Download Pakistan Aid - Debate Central

Debate Central
Winter 2007-2008
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ATO
Aid Trade-Off Disad
AID TRADE-OFF DISADVANTAGES
Pakistan and MCA
INDEX
PAKISTAN ATO - 1NC SHELL ........................................................................................................................................................ 3
PAKISTAN ATO - 1NC SHELL ........................................................................................................................................................ 4
PAKISTAN ATO - 1NC SHELL ........................................................................................................................................................ 5
Brink: Pakistan Aid .............................................................................................................................................................................. 6
Brink: Pakistan Aid .............................................................................................................................................................................. 7
Brink: Pakistan Aid .............................................................................................................................................................................. 8
Brink: Pakistan Aid .............................................................................................................................................................................. 9
Brink: Pakistan Aid ............................................................................................................................................................................ 10
Brink/Uniqueness: Pakistan Aid ........................................................................................................................................................ 11
Brink/Uniqueness: Pakistani Aid will continue ................................................................................................................................. 12
Uniqueness: Aid to Pakistan Now...................................................................................................................................................... 13
Link: African Aid ............................................................................................................................................................................... 14
Link: New Aid causes Trade-Off ....................................................................................................................................................... 15
Link – New Aid Programs ................................................................................................................................................................. 16
Link: New Aid causes Trade-Off ....................................................................................................................................................... 17
Link: New Aid causes Trade-Off ....................................................................................................................................................... 18
Link: New Aid causes Trade-Off ....................................................................................................................................................... 19
Link: New Funding ............................................................................................................................................................................ 20
Link: Public Health Assistance Trades-Off ....................................................................................................................................... 21
A2: Deficit/Supplemental Spending .................................................................................................................................................. 22
A2: Deficit/Supplemental Spending .................................................................................................................................................. 23
US Aid to Pakistan Good – General .................................................................................................................................................. 24
US Aid to Pakistan Good – General .................................................................................................................................................. 25
US Aid to Pakistan Good – Terrorism/Democracy ............................................................................................................................ 26
US Aid to Pakistan Good – Terrorism ............................................................................................................................................... 27
US Aid to Pakistan Good – Terrorism ............................................................................................................................................... 28
US Aid to Pakistan Good – Terrorism ............................................................................................................................................... 29
US Aid to Pakistan Good - Economy ................................................................................................................................................ 30
US Aid to Pakistan Good – Musharraf............................................................................................................................................... 31
US Aid to Pakistan Good – Musharraf............................................................................................................................................... 32
US Aid to Pakistan Good – Musharraf............................................................................................................................................... 33
US Aid to Pakistan Good – Musharraf/Military/Afghanistan ............................................................................................................ 34
US Aid to Pakistan Good - Military Relations ................................................................................................................................... 35
US Aid to Pakistan Good - Military Relations ................................................................................................................................... 36
US Aid to Pakistan Good – Relations ................................................................................................................................................ 37
IMPACT – South Asia Outweighs ..................................................................................................................................................... 38
IMPACT – Nuclear Control ............................................................................................................................................................... 39
IMPACT – Civil War Escalates ......................................................................................................................................................... 40
IMPACT – Indo-Pak War Escalation................................................................................................................................................. 41
IMPACT – Indo-Pak War Escalation................................................................................................................................................. 42
IMPACT – Deterrence fails to prevent India-Pakistan War ............................................................................................................ 43
IMPACT - Taliban Bad...................................................................................................................................................................... 44
IMPACT - Taliban Bad...................................................................................................................................................................... 45
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Debate Central
Winter 2007-2008
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ATO
Aid Trade-Off Disad
AID TRADE-OFF DISADVANTAGES
Pakistan and MCA
INDEX
Impact Extension: Afghanistan Collapse  US hegemony decline and more terrorism ................................................................... 46
Impact Extension: Taliban Victory  NATO Collapse .................................................................................................................... 47
Impact Extension: Taliban Victory  NATO Collapse .................................................................................................................... 48
Impact Extension: Afghanistan Key to NATO .................................................................................................................................. 49
Impact Extension: Afghanistan Key to NATO .................................................................................................................................. 50
NATO Key to Hegemony .................................................................................................................................................................. 51
NATO Key to Hegemony .................................................................................................................................................................. 52
Impact Module: NATO Soft Power ................................................................................................................................................... 53
Impact Module: NATO Soft Power ................................................................................................................................................... 54
Impact Extension Module: NATO stop Terrorism............................................................................................................................. 55
Impact Extension Module: NATO stop Terrorism............................................................................................................................. 56
NATO Good – Peacekeeping Module ............................................................................................................................................... 57
NATO Good – Peacekeeping Module ............................................................................................................................................... 58
Pakistani Politics ................................................................................................................................................................................ 59
Pakistani Politics - FYI on Pakistani Leaders .................................................................................................................................... 60
Pakistani Politics ................................................................................................................................................................................ 61
Pakistani Politics ................................................................................................................................................................................ 62
Pakistani Politics ................................................................................................................................................................................ 63
Pakistani Politics ................................................................................................................................................................................ 64
Pakistani Politics ................................................................................................................................................................................ 65
Pakistani Politics ................................................................................................................................................................................ 66
***MCA Trade-Off DA*** ............................................................................................................................................................... 66
Aid Trade-Off DA (MCA) - 1NC SHELL ......................................................................................................................................... 67
Aid Trade-Off DA (MCA) - 1NC SHELL ......................................................................................................................................... 68
Link: New programs ↓ MCA ............................................................................................................................................................. 69
***AFFIRMATIVE ANSWERS*** ................................................................................................................................................. 70
Non-Unique: Food Aid to Ethiopia .................................................................................................................................................... 71
PAKISTAN IMPACT TURN: Aid Cut-Off Good............................................................................................................................. 72
PAKISTAN IMPACT TURN: Aid Cut-Off Good............................................................................................................................. 73
AFF Answer – Afghanistan Aid ........................................................................................................................................................ 74
MCA - AFF ANSWER ...................................................................................................................................................................... 75
MCA - AFF ANSWER ...................................................................................................................................................................... 76
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Debate Central
Winter 2007-2008
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ATO
Aid Trade-Off Disad
PAKISTAN ATO - 1NC SHELL
BRINK and UNIQUENESS: Congress has just passed omnibus spending legislation that funds aid to
Pakistan, but any shift could be down the guillotine on Pakistani aid
Hindustan Times 12-15-07
[“US to give conditional aid to Pakistan,” Report from Asian News International, Lexis]
The US Congress is all set to put certain conditions on providing financial assistance to Pakistan, but without slashing any of the
funding.
The conditions will be meant to ensure that Pakistan plays its assigned and promised role in the US-led war against terrorism.
The November 3 emergency has loomed large on the Capitol Hill, but since it is going to be lifted in the next 24 hours, it is not
going to be the stumbling block it would have been otherwise.
The return of democracy and free and fair elections will also figure among the conditions imposed.
Congress is expected to ask the Bush Administration to formally certify that Pakistan is doing its bit and that US assistance is being used for the
purpose for which it is being extended.
All this will be finalised before Congress goes into its Christmas recess next week.
In practical terms, the congressional move will not make any difference to Pakistan. As long as relations between the two countries
remain stable, the Bush Administration will continue to supply the certification required of it, as in the past.
However, if the relationship takes a nosedive or the US no longer feels it needs Pakistan to the extent that it does today, the
guillotine will come down, as has happened more than once in the past, the Daily Times reported.
LINK: Earmarking in the budget process means that increased U.S. assistance to Africa would cause a
trade-off with aid to unprotected Pakistan
Morrison and Weiner, Overseas Development Council, 2000
[Kevin M. Morrison, Research Analyst at ODC, and David Weiner, Senior Fellow and Director of U.S policy program, “Declining
Aid Spending Harms U.S. Interests,” Overseas Development Council Policy Paper]
The constraints imposed by this downward trend in funding have been compounded by an upward trend during the 1990s
in the share of aid that Congress requires to be sent on specific projects or recipients – the practice known as “earmarking.”
