Download China Securitization Aff - DDI11

China Securitization Affirmative
DDI 2011
1
China Securitization Kritikal 1AC
China Securitization Kritikal 1AC .......................................................................................................................... 1
***1AC ................................................................................................................................................................... 2
Kritikal 1AC- Inherency ......................................................................................................................................... 2
Kritikal 1AC- Plan Text .......................................................................................................................................... 5
Kritikal 1AC- Securitization Advantage ................................................................................................................. 6
Kritikal 1AC- Solvency ........................................................................................................................................ 11
***General Extensions ....................................................................................................................................... 17
Inherency Extensions- Budget Provision .............................................................................................................. 17
Inherency- Political Anxiety ................................................................................................................................. 20
Inherency Extensions- Anxiety on Both Sides ..................................................................................................... 22
Topicality- Its ........................................................................................................................................................ 23
Topicality- FX Provision ...................................................................................................................................... 26
Topicality- Exploration/Development .................................................................................................................. 27
Topicality- Exploration/Development Extensions ................................................................................................ 28
Solvency- Cooperation.......................................................................................................................................... 29
Solvency- Securitization ....................................................................................................................................... 33
Solvency- US-Sino Relations ............................................................................................................................... 35
Solvency- US-Sino Relations ............................................................................................................................... 36
Solvency- Mars Initiative ...................................................................................................................................... 39
Solvency- Dual Use Capabilities .......................................................................................................................... 40
Solvency- Transparency........................................................................................................................................ 41
Solvency- Political Expediency ............................................................................................................................ 42
Solvency- A2: Wolf Clause .................................................................................................................................. 43
Solvency- A2: China’s a Threat ............................................................................................................................ 44
Solvency- High Magnitude Policy Paralysis ........................................................................................................ 47
Space Militarization Add-On ................................................................................................................................ 48
Space Debris Add-On ........................................................................................................................................... 52
***Securitization Advantage ............................................................................................................................. 53
Link- U.S. Constructs Chinese Threat .................................................................................................................. 53
Link- U.S. Anxiety = Chinese Militarization ....................................................................................................... 54
Solvency- Self-Fulfilling Prophecy ...................................................................................................................... 59
Framework- Reps Key .......................................................................................................................................... 60
***2AC A2- Disadvantages ................................................................................................................................ 60
2AC A2- Hegemony DA ...................................................................................................................................... 61
2AC A2- Politics ................................................................................................................................................... 62
2AC A2- Economy DA ......................................................................................................................................... 63
2AC A2- Evil Russia DA..................................................................................................................................... 64
2AC A2- Evil India DA ........................................................................................................................................ 65
***2AC A2- Counterplans ................................................................................................................................. 65
2AC A2- Non-Space Coop CP ............................................................................................................................. 66
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China Securitization Affirmative
DDI 2011
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Kritikal 1AC- Inherency
Contention 1: Inherency
Currently a provision of NASA’s budget plans prohibits the U.S. from cooperating bilaterally with China
Johnson-Freese 6/10/11- Joan Johnson-Freese, Chair of the National Security Decision Making Department at the US naval War
College (6/10/11, “US-China Space Cooperation: Congress’ Pointless Lockdown,” http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/uschina-space-cooperation-congress%E2%80%99-pointless-lockdown/) SP
In early May when the US government was scrambling to pass a budget, a provision was slipped into the NASA
appropriations bill that while counter to Obama Administration policy of expanded space cooperation, was not as important
as getting a continuing resolution passed and so allowed to slide through. Section 1340 of NASA’s budget prohibited
NASA and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) from spending funds to “develop, design,
plan, promulgate, implement, or execute a bilateral policy, program, order, or contract of any kind to participate,
collaborate, or coordinate bilaterally in any way with China or any Chinese-owned company.” It also prohibited the hosting
of “official Chinese visitors” at any NASA facility. Clearly, a comprehensive ban on US-China space cooperation was
intended. Just as clearly, ban supporters are under the impression that Chinese space officials are anxiously banging on the
proverbial US door, waiting and hoping for the opportunity to work with the United States – which just isn’t the case.
China has energetically and broadly moved out on their own in space, and based on watching on-going US political kabuki
dances about its future space plans, and seeing how difficult and tenuous it can be for other countries to partner with the US
– on the International Space Station (ISS), for example – most Chinese space officials consider working with the United
States as a potential liability to their own already-underway plans. In fact, many countries consider that they can afford only
so much US friendship, though Congress continues to act as though the US is the only game in town if countries want to
develop a robust space program. Rarely do US attempts at isolating countries – ally or competitor - succeed without
unexpected, and negative, consequences. The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 restricted data sharing from the Manhattan
Project with allies including Britain, resulting in a significant wartime rift and leading to Britain developing their own
bomb. After the infamous Cox Commission Report in 1999 which investigated charges of theft and illegal satellite
technology transfer to China, the US attempted to block dual-use satellite technology from sale or launch there. As a result,
European space industries that had been niche providers developed much broader capabilities so they could circumvent US
prohibitions. US companies have lost business and the globalization of technology marches on. For many years, Chinese
politicians considered there would be geostrategic benefits to be derived from being a partner on the ISS, symbolic of the
“international family of spacefaring nations.” The United States stiff-arming them from involvement is a factor behind
China now developing its own space station.
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***1AC
China Securitization Affirmative
DDI 2011
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Kritikal 1AC- Inherency
Public, political, and military slander creates an endless cycle of paranoia that prevents the U.S. from
cooperating with China
Jeff Foust, editor and publisher of The Space Review, The Space Review, 3/3/ 08, China and the US: space race or
miscommunication?, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1075/1, dk
Those in the US who are concerned about Chinese military space capabilities routinely cite a bevy of evidence, much of
which appears in official Defense Department documents, in support of their claims. This evidence suggests that China is
actively developing a wide range of ASAT weapons, from the kinetic kill vehicle tested last year to exotic approaches, like
“parasitic microsatellites” that could stealthily attack larger spacecraft. Many of those claims, though, are dubious. “A lot
of the information that our analysts and intelligence officers are consuming—that’s driving their perceptions of Chinese
intent regarding their civil and their military space programs—is based on very shoddy sources,” said Gregory Kulacki,
senior analyst and China program manager for the Global Security Program of the Union of Concerned Scientists. Kulacki,
speaking about US-Chinese relations in space at the New America Foundation in Washington last month, said that many of
the reports about Chinese military space projects came from questionable sources and were either inaccurate or
misinterpreted by US analysts. A case in point is the claim of Chinese development of parasitic microsatellites, which
appeared in the 2003 and 2004 editions of Defense Department reports to Congress about the Chinese military. “In chasing
that source down, it turns out it’s from an individual’s web site—a blogger—who made the whole thing up,” Kulacki said.
(The same Chinese blogger, he added, had published claims of a fanciful array of other advanced weapons on his site.) In
another case, the National Air and Space Intelligence Center mistranslated a publication by a junior instructor at a Chinese
artillery college and concluded that China was planning to deploy ASAT systems. To better understand the types of
sources out there, Kulacki and colleagues reviewed 1,500 articles published in China that referenced ASAT technology in
some manner between 1971 and 2007, and grouped them into four categories. Nearly half—49 percent—were classified as
“reviews” that provided only general information, while an additional 16 percent were “polemics”, or political diatribes
with little technical information. Such articles are considered “trash articles” in China, Kulacki said: “They’re things people
have to publish because they’ve got to publish something. They’re very low value and not read in China.” Of the rest, 29
percent of the articles represented some kind of original analysis of ASAT technology, while only 6 percent delved into
technical issues. Moreover, those technical articles don’t get the same level of attention by American analysts as the
reviews and polemics. “If you look at the citations in US reports on this, we’re undervaluing the journals that actually might
contain information that could tell us something meaningful about Chinese ASAT capabilities,” he said. While American
views of Chinese space efforts may be based on questionable sources, Chinese views of American space efforts are more
complex. “In a general sense, the Chinese public and Chinese professionals have a very positive view of the US space
program,” Kulacki said. He noted that a public expo about spaceflight in China shortly before the Shenzhou 6 mission was
primarily about American space efforts, including a wall in the back that featured portraits of the astronauts who died on the
space shuttle Columbia in 2003. There are, though, more hostile views of US space programs in China, particularly of
American military space projects. Those articles tend to be written not by space professionals but by political officers in the
Chinese military, who write polemics that claim that the US wants to fight space wars. Because they’re not written by
professionals, Kulacki said, they tend not to be sophisticated: in one example shown by Kulacki, a Chinese article was
illustrated by a model of an American ASAT weapon—made of Lego bricks. This results in something of an echo chamber
effect between the “polemical communities” in the US and China. “They feed off of each other for sure,” Kulacki said.
“There is this whole tiny dialogue between these two hawkish communities in these two countries that dominates the entire
discussion on this in the public domain.” There are also Chinese suspicions of American motives elsewhere in space.
Kulacki noted that, shortly before the Shenzhou 5 launch, NASA provided orbital debris tracking data to the Chinese so
they could avoid any potential collisions. A Chinese official involved with the mission told Kulacki that the data came late
in their planning process, raising suspicions. “The relationship is so bad that he was convinced that NASA did that on
purpose to mess them up,” he said. “There’s a lot of mistrust and bad feelings.”
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China Securitization Affirmative
DDI 2011
1
Kritikal 1AC- Inherency
The U.S. government arbitrarily characterizes China as a threat
Pan 04- Chengxin Pan, Department of Political Science and International Relations at Australian National University (June-July
2004, “The ‘China Threat’ in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics, Alternatives:
Global, Local, Political”) SP
More specifically, I want to argue that U.S. conceptions of China as a threatening other are always intrinsically linked to
how U.S. policymakers/mainstream China specialists see themselves (as representatives of the indispensable, securityconscious nation, for example). As such, they are not value-free, objective descriptions of an independent, preexisting
Chinese reality out there, but are better understood as a kind of normative, meaning-giving practice that often legitimates
power politics in U.S.-China relations and helps transform the "China threat" into social reality. In other words, it is selffulfilling in practice, and is always part of the "China threat" problem it purports merely to describe. In doing so, I seek to
bring to the fore two interconnected themes of self/other constructions and of theory as practice inherent in the "China
threat" literature—themes that have been overridden and rendered largely invisible by those common positivist
assumptions. These themes are of course nothing new nor peculiar to the "China threat" literature. They have been
identified elsewhere by critics of some conventional fields of study such as ethnography, anthropology, oriental studies,
political science, and international relations.*
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China Securitization Affirmative
DDI 2011
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Kritikal 1AC- Plan Text
The United States federal government should increase its cooperative space exploration with the People's
Republic of China.
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China Securitization Affirmative
DDI 2011
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Kritikal 1AC- Securitization Advantage
Contention 2: Securitization Advantage
China develops aggressive space programs as countermeasures to US military space developmentchanging current policies can end the security dilemma
Baohui Zhang, Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Asia Pacific Studies at Lingnan University,
JSTOR, 2011, The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship, Vol. 51, No. 2 (March/April 2011) (pp. 311332), http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/AS.2011.51.2.311, dk
China’s military space program and its strategies for space warfare have caused rising concerns in the United States. In fact,
China’s military intentions in outer space have emerged as one of the central security issues between the two countries. In
November 2009, after the commander of the Chinese Air Force called the militarization of space “a historical inevitability,”
General Kevin Chilton, head of the U.S. Strategic Command, urged China to explain the objectives of its rapidly advancing
military space program.1 Indeed, in the wake of China’s January 2007 anti-satellite (ASAT) test, many U.S. experts have
attempted to identify China’s motives. One driver of China’s military space program is its perception of a forthcoming
revolution in military affairs. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) sees space as a new and critical dimension of future
warfare. The comment by the commander of the Chinese Air Force captures this perception of the PLA.2 In addition,
China’s military space program is seen as part of a broad asymmetric strategy designed to offset conventional U.S. military
advantages. For example, as observed by Ashley J. Tellis in 2007, “China’s pursuit of counterspace capabilities is not
driven fundamentally by a desire to protest American space policies, and those of the George W. Bush administration in
particular, but is part of a considered strategy designed to counter the overall military capabilities of the United States.”3
Richard J. Adams and Martin E. France, U.S. Air Force officers, contend that “Chinese interests in space weapons do not
hinge on winning a potential U.S.-Chinese ASAT battle or participating in a space arms race.” Instead, they argue, China’s
military space program is driven by a desire to “counter the space-enabled advantage of U.S. conventional forces.”4 This
perspective implies that given the predicted U.S. superiority in conventional warfare, China feels compelled to continue its
offensive military space program. Inevitably, this perspective sees China as the main instigator of a possible space arms
race, whether implicitly or explicitly. China’s interpretation of the revolution in military affairs and its quest for asymmetric
warfare capabilities are important for understanding the 2007 ASAT test. This article suggests that the Chinese military
space program is also influenced by the security dilemma in international relations. Due to the anarchic nature of the world
order, “the search for security on the part of state A leads to insecurity for state B which therefore takes steps to increase its
security leading in its turn to increased insecurity for state A and so on.”5 The military space relationship between China
and the U.S. clearly embodies the tragedy of a security dilemma. In many ways, the current Chinese thinking on space
warfare reflects China’s response to the perceived U.S. threat to its national security. This response, in turn, has triggered
American suspicion about China’s military intentions in outer space. Thus, the security dilemma in the U.S.-China space
relationship has inevitably led to measures and countermeasures. As Joan Johnson-Freese, a scholar at the Naval War
College, observed after the January 2007 ASAT test, China and the U.S. “have been engaged in a dangerous spiral of
action-reaction space planning and/or activity.”6 This article, citing firsthand Chinese military sources, identifies the major
factors contributing to the security dilemma that is driving China’s military space program. The first is China’s attempt to
respond to perceived U.S. military strategies to dominate outer space. Chinese strategists are keenly aware of the U.S.
military’s plan to achieve so-called full-spectrum dominance, and the Chinese military feels compelled to deny that
dominance. The second factor is China’s concern about U.S. missile defense, which could potentially weaken Chinese
strategic nuclear deterrence. Many PLA analysts believe that a multilayered ballistic missile defense system will inevitably
compromise China’s offensive nuclear forces. China’s response is to attempt to weaken the U.S. space-based sensor system
that serves as the eyes and brains of missile defense. Thus, U.S. missile defense has forced China to contemplate the
integration of nuclear war and space warfare capabilities. Because of the security dilemma, many experts in both China and
the U.S. have expressed growing pessimism about the future of arms control. However, this article suggests that precisely
because the current U.S.-China military space relationship is governed by the security dilemma, it is amenable to changes in
the strategic environment that could extricate both from their mutual mistrust and the ongoing cycle of actions and
counteractions. The current strategic adjustment by the U.S., efforts by the Obama administration to curb missile defense,
and the fundamentally altered situation in the Taiwan Strait offer a window of opportunity for the two countries to relax the
tensions in their space relationship. With the right strategies, China and the U.S. could slow the momentum toward a space
arms race.
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China Securitization Affirmative
DDI 2011
1
Kritikal 1AC- Securitization Advantage
Representational hostility leads to future distorted and hardline policymaking
Lubman 04 (Stanley, Distinguished Lecturer in Residence (retired); Senior Fellow, Miller Institute for Global Challenges and the
Law and has specialized on China as a scholar and as a practicing lawyer for more than 40 years. “Stanley Lubman.
repositories.cdlib.org/csls/fwp/18” IG)
Any faint hope that narrow and dogmatically negative views of China might be tempered is no more than a whistle in the
dark, but the debates that have been quoted here suggest that there is a good deal of darkness in Congress that needs to be
illuminated. Unfortunately, the groups in Congress that have been identified here as anti-Chinese gather strength from their
numbers taken together, and are more likely than not to continue to join forces, especially on the economic issues that grew
prominent in 2003. On these latter issues, moreover, Congressional emotions are understandably fueled by knowledge of
the pain of constituents who lose jobs because their employers move manufacturing activities to China or close in the face
of competition from China. This article has explored only the surface manifestations of deeper issues that lie beneath the
Congressional debates because it has been concerned only with what has been said publicly, for the record. It undoubtedly
slights many other members whose spoken words have been few, but who are more temperate in their judgments than some
of their more vocal colleagues. More important, relationships with interest groups lie behind the one-dimensional images of
China in Congress that have been illustrated here. Labor unions, human rights advocates and anti-abortion groups have
been among China’s strongest critics, and there are others less obvious, such as Taiwan-funded lobbyists. The impact of the
lobbyists is reinforced, however, by what one veteran of thirty years of China-watching in the US government has noted as
“the lack of professional training or experience in dealing with China on the part of congressional staff members critical of
administration policy.”40 But when members of Congress reflect uncritically what lobbyists and poorly-informed staff tell
them, ignoring the complexities of modern China, they are led into drastic oversimplification of their debate and thought on
China policy. It is impossible to differentiate among the reasons underlying the demonizing of China by some in Congress,
but some ignorance, willful or not, underlies the words of the demonizers. More than ignorance is involved, of course, and
inquiry into the dynamics of Congressional participation in making China policy obviously must go behind the
Congressional debate that forms the public record. Whatever other factors are at work, however, the rhetoric that dominates
discussions of China by some members of Congress promises to continue to deform not only their personal perspectives,
but the contribution that Congress makes to formulation of this country’s China policy. At the very least, administration
policymakers are “diverted from other tasks…Much time is spent dealing with often exaggerated congressional assertions
about negative features of the Chinese government’s behavior…The congressional critics are open to a wide range of
Americans— some with partisan or other interests – who are prepared to highly in often graphic terms real or alleged
policies and behaviors of the Chinese government in opposition to US interests.”41 It is difficult not to agree with the
conclusion of one recent study, that “the cumulative effect” of Congressional criticism of the China policies under both the
first President Bush and President Clinton “reinforced a stasis in US-China relations and slowed forward movement.”42 Of
the PNTR debate itself, it has recently been said that “…the rancorous partisanship in both House and Senate during the
PNTR process, and the numerous other challenges highlighted by the protagonists – nonproliferation, human rights, trade
deficits, and other issues – sharpened the disagreements and laid the ground for future battles… the potential remained for
even more controversy and contention over China policy.”43 Indeed, the passage of time and the growing power of
economic issues since the PNTR debate underlines the trenchancy of this prediction, as the concluding section of this
article suggests.
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China Securitization Affirmative
DDI 2011
1
Kritikal 1AC- Securitization Advantage
A change in mindset solves for United States space securitization
Aaron L. Friedberg, an East Asian expert and former deputy national security adviser for Vice President Dick Cheney, Autumn
2005 “The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?, The MIT Press International Security, Vol. 30, No. 2, JSTOR”
The nature of the interactions between two states is not simply the product of objective, material factors, such as the
balance of trade or the balance of military power or the structure of domestic institutions. Interstate relations are also
shaped to a considerable degree by subjective factors, by the beliefs and ideas that people carry around in their heads and
that cause them to interpret events and data in particular ways. The most important of these can be grouped into three
categories: "identities" (i.e., the collective self-perceptions of political actors and their shared perceptions of others);
"strategic cultures" (i.e., sets of beliefs about the fundamental character of international politics and about the best ways of
coping with it, especially as regards the utility of force and the prospects for cooperation); and "norms" (i.e., beliefs not
only about what is efficacious but also about what is right or appropriate in the international realm).66 Identities, strategic
cultures, and norms are strongly shaped by the prevailing interpretations of a society's shared historical experiences. They
are transmitted across generational lines by processes of education and acculturation and, though not cast in stone, they do
tend to be highly resistant to change. The primary mechanism by which widely held beliefs evolve and are sometimes
transformed is through interaction with others. Such interactions convey new information and ideas that can help to
displace prevailing conceptions.67 Because their theoretical perspective causes them to be attentive to the potential
malleability of social relationships, constructivists tend to be optimists. If international politics is truly governed by
scientific laws rooted in material reality, like the laws of physics, then what people believe about how the world works will
matter only to the extent that it conforms to or deviates from reality. A man who chooses to step off the roof of a tall
building because he prefers not to believe in the force of gravity will nevertheless fall quickly to the ground. Similarly, in
the view of the pessimistic realists, the leader of a dominant state who does not believe that his country's position will be
challenged by a rising power (or who believes that such a power can be dissuaded from pursuing its ambitions by gentle
diplomacy) is destined to be disappointed. But if relations between nations are shaped above all by beliefs, rather than
objective material factors, there is always the possibility that people can change the world by changing how they think. At
the most general level, constructivists assert that international politics tends to be competitive and violent, not because
some immutable principles of human behavior require that it be so but rather be- cause, across the centuries, national
leaders have tended to believe this to be the case. By acting in accordance with their pessimistic expectations, leaders have
helped to make them come true. As Alexander Wendt puts it, "Realism is a self-fulfilling prophecy."" Provided that it was
widely shared among the world's most powerful nations, a more optimistic assessment of the prospects for, and benefits of,
international cooperation could achieve similar status.
China and U.S.’s anxiety about securitization leads to a self-fulfilling prophecy of miscalculation- causes
all impacts
Joan Johnson-Freese, Chair of the National Security Decision Making Department at the US naval War College, 20 06 “China
Security, http://www.wsichina.org/attach/china_security2.pdf”
Arms race Due to the threatening nature of space weapons, it is reasonable to assume that China and others would attempt
to block their deployment and use by political and, if necessary, military means.11 Many Chinese officials and scholars
believe that China should take every possible step to maintain the effectiveness of its nuclear deterrent. This includes
negating the threats from missile defense and space weaponization plans.12 In responding to any U.S. move toward
deployment space weapons, the first and best option for China is to pursue an arms control agreement to prevent not just the
United States but any nation from doing so – as it is advocating presently. However, if this effort fails and if what China
perceives as its legitimate security concerns are ignored, it would very likely develop responses to counter and neutralize
such a threat. Despite the enormous cost of space-based weapon systems, they are vulnerable to a number of low-cost and
relatively low-technology ASAT attacks including the use of ground-launched small kinetic-kill vehicles, pellet clouds or
space mines. It is reasonable to believe that China and others could resort to these ASAT weapons to counter any U.S.
space-based weapons.13 This, however, would lead to an arms race in space. To protect against the potential loss of its
deterrent capability, China could potentially resort to enhancing its nuclear forces. Such a move could, in turn, encourage
India and then Pakistan to follow suit. Furthermore, Russia has threatened to respond to any country’s deployment of space
weapons.14 Moreover, constructing additional weapons would produce a need for more plutonium and highly enriched
uranium to fuel those weapons. This impacts China’s participation in the fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT).15
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China Securitization Affirmative
DDI 2011
1
Kritikal 1AC- Securitization Advantage
China threat discourse makes war between the two countries inevitable and emboldens nationalists and
hardliners in China. We must reject this kind of security discourse so we can allow better ways of
thinking about China in the policy realm.
Pan 2004 (Chengxin Pan, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, Australian National
University, Canberra, “The ‘China Threat’ in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics,”
Alternatives 2004, p. 325-326 IG)
I have argued above that the "China threat" argument in main-stream U.S. IR literature is derived, primarily, from a
discursive construction of otherness. This construction is predicated on a particular narcissistic understanding of the U.S.
self and on a positivist-based realism, concerned with absolute certainty and security, a concern central to the dominant
U.S. self-imaginary. Within these frameworks, it seems imperative that China be treated as a threatening, absolute other
since it is unable to fit neatly into the U.S.-led evolutionary scheme or guarantee absolute security for the United States, so
that U.S. power preponderance in the post-Cold War world can still be legitimated. Not only does this reductionist
representation come at the expense of understanding China as a dynamic, multifaceted country but it leads inevitably to a
policy of containment that, in turn, tends to enhance the influence of realpolitik thinking, nationalist extremism, and hardline stance in today's China. Even a small dose of the containment strategy is likely to have a highly dramatic impact on
U.S.-China relations, as the 1995-1996 missile crisis and the 2001 spy-plane incident have vividly attested. In this respect,
Chalmers Johnson is right when he suggests that "a policy of containment toward China implies the possibility of war, just
as it did during the Cold War vis-a-vis the former Soviet Union. The balance of terror prevented war between the United
States and the Soviet Union, but this may not work in the case of China." For instance, as the United States presses ahead
with a missile-defence shield to "guarantee" its invulnerability from rather unlikely sources of missile attacks, it would be
almost certain to intensify China's sense of vulnerability and compel it to expand its current small nuclear arsenal so as to
maintain the efficiency of its limited deterrence. In consequence, it is not impossible that the two countries, and possibly the
whole region, might be dragged into an escalating arms race that would eventually make war more likely. Neither the
United States nor China is likely to be keen on fighting the other. But as has been demonstrated, the "China threat"
argument, for all its alleged desire for peace and security, tends to7 make war preparedness the most "realistic" option for
both sides. At this juncture, worthy of note is an interesting comment made by Charlie Neuhauser, a leading CIA China
specialist. on the Vietnam War, a war fought by the United States to contain the then-Communist "other." Neuhauser says,
"Nobody wants it. We don't want it, Ho Chi Minh doesn't want it; it's simply a question of annoying the other side."94 And,
as we know, in an unwanted war some fifty-eight thousand young people from the United States and an estimated two
million Vietnamese men, women, and children lost their lives. Therefore, to call for a halt to the vicious circle of theory as
practice associated with the "China threat" literature, tinkering with the current positivist-dominated U.S. IR scholarship on
China is no longer adequate. Rather, what is needed is to question this un-self-reflective scholarship itself, particularly its
connections with the dominant way in which the United States and the West in general represent themselves and others via
their positivist epistemology, so that alternative, more nuanced, and less dangerous ways of interpreting and debating China
might become possible.
