dealt with LeBlanc.
Because Walsh wanted to focus on his five-year plan with Providian, he may simply have
wanted to get the project handled as quickly and painlessly as possible, since it was a
legacy project and not of great interest to him. As well, he may have been thinking to
build up preliminary support with individuals he saw as effective change agents for his
own projects. Such perspectives may support why Walsh dismissed Storey in favor for
LeBlanc, as LeBlanc seemed to be the “go ahead” type and Storey the more “stop” type
of individual, both for the Trust project and possibly for Walsh’s five-year plan.
--Michael LeBlanc originally argued for the project in 1994, primarily because he wanted
to drive down costs and because he wanted more control over and accountability from the
front office, which he saw as inefficient and uncompetitive to boot. He considers himself
the “bull-headed” type who will “run as hard as he can” to force issues through, despite
conflicts that may arise. Needless to say his handling of the Trust project lacked finesse,
as is evidenced by social problems in committees and among employee morale, and even
in his basic decisions regarding project implementation. One committee LeBlanc led, the
steering committee, eventually sank into a morass and its duties had to be assumed by the
implementation committee, which was also led by LeBlanc but which did not contain as
many critical individuals as did the steering committee.
LeBlanc had no previous project management experience. While he may have
traditionally been a strong operations manager, he probably lacked the necessary skills
that ensured success regarding a large-scale, unprecedented project in the Trust division.
As the project manager, LeBlanc made a critical mistakes early that ensured problems
down the road.
In his decision to select the back-office to drive a project that would use an off-the-shelf
package already in use by a majority of the Trust market, LeBlanc failed to offer to the
front-office viable tools that would help to grow the business (say, through cross selling,
upselling, or improved customer relations) and to cull Providian’s competitive advantage
from Providian’s unnecessary processes. As well, his decision to have the back office
simply take over because he sensed antagonism between the back and front-offices did
nothing to foster teamwork within the Trust division at Providian.
Even worse, as the project progressed and problems presented themselves, LeBlanc chose
to ignore or steamroll over them rather than adapt to incorporate them. The fact that
LeBlanc further divorced himself from direct involvement in the project by assigning
Benari – who hired his own project managers – to head the Access Plus system did
nothing to improve the situation and LeBlanc’s responsiveness to issues as they arose.
Because of this, the project grew more out of touch with Providian’s core business
practices as time progressed.
Overall, LeBlanc seemed to develop a pattern of ignoring criticism and consolidating
power in order to get his project developed and implemented. Evidence that supports
this abounds, as LeBlanc initially decided to have the Trust division’s own IT
department, which he managed, handle the project instead of Providian’s main IT
department. LeBlanc did not include the senior VP of corporate services on the steering
committee at all. He argued against Providian’s internal auditor, Peter Storey. LeBlanc
chaired two of the three committees involved in the system’s development. Other vice-
presidents who worked for LeBlanc – like David Brown, Robert Case, and David English
– and who voiced concerns about the system ultimately signed off on the project, despite
earlier serious objections. It is unclear whether these VP’s were finally convinced that
the system would work or if they were otherwise compelled to sign off in favor of the
project by LeBlanc.
--Todd Benari worked under LeBlanc and was assigned to manage the Access Plus project
for LeBlanc. Although he saw more clearly the problems people presented about the
system, he never argued as vehemenently against it as did Storey.
--Peter Storey seems to be one of the few individuals who had both the foresight to grasp
the high level of risk the project represented, where its weaknesses were and that could
convey warnings to individuals who might affect change. Yet for some reason, he had a
reputation “for crying wolf” and even the project’s Audit Committee expressed doubts
about Storey. It is unclear whether Storey may have been incompetent or whether he
simply went against the political grain at Providian, but he was the only truly vocal
person to speak out against the project and he was the only individual fired from
Providian during the project development.