Download 1/11/02 Influence of sea power on the emergence of European

1/11/02
Influence of sea power on the emergence of European nation states to 1763.
The Vikings were the first people to venture out into the open ocean with man and wind
power.
The Atlantic nation states in Europe had larger beamed ships and used dead reckoning as
a means of navigation. Dead reckoning works by:
1. getting a land fix,
2. recording your time of travel
3. Knowing your speed.
The fix gives you a longitude, and the rate (time/speed) gives you a latitude.
The western Europeans started to develop legends of an un-broken water route to the
Indies. They wanted to get to the orient and all the money and goods there at a lower cost.
In Europe at the time, there were a lot of different skills, which resulted in a large variety
of products and goods/commodities. This made for a lot of brown water trade.
European emergence was influenced by a growth of a middle class of artists and
tradesman. This also included merchants. They developed a system of exchange,
banking, and insurance: a real economy. This led to a rose in disposable income, which
led to a desire for other, more exotic goods.
The prominent explorers of the time: Prince Henry of Portugal. A.k.a. Prince Henry the
Navigator. He financed expeditions and excursions into West Africa.
Bartholomew Dias was one of his financiers. He discovered the Cape of Good Hope in
1487.
Vasco de Gama was the first person to go around the Cape of Good Hope all the way to
India. (1498).
Spanish explorers: Magellan and Columbus. Magellan circumnavigated the world. And
Columbus is obvious in what he did. These people made Spain very wealthy, which
allowed it to do many things.
During this time, Spain is changing from a feudal system of government to a national
system of government. This led to a long time of domestic piece, which allowed the
economy to bloom. This change of government also made a uniform coinage. It led to a
lot of trade. This led to the decline of city-states, economically and militarily.
The new powers are England, France, Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands.
Henry the VIII was the first Spanish leader to really build up the Spanish navy. He armed
his ships with muzzle loaded guns, which had to be placed in the cargo decks, which led
to the broadside tactics.
The English navy is at a stand still until the Spanish declared war on England to make the
English crown catholic. This is the war for English Succession.
Francis Drake and John Hawkins were two prominent merchant people that armed their
ships in support of Elizabeth, the queen of England. They also developed ships that were
longer and less wide, leading to more speed and maneuverability. They armed their ships
with long range, lightweight weapons.
In 1586, Phillip II of Spain was conspiring to assassinate Elizabeth, because he couldn’t
quite wage war at that point. One of his assassins killed William the Stadtholder (a.k.a.
William of Orange) of the Netherlands, which led to the Spanish subjugation of the
Netherlands. He seized English ships that were in his ports.
In response, Elizabeth sends Drake off to seize Spanish territorial possessions. She also
offs Mary Queen of Scott.
Phillip II builds his fleets up, making his eventual grand armada.
England frustrates Spanish campaigns in the Netherlands, and wages a defensive war.
English strengths:
Economy supports maritime enterprise; they developed a “blue-water” navy; and their
was royal support for the navy.
English weaknesses: inferior in resources, population and army; they were an island
nation; England was a weak and fractionated monarchy.
Spanish strengths:
Great wealth from overseas empire; they had a powerful army.
Spanish weaknesses: political uncertainty; they had an economy that was un-supportive
of maritime enterprise; they continue to favor boarding tactics at sea, as used in the Battle
of Lepanto.
The Spanish decide to mount an invasion of England, with an unworkable plan, using
poor tactics and communication.
The ship closer to the source of the wind is considered windward.
The ship farther from the source of the wind is considered leeward.
The Spanish fleet is defeated by:
Inferior technology; inferior tactics; defeatist leadership; inadequate seamanship;
inadequate logistical support.
This event convinced the English that gun tactics are the only way to fight and win at sea.
The event was epochal in two respects: all out confrontation between chief champions of
Catholicism and Protestantism. It was also the first major contest between European
ocean-going national fleets.
It marks the beginning of Spanish decline.
It stimulates the Elizabethan age
It led to undecided raiding war until 1603.
It sows the seeds for the English-Dutch hostilities.
1/14/02
Anglo-Dutch Wars (1652-1674)
Battle for commercial domination of Atlantic, West Indies, and East Indies.
With Spanish navy devastated, her overseas holdings are vulnerable.
English, French, and Dutch infringe on Spanish land and trade routes.
The mercantilist economic theory compels England to challenge the Netherlands
supremacy.
England strengthens their navy through the navigation act - limiting imports to England
to British ships.
As Holland’s maritime commerce grew, her navy grew in proportion. This was an
immense advantage to Holland. This was happening as there were internal power
struggles in England and Holland. This allows the Dutch to dominate trade in the
Atlantic, and the east and West Indies.
This domination makes the English and the French enemies of the Dutch.
England’s navigation act of 1651: Goods can only be carried to England on English ships
or from ships of the original country. This leads to enmity between the English and the
Dutch.
Under Cromwell, the navy got better pay, formulated formal doctrine, rebuilt old ships
and built new ships, and commissioned privateers and cost incentives for ship seizing.
In March of 1653, the line ahead battle doctrine is established.
This leads us to the first Anglo-Dutch war: 1652-1654. Initially, the English didn’t do
well, because of a lack of formal fighting instructions. They eventually win the war, with
a blockade of Holland. There are two battles in the war. The end result is equal access to
the east and West Indies, and a cash settlement with the English.
From 1655-1664, there are the in-between years. During this time, Charles II is put back
to the thrown, and puts his brother as the Lord High Admiral of the Royal Navy. They
accept the new innovations that are put in place during the commonwealth. However, two
schools of thought arise about how to use the line ahead doctrine. The formal and the
melee. Formal mandated that the line does not break until the battle is over, while the
melee doctrine says to attack when the time is right.
In 1664, the English seize New Amsterdam, and many African ports. This leads to the
second Anglo-Dutch War. The English maintain a slight advantage through the war, and
sue for peace. However, during this time, there is the great London fire, and the plague
hits England. While Charles II sues for peace, he puts a lot of his navy out of
commission, allowing the Dutch to wreak havoc on the English navy.
As a result, the English get NA/NYC, relinquish control over the East Indies, get some of
the West Indies, and get rid of the navigation act.
In 1668, the English, Sweden, and Holland sign a treaty to contain French expansion.
Later, the English and the French sign the treaty of Dover, basically declaring war on
Holland. This leads to the third Anglo-Dutch war of 1672-1674. This is not a popular
war.
The Dutch have the early advantage of the war, because the French ships keep retreating
at the first sign of battle. There are two skirmishes, and two overall battles, but the Dutch
are the winners. In 1672, the German states and the Dutch sign an alliance. In 1673, the
Dutch blockade London, but that goes nowhere because of an outbreak of the plague on
Dutch ships. In 1674, England sues for peace, signs an alliance with the Dutch, and
marries the Duke of York’s daughter to William of Orange, the Dutch King. By 1678, the
French make peace as well.
An outcome of the war was an increase in trade for the English, who picked up the slack
that the Dutch let off.
“Line Ahead”
1. Only as strong as the weakest link.
2. Lesser warships not allowed into the line
3. Men of War “fit to lie in the line”, hence are “Ships of the line”
Classification:
1. 1st through 6th rate (i.e. first rate, second rate, etc)
2. classified based on the number of guns carried (i.e. “74 gun SoL”)
3. Name and number (i.e. “Victory, 100”).
80+guns: 1st, 2nd rate (three gun decks)
74 guns: third rates (two gun decks)
50 guns: 4th rates (flagship of cruiser sqdns)
<50 guns: Frigates, Sloops of War, Brigs, etc
Ships and guns
Average acceptable speed: 5-10 knots.
Guns
12 men to handle a “32 pounder”
Well-trained English gun crew:
1 broadside every 2-3 minutes
3-4 broadsides before exhaustion slows the crew.
1/16/02
Anglo-French Confrontations
Extended war lasted from 1689-1815 with two principle elements:
 Continental: France enjoyed a numerically superior army (5:1). Both worked hard to
enlist continental allies
 Maritime: Britain enjoyed maritime dominance aided by strong commerce and
unlimited resources.
War of English succession (1689-1697)
Louis XIV continues his aggression. Because of this, the league of Augsburg (antiFrench) is formed. It contains Austria, Spain, Sweden and several German states. It also
eventually includes England and Holland.
England’s Duke of York now King James II is an avowed catholic and tires to catholicize
England. Because of this, parliament invites back William of Orange and his wife Mary,
James’ Daughter.
James II flees to France, while Louis XIV attempts to restore him to the throne.
France has the most powerful navy in the world. Their ships are far superior to England’s
and they have more of them.
However, this is only on paper. The naval budget competes with the army’s budget. It
also has two coasts to defend, with two fleets. One is stationed in Toulon in the
Mediterranean and one is at Brest. They are separated by Gibraltar.
Naval tactics:
England:
Armada experience: “off-fighting” good idea, but need heavier cannon at closer range.
They used maneuvers to achieve line-forward.
They fired their broadsides at enemy hulls.
French:
Fired broadsides at masts and rigging to disable the ship
There was the conflict between the formalists and the meleeists.
Two battles during this war seem to support formalists:
 Battle of Beachy Head (1690): outnumbered Dutch-English fleet attempted to mass
on French rear; French van doubles back on allied van and crushes it.
 Battle of Barfleur (1692): French attempt mass on allied rear; allies break French
center and win.
In these battles, the melee tactic is used and is defeated by the formal tactic.
The land war is draining French resources. They prioritize the army and use guerilla
tactics for their navy.
As France approaches financial ruin, Louis stops his support for James, leaving William
the king of England.
War of Spanish Succession (1700-1713)
Charles II, last of Spanish Hapsburg line, was childish.
2 contenders to throne:
 Louis XIV of France
 Leopold I of Austria
Neither England nor the Netherlands willing to see Spain united with either France or
Austria.
In 1701, French occupy fortresses of Spanish Netherlands. A land war commences.
Grand alliance:
 England
 Austria
 Netherlands
 Most German states
 Prussia
 Portugal (later)
In 1702, Anglo-Dutch force repulsed at Cadiz (Aug). En route back, the Anglo-Dutch
force discovers Spanish treasure fleet in Vigo Bay protected by French-Spanish fleet.
They get the treasure, and take home 2m pounds. The also land ground forces and seize
fortifications overlooking the bay.
1704: 1800 English marines seize Gibraltar. This splits Toulon and Brest fleets.
Louis dispatches Toulon fleet to retake the rock. This leads to the battle of Malaga. The
English use line tactics. The French withdraw; nether side inflicts serious damage. This
leads to the permanent fighting instructions mandating formal line tactics.
Aug 1708: English marines capture Sardinia. The following month they capture Minorca,
which gives them the ability to blockade the French at Toulon.
Feb 1715: Treaty of Madrid: France is financially ruined.
England: acquires Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, and Hudson Bay territory from France. It
also acquires Gibraltar, Minorca, and Share of Spanish-American trade from Spain.
Britain is now known as Mistress of the Seas.
The seven years war:
The first world war.
War started in America with the French-Indian war.
Pitt’s plan: hitting and holding. Hitting- expand the British Empire by taking French and
Spanish colonies. Holding- prevent the loss of any Britain’s Possessions.
The royal navy was key. Britain allied with Frederick the Great of Prussia to keep French
continental forces busy.
Pitt was the minister of War for England. He was an imperialist. He wanted England to
build an empire for trade and imperialistic reasons.
French-Indian War (1754-1763)
Early victories over Washington and Braddock gave France near total dominance over
North America.
England’s re-conquest of North America:
 Royal Navy assumed control of the Atlantic
 1758: English Army establishes foothold in North America
 1759: Campaign to capture French capital at Quebec.
Implications: prelude to colonial rebellion.
It demonstrates to England the value of a balanced maritime strategy.
England garners complete control of American and Canadian territories (France and
Spain still have some, but not much east of the Mississippi).
England emerges as the lone maritime power.
Emergence of the European powers
 Climate, geography and people yielded a variety of products and skills.
 Navigable rivers and coastal waters provided low cost transportation.
 Growth of the middle class of artisans, tradesmen and merchants.
 Banking, investment, insurance and exchange systems.
 Demand for goods from other continents fuels the expansionism.
Importance of the 16th-18th century:
Basis for study/analysis by Alfred Thayer Mahan.
Importance of sea power dominance.
Implications of removal of French threat on English rule of her colonies.
1/18/02
The American Revolution: Part of a larger struggle
Some of the causes of the American Revolution.
 The peace of Paris of 1763, was in effect a truce, not a peace.
 Great Britain and France remain rivals and potential enemies
 Rivals for empire in North America, West Indies, Indian Ocean
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Britain passes a series of acts to help pay for the seven years war:
 Revenue act of 1764
 Stamp act of 1765
 Townshend acts of 1767
Leads to Boston massacre/tea party
Coercive acts passed as punishment (leads to shooting at Lexington and concord
The resulting rebellion becomes part of a renewed Anglo-French war.
There were five people killed at the Boston Massacre.
The coercive acts closed the Boston harbor, took away the right of election from the
citizens, and started to quarter military officials in private homes.
The British face a dilemma when the colonists rebel. They have a huge logistical
problem, have a decaying navy, and they have conflicting interests in the colonies (they
don’t want to hurt the loyalists).
American maritime heritage:
 American maritime heritage comes from the colonial status.
 Resources:
 Ships: merchant ships could be refitted or built as men of war.
 Crew: sailors in large supply.
 Raw materials: gifted with vast forests
Advantages of being a colony:
 Protection of the British fleet
 Ready market for goods
 Benefits of imperial trade
Disadvantages:
 Revenue generated doesn’t stay local
 Lack of military tradition
 No representation in parliament
 Lack of trading opportunities. They couldn’t trade outside of the British Empire.
 Different national interests
Some of the strategies that the Americans used during the war:
 Privateering. Limited warfare on the seas
 Enlist foreign powers to help
 Incite Canada to join the cause
 Fight a war of attrition
Some of the strategies the British used during the war:
 Command and control of the seas. They use this advantage to resupply the troops, reman the troops, and evacuate the troops.
1775: siege of Boston
 After Lexington and concord, Americans built forts surrounding Boston.
 May: Howe arrives with 10k troops and supplies by sea
 The British continually replenish by sea.
 July: Washington takes command of colonial forces. He quickly realizes he must stop
continuous re-supply and refreshment of British forces. Thus he formed
Washington’s navy without congressional approval.
 Washington's navy had a duel objective: to raid enemy supply ships, and to return
them to him.
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His navy hindered British supply lines, seized supplies for colonies, he took many
prices by 10/75. Congress authorizes a navy in October 75. His first ship was the
schooner Hannah.
Howe’s reaction to the cannons on the Heights:
 Could not elevate guns high enough to bombard Dorchester heights. Decides to
evacuate to Halifax.
 Threatens to burn Boston unless allowed safe passage to evacuate
 Washington learns his first lesson in sea power: Free use of the seas allows
unopposed coastal attack, evacuation and resupply from sea.
 When how got to Halifax, he waits until early June for reinforcements.
Our actions in Canada
They were led by Brig. Gen. Montgomery. He leads an invasion force up Lake
Champlain & Richelieu River w/ 1200 troops. He wanted to get Canada in alliance
against the British.
Took St. Johns and Montreal w/o a fight.
The Americans attack Quebec, fail, and retreat to Lake Champlain.
British counteroffensive: 2-prong attack relying on sea power. NYC> up Hudson River to
Quebec> down Richiliue river and lake Champlain.
The goal is to cut off New England from the rest of the colonies.
Southward campaign:
 Carleton pushed down the Richelieu to Lake Champlain. He stopped to build a fleet,
delaying his campaign. Set sail Oct 1776.
 Arnold at south end of the lake had already begun building small ships and attaching
cannon to them to oppose British. Whoever controlled the waterway controlled the
area. There were no roads for supply.
Battle of Valcour Island:
 Two day battle
 Much of the American fleet is destroyed
 Large number of troops able to flee to the woods
 The battle delayed the invasion until spring of 1777.
 It was a tactical victory for the British, but a strategic victory for American naval
power. It was critical to the revolution.
1/23/02
Close of 1776
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Washington’s army chased out of New York by Howe’s reinforced army and down to
3k men.
Christmas night of 1776 Washington re-crossed the Delaware and took Trenton
Recaptured most of NJ before settling in Morristown, NJ for the winter
1777: Saratoga: the turning point
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LTGEN Burgoyne relieved Carleton and moved southward from Canada in a two
pronged attack with General St. Leger
Due to delay, Americans now fully supplied, reinforced and ready for battle
Arnold defeats St. Leger at Ft. Stanwix
Colonial army defeats Burgoyne at Saratoga. This was a major defeat.
The green mountain boys were led by Ethan Allen. The green mountains were in
Vermont. Burgoyne tries to do raids in Vermont, but the GMB kick him.
1778: France enters the war
 France fears a peace after Saratoga
 They sign a treaty of commerce and alliance with the colonies
 Brings strong army and navy into the war on America’s side. Their ships have better
(more innovative) leadership and technology. They had superior warships led by
superior captains.
1778-83:
 1778: arrival of D’Estaing. This causes the British to evacuate Philadelphia
 1779: D’Estaing abortive attempt on NYC. It was going to be a near decisive victory
that Washington was looking for.
 1780: British southern campaign: take Virginia, Charleston, Savannah, etc
 1781: De Grasse from West Indies: Yorktown campaign, Virginia capes.
 1782: Battle of the saints
 1783: Treaty of Paris
The battle of the Virginia Capes: 9/5/81:
 British defeat
 Traps British forces at Yorktown
 Washington finally has naval superiority, which he has been waiting for since early in
the war.
 The generals that participate in the Yorktown campaign are:
 Washington
 Cornwallis
 Rochambeau
 La Feyette
Continental navy:
 New providence expedition: The first fleet action for the navy
 Penobscot expedition: Continental navy failure
 Charleston: continental navy failure
 Commerce raiders took the fight to the British coast: Wickes, Conyngham, and Jones.
 Navy committee established on 10/13/75. They are to acquire and fit out vessels for
sea and draw up regulations.
 Esek Hopkins named commander in chief of the navy
 He is authorized to build or purchase 13 frigates
Marine corps:
 Established 11/10/75 at Tun Tavern in Philadelphia
 Congress authorized raising two battalions of marines to operate under the navy
committee
 March 3, 1776: First amphibious operation at New Providence, Bahamas
Privateers/ commerce raiding:
 Continental congress, MA and RI all separately authorize privateering and
commission ships early in the war.
 Raised havoc on British SLOCs; hampered efforts of British army and forced major
changes in British war plans
 Ultimately 2k vessels held congressional commissions and 1k held state “Licenses”
 Capture hundreds of British “prizes” during the war worth > 18m.
New Providence expedition:
 Squadron of 8 converted merchant men totaling 124 guns under Esek Hopkins
 Feb 1776: Disobeyed orders to combat shipping off American coast and sailed to
Bahamas
 Seized 2 forts flanking Nassau and made off with munitions
 A British ship badly beat continental ships on the return voyage.
 This led to the dismissal of Hopkins by March of 1777.
Penobscot Expedition of July 1779
 Expedition to destroy British fort, deep in coastal waters of Maine territory
 3 continental navy vessels, 4 state vessels, 12 privateers and 3000 troops on 20
transports
 attacked and overcame British sloops of war and took the fort
 British sent fleet of 1 ship of the line, 5 frigates, and one sloop of war that chased
Americans up the river, destroyed them and retook the fort.
John Paul Jones:
 Most famous American naval officer
 Early command of sloop providence and Alfred took 25 British “prizes”
 June 1777-78: circled Britain in ranger attacking both shipping and shore installations
Battle of Flambough head of 9/4/79: Bonhomme Richard vs. Serapis.
Results of Revolution: British naval power:
 Permanent fighting instructions were scrapped. Instructions led to the defeat at
Virginia capes.
 Since French ships were superior, improvements were made to the royal navy with
regard to gunnery and tactics
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Maintained naval power at the end of the war. The British prevailed against a
combined French and Spanish fleet in the battle of the saints.
Results of the American Revolution:
 Treaty of Paris:
 American independence was recognized
 It was now out of the British empire
 America was very weak militarily
 Britain and France still had strong navies and armies
1/25/02
Neutrality and a national navy, 1783-1800
Effects of treaty of Paris, 1783:
 Spiteful British impose:
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Navigation acts:
 trade to British possessions in the west Indies barred
 limited exports to Britain to raw materials and naval stores
 Yankee skippers forced to smuggle or find new markets: china and the med. were
good opportunities
 American shipping was now prey for Barbary pirates.
State of the navy after 1785:
 Weak central government under the articles of confederation
 Navy considered an expendable luxury
 Last ship the alliance sold on 6/3/85. The marine Corp was also disestablished
 This led to a defenseless maritime nation
 America no longer benefited from the protection of the royal navy
Navy policy debate:
 Constitution:
 Ratified in 1788
 Before it the central government was weak.
 Authorized congress to provide and maintain a navy
 No action was taken because Barbary states at war with Portugal and sealed in the
Mediterranean.
 With a Barbary truce with Portugal in 1793, we had to take notice of them.
 Republicans:
 Led by Thomas Jefferson, secretary of state
 They represented artisans and landowners of the south and inland areas
 They believed a national navy was:
 Aristocratic
 Expensive
 Imperialistic
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 A national navy was not needed, the nation could hire a fleet
Federalists:
 Led by Alexander Hamilton, the secretary of the treasury
 They represented the commercial interests of the northeast
 They wanted a permanent strong navy
 A navy would protect trade
Influence of European events:
 France:
 Treaty of 1778: commerce and alliance
 1793: British orders in council authorize stopping of all neutral shipping with
France and the French West Indies.
 French privateers counter by seizing American ships.
 Barbary states:
 Algerian-Portuguese peace allows Barbary pirates to patrol the Atlantic
 11 American ships were captured by the Barbary states
 Made up the states of: Algeria, Tripoli, Tunis, and Morocco
 Seafaring nations could purchase immunity from them
 Wealthy nations pay to hamper poorer competition:
 England encouraged the Barbary corsairs to raid American shipping
 Pirates seized American ships for ransom and tribute
 The us reaction: Navy act of 27 may, 1794
 established the US navy
 Begin construction of six frigates
 Adams, Jefferson, and Franklin appointed to negotiate a treaty in Mary 1784
 Successful with Morocco which bordered the Atlantic
 Med remained shut
 Raids on American ships continued and Congress was forced to pay a bounty
Influence of European events: navy act of 27 may, 1794:
 Six frigates recommended and authorized: barely passed.
 Cancellation clause in the event of peace with Algiers. In the opinion of the
federalists, the U.S. navy was established by this act.
 Knox wanted 44s able to outmatch and intimidate any Barbary frigate. He ended up
with 3 44s and 3 36s.
Diplomacy and naval policy: Jay-Grenville treaty:
 Poor British harvest forces imports from America
 American foodstuffs and American shipping became critical to the British empire
 Jay treaty was signed to open the British Empire to American trade.
 Some restrictions remained in place.
 There were no neutral rights.
 It was signed 11/19/94
 It reopened the British west Indies for U.S. trade
