Download “More a series of separate regional conflicts than a single global war

“More a series of separate regional conflicts than a single global war.” How far do you agree with
this view of the Korean War and the Cuban Missile Crisis?
This statement implies that the Korean War and the Cuban Missile Crisis both came about
primarily because of conflicting local agendas, rather than because they were part of the larger,
globalised Cold War. It also implies that the two were wholly unrelated, instead of being part of the
continuing conflict between the two Cold War parties. However, I disagree with the statement
because in actual fact, the Korean War and the Cuban Missile crisis were both Cold War conflicts to
varying degrees and neither was more a local conflict than part of the Cold War.
In Korea, the conflict was initiated by the ambitions of the two Korean leaders, and the Cold
War powers were both initially reluctant to actively endorse their military agendas. In early 1950,
Kim Il Sung said to Soviet ambassador Shytkov, “I can’t sleep at night because I am thinking of the
unification of the whole country. If the cause…is postponed, then I may lose the confidence of the
Korean people.” Syngman Rhee, on his part, tried to rally American support for the South Korean
cause. In the autumn of 1949 Rhee stated, “I am sure that we could take Pyongyang…in three days.
And an all-Korean border with Manchuria would be easier to defend than the 38th parallel.” In 1950,
when John Foster Dulles visited Korea, Rhee dwelled on the topics of a North Korean attack and US
protection. Refusing to allow Dulles to evade the topic, Rhee kept asking, “But what if there is an
attack?” The evasive stance Dulles took towards Rhee was characteristic of the initial American
attitude towards Korean talk of war. In 1949 the US reduced aid and pulled their troops out of South
Korea in an attempt to restrain Rhee from mobilizing forces against the North. This reticent attitude
towards Korean conflict was mirrored on the part of the Soviets. In March 1949, Stalin said, “The 38th
parallel must be peaceful. It is very important.” He also rejected requests for permission to attack
the South on at least two occasions in the same year. It follows, then, that in the beginning the
initiative for the Korean War came from the North and South, straining at the leashes by which the
two Cold War superpowers held them.
Once it became clear, however, to America and Russia, that there was something at stake (in
Cold War terms), they both became active and willing participants in the war. Russia, needing to
recover from the fiasco of the Berlin Blockade, realized that there was a political victory to be gained
in Korea. With the newfound confidence lent by the atomic bomb (developed in 1949), and the
assurance of a communist ally in the Chinese, Stalin opportunistically seized the opening Kim
presented to him. If this venture in Korea succeeded, the Russians would gain a strategic hold in East
Asia, closer to the US’ principal ally in the region, Japan. It would also allow them to test NATO and
see how strong the commitment of the US’ allies would be. Very importantly, even though the North
Koreans initiated the move towards war, Stalin was ultimately the one who gave the go-ahead for it
to take place. On 30 January 1950, Stalin said, “I understand the unhappiness of comrade Kim Il Sung,
but he must understand that such a huge matter regarding South Korea…requires thorough
preparation. It has to be organized in such a way that there will not be a large risk. If he wants to talk
to me on this issue, then I’ll always be ready to receive him and talk to him…I am prepared to help
him in this matter.” The war only began when Stalin was ready for it to begin.
America entered the Korean War because, in the zero sum game of the Cold War, to not
match their opponent’s move would be to lose. As Byrne says, “The US viewed events strictly
through the lens of the Cold War.” Soon after the invasion of June 28th, 1950, Truman said, “The
Reds were probing for weaknesses in our armour; we had to meet their thrust without getting
embroiled in a world-wide war.” Much of the American rhetoric that went out was about meeting
the Soviet challenge- in 1950 Dean Acheson said, “To back away from this challenge…would be
highly destructive of the power and prestige of the United States…we could not accept the conquest
of this important area by a Soviet puppet under the very guns of our defensive perimeter with no
more resistance than words and gestures in the Security Council.” In the 1950s climate of
McCarthyism and anti-Soviet propaganda, whether or not Kim Il Sung really was acting out of Cold
War motivations (he was not), America saw him as a Soviet puppet, and interpreted his agenda as
most definitely part of the Cold War. Furthermore, the willingness of American participation War is
demonstrated in their ‘rollback’ of the communist forces beyond the 38th parallel, showing that the
US was determined to go beyond containment into diminishing communism.
Another way of looking at the commitment of all parties involved is in their military
investment in the Korean War. The war left almost 4 million Koreans (North and South) dead. The US
conducted major operations in Korea under the official banner of the UN, technically leading a
multilateral action. Altogether, it cost America 54 billion dollars and 37 000 troops, with 100 000
wounded. The USSR sent Soviet pilots to fly missions against the UN forces, and contributed 258 T34 tanks, 178 warplanes and 1600 pieces of artillery. It is also estimated that up to 20 000 Soviet
military personnel took part in the Korean War, but never on the front lines. The lack of direct Soviet
involvement might seem to point to less eager participation in the Korean War, but in truth there
was no need for the Soviets to directly involve themselves when they had China to fight for their
cause. Stalin encouraged Mao in launching the November 1950 PRC invasion, and promised China air
support if they would intervene in the war (although this never materialized). Over the four years of
the war, the Chinese committed 2.3 million troops, coming away with approximately 1 million dead.