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China Securitization Affirmative
DDI 2011
1
Kritikal 1AC- Securitization Advantage
Current US stance towards China on space is locked in the mindset of securitization, which can only be
escaped by cooperation
Shixiu '07
(Bao Shixiu, Senior Research Fellow at the Academy of Military Sciences, "Deterrence Revisited: Outer Space", 2007, World
Security Institute, http://www.wsichina.org/cs5_1.pdf// GH-aspomer)
The U.S. position makes another faulty assumption that national space programs and space assets can be effectively
dissected into commercial and civilian uses versus military uses and capabilities. This is out of tune with technological
developments and military inevitabilities. China’s space program Under American strategic dominance, a deterrent in space
will decrease the possibility of the United States attacking Chinese space assets is not transparent in many respects, but
neither is that of the United States. The reality is that many space technologies are inherently dual-use and it is therefore
very difficult to distinguish sufficiently and effectively the intentions and capabilities in space. Without some kind of
mutual understanding on controlling arms in space, suspicion will dominate relations between China and
the United States. U.S. actions seem to support the notion that China’s space program is a threat even if China only
develops commercial space assets. On the one hand, the United States has rejected Russian and Chinese proposals to
negotiate a treaty banning space weapons and their testing.5 According to official U.S. statements, such a treaty is not
necessary as there is no military race in space. In reality, the United States rejects such proposals because it would constrain
its freedom of action in space. In effect, this provides the United States with the opportunity to weaponize space at a time of
its choosing or at a time of its perceived need. Coupled with the fact that a series of American space reports in recent years
have argued vehemently for the development of military capabilities to control and dominate space, from a Chinese
perspective it appears that the United States aims to deploy space weapons regardless of China’s developments and
intentions in space.6 In this context, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that the United States unilaterally seeks to
monopolize the military use of space in order to gain strategic advantage over others and afford it the ability to protect U.S.
interests. While China is committed to upholding international treaties and norms, it also has its own national interests and
cannot subsume them to the interests of another country. China may consider the security problems of the United States, but
cannot change its national security considerations at their whim. Hence, China must be prepared to avoid being at the mercy
of others in space. China must seek countermeasures to deal with this problem accordingly.
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Contention 3: Solvency
Uncertainty within space policy creates securitization and fear- cooperating on space development key to solve
Blair and Yali 08- President of the World Security Institute, Project Director at the Congressional Office of Technology
Assessment and Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution (“The Space Security Dilemma,”
http://www.chinasecurity.us/images/stories/cs2-editorsnotes.pdf) SP
A dialogue of the deaf has resulted in both sides talking past each other -- a scene replayed repeatedly in U.S-China
strategic dialogues in areas as sensitive as space -- as the United States seeks to extract information about specific Chinese
technologies and programs, while China seeks to comprehend the strategic and tactical purposes of U.S. space programs.
Technological transparency is anathema to the Chinese, whose co-mingling of their civil and military programs keeps them
under a shroud of opacity, much to the frustration and chagrin of U.S. observers. As for intentions, the United States seems
to be almost schizophrenic. One one hand, there are ample official denials of plans to deploy space weapons, denials
supported by the very modest sums being invested in such weapons. On the other hand, current doctrine and war games
clearly envision space as a battleground and China as the main opponent there. Johnson-Freese also characterizes as
hypocritical the arguments made by the United States in which it describes its own pursuit of certain space technologies as
non-threatening while alleging “offensive” and “nefarious” intent when the same technologies are pursued by China. Out of
this uncertainty, inconsistency, and unpredictability springs the near-universal tendency to err on the side of caution. The
prevailing view on both sides, Johnson-Freese concludes in her hard-hitting critique of the state of Sino-American
discourse on space, holds that space progress is a zero-sum game in which any advance made by either side is harmful to
the security of the other side. In this psychological climate, it is unclear what if any space activity would be considered nonthreatening, and the unfortunate effect is to foster an almost irreversible momentum of escalating tensions over space.
Before the momentum propels the antagonists across the Rubicon, she recommends that they redouble their effort to convey
clear and consistent messages, improve the dialogue, and step lightly into cooperation in the non-threatening area of space
science through strategic-level talks about the Bush Moon-Mars Initiative.
Obama can override the provision banning cooperation with China over space missions
Cheng 5/9/11- Dean Cheng, Bachelor’s Degree in Politics from Princeton University and a Doctorate at MIT, Senior Analyst at
China Studies division of the Center for Naval Analyses (5/9/11, “Lost In Space: The Administration’s Rush for Sino-U.S. Space
Cooperation,” http://heritage.org/2011/05/09/lost-in-space-the-administration%E2%80%99s-rush-for-sino%E2%80%93u-s-spacecooperation/) SP
The Obama Administration appears absolutely intent on engaging the PRC in space cooperation. How else to explain the
claim by White House Office of Science and Technology Policy Director John Holdren that the congressional restriction
banning U.S.–Chinese space cooperation under just about any circumstances was not, in fact, a ban? According to Holdren,
the White House has concluded that the provision doesn’t extend to “prohibiting interactions that are part of the president’s
constitutional authority to conduct negotiations.” That includes, he said, a bilateral agreement on scientific cooperation
between the two countries that dates back to 1979. One doesn’t need a presidential signing statement to see that the White
House is near-desperate to engage the PRC in space cooperation. The problem is that, if the answer is “cooperation,” what
is the question? Moreover, the Administration has never satisfactorily answered just what it is that it seeks to cooperate
with the Chinese on. Is it still intent on negotiating a space arms control treaty? Is it hankering for a joint manned mission
to the moon, Mars, or Pluto?
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Kritikal 1AC- Solvency
The U.S. has claimed responsibility for contributing to the defense of allied space system- makes China’s joint
space policies fully accounted for by the USFG
Kueter 10- Jeff Kueter, President of the George C. Marshall Institute (July 2010, “Evaluating the Obama National Space Policy:
Continuity and New Priorities,” http://www.marshall.org/pdf/materials/900.pdf) SP
The Obama policy calls for the U.S. to work more closely with its allies on space issues. The policy says the U.S. will
employ measures to “… defend our space systems and contribute to the defense of allied space systems…” Elsewhere, it
discusses leveraging allied space assets to assist U.S. efforts to perform missions or aid reconstitution of capabilities. These
are important additions to U.S. space policy and fill a void left by the Bush policy. In our evaluation of the Bush policy, we
called for the creation of an alliance strategy for space.13 In considering steps the U.S. might take to improve the security
of its space assets, allies and their growing space capabilities are a natural source of complementary capabilities in pursuit
of shared interests.14 How the Administration pursues this objective warrants close observation, for it implies fundamental
shifts in how the U.S. develops space systems and performs space operations. Many of those existing practices are products
of a bygone era when our allies lacked useful space capabilities. That is no longer the case. Moving forward the U.S. will
require greater attention to improving and enabling the interoperability of its space systems with allies technically as well as
operationally. Planning, preparation, and conduct of joint space operations will be required. U.S. space organizations will
have to become more accepting of working with allies (and other partners) which will require organizational culture and
process changes.
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Kritikal 1AC- Solvency
Space securitization policy influences the majority of the bilateral relations between China and the U.S.cooperation solves
Space Daily, Xinhua, 5/18/11, "Wolf Clause" betrays China-U.S. cooperation,
http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Wolf_Clause_betrays_China_US_cooperation_999.html, dk
Obviously, the "Wolf Clause" runs counter to the trend that both China and the United States are trying to push ahead their
exchanges and cooperation in science and technology. During the third round of the China-U.S. Strategic and Economic
Dialogue (S and ED) held in Washington earlier this month, the two sides published accomplishments of the dialogue,
which includes the cooperation in science and technology. Moreover, China and the U.S. this year renewed their bilateral
agreements on scientific and technological cooperation. The Obama administration also attached importance to the current
development and trend of scientific and technological cooperation between China and the U.S. and realized the nature of
mutual benefit brought about by such cooperation. John P.Holdren, director of the Science and Technology Policy Office
of the White House, has told Xinhua that the cooperation on science and technology was one of the most dynamic fields in
bilateral relations between China and the United States. The "Wolf Clause" exposed the anxiety of hawkish politicians in
the United States over China's peaceful development in recent years, and it also demonstrated their shortsightedness to the
whole world.
Dual-use capabilities ensure that solving space security spills over to other sectors such as the military
Roger Handberg, professor of Political Science at the University of Central Florida, 10/7/20 10 “Dual-Use as Unintended Policy
Driver: The American Bubble, http://history.nasa.gov/sp4801-chapter18.pdf”
Out of this mishmash of goals and motivations, the concept of dual-use arose as one primary methodology by which all
space-related technologies could be evaluated as to whether they possessed significant military implications. This concept
created a truly artificial distinction since the only real difference between military and civilian or commercial uses was, at
its essence, user intent. The technology remained basically the same but its purposes varied. Military technologies were
often more robust in terms of their survivability (i.e., military specifications or “milspecs”), but the central application
remained the same for both.
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Kritikal 1AC- Solvency
The plan initiates fissures in the security framework between the U.S. and China
Burke 02 (Anthony, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of New South Wales, Sydney, Alternatives 27)
It is perhaps easy to become despondent, but as countless struggles for freedom, justice, and social transformation have
proved, a sense of seriousness can be tempered with the knowledge that many tools are already available - and where they
are not, the effort to create a productive new critical sensibility is well advanced. There is also a crucial political opening
within the liberal problematic itself, in the sense that it assumes that power is most effective when it is absorbed as truth,
consented to and desired - which creates an important space for refusal. As Colin Gordon argues, Foucault thought that the
very possibility of governing was conditional on it being credible to the governed as well as the governing. This throws
weight onto the question of how security works as a technology of subjectivity. It is to take up Foucault's challenge, framed
as a reversal of the liberal progressive movement of being we have seen in Hegel, not to discover who or what we are so
much as to refuse who we are. Just as security rules subjectivity as both a totalizing and individualizing blackmail and
promise, it is at these levels that we can intervene. We can critique the machinic frameworks of possibility represented by
law, policy, economic regulation, and diplomacy, while challenging the way these institutions deploy language to draw
individual subjects into their consensual web. This suggests, at least provisionally, a dual strategy. The first asserts the
space for agency, both in challenging available possibilities for being and their larger socioeconomic implications. Roland
Bleiker formulates an idea of agency that shifts away from the lone (male) hero overthrowing the social order in a decisive
act of rebellion to one that understands both the thickness of social power and its "fissures," "fragmentation," and
"thinness." We must, he says, "observe how an individual may be able to escape the discursive order and influence its
shifting boundaries ... by doing so, discursive terrains of dissent all of a sudden appear where forces of domination
previously seemed invincible." Pushing beyond security requires tactics that can work at many levels - that empower
individuals to recognize the larger social, cultural, and economic implications of the everyday forms of desire, subjection,
and discipline they encounter, to challenge and rewrite them, and that in turn contribute to collective efforts to transform the
larger structures of being, exchange, and power that sustain (and have been sustained by) these forms. As Derrida suggests,
this is to open up aporetic possibilities that transgress and call into question the boundaries of the self, society, and the
international that security seeks to imagine and police. The second seeks new ethical principles based on a critique of the
rigid and repressive forms of identity that security has heretofore offered. Thus writers such as Rosalyn Diprose, William
Connolly, and Moria Gatens have sought to imagine a new ethical relationship that thinks difference not on the basis of the
same but on the basis of a dialogue with the other that might allow space for the unknown and unfamiliar, for a "debate and
engagement with the other's law and the other's ethics" - an encounter that involves a transformation of the self rather than
the other. Thus while the sweep and power of security must be acknowledged, it must also be refused: at the simultaneous
levels of individual identity, social order, and macroeconomic possibility, it would entail another kind of work on
"ourselves" - a political refusal of the One, the imagination of an other that never returns to the same. It would be to ask if
there is a world after security, and what its shimmering possibilities might be.
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Making choices based on higher magnitude creates a policy paralysis, making their impacts inevitable
Rescher 83, (Professor of Philosophy, Nicholas Rescher, University of Pittsburgh Professor of Philosophy, “Risk: A Philosophical
Introduction to the Theory of Risk Evaluation and Management”
http://books.google.com/books/about/Risk.html?id=VB7FAAAAIAAJ IG)
The stakes are high, the potential benefits enormous. (And so are the costs - for instance cancer research and, in particular,
the multi-million dollar gamble on interferon.) But there is no turning back the clock. The processes at issue are
irreversible. Only through the shrewd deployment of science and technology can we resolve the problems that science and
technology themselves have brought upon us. America seems to have backed off from its traditional entrepreneurial spirit
and become a risk-aversive, slow investing economy whose (real-resource) support for technological and scientific
innovation has been declining for some time. In our yearning for the risk-free society we may well create a social system
that makes risk-taking innovation next to impossible. The critical thing is to have a policy that strikes a proper balance
between malfunctions and missed opportunities - a balance whose "propriety" must be geared to a realistic appraisal of the
hazards and opportunities at issue. Man is a creature condemned to live in a twilight zone of risk and opportunity. And so
we are led back to Aaron Wildavski's thesis that flight from risk is the greatest risk of all, "because a total avoidance of
risks means that society will become paralyzed, depleting its resources in preventive action, and denying future generations
opportunities and technologies needed for improving the quality of life. By all means let us calculate our risks with
painstaking care, and by all means let us manage them with prudent conservatism. But in life as in warfare there is truth in
H. H. Frost's maxim that "every mistake in war is excusable except inactivity and refusal to take risks" (though, obviously,
it is needful to discriminate between a good risk and a bad one). The price of absolute security is absolute stultification.
Securitization is a state of mind- peaceful intentions in space policy can reorganize a country’s thought processes
and actions
Blair and Yali 08- President of the World Security Institute, Project Director at the Congressional Office of Technology
Assessment and Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution (“The Space Security Dilemma,”
http://www.chinasecurity.us/images/stories/cs2-editorsnotes.pdf) SP
Chang and Sui understand that security is as much a state of mind as it is a physical condition, and therefore emphasize, as
many Chinese observers often do, the peaceful intention of the Chinese space program. By this logic, capabilities can be
controlled, and lose relevance, if one intends to be peaceful. American threat assessments, however, focus almost
exclusively on real or potential capabilities. Because intentions can be easily changed, asserting peaceful aims carries little
weight for Americans. Such assurances do little to assuage suspicions or downgrade threat projections. Also, since the late
1990s, the predominance of “hawkish” American attitudes toward potential threats has pushed the U.S. intelligence
community to adopt extremely conservative criteria for projecting threat -- for instance, by assessing an adversary’s
‘possible capabilities’ instead of ‘likely capabilities.’ This is a throwback to the early Cold War habit of using ‘greater-thanexpected’ threats as the basis for building up U.S. nuclear forces. ‘Possible’ threat is even more extreme than ‘greater-thanexpected’ threat.
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The U.S. Mars initiative could be a starting place for Sino-U.S. space cooperation- it solves for China’s
militarization and securitization of space
Blair and Yali 08- President of the World Security Institute, Project Director at the Congressional Office of Technology
Assessment and Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution (“The Space Security Dilemma,”
http://www.chinasecurity.us/images/stories/cs2-editorsnotes.pdf) SP
This tectonic shift three decades ago was allowed by an improving security environment for China, Wu notes. Receding
threats to China from the Soviet Union and the United States opened the window of opportunity for economic reform. As
both Wu and Hagt explain, this process of forcing the space sector to transform and compete in the marketplace drastically
altered the entire Chinese program. The divestment of the military from commercial activities across the board, including
the space sector, since 1999 has created new opportunities and incentives for international collaboration. In theory (the
editors’), Sino-American space cooperation should have deepened rather than frozen. However, the U.S. Cox Commission
report engendered an effort to isolate China’s space program. Wu remains convinced of the benefits of space cooperation.
Many Chinese analysts particularly emphasize the U.S. Mars initiative as a new starting place for Sino-U.S. space
cooperation. Deeper integration with the international community would help further separate China’s commercial space
industry from the military, she contends. Conversely, the continuing isolation of China’s space sector has the opposite
effect, and may rejuvenate military influence. And although “China does not have the luxury to engage in a military
competition with superpowers in space or in other areas,” Wu believes that “we now stand at the threshold of space
weaponization” and urges the international community to act quickly “to establish a system of rules to manage and
coordinate space activities.”
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Inherency Extensions- Budget Provision
Can’t cooperate, new spending bill doesn’t allow it for speculations against China
Homeland Security Newswire (April 22, 2011 “China syndrome Bill prohibits joint U.S.-China scientific activity”
http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/bill-prohibits-joint-us-china-scientific-activity IG)
We don’t want to give them the opportunity to take advantage of our technology, and we have nothing to gain from dealing
with them,” says Wolf. “And frankly, it boils down to a moral issue. … Would you have a bilateral program with Stalin?”
The language in the spending bill says that no government funds can be used by NASA or OSTP “to develop, design, plan,
promulgate, implement or execute a bilateral policy, program, order, or contract of any kind to participate, collaborate, or
coordinate bilaterally in any way with China or any Chinese-owned company.” It also prevents any NASA facility from
hosting “official Chinese visitors.” Wolf told Science that he singled out NASA because China’s space program, although
nominally independent, “is run by the People’s Liberation Army.” The inclusion of OSTP, though, is meant to cast a much
bigger net, he adds. “It addresses everything, the entire bilateral relationship on science and technology with respect to
NASA and everything that involves OSTP,” he says. “It’s the whole ball of wax.” Science reports that 0n 19 January the
administration extended a 1979 U.S.-Chinese agreement on scientific cooperation. On announcing the extension, the
Obama administration said the cooperation will cover “fisheries, earth and atmospheric sciences, basic research in physics
and chemistry, energy, agriculture, civil industrial technology, geology, health, and disaster relief.” “China is spying against
us, and every U.S. government agency has been hit by cyberattacks,” Wolf said in explaining his opposition to any
collaboration with the Chinese government. “They are stealing technology from every major U.S. company. They have
taken technology from NASA, and they have hit the NSF computers. … You name the company, and the Chinese are trying
to get its secrets.” Wolf added that “maybe next year we’ll include NGOs [non-governmental organizations].” He adds that
anyone who thinks the Chinese NGOs can operate independently of the government “is really naïve.”
China and the U.S. can’t bilaterally work on space efforts, too much fear
Robertson ‘11, (Epoch Times Staff Writer, 2011 (Matthew, The Epoch Times, “Wolf’s Clause Imperils (Some of)
Administration’s China Plans”, June 14, http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/content/view/57689/99999999/1/1/ IG)
Two Chinese journalists were supposed to watch the U.S. space shuttle Endeavour take off from the Kennedy Space Center
in Florida in mid-May. The shuttle was using the Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer-2 particle detector, a component developed
by Chinese scientist Samuel Ting, and their story would have made useful provender for China’s state media apparatus. But
they were turned away at the gates. Their employer, Xinhua, the official mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP), went into high dudgeon. A scornful editorial made no bones about the man and the law responsible: “‘Wolf Clause’
betrays China-U.S. cooperation,” the headline read. It was the doing of Rep. Frank Wolf, a long-term critic of the CCP,
after he became chairman of the House Commerce, Justice, and Science Appropriations Subcommittee in January. The
language he inserted into the spending bill for those agencies in April prevents NASA and the White House's Office of
Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) from using federal funds… Wolf made his position clear in his testimony to the
U.S.-China Commission in May: “The U.S. has no business cooperating with the PLA to help develop its space program.”
Cooperation with China on human space flight, would, according to Richard Fisher, an analyst and author on the Chinese
military, “In essence … constitute a free transfer of technology.” The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) leads China’s space
efforts, and there is no real difference between China’s military and civil space programs, experts say. Wolf thus asserts,
“There is no reason to believe that the PLA’s space program will be any more benign than the PLA’s recent military
posture.” His clause to combat this cooperative venture and others like it was passed as part of the budget negotiations, and
is valid until Sept. 30. The item will have to stand on its own merits in new legislation to be introduced into the House.
Though the area of acute concern was human space flight cooperation, Wolf made the language cover OSTP as well “to
send a signal to the White House and NASA” that “this is unacceptable,” according to Wolf’s staffer. “To engage China
increasingly in bilateral areas is not appropriate until we see some changes in China,” the staffer added…“The brief against
China misusing U.S. technology is not a null set: You give them a computer it turns into something they put in their
weapons program,” Sokolski said. “Congress exercising its power of the purse over technology transfers to countries they
see as despicable is legitimate. We used to have such a policy to Soviet Union; I don’t think it’s unprecedented.
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***General Extensions
China Securitization Affirmative
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Inherency Extensions- Budget Provision
Space Shuttle flights have not been introduced by the NASA-CNSA working group
Braukus 08- Michael Braukus, Spokesman for NASA’s Office of Exploration (12/23/08, “NASA Response to Aviation Week and
Space Technology Article,” http://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/2008/dec/HQ_08-336_AVWEEK.html) SP
As an initial matter, NASA has never asked the White House for a cooperative mission such as the one described in the
article. The fact is that the White House has been very supportive of a deliberate and careful establishment of relations
between NASA and the China National Space Administration (CNSA) over the past two years. As a result, NASA
commenced working group discussions with CNSA representatives on Earth and space science earlier this year. The
discussions of potential areas of future cooperation were based on the principles of mutual benefit, reciprocity, and
transparency, with the understanding that any proposal for specific projects would undergo careful review within the United
States Government. Approval would, of course, be affected by the overall status of the U.S.-China government-togovernment relationship. The Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer (AMS), space shuttle flights, and International Space Station
were never intended by either NASA or CNSA to be considered by the NASA-CNSA working group.
The most recent CR prohibits US-China space cooperation
Space Politics, 5/5/2011 “What’s the future of US-China cooperation in space?, http://www.spacepolitics.com/2011/05/05/whatsthe-future-of-us-china-cooperation-in-space/”
One of the few specific space policy provisions included in the final continuing resolution that funds the federal
government through the rest of fiscal year 2011 has to do with cooperation with China–or, rather, prohibiting cooperation
with China. The CR prevents NASA and OSTP from using any funds to “develop, design, plan, promulgate, implement, or
execute a bilateral policy, program, order, or contract of any kind to participate, collaborate, or coordinate bilaterally in any
way with China or any Chinese-owned company” unless specifically authorized in a future law. That also prevents NASA
from using any funds “to effectuate the hosting of official Chinese visitors at facilities belonging to or utilized by” the space
agency. That would appear to put the brakes on any prospects for cooperation with China, at least through this fiscal year.
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Inherency Extensions- Budget Provision
Wolf’s Clause is the only thing preventing the beginning of US-China space cooperation
Amy Svitak, staff writer for Space News, 5/4/2011 “China Viewed as Potential U.S. Partner in Future Mars Exploration,
http://www.spacenews.com/policy/110504-china-partner-mars-exploration.html”
WASHINGTON — U.S. President Barack Obama views China as a potential partner for an eventual human mission to
Mars that would be difficult for any single nation to undertake, a senior White House official told lawmakers. Testifying
May 4 before the House Appropriations commerce, justice, science subcommittee, White House science adviser John
Holdren said near-term engagement with China in civil space will help lay the groundwork for any such future endeavor.