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Provided compensation for captured ships
US neutral in British-French war
British gave most favored nation states to us
British abandon western forts
Settle Canadian boundary dispute
Public reaction was hostile to the treaty because we didn’t resolve the neutrality
issue
It was a great improvement in Anglo-American relations
It increased our clout overseas and helped secure treaties with Barbary states since
the British no longer encouraged acts against American shipping
Results of the treaty:
 1795: Algiers: America paid 642.5k bribe plus a 21.6k annual tribute
 frigate crescent, 36 guns was also given to them
 we made treaties with Tripoli in 1796 and Tunis in 1797
Naval acts of 1794:
 3 navy act ships were scrapped
 three frigates which were well along in construction were completed
 built by Joshua Humphreys
 Constitution, 44
 United States, 44
 Constellation, 36
Quasi-War with France: 1798-1801 causes:
 French reaction to Jay-Grenville treaty:
 Regarded as a betrayal to the treaty of 1778
 Ordered American ambassador to leave
 France issued a decree making US vessels treading w/ Britain in west Indies fair
game for French privateers
 300 American ships seized in a single year
 XYZ affair
 In 1797 Adams sent a delegation to Paris to secure a treaty similar to the jay
treaty.
 American delegation to Paris snubbed by French foreign minister Talleyrand
and met by X, Y, and Z. the foreign minister required a payment just to meet
with him.
 When news came back to America congress and the public were outraged
 In a patriotic fervor the saying, “Millions for defense, but not one cent for
tribute”, came about.
 As a result, the department of the navy is established 30 April 1798.
 Benjamin Stoddert was the first SECNAV
 He rapidly mobilized the navy
 This lead to increased naval expenditures
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Shipyards
The three frigate which were cancelled as a result of the treaty with the Barbary
pirates were ordered completed: president, 44; Congress, 36; and Chesapeake, 36.
 Issued letters of Marque authorizing seizure of French armed vessels in American
waters. This was later extended to all French warships and privateers anywhere.
It was a quasi war because no war was actually declared.
It was fought completely at sea.
The war was fought against armed French ships
U.s. navy operated with Britain:
 British ports and bases provided full support.
 Most of the French fleet blockaded or otherwise occupied by the British fleet
17 July 1778: Stephen Decatur (senior) in Delaware (20) captured privateer Croyable
(12) off NJ coast. Renamed the retaliation (14).
1799: increased funds for U.S. navy
summer 1798: the united states and the Delaware under commodore John Barry
captured several French privateers
Fall of 1798: Retaliation (14) under “Bad Luck” Bainbridge captured by two French
frigates, the insurgent (36) and the Volontaire (44).
Early 1799: Stoddert sent 22 warships to West Indies to conduct anti-privateering
ops.
1/28/02
Quasi war with France:
Thomas Truxtun:
 44-year-old navy vet. He was an important figure in the continental navy.
 he had published manual on celestial navigation and the US signal book
 Improved masting and rigging manuals
 Commanded the Constellation
 Yankee Racehorse: a nickname for the constellation.
 Feb/99: constellation (36) vs. the insurgente (36).
 The US aimed at hulls
 The French aimed at rigging and masts
 The constellation won decisively with superior sailing maneuvering and fighting. The
insurgente didn’t sink, but it was a clear victory
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2/1/1800: constellation Vs the vengeance (50).
It was a five-hour battle, with some of the battle fought at night.
The US was the clear victor but lost the mainmast of the constellation when trying to
board the vengeance.
The French escaped in darkness, but ran aground four days later.
End of the quasi war:
 1798: negotiations begin with napoleon.
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The treaty of Mortefontaine signed September 1800 and ratified in July 1801.
The US navy established as a viable force by capturing over eighty French vessels
The US navy gained much experience in working with the royal navy in operations,
maneuvers, signals, and professionalism
 At the end of the war Jefferson (a republican) came into office and laid up the navy
again.
Quasi war result:
 Peace convention:
 Nullified Franco-American alliance of 1778 and French decree of January 1798.
 Cancelled all American commercial claims against France
 Adams not re-elected for second term, because the treaty was not a popular one.
 US navy was a force to be reckoned with (ya right)
 Opened door for Louisiana Purchase.
The Barbary wars and the war of 1812:
1801-1814:
Post quasi war:
 The U.S. navy dominated the quasi war.
 President Jefferson in office gladly reduced the navy. It was a republican naval
policy.
 Officer corps reduced in number. The officer pay was also reduced.
 He sells all ships except thirteen frigates, and seven of those frigates were
mothballed.
The Barbary pirates:
 Annual tribute raised by the pirates.
 William Bainbridge forced to sail in George Washington under Algerian colors
 Jefferson no longer willing to meet the Barbary Pirates demands
 Sends frigates President, Philadelphia and Essex, and the schooner Enterprise to
Mediterranean under Richard Dale to protect shipping
 Pirates save the navy.
Barbary wars: course of the war:
 July 1801: After an initial show of force, Dale begins blockade of the port of Tripoli
operating out of Gibraltar.
 Congress declares war on the Barbary Pirates in Feb 1802. This is the first incident of
how the navy is an instrument of foreign policy.
 July 1802: Richard Morris relieves Dale, but is ineffective and dismissed from the
navy.
 1803: Edward Preble arrives at Gibraltar with frigates Constitution and Philadelphia.
Preble was young, about forty four at this time, and was sick from an unknown
disease he caught during the quasi war. He was ill tempered, and was not liked by the
captains who served under him. He eventually gained their respect, and his captains
were eventually referred to as Preble’s boys.
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Preble reaffirmed treaty with Morocco through the presence of his ship and the
departing American squadron.
Philadelphia captured as well as her captain, William Bainbridge, and crew.
A tragic loss which Preble realized under the protection of Tripoli’s shore batteries
that the only choice was to destroy her.
Preble sends Lt. Stephen Decatur, captain of the Enterprise, to lead a raid to burn the
Philadelphia on a ketch, Intrepid.
Decatur’s raid was a resounding success. He destroyed the Philadelphia, and had zero
casualties. Because of this, Decatur was promoted to captain. He as the youngest ever
(and still is) to be that rank.
Preble switches strategy and obtains Gunboats from Naples to use in the war.
The offensive begins in the summer of 1804.
Heroic battle where greatly outnumbered gunboats led by Stephen Decatur boarded
Tripolitan gunboats. This is the summer offensive of 1804.
Results of offensive: tribute and ransom reduced to 150k/yr. Preble refused and
presses on attack.
Continued American pressure led to the end of hostilities and the final release of
Bainbridge and his men for a mere 60k.
Jefferson’s Gunboat navy:
 Republicans did not want a powerful offensive navy.
 Jefferson wanted a navy based on defensive gunboats only.
 Only naval construction during the period was gunboats.
 Blue water navy capabilities were reduced again.
The Napoleonic wars:
 Battle of Copenhagen 1802:
 Napoleon negotiates armed neutrality with Sweden, Denmark, and Russia
 Britain forced to act before spring thaw of Russian fleet.
 Nelson attacks from south, continues to fight despite orders of Parker.
 Nelson bluffs Danes to terms.
 Armed neutrality collapses, Baltic trade resumes.
 Battle of Trafalgar 1805:
 Napoleon’s final British invasion attempt.
 Culmination of two years of battle between Nelson and the French and Spanish
fleets
 Nelson and Collingwood split fleet into two divisions.
 Furiously strike center and rear, forward van helpless.
 Battle results:
 15 French and Spanish ships lost
 Britain never challenged at sea again
 Nelson dies in moment of Triumph
 Napoleon unable to challenge England and is restricted to continental
dominance.
Leadership of Nelson:
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Took chances – battle of St. Vincent
Let subordinates take chancels –battle of the Nile
Devised good, strategic plans when required – Copenhagen
“No captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of the enemy.”
“England expects that every man will do his duty.”
Causes of the war of 1812:
 British were at war with France since 1803. French fleet was destroyed in a Guerre
d’escadre type engagement at Trafalgar.
 American merchants enjoyed unprecedented prosperity as the only major neutral
trader.
 British stir up Indian tribes in America
 British begin to seize U.S. ships to search for British deserters.
 Neutral rights were the key issue.
 1807: Chesapeake-Leopard affair
 This was an a-typical impressment of a warship, rather than a merchant vessel.
 James Barron, the American commander, was not ready to fight.
 Americans were outraged.
 Sanctity of a warship as part of national territory was violated during this incident.
 Results of the affair:
 National uproar. Jefferson could have had war, but decided not too.
 Jefferson was able to pass the Embargo Act in December of 1807, but it was
not effective and hurt the US more than the European powers. It was repealed
in March 1809.
 1810: War Hawks elected to congress. They believed in manifest destiny, but
not under that name. They thought it was national destiny to posses the
continent and take all foreign possessions on it.
 Increased tension finally led to War of 1812.
War of 1812:
 To Britain, the war of 1812 was a limited war. Napoleon was still their greatest threat
and concern. Britain could not dedicate all the required resources to the conflict.
 Great Britain was the greatest naval power with over eight hundred blue water
warships.
 British strategy was to blockade the US ports and hurt the economy. The blockade
also bottled up the fleet. They also decided to raid the American coast.
 American position:
 War hawks had coerced America and its new president, James Madison into a
declaration of War. (The war hawks were big talkers yet they rejected every bill to
strengthen the U.S. Navy.)
 American forces on 6/18/12: 17 seagoing warships plus some gunboats; 6700 man
army.
 American strategy: repulse British attacks/invade Canada. Naval policy was Guerre
de Course.
2/1/02
US naval policy: squadron versus single ship:
Commodore John Rodgers:
 The Senior U.S. Naval Officer
 His goal was to attack English shipping through the use of squadrons of American
warships
 He proposed to the SECNAV two squadrons. One to cruise around Britain and one to
stay at home.
 He supported squadron tactics.
 Stephen Decatur Jr, and William Bainbridge preferred single ship tactics. This tactic
limited losses. They pointed to the French raiders and their successful operations.
 SECNAV sided with Rodgers and split the navy into two squadrons.
 First squadron operations: Rodgers wanted to intercept convoy headed from Jamaica
to England.
 Rogers spotted the British frigate Belvidera and pursued convoy to England but never
caught up.
 The Squadron action was a failure. Only seven insignificant prizes captured
 SECNAV adopts single ship operations
 However, British massed fleet to find Rodgers vice stationing off ports. Allowed
hundreds of merchants to return to port safely.
Single ship engagements:
 Constitution Vs. Guerriere:
 August 1812: US victory
 Both 44 guns
 Commanded by Isaac Hull
 In July 1812, Constitution had barely escaped by kedging
 Constitution earned the nickname “Old Ironsides” in the battle.
 United States (44) Vs. Macedonia (38)
 Commanded by Stephen Decatur Jr.
 October 1812
 British commander underestimated opponent
 US had significant advantage in range and weight of broadside.
 US victory
 Constitution (44) Vs. Java (44)
 Both 44 guns
 Constitution commanded by William Bainbridge
 December 1812 off Brazil
 In a bloody two hour battle the Americans prevailed thanks to a higher state of
readiness.
 “Hard Luck Bill” Bainbridge finally had his victory.
 US victory
 Frigate victories were great morale builders back home when things were going badly
in Canada
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The British were shocked by our victories
Victories led congress to fund six additional frigates and four ships of the line.
Chesapeake Vs. Shannon
 James Lawrence commanded the Chesapeake
 2nd in command to Decatur when Philadelphia burned
 captured HMS Peacock while in command of sloop Hornet
 He was awarded command of Chesapeake with raw crew in Boston
 British commander Broke (gunnery expert) in Shannon (38) dared Lawrence to
fight
 The result was predictable with the inexperienced Chesapeake crew
 “Don’t give up the Ship.”
US naval policy: commerce raiding:
 Argus and Wasp in English Channel.
 Brought fight to English
 Essex in Pacific:
 David Porter led a highly successful raid where he took many prizes.
 He was finally seized off Chile after a year long cruise in which the British
whaling industry was ruined.
1812: Aborted invasion of Canada:
 Caused by lack of effective leadership: General Hull
 American army was too small.
 British threatened the whole Northwest Territory of the US. Detroit was captured
 Control of the lakes became critical.
Battles on the lakes:
 British hold on to Detroit at western end of Lake Erie was tenuous at best
 Long supply route over Lakes Erie and Ontario and St. Lawrence Seaway made
control of the waterways critical.
 American objective was to cut these waterborne lines of communication.
 The navy department sent Isaac Chauncey to take command of Lake Erie and
Ontario.
 Ontario:
 American army-navy force has captured York and Ft. George on Niagara River
 Neither side ever controlled the entire lake
 Neither commander Chauncey or Yeo willing to take Risks
 This was a stalemate.
 Erie:
 Oliver Hazard Perry named to command squadron
 Inherits two brigs and nine smaller vessels
 June 1813: Perry slips past blockade and sails to Put-In-Bay.
 10 September 1813:
 Perry in flagship Lawrence pairs off with British ship Detroit causing severe
damage to both ships
 Perry transferred his flag to Niagara when Lawrence could fight no longer.
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Detroit and Queen charlotte collide
Perry in Niagara able to rake both and resulted in the British surrender
“We have met the enemy and he is ours”
Perry’s victory led to the U.S. Land victory at the battle of Thames that ended
the danger to the Northwest Territory.
 Champlain:
 British planned invasion from Canada:
 Control of lake Champlain was required for the campaign to succeed
 In summer of 1814, a superior British force under Prevost marched to Plattsburg
 Thomas Macdonough brings squadron to Plattsburg bay to support Macomb’s
American army.
 11 September 1814:
 MacDonough’s differences:
 Like Arnold in the revolutionary war, the American fleet was smartly
deployed.
 Rigged spring lines to enable movement of the anchored ships
 Decisive victory for the battle, campaign, and the war.
 British forced to retreat. The victory changed the course of the war.
Washington Campaign: summer 1814:
 Napoleon was now defeated in Europe, so Britain could now dedicate efforts on the
Americans
 The campaign was meant as a diversion to draw strength away from the Canadian
border where the real offensive was to take place.
 Results of Campaign:
 Washington Burned
 Militia and Gunboats proved to be ineffective
 Attack stalled at fort McHenry in Baltimore Harbor:
 Francis Scott Key
 “Star Spangled Banner”
Battle of New Orleans:
 Early 1815: Was meant to be the other diversionary attack
 Occurred after treaty signed
 American Gunboats were defeated at Lake Borgne and allowed British landings
 British were repulsed by Andrew Jackson’s men
 No effect on the war but Jackson emerged as a national hero.
Treaty of Ghent:
 Signed 24 December, 1814
 British agree to end impressment
 The treaty created an undisputed and disarmed border with Canada
 Neutral rights were not addressed:
 Not a problem any more.
Naval contributions:
 Victory on lakes:
 Forced British out of the west
 Prevented invasion of New York
 Created stalemate
 Commerce raiding:
 Privateers contributed to the unpopularity of the war in England
 Single ship engagements:
 Boosted national morale
 Ineffective against blockade
British capabilities at sea during the war:
 Although the Napoleonic Wars were a constant distraction, British sea power
nonetheless was effective throughout the war of 1812.
 The British enjoyed mobility, no matter how extensive other distractions were.
 They hurt commerce and the U.S. Atlantic navy.
Conclusions:
 Gunboats and militia failed in coastal defense role
 A small navy could not prevent blockade
 No post war demobilization of the U.S. navy:
 Emerged stronger
 High public esteem.
2/04/02
United States Navy, 1815-60
The Search for Professionalism
This is a period of expansion for the navy. There are a lot of developments of technology
and organization in the navy.
Period of expansion:
 Manifest destiny: “Our manifest destiny is to overspread the continent allotted by
Providence for the free development of our yearly multiplying millions” John L.
O’Sullivan, 1845.
 Monroe Doctrine: European powers were not to colonize or intervene in the
Americas.
Reorganization of the navy:
 The postwar navy increases in size for the first time, no postwar reduction. Reason:
pride in the navy wartime accomplishments.
 However, the primary reason for expansion was to protect prospering U.S. commerce
abroad.
 US built ships of the line for the first time.
 Permanent squadrons were established:
 With the navy’s increased strength, the nation could now afford to have
multiple squadrons abroad:
 Mediterranean squadron: dealt with the Barbary States again.
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Squadron revived to deal with the Barbary corsairs because the Dey
had resumed capturing American merchantmen.
 US declared war on Algiers.
 Decatur convinced the Dey of Algiers and later the pasha of Tripoli
and Tunis that he US would not pay any more tribute and that the US
would no longer be subject to piracy.
 West Indies: dealt with piracy and privateering during the Central
American civil wars.
 Created to protect shipping against piracy.
 The first commander was James Biddle. David Porter replaced him.
Porter was successful in raiding the pirate’s havens with shallow draft
vessels.
 1824: Fajardo Incident: One of Porter’s officers was briefly in jail.
Porter landed with two hundred men and demanded the mayor make a
public apology or have his town blown off the map.
 Porter is relieved, leaves the navy, and becomes the CINC of the
Mexican navy.
 The West Indies Squadron absorbed in 1841 into a new home
squadron.
 Brazil squadron: take on the Spanish influences in that area.
 Formed to assist South American countries to fight Spain’s squadron
and to prevent seizure of U.S. ships.
 Essentially to enforce the Monroe doctrine.
 Pacific squadron: same as brazil squadron:
 Formed to support diplomatic effort with Argentina and Chile and to
recover captured U.S. ships.
 East Indies squadron: deal with the Chinese.
 Protected expanding U.S. trade in Asia. It was established after
American merchantmen were slaughtered.
 African squadron: deal with the slave trade.
 Formed with Britain in order to suppress the slave trade. It patrolled
mostly around Liberia.
The Secretary of the Navy called for a Board of Commissioners to manage the
expanding Navy:
 Three senior captains (Hull, Porter, and Rodgers) were the first members. Later
Bainbridge and Decatur join as well.
 The board was formed to assist in the following areas:
 Logistical responsibilities
 Advising ship deployments
 Assist the SECNAV in the deployment of forces and personnel.
Wilkes expedition, 1838-42:
 The trip gathered a significant amount of scientific knowledge
 Charted Fiji, Samoa, Gilberts, Antarctica, and North American West, and Northwest
Coast.
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The expedition recognized the strategic and trade importance of San Francisco and
whole West Coast.
Lt. Matthew F. Maury:
 Naval Oceanographer
 Known as the pathfinder of the seas
 He studied old logs and compiled the data
 He determined the best routes for maximum speeds and optimum conditions.
 Cut the passage from New York to San Francisco by 47 days.
Problems in the US Navy:
 Rough, ignorant sailors:
 Sailors were disciplined by fear. Flogging was common, and the chief reward was
“grog”
 Stagnation in officer corps: heroes of 1812 filled the top positions. Dueling was
common
 Inadequate training:
 M C Perry’s apprentice experiment onboard the brig USS Somers was a failure
after the crew almost mutinied.
 There was no concentrated effort to train naval officers.
Beginning of change:
 Secretary of the navy Upshur, 1841-42
 He set the wheel sin motion for expansion, modernization, and reform.
 He established five bureaus to replace the obsolete and stagnant board of
commissioners:
1. Navy yard and docks
2. Ordnance and Hydrography
3. medicine and surgery
4. provisions and clothing
5. construction, equipment and repair.
 SECNAV Bancroft came in after Upshur. He established the USNA in 1845. It was
modeled after the USMA (West Point).
The Mexican war: 46-48:
 Due to westward expansion: Texas became part of the US upon their request (3/1/45)
 US annexed California and New Mexico. The Mexicans did not recognize this.
 To force Mexico to comply, an amphibious invasion was planned:
 Landings were at Veracruz under Scott
 Army and USMC marched into Mexico city
 Halls of Montezuma
 Result: US gains territory for 15m.
Technological developments:
 New blood officers experimented with new technology and methods. MC Perry,
Maury, and Stockton.
 Developments:
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Steam propulsion:
 Maury and M.C. Perry were leading advocates of steam.
 In 1842 the Mississippi and Missouri were completed: steam powered,
wooden hulled, paddle wheelers which gave the US an early lead in steam.
 Steam gave increased mobility
 Inefficient engines and fuel now had to be carried
 Paddlewheels were inefficient
 Commercial ships made the greatest strides in steam
 Demologous: first steam warship. Robert Fulton was its inventor. It was
later renamed for him.
 Fulton II (1837): second US steamship. Perry used this ship to convince
congress about the use of steam.
 Princeton (1842): First screw driven warship.
 The screw driven warship was soon deemed superior to the paddlewheel.
Gunnery:
 During this time there was s switch from solid shot to shells. This also led to
the use of rifling.
 The pivot gun was developed to be used on either side of the ship.
 One fear of making a more powerful gun as the risk of explosion. A gun
designed by Stockton called the “peacemaker” exploded on the Princeton,
killing VIPs.
 John Dahlgren’s gun:
 He is known as the father of modern naval ordnance.
 It is smooth bore and has pressure curves
 The turret was developed in the Monitor.
 Rifling of guns was slow to be implemented.
Armor:
 Crimean war (Russians versus Turks), 54-56. Proved wooden hulled ships
were obsolete. Could not hold up to explosive shellfire but iron could. The
war also had a disastrous amphibious assault at Varna.
 1858: French frigate, Gloire 36, first seagoing ironclad. 5.6k tons
displacement.
 59: British ironclad battleship Warrior. Displaced 9k tons. Used all the
modern technological innovations.
Conclusion:
 Period of territorial and commercial expansion.
 Navy grew in earlier years, but professionalism and technology remained relatively
stagnant after 1850.
 This was a time of relative peace throughout the period.
 The U.S. held defensive and isolationist policy in relation to Europe.
 People lost interest in the navy over the years.
 Sectional division over slavery paralyzed naval development.
 Heading into the civil war, the navy was pretty much unprepared.
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Ships were still mostly sail and even steamships used sail (the propeller was
mostly for auxiliary power (8-10 knots max).
There were few new weapons
The fleet was also relatively small and aging.
2/08/02
Quiz today. No notes.
2/11/02
The Civil War Part I
Strategy and application of Sea power (1861-65)
Background factors to consider:
 Relative balance of power: who had the advantage
 Naval comparisons: who had the stronger navy
 Common operation heritage: the confederate navy was the weaker navy, and took
some of our revolutionary strategies
 Legatees: the inheritors of the legacies of past naval traditions
Relative balance of power:
 Population: north
 Exports: north
 Shipyards: north
 Industry: north
 Transportation (railroads): north
Naval comparisons:
 Yards: Norfolk navy yard was the only viable yard in the south
 Builders: north could build ships, the confederates had to buy them.
 Industrial base: the south could not produce the necessary arms required or food to
feed its people for that matter.
 Ships: at the start of 61 the navy had only forty-two operations ships, but the union
could build more. By the end of the same year, the union had 264 ships in
commission.
 Leaders: SECNAVS: Stephen Mallory (south); Gideon Welles (North)
Common operations heritage:
 War of 1812: blue water and brown water: fighting from an inferior position.
 15-46: “Gunboat diplomacy”: the importance of maritime commerce
 46-48: Mexican war: the first offensive U.S. naval war; ports on the pacific
 48-60: naval technological obsolescence vis-à-vis the RN. Apogee of the U.S.
merchant marine and the whalers.
Legatees:
 Confederate states:
 Legatee of the American naval tradition: coastal defense and commerce raiding
 Privateering was made illegal in 1856, which hurt this industry.
 Union navy:
 Legatee of the royal navy and of the U.S. navy in the Mexican War.
 Offensive naval warfare was used during this conflict.
Diplomacy:
 The north’s goal: keep Britain truly neutral. Keep the royal navy out of the conflict
and avoid conflicts with British ships.
 The South’s goal: Win British recognition and naval aid
 Mallory wanted commerce raiders and ironclad blockade breakers