Earmarking sharply limits flexibility in aid programming. U.S. development assistance funds are now subject to more than 120 distinct,
congressionally mandated spending directives, many of which can be linked to a single congressional sponsor. Some of these directives set dollar amount “floors”
for specific overseas aid programs; other specify by name a particular U.S.-based institution that is receive funds to carry out a project.
Many of these earmarks are well intentioned, but their cumulative impact is to weaken the U.S. aid program. Once
funding earmarks have been satisfied, there is often little aid left to meet other needs or respond to contingencies. Earmarks and
other mandates currently fence off large shares of U.S. economic aid for countries in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America.
Programs in South Asia, which generally do not enjoy such protection, have been vulnerable to overall budget pressure and
contingency raids from other accounts. The United States therefore risks under-investing in the development of a region of
considerable commercial and strategic importance.
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Debate Central
Winter 2007-2008
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Aid Trade-Off Disad
PAKISTAN ATO - 1NC SHELL
US backing of Musharraf is key to his political survival
Johnson, 11-28-07
[Jo Johnson, Financial Times’ South Asia bureau chief based in New Delhi since January 2005, "Musharraf must exit
both politics and the army," Financial Times, Published: November 28 2007, accessed: 11-28-07
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9b79c49e-9dca-11dc-9f68-0000779fd2ac.html ]
It is to the credit of the UK and other Commonwealth members that they have not abandoned the lawyers leading Pakistan’s faltering
struggle for democracy. These governments, however, do not matter. The country that counts most, the US, has ignored the fact that Mr
Musharraf has stolen victory in a presidential election he was not eligible to fight and then sacked the Supreme Court judges who were
poised to disallow his candidacy. While the US has pushed for the lifting of the state of emergency and for his retirement from the military, its
decision not to insist on the restoration of the judiciary has allowed Mr Musharraf to cling to power in a way that fatally undermines
the rule of law.
Mr Musharraf’s position, however, is now weaker than ever. As a civilian president, he will be dependent on the loyalty of the man
he has appointed to succeed him as army chief, General Ashfaq Kiyani, for whom he may soon become a liability. Although he will
retain his team of military aides and continue to chair the National Security Council, a body he created that straddles the military and civilian
spheres, Mr Musharraf will rapidly find that loyalty is to the uniform, not to the man. Under the constitution – suspended by the state of
emergency declared on November 3 – his only real power as president will derive from his ability to dissolve parliament.
Pakistan is now poised for a destabilising period of cohabitation between Mr Musharraf and the two former prime ministers, Benazir
Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, he has recently allowed back into the country. They are – at least for now – in confrontational mode. Ms Bhutto,
whose Pakistan People’s party commands about 35 per cent of the popular vote, has pledged to restore the judiciary should it come to power after
the January 8 elections. Mr Sharif, leader of a faction of the more conservative Pakistan Muslim League, has been even more forthright, on
Monday describing the restoration of Iftikhar Chaudhry, sacked twice as chief justice in the past eight months, as “the most important thing” on
his agenda.
It is questionable whether Ms Bhutto would follow through on her commitment to restore Mr Chaudhry and other independent justices to their
old jobs. But any sign that she were planning such a move would be the final straw for the shaky US-backed power-sharing arrangement between
the PPP leader and Mr Musharraf. Things have not yet reached that stage. Ms Bhutto knows that a liberated court would want to throw out Mr
Musharraf’s National Reconciliation Ordinance, a decree waiving corruption charges against politicians, which principally benefited her. Once in
power, though, she may feel it is worth taking that risk to rid herself of a meddlesome general.
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Debate Central
Winter 2007-2008
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ATO
Aid Trade-Off Disad
PAKISTAN ATO - 1NC SHELL
IMPACT: Coup in Pakistan will immediately lead to nuclear first strike against India which will
escalate
Hindutva Times ‘01
[“The Ominous Symptoms of a post-Musharraf Indo-Pak Nuclear War”, October 21, http://hindutva.org/indopakwar.html ]
But the
greatest danger posed by these defeated Taliban militiamen would be to the internal security of Pakistan. They would cause violent
unrest of civil war proportions which can be expected to lead to a military coup in Pakistan that would overthrow the regime of
President Musharraf. Defeated Taliban militiamen along with the pro-Jihad coup plotters of the Pakistan Army would swiftly start an undeclared war with India
All this will have implications for India in particular and for the ongoing American lead War on Terrorism. Without mincing too many words, we can say that the
defeated Taliban militiamen along with the pro Jihad coup plotters of the Pakistan Army would swiftly start an undeclared war with India,
with full scale attacks along the LoC and unprecedented insurgency inside Indian-administered Kashmir (and the rest of India too).
Needless to say that reverses to this first flush of Pakistani attacks in Kashmir will be bolstered by a first strike using nuclear
weapons by the rogue Pakistani army. North Indian cities could bear the brunt of these nuclear attacks . The surprise reversal of his
Afghanistan policy and jettisoning of the Taliban, by President Musharraf has put the possibility of the Indo-Pak nuclear war on hold, till President Musharraf is not
overthrown This dangerous but certain scenario could see the beginning of the world's first post-Hiroshima nuclear war. The result
could be the nuclear decimation of large parts of North India and to a lesser extent of other parts of India. If India responds swiftly, in kind,
to the first Pakistani nuclear attacks, then Pakistan could face complete decimation during the course of this war. This could
prophetically prove the US assertion the South Asia sits on a nuclear powder keg. A possibility of nuclear war that existed before
September 11th has now increased manifold. Even before that fateful day, the declare Pakistani policy has been that if they lose a conventional war,
they would use nuclear weapons. They have never committed themselves to a "no first use" policy for nuclear weapons, as India has done. So the danger of nuclear
war between India and Pakistan which was always there has now only become more acute. The surprise reversal of his Afghanistan policy and jettisoning of the
Taliban, by President Musharraf has for the time being, put the possibility of the Indo-Pak nuclear war on hold. This holds till President
Musharraf is not overthrown. But the day he is overthrown, we can safely predict a nuclear war between the two nations immediately
after that.
Indo-Pak nuclear war escalates worldwide, bringing nuclear winter and extinction
Caldicott, ‘02
[Helen Caldicott, founder of Physicians for Social Responsibility, The New Nuclear Danger: George W.
Bush’s Military-Industrial Complex, p. X]
The use of Pakistani nuclear weapons could trigger a chain reaction. Nuclear-armed India, an ancient enemy, could respond in
kind. China, India’s hated foe, could react if India used her nuclear weapons, triggering a nuclear holocaust on the subcontinent. If
any of either Russia or America’s 2,250 strategic weapons on hair-trigger alert were launched either accidentally or purposefully in
response, nuclear winter would ensue, meaning the end of most life on earth.
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ATO
Aid Trade-Off Disad
Brink: Pakistan Aid
Congress has just funded US AID assistance to Pakistan but lawmakers remain angry and suspicious
of aid to Musharraf. Congress would cut Pakistani aid first.
Press Trust of India 12-20-07
[The Press Trust of India, By: Sridhar Krishnaswami, December 20, 2007 “Lawmakers cut USD 50 mn in Pak aid, tie it
to democratic rule,” Lexis]
Pakistan might lose USD 50 million in US aid after an omnibus 2008 spending bill passed by the Congress shaved off the chunk,
also imposing conditions on the remaining USD 250 million of military assistance.
The Bush Administration had originally requested USD 300 million in military aid to Islamabad but lawmakers cut USD 50 million until the time
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice can certify that Pakistan is restoring democratic rights, including an independent judiciary.
A massive appropriations bill including the Pakistan aid package, which was passed by the lawmakers, has also said that the remaining USD 250
million set aside could only be used for anti-terrorism and law enforcement purposes. This effectively means the money could not be used for
procuring F-16 jets or Sidewinder missiles, seen as nothing to do with the war on terror but only aimed at India.
Lawmakers on the Capitol Hill have been sharply critical of the fashion in which President Pervez Musharraf has been going
about, especially in the aftermath of the declaration of emergency on November 3.
Earlier this month, the administration stopped an annual USD 200 million cash payment to the Pakistani government, instead
converting those funds to programmes for Pakistan that will be administered by the US Agency for International Development.
The omnibus spending bill was approved by the House and the Senate and sent to the President for signature.