Hence, in many ways, judging by the involvement of all parties in the Korean War, it went far beyond
a small domestic conflict.
The conclusion of the war shows a division between the local players and the foreign powers.
The armistice was almost entirely initiated and carried out by the Cold War powers, but for the local
players the Korean War never truly ended. Even after the Cold War powers withdrew their
involvement in the war, the North and South continued to consider themselves officially at war with
each other (although there was no actual fighting). For the Koreans, the Korean War always
remained primarily a local conflict. The majority of the casualties were Korean and it must be
assumed that they fought for unification rather than a Cold War agenda. Likewise, Kim and Rhee
continued to push their own domestic agendas- in North Korea, the war is officially known as the
Fatherland Liberation War.
The Korean War was as much a civil war as it was a Cold War confrontation. For the local
players, it always remained a civil war, but with the participation of the Cold War powers, it took on
international proportions. In the beginning, the two Koreas initiated and sought the assistance of the
superpowers, but in time, the Cold War came to subsume the local war, if only on the face of things.
The origins of the Cuban Missile Crisis were much more straightforward than those of the
Korean War. For the Americans and the Russians, it was a Cold War issue from the beginning, and as
for Cuba, if it did not start out as a Cold War conflict, it certainly became one very quickly.
The origins of the Cuban Missile Crisis are mired in the kneejerk hostility America displayed
towards Cuba and the leaders of its revolution. As McDonald says, “The United States, therefore,
assumed the right to define ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ revolutions in the Americas. As the Cuban
revolution passed outside the limits of the liberal/capitalist model favoured by the United States,
Washington’s grudging tolerance ceased and Castro was defined as the tool of foreign
subversion…Arguably, in treating Castro from the first as the possible agent of Soviet conspiracy,
Washington created what it most feared in Cuba. US determination to crush the revolution pushed
Castro into closer relations with the Russians than he might otherwise have considered and created
the pre-conditions f or the missile crisis of 1962.” In Cuba, as in Korea, the United States could only
see events through the lens of the Cold War. Castro’s nationalisation of the oil industry,
collectivization of agriculture, censorship of the press and confiscation of industrial assets
threatened US business interests in Cuba (80% of Cuba’s utilities, 40% of its sugar and 90% of its
mineral wealth were owned by Americans). To an America embroiled in the Cold War, Castro’s
economic reforms also undoubtedly suggested communist sympathies. In spite of the fact that
Castro evidently had no communist leanings and made attempts to reassure America that this was
so, the United States was still apprehensive of Castro’s revolution and reacted with hostility. For the
United States, its policy towards Cuba, which precipitated the Cuban Missile Crisis, was very much
motivated by Cold War fears and insecurities.
In the case of Cuba, frightened by the growing American hostility towards his regime, Castro
built closer ties with the USSR. In the bipolar world of the Cold War era, for a country at odds with
America, there was only one government to turn to for help. Castro has been recorded as saying, “If
the United States had not been bent on liquidating the Cuban revolution there would not have been
an October crisis…Were we right or wrong to fear direct invasion?...How could we be sure that we
would not be invaded? And this thought determined the setting up of strategic missiles in Cuba.”
American hostility towards Castro’s regime was demonstrated through an economic embargo and a
series of operations aimed at destabilizing and toppling Castro’s regime (for example backing exiles
to overthrow Castro in the Bay of Pigs ‘invasion’, and conducting large-scale military exercises near
Cuba, as well as sabotaging Cuba’s infrastructure as part of Operation Mongoose). As a result, Castro
began developing closer ties with Moscow. By July 1960, Krushchev had extended 100 million dollars
in credits to Cuba and promised to buy Cuban sugar, and had even gone as far as threatening to use
nuclear arms if the US were to invade Cuba. During this period, Castro also underwent a personal
ideological transformation- he became a self-proclaimed communist, allied to Moscow. In 1961,
Castro proclaimed, “The anti-imperialist, socialist revolution could only be one single revolution,
because there is only one revolution. That is the great dialectic truth of humanity: imperialism, and,
standing against it, socialism…I am a Marxist-Leninist and I shall be a Marxist Leninist until the last
days of my life.” Clearly, although Castro had not begun as a communist, his insecurity (caused by
American hostility) pushed him towards Moscow and eventually transformed him into one,
sheltering under the security of the communist umbrella. Hence, even though the Cuban Missile
Crisis had not begun as a Cold War issue for Castro, he quickly became aware of and party to its Cold
War implications, and conclusively allied himself with one of the two superpowers.