 Britain was hesitant to help because of anti slavery sentiment, neutrality laws, and
was not in need of southern cotton because of India
Problems with southern diplomacy:
 The war was a rebellion and not between sovereign countries
 The outcome of war was uncertain and so the British are cautious with helping the
south
 Diplomatic inexperience of confederacy and weak state department
 Fallacy of “King Cotton” thesis. Cotton supply was not a problem in Europe.
 Outcome: ultimately a failure
 Confederate reps. Bulloch and North get limited British aid by devising ways around
neutrality laws.
 commerce raiders were warships but disguised as merchant ships: Alabama, Florida,
Shenendoah, et al
 Blockade-runners were sold to the south. They were never delivered.
Trent affair:
 Charles Wilkes in San Jacinto stopped the British mail steamer Trent
 The confederate representatives who were on board were removed.
 This was neutrality violation and nearly ignited a war with Britain
 Tension cooled by diplomacy and apology
Antietam:
 September, 1862
 Union victory
 British withdraw all political aid and recognition of the confederate states.
Northern strategy:
 Welles plan was a blockade of the entire southern coast. Policy called “Anaconda.” It
implied a strangle hold on the south.
 In order to be successful the union had to take southern ports for coal, water, and food
by bombardment and amphibious assaults.
 The battle at Port Royal was to secure such a place.
 Riverine operations were planned, especially the Mississippi.
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Combined army-navy operations were preferred whenever possible since the
confederacy could not possibly cover its entire coastline.
Southern strategy:
 Coastal defense:
 Blockade braking: technology and quality might help… Ironclads
 Blockade running:
 The ships were small, fast, shallow draft steamers
 The initial success was hurt by desire for luxuries and growing effectiveness of
the northern blockade
 Overall, they might have actually hurt the war effort.
 Commerce raiding:
 Privateers: Davis Hoped to attract foreigners since the south was not a sea-going
population
 Success was limited because of the Declaration of Paris of 1856, making no
foreign prize courts available.
 Overall it was a failure because of lack of participation.
 Confederates state navy (the other option)
 Foreign built, and mostly foreign manned
 Commanded by southern officers
 CSS Sumter, Alabama, et al.
CSS Alabama: Most famous commerce raider
 Rapheal Semmes
 Had gained early experience in command of the Sumter
 Built in England, like most confederate ships
 Outfitted in the Azores. Britain would not violate its neutrality laws.
 The ship cruised worldwide (9/63-4/64)
 Captured sixty eight union vessels
 Finally defeated in June 64 by the USS Kearsarge
 The confederate cruisers were a huge success
 Diverted resources from the blockade
 Caused enormous damage to Northern shipping industry
 This caused a dramatic raise in insurance rates
Battles/operations: ironclads
 Norfolk navy yard (biggest in the country)
 The yard abandoned poorly by northern forces
 It was captured by the south on 4/20/61
 Most munitions and facilities were left intact
 The south was also able to raise the USS Merrimack
 It was a forty gun steamer/sailer, screw type propeller
 This presented an opportunity for the confederates to use technology to cancel out
the north’s numerical advantage
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South SECNAV Mallory saw the opportunity of the breaking of the blockade with
armored ships
 He turned the Merrimack into the ironclad CSS Virginia.
 It was a one of a kind
 170 foot long casemate, ten gun ports, 2/3 tun ram
 sloped roof of two feet thick oak and 2 inches of iron
 North SECNAV Welles heard of the Virginia and convened an Ironclad board
 Settled on the Monitor by Swedish designer, John Ericsson
 The Moniter was perhaps history’s most revolutionary naval design with over
forty patentable inventions including a rotating turret
 Vessel was afloat 101 days after the board decided on the design.
Battle of Hampton Roads:
 3/8/62: Virginia destroys the blockading frigate Congress and sloop Cumberland,
runs frigate Minnesota aground. Virginia retires ready to finish the job
 3/9/62: Virginia Vs. monitor:
 Monitor: was of shallower draft, more maneuverable, faster and with rotating
turret
 Virginia: on brink of defeat but got a luck shot through monitor’s eye slit
 The battle was a draw, but the blockade was preserved.
May 1862:
 Because of the Virginia’s inability to break the union blockade, the north’s army/navy
force recaptures Norfolk
 CSS Virginia is blown up to prevent capture.
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Key themes of U.S. naval history:
Technology: ironclads, fast steam ships
Leadership: Mallory and Welles
Strategy and tactics: Blockade
Naval doctrine: North position of power, south Guerre de Course
2/13/02
The Civil War Part II
The War in the west and closing confederate ports
Strategy and application of sea power (1861-65)
Battles/operations: Mississippi
 Union seizure of the Mississippi was critical to the war effort. Why?
 Seizure of the Mississippi would be an extension of the blockade for the Union.
 The south also realized this fact.
 Union began building a riverboat navy to invade down the river in combined ops
under Andrew Foote and U.S. Grant
 Union forces took Ft. Henry on the Tennessee river and Ft. Donelson on the
Cumberland river
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The confederates moved and concentrated their efforts on a more defensible area.
These include Vicksburg and Ft. Hudson
The Union took Island #10 on the Mississippi with Eads
CSA then diverted a large force form New Orleans to protect Corinth
Battle of Shiloh ensued:
 6-7 march, 1862
 Almost a union defeat
 South holds but weakens its new Orleans forces
 It would have been a union defeat, except for:
 A naval bombardment of the town
 A ferrying of troops to the battle
 And a hospital ship
New Orleans:
 It was the largest and richest city in the south.
 Early in the war the union seized Ship Island off the East Coast of the Delta. This
slows New Orleans trade to a trickle, and serves as a base of operations for
northern forces.
 City was weakly defended because of the manpower used to defend Corinth.
 Fixed forts defended it.
 Union believed that a naval force could overcome the confederate defenses.
 David Farragut with David Dixon Porter push up from Ship Island and bombard
Ft. St. Phillip and Ft. Jackson.
 Farragut’s and porter’s vessels break through the defenses of Fort St. Philip and
fort Jackson and take New Orleans
 The north won a great victory at a relatively small cost.
Vicksburg
 Southward:
 Movement continues under Grant and Davis. However, the advance was more
difficult than planned.
 At Ft. Pillow, confederates sink two union ironclads, but union forces finally
take the fort.
 At Memphis, confederates decide to make a stand.
 Results in a battle between fleets but superior union ships prevail
 Union wins and occupy Memphis
 Northward:
 Union army/navy capture Baton Rouge, Port Hudson, Natchez and on to
Vicksburg
 Vicksburg surrenders four July 1863.
 Finally after eight attempts, the union had cut off supply routes ending a
yearlong siege.
 Confederacy split in two, union now controlled Mississippi for troop
movement and blockading.
 Grant gives navy much of the credit for victory.
Closing confederate ports:
 As part of the Anaconda plan, the North wanted to close southern ports
 Blockade runners still had made there way past Union navy forces
 Charleston was originally targeted because of its symbolic value.
 Loved by the south
 Confederates had multiple forts protecting it.
 Dupont attempted a naval ironclad assault that failed.
 Four attempts of bombardment, an amphibious assault and a two year siege
ensued
 City finally surrendered when Sherman approached.
 Mobile bay: 5 August, 1864:
 Sherman’s march towards Atlanta made the taking of Mobile a worthwhile
engagement. Forces from Mobile would not be able to reinforce Atlanta.
 Mobile was the last Gulf Coast city of any significance left in confederate hands.
 In July 1864, Farragut was given the forces he needed to begin an operation.
 Buchanan and CSA had small sixteen gun fleet including Ironclad Tennessee
 The only approach into the bay was between forts Morgan and Gaines and the
narrow channel was full of mines.
 Farragut had eighteen ships and 159 guns.
 The attack was almost stalled when the Brooklyn backed down after watching a
Union ironclad explode. This is where the phrase, “Damn the torpedoes, Full
speed ahead”
 Fort Fisher Expedition:
 With the fall of Charleston, the only source of supplies for Lee’s army defending
Richmond was the city of Wilmington, NC.
 Initial attack was a failure due to poor army/navy cooperation and conflict
between Porter (admiral) and Butler (general).
 The second attack was a well-coordinated amphibious assault with new army
General Terry.
 Lee had lost his last significant supply line.
Technological innovations:
 North:
 Monitors: well armored, with a turret and most importantly build in large
numbers.
 No major innovation in ordnance.
 South:
 The south relied on technology to try to change the course of the war, because
they did not have the numerical advantage in the conflict.
 Virginia: steam powered, and well armored. Unfortunately, it was not able to be
produced in any significant numbers.
 C.S.S. Hunley. A submarine the confederates came up with.
 The Davids: ships with booms on their bows with explosives.
 Remote control and proximity mines: responsible for 31 kills: more than any other
source.
Conclusions:
 “Flight from flag”: decline of U.S. Merchant marine.
 The “Alabama Claims” caused a lasting diplomatic debate with Great Britain.
 Eventually 15.5k paid.
 Union Blockade set a precedent.
 Despite Northern success in application of British like offensive naval warfare, and
despite the failure of southern commerce raiding to win the war at sea, after the war,
U.S. naval officers regarded commerce raiding (especially the Alabama) as once
again the proper American naval strategy. We still use Guerre De Course at this point.
Key themes throughout U.S. naval history:
 Technology: mines, submarines
 Leadership: Porter, Farragut
 Strategy and tactics: Guerre de Course and amphibious assaults.
2/15/02
Developments of Naval technology, 1865-90
Their impact on strategy and policy
U.S. navy post civil war
 At the end of the civil war:
 700 ships and approximately 60k men
 by 1870 only 52 ships in commission and most of the others were mothballed
 Navy returned to a defensive policy
 Fixed forts and monitors for coastal defense
 Fast cruisers for commerce raiding
Naval technology up to 1865:
 Ironclad battles
 Hampton roads:
 Studied heavily by nations of the world
 Battle of Lissa: 20 July 1886 (Also studied)
 First battle between Iron-clad steam fleets
 Austria (inferior in number of ships and guns) Vs. Italy
 Guns Vs. rams. The Austrians because of inferior guns opted to ram and prevailed
 “Ramming” wave of the future”
 Capital ships had rams into the 20th century
Warship guns 65-98
 Breech Loading
 Interrupted screw breech mechanism corrected the gun’s tendency to burst
(French innovation)
 Faster rate of fire
 By 1881, all rifled naval guns were made of steel.
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 In 1887, smokeless powder introduced (French)
Higher penetrating power
 Slower burning powder enabled guns to be longer which increased range
 Better projectile design improved accuracy
 Recoil mechanisms (hydraulics) absorbed much of the force after a gun was fired
Armor (stronger)
 Compound iron/steel belts were being used
 Face-hardening of steel enabled armor belts to be reduced in thickness while
maintaining strength
Hull design 65-98
 Royal navy:
 Wood replaced by all iron (1860)
 Iron replaced by all steel (1886)
 Weight of armor was major concern
 Compromise:
 Provide absolute protection (heavy armor) to vital areas and adequate
protection everywhere else
 Compartmentalization
 Place coal in outboard compartments
 Protected decks
HMS Warrior
 First all iron hull
 All British hulls now metal
French soon to follow in 1872 With Redoutable
British look to have more ships than the next two nations combined
Weapons 65-98
Mines:
 More advanced contact mines
 Electrical detonation mines
 Submerged mines
 They are now called mines, not torpedoes
Torpedoes:
 1886: automotive torpedo with a contact warhead invented by Robert Whitehouse.
 It was a low cost weapon which caused heavy damage
 Led to a whole new class of ship: Torpedo boats:
 Small, light and fast
 Significant threat to large warships
 Led to light quick firing guns
 Led to torpedo boat destroyers to act as shield for capital ships which came to be
known as destroyers
Destroyers:
 Slightly larger and faster than torpedo boats
 Had quick firing guns and torpedoes
 Bainbridge class, 1898
Cruisers:
 Larger still
 Also carried large guns to protect against destroyers
 Used also for scouting and commerce raiding
 Two types: light which are like destroyers and heavy which are more similar to
battleships
Submersibles:
 Revolutionary War
 Bushnell’s turtle
 1800:
 Robert Fulton’s Nautilus
 Civil War
 Davids
 CSS Hunley
 1900:
 USS Holland.
 First commissioned submarine
 Developed by John Holland
 U.S. ordered five of the class
 All navies followed suit
 Mission: to attack armored ships of war
 Made possible by battery powered electric engines and gyroscopic mechanisms which
solved steering problems
Propulsion:
 Metallurgical breakthroughs provided stronger materials and higher steam pressures
 Water tube boilers = higher steam pressure
 Triple expansion engine
 Steam turbine
 All of these led to greater speed
New ship types:
 Battleships: new capitol ships
 Armored cruisers: heavy cruisers
 Protected cruisers: light cruisers
 Destroyers
Other developments
 Electrical generation equipment
 Steam turbines/electrical distribution
 Hydraulic systems
 Provided by electricity/steam
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 Drive rudders, turrets, heavy equipment
Communications
 Radio/teletype for communications between ships and ship to shore
Petroleum oil (vice coal)
 Greater speed, radius of action, easier storage and handling
1865-80: Decline and stagnation of U.S. Navy
 Massive postwar reduction (navy declined from third to twelfth in ranking)
 Lost status as naval pioneer (retained old Dahlgren smooth bores and obsolete
wooden frigates)
 Naval rationale: let European navies pay for technological innovation and
experimentation
Reasons for decline:
 Preoccupation with reconstruction of the south
 Belief that U.S. was not belligerent; isolationism; Europe preoccupied in Old World
 Limited naval mission; showing the flag and protecting commerce in Asia, Africa and
Latin America
1881-90: rebirth of U.S. navy
 Technology: ABCD ships
 Protected cruisers: Atlanta, Boston and Chicago
 Dispatch vessel: Dolphin
 Steam (some sail)
 Armor –double hulled and compartments
 Rifled cannon
 The change was brought about because we wanted a piece of the European trade pie
and the only way to get it was with a strong navy.
 1881 was a good time for it because we were in an economic boom time
1881-90: rebirth of U.S. Navy
 professionalism:
 naval institute (1873)
 Office of naval Intelligence (1882)
 Naval War College (1884)
 Stephen Luce: a Rear admiral who was commandant of Midshipmen. He gets the
money for the college
 Alfred Thayer Mahan: takes over after Luce leaves.
Conclusions:
 The U.S. navy reached its pinnacle during the Civil War that was lost shortly after 65,
not to be regained until the 20th century
 In the intervening decades GB led the world in promoting the development of modern
naval technology.
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The decline of the U.S. navy ended about 1880 and by 1890 a renaissance was in full
swing, the dominant evidence of which was Mahan’s book, The Influence of Sea
Power on History
2/18/02
The U.S. Navy and American Imperialism: 1898 –1914
The Spanish American War and Beyond
Causes of the Spanish American war.
Cuban revolution
 Insurrections destroy property in protest of Spain
 1895-98 – U.S. Investments threatened as a result of Cuban action
 General Weyler sent to Havana by the Spanish to end revolt. Result: “Butcher
Weyler”
 Yellow Journalism:
 Spanish atrocities and lack of humanitarianism was portrayed negatively in
American newspapers
 USS Maine
 Mission: to protect U.S. lives and property
 Destroyed by an explosion in February 98 while in Havana
 260 killed
 U.S. public believed explosion was caused by a Spanish mine
 A 1976 study by Rickover suggested otherwise
 “Remember the Maine” was a battle cry of the war
The war:
 Geography:
 Spanish Empire: Cuba, Puerto Rico, Philippines, Guam
 U.S. Objectives:
 Cuba was primary
 Puerto Rico was secondary
 With pressure to act, McKinley asked for permission to use the Army and Navy. A
resolution was passed declaring Cuba free and directing the president to use force.
 Conduct of the war: Pacific
 Philippines: phase one
 Dewey was given command of the pacific squadron with his flag on the
Olympia and did drills and training in Japan
 Prepped ships for war with overhauls and drills in Hong Kong
 Received notice of war by cable
 Entered Manila Bay 5/1/1898 with the intentions of destroying or
capturing the Spanish fleet.
 While going to Manila Bay, he constantly did drills.
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Forces:
 American: admiral Dewey
 Four cruisers, two gunboats and a revenue cutter (predecessor to the
Coast Guard)
 Gunnery and fire control drills on the way to manila.
 Spanish: Admiral Montojo
 Two cruisers (one modern and one immobile) and five other ships at
Manila
 Philippines: phase one.
 Spanish fortress fleet
 “You may fire when ready, Gridley”. Gridley was the commanding officer
of his flagship, the Olympia.
 Americans 170 hits, Spanish 15. Spanish fleet sunk at anchor
 Dewey becomes a national hero
 Siege of Manila begins.
 Other islands:
 On the way to occupy Philippines, Wake and Guam were seized, and
Hawaii was annexed
 Philippines: Phase two
 War against Aguinaldo’s Philippine Nationalists who had hoped for
independence
 U.S. bogged down for three years
Caribbean forces and war:
 American: Sampson at Key west
 Schley’s Flying Squadron at Norfolk meant to stay at home and protect the
coast. It was meant to be fluidic and mobile.
 Trip of USS Oregon around South America gave U.S. five battleships and
two armored cruisers in the Atlantic
 Spanish
 Four cruisers and two destroyers under Cervera
Spanish American war: pursuit of Cervera
 Sampson planned to meet Cervera at San Juan, Puerto Rico, but Spanish refueled at
Curcao
 Mahan condemned Sampson’s advance on PR. Cuba was the strategic objective.
 Sampson blockaded Havana and sent Schley to Cienfuegoes but Spanish went to
Santiago.
 For Cervera, just getting to Cuba was an accomplishment
 American squadrons unorganized and outguessed.
 Schley (28 May), then Sampson (1 June) arrive and beings one month long blockade
of Santiago Harbor.
 Sampson couldn’t enter the harbor due to mines and shore batteries
 Americans needed command of the seas before operations could be waged elsewhere.
 Sampson requested troops to capture shore batteries so mines could be removed.
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There was no overall commander between the army and navy.
Because of this, Sampson and Shafter have a meeting to agree on a course of action.
Both leave satisfied.
Marines seized Guantanamo for logistics base
Amphibious landing at Daiquiri (20 June) with the Rough Riders to clear batteries
and allow mine sweeping
Army went after the town of Santiago instead and got bogged down then asked the
navy to force their way into the harbor and relieve them through the minefield.
Sampson to meet Shafter
Fearing the capture of the Santiago and the Spanish fleet, Cervera helps solve the
American dilemma when ordered to get out of port at any cost.
Battle of Santiago:
 7/3/98, Spanish make their run
 Inferior Spanish fleet annihilated by superior and better managed U.S. fleet.
 Spanish losses 160 killed, 1800 captured
 American losses 1 killed, one wounded
 Peace treaty signed 10 December 1898
 Spanish home fleet recalled while en route to the Philippines fearing North
Atlantic fleet.
Results of the war:
 U.S. empire
 Possession of Puerto Rico, Guam, Philippines, naval base in Cuba
 Formerly independent islands: wake, Hawaii, Samoa, and harbor of Pago Pago
 U.S. is in undisputed control of the Caribbean.
 Sampson and Schley continue to bicker. Schley was politically connected.
 U.S. technological superiority proves overwhelming (battleships and big guns)
 Battleships enshrined as principal warship
 New construction programs to be completed by 1905: 10 first rate battleships,
four armored cruisers and 17 other types
 Recognized need for improvement in fire control and amphibious doctrine
 Dewey to head the new general board: first peace time U.S. strategic planning
 Devise war plans
 Assess foreign navies
 Influence president and secretary of state
 Mahan is vindicated in his shouting for capital ships
 Global empire yields bases and expanded obligations
 Oregon’s dash renewed desire for isthmian canal to link Atlantic and pacific fleets
President Teddy Roosevelt
 Avid Fan of the navy
 Former asst. secretary of the navy
 Lectured at War college and published books on naval history
 Respected and believed Mahan’s principles
 1901 became the youngest president in history
Progressive era of politics and the navy (1901-14)
 Naval budget:
 1890: 6.9% of federal expenditures
 1914: 19% of federal expenditures
 1903: U.S. began building two capital ships every year.
 capital ships: battleships we were producing two a year at this time
 1900 displacing 15k tons
 1914 displacing 32k tons
 strong presidents: TR, Taft, and Wilson
 A supportive congress funded battleships and canal
 In 1900, the General board of the navy was established as a successor to the naval
war board from the Spanish American War
 In 1903, the Army Navy joint board was established
 Prepared and updated War Plans known as “color plans”
Plan Orange:
 War plan for contesting Japan
 As early as 1905, Japanese and U.S. relations suffered. Treaty of Portsmouth between
Russia and Japan left Japan with bad feelings towards America. They felt that they
got the short end of the stick in the treaty.
 Planners knew that Philippine Islands were an “Achilles’ Heel” for any kind of
aggressive Japanese operation
 Strategy of Plan Orange:
 The initial loss of the Philippines would force us back to Hawaii and we would
have to fight our way back
Prewar international concerns:
 The Caribbean: expanding interests of Germany strong in Latin America
 After Spanish American War, the U.S. has a stake in Caribbean
 Previous annexation of Puerto Rico
 Naval base in Cuba
 Venezuela Crisis (1902)
 Germany wants a base there
 Germany plus Britain and Italy blockade Venezuela to recover 12.5 million loan
from a defaulted loan.
 U.S. fortifies the Caribbean
 Monroe Doctrine:
 Non-colonization
 “Hands off” the new world
 American non involvement in European quarrels
 The Roosevelt Corollary made us the dominant power in the region. Any nation that
wanted to do something here had to ask us first for permission
 An American lake
 Dominican Republic (1904). U.S. takes over fiscal responsibilities
 Cuba (1906-09) suppress rebellion
 Et al
Panama Canal: Joining the two-ocean navy
 Initial French attempt to build was a failure
 Panama was originally a Colombian province
 Columbia initially rejected treaty for U.S. to take over the French project.
 U.S. quietly supported a Panamanian revolution by blocking Colombian troops
 Panama granted U.S. ten mile wide zone in perpetuity of 10m and 250k annually
 U.S. credibility in Latin America hurt
 1914: canal opened
 1920: Columbia paid 25m conscience money
The pacific:
 Expanding interests of Japan gets U.S. attention in Pacific
 The U.S. stake: Hawaii and the Philippines
 “Open Door” policy
 china was being divided up between the European powers after it lost its war with
Japan, but U.S. still wanted to trade with all Chinese markets
 U.S. wanted to prevent any one foreign power to assume overriding control in
their sphere of influence
 This was proposed by Secretary of State Hay
 In 1900, group of Chinese patriots called “righteous and Harmonious firsts”
(boxer) started a campaign to rid china of foreigners
 International army including 2.5k U.S. troops put down the rebellion
Great White Fleet
 Started December 1907 and lasted 14 months
 Stimulated domestic support for naval building program
 Proved to Japan and the world we were a formidable naval power
 This convinced Japan that they needed a similar fleet
 Proved ability to steam around the world and be in fighting condition
 Made obsolete before it returned by the HMS Dreadnought
Relations with Britain
 Britain fully supported efforts of the U.S. during the Spanish American War
 Conceded fully to allowing the U.S. exclusively control of the Panama canal
 Pulled her ships out of the west Indies
Tech developments:
 HMS dreadnought
 The first all “big gun” battleship
 Built in secret, commissioned in 1907
 Gunnery accuracy
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Only three percent of U.S. shells hit at Santiago
Smokeless powder allowed battle at longer ranges
Captain William S. Simms learned better aiming and firing plus better overall fire
control and fleet coordination from British
Appointed “inspector of target practice” by TR
2/20/02
WWI is really the first phase of a thirty-year war. It is Germany’s attempt to dominate the
Eurasian landmass.
The World at War 1914-18.
Discussion of the naval war.
 Background
 Major surface actions
 War against shipping
 Campaign for Constantinople
Major allied powers:
 The alliances were a major cause of the conflict.
 Triple Entente:
 Great Britain
 Russia
 France
 Later (1917)
 U.S.
 Italy
 Japan allied with England in the Pacific
Major central powers:
 Germany
 Austria-Hungary
 Turkey
There is a hundred years of peace in Europe between the conference of Vienna
(Napoleonic Wars) and WWI, minus the smaller battles/wars.
Bismarck built a system of alliance between the European powers so that no two
countries could ever gang up on one country. About 1890, the Kaiser dies and his son
takes over. He fires Bismarck and then proceeds over the next 16 years to dismantle that
system of alliances, and builds a system that leads to war.