Since the September 11, 2001 terror attacks, Pakistan has been given about USD 10 billion in economic and military assistance including
reimbursements for the war on terror. In 2004, President George W Bush committed to a USD 6 billion, five-year programme to provide aid to
Pakistan.
What is being considered as significant that in making the cut in Pakistani assistance, lawmakers not only withheld a portion of the money sought
by the administration but strictly limited the use of the remaining part to "counter-terrorism and law enforcement activities directed against alQaeda and the Taliban and associated terrorist groups." This means that Islamabad cannot use the money for the F-16 jets or Sidewinder missiles.
"This is going to be a problem," an unnamed State Department official has told The Washington Post.
"The Pakistanis really want the F-16s. It is very symbolic in their eyes," the official added.
Senior State department officials have been urging lawmakers not to cut any assistance to Pakistan and have been arguing that money
going to Islamabad including by way of reimbursements for the war on terror are strictly audited.
Congress has appropriated up to USD 350 million in economic aid to Pakistan and up to USD 5 million for administrative
expenses needed by USAID to manage the USD 200 million in funds that had previously been given as a check to the Pakistani Ministry
of Finance.
"None of the funds appropriated by this Act may be made available for cash transfer assistance for Pakistan," the bill said.
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Aid Trade-Off Disad
Brink: Pakistan Aid
U.S. Aid to Pakistan is on the brink – some in Congress are pushing for a complete cut-off of support
for the Musharraf government
Hassan 12-15-07
[DR FAROOQ HASSAN, a Senior Advocate Supreme Court of Pakistan, Attorney at law (US) and Barrister at
Law (UK), “ARTICLE: Legitimising the illegitimate,” The Nation (Pakistan), December 15, 2007, Lexis]
In the US right now an acute debate with single focused and one sided objective is going on about how to ensure that the president
is 'persuaded' to have the forthcoming election fundamentally free from his personal grasp and junta's influence. This is on account of
the fact that without a single exception a very major newspaper predicts that such rigging will be in evidence and indeed inevitable! This one sided public outcry
has produced a spate of seminars, public addresses and also testimony in the congress, that such an eventuality is certain to create a havoc in the public trust in
institutions of political change in that country.
There is a total crackdown on the press and lawyers and the activist members of the civil society. The chief justice continues to be under house arrest. The president
of the Supreme Court Bar and two former presidents continue to be imprisoned since November 3. There are scores of other political leaders who have also been
arrested. Such clamp down on the press and the judiciary is to curb terrorism? Actually those who have been arrested are progressive, secular minded people and
law-abiding citizens.
I have addressed several important seminars myself. The major was at Harvard a couple of weeks ago when I to spoke to about a hundred professors of university
faculties and distinguished diplomats in this country. Then this week in Washington I addressed this topic at the most exclusive and prestigious American Society
of International Law. The lawyers' and judges audience was appalled at the idea of how it is possible that a person himself can condone or validate his wrong
doings against the constitution.
There is something odious to a lawyer's mindset in civilised countries that the brunt of government and state run oppression in Pakistan is against the lawyers'
community. I also addressed an important meeting at the Initiatives for Change (which began as an institution over half a century ago by that great moralist Frank
Buchman) in the capitol where I pointed out that there is no question that the president will rig this election to ensure that he is not prosecuted for committing
treason by violating article 6 of the constitution as he did so openly. An interesting point is that my article published in these columns on this point which appeared
on the 9th was carried almost verbatim and adopted by The Washington Post the next day.
Genuine well wishers and friends of Pakistan in the congress are urging the US administration to stop all support of the regime
presently operational in Pakistan. In addition, the president's rule is now certified by a leading American institution to be the most unpopular in the history
of this unfortunate country. Most US papers have carried this news prominently that "Majority wants Musharraf to quit."
An International Republican Institute (IRI) poll has shown that 83% of Pakistanis are opposed to emergency rule and 67% of them want President Musharraf to
resign, while 70% maintain that his government does not deserve to be re-elected.
An eight-member IRI mission was in Pakistan just prior to the declaration of the emergency rule on November 3. The random sample was based on the responses
of 3,520 men and women from across Pakistan. Seventy% said Pakistan is headed in the wrong direction, while 51percent said their personal economic condition
has deteriorated. Barring massive rigging, it is not likely that the government party can win, the IRI said. If it does win, it could result in civil unrest. As such the
conclusion of the IRI poll shows that the government party cannot win without massive rigging. Two-thirds of those surveyed express anger at current state of
affairs
These are interesting facets of this latest polling undertaken by admittedly neutral pollsters. Sixty% of Pakistanis are opposed to a Musharraf-Benazir Bhutto deal,
while 58% said they would support a grand opposition alliance. 56% said the army should play no role in civilian government. Thirty% said they would support the
Pakistan People's Party (PPP) in the January elections, while 25% said they would back the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N). Only at the lowest end of
public support is 23% favoured PML-Q.
The IRI said that its delegation found a commitment on the part of civil society and political parties to democratic elections, even among those who identified the
lack of a level playing field in the pre-election environment.
A general feeling of insecurity prevailed among most Pakistanis, it said. The concerns of the election period security did not, however, lead the majority of
Pakistanis, with whom the assessment mission met to concur with governmental decrees to limit or ban political rallies and gatherings. The IRI said, "Restoring
public, as well as international, confidence in elections will be difficult but the urge among Pakistanis for democracy remains strong. It is difficult to envision
credible elections without the full reversal of the actions imposed by the state of emergency."
The survey also calls into question the view in the United States of Musharraf as a leader who can effectively rule Pakistan and deliver in the campaign against
terrorism. Most interesting is the fact that two-thirds of those surveyed "expressed anger at the current state of affairs and desired change." Pakistan is thus on the
brink of a vast potential period of unrest according to this IRI report.
Martial law and the imprisonment of democratic opposition leaders don't make for a free and fair vote either. So the thesis that is being put forth by the
US based supporters of democracy in Pakistan is that they are calling on the international community - particularly the US
Congress, which has voted billions of dollars in military aid over the last six years - to use all its leverage for swift elections and
restoring constitutional protections. For a start there has to be neutrality in the elections and that can only be achieved through a neutral a6dministration.
As such there is demand that there has to be a formation of neutral caretaker cabinets at the federal and provincial levels and reconstitution of the Election
Commission to ensure the holding of free, fair and transparent elections to the national and provincial assemblies.
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Debate Central
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Aid Trade-Off Disad
Brink: Pakistan Aid
Uniqueness and Brink: Congress is currently funding aid to Pakistan in the new omnibus spending
legislation. But Congress is poised for a larger, angry rift regarding Musharraf
Griffith 12-21-07
[Stephanie, “Bush, Congress at loggerheads over Pakistan aid: observers,” Agence France Presse – English, December 21, 2007 Lexis]
Congress has slapped restrictions on US military aid to Pakistan, creating a rift with the George W. Bush administration on how
aggressively to pursue democratic reform there, congressional observers said.
The new restrictions, part of the 1,400-page "omnibus" spending bill approved by Congress this week, put limits on 300 million
dollars of US military aid received each year by Pakistan, a key US ally in the "war on terror."
In the past, Pakistan enjoyed free rein to use the funds, but under the catch-all budget bill passed by Congress late Monday, 250 million dollars of those funds now
are to be used strictly for counter-terrorism operations.
Lawmakers stipulated that the remaining 50 million dollars are to be withheld until the Bush administration demonstrates that Pakistan is making clear moves
toward democracy.
Congress is calling on Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to formally certify that Islamabad is actively working to restore
democratic rights.
Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf earlier this month resigned as head of the army and lifted emergency rule, but Congress said it is seeking more concrete
measures, including the restoration of an independent judiciary.
The White House has also pressed Musharraf to do more to ensure that elections set for January 8 are free and fair, notably by allowing access to free media.
US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher on Thursday downplayed the rift with lawmakers, and said during a teleconference he was confident that Rice
soon will be able to report to Congress that Pakistan is on the road toward full restoration of democracy.
Boucher, who did not say how soon he would be able to report to Congress, insisted that lawmakers and the administration share the same objectives of a
democratic Pakistan and waging an effective war against terror, and have only "miniscule" disagreements about the way forward.
