Download Understanding the Arab Spring

Whither the Arab Revolts?
Avraham Sela
Dep. of International Relations
The Hebrew University
Jerusalem, Mt. Scopus
Israel 91905
E-Mail: [email protected]
May 2012
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Preface
The social and political revolts that swept the Arab world since late 2010 have struck the
world with their immense energies, scope, persistence, and discernible success in radically
shaking hitherto ‘robust authoritarian regimes,’ according to Middle East experts. Though
the long-term consequences of this on-going phenomenon are still to be seen, there is little
doubt that these mass uprisings represent a major turning point in the contemporary history
of these societies.
What is striking indeed is that Arab societies, traditionally held by social scientists as most
resistant to democratization and political change, not only erupted against long-lived
autocratic regimes, but also set the tone and slogans for similar protest movements in other
parts of the world, including western societies. Protesters in Tunis, Cairo, Tel Aviv, London,
New York, and Oakland indeed seemed to be sharing an outcry against injustices of the
capitalist economy, a growing sense of social insecurity, especially among the young
educated middle-class due to continued unemployment, impoverishment, broadening gaps
between rich and poor, and most all, a sense of hopelessness for a better future. No less
conspicuous is the combined image of continued mass protest, intensive use of cellular
networks for mobilization as well as for reaching out to the world despite attempts to block
such communications.
Nonetheless, whether we look for causality, process, or possible consequences, a
comparison between the wave of Arab revolts and protest groups in Israel or western
countries would be grossly inappropriate due to built-in differences of social and political
development, norms and traditions.
Indeed, even within the Arab world’s perimeters, the revolts represent significantly different
models in terms of scope, the use of violence or lack thereof, and the nature of responses by
the various ruling elites. Such differences are salient not only between monarchies and
republics, rich and poor states, but also among republics ruled by a life-long militarybureaucratic regime.
Hence, despite the common popular and liberal slogans heralding the advent of the people
as a new political entity representing a common will (“The people wants …”) and claiming its
share in decision making, the rise to power of Islamic parties in Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, and
possibly Algeria, through free elections, and the first free election of a president in Egypt –
despite all these it is still questionable where these revolts are heading especially with
regard to democratization, social and economic development, and foreign policy.
Indeed, what possible consequences these popular revolutions may yield and especially
what trajectory they may take in the foreseeable future? Squarely put, how far would the
Islamic movements go in implementing their ideology in domestic and foreign policies now
that their dominant political power has been clearly manifested through open and free
elections? More specifically, what would be the impact of the new reality in Tunisia, Egypt,
and other Arab states on their policies concerning civil rights—especially for women and
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minorities—and the principle of the people’s sovereignty as a the ultimate source of
legislation and political legitimacy.
The main purpose of this paper is to analyze the nature of the current unrest in the Arab
world, even as it continues to unfold. I attempt to identify the major paradigm shifts that are
transforming the arena, while pointing out those threads from the past that continue to
impact it. The paper begins with tracing the underlying causes for the Arab revolts focusing
on what seems as the most significant factor affecting the Arab societies in our time, namely
the socio-economic quandary. The paper then examines possible future developments
based on over a year of social and political turmoil and change.
The Primacy of Socio-Economic Constraints
It is quite certain that the Arab revolts stemmed first and foremost from social and economic
frustration, especially of the urban educated middle class. It is thus no coincidence that
students, labor unions, and professional associations, men and women, largely in their mid20s to mid-30s took the lead of the social protest, albeit without any organizational
experience other than the ability to use their cellular phones for triggering a sense of
collective identity and drive for action.
Indeed, the Arab social and political turmoil since December 2010 has brought to light a
number of painful socio-economic challenges—youth unemployment, class and regional
inequalities, corruption, weak institutions, limited and stifled entrepreneurship, and the
need to advance the role of women in the economy. These challenges must be addressed if
the needs and aspirations of the region's citizens are to be met.
The recently published edition of The Arab World Competitiveness Report underlined the
need to generate jobs, defining it as the most pressing priority of the Arab world. Indeed, in
view of the relatively young Arab populations (more than half of the population is below 20)
the Arab countries need to develop nearly 2.5 million new jobs every year (Egypt alone is in
need of nearly one million new jobs a year) just to maintain the current level of
employment.