He prefaced his remarks with the assertion that human exploration of Mars is a long-term proposition and that any
discussion of cooperating with Beijing on such an effort is speculative. “[What] the president has deemed worth discussing
with the Chinese and others is that when the time comes for humans to visit Mars, it’s going to be an extremely expensive
proposition and the question is whether it will really make sense — at the time that we’re ready to do that — to do it as one
nation rather than to do it in concert,” Holdren said in response to a question from Rep. Frank Wolf (R-Va.), a staunch
China critic who chairs the powerful subcommittee that oversees NASA spending. Holdren, who said NASA could also
benefit from cooperating with China on detection and tracking of orbital debris, stressed that any U.S. collaboration with
Beijing in manned spaceflight would depend on future Sino-U.S. relations. “But many of us, including the president,
including myself, including [NASA Administrator Charles] Bolden, believe that it’s not too soon to have preliminary
conversations about what involving China in that sort of cooperation might entail,” Holdren said. “If China is going to be,
by 2030, the biggest economy in the world … it could certainly be to our benefit to share the costs of such an expensive
venture with them and with others.” Wolf, who characterizes China’s government as “fundamentally evil,” said it is
outrageous that the Obama administration would have close ties with Beijing’s space program, which is believed to be run
primarily by the People’s Liberation Army, or PLA. “When you say you want to work in concert, it’s almost like you’re
talking about Norway or England or something like that,” an irate Wolf told Holdren, repeatedly pounding a hand against
the table top in front of him. “As long as I have breath in me, we will talk about this, we will deal with this issue, whether it
be a Republican administration or a Democrat administration, it is fundamentally immoral.” Holdren said he admired
Wolf’s leadership in calling attention to China’s human rights record, but noted that even when then-U.S. President Ronald
Reagan referred to the former Soviet Union as “the evil empire” in the late 1980s, he continued to cooperate with the
communist bloc in science and technology if doing so was deemed in the U.S. national interest. “The efforts we are
undertaking to do things together with China in science and technology are very carefully crafted to be efforts that are in
our own national interest,” Holdren said. “That does not mean that we admire the Chinese government; that does not mean
we are blind to the human rights abuses.” Holdren said that as White House science adviser, his capacity to influence the
president’s diplomatic approach to Beijing is limited. “I am not the person who’s going to be whispering in the president’s
ear on what our stance toward China should be, government to government, except in the domain where I have the
responsibility for helping the president judge whether particular activities in science and technology are in our national
interest or not,” Holdren said. Recently enacted legislation prohibits U.S. government collaboration with the Chinese in
areas funded by Wolf’s subcommittee, whose jurisdiction also includes the U.S. Commerce and Justice departments, the
National Science Foundation and the National Institute of Standards and Technology.
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Inherency- Political Anxiety
Anxiety prevents joint manned space missions with China now – changing reps key
Jeremy Page, staff writer for WSJ, 10/29/10, WSJ, Orbital Paths of U.S., China Set to Diverge,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303891804575575904021690456.html, dk
BEIJING—U.S. President Barack Obama's early initiative to explore joint manned space missions with China appears to
have been stalled by the changing political winds on Capitol Hill—even as Beijing details ambitious plans to complete its
first manned space station within the decade. An apparent lack of concrete progress in talks on the subject last week
suggests the U.S. could miss out on potential benefits, such as cheaper flights to the International Space Station, while
China presses ahead with its space program and expands cooperation with Europe, Russia and others to get the technology
and experience it needs. Gen. Charles Bolden became the first head of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
to tour China's highly sensitive manned space flight facilities during his visit last week—access that both sides might have
portrayed as a major breakthrough in a different climate. China then underlined the scale of its manned space program
when it announced Wednesday that it planned to launch the first part of a manned space station by 2016, and to complete a
"relatively large" laboratory by around 2020. Gen. Bolden's trip stemmed from President Obama's first visit to China last
November, when the administration hoped to forge a new partnership on a range of issues, possibly including joint missions
to the International Space Station following the grounding of the U.S. space shuttle fleet next year. But while China has
hailed Gen Bolden's visit as progress, and still appears keen to expand cooperation, the response from the U.S. has been
decidedly muted, reflecting the domestic controversy around his trip. The White House has remained conspicuously silent
and NASA has provided even fewer details than Chinese state media about Gen. Bolden's tour of the space facilities, many
of which are controlled by the People's Liberation Army. Gen. Bolden made no public appearances during his six-day
visit— unlike his predecessor, Michael Griffin, who became the first NASA chief to visit China in 2006—and didn't
comment on his trip for four days after he left China. In his first public statement about it late Monday, he played down the
prospect of a future joint manned mission, stressing that he hadn't discussed any "specific proposals for future cooperation."
His reticence and the apparent lack of concrete progress came after four Republican lawmakers wrote an open letter Oct. 15
demanding that he brief Congress on his return and guarantee that he didn't discuss joint manned missions. "As you know,
we have serious concerns about the nature and goals of China's space program and strongly oppose any cooperation
between NASA and China," wrote the lawmakers, three of whom sit on the panel that oversees NASA's budget. Experts
say the two countries both stand to gain from cooperation in space. China, while increasingly confident about its own
technology, still has much to learn from the U.S., especially regarding manned missions. Meanwhile, the U.S. needs a
cheap way to put humans and equipment into orbit, until commercial rockets become available. The Obama
administration's space policy, released earlier this year, went further than any previous administration in emphasizing
international cooperation and Gen. Bolden has frequently spoken about its importance, with aides suggesting China could
play a key role. But with Republicans expected to regain control of the House of Representatives in next month's mid-term
elections—and China looming large as a campaign issue—experts now deem it unlikely that there will be real progress on
joint manned missions in Mr. Obama's first term, and possibly for the next decade. "In the short term, I think there is little
chance of such joint missions. I don't think Congress would accept it," said Peter Bond, consultant editor of the Jane's Space
Systems & Industry directory. Dean Cheng, an expert on China's space program at the Heritage Foundation, said: "Any
effort to push manned spaceflight cooperation without the necessary groundwork and high-level support is far more likely
to lead to disappointment and frustration, retarding future cooperation." The controversy highlights the volatility of U.S.China relations over the last year, with overlapping disputes on the value of China's currency, U.S.arms sales to Taiwan,
Beijing's territorial claims and U.S.support for a Chinese dissident who won the Nobel Peace Prize. It also speaks to the
longer-term anxiety in Washington—compounded since the 2008 financial crisis—about how China plans to use its rapidly
expanding economic, military and technological power, and whether it could one day become more powerful than the U.S.
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China Securitization Affirmative
DDI 2011
1
Inherency- Political Anxiety
Anxiety blocks cooperation with China despite leaders pushing
The Brunei Times, 4/30/11, China astronaut calls for US space cooperation, http://www.bt.com.bn/news-asia/2011/04/30/chinaastronaut-calls-us-space-cooperation, dk
"I think the two countries should proactively implement the intent expressed in the joint communique to eliminate obstacles
and promote exchange and cooperation in our space programmes," Yang Liwei, now the vice director of the country's
Manned Space Engineering Office, said. Efforts at US-China cooperation in space have failed in the past decade, stymied
by economic, diplomatic and security tensions, despite a 2009 attempt by President Barack Obama and his Chinese
counterpart, Hu Jintao, to launch collaboration. Obama and Hu, in a statement in November 2009, called for "the initiation
of a joint dialogue on human spaceflight and space exploration, based on the principles of transparency, reciprocity and
mutual benefit. " US fears over national defence and inadvertent technology transfer have proven to be major roadblocks,
particularly after Beijing carried out an anti-satellite test in January 2007, using a ground-based missile to destroy one of its
inactive weather satellites.
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China Securitization Affirmative
DDI 2011
1
Inherency Extensions- Anxiety on Both Sides
Cooperation barely exists between China and the U.S.; security suspicions on either side hinders
accommodation
Blair and Yali 08- President of the World Security Institute, Project Director at the Congressional Office of Technology
Assessment and Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution (“The Space Security Dilemma,”
http://www.chinasecurity.us/images/stories/cs2-editorsnotes.pdf) SP
Bringing Chinese voices into the Washington policy discourse, and into thoughtful conversation with their expert
counterparts in America and elsewhere, is the purpose of China Security. By providing an open forum that informs and
enriches understanding of Chinese thinking on critical matters of security, the journal hopes to attract an expanding cadre of
contributing experts from China’s think tanks affiliated with military, security, foreign policy, and academic institutions.
By tapping into the diverse views that exist in these intellectual circles, the journal promises to foster a genuine dialogue
that helps bridge the gap of misunderstanding between Chinese and American analysts. As the articles in this issue show,
such bilateral exchanges of information, views, and constructive proposals for cooperation have barely begun in the arena
of space policy. The dialogue is oblique, long on rhetoric and short on information. The governments harbor deep-seated
suspicions of each other’s aims and capabilities, and until they manage to overcome their fears and doubts, serious progress
toward accommodation will remain a long way off.
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China Securitization Affirmative
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1
Topicality- Its
According to the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, cooperating with other countries on space policy is normal
means
Outer Space Treaty 67- Proclaimed by US President October 10, 1967 (1/27/67, “Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities
of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,”
http://www.acq.osd.mil/tc/treaties/ost/text.html) SP
In the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, States Parties to the Treaty shall be
guided by the principle of co-operation and mutual assistance and shall conduct all their activities in outer space, including
the Moon and other celestial bodies, with due regard to the corresponding interests of all other States Parties to the Treaty.
States Parties to the Treaty shall pursue studies of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, and conduct
exploration of them so as to avoid their harmful contamination and also adverse changes in the environment of the Earth
resulting from the introduction of extraterrestrial matter and, where necessary, shall adopt appropriate measures for this
purpose. If a State Party to the Treaty has reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by it or its nationals in
outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, would cause potentially harmful interference with activities of
other States Parties in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, it
shall undertake appropriate international consultations before proceeding with any such activity or experiment. A State
Party to the Treaty which has reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by another State Party in outer space,
including the Moon and other celestial bodies, would cause potentially harmful interference with activities in the peaceful
exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, may request consultation concerning the
activity or experiment.
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China Securitization Affirmative
DDI 2011
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Topicality- Its
Cooperation with China has already been brought up; China agreeing would be normal means
Johnson-Freese 07- Joan Johnson-Freese, Chair of the National Security Decision Making Department at the US naval War
College (2/6/07, “America’s China Worries- Part I,” http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/america%E2%80%99s-china-worries%E2%80%93-part-i) SP
The Chinese have not leapfrogged US technology in any way. Chinese capabilities so far are limited to low-Earth orbit, and
the ASAT test was thus more a limited technological demonstration than evidence of operational readiness. Also, China has
demonstrated a threat capability, but not intent. The Chinese ASAT test negatively impacts years of work on both sides to
improve US-China relations generally and potential US-China space cooperation specifically. That cooperation, from the
American perspective, only recently became even imaginable, as signaled by NASA Administrator Michael Griffin’s trip to
China last September. Hopefully, the Chinese test will trigger the kind of debate in the US that has long been needed over
the desirability of developing and deploying space weapons. Certainly the US can take away one important lesson from
China’s irresponsible actions: There are limits to the technological ability to protect valuable space assets. So, rather than
succumbing to the temptation of matching one demonstration of saber-rattling with another, the US needs to diversify its
options for dealing with space threats rather than only expanding technological efforts. Additionally, arms control should be
included in the US policy mix of tools for protecting space assets. Because 95 percent of space technology is dual use,
space arms-control treaties have been traditionally dismissed as nonviable because of the ease with which countries can
“cheat.” However, “rules of the road” for space operations and threat identification, much as the US has for other areas of
military operation, would be a first step toward regulations that support US security goals. And Chinese ASAT technology,
barebones now, could improve with further testing. That should be a clarion call for the US to support a ban on destructive
ASAT testing. Overall, the US should avoid the temptation to match bravado with bravado by pouring resources into a
space arms race where the US will be racing only against itself. Only recently has meaningful dialogue with the Chinese
space communities commenced. That dialogue must continue and it should not be viewed as a reward to the Chinese, even
in the face of irresponsible actions, but rather an opportunity for the US to influence their future actions and learn about
intents. The Chinese, for their part, should realize that the primary impact of their ASAT test is to have shot themselves in
the foot diplomatically. They need to renounce any further such provocations and reaffirm their commitment to the peaceful
uses of space. They need to resist attempts to excuse their actions as mere reactions to US space policies and programs.
They need to take responsibility for the fact that their ASAT test will inflame military competition in space, and this should
be followed by China increasing the kind of transparency that has long been called for regarding their secretive space
programs. Otherwise, the credibility and capital that China has carefully nurtured as a nation developing into a responsible
member of the international community over recent years will be squandered, to the detriment of all.
The U.S. and China have previously discussed space science cooperation- the plan would just finish up those
discussions on the American side
The White House Press Release 09- Office of the Press Secretary, US-China Joint Statement (11/17/09, “US-China Joint
Statement,” http://beijing.usembassy-china.org.cn/111709.html) SP
The United States and China applauded the rich achievements in scientific and technological cooperation and exchanges
between the two countries over the past 30 years since the signing of the U.S.-China Agreement on Cooperation in Science
and Technology and agreed to further upgrade the level of exchanges and cooperation in scientific and technological
innovation through the U.S.-China Joint Commission on Science and Technology Cooperation. The United States and
China look forward to expanding discussions on space science cooperation and starting a dialogue on human space flight
and space exploration, based on the principles of transparency, reciprocity and mutual benefit. Both sides welcome
reciprocal visits of the NASA Administrator and the appropriate Chinese counterpart in 2010. The United States and China
agreed to strengthen their cooperation on civil aviation, and confirmed their intent to expand the Memorandum of
Agreement for Technical Cooperation in the field of Civil Aviation between the Federal Aviation Administration of the
United States of America and the Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC). The two sides welcomed cooperation by
public and private bodies on the development of high speed railway infrastructure.
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Topicality- Its
China already introduced a plan for cooperation on joint space exploration with the United States- we just need to
say yes
Messier 11- Doug Messier, Masters Degree in Science, Technology and Public Policy from The George Washington University’s
Space Policy Institute, Graduate of the International Space University and B.A. in Journalism from Rider University (4/15/11,
“Chinese Space Leader Calls for Cooperation as Congress Says No,” http://www.parabolicarc.com/2011/04/15/chinese-space-leadercalls-cooperation-congress/) SP
A leading figure in China’s space program was in Colorado this week urging joint cooperation with the United States,
including human spaceflight, while Congressional leaders in Washington were prohibiting NASA from doing anything of
the sort. Space News reports on remarks by “Lei Fanpei, vice president of China Aerospace Science and Technology Corp.
(CASC), which oversees much of China’s launch vehicle and satellite manufacturing industry”: Lei said he sees three
areas in which U.S.-Chinese cooperation would be in both nations’ interests. The first, he said, is an open commercial
access of each nation to the other’s capabilities in satellites and launch vehicles. The second, he said, is manned
spaceflight and space science, particularly in deep space exploration. The third is in satellite applications including disaster
monitoring and management. As Lei spoke at the National Space Symposium in Colorado, legislators in Washington were
approving a budget that prohibited NASA, which is keen to cooperate, from conducting any joint programs with China:
SEC. 1340. (a) None of the funds made available by this division may be used for the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration or the Office of Science and Technology Policy to develop, design, plan, promulgate, implement, or execute
a bilateral policy, program, order, or contract of any kind to participate, collaborate, or coordinate bilaterally in any way
with China or any Chinese-owned company unless such activities are specifically authorized by a law enacted after the date
of enactment of this division. (b) The limitation in subsection (a) shall also apply to any funds used to effectuate the hosting
of official Chinese visitors at facilities belonging to or utilized by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
US-China cooperation has failed due to security tensions- the plan affirms Obama’s earlier promise
Martina 4/29- Michael Martina, Staff Writer for Reuters (4/29/11, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/29/us-china-spaceidUSTRE73S4BS20110429) SP
(Reuters) - China's most renowned astronaut said on Friday his country and the United States should make good on their
presidents' promises to cooperate in space. "I think the two countries should proactively implement the intent expressed in
the joint communique to eliminate obstacles and promote exchange and cooperation in our space programs," Yang Liwei,
now the vice director of the country's Manned Space Engineering Office, said. Efforts at U.S.-China cooperation in space
have failed in the past decade, stymied by economic, diplomatic and security tensions, despite a 2009 attempt by President
Barack Obama and his Chinese counterpart, Hu Jintao, to launch collaboration. Obama and Hu, in a statement in November
2009, called for "the initiation of a joint dialogue on human spaceflight and space exploration, based on the principles of
transparency, reciprocity and mutual benefit." U.S. fears over national defense and inadvertent technology transfer have
proven to be major roadblocks, particularly after Beijing carried out an anti-satellite test in January 2007, using a groundbased missile to destroy one of its inactive weather satellites. Yang, considered a hero of China's ambitious space program
and the first from his country to enter space, made the statement during a carefully controlled media visit to China's
astronaut training facility in the western suburbs of Beijing. There, journalists were ushered through an echoing hall
housing three new space flight training simulators, none in use by China's 24 astronauts. But China is pushing forward
without the United States, its funding in the face of NASA scale-backs and its cooperative efforts with Russia and other
countries possibly constituting the next best hope for the future of space exploration. Yang noted potential joint space
research programs with France and efforts to launch the Mars probe Firefly 1 with Russia "in the near future." He said the
Chinese government has spent more than 20 billion yuan ($3.1 billion) in the first phase of its space planning, but has no
specific target to put a man on the moon. Chinese scientists have talked about the possibility after 2020. Over 13 years,
starting in August 1996, China ran up 75 consecutive successful Long March rocket launches after overcoming technical
glitches with the help of U.S. companies. In 2003, it became the third country, after the United States and Russia, to send a
man, Yang, into space aboard its own rocket. China launched its first moon orbiter, the Chang'e-1, in October 2007,
accompanied by a blaze of patriotic propaganda celebrating the country's technological prowess. Yang said China's space
program was intended to benefit humanity and promote scientific and cultural developments.
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China Securitization Affirmative
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1
Topicality- FX Provision
Obama can override the provision banning cooperation with China over space missions
Cheng 5/9/11- Dean Cheng, Bachelor’s Degree in Politics from Princeton University and a Doctorate at MIT, Senior Analyst at
China Studies division of the Center for Naval Analyses (5/9/11, “Lost In Space: The Administration’s Rush for Sino-U.S. Space
Cooperation,” http://heritage.org/2011/05/09/lost-in-space-the-administration%E2%80%99s-rush-for-sino%E2%80%93u-s-spacecooperation/) SP
The Obama Administration appears absolutely intent on engaging the PRC in space cooperation. How else to explain the
claim by White House Office of Science and Technology Policy Director John Holdren that the congressional restriction
banning U.S.–Chinese space cooperation under just about any circumstances was not, in fact, a ban? According to Holdren,
the White House has concluded that the provision doesn’t extend to “prohibiting interactions that are part of the president’s
constitutional authority to conduct negotiations.” That includes, he said, a bilateral agreement on scientific cooperation
between the two countries that dates back to 1979. One doesn’t need a presidential signing statement to see that the White
House is near-desperate to engage the PRC in space cooperation. The problem is that, if the answer is “cooperation,” what
is the question? Moreover, the Administration has never satisfactorily answered just what it is that it seeks to cooperate
with the Chinese on. Is it still intent on negotiating a space arms control treaty? Is it hankering for a joint manned mission
to the moon, Mars, or Pluto?
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China Securitization Affirmative
DDI 2011
1
Topicality- Exploration/Development
Cooperating with another country is considered exploration and/or development- three reasons
1. Extend Kueter 10- The U.S. has claimed responsibility for contributing to the defense of allied space systemmakes China’s joint space policies fully accounted for by the USFG
2. A crucial aspect of space development involves cooperating with other countries and enabling the
interoperability of its space systems- makes our plan the most substantial
Kueter 10- Jeff Kueter, President of the George C. Marshall Institute (July 2010, “Evaluating the Obama National Space Policy:
Continuity and New Priorities,” http://www.marshall.org/pdf/materials/900.pdf) SP
The Obama policy calls for the U.S. to work more closely with its allies on space issues. The policy says the U.S. will
employ measures to “… defend our space systems and contribute to the defense of allied space systems…” Elsewhere, it
discusses leveraging allied space assets to assist U.S. efforts to perform missions or aid reconstitution of capabilities. These
are important additions to U.S. space policy and fill a void left by the Bush policy. In our evaluation of the Bush policy, we
called for the creation of an alliance strategy for space.13 In considering steps the U.S. might take to improve the security
of its space assets, allies and their growing space capabilities are a natural source of complementary capabilities in pursuit
of shared interests.14 How the Administration pursues this objective warrants close observation, for it implies fundamental
shifts in how the U.S. develops space systems and performs space operations. Many of those existing practices are products
of a bygone era when our allies lacked useful space capabilities. That is no longer the case. Moving forward the U.S. will
require greater attention to improving and enabling the interoperability of its space systems with allies technically as well as
operationally. Planning, preparation, and conduct of joint space operations will be required. U.S. space organizations will
have to become more accepting of working with allies (and other partners) which will require organizational culture and
process changes.
3. The Obama policy focuses on international cooperation, making it a core part of the space topic, which is key to
topic specific education
Kueter 10- Jeff Kueter, President of the George C. Marshall Institute (July 2010, “Evaluating the Obama National Space Policy:
Continuity and New Priorities,” http://www.marshall.org/pdf/materials/900.pdf) SP
The Obama policy adds several new terms to the space policy lexicon – sustainability, responsible behavior, and stability,
most notably. How those terms come to be interpreted and subsequently reflected in decisions about other policies and
programs will be of considerable interest to U.S. departments and agencies, policy analysts, and foreign governments. On
face, the Obama policy appears to emphasize international cooperation and highlights the goal of U.S. space leadership
more than past policies. The U.S. actively participates in and leads international discussions on a host of space issues,
leaving one to ask what additional efforts are anticipated in the new policy. The Obama policy adds a welcome emphasis on
expanding cooperation with allies on space security concerns and added prioritization on assuring access to space. Finally,
the Obama policy offers more detailed discussion of commercial and civil space issues. The policy signals principles and
goals, but ultimately, actions, reflected by budgets, decisions about programs and technical investments, and positions taken
in bilateral and multilateral settings, will determine the character of U.S. space policy. How the policy’s principles, goals,
and guidelines are implemented is the challenge ahead.
4. Education outweighs Limits- The affirmative should not be limited to a partial set of affs that don’t involve the
current direction of space policy.
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Topicality- Exploration/Development Extensions
The National Space Policy outlined by Obama emphasizes bilateral transparency in order to maximize
development and exploration potential
Kueter 10- Jeff Kueter, President of the George C. Marshall Institute (July 2010, “Evaluating the Obama National Space Policy:
Continuity and New Priorities,” http://www.marshall.org/pdf/materials/900.pdf) SP
In both the statement of principles and elsewhere, the Obama policy places great emphasis on “space leadership.” Early
commentators see the policy as a dramatic revision of past policies with its emphasis on international cooperation and
commitment to “bilateral and multilateral transparency and confidence building measures.” The “guidelines” section offers
details on how the policy would strengthen U.S. space leadership and there is a separate section discussing transparency
and confidence-building measures. The Bush policy lacks these details, but it is wrong to interpret it as eschewing U.S.
leadership in space. The Bush policy set a specific goal of strengthening the nation’s space leadership, directed the State
Department and related agencies to work internationally to build support for the principles and activities outlined in the
policy, and routinely referenced working through international fora in the context of specific topics. For example, the Bush
policy called for the U.S. to assume a leadership role in international discussions and organizations to encourage the
adoption of “policies and practices aimed at debris minimization” and to encourage cooperation “in the exchange of
information on debris research and the identification of improved debris mitigation practices.” A careful examination of the
actions of the Bush Administration also reveals great use of pertinent international bodies for purposes related to the
transparency and confidence-building activities suggested in the Obama policy. 10 In pursuit of transparency, the Bush
policy directed the Secretary of State and others, as they are in the Obama policy, to “carry out public diplomacy efforts, as
appropriate, to build an understanding of and support for U.S. national space policies and programs …” The Obama policy
discusses these issues in greater detail, but whether the added detail reflects a dramatic shift in U.S. actions remains to be
seen.