"I don't think there is a difference between the government and the Congress on this issue," Boucher said.
"We look forward to reporting to the Congress, having a dialogue with them," he said.
The administration was particularly keen in focusing on next month's legislative elections in Pakistan, he said.
"We're trying to keep moving toward elections that are as fair and as free as possible. We do think there are (additional) steps that can be taken and will be taken,"
Boucher said.
"Lifting of the emergency was a big step, removing a heavy burden that had been placed on the election period," he said.
Boucher noted that the restrictions on Pakistan do not affect its recently announced purchase of F-16 fighter jets from the United States.
"The F-16 is a Pakistani purchase. It's their money, they're buying them and our military assistance goes for different purposes," the diplomat said.
But a senior congressional official told AFP that the rift between the administration and Congress on the way forward in Pakistan was
substantive, and that the legislation was meant to send a stern message -- not only to the State Department, but to Pakistan's military brass.
"That sends a very strong signal to the Pakistani military. They already are not pleased with Musharraf. It says to them, 'Look: You're
betting on the wrong horse,'" the aide said.
"If you have any interest in maintaining the posture of the Pakistani military -- which Musharraf is rapidly destroying -- it's not just the Pakistani
population you have to worry about. You also have to worry about the relationship with the US."
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Aid Trade-Off Disad
Brink: Pakistan Aid
Democrats are suspicious of U.S. Aid to Pakistan – it’s come under review in the Status Quo
Tate 12-7-07
[Deborah, Voice of America, “VOA NEWS: US OFFICIAL DEFENDS AID TO PAKISTAN,” Lexis]
A senior U.S. State Department official predicts elections in Pakistan scheduled for January 8 will not be perfect, but he says it will be an important step in the
country's transition to democracy. At a congressional hearing on Capitol Hill, the official defended U.S. aid to Pakistan, a key ally in the war on terror. VOA's
Deborah Tate reports.
Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher offered his prediction about upcoming parliamentary elections in Pakistan. "It is
not going to be perfect," he said.
Opposition groups in Pakistan believe the elections will not be fair, saying election authorities, the judiciary and local officials support those in President
Musharraf's party.
But in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Assistant Secretary Boucher remained optimistic. "If we keep working at it, and they keep
working at it, and they do what they pledge, with President Musharaff and the political party leaders have pledged, they can have an election that really does reflect
the choices made by the people of Pakistan.," he said.
The hearing was disrupted by a protester who took issue with Boucher's assessment. "How can the U.S. believe Musharraf will allow free and fair elections in
Pakistan? Musharraf is a dictator!"
The protester was escorted out of the room.
Boucher said he believes that President Musharraf will lift the state of emergency on December 16 as he has pledged, saying the Pakistani leader made good on his
vow to remove his military uniform and serve as civilian president.
But some Senate Democrats challenged the Bush administration's support for Musharraf and questioned the 10 billion dollars in
U.S. assistance given to Pakistan since 2001.
"In spite of that $10 billion, al Qaida and the Taliban have a safe-haven in the FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) region, Osama bin Laden is still on the
loose in the region, anti-Americanism remains high, and Pakistan's president has repeatedly exercised the powers of a dictator. Do we dare call our policies
in that respect a success?," said Senator Robert Menendez, a New Jersey Democrat.
Boucher defended the aid, saying that country's success as a nation is essential to U.S. security. And he said the United States has
played a positive role in moving Pakistan toward democratic change:
"Part of the reason why we are in a period of transition to democracy right now, part of the reason why there are political leaders in
Pakistan contesting elections that will be held in a month, part of the reason why the state of emergency once imposed is going to
be lifted soon is because of the role of the United States," he said.
Much of the U.S. aid to Pakistan since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States has been spent to reimburse Islamabad for its assistance in the
war on terrorism.
After President Musharraf imposed the state of emergency on November 3, the State Department began a review of U.S.
assistance.
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Debate Central
Winter 2007-2008
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ATO
Aid Trade-Off Disad
Brink: Pakistan Aid
U.S. aid to Pakistan is On The Brink – Congressional critics clashing with the Administration over the
aid package
L.A. Times 11-18
[By Peter Spiegel, Los Angeles Times Staff Writer, "U.S. aims to reshape Pakistan aid,"Los Angeles Times, November 18, 2007,
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-pakaid18nov18,1,5811140.story?coll=la-headlines-world download date: 11-29-07]
With the Pakistani government in turmoil, senior Pentagon officials are quietly moving to overhaul the system of massive U.S. military
aid to the country by more directly tying the payments to Islamabad's success in combating Islamic militants.
Defense Department officials also want to require detailed accounting of how Pakistan spends about $1 billion in annual payments and greater control by
Washington over spending.
The steps would fundamentally change one of the Bush administration's signature relationships of the post-Sept. 11 era, when it forged an alliance with the military
regime of President Pervez Musharraf against Islamic extremists and began providing huge sums with little oversight.
The Pentagon is focusing on the largest and most controversial aid program, known as the Coalition Support Funds. The proposal to link payments to specific
objectives would revamp the current practice of reimbursing Pakistan for money it says it spent.
In more traditional military aid programs, U.S. aid is subject to a series of legislative controls that occasionally require presidential action for money to be released.
By contrast, the post-Sept. 11 Coalition Support Funds have few reporting requirements, beyond the claims submitted by the Pakistanis.
"Backdoor subsidies is what it can look like to some more skeptical observers, because there hasn't been good oversight and the amounts involved have been so
great," said a government official who tracks military payments to Pakistan. "There is suspicion that it's a slush fund."
The questions about accountability for the program come amid concerns about U.S. aid to Pakistan spent on weaponry and equipment that U.S. military and
intelligence officials have said seem ill-suited to fight the militants.
The Pentagon effort to change the Washington-Islamabad relationship comes at a particularly tricky juncture, when the U.S. also is
trying to force Musharraf to make other changes, including ending the state of emergency he imposed two weeks ago.
But Pentagon officials have been frustrated for months by their limited knowledge of how Pakistan was spending the U.S. aid. And
they're being pushed by congressional criticism and revelations that Islamabad is not using the money as the administration intended.
U.S. officials must know "exactly where it goes" and "have more say" in Pakistan's use of aid, said a senior military official directly involved in the program.
"If I could craft it to allocate those resources to do specific things, I'd have a priority list of where I'd like to see it applied to," the official said.
The official and others described the Pentagon's efforts on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship.
However, proposals to cut back U.S. assistance to Pakistan are not universally popular in the Bush administration, where many view
Musharraf as a valuable ally who is committing his military forces to U.S. objectives, often with heavy costs.
Pentagon officials emphasized that their concerns and the push to overhaul the military aid program predated the current upheaval in Pakistan.
The senior military official insisted that there were no indications that Musharraf was improperly using the money in the crackdown. "I'm not really concerned
about it being spent for beating the political opposition," the official said.
Regular army troops have not been involved in breaking up street demonstrations against Musharraf's emergency decree; that task has been carried out by Pakistani
police and paramilitary troops. The intelligence services, however, have been involved in drawing up lists of candidates for arrest as "troublemakers," and in
providing information on their whereabouts.
The push for greater oversight has been given new urgency by calls from congressional Democrats for more accountability. Sen.
Robert Menendez (D-N.J.), chairman of the subcommittee responsible for foreign aid, said he planned a hearing to press the Bush
administration to explain how money is being spent in Pakistan. In an interview, Menendez said State Department officials provided "unacceptable"
answers.
"The administration hasn't been overly forthcoming, and I don't know why," he said. "If
they're not forthcoming because they don't really have the
type of accountability that we should be getting from the Pakistanis, then we need to deal with that."
On Friday, Menendez wrote to R. Nicholas Burns, undersecretary of State for political affairs, asking for any detailed audits of the Coalition Support Funds
program.
The Bush administration set up the program as a way to reimburse Pakistan for military action against Islamic radicals operating in areas bordering Afghanistan.
Since then, it has become the single largest source of military aid to Pakistan, totaling about $5.3 billion since its inception in early 2002 -- or about $80 million a
month. Money from the program accounts for about three-quarters of all U.S. military aid over the last six years.