Heir to the Throne of Austria-Hungary Fernedad is assassinated while in a parade in
Serbia. Serbia is a Slavic nation, as well as Russia. When A-H declares war on
Serbia, Russia comes to their aid. The Germans come to the aid of A-H, because they
have a common heritage. France gets drawn into the conflict when Russia declares
war because of a treaty with each other.
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Von Shliefan (sic) plan is devised to help Germany fight a two front war. It says that
Germany will sleep through Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg, and drive to
Paris. This is to knock France out of the war, and then turn the attention to Russia.
When Germany closes the ports on the North Sea, England goes to war with Germany
on the side of France.

The war becomes one of defense, because there are long range weapons that are rapid
fire (machine guns), but no defense against that. This leads to trench warfare
German Navy
 Built a large Mahanian battle fleet in order to bring about an alliance with Britain
which would leave France open to invasion
 Plan backfired and led to a building race with Britain
 Of note, Germany had less than fifty U-boats at the start of the war.
Royal navy:
 Expanded building program
 Had consolidated ships into a reduced number of fleets with the home fleet being the
largest
 When war began, an idea was to use the added advantage of the mobility of the navy
to hi continental targets (similar to Pitt’s plan during the seven years war). However,
it was later concluded that a continental army was necessary to defeat Germany.
 Result: Both Germany and Britain had large battle fleets at the start of the war.
Strategies:
 Britain
 Both Germany and Britain were disciples of Mahan
 Relied heavily on its navy. A major naval defeat could prove disastrous
 Blockade with stronger Grand Fleet (British)
 Germans
 Mines and forts for coastal defense
 Fight a war of attrition and defensive war
Surface action: North Sea
 Heligoland Bight:
 8/28/1914
 British ambush, attempted German counter ambush
 British victory
 Jutland
 5/31/1916
 Greatest naval battle to date
 British Grand Fleet outweighs German High Seas Fleet 8:5
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 151 British warships
 99 German warships
culminating surface action of the age of steam
both sides had no idea that both fleets were to sea
if the Germans had one, the High Seas Fleet would have been able to cut off the
supplies going into Britain
If the British had one, it would have kept the Russians in the fight, making the
British continental battle lines easier to maintain.
Jutland is important because of what it didn’t accomplish, rather than what it did
It had four phases
 Battle cruiser action: run to the south. Beatty (British) pursues Hiper
(German)
 Run to the north: Scheer (German) pursues Beatty (British)
 Main fleet action: Jellicoe (British) arrives
 The Night action: High Seas Fleet escapes.
War against shipping
 British blockade German coast. Germany was well prepared and was able to initially
endure the blockade quite well.
 German attack blockading ships with U-boats
 Germans strike back with a war against British shipping initially with Surface raiders
and then U-boats.
 Technology forced a change in tactics.
 Radio made surface raiding hard because warnings were easily spread.
 First U-Boat campaign
 1915
 Waters around Britain were declared a war zone.
 Destruction of enemy merchants, and warning sent to neutrals
 Lusitania, Arabic sunk
 U.S. protest leads to German declaration of Immunity for ocean liners to avoid
war with U.S.
 Second U-Boat campaign in 1916
 Unrestricted warfare:
 December 1916
 With German manpower strained and the blockade beginning to have an effect,
Germany was losing the war and U-boats were the only weapon not yet fully
utilized
 Germany plans to knock out Britain before U.S. aid can be mobilized
 The campaign almost worked.
 It was countered with British ASW
 No effective means of ASW at start of war.
 Decide not to use convoys
 Blockade, patrol sea lanes, attack German sub bases
 ‘Q-Ships” (armed merchant ships), mines, nets

 all efforts proved ineffective
 Germany sinking 150 ships a month.
United states in WWI
 America was originally neutral and traded with all European countries.
 American were first mostly upset about the British blockade hurting business
 U-boat warfare and British propaganda changed American opinion against
Germany as well as the fact that it was more profitable to trade with Britain and
France.
 The road to war:
 Lusitania sunk
 Unrestricted U-Boat warfare
 Zimmerman telegram
 U.S. steamer Algonquin sunk 3/12/1917
 U.S. Declares war 4/6/1917
U.S. contributions:
 Helps defeat submarines in Atlantic
 Troop transport
 Convoys
 Anti-submarine warfare.
Convoys:
 Admiral Sims
 Takes no longer to form a convoy than to “sanitize” shipping lanes
 Scheduling allows efficient use of ports
 Merchant officers capable of station keeping
 12 independent ships sunk for every one sunk in convoy.
Anti-submarine warfare:
 destroyers (less emphasis on BBs)
 Mine barrages. British and American forces put down a minefield that stretched
across from Scotland to Norway and across the English Channel.
 Submarines Vs. submarines.
Campaign for Constantinople:
 Was a plan to go through the Med, through the Black Sea, and resupply Russia. This
was a problem because of Turkey controlling the entrance to the Black Sea.
 It was a good plan made by Churchill, but was poorly executed.
 First attempt was to drive up the Dardenelles.
 Second attempt was an amphibious assault on Gallipoli
 Failures to make any progress led to British evacuation and revolution in Russia
 Failure due to:
 Mismanagement, hesitation and delay
 Inadequate use of minesweepers
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Inability of NGFS
Underestimation of Turks
Sheer hard luck
USMC studies lesson and mistakes of Gallipoli, and applies the knowledge to the
WWII Pacific campaigns.
End of the war (1918)
 Failure of Constantinople campaign leads to Russian collapse on eastern front
 Germany tries last desperate attack on Western front using reinforcements from the
East.
 U.S. presence on Western front allows allies to repulse Germany in second battle of
the Marne.
 Blockade of Germany took its toll
 U.S. advocated convoy system defeats U-boat threat
 Western front pushed into Germany
 Revolution imminent, Kaiser abdicates
 Germany surrenders November 11, 1918
Effect on Mahanian theory
 A wide spread belief was that a building rivalry of large battle fleets helps to cause
war
 Faith in the battle fleet for command of the sea remained a steadfast belief in the navy
 Unrestricted submarine warfare’s implications and lessons were ignored
2/22/02
The peacetime years. Coming out of the treaty of Versailles, Germany had to downsize
their military, couldn’t fund new technologies, and weren’t allowed to build up a new
navy, had to turn over their submarines, 10 battleships 14 cruisers and over 50 destroyers.
We interned their ships in GB. This leads to the Scapa Flow (sic) incident. The British
steam off on maneuvers, and leave the Germans to scuttle their ships.
Treaty of Versailles:
 Called for ten battleships, fourteen cruisers, and fifty destroyers and all submarines of
the German fleet to be interned in GB
 German navy to be reduced to a small insignificant force and its newest ships turned
over to the allies
 No submarines for the Germans.
 Great Britain attempts to make U.S. a second rate naval power, Wilson resists
 Wilson's fourteen points:
 League of nations, which a republican senate rejects out of fear of leading U.S.
into foreign entanglements. This weakens Democrat Wilson's chance in 1920
election

