Download keynes and the asia crisis

KEYNES AND THE ASIA CRISIS
Phillip J. Bryson
Professor of Economics, Marriott School
and Kennedy Center for International Studies
Brigham Young University
Prepared for the 1999 conference of the
International Studies Association
Paris, France
Published as “A Retrospective of the Asia Crisis: Origins and Outcomes,” in The New Millennium:
Challenges and Strategies for a Globalizing World,” ed. Sai Felicia Krishna-Hensel, (Aldershot, England:
Ashgate, 2000), pp. 213-224.
0
KEYNES AND THE ASIAN CRISIS
What John Maynard Keynes taught us about depression economics still makes sense and is
to this day regarded by the economics establishment as essentially true: when economic activity is
crippled by a dearth of aggregate demand, public spending and other policies to bolster aggregate
demand represent effective ways to return the economy to macro-economic health. But it may be
argued that what Keynes had to say about investments, particularly from a micro-economic
perspective, was not an unmixed contribution to global economic development. His “defunct
economist’s” voice1“Madmen in authority” distill their frenzy “from some academic scribbler of a
few years back,” Keynes insisted. See Roger L. Breit and William Ransom, The Academic Scribblers;
American economists in collision, 2nd edition, New York: Dryden Press, 1982, p. v. In the case under
investigation here, Keynes must bear the burden of some responsibility that, as yet, no one has laid
at his feet. may share responsibility for the Asian economic crisis of our time.
Paul Krugman, a vocal contemporary advocate of Keynesian economics, recently attributed
the Asian crisis to “crony capitalism,” defined as “dubious investments ...cheerfully funded by local
banks, as long as the borrower had the right government connections.”2 These investments were
precisely the economic problem of concern in this paper. A separate issue was the adverse financial
situation which became a catastrophe when “self-reinforcing panic” resulted in massive capital flight
from Asia.3 It is impossible in any empirical sense to separate the two different effects completely,
but in principle, before the crisis actually occurred, ill-advised investments and poor planning
Keynes’s most famous quote pertains to the fact that policymakers are guided, perhaps more often
than they would recognize or desire, by the thought of some “defunct economist.”
1
See his “Saving Asia: It’s Time to Get Radical,” Fortune, September 7, 1998, pp. 75-80. The
quotation here is from p. 76.
2
That capital flight was also Russia’s undoing, just as it had appeared to have turned the corner with
the first GDP growth since the transition began. That capital flight may almost be thought of as
expressive of the investors impulsiveness and instinctive response to uncertainty that was of concern
to Keynes, but the point to be made here is that Keynes’s influence on central investment planning
was the initial and prime cause of the phenomena to which capital flight was related in Asia and
Russia.
3
2
practices had set the stage for disaster.
Clearly, financial effects played an important separate role in the crisis. At some point, an
investments bubble distorted expectations; rendering investment expectations and judgments
unrealistic. The fact that Japanese interest rates were extremely low for some who accessed capital
from that country, meant that returns didn’t have to be exceptionally promising to provide
investment hopes where there should have been none.
In my view, Krugman correctly emphasizes that poor investments ultimately led to heavy
debt portfolios in Asia. But he could have made the explanation of the Asian slump far more
complete4 by associating John Maynard Keynes with the issues of corporate governance and central
direction of national investment planning with the Asian case.
I.
Some of the conclusions of the important chapter 12 of Keynes’s General Theory, “The State
of Long-term Expectation,” are most instructive here. They are the intellectual foundations of
postwar thought on economic growth and planning. Personally very well acquainted with the
uncertainties of investment prospects and market performance, Keynes noted “the extreme
precariousness of the basis of knowledge on which our estimates of prospective yield have to be
made,”5 i.e., the precariousness of our ability to deal with the future’s uncertainty. Although there
are investors engaged in “enterprise” who “purchase investments on the best genuine long-term
expectations he can frame,” there are also the “game-players”6 who are involved in the speculation
Fox (1998), writing in the same issue as the Krugman piece, addresses the Japanese case, important
because of its economic weight, but especially because it is the model of Asian corporate
governance. Fox characterizes the Japanese development process as “squeezing out savings and
investing them in Japanese industry. The Ministry of Finance “funneled cheap money to strategic
industries,” and, when industry couldn’t absorb it all, in real estate and the stock market (p. 82). Fox
speaks of “Japan, Inc.” as bankrupt financially and ideologically, at least in part because Japanese
companies have never been forced to pay “attention to return on equity and shareholder right” (p.