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Brink/Uniqueness: Pakistan Aid
American public opinion favors a cut-off of aid to Pakistan, but the Bush Administration continues to
support Musharraf
Haqqani, Director, Center for International Relations, Boston University, 11-29
[Husain, also the author of the book Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military (Carnegie Endowment, 2005). He's
also served as adviser to several Pakistani prime ministers, including Ms. Bhutto. "COMMENTARY: What's Next
in Pakistan?" Wall Street Journal, November 29, 2007; Page A19
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119630504505407476.html?mod=googlenews_wsj download date: 11-29-07]
U.S. public opinion is solidly against Mr. Musharraf's autocratic measures. According to a poll by Opinion Dynamics released by Fox
News this week, 50% of those surveyed said "yes" in response to the question, "Do you think the United States should cut off aid to
Pakistan until the state of emergency is lifted and democracy is restored?" Thirty four percent disagreed and 16% expressed no opinion.
The Bush administration, however, seems willing to let Mr. Musharraf get away with suspending Pakistan's constitution and
sacking independent Supreme Court judges now that he's resigned his army post and promised to hold elections. The
administration's reasoning appears to be based on the limits of U.S. influence within Pakistan, and the need for gratitude toward an
ally in the war against terror. But Mr. Musharraf's stepping down as army chief and holding elections in an atmosphere of intimidation would
not make Pakistan a democracy. It would make Pakistan resemble many of America's Middle Eastern allies, notably Egypt, where elections are
routinely held and a weak civil society survives at the sufferance of a dictatorship subsidized with American aid.
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Brink/Uniqueness: Pakistani Aid will continue
Congressional calls for cutting aid to Pakistan are occurring, but the Bush Administration continues
to support Musharraf in the Status Quo
The Times of India 11-30-07
["US backs out-of-uniform Musharraf," download date 11-30-07,
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/US_backs_out-of-uniform_Musharraf/articleshow/2583201.cms ]
The Bush administration on Wednesday conveyed that it still backs retired General Pervez Musharraf as Pakistan's supreme leader,
and will continue to do business with him. The assurance enabled the military ruler-turned-civilian 'president' to announce that he is meeting
a key US demand — rolling back the Emergency before the January 8 polls.
The US vote-of-confidence in Musharraf came from the highest levels of the government, with President Bush himself declaring
again that "Musharraf is a person who has done a lot for Pakistan democracy."
"(Stepping down as army chief) is something that a lot of people doubted would ever happen. And he told me he would take off his uniform, and
I appreciate that, that he kept his word," Bush said in brief remarks about the development in Pakistan in a CNN interview.
The President's certificate of democracy to Musharraf did not address his subversion of the supreme court and the judicial system that has
enabled him to extend his rule as a "president" elected in a dubious manner.
However, having endorsed Musharraf's re-election as president and winked at the undermining of the Pakistani judiciary, Bush went on to add
however that "in my judgment, in order to get Pakistan back on the road to democracy, he's got to suspend the emergency law before
(parliamentary) elections."
"I also hope that he enhances Pakistani democracy, and taking off his uniform is a strong first step. And having elections that are out from
underneath the emergency law would be a clear signal that he has put Pakistan back on the road," Bush said.
The remarks came shortly before Musharraf took oath as a civilian president and announced that he was rolling back emergency
provisions on December 16 — meeting the US demand. Bush also said Musharraf "has been an absolute reliable partner in dealing with
extremists and radicals", when asked if he expected the Pakistani ruler to continue to help in the search for Osama bin Laden. "It's a tough
situation in the remote parts of Pakistan," Bush explained. "But there are many examples of where the Pakistanis have, in cooperation with the
US, brought to justice members of al-Qaida's hierarchy. And I'm thankful for that."
Many critics, including some from his own administration, have suggested that Musharraf-led Pakistan have been cosy with extremists
and terrorists while milking Washington for billion of dollars in military and economic aid. There have also been calls from
Congress to cut or recalibrate aid to an over-militarized Pakistan.
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Aid Trade-Off Disad
Uniqueness: Aid to Pakistan Now
Congressional support for continuing aid to Musharraf is currently strong
Press Trust of India 12-10-07
[“US aid to Pak is money 'well spent', says Republican leader,” Lexis]
Expressing confidence in the leadership of Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, a top Republican leader has said the USD 10 billion in
aid given to the country by the US since 2001 was money "well spent".
"He's (Musharraf) been really a very important ally to us. And when we look at threats we face from around the world, having
Pakistan as one of our allies is important to our long-term future," House of Representatives' Republican leader , John Boehner said
in CNN's "Late Edition" show.
On being asked if he still had confidence in Musharraf, Boehner replied "I do".
On the USD 10 billion assistance to Pakistan since September 11, 2001, the Ohio lawmaker said: "It is well spent. They're an important ally of
the United States. They're going to continue to be an important ally.
"Clearly, what's been happening in Pakistan over the last several months is troubling, but I'm hopeful that emergency law that's in effect will in
fact go away next week and that elections, free and fair elections, do occur in January." When asked if he would support continued military
assistance to Islamabad, Boehner replied: "Absolutely".
US Aid to Pakistan likely to continue in Squo but more conditions and limits are still possible
Fabey 12-3-07
[Michael, “U.S. likely to continue military deals with Pakistan, CRS says,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report,
December 3, 2007, Pg. 5 Vol. 224 No. 44, Lexis]
It appears that the United States is unlikely to stop impending F-16 sales to Pakistan or other military equipment deals in the wake
of the coup there, a recent Congressional Research Service (CRS) report says.
"While the President has the authority to immediately halt all or some U.S. assistance to Pakistan, there are no signs that he intends
to do so," CRS said in a November report.
"In 'reviewing' U.S. aid programs," the report says, "administration officials could place holds on certain items, such as F-16 combat
aircraft being purchased by Pakistan as a Foreign Military Sale. Acute and historic Pakistani sensitivities to such U.S. policy choices -combined with repeatedly voiced concerns that Pakistan's full cooperation in counterterrorism efforts continue -- have most
analysts doubting that the United States would halt delivery of defense supplies to Pakistan."
Congress already has legislated conditions on U.S. aid to Pakistan and pending legislation would provide for further conditionality,
the report points out. "However, many analysts, including those making policy for the Bush administration, assert that conditioning U.S. aid to
Pakistan has a past record of failure and likely would be counterproductive by reinforcing Pakistani perceptions of the United States as a fickle
and unreliable partner."
On Nov. 3, Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf suspended the country's constitution and assumed emergency powers in his role as both
president and army chief. The move came just over eight years after Musharraf overthrew the elected government in a bloodless 1999 military
coup.
"Numerous commentators on U.S. assistance programs for Pakistan have recommended making adjustments to the proportion of funds devoted to
military versus economic aid and/or to the objectives of such programs," the report says. "For most of the post-2001 period, funds have been split
roughly evenly between economic and security-related aid programs, with the great bulk of the former going to a general economic (budget)
support fund and most of the latter financing 'big ticket' defense articles such as airborne early warning aircraft, and anti-ship and anti-armor
missiles."
Only about 10 percent of the more than $10 billion provided to Pakistan since 2001 has been specifically devoted to development and
humanitarian programs, according to CRS. "The Bush administration and/or Congress may find it useful to better target U.S. assistance programs
in such a way that they more effectively benefit the country's citizens," CRS says. "Some analysts call for improving America's image in Pakistan
by making U.S. aid more visible to ordinary Pakistanis."
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Aid Trade-Off Disad
Link: African Aid
African Aid Results in Internal Budget Trade Off – Won’t Increase Overall Aid Levels
Middle East Quarterly 2000
[Roundtable Discussion, “Debate: Continue U.S. Aid to Israel?” June, Volume VII, Number 2, Patrick Clawson is
Senior Editor of the Middle East Quarterly, Hillel Fradkin is resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute,
http://www.meforum.org/article/63 accessed: 11-29-07]
Clawson: It's too easy to say we don't have to make hard choices because we have extra money available. Of course, the reason we
have extra money is that we've been extraordinarily parsimonious. Every single, solitary expenditure must be
examined very, very carefully to see whether it justifies itself.