Cooperating with China makes exploration and development of space better- means a more substantial debate
Associated Press, 7/12/11- (“China’s space program targets moon”, http://articles.boston.com/2011-0712/news/29765708_1_china-plans-chinese-space-station-space-leadership) SP
This year, a rocket will carry a boxcar-size module into orbit, the first building block for a Chinese space station. Around
2013, China plans to launch a lunar probe that will set a rover loose on the moon. It wants to put a man on the moon
sometime after 2020. While the United States is still working out its next move after the space shuttle program, China is
forging ahead. Some analysts worry that the United States could slip behind China in human spaceflight - the realm of
space science with the most prestige.
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Solvency- Cooperation
US-China cooperation could shape Chinese space policy and prevent militarization
Moltz 06- James Clay Moltz, CNS Deputy Director, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (1/26/06, “Combating the
Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction with Training and Analysis,” http://cns.miis.edu/stories/060126.htm) SP
A current assumption of U.S. defense policy is that the potential vulnerability of U.S. space assets to foreign attack will
eventually need to be addressed by the U.S. deployment of space weapons. However, given the breadth of U.S. policy tools,
an equally viable option may be a strategy of "cooperative engagement" with possible rivals in space, with the aim of
steering these programs into directions favorable to U.S. interests. This could create a "positive sum" game in space for all
actors, whereas today we tend to view space competition in Cold War "zero sum" terms. In order to test this hypothesis
regarding the possible use of cooperation as a threat prevention tool, the Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation
Studies and the Space Policy Institute of George Washington University co-sponsored a seminar on January 19, 2006, in
Washington, D.C. The meeting featured five speakers, each of whom analyzed the viability of a U.S. "cooperative
engagement" strategy in space toward a specific country (or countries) that have been seen as possible U.S. rivals.
Approximately 80 persons attended the event, including representatives from the space industry, various non-governmental
organizations, local universities, the State Department, the Defense Department, the U.S. House of Representatives, the
U.S. Senate, and NASA. Speakers (and topics) included Dr. Joan Johnson-Freese (China), Dr. Victor Zaborsky (Russia and
Ukraine), Dr. Randall Correll (India), Dr. Daniel Pinkston (North and South Korea), and Dr. John Sheldon (Iran). Dr.
Johnson-Freese's presentation on China provided considerable information about China's interest in space cooperation with
the United States, but also noted its desire not to appear to fall into an "unequal" relationship with Washington, given
China's priority to develop its own national space capabilities. Dr. Johnson-Freese called U.S.-Chinese space relations
today "the last active venue of the Cold War" and urged U.S. policymakers to reconsider the current U.S. strategy of
seeking to isolate China in space, largely on non-space-related political grounds. Her remarks emphasized the questionable
effectiveness of current U.S. policy, given the ample availability of Russian and European space technologies to China.
Instead, she argued that NASA and U.S. companies could play a positive role--if allowed--in helping to "shape" Chinese
space policy and to steer it in a direction favorable to U.S. interests. More specifically, she suggested that space cooperation
should be on the agenda of the upcoming summit between President George Bush and Chinese Premier Hu Jintao. Dr.
Zaborsky began his presentation with a review of the success of the U.S. policy of cooperative engagement in dealing with
the proliferation threat posed by the Russian and Ukrainian space industries over the past 15 years. By providing Russian
and Ukrainian aerospace firms with launch quotas, access to U.S. corporations, and participation in the International Space
Station (ISS), Dr. Zaborsky argued, the United States was able to strengthen export compliance within these industries and
help provide needed space technologies to assist in the ISS's development. Russian and Ukrainian engines and launch
vehicles have also played a key supporting role in ensuring U.S. civilian and military space access over the past decade. Dr.
Zaborsky noted Russia's willingness to cancel a lucrative cryogenic engine deal with India as evidence of real compromises
made by Russian industry in the 1990s in order to support U.S. nonproliferation goals. Looking ahead, Dr. Zaborsky urged
a continuation of U.S. policies and the expansion of cooperation as a means of maintaining U.S. influence and leverage.
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Solvency- Cooperation
Cooperating with China over space development decreases securitization and increases transparency
Blair and Yali 08- President of the World Security Institute, Project Director at the Congressional Office of Technology
Assessment and Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution (“The Space Security Dilemma,”
http://www.chinasecurity.us/images/stories/cs2-editorsnotes.pdf) SP
In spite of the bleak and deteriorating space relations between China and the United States, hope springs eternal in the essay
by Sun Dang En, a research fellow of the Academy of Military Sciences. Sun’s hard-nosed realism acknowledges China’s
uphill struggle to advance its progress in space and China’s need for support from international partners, including
especially the United States, to fulfill its ambitious quest. Like Chang, he disputes the allegations about China exploiting its
manned space flight program for military purposes, adding to Chang’s points a rebuttal of the charge that the Shenzhou
launch vehicle could be fitted with a warhead and serve as an advanced ballistic missile. Sun disputes this dubious charge
on the persuasive grounds that this vehicle takes 20 hours to fuel (compared to U.S. and Russian missiles that are always
ready for launch within minutes). He implies, correctly, that such lengthy preparations would be readily detectable and that
a militarized Shenzhou rocket would be extremely vulnerable to a preemptive strike by U.S. or other forces. We (the
editors) estimate that the combined surveillance, detection, and attack time of modern missile and aircraft forces in the U.S.
arsenal is far shorter than the Chinese rocket’s fueling time alone. While rebutting allegations that China is advancing its
military space program under the guise of a civilian mission, Sun acknowledges that Chinese opaqueness engenders
suspicion: “At present, the main obstacle to Sino-U.S. cooperation on manned spaceflight is that the U.S. believes China’s
space programs lack transparency and are controlled by the military.” Yet Sun finds cause for optimism in their space
relations building upon recent friendly gestures such as the voluntary passing of information on space debris from the
United States to China prior to the launch of Shenzhou VI. He calls upon both countries to expand their cooperation
dramatically into a host of space activities dedicated to economic, human, and scientific development.
Cooperation between US and China in space is possible
Jeffery Logan, Specialist in Energy Policy Resources, Science, and Industry Division for congress, 9/29/20 08 “China’s Space
Program: Options for U.S.-China Cooperation, http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RS22777_20080929.pdf”
Information and data sharing. Confidence building measures (CBMs) such as information exchange on debris management,
environmental and meteorological conditions, and navigation, are widely considered an effective first step in building trust
in a sensitive relationship. NASA has done some of this with CNSA in the past, but more is possible. Space policy
dialogue. Another area of potential exchange could begin with “strategic communication,”24 an attempt for each side to
more accurately understand the other’s views, concerns, and intentions. Dialogue on “rules of the road,” a “code of
conduct,” or even select military issues could be included. ! Joint activities. This type of cooperation is more complex and
would probably require strong political commitments and confidence building measures in advance. Bi- and multi-lateral
partnerships on the international space station, lunar missions, environmental observation, or solar system exploration are
potential options.
China wants to cooperate with the US regarding space missions
Jack Kennedy, OpEd Columnist at Kingsport Times-News, board of directors at Virginia Commercial Space Flight Authority,
4/15/2011 “China Seeks US Space Policy Cooperation, http://spaceports.blogspot.com/2011/04/china-seeks-us-spacecooperation.html
A top Chinese government space official on April 14 appealed to the U.S. government to lift its decade-long ban on most
forms of U.S.-Chinese space cooperation, saying both nations would benefit from closer government and commercial space
interaction. Lei Fanpei, vice president of China Aerospace Science and Technology Corp. (CASC), which oversees much of
China’s launch vehicle and satellite manufacturing industry, specifically called for cooperation on manned space flight, in
which China has made massive investment in recent years, reports Peter B. de Sekling of Space News. While cooperation
with the United States has been shut down, he said, China has maintained relations with the 18-nation European Space
Agency, Brazil, France, Russia and others. Lei said he sees three areas in which U.S.-Chinese cooperation would be in both
nations’ interests. The first, he said, is an open commercial access of each nation to the other’s capabilities in satellites and
launch vehicles. The second, he said, is manned spaceflight and space science, particularly in deep space exploration. The
third is in satellite applications including disaster monitoring and management.
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30
China Securitization Affirmative
DDI 2011
1
Solvency- Cooperation
Cooperation with China over space development and exploration helps develop political ties and trust between
China and the U.S.
Reuters 1/3/11- Reuters (1/3/11, “US-China Space Cooperation Fades,” http://www.royalsociety.org.nz/2011/01/03/china-usaspace-2/) SP
ANTI-SATELLITE TESTS Possible US-Chinese cooperation became more controversial after Beijing carried out a
watershed anti-satellite test in January 2007, using a ground-based missile to knock out one of its inactive weather satellites
in high polar orbit. No advance notice of the test was given. Thirteen months later, the United States destroyed a
malfunctioning US spy satellite using a ship-launched Raytheon Co Standard Missile 3 after a high-profile buildup to the
event. The US interception was just outside the atmosphere so that debris would burn up promptly. US officials say China’s
capabilities could threaten US space assets in low orbit. The Chinese test also created a large cloud of orbital debris that
may last for 100 years, boosting the risk to manned spaceflight and to hundreds of satellites belonging to more than two
dozen countries. China’s work on anti-satellite weapons is “destabilizing,” Wallace Gregson, assistant US secretary of
defense for Asian and Pacific security affairs, said in December, also citing its investment in anti-ship missiles, advanced
submarines, surface-to-air missiles and computer warfare techniques. “It has become increasingly evident that China is
pursuing a long-term, comprehensive military buildup that could upend the regional security balance,” Gregson told a
forum hosted by the Progressive Policy Institute in Washington. The Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank, called
on members of the incoming Congress to be wary of any space cooperation with China on the grounds it could bolster
Beijing’s knowledge and harm US security. “Congress should reject (the Obama) administration attempts to curry favor
with the international community while placing US advantages in space at risk,” Dean Cheng, a Heritage research fellow
for Chinese political and security affairs, and two colleagues said in a Dec. 15 memo to lawmakers. Proponents of
cooperation say even symbolic steps, such as hosting a Chinese astronaut on the International Space Station, might help win
friends in Beijing and blunt hard-liners. Gregory Kulacki, China project manager for the Union of Concerned Scientists, a
group often at odds with US policy, said cooperation would be more of a political project than a technical one. “We need to
get past the idea that the Chinese need us more than we need them,” he said.
Space is the biggest international brotherhood in existence- Welcoming China will ease concerns about security
Klotz 7/15/11- Irene Klotz, Reuters Staff Writer (7/15/11, “UPDATE 1-Astronaut welcomes China to space brotherhood,”
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/15/space-shuttle-idUSN1E76E1GU20110715) SP
A U.S. astronaut on the final shuttle mission said on Friday China's first space station will be a welcome addition to the
orbital brotherhood. "China being in space I think is a great thing. The more nations that get into space, the better
cooperation we'll have with each," Atlantis astronaut Rex Walheim said during an in-flight interview with Reuters. "Space
is one of the biggest international brotherhoods we have." The first module of China's planned Tiangong-I space station
arrived at its Gobi Desert launch site on June 29, the Xinhua news agency reported. It is scheduled to fly later this year on a
Long March rocket and is to be visited by Chinese astronauts -- known as taikonauts -- next year. The United States is
preparing to regroup its human spaceflight program. It is retiring its three-ship shuttle fleet upon Atlantis' return on July 21
in order to free up funds to develop new vehicles that can travel beyond the space station, where the shuttles cannot go.
Walheim and his three shuttle crewmates are halfway through a planned 13-day mission, the final flight in the 30-year-old
shuttle program. They are delivering more than 5 tons of cargo to the International Space Station, a $100 billion project of
16 nations that orbits 240 miles (380 km) above Earth. The food, clothes, equipment and supplies aboard Atlantis are
intended to tide over the station until NASA's newly hired cargo delivery companies, Space Exploration Technologies, or
SpaceX, and Orbital Sciences Corp (ORB.N), are ready to begin resupply missions next year. Russia, Europe and Japan
also operate freighters. Crew ferry flights will be handled exclusively by Russia, at a cost of more than $50 million per
person, until U.S. commercial firms develop that capability.
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31
China Securitization Affirmative
DDI 2011
1
Solvency- Cooperation
China and the US should cooperate to increase transparency and reduce risks of conflict
MacDonald 08, (Bruce W., Council on Foreign Relations, “China, space weapons, and U.S. security”
http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=o0GkabrNftIC&oi=fnd&pg=PP2&dq=china+us+classify+each+other+as+space+threa
ts&ots=OTlffI8tGS&sig=WhjYe_yA8suj0DmrEaLSTi2UTlM#v=onepage&q&f=false. IG)
The United States faces a serious challenge as its military and economic powers increasingly depend upon space
infrastructure that grows more vulnerable as worldwide space technology advances, especially in China. While the United
States will likely remain the preeminent space power at least for the next twenty to thirty years, it will no longer enjoy the
level of near monopoly on military space capability that it has enjoyed since the fall of the Soviet Union. As China becomes
a credible space power with a demonstrated offensive counter- space capability, the question for U.S. policy is what kind of
feasible and stable space regime best serves U.S. Iong—term security interests. This question should be addressed early in
the new administration`s tenure, if not earlier. The fundamental U.S. security interest in the wake of China’s 2007 ASAT
test should be deterring China and others from attacking U.S. assets in space, using both a combination of declaratory
policy, military programs, and diplomacy, and promoting a more stable and secure space environment. At the same time,
the United States and China should both pursue diplomatic options to increase clarity and minimize misunderstanding on
space-related matters, and reduce the chances of accidental conflict. This comprehensive mix of military and diplomatic
measures is more likely to achieve U.S. space and larger national security objectives than either by itself.
Recommendation for U.S. China to cooperate
MacDonald 08, (Bruce W., Council on Foreign Relations, “China, space weapons, and U.S. security”
http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=o0GkabrNftIC&oi=fnd&pg=PP2&dq=china+us+classify+each+other+as+space+threa
ts&ots=OTlffI8tGS&sig=WhjYe_yA8suj0DmrEaLSTi2UTlM#v=onepage&q&f=false. IG)
On a quid pro quo basis, State and NASA should discuss with China the opportunities for greater civilian space cooperation
as a confidence-building measure.
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China Securitization Affirmative
DDI 2011
1
Solvency- Securitization
Cooperation over space is key to solving the security dilemma
Rosita Dellios, Associate Professor of International Relations at Bond University, 12/1/20 05 “Culture Mandala: The Bulletin of the
Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies,
http://epublications.bond.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1093&context=cm”
This is not surprising in view of China's increasingly global image. It exhibits a desire to accord with international
standards, particularly in economic and scientific practices. Once a closed society in which it was more important to be 'red'
than 'expert', 21st century China is unrecognizable. Deng Xiaoping's post-1978 reforms have resulted in a China that is far
more open to the world, participating in inter-governmental institutions, transnational regimes and the global market
economy. Indeed, China's export success has been such that fear of the China Inc phenomenon has come to rival fear of a
militarily powerful China. Beijing's diplomatic tasks in dampening threat perceptions are of considerable importance. In
this regard, the space program can represent a window with a particularly attractive view of the new participatory China.
Space may not only be an attractive indicator of Beijing's commitment to multilateralism. It could also be an instigator by
leading to deeper international cooperation.
US-China space cooperation reduces tensions and increases transparency
James Clay Moltz, National Security Affairs faculty of the Naval Postgraduate School, 20 06 “Preventing Conflict in Space:
Cooperative Engagement As Possible U.S. Strategy, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14777620600910563#preview”
Finally, unabated space competition, particularly with an emphasis on U.S. ‘‘superiority’’ and ‘‘dominance,’’ is equally
likely to increase international tensions, stimulate currently dormant military responses, and foment dangerous practices in
space, all of which could work to the disadvantage of the United States. Thus, an alternative policy based on the use of
cooperative engagement as a policy tool is worth exploring. Fortunately, the United States enjoys an abundance of possible
levers—economic, political, and military—to dissuade countries from adopting a hostile course in space. In theory,
therefore, a U.S. strategy of enhanced space engagement could accomplish several objectives: 1) reduce tensions and
improve the reputation of the United States as a country seeking to foster space security through cooperation; 2) build
substantive linkages between space programs to increase mutual benefits, transparency, and cost savings; and 3) shift
traditional ‘‘zero sum,’’ military-based thinking in space to ‘‘positive sum,’’ commercially oriented dynamics.
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33
China Securitization Affirmative
DDI 2011
1
Solvency- Securitization
US-China space cooperation increases transparency
Aaron R Ressler, Major at the Air Command And Staff College Air University Maxwell Air Force Base, April 2009 “Advancing
Sino-U.S. Space Cooperation, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA539619”
Both China and the U.S. are open to international space cooperation, as noted in their respective policy documents on space
and current cooperative programs. History has shown that both China and U.S. have gained from space cooperation, which
could be an ideal solution in seeking to deter China from exercising ASAT operations. Benefits. While possibly deterring
Chinese ASAT operations, this deterrence would be a secondary effect (or benefit for that matter) of successful U.S.-China
space cooperation. In order for this cooperation to take place, the benefits will have to outweigh the challenges (some which
will likely be viewed as risks) for both nations. The first benefit of cooperation would be improved transparency. 82
Secrecy of China’s space program has led to a suspicious outlook by many critics of this program. Space cooperation
between the two countries could be based on regular meetings which “could help the two nations understand each other’s
intentions more clearly.” 83 With China as a partner, the U.S. would have better visibility and communication with the
CNSA concerning China’s space activities, and the same would hold true for China. Reviewing China’s White Paper on its
space policy and trying to make sense of its counterspace capabilities after the fact is the wrong approach. “If NASA signed
an agreement with CNSA and began joint space projects, they would more easily and directly understand China’s space
activities and directions.” 84 Another benefit mentioned earlier is cost savings, which would be attractive for both nations.
For most countries, budgets for space are insufficient or limited to the point where they depend on international space
cooperation to meet their goals. 85 Exceptions to this in some degree are Russia, the U.S. and China, as all have achieved
their own manned space programs. President Bush’s “Vision for Space Exploration” announcement in 2004 called for
“redirecting NASA’s human exploration program from low Earth orbit to the Moon, Mars, and worlds beyond.” 86 The
timeframe specified in this announcement for the return to the moon was between 2015-2020, carrying a price tag of $104
billion. 87 China too has ambitions for manned missions to moon, so spreading the cost could prove beneficial to both
nations. Increasing U.S. options with regard to manned spacelift could be a benefit in U.S. cooperation with China and is
something the U.S. should consider for increased safety and logistics. History has shown that the U.S. was fortunate to have
the cooperative programs it had with Russia when the shuttle fleet was grounded following the Columbia accident of 2003.
If China were to become both a U.S. and ISS partner, the U.S. would eventually (assuming continued Shenzhou success)
have another option besides Russia as a backup to deliver astronauts and supplies to the ISS. 88 Global stability is another
possible benefit stemming from U.S.-China space cooperation. 89 “Both China and the USA are important countries in
global politics, economics,” 90 Maintaining a healthy relationship between these two countries has positive global impacts.
It is possible to overcome the status quo securitization of China
Kevin Pollpeter, fellow at the Strategic Studies Institute, March 2008 “BUILDING FOR THE FUTURE: CHINA’S PROGRESS IN
SPACE TECHNOLOGY DURING THE TENTH 5-YEAR PLAN AND THE U.S. RESPONSE, Strategic Studies Institute”
While the inherent military nature of China’s space program and its lack of transparency preclude most forms of
cooperation, the United States can cooperate with China in beneficial ways that do not transfer technology or expertise.
These include coordinating scientific research and increasing the safety of human spaceflight by establishing a code of
conduct to rescue imperiled astronauts. Consequently, the challenge for the United States is to manage the positive-sum and
negative-sum consequences of China’s ascendant space program by improving its space industry, better enabling its
military to counter space-based threats, and engaging in cooperative activities that improve science and increase the safety
of human space flight.
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34
China Securitization Affirmative
DDI 2011
1
Solvency- US-Sino Relations
Collaborating with China improves relations and saves money
Logan 08- Jeffery Logan, Specialist in Energy Policy in the Resources, Science, and Industry division of The Congressional
Research Service, The Library of Congress, 9/28/08, “China’s Space Program: Options for U.S.-China Cooperation,”
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22777.pdf) SP
Benefits of Cooperating with China. The potential benefits of expanded cooperation and dialogue with China include: !
Improved transparency. Regular meetings could help the two nations understand each others’ intentions more clearly.
Currently, there is mutual uncertainty and mistrust over space goals, resulting in the need for worst-case planning. !
Offsetting the need for China’s unilateral development. Collaborating with China — instead of isolating it — may keep the
country dependent on U.S. technology rather than forcing it to develop technologies alone. This can give the United States
leverage in other areas of the relationship. ! Cost savings. China now has the economic standing to support joint space
cooperation. Cost-sharing of joint projects could help NASA achieve its challenging work load in the near future. Some
have argued that U.S. space commerce has suffered from the attempt to isolate China while doing little to keep sensitive
technology out of China.
Solar system exploration with China increases relations- empirically proven
Logan 08- Jeffery Logan, Specialist in Energy Policy in the Resources, Science, and Industry division of The Congressional
Research Service, The Library of Congress, 9/28/08, “China’s Space Program: Options for U.S.-China Cooperation,”
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22777.pdf) SP
Options for Possible Cooperation. ! Information and data sharing. Confidence building measures (CBMs) such as
information exchange on debris management, environmental and meteorological conditions, and navigation, are widely
considered an effective first step in building trust in a sensitive relationship. NASA has done some of this with CNSA in the
past, but more is possible. ! Space policy dialogue. Another area of potential exchange could begin with “strategic
communication,”24 an attempt for each side to more accurately understand the other’s views, concerns, and intentions.
Dialogue on “rules of the road,” a “code of conduct,” or even select military issues could be included. ! Joint activities. This
type of cooperation is more complex and would probably require strong political commitments and confidence building
measures in advance. Bi- and multi-lateral partnerships on the international space station, lunar missions, environmental
observation, or solar system exploration are potential options. A joint U.S.-Soviet space docking exercise in 1975 achieved
important technical and political breakthroughs during the Cold War.
US-China space cooperation increases transparency and trust
Kevin Pollpeter, fellow at the Strategic Studies Institute, March 20 08 “BUILDING FOR THE FUTURE: CHINA’S PROGRESS
IN SPACE TECHNOLOGY DURING THE TENTH 5-YEAR PLAN AND THE U.S. RESPONSE, Strategic Studies Institute”
The rise of China as a space power also raises the question of whether the United States should cooperate with China in
space. The difficulty in deciding an appropriate response arises from the inability of both sides to determine whether their
relationship will be friendly or hostile. Nevertheless, the United States is presented with four policy options to meet the
changing dynamics presented by China’s space program: contain, compete, cooperate, and do nothing. Containment is the
least viable of the four options, and as China becomes more integrated with the world, it will become even less practical.
Competition may also be problematic. U.S.-China relations may be ambivalent, but extensive cooperation does take place
in many araeas, and it is not apparent how defining China as a competitor in a space race will further relations. It is also not
apparent whether the American public will support a race which will require additional funding with little short-term gain.
Cooperation, on the other hand, has the potential to increase transparency and trust and to lessen competitive aspects that
may lead to armed conflict.
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35
China Securitization Affirmative
DDI 2011
1
Solvency- US-Sino Relations
US-China space cooperation lessens tensions that may cause conflicts and increase transparency
Kevin Pollpeter, fellow at the Strategic Studies Institute, March 20 08 “BUILDING FOR THE FUTURE: CHINA’S PROGRESS
IN SPACE TECHNOLOGY DURING THE TENTH 5-YEAR PLAN AND THE U.S. RESPONSE, Strategic Studies Institute”
Alternatively, the similarities of the two space programs have prompted calls for cooperation. Supporters of cooperation
argue that cooperation in space has the potential to increase transparency and trust and to lessen competitive aspects that
may lead to armed conflict.96 Supporters of cooperation also argue that cooperation can produce dependencies on the
United States for technologies that could be used as leverage to influence the Chinese space program in ways advantageous
to the United States and can increase the transparency of the Chinese space program.