Scapa Flow incident:
 6/21/1919
 German fleet scuttled as an act of defiance
 British and French were infuriated
Major navies at the end of WWI
 GB
 Still the strongest numerically
 However, a dominance was threatened by a challenge form the U.S.
 Many of its battleships and cruisers were now obsolete
 Did not want a naval arms race and tried to deter the U.S. from adopting a large
building program
 Opposed Wilson's principle of Freedom of the Seas.
 Japan
 Seized German possessions to facilitate expansion into china
 Japan was engaged in a major building program designed to give Japan naval
dominance in the western pacific to protect there expansion
 They object to the Washington arms conference because they have an inferiority
complex.
 Post WWI, the U.S. was engaged in a major building program. Wilson wanted a fleet
to ensure freedom of the seas.
 Wilson emphasized capital ship construction for political purposes. If completed, the
U.S. navy would be the most powerful in the world.
 The American people sought a “return to normalcy” and did not support the concept
of developing a navy second to none.
 1921: Congress called for disarmament conference.
Wilson wanted a strong navy to deter Japan from aggression.
Washington conference (1921-22):
 Japan, Britain, and U.S. major powers involved
 Secretary of state Hughes sought a comprehensive solution to problems in the pacific
and an end to the naval arms race.
 He wanted a ten year moratorium on ship building
 He wanted to scrap the vast majority of the ships in the present navies of the
world.
 He wanted to scrap 66 ships
 Hughes disliked Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 (potential threat to U.S.)
 Japan hesitated to participate, feeling they would be left in a position of inferiority.
 Resulted in three major treaties.
 Five power naval limitation treaty
 U.S., Britain, Japan, France, Italy
 10 year holiday on capital ship construction
 capital ship tonnage ratio of 5-5-3-1.7-1.7 (U.S.-GB-Japan-France-Italy)
 carriers limited to 27k tons, with eight inch guns
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battleships limited to 35k tons and sixteen inch guns
no limit to cruisers, destroyers, submarines. This gives an advantage to GB.
non-fortification clause of west pacific possessions inserted in order to
appease the Japanese
 this clause expires in 1936
four-power treaty
 U.S., Britain, Japan, France
 Terminated the Anglo-Japanese alliance
 Each country would “respect” the other’s far eastern possessions
 Mutual consultation on crisis
Nine-power treaty
 U.S., Britain, Japan, France, Italy, China, Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal
 Guaranteed “open door” in China
Balance sheet on treaties
 Negative:
 Force to ensure “open door” in china.
 Japanese angered by this limit to their expansion, smaller classes of ships
not included in which the U.S. was behind already
 Positive
 Naval limitations realistically accepted congressional budgetary austerity
 U.S. navy able to develop technologically
Impact of Washington naval conference on U.S. navy.
 Conversion from coal to oil
 Development of naval aviation and the aircraft carrier
 1 star General Mitchell anchors German BBs off Virginia Capes and has bombers
destroy them. this leads him to believe that the navy is obsolete and the nation
needs an air force.
 Development of modern radio communication
 Development of the submarine
 Development of the new electrical power systems
 Use of Aluminum and plastic to reduce weight
Geneva Conference of 1927:
 U.S. hoped to extend 5-5-3 ratio on cruiser tonnage
 Britain, France and Japan resisted
 No agreement.
London conference of 1930
 Inspired by President Hoover, an isolationist, economy minded Quaker, and a labor
government in Britain
 U.S., Britain, Japan, France, Italy
 Results:
 Ban on construction of capital ships extended to 1935
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Ratio in cruisers destroyers: 10-10-7 and parity on subs
France and Italy did not concur.
Final disarmament attempts:
 Geneva conference of 1932
 Complete failure
 Japan and France resist; Hitler emerging in Germany and starting to rebuild
 London naval conference of 1936
 Mild limitations on size of naval craft
 Italy and Japan did not sign
Situation by 1936
 Hitler in power by 33, aggression begins in thirty five
 Britain attempts appeasement, including naval pact permitting Germany to rebuild
navy
 By the end of 1936, all the naval limitation treaties expire
 Japan aggressive in Manchuria and in 1934 renounced Washington treaties
 U.S. remained isolationist, neutral, and did not begin major rebuilding of Navy until
the FDR administration.
 National recovery act of 1933
 Vinson-Trammel Bill
 Second Vinson Act
2/25/02
The mood of the nation:
 Isolationist tendencies reinforced by the great depression
 Large corporations were thought to be the cause of WWI
 These beliefs led to the neutrality acts:
 1935: Congress forbids the selling of things to belligerents
 1936: No loans for belligerents
 1937: Cash and Carry for non war materiel
 1939: Cash and Carry for war Materiel
International events
 The anti-war mood was also prevalent amongst the European victors of WWI
 France developed the impregnable Maginot line.
 The success of the treaty of Versailles hinged on the disarming of Germany and the
strength of the League of Nations. However, European powers avoided conflict by
giving into the demands of fascist countries
 1931:
 Manchurian incident (start of WWII) Japan invades Manchuria
 1933: Japan and Germany withdraw from the league of nations (collapse of the
league)
 1935: Germany denounces the treaty of Versailles and rearms. Italy invades Ethiopia
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1936: Germany reoccupies the Rhineland (collapse of Treaty of Versailles); Spanish
civil War; expiration of the Washington naval treaty. Rome-Berlin axis is created
1937: full scale undeclared war between Japan and china
War plan orange:
 War plan orange went through many mutations, evolving eventually into the rainbow
plans
 The period between 1937-41 was one of increasing tension, the U.S. exercised the full
range of options available for employing naval diplomacy, short of war
 This era provides a number of insights into the use of sea power as an element of
national policy.
 Was between the U.S. and Japan
 U.S. would lose the Philippines at an early stage, would fall aback to Hawaii
 We would eventually retake and have a cataclysmic battle between the two fleets
Technology and doctrine:
 Orange plan drove developments in:
 Amphibious warfare:
 Studies of Gallipoli
 Landing operations manual published in 1934
 Detailed planning and rehearsal were made a must
 Combat loading of transports practiced
 NGFS practiced
 LCVP/LVT/LST developed by USMC
 Construction battalions
 Ability to convert captured island to operational bases essential for Orange
plan
 “Seabees” – uniformed military troops experienced in construction and could
operate under enemy fire
 Seaborne supply support
 Fleet train
 Support fleet with fuel oil, munitions, supplies and repairs
 Keep up with advancing fleet
 Gave fleet the necessary 6000 mile operating range required for a pacific
campaign
 Construction of oilers floating dry docks, repair ships and ammunition carriers
 Submarine force
 Larger ships with longer range for deployment in vast pacific. Much larger
than the U-boats used by Germany.
 Designed to wage war on Japanese shipping
 Research and development into ASW tactics and equipment (sonar, tracking
systems, etc)
 Naval aviation
 Aircraft carriers
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1921: old Colier Jupiter converted to CV1 Langley, the navy’s first carrier
1928: Lexington and Saratoga converted form battle cruiser hulls to
carriers
 late 1920s, mock attacks were staged against Panama Canal, mare Island
and Pearl Harbor
 1934: ranger is first built from the keep up as an aircraft carrier
 designed to carry fleet Recon aircraft
 by the time of commissioning, technology advancements had made it
obsolete
 1937: Yorktown; first modern carrier designed to carry assault aircraft
 1941: Enterprise, wasp, and hornet commissioned
 by pearl harbor, we had six commissioned and 19 more on order
Carrier aircraft
 Early on became highly specialized
 Fighters:
 Grumman wildcat
 Grumman Hellcat
 Dive bombers
 Douglas Dauntless
 Torpedo planes
 Douglas Devastators
 Grumman Avenger
Revisions to strategic planning
 After observing events in Europe emphases was shifted from pacific to Atlantic
 Security of the Caribbean and Panama to have top priority (sacrificing Philippines
and Guam)
 Defensive strategy in pacific
The rainbow war plans
 Rainbow 1: unilateral defense of America above 10°s
 Rainbow 2: war in west pacific in association with Britain and France; U.S. putting
major emphasis in pacific vice Europe
 Rainbow 3: unilateral war in western pacific
 Rainbow 4: unilateral defense of entire Americas and eastern pacific
 Rainbow 5: war in Europe allied with Britain and France with U.S. forces sent to
defeat Germany and Italy
Force levels and deployments of the US fleet in 37
 Navy officers and enlisted: 113k
 Marine corps: 18k
 Battleships: 15
 Aircraft carriers: 3
 Heavy cruisers: 17
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Light cruisers: 10
Destroyers: 196 with 162 overage
Submarines:
Evaluation of the navy’s ability (1939):
 Enough capital ships for an offensive in the Atlantic and a defensive in the pacific
 Insufficient number of aircraft carriers
 Barely sufficient cruisers to screen the battle fleet and scouting force
 Sufficient number of destroyers for screening combat forces only. Insufficient
destroyers for convoy and ASW. Many destroyers were overage.
 Submarines were 40 percent below war strength
 Aircraft:
 Shortage of long range patrol bombers
 Lack of modern carrier aircraft
 Manpower: enlisted personnel afloat: 78 percent of prescribed manning
 Bases: critical deficiencies
 Patrol plane bases needed at Oahu, midway, Jonston, Palmyra, Wake and
Puerto Rico
 Advance fleet bases required in Trinidad, and other various places
 Conclusion: not fully prepared
 Result: the Vinson expansion bill
 Rearmament: authorization of the two Ocean navy not to be completed until 1946.
Effects of the outbreak of war in Europe:
 The fall of France and isolation of Britain shocked American isolationists and focused
U.S. interest towards Europe
 New opportunities for Japan:
 Reduced British participation in far eastern affairs
 Reduced threat of Russian intervention
 Increased vulnerability of French and Dutch possessions
 All aid to Britain short of war:
 Destroyers for bases deal:
 Fifty overage destroyers in exchange for 99 year leases on bases in the
Bahamas, Jamaica, and Newfoundland
 Lend-lease to Britain and Russia
 American occupation of Greenland and Iceland
 American escort of Convoy and eventual cooperation with the royal navy in hunting
down U-boats. Followed by torpedoing of Greer and Kearney and sinking of Rueben
James.
Preparations for war in the pacific:
 In early 1940 Rainbow II dominated the strategic plans for the pacific
 The U.S. fleet was kept at Pearl harbor as a deterrent to Japan
 Shift in strategy to “Atlantic first”
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 A strong offensive in the Atlantic and a defensive in the pacific
 Defeat Germany and Italy first, then deal with Japan
Defend the Philippines as long as possible then fall back
Embargo on 7/26/40 on aviation fuel and high grade scrap
9/40: Japan formally joins the axis
4/13/41: Japan signs a five year treaty of neutrality with Russia
6/41: Japan forced the French to turn over bases in Southern Indochina
7/26/41: U.S. freezes all Japanese assets and cuts off the flow of oil
decision to fortify and defend the Philippines
October 1941: Tojo and his war party took control of the government
Japan sends special envoy Karusu to Washington with Japan’s “last proposals”.
11/26/41: secretary hull responds to Japan’s proposals by demanding Japan’s
withdrawal from both China and Indochina; ensure the integrity of the Chinese
nationalist government and enter a non-aggression pact with the U.S.
December 6, 1941: Roosevelt personally appeals to Emperor Hirohito to withdraw
from Indochina; Japan’s reply was received at 7:55 the next morning in Pearl Harbor
2/27/02
Test today. No notes.
3/1/02
Video today. No Notes.
3/4/02
World War II in the Atlantic
War in Europe:
 September 1939: Germany invades Poland. England and France declare war on
Germany.
 39-40: inconclusive on western front (phony War)
 Britain blockades Germany
 Germany begins commerce raiding at sea with U-boats and surface raiders
 Scuttling of Graf Spee after Battle of River Plate
 April 1940: Germany invades Norway to keep Britain from tightening blockade by
mining northern approaches
 May 1940: Germans launch attack on low-countries and France. They outflank the
Maginot line.
 British and French forces are overwhelmed by the German Blitzkrieg
 Italy joins conflict after German victory is assured.
 June 1940: France falls
 Britain withdraws troops from Europe (Dunkirk)
 France divides up into occupied France and Vichy France
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To avoid having French ships fall into the hands of the Axis Powers, British forces
attack the French navy.
Britain now stood alone and the battle of Britain began. (Operation Sea Lion. The
code name given to the battle by Hitler)
Convoys Vs. Wolfpacks
 Britain
 adopts convoy strategy at outset
 Recognizes importance of maintaining SLOCs with the U.S.
 Germany
 Former WWI commander Karl Doenitz was appointed by Admiral Raeder to head
the German submarine force
 Most thinking still centered around battleships even in the Germany navy.
 At the start of WWII Germany only had fifty-six U-boats. Doenitz estimated that
three hundred were required
 1939 through the spring of the next year was disappointed for the U-Boat fleet
 Things change when bases become available in France and Norway
 Doenitz organizes U-boats into wolfpacks to mass attacks on convoys. Convoy
positions radioed in by patrolling U-boats.
 U-Boat sinkings climax in fall of 1940. This happy time for the German’s resulted
in 217 ships sunk and only six U-boats lost.
 Germany luck begins to change in 1941.
 British knock out some on the most talented and experienced U-Boat captains
 British capture a germane marine Enigma Machine.
 British capture a U-Boat intact and study it for its weaknesses
 By the time America officially enters the war, the British believe the U-Boat
menace had passed.
German surface raiders:
 Germany used surface raiders with moderate success
 No large surface battles in the Atlantic as the German surface fleet had a hard time
breaking out into the open ocean.
 22-26 May, 1941: Chase of the Bismarck
Undeclared war:
 FDR an internationalist and interventionist
 Isolationist strength so great that FDR ran on a platform opposing intervention in
1940.
 Following FDR’s election to unprecedented third term, U.S. passed first peacetime
“draft”.
 U.S. drifts into undeclared war against Germany.
 Attempts to maintain neutrality, between 39-41.
 Congress and people influenced by isolationists and “America first” propaganda
 U.S. neutrality patrols help British ASW
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“All aid to Britain short of war” includes “destroyer for bases deal” and “LendLease”
With the prospect of British defeat looming, Two-Ocean Navy Act was passed.
U.S. destroyers on escort duty: Greer fired upon, Kearny torpedoed, and Rueben
James sunk
FDR identifies German victory as threat to U.S. security because it would destroy
British sea power, and the Royal Navy was a “Shield of the Republic” since about
1890.
WWII:
 The U.S. officially enters the war December 1941 following the attack at Pearl
Harbor.
 Germany moves U-Boat offensive to U.S. east coast shipping
 Germans experience a “second Happy Time” as the Americans are ill prepared for
war.
 As convoys became more effective on the east coast of U.S., Doenitz moved his Uboats south
 Interlocking convoy system finally reduced ship losses to acceptable levels.
3/6/02
World War
 U-boats also very effective in cutting allied northern supply route to Russia
 Doenitz shifts U-boats back in north Atlantic in 42. Germany now has three hundred
U-boats
 Allies counteract with radar, asdie (sonar), and HF/DF (High Frequency Direction
Finder) to locate the wolfpacks
 New ASW weapons such as “hedge hog” caused havoc on the U-boats.
 Doenitz concedes defeat in the North Atlantic
 Doenitz forced into central Atlantic as allies strengthened convoys and developed
ASW tactics
 “Hunter Killer Groups” eventually mauled U-boats at sea as allies improved coverage
and sank more U-boats.
 By the end of the war, U-boats had lost their effectiveness
 Of the 1175 U-boats, 751 were lost.
Competing allied strategies in Europe:
 British:
 Preferred a peripheral strategy.
 War of attrition:
 North Africa, Egypt, Sicily, etc
 U.S.
 Preferred direct attack on Germany through western France
 U.S. initially acquiesces to British peripheral strategy
 Allowed U.S. to pursue war in the pacific
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Drew German resources off the western front, effectively weakening it
enough for the eventual cross channel invasion
Allies checked German advances in Egypt, stalemated on Russian front,
attacked Italy beginning in July 43
Allies spend the next year building up in England for cross channel invasion
Operation Torch was the name of the African campaign
The invasion of Sicily was known as Operation Husky
Normandy Invasion:
 June 6, 1944: Normandy invasion, Southern France
 August 1944: succeed in pushing Germany back into its own borders
 Spring 1945: the end of the war in Europe.
Chronology of significant events:
 9/1/39: Germany attack Poland
 9/17/39: U-29 sinks carrier HMS Courageous, U-47 sinks Royal Oak
 12/13/39: battle of the river plate. Graf Spry becomes important
 22-26 may, 41: chase of the Bismarck
 11/8/42: operation torch
 1/14/43: Casablanca Conference: decision to invade Sicily
 7/10/43: invasion of Sicily
 9/9/43: invasion of Italy at Salerno
 1/21/44: landing at Anzio. Heaviest casualties in the Italian campaign
 6/6/44: Normandy invasion
 8/15/44 Invasion of southern France
Key themes:
 The navy as an instrument of foreign policy
 Interaction between congress and the navy
 Inter-service relations
 Technology
 Leadership
 Strategy and tactics
 Naval doctrine
 The future
3/8/02
The War in the Pacific, Part 1
Background review
 Tense relations: Japan challenged America’s “open door” policy by attacking
Manchuria in 31
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1937: Japanese expansion in china resulted in attack on a gunboat, the USS Panay, by
Japanese aircraft
Strategic planning:
 in early 1940 rainbow II dominated the strategic plans for the pacific
 There is a shift to the Atlantic first policy.
 A strong offensive in the Atlantic and a defensive in the pacific
 First defeat Germany and Italy, then Japan
 Support British forces in the East Indies and defend midway, Johnson, Palmyra,
Samoa, and Guam.
 Defend the Philippines as long as possible, then withdraw to Malay barrier.
Political developments:
 Early 40: U.S. cuts off supply of war materials
 September 40: Japan formally joins the axis
 June 41: Japan forced the French to turn over bases in southern Indochina
 July 26, 41: U.S. freezes all Japanese assets, FDR adopted economic sanctions
leading to an oil embargo by U.S., British, and Dutch
 26 Nov., 41: U.S. gives Japan an ultimatum to evacuate china or the flow of oil would
stop. U.S. didn’t expect Japan to comply
Japan’s plan:
 Southern drive into Indochina and Dutch east Indies for oil
 Strike at Philippines and Singapore to knock out local American and British forces
 Attack on pearl harbor conceived by Admiral Yamamoto
 Risk great: U.S. would surely enter war
 Potential gain greater: U.S. pacific fleet would be knocked out of the war. Japan
would then consolidate gains throughout china, southeast Asia (French Indochina,
Malaya, Burma, Thailand, the Dutch East Indies, Philippines, and the Gilberts and
Marianas ceded to Japan at end of WWI)
 With the U.S. fleet devastated, Japans maritime fortress would be impregnable.
 The U.S. would sue for peace and two mighty but equal empires would face each
other across the pacific
 The Balance of war in Europe then favored the Axis -Germany and Italy- would then
declare war on us as well
The attack on Pearl Harbor:
 The six newest and largest Japanese carriers at core of striking force
 Sortie from Kurils 25 Nov., rendezvous on 7 Dec, 200 miles north of pearl harbor
 First wave was 183 aircraft at 6:00am. Strike was at 7:55
 “Tora.. Tora.. Tora”
 90 percent of the damage inflicted by 8:25
 the code to do it was: Climb Mount Nitaki
 initial U.S. lineup:
 U.S. pacific fleet battleships in berths for weekend liberty

2 pacific fleet carriers, the Lexington and Enterprise, were delivering aircraft to
midway and wake islands
Aircraft neatly lined up to avoid sabotage
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Losses:
 Navy:
 2117 dead
 960 missing
 876 wounded
 8 battleships, two of which were not recoverable
what they didn’t hit:
 Submarine base
 Repair shops: all but two of the BBs damaged were eventually returned to service
 4.5 million barrels of oil
results:
 BB fleet was effectively destroyed. This was a blessing in disguise
 Carriers became capital ships
 Japanese did not meet objective of destroying entire American fleet.
 American reaction? Sue for peace? Not hardly
 Result not anticipated by American naval planners before pearl harbor, but it would
totally change the methods of naval battle for the rest of the 20th century.
 U.S. galvanized to declare war
 Hitler declared war on the U.S.
From pearl harbor to midway
 The British and American high command (prime minister Churchill, president
Roosevelt, General George Marshall) determined to fight and win first in Europe
while holding Japan at bay.
 Nimitz relieved Kimmel was commander pacific Fleet
Continued Japanese attacks
 Malay peninsula attacked
 British Repulse and Prince of Wales sunk off Malay peninsula by aircraft
 Thailand, Philippines, Borneo invaded
 Hong Kong, Guam, Wake captured
 Within ninety days of the initial attacks, Japan had secured all its objectives and had
all the resources it need to wage war
American defensive organization and plans:
 Admiral Nimitz in central pacific from pearl harbor
 MacArthur in southwest pacific, although fleet elements in this zone remained under
Nimitz control
 Controversial command structure. No common superior. Ran two separate wars in the
pacific
 Hold the line
 Guard lines of communication between Hawaii, midway and Australia
 Divert Japanese drive into the east Indies
Doolittle’s raid:
 18 April 42: 16 B-25s Launched from Hornet
 led by LTCOL James H. Doolittle, U.S. Army
 Landed in china, Russia, and Japan
 Great Morale Boost for the Americans but of little military value
 This action eventually led to beginning of the end for the Japanese
Japanese expansion continues:
 Japanese originally planned to reach defensive perimeter and sink any ship that
entered it until the U.S. was willing to negotiate
 So far ahead of schedule they felt invincible and decided to expand their conquests
and isolate Australia
 Decided to advance through the Solomons, New Hebrides New Caledonia and Samoa
then build ship, submarine, and air bases to intercept convoys to Australia
 Doolittle’s raid convinced Japan that more victories were needed in the central pacific
 Yamamoto scheduled two operations:
 May 1942: Port Moresby in New Guinea
 June 1942: midway island in central pacific
Japanese overconfidence:
 Due to overconfidence, Yamamoto only assigned three carriers to the Port Moresby
op
 Overconfidence extended to radio comms: Yamamoto sending orders concerning
future ops in a code Us had already broken
 By April 1942, Nimitz knew the Japanese would land and assault Port Moresby
Battle of the Coral Sea:
 Nimitz sent only available carriers, Lexington and Yorktown to block out the
Japanese
 Second to last day of battle
 U.S. planes sink the Shoho
 Invasion force reverses course with air support removed
 Japanese strike force busy sinking a U.S. destroyer and oiler mistaken as carriers
 8 may 1942: Each carrier force located the other and attacked simultaneously
 Japanese had advantage in experience and intermittent cloud cover, U.S. ships in the
clear
 Damage assessment:
 One Japanese carrier put out of action
 Yorktown damaged but survived
 Torpedo hits and fires, forcing the Lexington to the bottom
 Results:
 First purely carrier engagement in history, opposing ships never saw each other
 Japanese the tactical victors in terms of tonnage destroyed
 The Americans were the strategic victors because we turned them back from
invading Port Moresby

Yamamoto now believed more than ever that the American fleet had to be
destroyed at Midway
Midway:
 3-6 June 1942:
 Japan believed they had sunk both carriers in the coral sea
 Japan had to leave two carriers at home as a result of coral sea
 Japan was counting on element of surprise
 Yamamoto commanded operation from deployed battleship force Seven out of touch
 Japanese plan:
 Carrier raid backed by Japanese combined fleet to complete destruction of U.S.
fleet
 Diversionary attack on the Aleutians and raids on Midway to draw out U.S.
carriers
 Attack and report approach of U.S. carrier force with submarines west of pearl
harbor
 Attack with carriers
 Finish off with battleships
 Successful U.S. interception and decoding of Japanese naval operation
communications was so complete we thought it was a ruse
 Nimitz’ disposition of American forces:
 Only three carriers
 Deployed carriers Enterprise, Hornet, and Yorktown under Fletcher before
Japanese submarines arrived on station
 Reinforced aircraft on midway to act as an unsinkable carrier
 Established air patrols on approaches to midway
 3 June:
 Japanese forces attack Aleutians
 4 June:
 Japanese attack midway but fail to damage the runway
 U.S. counter attacks from midway but leave the Japanese forces undamaged
 Nagumo’s send wave must shift armament from anti-ship weapons to contact
bombs for shore targets to finish off the runway of midway
 Nagumo receives word of unanticipated enemy ship force.
 Decides to land first strike group and attack during the couple hours required to
refuel and shift weapons again
 Changed course to close the U.S. carriers to make it happen
 U.S. torpedo bombers attack with no hits
 Japanese score heavy losses to torpedo planes
 Japanese give their attention and fighter cover to combat low altitude torpedo
bombers, neglecting the dive bombers above
 Enterprise dive bombers follow course of Japanese destroyer to find Japanese
carriers
 Bombers from the Yorktown arrived overhead simultaneously with the enterprise
bombers and they rain hell on the Japanese.