83). This is an important part of the explanation of the Asian flu.
4
John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money, New York: Harcourt,
Brace, & World, 1936, p. 149.
5
Ibid., p. 156.
6
3
that seeks for capital appreciation rather than income. Such speculation he found to be particularly
common among Americans, who were more apt to be “unduly interested in discovering what
average opinion believes average opinion to be.” This “national weakness finds its nemesis in the
stock market.”7 The inaccessibility of Throgmorton Street or the London Stock Exchange (as
opposed to “differences in national character”) was what made it less subject to speculative
influence than Wall Street.
The inability to quantify the highly uncertain future did not leave investors incapable of
action, since he believed investors actions were “a result of animal spirits--of a spontaneous urge to
action rather than inaction, and not as the outcome of a weighted average of quantitative benefits
multiplied by quantitative probabilities.”8 Although Keynes believed it was really quite impossible for
any investor to deal with the profound uncertainty of the future, he still expected people interested
in the strictly short-term response to be outperformed by the enterprising investor with a more longterm orientation. For Keynes, the appropriate policy inference was apparent. “I expect to see the
state,” he said, “which is in a position to calculate the marginal efficiency of capital-goods on
long views and on the basis of the general social advantage, taking an ever greater responsibility for
directly organizing investment.”9
By the end of the second world war, this sentiment had become sufficiently widespread as to
ensure the adoption of economic planning by most of the nations of the world.10 People
remembered, first of all, that in the years prior to the chaos of the war, the Soviet Union had
achieved spectacular growth rates through the implementation of central economic planning. The
early onset of Soviet plan failure, even in those years, was not yet perceivable because of the lengthy
Ibid., p. 159.
7
Ibid., p. 161.
8
Ibid., p. 164.
9
The economic plans of a score of nations is reviewed in a most helpful volume on the topic, Jan
Tinbergen, Central Planning, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964.
10
4
processes of shifting production capacities from a peacetime to a wartime footing and back again.
But aside from the Soviet model, even in the West it seemed only reasonable and appropriate for the
state to organize investment planning for postwar life.
National economic plans enunciated the aims and guiding principles of development policy
and described the desired development of the country as a whole as well as the economy’s principal
sectors. Generally, estimates on production and investment figures were provided; often a plan was
“considered synonymous with a program of investment projects.”11 Most plans were relatively
innocuous as compared to the comprehensive and authoritarian planning of the Soviet bloc
countries. As the post-war planning era wore on and few positive results were perceived from the
planning effort, it was relatively simple to downsize these modest experiments into various forms of
“structural policies.”
In Japan, as is well known, the planning effort was directed through the Ministry of
International Trade and Industry, MITI. The attempt was made to “target a potentially growing
industry and implement an industrial policy that would enhance productivity in that industry and
ultimately improve its competitiveness in the global market through coordinated efforts by the
government and business leaders.”12p. 156. Targeted industries were to be plied with capital from the
local bank, as directed by the Ministry of Finance. Japanese industrial power was perceived as a
function of its ability to administer “guided capitalism.”
II.
The system of corporate governance as established in the United States is designed to assure
investment projects with returns that translate into shareholder earnings. That implies, of course,
that corporations must pay attention to short-term returns; if a company doesn’t roughly match the
performance of firms of similar risk profiles, stockholders will walk, searching for the higher return
Ibid., p. 46.
11
Masato Yamazaki, “Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI),” Modern Japan: An
Encyclopedia of History, Culture, and Nationalism, New York: Garland Publishing, 1998,
12
5
they feel they have a right to expect. To some, this preoccupation with the bottom line is hostile to
long-term projects which might generate returns later but which may not be profitable at the
present. The alleged inability of American firms to select projects without regard to their short-term
profitability has likewise been viewed as a strong disadvantage to their strategic performance.