MEQ: It's a zero-sum game?
Clawson: The United States is prepared to spend a certain amount of money on foreign affairs, not more. If we
spend more of it in one area, we spend less in another. It's not elastic. It's not exactly a zero-sum game but it is a 10percent-sum game.
Fradkin: That's right. There is
a new situation in the post-cold war era. Aid to Africa was driven by the
competition between the Soviet Union and us; now this is over. A serious discussion about foreign aid has to
offer new justifications for spending money. The main options are security, economic or humanitarian.
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Link: New Aid causes Trade-Off
Congressional “Pay-Go” Rules compel any new aid spending to trade-off with other international aid
programs – Tsumani relief proves
Center for American Progress ‘05
[“Memo to the community,” http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/kfiles/b315637.html accessed: 11-26-07]
The foreign assistance component of the budget is critical this year in light of the increased assistance
pledged in response to the tsunami in Asia. Funding for our relief efforts is currently being drawn from
existing accounts, reprogrammed from this year's budget and taken from other foreign aid accounts. It
remains to be seen how—or whether—the administration will deal with these accounts in the budget. For
example, how much will it request to fund relief efforts in Sudan, eastern Congo, Uganda, Bangladesh and
other "orphan disasters"? Will money for tsunami relief cause other priorities to be short-changed? The
increases in the foreign assistance budget—particularly with respect to the Millennium Challenge Account
and Global HIV/AIDS Initiative—are positive steps forward. However, these increases were accompanied
by proposed cuts to Development Assistance and Child Survival and Health Programs Fund, which would
mean less aid for the poorest countries and weak and failing states.
Budget Process: Making the Rules up as We Go
In 1990, Congress agreed to bipartisan pay-as-you-go
rules for the budget process. These rules required that the costs of
both entitlement expansions and tax cuts be offset fully, guarding equally against deficit-increasing actions on both sides of the
federal budget ledger. Recently proposed pay-as-you-go rules were unbalanced and would have imposed no constraints on new tax cuts.
Adopting them would make it much easier to cut funding to critical programs while allowing the Bush tax changes to remain in place. What
other "Trojan horses" will be included under the guise of "process" that actually would implement real cuts
for vital domestic and international priorities? This year's budget rule proposals are very similar to last year's:
unbalanced PayGo rules and a variety of other gimmicks designed to cut essential domestic and international
priorities, making it easier to enact more tax cuts that benefit the wealthy.
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Aid Trade-Off Disad
Link – New Aid Programs
New initiatives trade off with current foreign assistance programs. It’s zero-sum
Sesssions, program coordinator, Center for Global Development, '06
[Myra, "The PMI Turns One - How Will We Measure Success?" July 6, download date: 10-24-07,
http://blogs.cgdev.org/globalhealth/2006/07/the_pmi_turns_o.php ]
Myra comments: It is clearly true that the PMI [President's Malaria Initiative] has helped increase international attention to malaria and has transformed a
notoriously under-funded and under-appreciated area of US foreign assistance for global health. However, measuring the success of this initiative should not be
confined to a discussion of health outcomes and implementation strategies, although these elements are crucial. Evaluators should also look at the aid mechanism
itself: is this model effective? What are the trade-offs for those countries that receive the concentrated funding and those who don't? What are the trade-offs for US
global health and foreign assistance overall? Are the gains that are made cost-effective?
What we need going forward is increased transparency in decision-making processes, including country selection, as well as better public knowledge about the
inputs and results. We also need an understanding that this is a new and different way of doing business - a grand experiment in foreign aid - and one that needs
healthy scrutiny from time to time.
Comments
For me, one of the most encouraging parts of the PMI is its effort to involve the host government and other development partners from the initial stages
of program planning. Hopefully, early success using this more inclusive model will have spillover effects to other USAID programs.
Myra - when you ask about the possible tradeoffs for global health, what exactly are you referring to? Do you believe PMI spending is crowding out
other potential health spending?
Posted by: Michael Bernstein at July 6, 2006 02:04 PM
Thanks for the comment and question, Michael. I have not done the analysis of the data to see if the PMI is having a negative impact on the funding levels of other
health initiatives-- and given all of the other changes in the US foreign assistance budget I am not sure it would ever be possible to isolate the impact of the PMI.
However, during a recent CGD event, Congressman Kolbe talked at length about the future challenges in maintaining foreign assistance
funding levels in light of increasing domestic federal expenditures. Mark Lippert, the Director of Foreign Policy for Senator Barak Obama also
touched on this key issue at an April CGD event about the future of MCA. The message from each of these speakers was that funding levels for any
particular initiative or priority should be looked at in the broader context-- and that the appropriations process is essentially a zerosum game full of trade-offs.
In today's tight budget climate, I think that there is no doubt that funding for the PMI and other new intiatives will detract from real or
potential funding for other areas of the foreign aid budget – and that that reality should be a part of the conversation about the
successes and opportunities of the initiatives.
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Link: New Aid causes Trade-Off
New Aid would force a trade-off within the USAID
Stewart, Center for Global Development, '06
[Patrick, “U.S. FOREIGN AID REFORM: WILL IT FIX WHAT IS BROKEN?” September 2006,
http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/10497, p. 7)
Even more problematic, the reform plan does nothing to alleviate the problem of earmarks, which mandate that foreign assistance
funds be devoted to particular countries or purposes. Today’s foreign operations budget is constrained by hundreds of distinct
Congressional earmarks, as well as multiple executive branch directives, many of which reflect parochial interests and undercut
aid effectiveness, particularly from a development perspective. They are also very difficult to remove, given the entrenched
support of domestic constituencies and special interests. Although often framed as a specific pathology of Congress, the White
House is also culpable, particularly given the proliferation of “Presidential Initiatives” that often come at the expense of
established aid programs. Unless Tobias can persuade Congress to eliminate some of these restrictions and impose discipline on
the executive branch itself, he will find it difficult to align State and USAID funds with pressing U.S. priorities in particular
countries.
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Link: New Aid causes Trade-Off
Plan Causes Internal Budget Trade Off
Tobias, USAID Administrator, ‘07
[Randall, USAID Administrator, Congressional Quarterly, Congressional Testimony, March 28, lexis]
Focusing resources in this way has its tradeoffs. When one area goes up, unless there is an abundance of new
resources, other areas go down. While the FY 2008 budget increased by $2.2 billion over FY 2006 enacted levels,
we squeezed far more in the budget. The budget includes important increases for HIV/AIDS, malaria, and humanitarian
assistance; and for countries in which there are new requirements and opportunities such as in Kosovo, Iran, and Cuba. The FY
2008 budget also reflects efforts to continue to shift program funding, where requirements are predictable,
from supplemental requests for Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan and avian influenza into the base budget.
Plan Will Trade off With Other Foreign Assistance – Political and Budgetary Constraints Prevent Net
Increase in Funding
Obey, Congressman, ‘06
[David, US Representative, Democrat from Wisconsin, Federal News Service, April 4, lexis]
First of all, Ms. Lowey congratulated you for having a foreign assistance budget that is significantly increased
over last year. I wish I could echo those comments. I certainly -- given the fact that I chaired this subcommittee for 10
years, I certainly recognize our responsibility to deal with the issues that are dealt with by this budget. But I think that your
request is simply, in real-world terms, unsustainable so long as it comes in the context of a budget which, for
instance, will cut education by $35 billion from the existing current services level over the next five years, and in the context of a
bill which will cut domestic discretionary funding for education, health, science, agriculture and a variety of other
domestic activities by some $56 billion below current services over a five-year time period.
I think anyone who believes that this Congress is going to vote for these kinds of increases in foreign assistance in the teeth of those kinds of decisions on the
domestic front -- I think if someone believes that, I will try to find three or four bridges I could sell. It just ain't gonna happen, in my view.