Bombs, exposed ordnance and fuel quickly turned three Japanese carriers into
wrecks
 Fourth carrier, Hiryu survived to launch an attack against the Yorktown
 We lost the Yorktown in the battle
 Losses:
 American: 307 lives
 One carrier
 One destroyer
 One hundred forty seven planes
Battle of midway is the turning point of the pacific war, despite the technological
superiority of the Japanese. Intelligence turned the tide in the war.
3/18/02
Prelude to Guadalcanal
 Japanese imperial headquarters shocked by defeat at midway
 Cancel plans to take Fiji, Samoa, New Caledonia
 Must proceed with plan to take Port Moresby as it is within bomber distance to major
southwest pacific imperial naval operating base at Rabaul, New Britain
 Japanese begin airfield at Guadalcanal to support attack. This is what we know as
Henderson field
 Americans move to reinforce south pacific area, protect vital SLOCs (Sea Lines Of
Communications)with Australia
 Two bases established in New Hebrides
 U.S. plan disputed by inter-service rivalry
 MacArthur proposes taking command of two carriers and first marine division
and taking Rabaul
 King stridently objects. He proposes a step by step plan through the Solomons to
take Rabaul. He wants Nimitz and Ghornmley to take charge of the marines and
do amphibious assaults with the navy providing support
 Compromise:
 Nimitz to coordinate attack as far as Santa Cruz islands
 Command switches to MacArthur once a base near Tulagi is secured
 He attacks Rabaul two ways: southern through the Solomons and the western
attack from New Guinea
 Operation watchtower set for august 1, 1942.
 Guadalcanal substituted for Santa Cruz islands when U.S. intelligence learns of
Japanese plans to build airfield there
 Few resources available for watchtower
Guadalcanal campaign:
 Initial landing virtually unopposed. The marines take and complete Henderson field
 First major amphibious campaign of the war. This marks the beginning of the allied
offensive
 Lessons to be learned: coordinating major offensive with the army, navy and Marine
Corps. Also the basic planning in the battle with compromising and such

Neither side can afford defeat; both suffer heavy losses. U.S. loses more tonnage at
sea, including all carriers lost or damaged at one point. Japan loses more lives
 Japan allowed to dominate at sea at night (Tokyo Express). The U.S. dominates
daylight activities with shore and carrier based air cover
 U.S. eventually wins as political decision is made that Roosevelt cannot afford
another defeat at the hands of the Japanese with an election coming up.
 The battle goes from august 42 to February 43.
 MacArthur meanwhile successful in driving Japanese from Papuan peninsula on New
Guinea. By Feb 43, both roads to Rabaul are open and Japanese plans for offensives
are over.
 King uses this development at Casablanca conference to get the CCS approval of his
plan to allocate more resources to Pacific (at expense of “Europe First” Plan)
 Reconquest of Attu and Kiska, Aleutian islands
 January 43-may 43
 No real threat to security, but needed to eradicate Japanese control of American
territory for political reasons
 Last of classic surface ship battles takes place as Americans attack heavily
guarded convoy
 Minimal resistance on Attu, none on Kiska although Americans expected much
more and planned accordingly
Central Solomons campaign:
 Coordinated amphibious attacks toward Rabaul through central Solomons
 Yamamoto strips CVs of aircraft to reinforce Rabaul and stop Americans
 Yamamoto killed by P-38 attack when American intelligence learns of his travel
plans. Successor proves ineffective and loses many airplanes without stopping
American third or seventh fleets
 Quantum advances in amphibious tactical doctrine over Guadalcanal
 Halsey institutes bypassing strategy – avoiding or cutting off heavily reinforced
Japanese areas and pressing on to next objective. Results I n many lives saved
 U.S. ships become proficient in radar use, CICs established to maintain radar plots,
learn to control seas at night
 6/43: new Georgia
 11/43: Bouganville
 bypassed southern portion of island where Japanese entrenched and landed
marines halfway up west coast
 Japanese respond as predicted, send cruiser force to attack transports, beat by
Americans
 Japanese try to reinforce southern part of island with Tokyo express, but
Americans thwart their efforts

Neutralization of Rabaul:
 August 43, king gets permission to bypass Rabaul. Instead it would be neutralized by
a “ring of steel” consisting of land and carrier based air attacks
 Japanese strip remaining carrier decks to defend but incur heavy losses while
inflicting little damage

New American carries delivered: Essex, Bunker Hill, Independence, and Princeton.
They prove effective
 Admiralties taken, just north of Rabaul.
 Japanese withdraw ships and aircraft from Rabaul in Nov. 1943. Troops remain to
defend the island.
 Heavy loss of Japanese aircraft results in U.S. early unopposed conquest of the
Solomons
 Green Island, Emirau, Los Negros, and Manus taken by march 43. Completes the
boxing in of Rabaul and provides for air support bases for U.S. advances towards the
Japanese islands.
 Allied counteroffensive never stops again.
 MacArthur is now able to make good on his promise to return to the Philippines.
Dual advance:
 Central pacific:
 Spruance and fifth fleet making an aircraft carrier drive across the central pacific
 Mission: drive through islands of central pacific, capturing them as forward bases.
Cut the Japanese SLOCs.
 Plan: push accomplished by carrier aviation and marine amphibious divisions.
with this plan, you can bypass some strongholds and attack others at will.
 Major campaigns: Gilberts, the Marshals, and the Marianas
 South pacific:
 MacArthur/Halsey and the third fleet island hopping up from the south pacific
 Mission: drive up the new guinea-Mindanao axis from the south, towards
Philippines and Japan. Contain Japanese in south to prevent them opposing drive
across the central pacific. MacArthur wanted the south to be the main drive.
 Plan: mainly army offensive with some marine help and army air Corp air cover.
 Objective: Philippines and the penetration of the Japanese inner defense zone.
Marianas:
 11-15 June, 44: U.S. invades the Marianas
 5k U.S. deaths, 50k Japanese deaths
 US bases for further advances
 Sub base for attacks on Japanese shipping
 U.S. bases in range for B-29s to bomb Japanese home islands
 U.S. attack on Marianas draws out the Japanese fleet and results in Battle of
Philippine Sea
Philippine Sea:
 The Marianas Turkey Shoot: inexperienced Japanese aviators lost 346 aircraft in four
bombing raids
 U.S. subs sink two Japanese carriers, which were operating on highly volatile crude
oil
 Japanese fleet retreats NW.
 6/20/44:
 U.S. fleet pursued Japanese, launched 216 aircraft for bombing at 275 miles
 U.S. bombers sink one Japanese carrier and damage two others.


By the end of the day, Japanese only have 35 aircraft left in their fleet.
Due to the great distance, many US pilots do not return to the fleet. Fleet must
cease pursuit of Japanese to recover pilots and planes
Drive across the pacific: the Marianas:
 Signaled the beginning of the end for the Japanese. Tojo government fell. Succeeding
government was desirous of peace, but ridged Japanese military code and pride
prevented initiating of Peace negotiations for over a year
3/20/02
Submarines in the pacific: Outbreak of War
 United states:
 After Pearl Harbor, King adopts unrestricted submarine warfare
 Pacific fleet @ pearl harbor: 21 fleet boats
 Asiatic fleet @ manila bay: 23 fleet boats, 6 S-Boats
 13 subs from Netherlands in the far east
 Fleet boats were the modern submarines of the time. They had greater endurance,
could dive deeper, stay out longer, and were faster than the S-boats.
 Japanese:
 attack only warships
 60 subs: 46 I class (large), 14 RO class (medium), numerous midget subs
 lacked radar, used for Recon
 damaged Saratoga (twice), sank the Wasp, finished off Yorktown, sank Liscome
Bay (escort carrier) and Indianapolis (cruiser)
 As Japanese sub losses increase and operations lose effectiveness, kamikaze
tactics later adopted.
 Kaitens employed as last resort
Submarines in the pacific: early operations:
 Gudgeon, Pollack, Plunger: first to deploy
 Defend Philippines: 31 attacks with 66 torpedoes results in only 3 freighters sunk
 Asiatic fleet moved to Java, later to Freemantle, Australia
 Ran supplies to Bataan and Corregidor. Evacuated personnel including Filipino
president and Crypt-analysts
 Attempted to defend Malay Barrier
Early problems:
 Extremely cautious commanders and tactics led to disappointing results early in the
war
 Torpedo problems:
 Early detonation of magnetic exploder led to use of contact type
 Firing pin problems
 Steam propulsion eventually replaced by electric
 After firing pin problem was solved, the U.S. finally had a reliable torpedo
Later operations:
 “invisible trap” helps sink carriers Shokaku and Taiho at Philippine sea



By 44 subs are effective against warships. Sink 1 BB, 7 carriers, two heavy cruisers,
eight light cruisers, thirty one destroyers and seven submarines
lifeguard duty: 504 airmen rescued
Sank 5,320,094 tons of merchant shipping during the war.
Philippines invasion:
 Preliminaries:
 Air raids from carriers 9/12/44
 Attack on Palaus: 9/15/44
 Attack on Ulithi 9/24/44
 Blockading with China-based bombers and Halsey’s carriers
 10/17/44: rangers go ashore
 10/18-20/44: NGFS (Naval Gunfire Support)
 10/20/44: troops land on Leyte and MacArthur goes ashore
 Japanese reaction:
 Capture of Philippines would divide Japanese surface and carrier fleet
 Japanese launched an elaborate naval defense plan of Philippines known as
SHO-1
 Center force: surface force from Malaysia
 5 BBs, 12 CVs, 15 DDs
 Southern force: surface force from Malaysia supplemented by ships from Japan
 2 BBs, 2 CVs, 5 DDs
 Northern force: decoy carrier force
 4 CVs
Leyte Gulf:
 10/23/44
 U.S. submarines spot central force, sink two CVs and warn Halsey and the third
fleet
 Halsey launched five successive air attacks sinking the monster BB Musashi and
damaging three others
 10/24/44
 Kinkaid with the seventh fleet orders Oldendorf to plug Surigao strait with PTs,
DDs, CVs, and six old BBs when aircraft spot southern force
 Halsey lured north by Ozawa’s decoy northern force
 Southern force ran into Oldendorf’s trap during the night and lost two BBs and
two DDs
 San Bernardino Strait left unguarded due to miscommunication and no chain of
command allowing Central force to slip through
 10/25/44
 Central force encounters seventh fleet’s outgunned TAFFY 3 escort carrier task
unit.
 TAFFY 3 runs to launch escort planes, attacks with destroyers and calls for help
 Central force turns back


Meanwhile Halsey inflicts heavy damage on Northern Force but was out of
position to assist
Results:
 Japanese fleet shattered. No more serious opposition to U.S. in pacific
 Opened door for further landings (38) in the Philippines in support of
MacArthur’s campaign
 Japanese begin resorting to Kamikaze tactics
 Philippines under U.S. control by April 45.
Iwo Jima:
 Purpose establish B-29 base so that damaged planes bombing Japan could land
 Invasion 2/19/45
 Most formidably defended eight square miles in the pacific
 Conquest took over one month, cost 19k wounded and 7k dead
 Proved to be worthwhile
Okinawa:
 Complete blockade of Japan from south
 Airbase for bombings of Japanese mainland
 Initial landing 4/1/45 with 183k troops
 Conquest lasted until 6/21/45
 7.6k dead and 31.8k wounded
 Kamikaze strikes and bombings sank 34 ships and damaged 368 others
 Yamato Battle Group destroyed while engaging TF-58 on 4/7/45 in a suicide mission
Defeat of Japan:
 July 45: combined U.S./British fleet strike at Japanese naval bases, virtually
destroying the Japanese fleet
 7/26/45: Japan rejects Potsdam Proclamation
 8/6/45: Truman orders B-29 to drop A-bomb on Hiroshima
 8/8/45: Russia declares war on Japan. Red army marches into Manchuria
 8/9/45: B-29 dorps A-bomb on Nagasaki
 8/15/45: cease fire is called
 8/28/45: U.S. troops arrive in Japan
 9/2/45: Japanese surrender on Missouri on Tokyo Bay
3/22/02
The Postwar navy and the beginning of the cold war:
45: end of the war
 U.S. power position in the world
 Mood of nation
 U.S. temporary monopoly on the A-bomb
45-49: decline of the navy:
 Postwar phenomena in general
 Demobilization
 Rapidly declining fleet
 Worldwide instability caused wide-ranging operations
 Defense reorganization and internal defense struggles prompt a search for new roles.
 45-46:
 postwar tasks:
 return troops, POWs, refugees
 minesweeping
 reduction in force:
 nay personnel: 3.4m to 375k
 marine corps: 475k to 75k
 major combatants: 1.2k to 237
 aircraft: 40k to 4.3k
Post war debates:
 no new weapons systems except nuclear
 navy makes do with still-new world war II equipment
 useful ships mothballed
 RESERVES established
 Debate over need for conventional weapons
World wide instability:
 United nations formed which accelerated the navy’s downsizing
 Soviet Union’s “iron curtain” expands I vacuum left by defeat of Germany and Japan
 Albania, Bulgaria, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania became soviet
satellites
 China:
 Civil war between Chiang Kai-Shek’s nationalist and Mao Tse Tong’s communist
backed by the soviet union
 Communist prevail and nationalists fleet to Formosa (Taiwan) in 49
 U.S. seventh fleet kept two sides separated but did not get involved in the civil
war.
 Europe:
 Instability in Turkey, Greece, Italy, Palestine and France
 Gradual withdrawal of British navy from the Mediterranean
 U.S. picked up for British with permanent formation of U.S. sixth fleet in the
Mediterranean
 Sixth fleet initially one CVBG then expanded to two CVBGs and an ARG
Reorganization of the military:
 Impetus to unify armed forces based on Nimitz’s command of the pacific
 Army air corps:
 Looking for independence




 Convinced that the Atomic Bomb made them first line of defense
 Wanted to reduce other forces for build up
 Wanted Jurisdiction over all air defense
National security act of 47
 Reaffirmed civilian control of the military: SECDEF strengthened to a cabinet
position
 Defined three services: army, navy, and air force
 JCS retained from world war II
 Navy maintained air forces and USMC
 James Forrestal was critical in ensuring the Navy was maintained
Navy resisted the national security act
Navy appeased by naming James Forrestal the first SECDEF
Defense reorganization act of 49 renamed the national military establishment to the
Department of Defense
Internal struggles:
 USAF emerged as dominant service
 USAF bombers (B-36) could not reach all of the USSR
 Navy proposed “super-carrier” United States large enough to launch atomic weapons
 USAF objected but overruled by Forrestal
 Louis Johnson
 Succeeded Forrestal as SECDEF
 Former B-36 manufacturer and extremely pro USAF and strategic bombing
 “We’ll never have any more amphibious ops that does away with the Marine
Corps. And the Air force can do the job of the navy, so we don’t need it anymore.
If we don’t need a navy, we don’t need the super carrier”
 cancels plans for the United States
 attempts to abolish USMC air
 sparks “revolt of the admirals”:
 SECNAV Sullivan resigns, CNO Sherman fired
Atomic bomb defense theory:
 USAF perceived that the Us monopoly on the atomic bomb was all the defense
needed
 Problem with theory: diplomacy may not work in situations but atomic bomb
retaliation may be too extreme
 Strategic bombing cannot win a war eventually troops must be landed
 Navy required for transport and supply with an air arm for support and mobile body
of amphibious troops (USMC)
Impetus of Change:
 “containment strategy” required a rapid and sustained buildup of military and
nonmilitary strength
 Marshall Plan
 Containment would dominate policy for next thirty years



Invasion of south Korea
Soviets blockade Berlin prompting “Berlin airlift”
Soviets detonate A-bomb in 1949
NATO:
 Response to communist movements in Europe. Security of nations in Jeopardy.
 11 members originally
 NATO treaty stated that an attack on any member constituted an attack against all
 Joint military exercises commenced
Korean War:
 Potsdam conference established the thirty eighth parallel as a temporary border
 Soviet Union set up a puppet government in north Korea at the end of WWII
 U.S. Conducts free elections in south Korea and pull out of country 8/15/48
 Soviets believed that U.S. would not get involved in any conflict in Korea
 By June 1950, North Koreans had a large soviet-trained army and was poised to strike
 6/25/50: north Korea attacks pushing southern forces back to the “Pusan Perimeter”
 UN condemns the act and called for military sanctions
 Soviets had boycotted the UN and was not present at the vote
3/25/02
The Korean War:
The Pusan perimeter was the point that we pulled back to after the initial repulsion of our
forces by the north.
We made our first landing at Inchon because it was a point that would split their supply
lines in half.
The significance of the Chosin Reservoir was that it showed the colors of the marines and
the army. The Marines retreated in an orderly fashion, whereas the army retreated in a
run.
Inchon is the port for Seoul.
 MacArthur CINC far east
 South Koreans backed into corner
 Ninety percent of north Korean army surrounding Pusan perimeter with no navy
 Extremely dependent on over land supplies
 American public shocked at the sorry state of the armed forces
 Carrier aviation crucial in covering the retreat.
 Plan: amphibious landing at Inchon to cut off North Korean army.
 Navy initially opposed due to tides, narrow channel and island defenses at Inchon
 MacArthur given permission to do the landing and given the first marine division to
carry it out.
 Naval participation:
 Navy first on scene: Juneau and Dehaven
 Logistics, gunfire and air support



Interdiction and blockade
Inchon landing: turning impending defeat into victory.
Chinese intervention and frozen Chosin River
 Brilliant retreat executed by marines
 Outstanding carrier support
 100k troops withdrawn by sea at Hungnam
Impact of the Korean War:
 Personnel: 1951: navy personnel strength doubled. They came from the reserves
recalled, force integration, women, and the draft.
 Research and development:
 carrier-based nuclear capability
 vertical assault (helicopters)
 ASW
 SAM
 Missions
 Nuclear submarines: Hyman Rickover
 Carrier-based jets
 Navy laid groundwork for post-53 modernized navy
 Procurement:
 USS Forrestal and USS Saratoga
 Sherman class Destroyer
 Boston Class CG
 USS Nautilus Keel laid 1952
Conclusion:
 Navy survived difficult period:
 Reduced force levels
 loss of authority in defense reorganization
 Navy contributed to cold war strategy
 containment
 balanced force strategy
 Navy adapted to overcome limits placed on it
 personnel
 ships and weapons systems
The navy’s role in the strategy of containment, 1953-62
Factors impacting cold war strategy:
 NSC 68: (memorandum)
 National security council (Truman)
 April 1950
 Blueprint for cold war strategy
 Build up military to frustrate the Kremlin
 Build up military strength so that it will not have to be used
 Korean invasion: perception reinforced

Impact of NSC 68 and Korea on navy:
 Reversed trend of draw downs and accelerated buildup
 Large scale reactivation of mothball fleet
 Development of new generation of ships
 Carriers: Forrestal class. Seven of that basic type built
 Nuclear submarines: USS Nautilus
 Use of navy for bombardments and amphibious landings in Korea
demonstrates the need for power projection force
 Korea disproves USAF assertion that strategic bombing would be all that was
necessary to win future wars. The B-36 wasn’t the answer.
 Louis Johnson was fired six weeks after Korea began.
 Build up of sixth fleet in the Med to counter communist moves in the Black
Sea.
 Hot debates in the JCS over who would get the money for implementation of
strategic plan. Would it be the USN or the USAF?
Resources for defense:
 Period of DoD internal struggle to determine size, composition, and mission of navy
in future
 Navy seeks nuclear capability and strategic mission to ensure future funding
 ASW development
Navy nuclear delivery systems development
Nuclear capable aircraft:
 AJ1 Savage: carrier launched, land based
 A-3 Skywarrior: high altitude heavy attack bombers
 A-5 Skyraider: supersonic high altitude heavy attack
 A-6 intruder: medium attack, low altitude
Nuclear cruise missiles:
 KUW-1 Loon: launched form WWII fleet subs
 SSM-N-8 Regulus: turbojet propulsions launched from submarines and nuclear
cruisers
 Polaris missile system:
 Developed by navy’s special projects office in 55
 1500-mile land and sea based missile.
 USS George Washington:
 SSN under construction converted to SSBNs. They were converted for
Skipjack class
 130 foot plug inserted in center
 launched July 1960 less than five years after project started
 incredible money and effort involved
 First SSBN patrol began 11/15/60 with 16 ballistic missiles onboard.
Polaris delivery:
 41 for freedom.
 George Washington class SSBNs all authorized by 8/62