Yet generating such a huge scope of new jobs is unrealistic without significantly developing
the economic competitiveness of the Arab societies. Moreover, fostering job creation is
closely connected with better governance, advancement of inclusive growth, and
encouragement of international economic integration, all of which have been absent from
Arab states’ domestic arenas.
Generating jobs is particularly urgent for the youth, women and the most educated. Youth
unemployment (15-24 years) averages 25 percent across the region (compared to 17
percent in OECD countries) and reaches 30 percent in countries like Saudi Arabia and
Tunisia. Moreover, the most educated segments of the population are not finding
employment, over 40 percent in Saudi Arabia and above 20 percent in Morocco and the
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UAE. Another striking feature in the region is the high level of unemployment among women
(up to 40 percent) and their very low labor force participation rates (33 percent compared to
61 percent in OECD countries).
Sustainable job creation is further hampered by the disproportionate weight of the public
sector in the region's economies – 70 percent of nonagricultural employment in Egypt is in
the public sector – and low levels of entrepreneurship, with economies in the region
registering only 0.6 new firms per 1,000 working age people, compared to approximately
four firms in high-income countries.
While the region registered a solid economic performance over the better part of the last
decade, with a GDP growth of 5.2 percent between 2000 and 2008 (compared to only 2.4
percent for OECD countries), the global economic crisis and recent events have negatively
impacted most economies, apart from a few oil rich states that benefited from rising energy
prices. Particularly affected are the economies of Egypt and Tunisia, which did not grow
more than 1 percent in 2011 and are struggling to minimize instability and uncertainty for
investors. Other countries, such as Morocco and to a lesser degree Jordan, are holding their
ground. The state of economic affairs is by far worse in Yemen while the escalating armed
revolt in Syria is a guarantee for further deterioration in its economy.
But how and why have Arab economies deteriorated to such a low level of economic
competitiveness, resulting in staggering levels of unemployment, increasing gaps between
rich and poor, and impoverishment of the middle-class? The backdrop of this remarkably
stagnated and underdeveloped social and economic state of affairs must be taken into
consideration in estimating future scenarios of change in the wake of the current revolts.
The UNDP report on the Arab human development, prepared by Arab experts and published
in July 2002, revealed a harsh reality of the social and economic conditions in the Arab
world. The report’s findings offer both data and structural explanations to the state of affairs
in Arab countries.
According to the report the Arab world was at the bottom of human development, lagging
behind Latin America, the Caribbean, and South East Asia. According to the report one-fifth
of Arabs lived below the poverty line (defined as less than $2 a day). In the previous 20 years
the average annual growth of per capita GDP was only 0.5 percent – the lowest in the world
except the sub-Saharan African countries. The total GDP of all the Arab states together (260
million people at the time of the report), stood at $500 billion, less than Spain’s GDP alone,
and only five times more than that of Israel (of 6 million people then).
The report pointed to serious structural deficiencies and extremely low indicators in social
and economic areas such as health and education, research and development, and
socialization of science and technology. The main reason for this gloomy situation of the
Arab societies, the report concluded, was the absence of democracy and, more specifically,
the lack of basic freedoms and continued suppression of human and civil rights.
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The authoritarian regimes surrounded themselves with powerful military, security, and
intelligence organizations and often by a ruling party, whose primary task is to foster
patronage relations with social and economic sectors in return for political support. The
combination of corporative economy and ‘rentierism’ of most Arab states, rich and poor,
undercut the prospect of international competition and discouraged foreign investments.
The private sector thus remained small and absent of the necessary resources of capital,
technology, management and marketing skills to develop economic enterprises capable of
competing in the global market.
What Lies Ahead?
The extent to which countries in the region are able to recover will depend on the speed,
design, and execution of political transition and economic reforms, as well as on the
recovery of the global economy. What is certain is that the developments since 2011 provide
a unique window of opportunity for the Arab world to leverage its “youth bulge” and
introduce the transparent and accountable policies and institutions that will support
increased competitiveness and higher living standards.
Achieving higher growth and employment will require that the different challenges be
tackled through a coordinated and comprehensive strategy that involves governments, the
private sector, civil society, and the international community. The region's governments—
old and new—and the international community need to work hand in hand to develop
strategies to promote inclusive and sustainable economic growth and employment if they
are to fulfill the aspirations of the Arab world's citizens.