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Link: New Aid causes Trade-Off
Foreign Affairs Funding Trade Offs Are Normal Means
Gardner, Law Professor, Columbia, 2000
[Richard N. Gardner is professor of law and international organization at Columbia Law School and counsel to the
global law firm of Morgan Lewis. He served as U.S. Ambassador to Italy from 1977 to 1981 and as U.S. Ambassador
to Spain from 1993 to 1997, Foreign Affairs, August, lexis]
More money is not a substitute for an effective foreign policy, but an
effective foreign policy will simply be impossible
without more money. Foreign policy experts therefore disdain "boring budget arithmetic" at their peril.
The State Department recently set forth seven fundamental national interests in its foreign affairs strategic plan: national security;
economic prosperity and freer trade; protection of U.S. citizens abroad and safeguarding of U.S. borders; the fight against
international terrorism, crime, and drug trafficking; the establishment and consolidation of democracies and the upholding of
human rights; the provision of humanitarian assistance to victims of crisis and disaster; and finally, the improvement
of the global environment, stabilization of world population growth, and protection of human health. This is a sensible list, but in
the political climate of today's Washington, few in the executive branch or Congress dare ask how much money will really be
required to support it. Rather, the question usually asked is how much the political traffic will bear.
Going on this way will force unacceptable foreign policy choices -- either adequate funding for secure
embassies and modern communications systems for diplomats or adequate funding for U.N. peacekeeping in
Kosovo, East Timor, and Africa; either adequate funding for the Middle East peace process or adequate funding to safeguard
nuclear weapons and materials in Russia; either adequate funding for family planning to control world population growth
or adequate funding to save refugees and displaced persons. The world's greatest power need not and should not
accept a situation in which it has to make these kinds of choices.
Tiny Size of Foreign Affairs Budget Makes Trade Offs Normal Means
Gardner, Law Professor, Columbia, 2000
[Richard N. Gardner is professor of law and international organization at Columbia Law School and counsel to the
global law firm of Morgan Lewis. He served as U.S. Ambassador to Italy from 1977 to 1981 and as U.S. Ambassador
to Spain from 1993 to 1997, Foreign Affairs, August, lexis]
A dangerous game is being played in Washington with America's national security. Call it the "one percent
solution" -- the fallacy that a successful U.S. foreign policy can be carried out with barely one percent of the
federal budget. Unless the next president moves urgently to end this charade, he will find himself in a financial
straitjacket that frustrates his ability to promote American interests and values in an increasingly uncertain
world.
Ultimately, the only way to end the dangerous one percent solution game is to develop a new national consensus that sees the
international affairs budget as part of the national security budget -- because the failure to build solid international partnerships to
treat the causes of conflict today will mean costly military responses tomorrow. Those who play the one percent solution
game do not understand a post -- Cold War world in which a host of international problems now affects
Americans' domestic welfare, from financial crises and the closing of markets to global warming, AIDS,
terrorism, drug trafficking, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Solving these problems will
require leadership, and that will cost.
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Link: New Funding
Our Guaranteed Funding Link – Guaranteed Funding Ensures Internal Budget Trade Off
Irving, Associate Director of Budget Issues, General Accounting Office, ‘99
[Susan, Budget Issues: Cap Structure and Guaranteed Funding, GAO/T-AIMD-99-210]
Like the caps, a guaranteed minimum funding level limits the range of trade-offs. However, it also raises some additional issues.
Its impact depends on the design of the guarantee. For example, if a guaranteed minimum funding level for area X is carved out of
the general discretionary cap - and that cap is not increased - then the remaining activities within that cap must compete for what is
left.
Limited resources means there will be budget trade-offs
Shick 2000
[Allen, Fellow @ Brookings, The Federal Budget: Politics Policy and Process, 2000, p. 4]
Conflict is expanded by friction over who should pay and who should benefit, over how the tax burden should be distributed, and
over which programs should grow andwhich should shrink. Budgeting is a allocative process in which there never is enough
money to allocate. It is also a redistributive process in which some gain because others lose - some get back more from
government than they pay in taxes and others get less.
Plan Results in Cuts in Other Areas of Foreign Assistance
Leach, Congressman, 2000
[James (Jim) Albert, U.S. Representative, Republican from Iowa, Federal News Service, March 8, lexis]
The problem is this -- I mean, the
question the ranking minority member asked is tough, but it's an example of the kind
of questions you are all going to have to deal with, if we don't get more money into this federal budget, and that's why I
think it was very useful that he did that. No one wants to choose and the natural instinct is to say we'll do both. But,
we won't do both, if the overall budget allocation is too low. If we get to the floor of the House with a budget
allocation for foreign operations that is very low, we have a problem.
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Link: Public Health Assistance Trades-Off
Public Health Assistance Results in Budget Trade Off
San Francisco Chronicle ‘05
[Marc Sandalow, Washington Bureau Chief, “How much to give? No right answer. Japan is top donor -- $500 million,”
January 5, http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2005/01/05/MNGPEALB2B1.DTL?ml accessed 11-27-07]
The question of how much to donate -- the same question that confronts scores of other nations and millions of individual
donors -- is one without easy answers. How can anyone judge whether a contribution of $350 from a wealthy family, or of
$350 million from a wealthy nation, in the wake of such a calamity, is the proper amount?
"You can't,'' said Brett Schaefer, a foreign policy and economic fellow at the Heritage Foundation, a conservative
Washington think tank.
“There is always going to be the sense that the United States could give more,'' Schaefer said."It's all a trade-off. You have
finite budget resources, and you have to decide where you are going to use it.''
Those decisions come against a backdrop of a mounting federal budget deficit and a bill of about $5 billion
per month in Iraq.
Public Health Assistance Trades Off With Other Parts of USAID Budget
Daulaire ’98
[Nils, Senior Health Advisor, USAID, Federal News Service, May 20]
The overriding goal of global health programs is to reduce the toll of death and suffering due to disease. As
WHO has stated, disease eradication and elimination can only be seen as one component of a broader strategy to achieve this goal.
Eradication efforts must be carried out in ways that build lasting health care systems able to address non-eradicable diseases. It is
therefore critical to examine trade-offs. With a budget for international development assistance which has
decreased substantially compared to four years ago -- and which we can never hope will match the total needs of
the world -- weighing trade-offs is something in which we at USAID have a great deal of hard-won
experience.
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Aid Trade-Off Disad
A2: Deficit/Supplemental Spending
Plan Won’t Be Funded With Deficit Spending – Bush Will Hold The Line
Novak ’07
[Robert Novak, Chicago Sun Times, 6-18-2007, lexis]
Addressing a Republican fund-raising dinner at the Washington Convention Center last Wednesday night, President Bush declared: "If the
Democrats want to test us, that's why they give the president the veto. I'm looking forward to vetoing excessive spending, and I'm looking
forward to having the United States Congress support my veto." That was more than blather for a political pep rally. Bush plans to veto
the Homeland Security appropriations bill nearing final passage, followed by vetoes of eight more money
bills sent him by the Democratic-controlled Congress.
That constitutes a veto onslaught of historic proportions from a president who did not reject a single bill
during his first term. Of the 12 appropriations bills for Fiscal Year 2008, only three will be signed by the president in the form shaped by
the House. What's more, Bush correctly claimed he has the one-third plus one House votes needed to sustain these vetoes.
The unpopular president is taking the offensive on fiscal responsibility. After bowing to Republican demands
on earmarks, Democratic leadership faces a battle of the budget. Bush was the first president since John Quincy Adams not
to exercise his veto power during a complete four-year term, even though the Republican-controlled Congress was on a spending spree. He has
vetoed two bills in his second term, rejecting only the Iraq war money bill since Democrats took control. Dwight D. Eisenhower a half century
ago seemed no more comfortable with the veto, but I observed how much Ike was energized during his last two years as president following a
Democratic midterm election landslide by using what he called his "veto pistol" 24 times (only twice overridden despite huge Democratic
majorities). Bush's aides report similar enthusiasm by the current president on the eve of his veto offensive. The first
appropriations bill to be vetoed, Homeland Security, raises spending 14 percent over the previous year, compared with 7 percent requested by the
administration. Bush also objects to this measure because it applies higher wages under the Davis-Bacon Act to workers covered by the bill. The
second money bill hitting the president's desk, Military Construction and VA (Veterans Affairs), is even more costly, with a 30 percent boost
contrasted with the administration's 22 percent increase.