Cooperation between the US and China will increase safety in space and increase transparency
Kevin Pollpeter, fellow at the Strategic Studies Institute, March 2008 “BUILDING FOR THE FUTURE: CHINA’S PROGRESS
IN SPACE TECHNOLOGY DURING THE TENTH 5-YEAR PLAN AND THE U.S. RESPONSE, Strategic Studies Institute”
Cooperation could also have benefits in the realm of human space flight by increasing safety in space.105 The United
States and China already have an agreement to assist stranded astronauts on the earth; this agreement could be extended to
space. Having the option to use Chinese spacecraft to rescue astronauts or cosmonauts manning the Space Shuttle,
International Space Station, or the future Orion spacecraft seems to be a pragmatic goal.106 In these situations, only the
Russians could provide rescue, and even that could be threatened if political unrest in Kazakhstan were to prevent launches
from Baikonur. Developing a code of conduct for space travel, similar to those governing travel on the high seas obligating
assistance to crews in peril, would increase the safety of one of the most dangerous occupations. Such a code of conduct
would require the Chinese to practice docking with the International Space Station and U.S. spacecraft to ensure safety and
reliability. It would also require U.S. spacecraft to dock with the planned Chinese space station. A side benefit of a code of
conduct to assist endangered astronauts in space may be an increase in the transparency of the Chinese space program.
Cooperation would necessarily entail discussions over technology, policies, and intent that would otherwise be difficult to
obtain.
Cooperation with China over space will benefit both the US and China
Kevin Pollpeter, fellow at the Strategic Studies Institute, March 20 08 “BUILDING FOR THE FUTURE: CHINA’S PROGRESS
IN SPACE TECHNOLOGY DURING THE TENTH 5-YEAR PLAN AND THE U.S. RESPONSE, Strategic Studies Institute”
As China’s space power grows, space diplomacy will also have a role in meeting the challenges of China’s space program.
This monograph argues that a program of limited cooperation with China that focuses on tangible benefits for both
countries is best suited to meet those challenges. Space activities are multifaceted, and the U.S.-China space relationship
need not be solely defined by military considerations. Nevertheless, the inherently military nature of the Chinese space
program and its lack of transparency and tendency towards disinformation preclude most forms of cooperation. By focusing
cooperation on the safety of space travel and improving science, however, NASA can contribute to its mission while
meeting the challenges of a growing space power.
Cooperation will improve transparency, but mistrust and securitization make cooperation difficult the
achieve
Jeffery Logan, Specialist in Energy Policy Resources, Science, and Industry Division for congress, 9/29/20 08 “China’s Space
Program: Options for U.S.-China Cooperation, http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RS22777_20080929.pdf”
The potential benefits of expanded cooperation and dialogue with China include: Improved transparency. Regular meetings
could help the two nations understand each others’ intentions more clearly. Currently, there is mutual uncertainty and
mistrust over space goals, resulting in the need for worst-case planning.
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36
China Securitization Affirmative
DDI 2011
1
Solvency- US-Sino Relations
Cooperation in space could bolster US-Sino relations, but US concerns over an inadvertent technology
transfer block such action
Reuters 1/3/11- Reuters (1/3/11, “US-China Space Cooperation Fades,” http://www.royalsociety.org.nz/2011/01/03/china-usaspace-2/) SP
The prospects for cooperation between the United States and China in space are fading even as proponents say working
together in the heavens could help build bridges in often-testy relations on Earth. The idea of joint ventures in space,
including spacewalks, explorations and symbolic “feel good” projects, have been floated from time to time by leaders on
both sides. Efforts have gone nowhere over the past decade, swamped by economic, diplomatic and security tensions,
despite a 2009 attempt by President Barack Obama and his Chinese counterpart, Hu Jintao, to kick-start the bureaucracies.
US domestic politics make the issue unlikely to advance when Obama hosts Hu at the White House on Jan. 19. Washington
is at odds with Beijing over its currency policies and huge trade surplus but needs China’s help to deter North Korea and
Iran’s nuclear ambitions and advance global climate and trade talks, among other matters. Hu’s state visit will highlight the
importance of expanding cooperation on “bilateral, regional and global issues,” the White House said. But space appears to
be a frontier too far for now, partly due to US fears of an inadvertent technology transfer. China may no longer be much
interested in any event, reckoning it does not need US expertise for its space program. New obstacles to cooperation have
come from the Republicans capturing control of the US House of Representatives in the Nov. 2 congressional elections
from Obama’s Democrats. Representative Frank Wolf, for instance, is set to take over as chairman of the appropriations
subcommittee that funds the US space agency in the House. A China critic and human rights firebrand, the Republican
congressman has faulted NASA’s chief for meeting leaders of China’s Manned Space Engineering Office in October. “As
you know, we have serious concerns about the nature and goals of China’s space program and strongly oppose any
cooperation between NASA and China,” Wolf and three fellow Republicans wrote NASA Administrator Charles Bolden on
Oct. 15 as he left for China. SPACE EXPLORATION Obama and Hu, in a statement in November 2009, called for “the
initiation of a joint dialogue on human spaceflight and space exploration, based on the principles of transparency,
reciprocity and mutual benefit.” The statement, marking a visit by Obama to China, also called for reciprocal visits in 2010
of NASA’s chief and “the appropriate Chinese counterpart.” Bolden, who went to China as head of a small team, said
discussions there “did not include consideration of any specific proposals for future cooperation” – a statement apparently
designed to placate Wolf, who will have a big say in NASA’s budget. The Chinese visit to NASA did not materialize in
2010 for reasons that have not been explained. NASA representatives did not reply to questions but a Chinese embassy
spokesman, Wang Baodong, said he suspected it was “mainly a scheduling issue.” China is an emerging space power. Over
13 years starting in August 1996, it ran up 75 consecutive successful Long March rocket launches after overcoming
technical glitches with the help of US companies. China launched its second moon orbiter in October. In 2008, it became
the third country after the United States and Russia to send astronauts on a spacewalk outside an orbiting craft. Beijing
plans an unmanned moon landing and deployment of a moon rover in 2012 and the retrieval of lunar soil and stone samples
around 2017. Chinese scientists have talked about the possibility of sending a man to the moon after 2020 – more than 50
years after US astronauts accomplished the feat.
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37
China Securitization Affirmative
DDI 2011
1
Solvency- US-Sino Relations
Cooperation with China over space development and exploration helps develop political ties and trust
between China and the U.S.
Reuters 1/3/11- Reuters (1/3/11, “US-China Space Cooperation Fades,” http://www.royalsociety.org.nz/2011/01/03/china-usaspace-2/) SP
ANTI-SATELLITE TESTS Possible US-Chinese cooperation became more controversial after Beijing carried out a
watershed anti-satellite test in January 2007, using a ground-based missile to knock out one of its inactive weather satellites
in high polar orbit. No advance notice of the test was given. Thirteen months later, the United States destroyed a
malfunctioning US spy satellite using a ship-launched Raytheon Co Standard Missile 3 after a high-profile buildup to the
event. The US interception was just outside the atmosphere so that debris would burn up promptly. US officials say China’s
capabilities could threaten US space assets in low orbit. The Chinese test also created a large cloud of orbital debris that
may last for 100 years, boosting the risk to manned spaceflight and to hundreds of satellites belonging to more than two
dozen countries. China’s work on anti-satellite weapons is “destabilizing,” Wallace Gregson, assistant US secretary of
defense for Asian and Pacific security affairs, said in December, also citing its investment in anti-ship missiles, advanced
submarines, surface-to-air missiles and computer warfare techniques. “It has become increasingly evident that China is
pursuing a long-term, comprehensive military buildup that could upend the regional security balance,” Gregson told a
forum hosted by the Progressive Policy Institute in Washington. The Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank, called
on members of the incoming Congress to be wary of any space cooperation with China on the grounds it could bolster
Beijing’s knowledge and harm US security. “Congress should reject (the Obama) administration attempts to curry favor
with the international community while placing US advantages in space at risk,” Dean Cheng, a Heritage research fellow
for Chinese political and security affairs, and two colleagues said in a Dec. 15 memo to lawmakers. Proponents of
cooperation say even symbolic steps, such as hosting a Chinese astronaut on the International Space Station, might help win
friends in Beijing and blunt hard-liners. Gregory Kulacki, China project manager for the Union of Concerned Scientists, a
group often at odds with US policy, said cooperation would be more of a political project than a technical one. “We need to
get past the idea that the Chinese need us more than we need them,” he said.
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38
China Securitization Affirmative
DDI 2011
1
Solvency- Mars Initiative
The U.S. Mars initiative could be a starting place for Sino-U.S. space cooperation- it solves for China’s
militarization and securitization of space
Blair and Yali 08- President of the World Security Institute, Project Director at the Congressional Office of Technology
Assessment and Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution (“The Space Security Dilemma,”
http://www.chinasecurity.us/images/stories/cs2-editorsnotes.pdf) SP
This tectonic shift three decades ago was allowed by an improving security environment for China, Wu notes. Receding
threats to China from the Soviet Union and the United States opened the window of opportunity for economic reform. As
both Wu and Hagt explain, this process of forcing the space sector to transform and compete in the marketplace drastically
altered the entire Chinese program. The divestment of the military from commercial activities across the board, including
the space sector, since 1999 has created new opportunities and incentives for international collaboration. In theory (the
editors’), Sino-American space cooperation should have deepened rather than frozen. However, the U.S. Cox Commission
report engendered an effort to isolate China’s space program. Wu remains convinced of the benefits of space cooperation.
Many Chinese analysts particularly emphasize the U.S. Mars initiative as a new starting place for Sino-U.S. space
cooperation. Deeper integration with the international community would help further separate China’s commercial space
industry from the military, she contends. Conversely, the continuing isolation of China’s space sector has the opposite
effect, and may rejuvenate military influence. And although “China does not have the luxury to engage in a military
competition with superpowers in space or in other areas,” Wu believes that “we now stand at the threshold of space
weaponization” and urges the international community to act quickly “to establish a system of rules to manage and
coordinate space activities.”
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China Securitization Affirmative
DDI 2011
1
Solvency- Dual Use Capabilities
Space tech has dual-use
Dean Cheng, Research Fellow, Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation, 10/30/2009 “U.S.-China Space Cooperation:
More Costs Than Benefits, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/10/us-china-space-cooperation-more-costs-than-benefits”
Beyond the technical issues, however, there are more fundamental political concerns that must be addressed. The U.S.
military depends on space as a strategic high ground. Space technology is also dual-use in nature: Almost any technology or
information that is exchanged in a cooperative venture is likely to have military utility. Sharing such information with
China, therefore, would undercut American tactical and technological military advantages.
Space exploration directly affects securitizing and militaristic policies due to dual-use capabilities
Fraser MacDonald, Lecturer in Human Geography, 2007, Anti-Astropolitik: outer space and the orbit of geography, 16-17, dk
The most striking aspect of the sociality of outer space is the extent to which it is, and always has been, thoroughly
militarized. The 1967 UN Outer Space Treaty banned nuclear weapons in space, on the moon or on other celestial bodies,
and contained a directive to use outer space ‘for peaceful purposes’. But its attempt to prohibit the ‘weaponizing’ of space
was always interpreted in the loosest possible manner. The signatories to the OST in Washington, London and Moscow
were in no doubt that space exploration was primarily about military strategy; that the ability to send a rocket into space
was conspicuous evidence of the ability to dispatch a nuclear device to the other side of the world. This association remains
strong, as the concern over Iran’s space programme (with its Shahab family of medium range missiles and satellite launch
vehicles) makes clear. Several commentators in strategic affairs have noted the expanding geography of war from the two
dimensions of land and sea to the air warfare of the twentieth century and more recently to the new strategic challenges of
outer space and cyberspace (see for instance Gray, 2005: 154).
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Solvency- Transparency
Transparency is key to dispel misperceptions that generate securitization logic
Gallagher 10- Nancy Gallagher, Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, U of Maryland, Published in
Astropolitics, Volume 8, Issue 2 (May 2010, “Space Governance and International Cooperation,”
http://www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/files/space_governance_and_international_cooperation.pdf) SP
U.S. proposals for cooperative steps to improve strategic stability in space have eschewed broad legal limits on capabilities
in favor of dialogue and transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs). The Obama Administration has been
trying to establish regular bilateral strategic stability talks with Russia and China covering nuclear, space, and cybersecurity issues. The United States has also been calling on China, in particular, to be more transparent about its space
programs, capabilities, and intentions. While the administration says that strategic dialogue would provide “mutual
reassurance in the space domain,” its public remarks highlight advances in Chinese counterspace capabilities that concern
the United States without acknowledging that the United States already has more advanced counterspace capabilities of
great concern to China.28 Americans and Europeans often propose transparency measures as a low-risk way to test
intentions and dispel misperceptions that could generate unwarranted suspicions, arms build-ups, and fears of attack. Other
countries have a less favorable view of transparency for its own sake. While Russia and China have agreed to extensive and
intrusive verification when necessary for high confidence in compliance with legally binding arms control treaties that
serve their security interests, they have usually rejected requests to provide sensitive information without a legal agreement
regulating its provision and use. That reluctance is partly cultural, but it is also strategic; the weaker player has greater
reason to worry about sharing information that might reveal their vulnerabilities, especially in the absence of any
constraints on the stronger player’s capabilities or actions. The United States probably also overestimates the reassurance
value of minor TCBMs, like presentations on national space policies and expert visits to military satellite flight control
centers, given the huge gap between U.S. military space capabilities and those of all other countries and the amount of
classified information about U.S. military space spending, programs, and capabilities that would undoubtedly be excluded
from these interactions.
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Solvency- Political Expediency
Dealing with China in a way that is politically favourable makes space securitization the default
Gallagher 10- Nancy Gallagher, Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, U of Maryland, Published in
Astropolitics, Volume 8, Issue 2 (May 2010, “Space Governance and International Cooperation,”
http://www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/files/space_governance_and_international_cooperation.pdf) SP
In sum, there are good reasons for conceptualizing space cooperation as managing a global commons so that a growing
number of individual space actors can continue to use it in a safe, equitable, and sustainable manner, but there are also
major reasons why framing the need for greater space cooperation in this way is unlikely to produce international
agreements that make a major difference in outcomes. Interference from overcrowding and accidents caused by space
debris have so far been low probability, low consequence events. This makes it hard to convince policy makers outside of
the space community that they should devote significant time, money, and political capital to get more rapid international
agreement on, and more widespread compliance with, stricter rules, wider information sharing, and better managerial
processes. With ongoing wars and the global economic crisis, a 1-in-1,000 chance of a given satellite colliding with a chunk
of space debris during a ten-year functional lifetime does not sound too bad.20 Debris cascades could dramatically increase
the future risks and costs of space operations, but that would still pale by comparison with the consequences of global
warming or rampant nuclear proliferation. If proponents of greater space cooperation truly believe that collective action
problems like debris mitigation are the most important reason for cooperation, and if they are satisfied with the rate of
progress on improving launch, operation, and disposal practices that has occurred over the past fifteen years, then
continuing to frame the case for cooperation in these terms is a fine strategic choice. But if they believe that progress
towards sustainability in managing space as a global commons has been inadequate, then they need to reconsider the
preference for informal self-regulation over more formal and fully developed regulatory arrangements. And if they were
hoping to use major successes in relatively uncontroversial types of technical space coordination as a way to build
momentum for more significant cooperation on politically difficult space security issues, then they should think about how
those larger, more politically sensitive issues are impeding low-priority technical coordination. Strategic sensitivities
impede cooperation because many people whose decisions affect space, especially from U.S. and foreign defense policy
communities, resist doing what would make sense for the long-term sustainable management of space as a global commons
because they do not think about space in the same way that environmentalists, international lawyers, or collective action
theorists do. People who believe that access to and use of space can be controlled for strategic gains relative to potential
competitors sometimes invoke the “space as a global commons” phrase as a way to assert their own right to use space
without interference from others without acknowledging that other users have similar rights, and that all rights in space
confer corresponding responsibilities. An extreme form of this view argues that the United States should become a space
hegemon to police the shared environment, protect peaceful uses, and prevent anyone else from accessing or using space
for hostile purposes.21 Less extreme forms of adversarial thinking also impede functional cooperation by limiting
willingness to share space surveillance information and restricting exports of technologies that could help with debris
mitigation, space traffic management, and the optimization of scarce resources. The more such adversarial logic dominates
decisions about space, the less likely U.S. or foreign decision-makers will be to forego short-term gains and future
flexibility in order to protect space from environmental degradation and to avoid social disapproval.
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Solvency- A2: Wolf Clause
The Wolf Clause is a product of anxiety toward peaceful Chinese development
Space Daily, Xinhua, 5/18/11, "Wolf Clause" betrays China-U.S. cooperation,
http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Wolf_Clause_betrays_China_US_cooperation_999.html, dk
The United States' National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) revoked the media passes granted to journalists
from China due to the ban, or the "Wolf Clause", which was regarded as "discriminative" by even Americans themselves.
On April 15, U.S. President Barack Obama signed into law the budget bill for fiscal year 2011 which will end on Sept. 30
after the House of Representatives passed it. The bill included a clause which bans any China-U.S. joint scientific research
activities related to NASA or coordinated by the White House's Science Policy Office. Under the clause in the budget bill,
none of the Congress-approved funds for the U.S. government "may be used for the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration or the Office of Science and Technology Policy to develop, design, plan, promulgate, implement, or execute
a bilateral policy, program, order, or contract of any kind to participate, collaborate, or coordinate bilaterally in any way
with China or any Chinese-owned company." It also applies the limitation "to any funds used to effectuate the hosting of
official Chinese visitors at facilities belonging to or utilized" by NASA. As a result, Chinese journalists were denied the
opportunity to make live coverage of the shuttle's blast-off, just as their peers from other countries have done. The Chinese
journalists were also kept away from NASA's press conferences. Obviously, the "Wolf Clause" runs counter to the trend
that both China and the United States are trying to push ahead their exchanges and cooperation in science and technology.
During the third round of the China-U.S. Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S and ED) held in Washington earlier this
month, the two sides published accomplishments of the dialogue, which includes the cooperation in science and
technology. Moreover, China and the U.S. this year renewed their bilateral agreements on scientific and technological
cooperation. The Obama administration also attached importance to the current development and trend of scientific and
technological cooperation between China and the U.S. and realized the nature of mutual benefit brought about by such
cooperation. John P.Holdren, director of the Science and Technology Policy Office of the White House, has told Xinhua
that the cooperation on science and technology was one of the most dynamic fields in bilateral relations between China and
the United States. The "Wolf Clause" exposed the anxiety of hawkish politicians in the United States over China's peaceful
development in recent years, and it also demonstrated their shortsightedness to the whole world.
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Solvency- A2: China’s a Threat
China dual-use space technology poses no threat to the United States
Blair and Yali 08- President of the World Security Institute, Project Director at the Congressional Office of Technology
Assessment and Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution (“The Space Security Dilemma,”
http://www.chinasecurity.us/images/stories/cs2-editorsnotes.pdf) SP
Also, since the late 1990s, the predominance of “hawkish” American attitudes toward potential threats has pushed the U.S.
intelligence community to adopt extremely conservative criteria for projecting threat -- for instance, by assessing an
adversary’s ‘possible capabilities’ instead of ‘likely capabilities.’ This is a throwback to the early Cold War habit of using
‘greater-than-expected’ threats as the basis for building up U.S. nuclear forces. ‘Possible’ threat is even more extreme than
‘greater-than-expected’ threat. In any case, there is nothing China can do to convince American worst-case analysts that
China could not possibly adapt its dual-use space capabilities for ‘possibly’ posing military threats to the United States.
There is no escape from this logic trap. Chang and Sui’s exclusive focus on China’s manned space program side-steps the
more serious U.S. concern with the non-manned space program. In the former arena, the predominance of peaceful
purposes in manned space activities is widely appreciated, but the possibilities of threats to U.S. space assets by the nonmanned space program are much more pronounced, as Chang’s other publication reviewed later makes abundantly clear.
We cannot, however, fault Chang and Sui for neglecting an arena that occupies the center of Western suspicions toward
China. The non-manned space program is beyond the scope of their article. For a comprehensive examination of both
arenas, interested readers should consult Chang’s ground-breaking book Military Astronautics (reviewed later in this
journal in the book review section), which is the product of a Chang-led task force of the PLA on military space.
The United States perceives China as a threat arbitrarily
Pan 04- Chengxin Pan, Department of Political Science and International Relations at Australian National University (June-July
2004, “The ‘China Threat’ in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics, Alternatives:
Global, Local, Political”) SP
At first glance, as the "China threat" literature has told us, China seems to fall perfectly into the "threat" category,
particularly given its growing power. However, China's power as such does not speak for itself in terms of an emerging
threat. By any reasonable measure, China remains a largely poor country edged with only a sliver of affluence along its
coastal areas. Nor is China's sheer size a self-evident confirmation of the "China threat" thesis, as other countries like India,
Brazil, and Australia are almost as big as China. Instead, China as a "threat" has much to do with the particular mode of
U.S. self-imagination. As Steve Chan notes: China is an object of attention not only because of its huge size, ancient
legacy, or current or projected relative national power.... The importance of China has to do with perceptions, especially
those regarding the potential that Beijing will become an example, source or model that contradicts Western liberalism as
the reigning paradigm. In an era of supposed universalizing cosmopolitanism, China demonstrates the potency and
persistence of nationalism, and embodies an alternative to Western and especially U.S. conceptions of democracy and
capitalism. China is a reminder that history is not close to an end. (39) Certainly, I do not deny China's potential for
strategic misbehavior in the global context, nor do I claim the "essential peacefulness" of Chinese culture. (40) Having said
that, my main point here is that there is no such thing as "Chinese reality" that can automatically speak for itself, for
example, as a "threat." Rather, the "China threat" is essentially a specifically social meaning given to China by its U.S.
observers, a meaning that cannot be disconnected from the dominant U.S. self-construction. Thus, to fully understand the
U.S. "China threat" argument, it is essential to recognize its autobiographical nature. Indeed, the construction of other is not
only a product of U.S. self-imagination, but often a necessary foil to it. For example, by taking this particular representation
of China as Chinese reality per se, those scholars are able to assert their self-identity as "mature," "rational" realists capable
of knowing the "hard facts" of international politics, in distinction from those "idealists" whose views are said to be
grounded more in "an article of faith" than in "historical experience." (41) On the other hand, given that history is
apparently not "progressively" linear, the invocation of a certain other not only helps explain away such historical
uncertainties or "anomalies" and maintain the credibility of the allegedly universal path trodden by the United States, but
also serves to highlight U.S. "indispensability." As Samuel Huntington puts it, "If being an American means being
committed to the principles of liberty, democracy, individualism, and private property, and if there is no evil empire out
there threatening those principles, what indeed does it mean to be an American, and what becomes of American national
interests?" (42)
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Solvency- A2: China’s a Threat
The U.S. government arbitrarily characterizes China as a threat
Pan 04- Chengxin Pan, Department of Political Science and International Relations at Australian National University (June-July
2004, “The ‘China Threat’ in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics, Alternatives:
Global, Local, Political”) SP
More specifically, I want to argue that U.S. conceptions of China as a threatening other are always intrinsically linked to
how U.S. policymakers/mainstream China specialists see themselves (as representatives of the indispensable, securityconscious nation, for example). As such, they are not value-free, objective descriptions of an independent, preexisting
Chinese reality out there, but are better understood as a kind of normative, meaning-giving practice that often legitimates
power politics in U.S.-China relations and helps transform the "China threat" into social reality. In other words, it is selffulfilling in practice, and is always part of the "China threat" problem it purports merely to describe. In doing so, I seek to
bring to the fore two interconnected themes of self/other constructions and of theory as practice inherent in the "China
threat" literature—themes that have been overridden and rendered largely invisible by those common positivist
assumptions. These themes are of course nothing new nor peculiar to the "China threat" literature. They have been
identified elsewhere by critics of some conventional fields of study such as ethnography, anthropology, oriental studies,
political science, and international relations.*
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Solvency- A2: China’s a Threat
Perceiving China as a threat creates an us-them dichotomy that can only be resolved with cooperation
Pan 04- Chengxin Pan, Department of Political Science and International Relations at Australian National University (June-July
2004, “The ‘China Threat’ in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics, Alternatives:
Global, Local, Political”) SP
At this point, at issue here is no longer whether the "China threat" argument is true or false, but is rather its reflection of a shared
positivist mentality among mainstream China experts that they know China better than do the Chinese themselves.^^ "We" alone can
know for sure that they consider "us" their enemy and thus pose a menace to "us." Such an account of China, in many ways, strongly
seems to resemble Orientalists' problematic distinction between the West and the Orient. Like orientalism, the U.S. construction of the
Chinese "other" does not require that China acknowledge the validity of that dichotomous construction. Indeed, as Edward Said point
out, "It is enough for 'us' to set up these distinctions in our own minds; [and] 'they' become 'they' accordingly. "64 It may be the case
that there is nothing inherently wrong with perceiving others through one's own subjective lens. Yet, what is problematic with
mainstream U.S. China watchers is that they refuse to acknowledge the legitimacy of the inherent fluidity of Chinese identity and
subjectivity and try instead to fix its ambiguity as absolute difference from "us," a kind of certainty that denotes nothing but otherness
and threats. As a result, it becomes difficult to find a legitimate space for alternative ways of understanding an inherently volatile,
amorphous China^^ or to recognize that China's future trajectory in global politics is contingent essentially on how "we" in the United
States and the West in general want to see it as well as on how the Chinese choose to shape it.^^ Indeed, discourses of "us" and "them"
are always closely linked to how "we" as "what we are" deal with "them" as "what they are" in the practical realm. This is exactly how
the discursive strategy of perceiving China as a threatening other should be understood, a point addressed in the following section,
which explores some of the practical dimension of this discursive strategy in the containment perspectives and hegemonic ambitions
of U.S. foreign policy.