All commissioned by April 67
Last decommissioned in 1994 following more than 3k strategic deterrent patrols
Others converted to Spec Ops.
Resources for defense:
 Navy internal competition for funding kills all but carriers and Polaris subs
 Single integrated operation plan (SIOP): JCS gives navy piece of the action
 Development of small nuclear weapons gives carrier air new tactical nuclear Mission
in addition to strategic mission
 Carrier air withdrawn from SIOP; loses strategic mission to Polaris; remains core to
the strategic defense of America.
ASW development
 Designed to counter Soviet submarine threat
 Hunter Killer Groups (HUK)
 Nuclear powered attack submarines (SSN)
 Underwater sound surveillance system (SOSUS)
 SSN
 Developments in SONAR, nuclear propulsion, hull design and torpedoes made
SSN most effective ASW platform
 1956: Skipjack class
 SOSUS: ocean wired for sound.
Shipbuilding dilemma:
 Retirement of WWII ships
 Quality versus quantity
Naval diplomacy in the cold war:
 Deployment policy reflects foreign policy
 U.S. perceives its interests to be worldwide
 Therefore, the navy ranges worldwide to influence international affairs through
“presence and threat of either limited or unlimited naval force.”
 Examples: Indochina, Quemoy, Beirut
 1958: Quemoy and Matsu: PRC plans to bomb and invade nationalist china’s islands.
 Presence: 7th fleet discourages any invasion
 Sealift resupply: coercive threat of naval air attack on mainland used to intimidate
Chinese to permit resupply
 1958: Beirut election stuff
 1962: Cuban missile crisis
3/29/02
U.S. navy: Cuba through Vietnam
1959-1976
Cuba:
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Castro seized control in 59
 confiscated U.S. assets
bay of pigs failure: 4/17/61
 CIA trained Cuban exiles badly beaten
 U.S. humiliated
Cuban missile crisis:
 Bay of pigs fiasco led Khrushchev to believe that Kennedy lacked the resolve to act
 Russians established a nuclear missile site in Cuba
 U.S. navy ships and aircraft began quarantine on 10/24
 Khrushchev with no options other than removing missiles or nuclear war ordered the
missiles to be dismantled.
 Result: Russians realized they needed more submarines in order to challenge
American maritime power
Vietnam war:
 French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 54 resulted in the establishment of north and south
Vietnam
 In early 60s Ho Chi Minh encouraged dissident movements in the south to help move
the country towards being reunited
 U.S. sent military advisors and war materials to Vietnam to counter this threat
 Gulf of Tonkin incident led to first air raid on the north and increased U.S.
involvement.
 Gulf of Tonkin resolution passed
 End of 68, 500k American soldiers, sailors, and marines in the Vietnam conflict
 Vietnam was a limited war
 Navy’s role:
 Carriers at Yankee station (north) and Dixie station (south until 66) provided air
support as well as offensive bombing
 BBs and other combatants provided NGFS.
 Vessels to patrol south Vietnamese coasts and rivers (brown water navy)
 Marines
 SEALS
 Conclusions:
 Costs were high. 551 aircraft lost
 Results were uncertain at best, only slowed supply flow from north to south
The “brown-water” navy
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Coastal: operation market time
 Low tech, improvised operation
 Navy, Coast Guard, South Vietnamese, allied units closely blockaded south
Vietnamese coast
 Effectively blocked movement of sea-borne cargo to resupply the Viet Cong
 Forced use of the Ho- Chi Minh Trail
Decline of the navy:
 Skyrocketing procurement costs
 Bigger ships
 More sophisticated ships
 Push for nuclear-powered ships
 Rickover dominance of development and procurement policy
Post Vietnam use of the military:
 The Vietnam conflict changed not only the navy, but has had a lasting impact on
every use of the U.S. military since that time
 The cost to the American people was dramatic: 50k plus deaths
4/1/02
The Navy under Carter, Reagan and Bush: the pinnacle of the cold war (1977-1991)
US/Soviet naval comparisons:
 Differing naval pollicies/priorities
 Geography:
 U.S. was a maritime power
 Soviet union was a continental power
 Internal defense priorities
 U.S. navy versus U.S. army/air force
 Soviet navy versus army/air force/ rocket forces
 Perceived threats:
 U.S. had peaceful and stable borders
 The soviets have historically had unfriendly or unstable borders and have been
repeatedly invaded
 Naval background
 The US was an “old navy” which emerged form WWII with overwhelming naval
mastery built primarily on carriers
 Soviets were a “new navy”, avoiding expensive and dated strategies and weapons
systems. They rejected the carrier as a viable ship
 Economic approach to shipbuilding:
 U.S. ships: few in number with high technology and minimal personnel
 Soviet ships: numerous but austere, with improving technology
 Naval configuration:
 Navies configured for different wars
 U.S. configured for long war in remote locations: adept in UNREP and stressed
those type of vessels
 Soviets configured for short war near their own borders/coasts: soviet ships armed
to the teeth with huge missiles
 Surface combatants (1970s)
 Surface combatants: U.S.: 217; USSR 446
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 Soviets lower technology but greater quantity
 Soviets led every category except carriers
 Sea-based aircraft: U.S. 1500; USSR: 50
 Aircraft carriers: U.S.: 21; USSR 3
 Amphibious forces: U.S. 85; USSR: 36
 Logistic support: U.S. led due to priorities
Submarines:
 Nuclear: U.S. 109; USSR 142
 Diesel: U.S. 10; USSR 152
 U.S. quieter with better ASW and sonar
 ASW: USSR again had larger fleet but U.S. had superior quality and technology,
especially in ASW aircraft (P-3, S-3, H-2)
 Quality of personnel:
 U.S. better paid volunteers
 USSR still used conscription, low personnel support and comfort resulted in
low number of re-enlistments
 Anti-ship missiles:
 Complete soviet superiority in number and quality. fired by all platforms
Maritime resources:
 Merchant fleet: U.S: 900; USSR: 2400
 Soviet merchant fleet was part of navy
 U.S. merchant fleet not even part of DoD
 Soviets great superiority in SS’s gave them great ability to interdict shipping
The Carter administration:
 Political climate of 76:
 Aftermath of Vietnam war: support of defense budget was political suicide
 Watergate led to distrust of republicans
 Democrat Jimmy Carter elected President (77-81)
 Ideals and plans:
 Navy anticipated support form USNA graduate
 Carter wanted to reduce the size of government
 U.S. support was tied to moral and Humanitarian issues
 Former GA governor had little experience in foreign affairs and world politics
 Plans did not include world leadership from strength
 Decline of the navy under Carter:
 Carter inherited a congressional and popular anti-military attitude that made it
very difficult to win large naval appropriations from congress even had he
intended to do so
 He also inherited a reduced navy composed of older ships, the result of deferring
shipbuilding during the Vietnam War.
 Carter’s naval policy:
 The president did not support naval expansion, and he allowed congress to delete
funds
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A fourth Nimitz class carrier finally added to budget in 1980
His five year building programs were extremely austere, and congress finally
added three billion to Carter’s naval request for 81
He de-emphasized the “presence” mission of the navy
He limited the conceptual basis for the Navy’s size to plans for SLOC protection
and support of the major U.S. commitments to Europe and Japan
The Iranian crisis (78-81) forced Carter to send warships to the Arabian sea and
Indian ocean, and in 1980 his administration created the rapid deployment Joint
task force (RDJTF), out of existing assets leading to extremely long at-sea periods
The failed attempt to rescue the hostages in Iran (April, 1980) involved navy
helicopters and the USS Nimitz, but the problems stemmed from the creation of
an ad hoc force that had no integrated experience.
Raised serious questions about Military readiness
Charred remains of Americans killed in failed rescue attempt displayed
The soviet union ignores Carter’s warning and invaded Afghanistan
Soviets reject Carter’s TV demand to withdraw soviet troops in Cuba.
Carter’s foreign policy education is very costly to U.S. prestige and the navy.
The Reagan years:
 Strong supporter of world leadership from strength
 Determined to rebuild the military
 Named John Lehman as secretary of the navy
 Maritime superiority and nothing less
 Planned to spend 1.5 trillion for defense
World events under Reagan:
 Iranian hostages released in Jan of 81
 Libya and the Gulf of Sidra: Aug 1981
 Sixth fleet supports “freedom of the seas” principle
 Grenada: 10/25-11/2 1983
 Operation Urgent Fury
 Checked soviet influence in the Caribbean
SECNAV John Lehman:
 “Rickover firing”
 Lehman determined to end the Rickover (nuclear community) dominance of the
navy and tighten his control over the navy
 Lehman, a NR aviator, viewed the navy as being dominated by engineers which
hindered conceptual thought and strategic planning
 Rickover was finally pushed aside in January of 82; however, Opposition to
Lehman by Navy’s senior admirals lasted well past this date.
 Battleship Band-Aid
 Reactivated four Iowa Class battleships
 Cheap and quick way to add significant ability to the fleet
 Completed ahead of schedule and under budget
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Revamping U.S. naval strategy:
 Lehman established and chaired navy policy board which included CNO ADM
James Watkins and Marine Commandant GEN P.X. Kelly
 Goal of six hundred ship navy established as republican policy platform “plank”
 Policy board produced the “maritime strategy”
 Main tenet: 600 ship navy with CVBGs as centerpiece
 Offensive in outlook: designed to press home attacks against soviet naval
forces and homeland bases
 Forward deployed forces, principally CVBGs were key to the strategy
 Criticisms of the maritime strategy:
 Could be very costly in terms of carrier and aircraft losses
 Difficult to keep SLOCs open with bulk of fleet concentrated for the
forward offensive battle
 Potentially provocative in destabilizing nuclear balance; thereby triggering
nuclear exchange
Interventionism:
 Responses to terrorism gave Lehman an opportunity to test and refine the carrier
centered doctrine
 Lehman used the December 1983 air strikes in Lebanon as the Catalyst to show the
world his concept of an aviation-centered organization
 The strike on Libya was the first use of the SECNAV’s new weapon, later refined by
Persian gulf operations
The post-Lehman navy:
 Still built around the big-deck carrier
 Dominated by the carrier aviation and nuclear submarine communities
 Question for the future: size and composition of surface fleet in an era of shrinking
appropriations
 Desert Shield/Desert Storm gave a very temporary respite to congressional fundslashing
4/3/02
The Soviet Navy
Why do we still study soviet/Russian security policy?
 Nuclear weapons issues
 Still the largest naval and merchant fleet in the world
 Volatility, political instability, Zhirinovsky factor
 Review U.S. naval policy in light of soviet developments during the cold war
Views of Gorbachev’s revolutionary foreign policy:
 “New thinking” which reflect current Russian policies
 Pessimist view
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Russian military, foreign policy, and arms control moves are impelled by
weakness.
 Soviet leaders are hoping for a “Peredyshka” or breathing space
 Historical parallel with the “new economic policy” of the 1920s and a return to
limited capitalism
 Revitalize industry and appease internal dissension while establishing foundations
for future buildup
 Weaken western security ties, forces, and alliances, through lessening perception
of threat
 Eventual return to confrontation; dispute among western analysts over ideological
versus nationalist motivations
 Naval fore levels will remain relatively high
Optimist view
 Broad recognition among Russian/soviet elite of the failure of communism or the
“ideology is dead”
 Internally Russia is moving towards a western style democracy
 In foreign policy, Russia now seeks a stable international order and western
economic aid
 Russia had abandoned (if it every possessed) its expansionist aims review
paranoia claims and fear of invasion due to history
 Russian naval force levels are likely to continue to be drastically cut
Agnostic view
 Russian policy is in a state of drift
 Until a new national or leadership consensus is formed, no cohesion is likely in
soviet policy
 Naval programs and policies are likely to continue by momentum, checked only
by budgetary considerations
Geographical factors retarding the growth of Russian sea power:
 Northern location has meant severe problems with ice and bad weather
 The country has relatively few ports and only Murmansk has both interior
communications and direct access to the open ocean.
 The widely separated ocean fronts require fragmented fleets with varying
compositions
 The same factors have hampered development of merchant fleets
Historical factors:
 Russians originally were not a seafaring people
 Efforts by Tsar “Ivan the Terrible” to build a navy abandoned after Sweden expelled
Russians from the Baltic
 Permanent maritime access was not obtained until Peter the Great’s capture of Azov
and the building of St Petersburg on the Neva marshes
 After various military or political setbacks, Russia partially lost access to the Black
Sea.
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The lower educational and cultural level of the Russian/soviet naval personnel made
them less effective, relative to western navies
Primary interests of the soviet state from 45-91
 Protection and preservation of the soviet government and party rule within the soviet
union
 Protection of the territory of the Soviet Union and its buffer client states
 Fostering the extension of friendly socialist systems and support for allied client
states. Expanding their own influence using “wars of national liberation”
 Export of socialist/communist revolution
 Consonance of these objectives with soviet naval hardware, the soviet navy was the
product of these interests
Analysis of the soviet navy:
 Capability analysis: study of naval hardware
 Building programs/dates
 Mirror imaging
 Operations/exercise analysis
 Will they fight? How they train?
 Naval presence versus naval warfare
Soviet naval missions:
 Strategic strike
 Since 63 this has been the main mission of the soviet navy. In 66, Gorshkov stated
“nuclear powered subs equipped with ballistic missiles have now become the
main force of the navy”
 Over 40 percent of the Soviet navy’s construction effort since 1966 went to
SSBNs.
 An increasing emphasis is placed on the DELTA and TYPHOON classes, which
are safer because their missile ranges permit them to remain in “bastions”
adjacent to home waters. The shorter ranged YANKEE class has been phased out
or converted to attack/cruise missile subs
 The soviet union also attaches importance to air and surface protection of its
SSBNs in “bastions” this “pro SSBN” mission was primary for many soviet naval
forces
 There is an ongoing debate among western analysts as to the wartime targeting of
soviet SLBMs. it illustrates the “mirror image” fallacy, for in fact the soviet union
does not necessarily intend to use its weapons in ways the U.S. would.
 Strategic defense
 The soviet navy attaches high priority to the defense of the USSR from SLBM
attack. Its exact priority, and the level of confidence the soviet it navy places on
being able to carry out this mission, remains unclear. This was the number one
priority until the mid-sixties.
 It is this mission which offers the greatest advantages to the soviet navy in
furthering its own institutional interests
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There are significant differences among western observers over the extent to
which soviet blue water operations since the mid 60s have an anti-SSBN mission.
Most agree that the tremendous technological hurdles and scope of an anti-SSBN
ASW makes this a difficult mission for the soviet navy to fulfill. This is a possible
explanation for the shift to strategic strike as primary mission
 The strategic defense mission caused a further extension of the soviet defense
perimeter based on increased sustainability
Defense against maritime attack
 The priority the soviet navy ahs given this mission has varied over time
 After WWII, its objective was to ensure the soviet navy’s ability to protect against
the tremendous amphibious assault capabilities demonstrated b y the U.S. during
WWII, especially in the pacific
 The development of large numbers of small missile boats (Osa, Komar,
Nanuchka, Tarantul classes) indicate the priority of this mission
 After 52, the U.S. navy’s efforts to guarantee itself a nuclear mission resulted in
the savage and the Skywarrior aircraft. This refocused soviet concern on the
mission of maritime defense
 The USSR answered with missile-firing ships. Navla missiles were nuclear
capable
 The Badger and Bear D aircraft were also assigned this mission
 The soviet defense perimeter moved to 1.5k mile to meet the U.S. navy carriers
 Efforts devoted to Charlie II and Oscar subs and the Backfire bombers indicate
the continued goal of striking at U.S. carriers. It is difficult, at increased ranges
from the USSR, to separate “maritime defense of the homeland” from an as yet
unarticulated “sea control”
Maritime interdiction
 The priority attached by the USSR to cutting western maritime routes is an issue f
controversy among naval analysts. Many assert, based on the size of the large
soviet submarine force, but without other direct evidence, that it ahs a very high
(although not top) priority
 It had low priority during the Khrushchev era, since there was no soviet belief in
the likelihood of a sustained east-west conflict
 The chief value of a sub anti-shipping campaign might be that of distracting and
diverting the west, and especially U.S. ASW assets
 This mission might offer strategic leverage (threaten oil shipping routes).
 Land-based strike aircraft, e.g. backfire, also have a key role in this mission area
Protection of shipping
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Amphibious warfare
Naval diplomacy
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4/05/02
Protection of shipping
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The USSR without extensive road and rail systems is still dependent on shipping for
internal transportation, especially during wartime. Soviet shipping is especially
important and vulnerable in the Baltic. Since the single rail Trans-Siberian railroad
cannot carry all the required goods to the Far east, the SLOC through the Indian
Ocean to Vladivostok and Petropovlovsk is increasingly important
The USSR in recent years has built up huge merchant and fishing fleets, which in
times or regions of instability will need protection
Amphibious warfare:
 WWII amphibious operations were a useful adjunct to major soviet ground
campaigns. Gorshkov distinguished himself in a series of amphibious operations
between 42-44 on the Black sea coast
 With Khrushchev’s departure in 64, the naval infantry was reactivated. Since the mid
sixties, several important amphibious exercises have been held
 The dominant emphasis in this mission is that of tactical Baltic area operations,
offering support to westward advancing ground troops.
 The northern fleet conducts amphibious operations near the Norwegian border. The
pacific fleet has a high share of amphibious warships. The soviets never attached the
same importance to power projection that we did
Naval diplomacy:
 The number of soviet naval ship visits greatly increased over two decades, especially
in the Med, Caribbean, and Indian Ocean areas until 86. They eventually included a
75 Boston, 83 Norfolk, and in 1990 San Diego ship visit
 They conducted joint exercises with Cuba, Vietnam, and its Warsaw pact allies
Soviet/Russian naval history:
 Tsarist navy in the Russian revolution
 The mutiny on the cruiser “Potemkin” in the black Sea in 1906
 The Cruiser Aurora’s role and fame
 The 1918 Ice Cruise of the Baltic Fleet
 Loss of the remainder of the fleet to the Whites
 Naval infantry in the Russian civil war.
 1921 Kronstadt mutiny shakes perception of the Navy’s political reliability
 Steady weakening of the navy through the twenties due to the aftermath of the
mutiny, poor condition of the ships, and other economic priorities by the
communist leadership
Old school strategy:
 Former Tsarist philosophy
 Push to rehabilitate older bigger ships
 Persistence of Mahanian “command of the sea” thinking, partially due to continuity
of officer personnel, especially on the naval staff and schools
 England was seen as the naval power to be feared
 Upkeep efforts were concentrated on the Baltic fleet, site of the surviving ships
 Lack of budgetary support kept the navy in a weak position
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Concentration of assets diverted to coastal defense efforts
The strategy of “active defense”, a type of offensive defense, was persistent in soviet
naval thinking (as it is today).
Discredited by Stalin in 1928, with the first five year plan
Young school strategy:
 Antithesis of “old school” strategy
 Marxist-Leninist principle of unified command meant coordinating army/navy
operations (subordinating navy to Red Army operations)
 BBs useless (too expensive?) (Industrial inadequacies?)
 Emphasis was on submarines: largest force in the world by 1937
 Bulk of defense spending allocated to the land forces
 During the twenties and early thirties, the USSR did not pursue a balanced fleet
strategy, as did the U.S.
 Embarrassment during the Spanish civil war; the impotence of soviet naval power to
protect shipments to the Republicans presaged the 1962 experience in Cuba
 Awareness of inferiority prompted the unusual proposal of joint fleet maneuvers in
the Baltic with the British and French in 1939
Stalinist strategy:
 Stalin moved slowly to the balanced fleet concept, but not to a blue water fleet
 The move was cautious at first, but more insistent after the purges of the later thirties
 The second five-year plan (33-37) began the modernization of older surface forces;
the third five-year plan reinforced this thinking and tendency. A long term plan for
naval development adopted
 Shipyard improvements and industrial expansions supported this development plan
 Aircraft carriers were included in the original plan but construction never began,
owing to resource constraints and a lack of suitable ports and the operating areas,
particularly in the Baltic. Coastal aviation was envisioned as protecting fleet units
 Goals of this expanding navy were never made clear by Stalin. His motives may have
been deterrence and prestige, but his autocratic control over strategy meant that he
never had to explain himself.
 Stalin seems to have had little intention of operating his fleets in wartime in a
strategically offensive manner
Factors in Stalin’s decision to build a balanced fleet:
 The rise of expansionist militarism in Japan and Germany, which pointed to an early
outbreak of war
 After the expiration of the Washington Naval Conference Treaty in 1936, Germany
and Japan began putting emphasis on large ship construction
 His humiliating experience in the Spanish Civil War, where he was shown to be
impotent in the Med.
 The 1936 London Conference showed Stalin that the western powers were
unimpressed by a navy having its primary strength in subs