For Krushchev, Cuba was very much an opportunity to get an edge over the United States in
the Cold War arms race. As Gaddis puts it, “The Cuban Missile Crisis arose because Krushchev
understood more clearly than Kennedy that the West was winning the Cold War.” The US had
missiles within range of the USSR; Russia did not yet have the capability to strike its opponent. In the
late 1950s, the US had placed Jupiter missiles in Turkey, Britain and Italy and deployed U-2 spy
planes, all of which actions (according to Sewell) showed the US lead over the USSR in both missiles
and warheads. At the time of the crisis, the USSR had only a handful of ICBMs, while the US had 144
missiles positioned on Polaris submarines, as well as 294 ICBMs. The fortuitous thing about Cuba
was that it was so very near to America. According to John Mason, the missile deployment in Cuba
could be seen as a ‘quick fix’, a stopgap measure for long-term build-up of ICBMs. By placing the
cheaper, medium and intermediate range missiles on Cuba, the USSR could double its 1st-strike
nuclear capacity at relatively little expense. Other possible reasons for Russia’s actions in Cuba were
to test the young, liberal American president and to gain a victory for Russia after the failure of the
Berlin Wall in August 1961. Among all these causal links and motivating factors, one thing is
apparent: for Russia, the Cuban Missile Crisis was a Cold War confrontation from the very beginning.
Even the way the Cuban Missile Crisis was concluded tells us that it was much more a Cold
War confrontation than a ‘separate regional conflict’. The terms of the Kennedy-Krushchev
agreements were, as the name suggests, drawn up almost entirely by the leaders of the two Cold
War superpowers. Cuba’s role in the crisis was understated and even, at points, forgotten. The terms
of the Kennedy-Krushchev agreements are a manifestation of the Cold War concerns of the two
leaders. The removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba, for instance, was the primary goal of the US to
ensure its security, and was undertaken in exchange for the removal of US Jupiter missiles from
Turkey, for the security of the Soviet Union. Whether or not Castro wanted the missiles to remain in
Cuba for Cuba’s security was not a concern. Indeed, Castro is quoted as saying, “[Krushchev] should
not have returned the missiles without consulting us…I cannot accept that Krushchev promised
Kennedy to return the missiles without making the least reference to the indispensable agreement
by the Cuban government.” Even though it might be argued that Cuba’s interests were considered in
the talks, with the US guarantee that it would not invade Cuba, securing Cuba’s survival as a
communist regime was very much in the interests of the Soviet Union as well.
In the case of the US and the USSR, Cuba was used as a means of securing or furthering their
Cold War interests. In the case of Cuba, while Castro acted mainly for the purposes of local security,
he was aware of the Cold War implications of the crisis and had clearly allied himself to one of the
Cold War powers. Hence the Cuban Missile Crisis, to all intents and purposes, was much more part
of the ‘single global war’ of the Cold War era than a ‘separate regional conflict’.
It cannot be said, either, that Korea and Cuba were a series of separate regional conflicts.
Indeed, a causal link can be drawn between Korea and Cuba. The Korean War resulted in the
passing of National Security Council Resolution 68 (NSC 68), which remilitarized US foreign policy,
and cemented the US perception of communism as militaristic, concluding that the Soviets would try
to take over the free world by military force, if necessary. The increase in the US defence budget was
phenomenal. In 1950, the US defence budget stood at 17.7 billion dollars. In 1951, it jumped to 53.4
billion dollars, with much of this capital being spent on building up the US military as opposed to
flowing into Korean War efforts. The US also increased its military aid to allies. As Byrne says, “The
whole American approach to the Cold War [had changed]. Previously, most US aid was economic in
nature…During the Korean War those priorities had changed. For the first time, military aid was
greater than economic aid.” The Cuban Missile Crisis was clearly and most definitely a military crisis
over arms. The Soviets were motivated by the arms race, and at the heart of the crisis were the
missiles placed in Cuba and in Turkey. This concern over military security and the arms race came
about only because of the events of the Korean War, which prompted the increased militarization of
the Cold War.
In conclusion, far from being an unrelated series of separate regional conflicts, the crises in
Korea and Cuba were in fact conflicts integrated into the thread and continuity of the Cold War, to
varying degrees. In Korea, local agendas still played an important part in shaping the war, and the
Cold War agenda was largely superimposed onto the war. Cuba was a Cold War confrontation to a
much greater extent, where local agendas were largely understated, and even ignored. Nevertheless,
on the whole, Korea and Cuba were still more part of a ‘single global war’.
Bibliography
Walker, M. (1993) The Cold War and the making of the modern world. London: Vintage.
Ball, S.J. (1997) The Cold War: An International History, 1947-1991. London: A Hodder Arnold
Publication.
Mason, J.W. (1996) The Cold War: 1945-1991. New York: Routledge.
Brenner, P. (1990, October) Cuba and the Missile Crisis. Journal of Latin American Studies, 22, 125152.