China is not a threat. “China threat” literature is based on prejudices, racism, and institutional selfinterest.
Roy 96 (Denny, “The "China Threat" Issue: Major Arguments” August 1996 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2645437 IG)
Anti-China prejudice. As part of their counterattack, critics have questioned not only the arguments but also the motives of
the "threat-mongers," who are often alleged to carry mean-spirited prejudices or an ignoble hidden agenda. An obvious
possible charge against Westerners who criticize China is racism. More generally, there is the fear of the Other. Gary
Klintworth writes: "In our mind's eye, we have that Napoleonic image of China as an awakening Chinese dragon.... It is
non-European, non-democratic and avowedly, the last communist stronghold left in the world." Another possible source of
anti-China bias is institutional or professional self-interest. Austin asserts that exaggerated claims about China's intentions
and military buildup are part of "an effort to prop up continued levels of defense spending in the face of severe budgetary
pressures." Many Chinese scholars make the same point. Shen Qurong, for example, writes that people who see China as a
threat "are looking far and wide for an enemy on purpose, for their old enemy has disappeared with the end of the Cold War
and the disintegration of the former Soviet Union. It seems that these people cannot go without an enemy.”
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Solvency- High Magnitude Policy Paralysis
Their apocalyptic rhetoric furthers the threat of destruction and justifies unending, state violence
Coviello 2k (Peter, Professor of English and Acting Program Director of Africana Studies – Bowdoin College, Queer Frontiers, p.
40-41 )
Perhaps. But to claim that American culture is at present decisively postnuclear is not to say that the world we inhabit is in
any way postapocalyptic. Apocalypse, as I began by saying, changed-it did not go away. And here I want to hazard my
second assertion: if, in the nuclear age of yesteryear, apocalypse signified an event threatening everyone and everything
with (in Jacques Derrida's suitably menacing phrase) `remainderless and a-symbolic destruction,"6 then in the postnuclear
world apocalypse is an affair whose parameters are definitively local. In shape and in substance, apocalypse is defined now
by the affliction it brings somewhere else, always to an "other" people whose very presence might then be written as a kind
of dangerous contagion, threatening the safety and prosperity of a cherished "general population:' This fact seems to me to
stand behind Susan Sontag's incisive observation, from 1989, that, "Apocalypse is now a long-running serial: not
`Apocalypse Now' but 'Apocalypse from Now On."" The decisive point here in the perpetuation of the threat of apocalypse
(the point Sontag goes on, at length, to miss) is that the apocalypse is ever present because, as an element in a vast economy
of power, it is ever useful. That is, through the perpetual threat of destruction-through the constant reproduction of the
figure of apocalypse-agencies of power ensure their authority to act on and through the bodies of a particular population.
No one turns this point more persuasively than Michel Foucault, who in the final chapter of his first volume of The History
of Sexuality addresses himself to the problem of a power that is less repressive than productive, less life-threatening than,
in his words, "life-administering:' Power, he contends, "exerts a positive influence on life . . . [and] endeavors to administer,
optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations:' In his brief comments on what he
calls "the atomic situation;' however, Foucault insists as well that the productiveness of modern power must not be
mistaken for a uniform repudiation of violent or even lethal means. For as "managers of life and survival, of bodies and the
race," agencies of modern power presume to act "on the behalf of the existence of everyone:' Whatsoever might be
construed as a threat to life and survival in this way serves to authorize any expression of force, no matter how invasive or,
indeed, potentially annihilating. "If genocide is indeed the dream of modern power;' Foucault writes, "this is not because of
a recent return to the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the
race, and the large-scale phenomena of population:'8 For a state that would arm itself not with the power to kill its
population, but with a more comprehensive power over the patterns and functioning of its collective life, the threat of an
apocalyptic demise, nuclear or otherwise, seems a civic initiative that can scarcely be done without.
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Space Militarization Add-On
Extending the logic of pre-emption into space necessitates full scale wars over an impossible technology.
Space Militarization is a political goal seeking total world domination.
Gray 07(Charles Hables Gray June 1, 2007, Professor at UCSC, Postmodern War at Peak Empire, Science as Culture IG)
There is no need here to reprise all the arguments against the Star Wars proposals or the militarization in space but
something needs to be said about the particular perspective of the role of information in military systems because it is one
of the major problems of Postmodern war. The problems are framed by a pragmatic combination of lived experience with
information systems and what we know about information theory itself.6 In light of the work on the limitations of
computers in relation to Star Wars, specifically and weapons in general, and more general critiques of science and
technology, the faith that the US government and others show in technology is disturbing. They don’t care that what they
want is deemed impossible now; they assume that eventually anything will be technologically possible. The limitations of
ballistic missile defense in general render the whole idea of an ICBM defense nonsensical. It isn’t just that it costs the
defender 10 to 100 times more to counter a deception by the attacker. The idea that any small state or non-governmental
organization would choose to deliver weapons of mass destruction by rocket instead of some other way is just not credible.
The systems effects are multiple. It isn’t just the impossibility of predicting the outcomes of complex systems, that is
discussed in the technical articles, rather it is some of the larger effects of ballistic missile defense that are foreseeable that
we should be concerned with. If the Star Wars system was really meant as a defensive system only (which is impossible in
actual military terms, but one can pretend) then it would be trying to use an impossible technology to solve a horrible
problem that was bought into being by technology in the first place. However, since the actual goal of the current plans is
just to make the next step in the militarization of space a reality, it is a political goal (literally, of world domination) being
met by an impossible technology. The militarization of space and its domination has been an explicit goal of parts of the US
military since the mid-1940s. Now there is a consensus at the Pentagon and it is shared by the rest of the executive branch
and much of the national legislature. A Unified Space Command is in place and there plans for the Space Force, a new
military branch to join the Air Force, Navy, and Army. It’s politically sensitive, but it’s going to happen. Some people
don’t want to hear this, and it sure isn’t in vogue, but – absolutely – we’re going to fight in space, we’re going to fight from
space and we’re going to fight into space. (Quoted in Scott, 1996, p. 51, original emphasis) The National Missile Defense
and its resulting occupation of space by the US Space Corp. is deemed necessary in order to avoid a ‘Space Pearl Harbor’.
So defensive ‘preemption’ becomes the rationale for the abrogation of the treaties preventing war in space and the
beginning of the military exploitation of ‘the last frontier’, fortunately infinite. To its supporters it seems inevitable. It is our
manifest destiny. You know we went from the East Coast to the West Coast of the United States of America settling the
continent and they call that manifest destiny and the next continent if you will, the next frontier, is space and it goes on
forever. (Sen. Bob Smith (R. New Hampshire), Senate Armed Services Committee. Quoted in the ‘Star Wars Returns’
documentary, February 2001) Militarizing space is just part of a major refocusing of military priorities for the United
States. Down the line, we can expect that nanotechnology could produce new types of weapons of mass destruction, and,
from space, effective lasers could do very bad things, but these are far enough away that we need not worry about them for
a decade or so. Meanwhile, defense intellectuals and established militaries have been flogging a new type of war, based on
information, and promising easy, maybe even bloodless, victories.
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Space Militarization Add-On
The attempt to assert US dominance of space creates a dangerous new Empire of space – one in which the
sovereignty of all other nations disappears. International norms and taboos no longer apply in a world of
zero-warning time space warfare – the affirmative ensures a global state of bare life.
Duvall and Havercroft 08 (Raymond Duvall works in critical international relations and Jonathan Havercroft is an assistant
professor, Department of Political Science, University of Oklahoma, Taking sovereignty out of this world: space weapons and empire
of the future, October 2008, Review of International Studies (2008), 34, 755–775 IG)
This scenario is fascinating for the political logic at work within it – force application from space is required to attack an
otherwise inaccessible target. All three reasons stated for inaccessibility involve potential gaps in US capacity to project its
power globally. Either the defences of the target country have not been suppressed, or other states have not consented to let
US forces fly through their airspace, or other coalition members – presumably in NATO or the UN – have not consented to
the action. What places targets ‘out of reach’ in this scenario, then, is the sovereignty of other states as exercised through
their abilities to defend their territory, control their airspace, and/or participate (jointly) in authorised decision of the
(global) exception to international law. As Schmitt has argued with respect to domestic law, the sovereign is constituted
through the capacity to decide the exception to the application of law in a moment of crisis.52 The effect of space weapons
for force application is to erase that sovereignty – states are constituted as subjects lacking authorisation of decision, and
lacking a boundary effectively demarcating inside from outside. While other weapons systems can be used to intervene in
affairs within a state’s borders, their constitutive logic (with the possible exception of nuclear and some forms of biological
weapons) is not, per se, corrosive of sovereignty, because in principle, even if not in every instance, they can be defended
against. Precision space-based strikes happen so rapidly, however, that a defensive response is not possible. As such they
strip states of the defensive ‘hard shell’ that, classical realists argued, is constitutive of sovereignty. All three justifications
thus buttress the exclusive capacity of the US to ‘decide the exception’ globally, while diminishing, by circumvention, the
sovereignty of other states. The hypothetical use of space weapons in this scenario is an imperial project.53 Furthermore,
these weapons would be most useful against small targets, such as groups and individuals. While the justification for the
use of space-based weapons in the quoted scenario was to prevent genocide, the hypothetical attack constitutes their
possessor as global police, punishing without trial those specific actors it deems responsible for genocide. Even if the
specific act provoking space-based attack is not a violation of international law, the political society with the capacity to
intervene – and with it the capacity to decide when to intervene – constitutes itself as sovereign police of the international
system.54 Space-based weapons for force application, then, are most useful at targeting individuals and groups at short
notice in order to achieve the policing objective of ‘order’ and control under a rule of law, even as that sovereign policing
decision is made outside of the very law in whose name it is made. We have already seen glimpses of this type of warfare in
recent years. Consider, for example, that the Iraq War began with a so called ‘decapitation strike’ aimed at assassinating
Saddam Hussein in the hope of ending the war before it began. Similar tactics have been used by the Israeli Defence Forces
to kill specific leaders of the Palestinians. Also, the US has used Unmanned Aerial Vehicles equipped with missiles to
target members of Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Placing weapons in space aimed at terrestrial
targets would markedly accelerate the ability to carry out these types of ‘targeted killings’ (assassinations). Thus,
application of force from orbital space would have at least three crucially important constitutive effects. First, it would
constitute the US, as possessor of these weapons, as the centre of a globally extensive, late-modern empire,55 a sovereign
of the globe. But this sovereign would exercise its power in a new way. Rather than needing to have occupying forces in
place to control the Earth’s lands and seas, it could rely heavily on space weapons to exercise social-political control. While
these weapons are not particularly useful in fighting large-scale wars, or in the conquest of territory, there would no longer
be a need to hold territory. All the global sovereign would have to do is to kill, or perhaps even threaten to kill, potential
adversaries around the world in order to ‘police’ social and political activities throughout its global empire.56 Second, these
weapons, just as space-based missile defence, would effectively strip other states of their territorial sovereignty. While de
jure sovereignty may remain intact, de facto sovereignty would be effectively erased, in a manner reminiscent of classical
empire. For decades, realist international relations scholars have promoted the idea that states secure their sovereignty
through self-help.57 If states lack the capacity to defend themselves from adversaries, they are particularly vulnerable to
attack and conquest. While liberal and constructivist scholars have questioned how closely sovereignty is linked to military
capability, realists have responded that throughout history states with disproportionate military power have repeatedly
violated the sovereignty of weaker states.58 While space-based weapons in and of themselves would not enable conquest of
another state, they could be used very effectively to achieve precise political objectives on the territories nominally under
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the sovereign authority of other states. Imagine what impact these weapons would have on US foreign policy with respect
to two of its currently most pressing objectives. Consider, for one, how useful such weapons might be with respect to
preventing a rival state, such as Iran or North Korea, from acquiring nuclear weapons. While there has been speculation that
the US or Israel may launch air strikes against potential nuclear weapons manufacturing facilities in these countries, the
logistics – getting access to airspace from neighbouring countries, and the possibility of retaliation against military forces in
the area – make such operations difficult. Using weapons in space would avoid these logistical difficulties, thereby making
the missions easier (and presumably more likely). Threatening spaced-based attack on either manufacturing sites of
weapons or on the political leadership of an adversary might be sufficient in many cases to alter the behaviour of targeted
governments. In short, if the US were to deploy such weapons in space, they would likely be used to similar effect as the
gunboat diplomacy of the 19th century. A second contemporary policy objective is to fight specific non-state actors. The
9/11 Commission Report discussed in great detail the logistical obstacles that prevented the Clinton administration from
capturing or killing Osama Bin Laden,59 principally the difficulty in either launching cruise missiles into Afghanistan
through another state’s airspace or deploying US Special Forces in an area remote from US military bases. Had the US
possessed space-based weapons at the time, they probably would have been the weapons of choice. When combined with
intelligence about the location of a potential target, they could be used to kill that target on very short notice without
logistical hurdles. The sovereignty of states would no longer be an obstacle to killing enemies. All that would stand in the
way would be international norms against assassination and the potential political backlash of imperial subjects. While
much has been made by constructivists in recent years of the capacity of norms and taboos to restrain state behaviour in a
world of sovereign states, it does not necessarily follow that in a world of only one effectively global sovereign such taboos
and norms would continue to function or even exist. The example of using space weapons to target non-state actors such as
Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda points to a third constitutive effect of space weapons capable of force application. Because
these weapons could target anyone, anywhere, at anytime, everyone on Earth is effectively reduced to ‘bare life.’60 As
Agamben demonstrates, sovereign power determines who is outside the laws and protections of the state in a relationship of
‘inclusive exclusion.’ While human rights regimes and the rule of law may exist under a late-modern global empire policed
by space weapons,61 the global sovereign will have the ability to decide the exception to this rule of law, and this state of
exception in many cases may be exercised by the use of space weapons that constituted the sovereign in the first place.
Constituting empire of the future Each of the three forms of space weapons has important constitutive effects on modern
sovereignty, which, in turn, are productive of political subjectivities. Exclusive missile defence constitutes a ‘hard shell’ of
sovereignty for one state, while compromising the sovereign political subject status of other states. Space control reinforces
that exclusive constitution of sovereignty and its potentiality for fostering unilateral decision. It also constitutes the ‘spacecontrolling’ state, the US, as sovereign for a particular global social order, a global capitalism. Space weapons capable of
direct force application obliterate the meaning of territorial boundaries for defence and for distinguishing an inside from an
outside with respect to the scope of policing and law enforcement – that is an authorised locus for deciding the exception.
States, other than the exceptional ‘American’ state, are reduced to empty shells of de jure sovereignty, sustained, if at all, by
convenient fiction – for example, as useful administrative apparatuses for the governing of locals. And their ‘citizens’ are
produced as ‘bare life’ subject to the willingness of the global sovereign to let them live. Together and in conjunction, these
three sets of effects constitute what we believe can appropriately be identified as an empire of the future, the political
subjects of which are a global sovereign, an exceptional ‘nation’ linked to that sovereign, a global social order normalised
in terms of capitalist social relations, and ‘bare life’ for individuals and groups globally to participate in that social order. If
our argument is even half correct, the claim with which this article began – that modes of political killing have important
effects – would be an understatement! Implications of empire of the future If the logic of space weapons projects as now
being pursued by the United States is to constitute a new, historically unprecedented form of empire, there are significant
theoretical and practical implications. By way of conclusion, we take up some of the most important of those implications
briefly in this section. Retheorising empire Broadly speaking, recent theorising on empire has posited two competing
pictures. On one side, some scholars see in existence an effectively imperial global hegemony, in which the United States,
through a combination of hard and soft power, dominates the international system in a manner of territorial control
analogous to the British or Roman empires (often debating which of the two is the more appropriate analogy).62 On the
other side, theorists such as Hardt and Negri have posited a decentred system in which a network of loosely integrated
institutions govern the various facets of the lives of all political subjects under a single, dispersed biopolitical regime that
they have labelled Empire.63 Each of these images is conceptually and theoretically evocative; in our view both have much
to recommend them despite their being opposing visions. This is because each captures a crucially important conceptual
dimension – in the case of arguments about putative American empire, the centralisation of sovereign power; and in the
case of Hardt and Negri’s post-modern Empire, the deterritorialisation of sovereignty. At the same time, however, each
view is held to negate the other, seeing the two core principles as mutually contradictory. We argue instead that space
weapons constitute a third version of empire that is neither the de-centred post-modern vision of Hardt and Negri, nor the
territoriallydefined hegemonic vision of advocates and opponents of American imperialism. If our analysis of constitutive
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logics is correct, theorists of empire must acknowledge that there is not a necessarily contradictory relation between
deterritorialisation and centralisation of sovereign power – the two conjoin in empire of the future.64 In his later work
Marshall McLuhan introduced ‘the tetrad’ as a heuristic device for examining the impact the introduction of a new
technology would have on a society.65 The tetrad was designed to arrest the tendency of theorists to describe the impact of
technology in purely causal terms. McLuhan’s tetrad involves asking a set of four questions: What will the technology
extend, enlarge or enhance? What will it erode or amputate? What will it reverse or flip into when pushed to its limits?
What will the new technology retrieve that earlier technologies had rendered obsolescent? By addressing the four moments
in McLuhan’s tetrad, we clarify how of a new sovereignty space weapons are constitutive, situated in the space-based
empire of the future, which conjoins deterritorialisation (of Hardt and Negri’s Empire) with the centralisation of sovereign
power (of classical imperial forms). First, space weapons will extend the capacity of their possessor to project force
globally and to defend its own territory. While the US, by virtue of its military pre-eminence, already has this capacity to
some extent, space weapons significantly deepen it – by compressing the time required to attack a target (from days and
hours for airborne weapons to minutes and seconds for space-based weapons); by sharpening precision of targeting; and by
further reducing the ability of others to deliver force against the US. Force application from orbital space is an extension of
the modes of precision killing now associated with laser-guided smart bombs, unmanned aerial vehicles, and GPS-guided
cruise missiles. These existing forms of US air power rely heavily on space-based technology, such as GPS satellites, for
their targeting, and thus represent the vanguard of the space age. Moving the weapons systems themselves into space will
extend the range of their Earth-based counterparts and compress the time necessary to launch an attack. The current air
power regime, on which the US relies, requires a vast network of bases around the world to serve as staging and supply
areas to support attacks.66 In extending the speed and range of modes of precision killing and destruction, empire of the
future dispenses with the need for such a network of bases.
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Space Debris Add-On
China’s ASAT weapons test resulted from the United States’ unilateral positioning and contributed
dramatically to space debris
Logan 08- Jeffery Logan, Specialist in Energy Policy in the Resources, Science, and Industry division of The Congressional
Research Service, The Library of Congress (9/28/08, “China’s Space Program: Options for U.S.-China Cooperation,”
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22777.pdf) SP
On January 11, 2007, China conducted its first successful anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons test, destroying one of its inactive
weather satellites.14 No advance notice of the test was given, nor has China yet explained convincingly the intentions of
the test.15 The international community condemned the test as an irresponsible act because it polluted that orbital slot with
thousands of pieces of debris that will threaten the space assets of more than two dozen countries, including China’s, for
years. Understanding the nuances of China’s intent in conducting the test is important, but remains open to interpretation.
How was the decision made to conduct a test that would contradict Beijing’s publicly-held position on the peaceful use of
outer space, and that would almost certainly incur international condemnation? Some speculate that the United States’
unilateral positions encouraged China to conduct the test to demonstrate that it could not be ignored.16 In particular, the
U.S. National Space Policy issued in September 2006 declares that the United States would “deny, if necessary, adversaries
the use of space capabilities hostile to U.S. national interests.”17 Given China’s apparent commitment to space, the
growing U.S. dependence on space for security and military use, and Chinese concerns over Taiwan, the ASAT test may
have been a demonstration of strategic Chinese deterrence.18 Others saw a more nefarious display of China’s space
capabilities, and a sign that China has more ambitious objectives in space.19 Still others speculate that the engineers
running China’s ASAT program simply wanted to verify the technology that they had spent decades developing and
significantly underestimated the international outrage the test provoked.20 The Chinese ASAT test seemed to derail any
movement to build on the meeting between NASA and CNSA. Some believe that China’s ASAT test will continue to
dampen momentum that might have been building for the two countries to expand cooperation, while others argue that it is
a pressing reason to boost dialogue.21
Space debris resulting from China’s ASAT test cripples U.S. military, civilian communications
applications, and the credibility of China’s peaceful space program
Dumbaugh 07- Kerry Dumbaugh, Specialist in Asian Affairs in the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division of the
Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress (11/9/07, “China-U.S. Relations: Current Issues and Implications for U.S.
Policy,” http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/96422.pdf) SP
On January 11, 2007, the PRC carried out its first successful anti-satellite (ASAT) test by destroying one of its moribund
orbiting weather satellites with a ballistic missile fired from the ground. Previously, only the United States and the Soviet
Union had conducted successful ASAT tests — tests both countries reportedly halted more than 20 years ago because of
resulting space debris that could endanger other orbiting satellites. U.S. officials reportedly received no advance notice
from Beijing, nor did Chinese officials publicly confirm the ASAT test until January 24, 2006, 13 days after the event and
almost a week after the U.S. Government had publicly revealed the PRC test on January 18, 2007. The January PRC ASAT
test and the lack of advance notification to U.S. officials by Beijing has raised a number of concerns for U.S. policy. Chief
among these are questions about the new potential vulnerability of U.S. satellites — crucial for both U.S. military
operations and a wide range of civilian communications applications — and the credibility of PRC assertions that it is
committed to the peaceful use of space. In addition, officials from the United States and other countries have criticized
China for either ignoring or failing to realize the extent of the test’s contributions to the growing problem of space debris.
According to space science experts, the extent of space debris now orbiting the earth, which is already calculated at about
10,000 detectable items, poses an increasing hazard to hundreds of the world’s operational satellites, any of which could be
destroyed upon collision with a piece of space “junk.”11 Beijing, which hosted the annual meeting of the Inter-Agency
Space Debris Coordination Committee from April 23-26, 2007, itself became a significant contributor to the space debris
problem with its January 2007 ASAT test. According to a State Department spokesman, the United States is reevaluating its
nascent civil space cooperation with China (initiated during the meeting of Presidents George Bush and Hu Jintao in April
2006) in light of the January ASAT test.12
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Link- U.S. Constructs Chinese Threat
Discussion of policy is based on a positivist mode of “knowing” China. China is not something that we
stand back and observe- this constructs a mode of thought that can only relate to China as a threat.