 As in all other areas, Stalin considered himself to be a superior naval strategist
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His shift in policy was facilitated by massive purges of naval personnel; the slightest
hint of opposition to Stalin meant death
Soviet navy in WWII:
 The new navy was caught between the old and the new schools, had no carriers or
modern BBs, and had been weakened by purges of senior leadership and officer corps
in the late thirties
 It had three pre WWI BBs, 10 cruisers, sixty six destroyers, 218 submarines (the
world’s largest underwater fleet)
 Immediately preceding the German invasion, Stalin ordered no response to attack
other than direct self-defense. Navy therefore was not allowed to prevent massive
mining of the Baltic and black sea operating areas
 Soviet naval forces were relegated to coastal defense, and so came under the
operational control of army commanders
 The Front commanders had control of local units
 The main role of the pacific fleet was as a deterrent to Japanese naval attack (Japan
and the USSR had a non aggression pact which dated from thirty nine)
 The Baltic, black, and northern fleets all saw combat, albeit primarily in coastal
operations
 The Baltic and black sea fleets each were reduced to a single port
 The war experience provided lessons in the necessity of air cover and gunfire support
for amphibious operations
 Russian commanders received little deep water combat experience in the war
 With 20m dead after the war, millions more in exile, and much of the country
devastated by German occupation, all able bodied workers were taken out of the navy
and assigned to civil service
Stalinist postwar period
 After the war, Stalin continued with his idea of a large balanced fleet, although he
now was facing an opponent with overwhelming naval superiority
 Construction of BBs was retained in soviet naval planning until Stalin’s death in 53
 As before the war, the balanced fleet seemed intended for deterrence and overseas
stuff
 After Stalin’s death, Gorshkov notes the fallacy of assuming that a maritime enemy
would be willing to fight in well-defended inshore areas of soviet choosing
 The Cruiser/destroyer shipbuilding program was quickly altered to emphasize subs,
aircraft, and light and fast surface forces (missile boats). Carriers were dismissed as
ineffective in the missile age
 In 55 Gorshkov was ordered to the position of Deputy Commander in Chief of the
soviet navy, due to his having impressed Khrushchev with his idea of building lots of
small ships
4/8/02
Khrushchev era:
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As early as 1956 Khrushchev had declared the unsuitability of large ships, other than
to carry statesmen to conferences.
The soviet navy faced a struggle with missile enthusiasts to save itself from virtual
dissolution, in a parallel with the Unification debate in the U.S. (1947-50).
The soviet navy saves itself by joining the missile enthusiasts. Formation of a new
“soviet school” similar to the prewar “Young school” but emphasized missile
weaponry and nuclear weapons.
High cost of CVBGs probably were less a consideration than belief by Khrushchev
and General staff that superiority over the United States in the nuclear confrontation
was the only meaningful military goal. Khrushchev greatly increased funding for
Ballistic missiles and air defense.
A deterrent/defensive submarine based naval strategy emerged
Gorshkov succeeded in keeping Sverdlov class large cruisers alive as missile
platforms and for naval presence.
Gorshkov (commander in chief of the soviet navy until 1985) accelerates nuclear
research efforts, culminating in the November class subs that go to sea in 1959
followed by the Echo and hotel classes.
Pinnacle of the soviet navy:
 Admiral Gorshkov with the support of Leonid Brezhnev make soviet navy a “blue
water” fleet capable of supporting soviet policies globally
 Dramatically increased at sea operations in the 60s
 Particular emphasis on politico-economic crisis in the Mediterranean and Indian
ocean (1967 war, 1970 Jordanian Crisis, 1973 Yom Kippur War, and 1965 Angolan
civil war)
 Operations:
 Submarines:
 Marked increase in activity of all classes: torpedo, cruise missile, and ballistic
missile (SSBN)
 Yankee and Delta SSBNs brought much of U.S. into nuclear range
 Analogous response of Echo II deployments off the U.S. coast when Pershing
II and cruise missiles deployed to Europe in 1983
 Mediterranean was the area of most significant and dramatically increased soviet
operations, giving soviets a wide variety of politico-military options, although
there were also increased operations in the Caribbean and Indian Ocean.
 Soviet influence in the third world:
 Highlight soviet use of bases in Yemen and use of former U.S. facilities at
Cam Ranh Bay SRV.
 AGI were surveillance ships of U.S. carrier battle groups and submarine ports.
The end of the cold war:
 In November of 88, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher declared that after forty-two
years the cold war was over. It was not until 1991 that the world fully agreed.
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In 85, Gorbachev comes to power and beings programs of “perestroika” (reforms)
and “glasnost” (opening [of the nation]). In 1987, the “new thinking” in foreign
policy begins.
In 89 free elections oust most of the communist governments in Eastern Europe.
Gorbachev doesn’t intervene to stop the “velvet revolutions” in support of his clients.
Soviet troops do not move into Poland as they had in Hungary in 56 and
Czechoslovakia in 68
In November of 1989, the Berlin Wall is breached. By October 1990, the “Genscher
Plan” reunites East and West Germany.
In 1991, the Warsaw pact and the organization for economic cooperation and
assistance among communist nations (COMECON) dissolve, Gorbachev concludes
the strategic arms reduction treaty (START) and the conventional forces in Europe
(CFE) arms reductions pacts with the U.S., which were disproportionate to the U.S.
reductions
The soviet forces came home from 12 years in Afghanistan without a victory
Gorbachev establishes a defensive military doctrine
In august 1991 rightist coup fails, but brings the ultimate collapse of the Soviet
Union
Who won the cold war?
 Gorbachev’s personal characteristics deserve much but not all of the credit. After a
series of aging leaders in ill health (Brezhnev, Andropov, Chernenko), he was a
vigorous skilled politician committed to reform the stagnant centrally controlled
economy.
 The burden of military spending bore down ever more painfully on soviet living
standards, as did soviet expenditures to prop up client states like Cuba and Nicaragua.
Ronald Reagan’s military renewal (actually began in the last year of the Carter
administration), including the 600-ship navy and the array of high tech weaponry
further taxed the soviet ability to keep pace.
 The information revolution could not be stopped by the iron curtain. In the 1980s
most east Germans could regularly watch West German television. The Helsinki
Human rights accords of 75 forced communist governments to tolerate more dissident
movements. Technological change made it impossible for communist governments to
insulate their people from world developments.
 The access to western trade and technology was more important to Gorbachev than
continuing support of “wars of national liberation” and continuing with a foreign
policy averse to the “western imperialists”
 Revisionists argue that containment did not defeat the soviet system, but the system
eventually defeated itself.
The Russian navy today (1980-91):
 Significant diversity and improvement in capabilities of warships, aircraft, and
weapons
 Large increases in operations far distant from soviet shores beginning in the early
sixties until 1985 and Gorbachev comes to power and Gorshkov is retired. Since 85, a
reduction in out-of-area (OOA) ship days in every area except the Persian Gulf where
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convoy escort operations have caused increased presence. Soviets remove submarines
from the Indian Ocean.
Commitment by soviets to a navy “second to none”
Soviet appreciation of political value of a large, modern navy remains unchanged.
Surface combatants: large number of frigates; fast, heavily armed, long range,
electronically sophisticated ships; emphasis on cruise missiles for armament
continues on newest classes.
Submarines: still the world’s leader in numbers 1989 saw 98 new boats from five
classes produced
Aviation: sea based, fixed wing aircraft (Mig-29 and SU-27) on carriers. Backfire
bombers; ASW helicopters and aircraft
Soviet exercises: increased complexity and distance from home water (e.g. Okean,
1970 and 1975); no major exercises since 1980
The soviet/Russians who had long been reluctant to ever throw anything away began
to retire older classes of ships and sell them as scrap to other nations
Today:
 Limited open ocean ASW capability
 Underway replenishment capability still lags behind
 Inadequate sea based tactical air forces
 Geographical constraints limiting access to open ocean have not changed
 August 1991 coup: Chernavin will not support the Putsch and is retained
 1991: Ukraine’s president Kravchuk fights for a percentage of the Black Sea fleet.
Georgia wants a piece of the Caspian Sea flotilla.
 Control of nuclear weapons becomes an issue
 Joint CIS (commonwealth of independent states) lasts less than one year as a
political organization. It still exists on paper for positive control of nuclear
weapons.
4/10/02
The Gulf War: The influence of Sea Power on a Desert Victory
There are three things that we should know from this lecture:
 Why did Saddam Hussein invade Kuwait
 Possible reasons:
 Dispute over Warbah and Bubiyan islands. Without the control over these
islands, he would be essentially landlocked, and would not be able to get his
oil to market.
 Border disputes
 There was a shared oil field that was involved in the border disputes
 There was a huge debt that had to be paid off from the Iraq-Iran War
 The Shatt al Arab is the navigable part of the Tigress-Euphrates that empties
into the Persian Gulf. Iran does not let the Iraqi’s navigate this part to get its
oil out, making the Warbah and Bubiyan islands critical to Iraq’s economy.
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The importance of coalition building, and from Iraq’s point of view, how do you
attack the coalition
How do maritime forces influence the battlefield in what is principally a ground war?
In 1980, the Shah of Iran falls to the radical Muslim groups, with the Ayatollah taking
power. The embassy in Tehran is taken over, and our people are taken captive. America
now hates Iran. Saddam Hussein attacks Iran at this point, leading to eight years of
combat. It was a nasty war, what with chemical weapons being used. During this war, we
support Iraq. The animosity between Iran and the rest of the Muslim world is centuries
old because the Iranians are Persians, whereas the Muslims are Arabs.
There are two branches of the Muslim religion:
 The Sunnis are from Saudi Arabia and consider themselves to be the keepers of the
true Islam
 The Shiites are from the Persian regions. These two groups don’t like each other for
ethnic, rather than religious reasons.
Invasion of Kuwait:
 Late July: troops massed at the Kuwait border
 U.S. did not expect an invasion
 U.S. ambassador received a promise from Hussein of no attack
 8/2/1990
 at one o’clock in the morning, three tank divisions take Kuwait
 amphibious assaults against the Emir’s palace and key facilities
 the invasion did not take a long time, as Kuwait is not large
 Emir escaped and a large portion of Kuwaiti funds were electronically transferred
out of the country.
 By the next day, Iraqi tanks are sitting on the Kuwait Saudi border, which makes
us nervous.
 U.S. military reaction:
 At two o’clock in the morning on the 2nd of august CVBG in Indian ocean
ordered to gulf of Oman
 CVBG in Med ordered to eastern Med in preparation for entering the Red Sea
 CVBG later positioned to Persian gulf and red sea
 Until this time, we had never had a CVBG in the Persian Gulf.
 SECDEF Cheney’s meetings with Saudi Arabia resulted in agreement that
U.S. would provide forces to defend Saudi Arabia and would leave the
Kingdom when the job was done. Diplomatic negotiations began to enlist
worldwide condemnation and organization of the coalition.
 Overall concern/fear: Iraq would continue aggression and take over all of the Saudi
peninsula; thereby controlling forty percent of the oil resources in the world
 UN reaction: condemned the invasion and demanded withdrawal. On 8/6 trade and
financial embargoes were imposed. With embargo in place, the navy can now start
doing Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO)
Even an ARG in-between Iraqi forces and Saudi Arabia, it would just be like a speed
bump in their path.
The coalition:
 Nearly fifty countries made a contribution.
 38 countries deployed air, sea or ground forces
 Coalition members, other than the U.S.: provided 54b of the estimated 61b in costs.
About 2/3 of this was from the gulf states
 the U.S., UK, France, and Canada sent naval support the first week
 Italy, Spain, Germany, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and turkey provide bases
 Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria commit noncombatant
military units and humanitarian assistance
 Gulf cooperation council (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, Oman, and
Kuwait) provided access to bases and logistic assistance
 Despite traditional Islamic political religious ties, Egypt regarded attack as a breach
of faith and provided troops and acted as a center for Kuwaiti exiles. Also allowed
passage of allied naval units through the Suez Canal. Syria and Morocco also
deployed troops to Saudi Arabia
 Jordan and Iran: officially neutral; did not adhere to economic sanctions; smuggled
across borders. Jordan’s actions resulted in a coalition naval unit trade embargo of the
red sea port of Aqaba
 Supporters of Iraq: Yemen and Sudan
Israel:
 Maintained a low profile
 Did not respond to scud attacks
 U.S. placed patriot missile batteries in Israel for defense against scuds
 If Israel got into the war, the Arab states would have broken the coalition, and
Saddam’s enemies would have shattered.
Iraqi occupation:
 Republican guard units eventually withdrawn to border, replaced by Popular army
and regular army units
 They committed many atrocities against the Kuwaitis. They violated the Geneva
Convention often.
 Westerners in Kuwait and Iraq were taken as hostages and used as human shields
against attack (ultimately freed in December)
 Iraq conducted environmental terrorism by releasing millions of gallons of oil into the
Persian gulf and setting fire to Kuwaiti oil fields
Operation desert Shield:
 Coalition objectives:
 Withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait
 Restoration of Kuwait’s legitimate government
 Security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the Persian gulf
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U.S. national policy objectives:
 Destruction of weapons of mass destruction
Defend coastal area in Saudi Arabia:
 Needed for a buildup
 Needed to ensure Saudi oil continued to flow
Naval role in desert shield:
 First on scene, CVBG and JTF middle east
 Provided power projection and strike capability
 The initial force equalizer
 MIO ops commenced upon UN approval of the trade embargo (8/6/1990)
 ARG –Marine forces (defense and amphibious assault threat)
 Maritime prepositioning ships deployment
 Ready reserve fleet ships activated and fast sealift ships began loading army units
 95 percent of all equipment went by sea
 carrier air wings and marine aircraft wings aided in the achieving and maintaining air
supremacy in Saudi airspace
 SEAL special forces operated behind enemy lines and conducted amphibious
invasion deceptions
Operation desert storm:
 Four phased campaign:
 Phase I: strategic air campaign
 Targets were selected long beforehand. it was designed to confuse and scare
the Iraqi leadership, as well as destroy air defense infrastructure
 Phase II: air supremacy in Theater
 This took about two weeks. It involved completely destroying the air defense
system and the Iraqi airforce.
 Phase III: Battlefield preparations
 This is attacking the Iraqi lines on the Kuwaiti-Saudi border.
 Phase IV: Offensive ground campaign
 It takes 100 hours
 1/3 of the aircraft in the war were navy
 we had three CVs in the operation
 The most important contribution from the navy to the ground campaign was
amphibious warfare. We convinced Hussein that we were going to do an amphibious
assault on his flank, bogging down three Iraqi divisions in Kuwait while we did our
left hook into Iraq.
Marine contribution to the ground campaign:
 Two infantry divisions were involved.
 They liberated Kuwait
Conclusions:
 We only lost 313 people, and most were friendly fire
 The combined coalition forces had won the fight
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Ready land bases may not always be available, reinforcing the importance of the
navy-marine corps team
4/12/02
U.S. naval strategy in the post-cold war era
During the Reagan administration, there was the maritime strategy. There was the “from
the sea” strategy in ’92, and then later the “forward … from the sea”
Throughout the twentieth century, our strategy was primarily command of the sea and
Mahanian engagements.
The maritime strategy:
 Developed in the mid 80s by SECNAV Lehman, with CNO ADM Watkins and
marine commandant General Kelly
 The blueprint for actions of the “six hundred ship navy” which was a priority of the
Reagan
 Governed naval planning through Reagan’s admin
 Established maritime role in the national strategies of the U.S.
 Presupposed an era of violent peace
 Took into account soviet strategies
 Spectrum:
 Covered the whole spectrum of potential conflict
 Peacetime presence (putting a CV in the gulf, showing the flag)
 Crisis response (responding to a crisis (Libya with the terrorists in 86)
 War fighting
 Phase I: deterrence/transition to war
 Phase II: seizing the initiative
 Phase III: carrying the fight to the enemy
 War termination
 Discussed general operations in execution of the strategy
 Presented arguments supporting the strategy and its force structure
requirements
 The amphibious warfare strategy
 The 600 ship navy rationale
 Summary:
 It was a part of the national strategy of deterrence
 It had broad framework, allowing you to structure a number of different scenarios
into it. It was very versatile and malleable
 It necessitated support by a fleet capable of sailing to any ocean in sufficient force
to act as a deterrent.
 If deterrence fails, it has to be capable of fighting to an outcome favorable to the
U.S.
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The end of the cold war removed the justification previously provided by the
soviet navy for maintaining a strategy of maintaining command of the sea
From the sea:
 With the dissolution of the soviet union and the breakup of the soviet navy that began
in 89, the USN was left without a relevant strategy
 In 1992, from the sea came out.
 It was much more littoral focused.
 There was no major enemy navy
 The primary aim now was to protect the areas bordering the oceans and major seas
containing the bulk of the world’s population and trade that are vital to the political
and economic well being of the U.S., its allies, and coalition and trading partners.
 The secondary aim was to insure that the U.S. remained the prime promoter of
democracy abroad
 Potential enemies would be a whole lot weaker than the soviet navy, but their low
tech mines, land based missiles, and deadly combatant small craft posed serious
threats to U.S. national interests
 To meet these threats, the strategy retained the blue water capabilities, but also
created a highly capable maneuver force tailored for forward deployed peacetime
operations, crisis reaction, and conflict
 The USN and the Marine Corps participating as near-equals would shape these new
forces, and the coast guard would also become increasingly important.
 Reserve personnel are very important in the strategy, because of base closures and the
changing of the force structure.
 The strategy does not address weapons systems comprising this new force structure,
and this omission reflected the historic difficulty in effecting any restructuring that
reduced the relative importance of aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines in the
Navy’s arsenal
 It reflected the fiscal reality of downsizing mandated by Congress and the new
administration of President Bill Clinton. It also reflected a temporary eclipse of the
authority of the CNO and ascendancy of the commandant of the Marine Corps
occasioned by the Navy’s preoccupation with minimizing the adverse publicity
emanating from the notorious “Tail Hook” scandal
“Forward from the sea”
 By 1994 the downsizing had run its relatively short and mild course and the “tail
hook” episode had become largely a thing of the past. The Navy then attempted t
resurrect a more sea-oriented strategy. This new doctrine contained in “Forward..
from the sea” was a clear attempt to minimize the appearance of doctrinal
retrogression
 We proceed cautiously so as to not jeopardize our readiness for the full spectrum of
missions and functions for which we are responsible.
 The new strategic doctrine stresses the main role of the navy: to fight and win wars
 In situations short of war, the navy’s strategy “is to be engaged in forward areas, with
the objectives of preventing conflicts and controlling crises”
 The basic building blocks of this strategy are CVBGs and ARGs.
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Peacetime forward presence has been demonstrated in Somalia, Haiti, Cuba, and
Bosnia as well as our continuous enforcement of the UN sanctions against Iraq
Conclusions:
 The 1990s constitute a time of great volatility in international affairs, and the
conforming guidelines of the cold war (45-89) offer little or no help in charting the
current and future foreign policy of the U.S.
 As a direct result of the radical alteration in the global foreign policy environment,
U.S. national military and naval strategies are in a state of flux
 Expect more revisions to “forward …from the sea”
4/15/02
The future of Sea power
Current situation:
1997 QDR (quadrennial defense review) force:
 12 CV/CVN BG
 11 active CV/CVN and 1 reserve/training carrier
 10 CVWs
 12 ARGs
 50 SSN’s
 14 SSBN’s
 116 surface warships
 carrier centric
 crisis response
 forward deployed
 overtasked
 estimated need of 68-71 SSNs needed for current obligations
 current development programs:
 DDG-21 Zumwalt class
 Two teams: blue and gold
 Land attack destroyer
 CG-21 further down the development road
 AEGIS
 LPD-17
 Behind schedule
 Improved amphibious design
 Replacement for older amphibious ships.
 SSGN
 Ohio class submarines available due to treaties for nuclear disarmament
 Expensive to convert without leaving NBM capability
 7 tomahawks per tube: 156 total/boat
 also have SEAL capabilities. Two tubes will be set aside for only SEAL stuff.
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Virginia class SSN
 Replaces the LA class
 Electric drive eventually
 UAV and UUV
JSF
 USN replacement for the F-14/18
 USMC replacement for the AV-8
 Competing designs by Lockheed and Boeing
Multi-mission aircraft
 Replaces the P-3, EP-3 and maybe C-130
 Four possible plans
CVX-1
Future?
 Cruise missile centered
 How many ships are enough
 What are our goals:
 2 regional conflict force
 forward deployments