Japan’s postwar development was based on a system of corporate governance borrowed,
essentially, from Germany. That system served as a model for other Asian countries. Japan’s early
successes in the postwar period in the steel, automobile and other industries were a fillip to the
development of the economy as a whole. Economic successes enjoyed through this period were
often attributed to industrial planning strategies more than to more proximate causes, e.g., the highquality manufacturing techniques the Japanese adopted and the openness of the large, American
market to their exports. These factors, observed with hindsight, are considered more significant
today.13
Japan’s initial development and trade successes resulted in huge export earnings which
combined with the immense savings of the Japanese people. Somewhat later, export successes began
to be registered by other successfully developing Asian countries and a massive influx of capital
began to pour in from the west. By the late eighties, the world was convinced that Japan was the
future economic superpower and that the United States could basically be written off as an
economic power.14
In a work of immense popularity, Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations (New York:
The Free Press, 1990), p. 126 wrote “Government is prominently discussed in treatments of
international competitiveness. Many see it as a vital, if not the most important, influence on modern
international competition. Government policy in Japan and Korea is particularly associated with the
success these nations’ firms have enjoyed.” At this point in history, even Business Week had begun to
call for a national industrial policy; see the April 6, 1992 issue’s lead story, “Industrial Policy: Call It
What You Will, The Nation Needs A Plan To Nurture Growth.”
13
Permit me one example: the Harvard Business School case entitled “Korean Development and
Western Economics.” In this case, revised as late as December 18, 1996, the author, George C.
Lodge was still convinced that American corporate governance was the wave of the past. The U.S.
government, according to Lodge, “has not pursued long-term economic goals...it has also operated
on market principles under which it is not the role of government to plan for the competitiveness of
the economy in the world” (p. 8). American firms are under the disadvantage that “the overriding
responsibility of managers is not to the nation but to shareholders...not with the long-run health of
14
6
In the early 1990's, Lester Thurow felt that the question of international competitiveness was
the most important issue facing U.S. policymakers.15 In his view, there would be no effective way to
compete against Japan and Europe without restructured antitrust laws permitting larger units
capable of competing with the more long-term oriented keiretsu of Japan. It was seen to be of equal
importance to implement measures that would make investments in American corporations a more
long-term prospect. He was not prepared to argue that the German or Japanese governance systems
could be adopted successfully by the United States,16 but was convinced that a national strategy or
national industrial policy would prove essential to our survival as a competitor in world markets,
“especially in industries with increasing returns”17
Japan’s record in industrial policy was not one of unblemished success, of course, but the
combination of an abundance of resources available for growth industries poised to penetrate the
open U.S. market and the acquisition of superb manufacturing skills served to set Japan on a course
of postwar prosperity. This concatenation of strengths revealed the phenomenon of Japanese
“creative imitation,” which led to Japanese market dominance in a number of important world-wide
industries by the early 1990's. That success resulted in considerable export earnings. Those earnings,
combined with extensive domestic savings, made an abundance of capital available for Japanese
purposes.
the enterprise they theoretically own (sic!) but with quick and generous returns to their clients” (ibid.).
The corollary principle is that “a critical function of the government-business partnership was the
identification of particular industrial sectors” (p. 9) in an industrial targeting policy. Quoting a
Confucian perspective the conclusion is reached that the planning bureaucracy provides
comprehensive leadership to “provide for, to enrich, and to educate the people. Bureaucrats are not
merely government functionaries, but leaders, intellectuals, and teachers” (p. 10).
Thurow, Lester, Head to Head: The Coming Economic Battle Among Japan, Europe, and America, New
York: Warner Books, 1993.
15
Ibid., p. 291.
16
Ibid., p. 295. He also cited Robert Lawrence of the Brookings Institute contending that the U.S.
must take the industria targeting efforts of foreign countries more seriously and Paul Krugman
insisting that our government should subsidize a few strategic sectors as an alternative to managed
trade. See ibid., p. 297.
17
7
By the 1980's other Asian nations, especially Korea, had joined Japan in successful export
drives permissive of dramatic national economic development. State interventionist policies were
perceived as the key to rapid export growth as well as to economic growth in general, both for
Korea and for other industrial late-comers. Such policies included “throwing up trade barriers and
providing subsidies to promote local industry” to prevent countries from being “stunted by failure
to follow interventionist policies.”18 Investors were provided with “incentives that, simplified, boil
down to subsidies.”19 Repeated governmental support for large business concerns “was exchanged,
de facto, for good performance, . . .evaluated in terms of production and operations management
rather than financial indicators.” The Korean government’s sternest mandate “for all large size firms
– no matter how politically well connected – related to export targets.”20
Banks were interested, according to this view, in “helping orient the chaebol conglomerates
toward accumulating capital rather than toward seeking rents.”21 Here again we have the alleged
“long-term view” rather than the emphasis on short-term returns for the stockholder.