Pan 04 (Chengxin, The "China Threat" in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics,
Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 29, 2004 IG)
China and its relationship with the United States has long been a fascinating subject of study in the mainstream U.S.
international relations community. This is reflected, for example, in the current heated debates over whether China is
primarily a strategic threat to or a market bonanza for the United States and whether containment or engagement is the best
way to deal with it. (1) While U.S. China scholars argue fiercely over "what China precisely is," their debates have been
underpinned by some common ground, especially in terms of a positivist epistemology. Firstly, they believe that China is
ultimately a knowable object, whose reality can be, and ought to be, empirically revealed by scientific means. For example,
after expressing his dissatisfaction with often conflicting Western perceptions of China, David M. Lampton, former
president of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, suggests that "it is time to step back and look at where China
is today, where it might be going, and what consequences that direction will hold for the rest of the world." (2) Like many
other China scholars, Lampton views his object of study as essentially "something we can stand back from and observe
with clinical detachment." (3) Secondly, associated with the first assumption, it is commonly believed that China scholars
merely serve as "disinterested observers" and that their studies of China are neutral, passive descriptions of reality. And
thirdly, in pondering whether China poses a threat or offers an opportunity to the United States, they rarely raise the
question of "what the United States is." That is, the meaning of the United States is believed to be certain and beyond
doubt. I do not dismiss altogether the conventional ways of debating China. It is not the purpose of this article to venture
my own "observation" of "where China is today," nor to join the "containment" versus "engagement" debate per se. Rather,
I want to contribute to a novel dimension of the China debate by questioning the seemingly unproblematic assumptions
shared by most China scholars in the mainstream IR community in the United States. To perform this task, I will focus
attention on a particularly significant component of the China debate; namely, the "China threat" literature. More
specifically, I want to argue that U.S. conceptions of China as a threatening other are always intrinsically linked to how
U.S. policymakers/mainstream China specialists see themselves (as representatives of the indispensable, security-conscious
nation, for example). As such, they are not value-free, objective descriptions of an independent, preexisting Chinese reality
out there, but are better understood as a kind of normative, meaning-giving practice that often legitimates power politics in
U.S.-China relations and helps transform the "China threat" into social reality. In other words, it is self-fulfilling in practice,
and is always part of the "China threat" problem it purports merely to describe. In doing so, I seek to bring to the fore two
interconnected themes of self/other constructions and of theory as practice inherent in the "China threat" literature--themes
that have been overridden and rendered largely invisible by those common positivist assumptions. These themes are of
course nothing new nor peculiar to the "China threat" literature. They have been identified elsewhere by critics of some
conventional fields of study such as ethnography, anthropology, oriental studies, political science, and international
relations. (4) Yet, so far, the China field in the West in general and the U.S. "China threat" literature in particular have
shown remarkable resistance to systematic critical reflection on both their normative status as discursive practice and their
enormous practical implications for international politics. (5) It is in this context that this article seeks to make a
contribution.
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Link- U.S. Anxiety = Chinese Militarization
America’s securitizing mindset forces China to militarize; this competition for resources in space will
result in a self-fulfilling prophecy
Blair and Yali 08- President of the World Security Institute, Project Director at the Congressional Office of Technology
Assessment and Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution (“The Space Security Dilemma,”
http://www.chinasecurity.us/images/stories/cs2-editorsnotes.pdf) SP
For China, the prevailing worldview sees a superpower striving for absolute security, a quest driven by fear or hegemonic
ambitions that are impervious to reason. U.S. space policy might be the best illustration of America’s drive for security at
the expense of others’ security. China’s fear of becoming contained and ‘encircled’ by a hegemonic state and its allies is
constant. Through the eyes of the Chinese military, space is the heart of an ongoing revolution in military affairs and has
demonstrably served this ‘containment’ stratagem of the United States. The United States has enforced an unprecedented
ban on exporting any space-related technology and commodities to China since 1999, but has steadfastly refused to have
any meaningful dialogue with China either through an international forum or bilateral channels. This comprehensive
isolation of China’s space program confirms the belief and fear of many Chinese military strategists that the United States
seeks to arrest China’s progress in space in order to thwart its ability to revolutionize its warfighting technologies and win
on the high-tech battlefields of the future. A zero-sum mindset toward space is hardening in China as a result of this
apprehension, as amply illustrated in the public media. Space is eyed in China as an area of resources and possibilities to be
acquired before it’s too late. Shu Xing, whose book is reviewed later in this journal, likens the grabbing of satellite orbits to
the “Enclosure Movement” in late 18th Century England in which the more capability one has, the more resources one can
seize. Another reviewed author argued that countries scramble into space to fight for the tremendous resources found there
and “once this fight for resources causes irreconcilable conflicts, it may lead to radical space confrontations.” A space war
seems to many Chinese to be another form of resource war. Given China’s population and rapid economic growth,
controlling resources is understandably a paramount concern. Regarding space, however, a zero-sum (‘win-lose’) attitude is
narrow-minded and misguided. If feverish competition for resources in space causes Sino-American relations to deteriorate
or leads to the outbreak of war between them, then both parties lose.
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Link- U.S. Anxiety = Chinese Militarization
Aggressive Chinese space programs are only countermeasures to US military space development –
changing current policies can end the security dilemma
Baohui Zhang, Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Asia Pacific Studies at Lingnan University,
JSTOR, 2011, The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship, Vol. 51, No. 2 (March/April 2011) (pp. 311332), http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/AS.2011.51.2.311, dk
China’s military space program and its strategies for space warfare have caused rising concerns in the United States. In fact,
China’s military intentions in outer space have emerged as one of the central security issues between the two countries. In
November 2009, after the commander of the Chinese Air Force called the militarization of space “a historical inevitability,”
General Kevin Chilton, head of the U.S. Strategic Command, urged China to explain the objectives of its rapidly advancing
military space program.1 Indeed, in the wake of China’s January 2007 anti-satellite (ASAT) test, many U.S. experts have
attempted to identify China’s motives. One driver of China’s military space program is its perception of a forthcoming
revolution in military affairs. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) sees space as a new and critical dimension of future
warfare. The comment by the commander of the Chinese Air Force captures this perception of the PLA.2 In addition,
China’s military space program is seen as part of a broad asymmetric strategy designed to offset conventional U.S. military
advantages. For example, as observed by Ashley J. Tellis in 2007, “China’s pursuit of counterspace capabilities is not
driven fundamentally by a desire to protest American space policies, and those of the George W. Bush administration in
particular, but is part of a considered strategy designed to counter the overall military capabilities of the United States.”3
Richard J. Adams and Martin E. France, U.S. Air Force officers, contend that “Chinese interests in space weapons do not
hinge on winning a potential U.S.-Chinese ASAT battle or participating in a space arms race.” Instead, they argue, China’s
military space program is driven by a desire to “counter the space-enabled advantage of U.S. conventional forces.”4 This
perspective implies that given the predicted U.S. superiority in conventional warfare, China feels compelled to continue its
offensive military space program. Inevitably, this perspective sees China as the main instigator of a possible space arms
race, whether implicitly or explicitly. China’s interpretation of the revolution in military affairs and its quest for asymmetric
warfare capabilities are important for understanding the 2007 ASAT test. This article suggests that the Chinese military
space program is also influenced by the security dilemma in international relations. Due to the anarchic nature of the world
order, “the search for security on the part of state A leads to insecurity for state B which therefore takes steps to increase its
security leading in its turn to increased insecurity for state A and so on.”5 The military space relationship between China
and the U.S. clearly embodies the tragedy of a security dilemma. In many ways, the current Chinese thinking on space
warfare reflects China’s response to the perceived U.S. threat to its national security. This response, in turn, has triggered
American suspicion about China’s military intentions in outer space. Thus, the security dilemma in the U.S.-China space
relationship has inevitably led to measures and countermeasures. As Joan Johnson-Freese, a scholar at the Naval War
College, observed after the January 2007 ASAT test, China and the U.S. “have been engaged in a dangerous spiral of
action-reaction space planning and/or activity.”6 This article, citing firsthand Chinese military sources, identifies the major
factors contributing to the security dilemma that is driving China’s military space program. The first is China’s attempt to
respond to perceived U.S. military strategies to dominate outer space. Chinese strategists are keenly aware of the U.S.
military’s plan to achieve so-called full-spectrum dominance, and the Chinese military feels compelled to deny that
dominance. The second factor is China’s concern about U.S. missile defense, which could potentially weaken Chinese
strategic nuclear deterrence. Many PLA analysts believe that a multilayered ballistic missile defense system will inevitably
compromise China’s offensive nuclear forces. China’s response is to attempt to weaken the U.S. space-based sensor system
that serves as the eyes and brains of missile defense. Thus, U.S. missile defense has forced China to contemplate the
integration of nuclear war and space warfare capabilities. Because of the security dilemma, many experts in both China and
the U.S. have expressed growing pessimism about the future of arms control. However, this article suggests that precisely
because the current U.S.-China military space relationship is governed by the security dilemma, it is amenable to changes in
the strategic environment that could extricate both from their mutual mistrust and the ongoing cycle of actions and
counteractions. The current strategic adjustment by the U.S., efforts by the Obama administration to curb missile defense,
and the fundamentally altered situation in the Taiwan Strait offer a window of opportunity for the two countries to relax the
tensions in their space relationship. With the right strategies, China and the U.S. could slow the momentum toward a space
arms race.
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Link- U.S. Anxiety = Chinese Militarization
China sees the US space program as a threat to their national security and will take military action
against the US
Joan Johnson-Freese, Chair of the National Security Decision Making Department at the US naval War College, 20 06 “China
Security, http://www.wsichina.org/attach/china_security2.pdf”
China has seen much evidence to suggest the movement by the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush toward
space weaponization is real. A number of U.S. military planning documents issued in recent years reveal the intention to
control space by military means. In practice, the United States is pursuing a number of research programs to enable the
development of space weapons, which could be used not only to attack ballistic missiles in flight but also to attack satellites
and targets anywhere on Earth. Chinese officials have expressed a growing concern that U.S. plans would stimulate a costly
and destabilizing arms race in space and on Earth, with disastrous effects on international security and the peaceful use of
outer space. This would not benefit any country’s security interests. Beijing believes the most effective way to secure space
assets would be to agree on an international ban on weapons in space. In what follows, I first examine briefly why China
says NO to U.S. space weaponization. I then explore in detail preventative measures that can be taken. Why China Says NO
to U.S. Space Weaponization China has a number of major concerns about the current direction of U.S. military space
efforts. For example, China is worried about how U.S. space weaponization plans might affect Chinese national security,
international security, and protection of the space environment. China’s concerns about U.S. actions Many Chinese officials
and security experts have great interest in U.S. military planning documents issued in recent years that explicitly envision
the control of space throught the use of weapons in, or from, space to establish global superiority. In its 2003 report,
“Transformation Flight Plan,” the U.S. Air Force lists a number of space weapon systems desirable in the event of a space
war.1 These include space-based kinetic kill vehicles, space-based lasers (SBL), hypervelocity rod bundles, space-based
radio frequency energy weapons, space maneuver vehicles, and the Evolutionary Air and Space Global Laser Engagement
(EAGLES) laser relay mirror. In 2004, the Air Force showed clearly in its Counterspace Operations Doctrine document
what it actually intends to do: that is, achieve and maintain space superiority, – the “freedom to attack as well as the
freedom from attack” – in space.2 In practice, the pursuit of controlling space would require anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons
to negate an adversary’s space capabilities. It is believed that the current Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system
deployed in Alaska will have a significant intrinsic capability for ASAT use. Thus, it is reasonable to argue that one true
purpose for the Bush administration’s rush for the GMD deployment could be to acquire an ASAT capability for its space
control strategy. The scope of space weaponry, generally accepted by many Chinese includes not only weapons stationed in
outer space, but also weapons based on the ground, at sea or in the air that target objects in outer space. Outer space objects,
in the Chinese definition, include not only satellites but also ICBMs traveling through outer space.3 Since the GMD system
would intercept its target in outer space, it could be seen as a space weapon. Moreover, the GMD system could be the first
step toward a more robust, layered system for space control. Consequently, China feels that U.S. plans to deploy a missile
defense system is an intentional first step toward the weaponization of space.4 In addition, the United States also pursues a
number of other research programs that could lead to ASAT weapons. For instance, the Air Force has a research project to
test small satellites, the Experimental Satellite Series (XSS), that could be used to attack other satellites.5 Further, the
United States is pursuing space-based ballistic missile defense (BMD) for global engagement capabilities. It is believed that
an effective, global-coverage BMD system must start intercepting an ICBM as early as the boost phase, which, under U.S.
Missile Defense Agency plans, would entail the use of space-based interceptors. Indeed, the current U.S. budget for missile
defense shows continued interest in a number of space weapon-related programs, such as the Near Field Infrared
Experiment (NFIRE) satellite and Space-Based Interceptor Test Bed. The United States does have legitimate concerns
about its space assets, given that U.S. military operations, economy and society are increasingly dependent on space assets
and such assets are inherently vulnerable to attacks from many different sources. However, it does not mean that the United
States currently faces credible threats from states that might exploit those vulnerabilities.6 Further, space-based weapons
cannot protect satellites, since these weapons are also vulnerable to many types of attack, similar to the satellites requiring
protection. The true aim of U.S. space plans is not to protect U.S. assets but rather to further enhance American military
dominance. Prof. Du Xiangwan, vice president of the Chinese Academy of Engineering, recently presented his view that
the Transformation Flight Plan indicated that “many types of space-based weapons will be developed,” and “the tendency
toward space weaponization is obvious and serious.” He further noted that military dominance on Earth is not enough, “the
U.S. also seeks to dominate space.”7 Beijing fears that by unilaterally developing missile defense systems and pursuing
space weaponization, the United States is seeking to establish a global military superiority using both offensive and
defensive means.8 Moreover, China’s fears about U.S. hegemonic tendencies are exacerbated by the fact that space
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[Johnson-Freeze continues]
weapons, due to their vulnerability to other less expensive, asymmetric measures, are inherently first-strike weapons. 9
Neutralizing China’s nuclear deterrent In particular, China is concerned that the U.S. missile defense network will undercut
China’s strategic nuclear deterrent. Even a limited missile defense system could neutralize China’s fewer than two dozen
single-warhead ICBMs that are capable of reaching the United States. China is even more concerned about space-based
BMD systems that would be far more dangerous to China’s nuclear deterrent than a non-space-based BMD system. In
addition, Beijing is worried that the deployment of missile defense systems would further promote a preemptive U.S.
military strategy. As viewed by Chinese leaders, China’s own small strategic nuclear arsenal appears to be a plausible target
for U.S. missile defenses.10 China fears that the BMD network would give the United States more freedom and power to
intervene in its affairs, including undermining the country’s efforts at reunification with Taiwan. Moreover, China is
concerned that putting weapons in space would constrain its civilian and commercial space activities. China sees itself as a
developing economic space power, dependent on free access to space for financial gain. However, U.S. driven space
weaponization directly threatens this access. Arms race Due to the threatening nature of space weapons, it is reasonable to
assume that China and others would attempt to block their deployment and use by political and, if necessary, military
means.11 Many Chinese officials and scholars believe that China should take every possible step to maintain the
effectiveness of its nuclear deterrent. This includes negating the threats from missile defense and space weaponization
plans.12 In responding to any U.S. move toward deployment space weapons, the first and best option for China is to pursue
an arms control agreement to prevent not just the United States but any nation from doing so – as it is advocating presently.
However, if this effort fails and if what China perceives as its legitimate security concerns are ignored, it would very likely
develop responses to counter and neutralize such a threat. Despite the enormous cost of space-based weapon systems, they
are vulnerable to a number of low-cost and relatively low-technology ASAT attacks including the use of ground-launched
small kinetic-kill vehicles, pellet clouds or space mines. It is reasonable to believe that China and others could resort to
these ASAT weapons to counter any U.S. space-based weapons.13 This, however, would lead to an arms race in space. To
protect against the potential loss of its deterrent capability, China could potentially resort to enhancing its nuclear forces.
Such a move could, in turn, encourage India and then Pakistan to follow suit. Furthermore, Russia has threatened to
respond to any country’s deployment of space weapons.14 Moreover, constructing additional weapons would produce a
need for more plutonium and highly enriched uranium to fuel those weapons. This impacts China’s participation in the
fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT).15 Eventually, failure to proceed with the nuclear disarmament process, to which the
nuclear weapon states committed themselves under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, would damage the entire nuclear
nonproliferation regime itself, which is already at the breaking point. As Hu Xiaodi, China’s ambassador for disarmament
affairs, asked, “With lethal weapons flying overhead in orbit and disrupting global strategic stability, why should people
eliminate weapons of mass destruction or missiles on the ground? This cannot but do harm to global peace, security and
stability, and hence be detrimental to the fundamental interests of all States.”16
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1
Link- U.S. Anxiety = Chinese Militarization
US space policy worries other countries like China
Joan Johnson-Freese, Chair of the National Security Decision Making Department at the US naval War College, 20 06 “China
Security, http://www.wsichina.org/attach/china_security2.pdf”
U.S. rhetoric and activities have not gone unnoticed in other countries, including China. When the U.S. government begins
publishing documents on web pages showing lasers firing from space, as the Vision 2020 website originally did, people and
countries tend to get nervous. The ‘Rods from God’ concept, with an artist’s rendering provided in the June 2004 issue of
Popular Science, has generated considerable discussion at scientific conferences, not only about tech-nical viability, but
whom the United States intends to use it against.
China’s militarization of space is the result of US space policy
Joan Johnson-Freese, Chair of the National Security Decision Making Department at the US naval War College, 20 06 “China
Security, http://www.wsichina.org/attach/china_security2.pdf”
Two critical events occurred in 2001 that the Chinese interpreted as sending clear messages to them. First, as noted earlier,
the United States issued the Space Commission report. The part of the report that caught the attention of the Chinese was
the statement that space would inevitably become a battleground, therefore the United States would be remiss not to
prepare,36 with the unspoken assumption being that preparation meant the development of space weapons. Second, the
United States held its first-ever space war game, called Schriever I.37 In that well-publicized war game, U.S. forces were
pitted against an opponent threatening a small island neighbor, one about the size and location of Taiwan. It didn’t take the
Chinese long to conclude that they in turn would be remiss not to prepare for the inevitability of U.S. development of space
weapons, as China might well be the target of those weapons. From the Chinese perspective, officials have concluded that
if the United States would be remiss to not prepare for the inevitable weaponization of space and against a space Pearl
Harbor, they would be remiss not to prepare for the execution of the U.S. Counterspace Operations doctrine as part of a
unilaterally developed and supported preemptive action. Is that the response that the United States has been seeking? Both
China and the United States see space assets as so valuable to their national security equations that any gain made by one
country in advancing its capabilities is viewed as not just threatening but as a loss by the other. China is interested in
developing military space capabilities as part of its military modernization effort, as are most countries in the world. It is
further interested in development of space capabilities as part of globalization efforts and to send a techno-nationalist
message regionally and globally. But China is also responding to the message it hears from the United States
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Solvency- Self-Fulfilling Prophecy
Only U.S.-Sino cooperation can prevent the deployment of space weapons- the ball is in the United
States’ court
Blair and Yali 08- President of the World Security Institute, Project Director at the Congressional Office of Technology
Assessment and Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution (“The Space Security Dilemma,”
http://www.chinasecurity.us/images/stories/cs2-editorsnotes.pdf) SP
The deployment of space weapons by any nation would cast a dark cloud over the future security of China and the world.
The Chinese authors in this volume seem quite united in their view of the need to avoid crossing this threshold, and instead
revive a spirit of international cooperation in space. That call, we believe, is sincere and places the ball in America’s court
for now. China bears some responsibility, however, for clarifying its program, making its technologies as well as intentions
more transparent, and encouraging both military and civilian policy analysts to study and debate publicly. China needs to
address squarely how space will be used to strengthen its national security, and explain how exchanges and cooperation
with the United States and others in space projects will not be exploited to obtain potential advantage over those partners.
China and the United States should open new venues for dialogue at different levels, and build confidence through
cooperation in apolitical matters such as data sharing in debris monitoring. The Chinese view of the paramount importance
of the politico-strategic intentions behind space cooperation has merit. If China and other space-faring nations intend to
pursue the peaceful use of space and seek cooperation for the benefit of mankind, then the time is ripe to reopen a
constructive agenda of action as well as talk.
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Framework- Reps Key
This framework is crucial in debating China---reps are more important than institutional interactions
Liss 03 (Alexander, Strategist at The Brand Union, MBA at NYU, Brand researcher and strategist "Images of China in the American
Print Media: A Survey from 2000 to 2002" IG)
American society’s images and perceptions of China have had several recurring themes over the years. In the past, some of
these have included the perception of China as a potential market for American goods and as a potential supply of converts
for American missionaries. These images changed during the years of diplomatic isolation of the Cold War, turning the
Chinese into a vast horde of ‘reds’, a faceless, invincible mass that threatened all of Asia. In the post-Cold War world,
Sino–US relations face an uncertain future. The time is not far off when there will again be two superpowers, and there is
the potential for conflict between them. In this new era, it is interesting to examine what images of China have emerged in
contemporary American society. The goal of this paper is to do just that. By examining articles about China in four major
American daily newspapers, over a three-year period, a rough sketch emerges of how China is perceived to the ‘average’
reader of these four publications. These images, while interesting in their own right, also provide a valuable benchmark for
the direction of Sino–US relations. Overall, it seems that, just as in past periods of rivalry, negative images of China
overwhelm the positive. But, before we can conclude that the current relationship is also one of competition, there are also
some significant images of a country whose future lies entwined with the US in a partnership, not a battle. If we can take
the articles of this study as a representative slice of American society at large, the general trend seems to be one in which,
although China is sometimes viewed in a harsh and critical light, there is still hope for the two countries to come together—
or even for China to become more like the United States. The relationship between the United States and China works on
many levels and involves many actors. The phrase ‘Sino–US relations’ usually brings to mind an image of interaction
between the governments of each country. Yet, if we merely examine the diplomacy between the two countries, then we are
left with an incomplete picture of the forces that affect how the nations engage each other. A key element to consider is the
relationship between the two societies. Popular opinion and popular perceptions of each culture in the eyes of the other are
far more subtle elements to consider, yet they are no less important than the official acts of government, and indeed, may
even be more so.
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***2AC A2- Disadvantages
China Securitization Affirmative
DDI 2011
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2AC A2- Hegemony DA
Dominance in space is over for the U.S. but if cooperation happens, it can remain a preeminent figure
MacDonald 08, (Bruce W., Council on Foreign Relations, “China, space weapons, and U.S. security”
http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=o0GkabrNftIC&oi=fnd&pg=PP2&dq=china+us+classify+each+other+as+space+threa
ts&ots=OTlffI8tGS&sig=WhjYe_yA8suj0DmrEaLSTi2UTlM#v=onepage&q&f=false.IG)
Some are attracted to a U.S. posture of dominance in space, and such a vision has superficial appeal. However, this
attraction overlooks the serious difficulties that accompany it. Space assets are tar more difficult to defend than to attack,
and it will be well within China’s capability in the military to prevent the United States from attaining a dominant: space
position. Already China‘s economy is growing as fast as that of the United States in absolute terms. One may visit otherwise, but the United States will not be able to maintain its near monopoly on space power into the future, though perhaps,
with smaller margins, it can remain preeminent in space for many years to come. The United States faces an attractive
space future if it does not let the best be the enemy of the good. U.S. space superiority is possible, but space dominance is
not likely. Ground-based offensive assets are more survivable, and hence less destabilizing in a crisis, and are also likely to
be less expensive and more reliable. Conversely, space-based offensive assets are vulnerable and have significant potential
for crisis instability, offering huge incentives for adversaries to strike first. Thus, what the United States chooses to acquire
as its offensive capability should first be evaluated against these criteria, as well as those suggested on page twenty.