A. The Political and Social Dimensions
Despite the varied forms of social and political revolts and responses by ruling elites, it is
safe to argue that the turmoil in the Arab countries harbingers the end of an era marked by
authoritarian leaders, supported by a ruling party controlling every aspect of life, a
centralized and largely public economy, and a disciplined bureaucracy, including a strong
and loyal army. Since January 2011 most of these features, including the growing tendency
among republican regimes to behave as monarchs passing the reins of power from father to
son, have either been undermined or abolished. The result is free, open, and transparent
competition among candidates who genuinely appeal to public support as in the cases of
Tunisia and Egypt.
The main question for the future is who are the organizing and driving forces behind the
mass protests? In the absence of an Arab 'civil society' in the Western meaning of the term,
namely, the existence of relatively autonomous social organizations capable of effecting
collective action, the main organized 'civil society' is represented by the Islamic movements,
primarily of the Muslim Brotherhood type, whose commitment to the principles of liberalism
(civil and human—especially women’s—rights, tolerance of the non-Muslim 'other,' and
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most of all, commitment to maintain and respect the electorate decision) is seriously
questioned by seculars in the Arab world and beyond.
A key question is that of women's rights in the new political orders emerging in the Arab
countries. Arab women have spoken out, emphasising that a guarantee of their human
rights is a prerequisite to a just society. But in the noise of the celebrations as dictators get
toppled, these voices are sometimes being drowned out.
If women's rights are also human rights, then should societies fighting for the reassertion of
human rights also first guarantee women their rights? Is it possible to allow religion to
dictate law if the interpretation of that religion is left to men? Are rights that women have
won, even in a dictatorship, still valid even after the overthrow of the dictator?
The grounds for apprehension are indeed abundant: will the Islamic movements in Tunisia
and Egypt sincerely profess moderation? How dangerous are their electoral victories for a
stable and peaceful Middle East? The change of regimes triggers fears in Israel and its
supporters of a politically empowered Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, where a peace treaty
for decades has protected Israel's southern flank. Though the threat is tempered somewhat
by the continued hand of the Egyptian military on the levers of power, the possibilities of
serious erosion of the already limited scope of relations between the two states cannot be
exaggerated.
The intervention of Western governments, especially the United States and the EU, in
stating their support of the Arab revolts in the name of democracy and human rights and its
impact on the course of events raise questions about the future role of Western
governments in ‘the day after’. That is, what role these developed countries are expected to
play in securing the establishment of stable and functioning economic and political systems
beyond concern for securing an uninterrupted supply of oil and gas from the Arab countries
as demonstrated in the case of NATO’s military intervention in Libya against Qadhafi?
B. The Role of the Military
What came as a surprise was the conduct of the Arab armies, which contrary to the image
associated with them in recent decades as loyal instruments of power, opted—especially in
the cases of Tunisia and Egypt—to adopt an independent position and side with the
populace against the rulers.
The actual conduct of the military establishments of Tunisia, Egypt, and largely of Libya along
the months of upheaval demonstrates the return of this social sector to the center of the
political arena. The refusal of the Egyptian military to intervene in repressing the protesters
and pressure on Mubarak to resign, and the defection of Libyan and Yemenite military units
to join the protesters and rebels, all demonstrated a significant departure from the military
patterns of political behavior in the last three-four decades.
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Yet, time will tell whether these manifestations represent a new and independent mode of
conduct culminating in stabilizing the political arena and return of the military to the
barracks—as in the Turkish model—or an attempt by top-military officers to safeguard their
turf and interests as an occupational sector by jumping on the wagon before it is too late. No
less important, by adopting the role of protectors of the people’s wellbeing the top military
echelons might be able to clear themselves of possible accusations for decades of serving
the much hated toppled regime. Interestingly enough, despite its ‘positive’ role in forcing
Mubarak to resign, the Egyptian military leadership has come under increasing criticism, first
by the secular groups, for their preference of cooperation with the Muslim Brotherhood
movement and later by the Islamists who remain suspicious about the military’s willingness
to genuinely relinquishing its powers to a democratically elected government.
In Syria, however, and to a lesser extent in Yemen and Bahrain, the military has
demonstrated little tolerance for the public protest and support of the ruling elite. The
different conduct of these military establishments can be explained by the relatively narrow
ethnic basis of these regimes, and the military’s awareness that a change in the nature of
the regimes would lead to serious damage to their own status and privileges. This is
especially conspicuous in comparison to the continued confrontation between the military
establishment and society in Syria, which has thus far claimed at least 10,000 lives.
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