Entrepreneurship was the business of the Korean government in the 1960s and 1970s, for it was the
national planning function to determine “what, when, and how much to produce in milestone
investment decisions.”22
Five months after the military Junta took power in 1961, the country’s banks were
nationalized, facilitating government determination of “where, when, and how much to invest in
which industries.”23 This was all part of the policy of selecting firms to become industry leaders
See Alice H. Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late industrialization (New York, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1989), p.12.
18
Ibid., p. 13.
19
Ibid., p. 16.
20
Ibid., p. 17.
21
Loc cit.
22
Ibid., p. 73.
23
8
through industrial licensing-cum-subsidized credit allocation.”24
As selected Korean firms successfully pursued export-promotion incentives, they began to
register impressive export earnings. Other Asian countries also adopted a basically Japanese model
of corporate governance and industrial development style. They also began to accumulate capital,
not so much from domestic savings as from export earnings and flows of direct foreign investment.
III.
In recent years processes of investment have been globalized. The generation of a huge pool
of capital not previously experienced made possible a rapid increase in industrial and economic
capacity in places where investors might choose to concentrate this vast resource. Asian domestic
saving, especially Japanese, is very large. As the United Nations’ World Economic and Social Survey
indicated a few years ago, a rising global investment level “means that world saving has risen to
‘finance’ it.”25 The share of global expenditures invested rose rapidly with the recovery from
recession in the early 1980s, but did not decline appreciably in the recession of the early 1990s.
Hence, the total investment share was rising in the mid-nineties.26
By 1993 a net transfer of financial resources began to supplement gross domestic savings in
financing gross domestic investment in the Asian countries. In the case of Japan, the source of
investment funds was also augmented by net export earnings, since, as a result of cultural and
political trade barriers, imports did not reach the same level as exports. Some of this investment
pool came from outside the region as capital poured in from the West, but a considerable share
came from Japan,27 and some other Asian countries were investing in their less developed neighbors
Loc. Cit.
24
See World Economic and Social Survey 1995: Current Trends and Policies in the World Economy (New York,
United Nations, 1995), p. 43.
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid., p. 46. As the dollar value of the yen depreciated during this period, Japanese investors became
reluctant to purchase American securities. Avoiding the risk of dollar depreciation, Japanese
investors in the 1990s increased investments in Asia with yen-denominated loans. Asia’s central
banks also shifted more of their massive foreign-exchange reserves into yen. See Ibid., pp. 46, 47.
27
9
as well. The United States also became a major supplier of funds to Asia and the rest of the world,
both through direct and portfolio investment, the sum of these being $178 billion in 1993 and $119
billion in 1994.28
The final acceleration of South and East Asia’s powerful economies was based on
investment growth, domestic and foreign. High levels of government investment in infrastructure
have also been maintained in Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam. Worldwide,
foreign direct investment is far and away the largest part of net financial flows to the developing
economies, and these are highly concentrated with nearly 75% flowing to the ten largest recipients in
Asia and Latin America.29
Gross direct investment inflows reached their pre-crisis peak in Asia at about $80 billion for
1997.30 The economic reversal for the region was due in large measure to a sharp decline in flows
from the major Asian investors, especially from Japan and Korea as the stock market and real estate
bubbles burst. The onset of the crisis for 22 countries of South and East Asia in 1997 made itself
manifest with an outflow of approximately $92 billion in short-term borrowing, stock market net
flows, and net outflows of funds from domestic residents.31
IV.
After having generated huge savings in postwar Japan, which translated through investment
and production processes into extremely large import earnings, a large pool of Asian capital was
generated. Later Asian economic powers based on the Japanese model of corporate governance
borrowed investment funds rather than generating them through domestic savings, but these were
Ibid., p. 46.
28
See See World Economic and Social Survey 1998: Trends and Policies in the World Economy, (New York:
United Nations, 1998), p. 78.