Cooperating with other nations on space policy opens the floodgates for space traffic management and
codes of conduct, demonstrating U.S. leadership
MacDonald 08- Bruce W. MacDonald, senior director of the Nonproliferation and Arms Control Program with the USIP Center
for Conflict Analysis and Prevention, CSR No. 38 (September 2008, “China, Space Weapons, and U.S. Security”) SP
As the number of spacecraft, the amount of debris in orbit, and the demand for orbital slots and transmission frequencies
increase each year, there is a growing need for all spacefaring nations and entities to cooperate so spacecraft can function
without incident. Just as roads, airways, the broadcast spectrum, and other commonly used but finite resources require
management, similar rules are needed to regulate “traffic” in space. 22 Measures such as space traffic management and
codes of conduct should be viewed as essential aspects of U.S. space policy. There is a need to build up “rules of the road”
that all spacefaring states accept. This process will not be rapid, but gradually developing boundaries for acceptable action
will provide the basis for a safer space environment and build trust that could make needed agreements possible. By
proactively engaging the international community on these initiatives, the United States would demonstrate its leadership
role in, and proper stewardship of, the space domain, as well as reap the resulting practical benefits. In terms of global
security policy, space traffic management, codes of conduct, and CBMs can lay the foundation for a system in which
nervous countries are reassured by sound data and a modus operandi that emphasizes observation, communication, and
explanation, rather than fear-based reaction caused by limited information. Even on a voluntary basis, a code of conduct
delineating the rights and responsibilities of spacefaring nations could provide a means to reduce the growing chaos in
space and create international behavioral norms. Many variations of such a code have been discussed; one useful example is
provided in Appendix I of this report.
Credibility key to uphold deterrence
MacDonald 08- Bruce W. MacDonald, senior director of the Nonproliferation and Arms Control Program with the USIP Center
for Conflict Analysis and Prevention, CSR No. 38 (September 2008, “China, Space Weapons, and U.S. Security”) SP
Credibility is important both to enhance deterrence and to provide options should space deterrence fail. Whatever future
counterspace capabilities are developed should have reversible effects. For example, a jammer disrupts a satellite ground
station link, but does not permanently damage the satellite or the ground station, and leaves no debris. This kind of weapon
would be far less dangerous, and thus less destabilizing, than one that permanently destroyed or disabled satellites and/or
their support infrastructures.
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2AC A2- Politics
The House misunderstands Chinese space efforts – empirically proven by CNOOC
(This also assumes Wolf, he’s served 16 terms for Virginia)
(“Stepping into this debate are two key members of the Congress, Reps. Mark Kirk and Rick Larsen. The two serve as co-chairs of the
US-China Working Group in the House of Representatives…”)
Jeff Foust, editor and publisher of The Space Review, The Space Review, 7/17/06, US-China space cooperation: the Congressional
view, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/661/1, dk
China’s space program, and its potential to be an adversary or ally to American space efforts, has been the subject in recent
months of considerable debate, informed or otherwise. It’s the “otherwise” that has been the problem: much of the debate
has been based on limited or inaccurate information about Chinese space efforts, onto which people apply their own
perceptions—and misconceptions—about China in general. Such an approach can be a hazardous way to set policy.
Stepping into this debate are two key members of the Congress, Reps. Mark Kirk and Rick Larsen. The two serve as cochairs of the US-China Working Group in the House of Representatives and visited China earlier this year, including
making a rare visit to the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center, the remote spaceport from which China conducts its manned
launches. At a forum last week organized by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Kirk and Larsen
shared their assessments of both China’s space program and their colleagues’ attitudes towards it. “Relentlessly negative
and highly misinformed” Kirk, a Republican from the northern suburbs of Chicago, said that US-China Working Group,
comprised of about 50 members of the House, both Republicans and Democrats, was formed in June 2005 to raise
awareness among their colleagues about China and how to work with the country. The group “doesn’t take a position on
issues, but we try not to be dragon slayers in this and not be panda huggers, but instead to develop a more nuanced view
towards China,” he explained. Unlike the White House or the Senate, “the House view towards China is relentlessly
negative and highly misinformed,” Kirk said. The formation of the US-China Working Group was linked to Congressional
debate about the proposed acquisition of oil company Unocal by a Chinese state-owned company, CNOOC. That debate,
Kirk said, was laced with inaccurate information about CNOOC and China, creating enough controversy that CNOOC was
eventually forced to withdraw its bid. “It is perfectly acceptable to criticize China when you have a correct means,” Kirk
said. “What we are against is uninformed criticism, which is largely what I regard as dominant on the House floor today.”
That “uninformed criticism”, Kirk said, causes the House to stand apart from both the Senate and the White House. “I’ve
characterized the White House view towards China as nuanced and complex. The Senate view towards China is at least
multifaceted, with some ups and some downs. And the House view towards China is relentlessly negative and highly
misinformed.” One way the working group is trying to improve overall perceptions about China in the House is through
better understanding, and potentially cooperating with, China’s space program. However, this is an area that Kirk believes
requires a lot of outreach to his colleagues. “My take on the House of Representatives floor right now,” Kirk said, “is if I
said that China had a very active manned space program, that would still be news to a lot of my colleagues… I think this
entire field is one in which the Congress is largely unaware.”
Dealing with China in a way that’s politically popular is the cause of securitization
Space Daily, Xinhua, 5/18/11, "Wolf Clause" betrays China-U.S. cooperation,
http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Wolf_Clause_betrays_China_US_cooperation_999.html, dk
As a result, Chinese journalists were denied the opportunity to make live coverage of the shuttle's blast-off, just as their
peers from other countries have done. The Chinese journalists were also kept away from NASA's press conferences.
Obviously, the "Wolf Clause" runs counter to the trend that both China and the United States are trying to push ahead their
exchanges and cooperation in science and technology. During the third round of the China-U.S. Strategic and Economic
Dialogue (S and ED) held in Washington earlier this month, the two sides published accomplishments of the dialogue,
which includes the cooperation in science and technology. Moreover, China and the U.S. this year renewed their bilateral
agreements on scientific and technological cooperation. The Obama administration also attached importance to the current
development and trend of scientific and technological cooperation between China and the U.S. and realized the nature of
mutual benefit brought about by such cooperation. John P.Holdren, director of the Science and Technology Policy Office
of the White House, has told Xinhua that the cooperation on science and technology was one of the most dynamic fields in
bilateral relations between China and the United States. The "Wolf Clause" exposed the anxiety of hawkish politicians in
the United States over China's peaceful development in recent years, and it also demonstrated their shortsightedness to the
whole world.
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2AC A2- Economy DA
US-China cooperation in space would ease tension, save money, and help US companies
Leonard David, senior staff writer for space.com, 4/16/2006 “U.S.-China Cooperation: The Great Space Debate
http://www.space.com/2284-china-cooperation-great-space-debate.html”
NASA Administrator, Michael Griffin, has confirmed that he has been invited to visit China, although no specific date has
been set for the meeting. How best to work with China is increasingly becoming part of a space policy debate in the United
States. The posturing between nations is reminiscent of Cold War discussions with the former Soviet Union. Those talks led
to an array of cooperative ventures, from weather data exchanges to the docking detente of Apollo-Soyuz in 1975, setting
the stage for working together on the International Space Station project. Defuse possible tensions "China civil space plans
are ambitious and inevitable," said Joseph Fuller, Jr., President and Chief Executive Officer of the Futron Corporation
based in Bethesda, Maryland. "It is not a question of if, but when. For the U.S. exploration vision to succeed on a grand
scale, it must include China, India, Russia and other space faring nations," he said. "Substantial collaboration already exists
in business and economics," Fuller said, "why not civil space?" As China expands its automated and human spaceflight
abilities, how best should the United States look upon this blossoming work--from a military/civilian perspective? Denying
NASA and U.S. space commercial vendors the right to work with China is a political, not a security issue, said James Clay
Moltz, Deputy Director, Center for Nonproliferation Studies and Professor of International Policy Studies at the Monterey
Institute of International Studies in Monterey, California. "Space station technologies are available from other suppliers and
are unlikely to lead to any meaningful military advantages," Moltz explained. "On the other hand, forcing China to develop
its own space station with Russian or other partners simply sets up a possible competitor where there doesn't need to be
one." Moltz told SPACE.com that cooperating with China would defuse possible tensions, promote cost-savings for NASA,
and level the playing field for U.S. companies. The United States should continue to hold China to account for human
rights violations and other problems, but not hold space hostage. "It's simply not in U.S. interests," he said.
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2AC A2- Evil Russia DA
Russia is nowhere near a threat, despite what critics say
LeVine 10- Steve LeVine, Foreign Policy Staff Writer (12/30/10, “Putin’s Most Telling month: December,”
http://oilandglory.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/12/30/putins_most_telling_month_december) IG
In watching Russia, it's important to clear away the brush in which one can get lost. For starters, despite some excited talk over civil
rights and the New START treaty, Russia is not a security threat to the United States or NATO. Russia does remain a place where
victims and their defenders suddenly find themselves the accused, as the New York Times' Clifford Levy writes movingly of Oleg
Orlov and his defense of the murdered Chechen human rights activist Natalya Estemirova. But, while China is deploying a blue-water
navy that actually will test U.S. dominance of the Indian Ocean and sea lanes beyond, Russia challenges the United States nowhere
militarily. Critics continue to pile onto New START, saying the nuclear arms reduction treaty weakens missile defense, but the
opposite is true: Moscow has offered, and ought to be granted, a partnership in a grand missile defense umbrella covering the Eurasian
land mass. (Grave doubts remain whether such technology will work any time soon, as we have discussed previously, but that is no
reason not to enlarge the common ground between NATO and Russia now.)
-Plan doesn’t stop any missiles, asats, etc. from being sent into outer space, plan cooperates with china and destroys the security
mindset against china. Missiles would still be there meaning U.S. wouldn’t be perceived as weak by Russia.
Russia and the U.S. are in cooperation now
AFP ’11 (April 21 2011 “Biden, Putin discuss trade, missile defense”
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5ihomJZUFYOoFafUKgwnIshsMbUNw?docId=CNG.10ca48e6e2cf6458f9bfe
7b870c2abe3.231 IG)
WASHINGTON — US Vice President Joe Biden and Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin on Thursday discussed Moscow's goal
of joining the World Trade Organization and missile defense cooperation, the White House said. Biden and Putin talked about "the
Obama administration's commitment to terminate" the application to Russia of a Cold War-era US law that blocks certain non-market
economies that restrict emigration from joining the WTO. They also discussed "next steps on missile defense cooperation" and
"agreed on the importance of continuing momentum in relations between the United States and Russia," according to a White House
statement. "Vice President Biden underscored the continued need for cooperation between the United States and Russia on global
security issues and pledged to continue to work with Russia on facilitating travel between our two countries," it said. Moscow needs
Washington to stop applying the so-called Jackson-Vanik law to Russia in order to gain US "permanent normal trade relations" -- and
be cleared for WTO accession. Russia is the last major economic power to lack WTO membership. The conversation came a day
after Putin needled the United States over its deficits and national debt and accused Washington of "behaving like a hooligan" by
flooding world markets with devalued dollars. "Look at their trade balance, look at the budget deficit, at the debt of the United
States," Putin said in closing comments to his annual address to parliament. "We have none of that -- and, I hope, we never will,"
Putin said to a strong round of applause.
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2AC A2- Evil India DA
Relations between India and the U.S. continue to deepen
Hindustan Times 7/12 (7/12/11, " 'Indo-US relations continue to deepen' ", http://www.hindustantimes.com/Indo-US-relationscontinue-to-deepen/Article1-720416.aspx IG)
Indian ambassador to the US Meera Shankar talked to Yashwant Raj as US secretary of state Hillary Clinton goes to India for the
annual strategic dialogue on July 18. On the current of state of bilateral relations: We continue to deepen our relationship with the
related stories US across a very broad spectrum — political, strategic and economic. The visit of secretary Clinton to India for the
strategic dialogue will be an opportunity to review the considerable progress that we have made since President Obama’s historic visit
last November, explore new initiatives and chart out the course for the future and also exchange views on the situation in our
neighbourhood and beyond. On whether there are likely to be any fresh initiative: We are working on several initiatives, including in
the areas of civil aviation, energy and investment which will provide new avenues for cooperation. On the role of defense purchases
in the strategic relationship: Our defence relationship is an important component of overall strategic relationship. We have purchased
about US $8 billion worth defence equipment from US in recent years. As Indian modernises its armed forces, there will be more
such opportunities.
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***2AC A2- Counterplans
China Securitization Affirmative
DDI 2011
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2AC A2- Non-Space Coop CP
U.S.-China space cooperation key due to military and economic uses- spills over to a broad international
effort
Gallagher 10- Nancy Gallagher, Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, U of Maryland, Published in
Astropolitics, Volume 8, Issue 2 (May 2010, “Space Governance and International Cooperation,”
http://www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/files/space_governance_and_international_cooperation.pdf) SP
As the most powerful player in the system, the United States wants rules to provide reassurance that weaker players will not
exploit its vulnerabilities for asymmetrical attacks, that developing countries will behave responsibly rather than cut corners
and cause problems for others, and that rising powers will want to join rather than change the status quo. But for this rulebased order to attract widespread support and sustained compliance, the United States must also provide credible
reassurance that it will follow the rules itself, that it will not use its military and technological advantages in ways that harm
others’ interests, and that it will support international governance arrangements that give others a meaningful voice in
decisions that affect their security, prosperity, and way of life. Space epitomizes these current strategic challenges. It serves
functions of vital importance for high-technology military operations, electronic financial transactions, power-grid
operations, and countless other aspects of life in the information age. Yet, the space technologies needed for these
beneficial purposes can also be deliberately or inadvertently misused in ways that threaten inherently vulnerable satellites
and those who depend on them. Space is central to U.S. military, economic, and technological predominance; it matters
greatly to countries who aspire to interact as equals with the United States; and it offers hope to those who have not yet
benefitted much from globalization. Thus, there are both practical and symbolic reasons to choose space cooperation as a
leading opportunity to provide mutual reassurance and to build effective global governance institutions.
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2AC A2- Non-Space Coop CP
Space cooperation is key- reduces the likelihood of international conflict and spills over to other sectors
Gallagher 10- Nancy Gallagher, Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, U of Maryland, Published in
Astropolitics, Volume 8, Issue 2 (May 2010, “Space Governance and International Cooperation,”
http://www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/files/space_governance_and_international_cooperation.pdf) SP
The National Space Policy and posture reviews of the Obama Administration place much greater emphasis on international
cooperation than did the George W. Bush administration.1 So far, though, the new administration has not articulated a
coherent and compelling strategic concept to guide its pursuit of space cooperation. Department of Defense (DOD) officials
have argued that the United States needs more informal cooperation because space is increasingly “congested,”
“competitive,” and “contested.”2 State Department officials have used more diplomatic terms, saying that space is not only
“congested,” but also “multifaceted” and “interdependent.”3 Each phrase reflects a different, somewhat contradictory way
of defining the problem that space cooperation could help solve. Each also puts conceptual limits on the kinds of
cooperation deemed worthy of serious U.S. consideration in ways that reduce the likelihood of international agreement on
measures that would advance the administration’s main policy objectives in space and its overall national security strategy.
This conceptual confusion may explain the gap between the Obama Administration’s declared interest in space cooperation
and the lowest-common-denominator measures that it has endorsed. For example, the United States recently announced that
it would begin providing pre-launch notification for commercial and civilian satellites, but not national security satellites,
and only for “the majority” of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.4 This is a
positive gesture, but it only partially fulfills the Hague Code of Conduct pledge made, but never implemented, by the Bush
Administration. It falls far short of a prelaunch and post-launch notification accord signed with Russia during the Clinton
Administration.
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2AC A2- Non-Space Coop CP
Cooperating with China on space is integral to the entire US-Sino relationship
Gallagher 10- Nancy Gallagher, Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, U of Maryland, Published in
Astropolitics, Volume 8, Issue 2 (May 2010, “Space Governance and International Cooperation,”
http://www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/files/space_governance_and_international_cooperation.pdf) SP
One way to think more strategically about the role of space cooperation in achieving U.S. objectives is to evaluate different
ways of conceptualizing why it might be useful, what kinds of cooperation would be preferable, and whether other key
countries are likely to agree to measures that will produce the desired results. Three strategic objectives represent a core of
continuity in U.S. national space policy over time, despite major disagreements about what they mean in practice and how
they should be pursued: (1) to secure the space domain for peaceful use; (2) to protect space assets from all hazards; and (3)
to derive maximum value from space for security, economic, civil, and environmental ends. This paper analyzes the three
strategic logics for space cooperation evoked by different policy ideas being used in the Obama Administration’s space and
security policies. The Global Commons logic seeks more informal cooperation so that a multitude of self-interested space
users can share a “congested” environment without causing unintentional harm. In the Strategic Stability logic, U.S. use of
space is increasingly “contested” by states or non-state actors who might attack vulnerable space assets to offset U.S.
military advantages. In this logic, the primary purpose of space cooperation is to minimize such attacks by increasing the
negative consequences for attackers, reducing their potential benefits, and avoiding misperceptions. The Space Governance
for Global Security logic centers on characterizations of space as “interdependent” and “multifaceted.” This logic
emphasizes that the more different countries, companies, and individuals depend on space for a growing array of purposes,
the more they need equitable rules, shared decision-making procedures, and effective compliance mechanisms to maximize
the benefits that they all can gain from space, while minimizing risks from irresponsible space behaviors or deliberate
interference with legitimate space activities. Each logic highlights important features of the evolving space arena, and each
gives good reasons why greater international cooperation could help accomplish U.S. objectives at an acceptable level of
risks and costs. Since the main goal of U.S. space policy in recent years has been to maximize U.S. military power and
freedom of action in space, with commercial and civilian interests subordinated to that goal,6 most Americans and allies
who argue for greater space cooperation use the Global Commons or Strategic Stability logics. Although the Global
Commons logic has the widest appeal, emerging space environmental problems do not seem urgent enough to motivate
much more cooperation than has already been achieved since this collective action rationale for cooperation gained
adherents in the 1990s. Framing the case for space cooperation in environmental terms also obscures, and is obstructed by,
conflicting security interests among different spacefaring nations. Using the Strategic Stability logic to build the case for
more space security cooperation, on the other hand, intensifies the sense of urgency by exaggerating conflicting security
interests.
Domestic political resistance can be overcome by explaining dual use capabilities of space technology with
reference to cooperation
Gallagher 10- Nancy Gallagher, Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, U of Maryland, Published in
Astropolitics, Volume 8, Issue 2 (May 2010, “Space Governance and International Cooperation,”
http://www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/files/space_governance_and_international_cooperation.pdf) SP
In doing so, though, it risks inadvertently stimulating competition, and undermining the prospects for cooperation. The
Space Governance for Global Security Logic broadens the rationale for cooperation to include the mutual positive gains
that space users can achieve at lower cost through collaboration, as well as the negative benefits from reducing risks of
inadvertent interference and deliberate attack. It offers a more compelling reason to increase policy coordination than the
Global Commons logic does, and a more constructive context for space security cooperation than the Strategic Stability
logic. Although the Space Governance for Global Security logic might encounter more initial political resistance in the
United States than the other two logics, it is more likely to produce international agreements that accomplish the desired
results. Domestic political resistance could be overcome by showing how space has become integral not only to modern
U.S. military operations, but to all the major elements of the 2010 National Security Strategy’s vision for promoting
security, prosperity, and shared values by building a just and sustainable international order in space as well as on Earth.
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China Securitization Affirmative
DDI 2011
1
2AC A2- Non-Space Coop CP
Space cooperation key- compatible interests are more common in space than antagonistic ones
Gallagher 10- Nancy Gallagher, Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, U of Maryland, Published in
Astropolitics, Volume 8, Issue 2 (May 2010, “Space Governance and International Cooperation,”
http://www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/files/space_governance_and_international_cooperation.pdf) SP
While space cooperation can make valuable contributions to strategic stability, it would be a mistake to use an adapted
version of Cold War deterrence and arms control logic as the dominant way to conceptualize it.38 That logic assumed a
fundamentally adversarial bilateral relationship, where the prime indicators of relative power (nuclear weapons and
conventional forces) could be directly compared, and the only common interest lay in avoiding mutual nuclear disaster.
None of those conditions hold in space. There, a growing number of states and non-state actors interact in complicated
patterns using ambiguous systems that can have both military and non-military applications. Moreover, compatible interests
have always been far more common in space than antagonistic ones. Making deterrence the dominant paradigm for space
security would not only perpetuate Cold War-style nuclear relationships among the United States, Russia, and China, it
would also unnecessarily recreate the same dangerous dynamic in space, where it would be much more difficult to avoid
deliberate or inadvertent deterrence failures. At the same time, it would raise the costs of using space for commercial and
civilian purposes, and impede the close cooperation that the United States needs from Russia, China, and a number of other
spacefaring countries if it wants to achieve its highest priority objectives for security, prosperity, and world order.
Therefore, while the United States should pursue cooperative steps that would increase both space and terrestrial strategic
stability, it should frame its reasons for seeking space cooperation using a less adversarial, more ambitious, and more
inclusive rationale.
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69
China Securitization Affirmative
DDI 2011
1
2AC A2- Non-Space Coop CP
Space cooperation is key- US can use it as a springboard for bilateral cooperation in all sectors
Thaisrivongs 06- David Thaisrivongs, Associate Editor at the Harvard International Review (5/6/06, “New Space for US-China
Relations,” http://hir.harvard.edu/international-trade/the-final-frontier) SP
On October 15, 2003, at 9:00 AM Beijing time, the People's Republic of China became the third nation in history to send a
human into orbit. The "taikonaut," Lt. Col. Yang Liwei, landed the inaugural flight just over 21 hours later and immediately
became a national hero. However, there are many in the United States who look suspiciously at China's accomplishment,
fearing that China's developing space technology is being used for military reconnaissance. The US Department of Defense
annual report on "Military Power of the People's Republic of China" in 2002 concludes that this manned spaceflight could
eventually aid Chinese military space capabilities and further its development of direct-ascent anti-satellite weapons, US
navigational satellite signal jamming technology, and ground-based laser systems. However, when this remarkable
achievement for China is considered in a broader context of political relations, it is clear that the United States should now
shrug off its Cold War mentality in favor of more optimistic US-China relations. China is willing to work with countries
and accept help from them for its space program. Russia, its main partner, signed a bilateral space cooperation agreement
with China in 1994 that provides for mutual space program development in areas including human spaceflight and missions
to Mars. Russia aided China in its development of the Shenzhou spacecraft, the model that took Yang into space, and
continues to provide technical assistance and materials to China's program. China has also benefited from cooperation with
many other nations, including Sweden, which launched the Freja satellite on a Chinese vehicle in 1992, and Brazil, which is
working with China to develop satellites under the China-Brazil Earth Remote Sensing program. In addition, China is
cooperating with the European Space Agency (ESA) in magnetospheric studies, and signed a cooperative agreement in
September 2003 with the European Union for the EU-ESA Galileo navigation system, a more advanced version of the US
Global Positioning System. Beneath the facade of China's costly display in October, there lies a country still in need of
economic help. According to the World Bank's World Development Indicators for 2002, China's gross national income
index is a mere US$940, compared with US$35,060 for the United States. Despite a burst of recent growth, foreign direct
investment (FDI) and loan growth in China declined in October 2003, a possible sign that the Chinese economy is starting
to cool off. The Commerce Ministry recently reported that for the first ten months of 2003, FDI was at US$46.6 billion,
giving the country a little over two more months to attract another US$13 billion to China's 2003 FDI target level of US$57
billion. This economic situation represents an ideal opportunity for the United States to permanently strengthen its relations
with China by utilizing the recent manned spaceflight as a springboard for bilateral cooperation
in many sectors. Given its knowledge in the area of space technology and China's demonstrated willingness to work
with other countries on space-related projects, the United States has the opportunity to join the large circle of nations that
offer China assistance for its space program. Given that foreign-backed ventures make up half of the total exports in China
and are critical in creating jobs (30 million former public workers, 150 million rural citizens, and about 200 million other
people in China are jobless), it is in desperate need of US economic investment, both at the private and public levels. From
China's entry into the World Trade Organization to the support it has given to US corporations that tap its resources,
China's promising steps suggest it is time for the United States to reduce some of the tariffs stifling economic integration
and discouraging business cooperation at many levels. The United States should welcome China into the group of countries
it considers strong allies, disavowing the history of suspicion and escalating standoffs, and accepting China as a partner in a
broader, global context. Aiding the Chinese space program could be the first key step in launching US-China relations into
an era of mutual trust and cooperation.
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