29
Net Direct Investment inflows alone into Asia for the years from 1987 to 1997, as estimated by the
Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the UN, ran as follows: 0.4 (billions of dollars,
1987), 3.3, 4.3, 4.3, 7.2, 11.9, 28.0, 33.4, 28.6, 30.9 and 30.1 (1997). See Ibid., p. 158.
30
Ibid, p. 76.
31
10
also transformed into large pools of export earnings. By the 1990s America’s own propaganda about
the economic power of Asia and the economic decline of the United States was likely an extra
source of encouragement to those channeling huge pools of capital into direct foreign investments
in Asia.
These investment funds were badly managed.32 Finance Ministries implemented the
investment plans of government officials according to industrial policy, directing banks to supply
funds generously to the targeted industries and firms. When these firms generated losses, that was
viewed as a strictly short-term phenomenon. Such industries would ultimately prove competitive in
key markets, so the short-term lack of profitability could be ignored.
But debts grew and Ministry of Finance officials had every right to grow concerned. In the
case of Japan we read of the way bank officials provided favors for the approbation or silence of
Finance Ministry officials. The funds available were embarrassingly large and banks always feel
pressure to invest available funds, so the unprofitable loans continued and debts grew. Ultimately, in
such circumstances investors become suspicious or simply grow impatient with poor returns, and a
process of capital flight begins. Taking money out of investments means selling stocks for the local
currency, then selling that currency in the nearest available market for the currency desired by the
investor. The selling off of currencies represents significant increases in supplies of certain
The Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the UN has described the crisis in Southeast
Asia as follows:
“The downward spiral of currency depreciation (which stemmed from capital flight as
investors sold stocks and then the investment host’s currency to remove their funds from
endangered countries, PJB) and stock market decline started in mid-1997 undermined the viability of
heavily indebted financial institutions and corporations, drying up liquidity and freezing investment
and even production. Together with significantly higher interest rates throughout the region to shore
up exchange rates, there began a flood of bankruptcies of heavily indebted but otherwise viable,
corporations, which further weakened local financial institutions.
Because of contagion in financial markets, strong intra-regional trade and financial linkages
and, in some cases, competition of exports in third markets, even the economies with much smaller
imbalances, sustainable debt levels and relatively sound financial and corporate structures have been
adversely impacted.” See World Economic and Social Survey 1998: Trends and Policies in the World Economy,
(New York: United Nations, 1998), p. 41.
32
11
denominations, driving their values down in the exchanges. This becomes a source of severe
hardship for countries whose consumption and production patterns involve large volumes of
imports which become substantially more expensive as their currency values plummet. In the
meantime, banks are unable to pay off bad loans as they come due, as are the corporations to whom
they have loaned funds. Liquidity dries up and it becomes impossible to continue to purchase
factors of production, so they must reduce their labor force and face bankruptcy.
V.
The primary cause for the mismanagement of investment is just as Keynes described it. The
future is uncertain and even the wisest investors cannot perceive the future directions of global
industries. Yet this is the task that must be undertaken by the economic planner who is to select the
industries targeted for development and global market dominance. Perhaps the task is not difficult if
you are in postwar Japan attempting to direct industrial development from ground zero, needing
only to find a few basic industries that will be in demand in the American market. But after the
worldwide development of many basic industries and their market mastery by manufacturers in both
developed and developing countries, an assignment to craft the development of new technologies,
processes and commodities is an exceptionally large challenge for the median government
bureaucrat.
Part of the challenge for Asian planners was that the flow of funds to manage became
extremely large. Keynes provided some apt observations about investment problems in his General
Theory chapter, “The Marginal Efficiency of Capital.” Keynes’s notion of a prospective yield of an
investment suggested a series of returns obtained by selling the resultant output after deducting the
flow of costs involved in its generation.33 The marginal efficiency of capital was a “rate of discount
which would make the present value of the series of annuities given by the returns expected from
the capital-asset during its life just equal to its supply price” or an internal rate of return. The value
of investment returns will diminish, of course, as the investment volume is increased. An
Keynes, op. Cit., pp. 135, 136.
33
12
aggregation of such schedules for the divergent types of capital represents an investment demand
schedule. So long as the declining value of this marginal efficiency of capital exceeds the interest
rate, it pays to continue to invest.
The economic planner would logically rank prospective investment projects according to
their marginal efficiency of capital or internal rates or return. He would then begin by funding
projects with the highest returns and continue funding until the internal rate of return is equal to the
interest rate. But what if that financial requirements of proposed investment projects represents only
a fraction of the total of funds available for investment. In the case of Japan it has not apparently
bothered planners to pour money into investments with zero or negative returns.
Keynes also spoke of two kinds of investment risks.34 First, the entrepreneur’s risk arises
from the uncertainty that the investment will achieve the prospective yield for which he hopes.
Second is the lender’s risk, which is basically that the entrepreneur may default. This lender’s risk is
enhanced by a fundamental asymmetry of information between the lender and the entrepreneur: the
latter has more complete knowledge
Asymmetric information can be a difficult problem for lenders when borrowers of
investment funds have better information as to the riskiness of their proposed projects and are
motivated in their pursuit of scarce funds not fully to disclose any negative information to lenders.
When interest rates are high, a positive proportion of applicants for funds will seek loans, knowing
that their high-risk projects may yield high returns.35 At much lower interest rates, a smaller portion
of loan applicants will present high-risk, high-return demands for loanable funds. If projects are
funded without careful attention and research, the lender can mistakenly provide low-cost funds for
high risk projects. Which means the probability of default becomes very high.
Ibid., p. 144.
34
Where interest rates are high, scarce pools of investment funds could be used for projects adversely
selected. The high-return prospects seeking funding are associated with high risk or, as Keynes
worried, a high probability of default. Where high risks are present, lenders (bankers usually, or
planners in the case of industrial policy practice) should ration credit and make sure they get the best
information possible on the projects they fund. See Zoltan J. Acs and Daniel A. Gerlowski,
Managerial Economics and Organization, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1996, pp.176-177.
35
13
When planners supply low-interest funds to clients they select, and when the supplies of
funds are not tightly constrained, the tendency can be expected to be as it was in Japan and Asia in
the mid-nineties. The numbers of projects that promised abundant returns, funded first, will be too
few to absorb the available funds. The normal banker or planner will feel the need to find a home
for all the available funds and will grow accustomed and somewhat insensitive to high risk prospects
poorly documented as to their soundness. The same people would demanded better information in a
more competitive environment of sound investment prospects. Huge investments in additional
manufacturing capacity, in spite of an overabundance of already extant worldwide capacity, can be
seen as the ultimate result of the Keynesian mandate for government activism in this field. Thus,
government investment functionaries are inclined under Asian circumstances to allocate a
superabundance of capital even where there is a dearth of solid investment projects.
All these things together spell Asian economic crisis. Some have viewed the Asian situation
as fundamentally sound. The basic manufacturing capital stock, the talented labor force, the
continuing managerial skills, etc., remain in place. Solve the financial problems and things can go on
as before. But more is required. Corporate governance must provide more astute direction for the
use of investment funds. Keynes’s assertion that investment complexities related to uncertainty
about the future would require heavy involvement by central governments in investment planning
has not been worthy of the confidence that some of his propositions inspired.
14
References
Acs, Zoltan J.and Gerlowski, Daniel A., Managerial Economics and Organization, New Jersey: PrenticeHall, 1996.
Amsden, Alice H., Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late industrialization, New York, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1989.
Fox, Justin, “Why Japan Won’t Budge,” Fortune, September 7, 1998, pp. 82, 83.
“Industrial Policy: Call It What You Will, The Nation Needs A Plan To Nurture Growth,” Business
Week, April 6, 1992.
Keynes, John Maynard, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, New York: Harcourt,
Brace and World, Inc., 1936.
Krugman, Paul, “Saving Asia: It’s Time to Get Radical,” Fortune, September 7, 1998, pp. 75-80.
Porter, Michael E., The Competitive Advantage of Nations, New York: The Free Press, 1990.
Thurow, Lester, Head to Head: The Coming Economic Battle Among Japan, Europe, and America, New
York: Warner Books, 1993.
Tinbergen, Jan, Central Planning, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964.
World Economic and Social Survey 1995: Current Trends and Policies in the World Economy (New York,
United Nations, 1995.
World Economic and Social Survey 1998: Trends and Policies in the World Economy, New York: United
Nations, 1998.
15