Nevertheless, Bush will sign this bill. According to congressional sources, Rep. Jeb Hensarling of Texas, chairman of the Conservative
Republican Study Committee, privately advised the White House against a veto because it would be overridden thanks to support for veterans -setting a bad example for the future. Bush next plans vetoes of the Energy-Water and Interior-Environment bills. The remaining vetoes would be
on Labor, HHS, Education; Transportation and HUD; Commerce, Justice and Science; Agriculture and Rural Development; State and Foreign
Operations (partly because the House bill omits the so-called Mexico City anti-abortion language) and Defense. In addition to the VA
Appropriations, the only other money bills Bush plans to sign are Legislative Branch, where Congress traditionally sets its own funding, and
Financial Services and General Government, where the House bill actually falls short of the administration's request. Hensarling last week
collected signatures of 147 House Republicans, one more than needed, pledging to sustain money bill vetoes, and the number is growing. Rep.
James Walsh, representing a shaky upstate New York district, as the ranking Republican on the Labor-HHS Appropriations subcommittee, has
indicated he probably will vote to override a veto of that bill. But subcommittee ranking Republicans -- the famous "Cardinals" who are a law
unto themselves in Congress -- met with the president last Thursday and signaled support for his budget offensive. It is an offensive
pressed on Bush by congressional GOP leaders and by his own budget director, Rob Portman, a former member
of the House Republican leadership as a congressman from Ohio. Portman believes the 2006 electoral catastrophe in his state
was caused mainly by Republicans losing the mantle of fiscal responsibility. Unless it is retrieved, Ohio -and the presidency -- will go to the Democrats in 2008. By vetoes that would slice over $20 billion in
Democratic spending, Bush is seeking to transform that outlook. It will trigger an epochal political struggle
in the months ahead.
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A2: Deficit/Supplemental Spending
Even Supplemental Spending Will Force Trade Offs
Gardner, Law Professor, Columbia, 2000
[Richard N. Gardner is professor of law and international organization at Columbia Law School and counsel to the global law firm
of Morgan Lewis. He served as U.S. Ambassador to Italy from 1977 to 1981 and as U.S. Ambassador to Spain from 1993 to 1997,
Foreign Affairs, August, lexis]
Clinton and Albright strongly protested the congressional cuts. They will undoubtedly protest even more when the appropriations committees of
the Senate and the House divide up the meager 150 Account pie into inadequate slices for essential foreign affairs functions. At the end of this
congressional session, $ 1 billion or so of the foreign affairs cuts may be restored if Clinton threatens to veto the appropriation bills -- not easy to
do in an election year. Of course, the next president could make another familiar move in the one percent solution
game -- ask for a small supplemental appropriation to restore the previous cuts. But if the past is any guide,
Congress will do its best to force the next administration to accommodate most of its supplemental spending
within the existing budget. (This year, for instance, Congress resisted additional spending to pay for the U.S.
share of multilateral projects such as more U.N. peacekeeping and debt reduction for the poorest countries.)
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US Aid to Pakistan Good – General
Cuts in US Assistance to South Asia Undermine U.S. Leadership and Democracy and Cause South
Asian Conflict
Carpenter, Assistant Administrator for the Near East, USAID,’95
[Margaret, Federal News Service, March 7, Lexis]
U.S. development assistance to South Asia is in America's national interest, and U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) programs are important tools for achieving U.S. foreign policy goals in the region. American leadership through foreign
assistance is helping create the markets of the future for the United States and advancing both peace and prosperity in Asia. As
Secretary Raphel has said, U.S. foreign policy in South Asia: promotes regional peace and stability; limits nuclear proliferation;
helps establish good trading partners; promotes democracy and human rights; and, curbs the spread of narcotics.
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US Aid to Pakistan Good – General
Continuation of aid to Pakistan is key to political stability and bilateral relations.
Oakley, former U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, 11-26-07
[By Robert B. Oakley and Joshua Yaphe, Robert B. Oakley is a research fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies.
He served as ambassador to Pakistan from 1988 to 1991 and has held other positions at the National Security Council and State
Department. Joshua Yaphe is a research assistant at the Near East-South Asia Center for Strategic Studies. “What Pakistan Needs:
Cutting Aid Is the Wrong Move at the Wrong Time,” Washington Post, Monday, November 26, 2007; A15, download date: 11-26-7
found at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/11/25/AR2007112501546.html ]
The worst thing the United States could do now would be to cut back support for Pakistan.
Instability is on the horizon in nuclear-armed Pakistan. Gen. Pervez Musharraf's promise to hold free and fair elections is in doubt,
and many are calling on the United States to reduce and redirect its assistance.
Experts in Washington have noted that a good deal of U.S. assistance to Pakistan's military has gone to high-end defenses directed at India; this makes them of little
use against the insurgents the United States wants to target. Civil society activists have produced a litany of grievances that they believe could be addressed if the
United States were to threaten withdrawal of its assistance as leverage for democratic change. These arguments are nothing new. Benazir Bhutto has for decades
had friends in Congress championing her cause of a "truly democratic" Pakistan. Pro-India forces in Washington have also lobbied for years to reduce U.S. arms
sales to Pakistan.
But the United States and Pakistan have a long history together, and many of these paths have been taken before. The most
dramatic example came in 1990, when Congress passed the Pressler Amendment, aimed at cutting off many forms of assistance as
long as Pakistan continued its pursuit of nuclear weapons. The effect was not what we intended. Pakistan perceived India as its strategic
security concern, just as it does now, and no U.S. sanctions were going to change that. What the Pressler Amendment produced was not a subduing
of the effort to acquire nuclear weapons but great resentment among Pakistani military and civilian leaders toward the United
States.
For 10 years following the amendment's passage, Pakistani military leaders made almost no visits to the United States, which also meant they received no U.S.
training or educational opportunities. To this day, when senior Pakistani military leaders come here, they speak well of America. Most have fond memories of the
1970s, when many of them took courses at Fort Leavenworth. But most mid- and low-level officers who visit arrive with negative attitudes toward America and are
content to leave thinking the same way. The younger generations felt that the United States abandoned Pakistan in the 1990s.
That resentment is still felt. The United States has increasingly pushed for Pakistan's army to enter the tribal areas near its border with Afghanistan to combat alQaeda and the Taliban. Pakistani troops have been forced to fight their own countrymen, which they resent and for which they blame the United States and
Musharraf. The United States should continue cooperating with Pakistan against al-Qaeda and other jihadis, but we need to be careful about pushing the army into
conflicts in which it suffers high numbers of casualties and troops are forced to kill their own tribesmen.
We should also resist internal and international pressure to cut assistance to Pakistan's military. Despite our frustrations, we must keep
in mind that Pakistan's military controls its nuclear capabilities and has always been a major force holding the country together.
Instead of cutting aid, we should work to bring about discussions between the army and civilian political leaders on appointing a senior civilian to serve as interim
president, replacing Musharraf. Given the strain the military has been under, senior military leaders may prefer this option to find a way out of the current situation.
(Appointing a powerless interim prime minister and cabinet changes nothing.) An interim government could then prepare for truly free and fair elections and a
return to the rule of law, with the state of emergency lifted and civil liberties restored.
This would be a difficult, time-consuming process. It will take years to restore security, stability and democracy to Pakistan. We should remain committed for the
long haul.
Yesterday, former prime minister Nawaz Sharif returned from exile, apparently with the support of Saudi Arabia. This probably will mark the end
of Musharraf's political career. As for Bhutto, she greatly compromised her legitimacy this summer by tying her tether to Musharraf's sinking ship. Sharif may
be the future of Pakistan, an eventuality the United States must prepare for. He commands a strong following and, most important, has
traditionally been strongly supported by the Pakistani army and intelligence services.
Pakistan's army will remain a major force uniting the country. Its cooperation is essential in the fight against al-Qaeda and to
prevent cross-border insurgent activities in Afghanistan. Its efforts do not always meet our expectations. But it has been a long road
rebuilding U.S.-Pakistan relations, and we cannot afford to damage them again at this sensitive moment.
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US Aid to Pakistan Good – Terrorism/Democracy
Pakistan Aid Key to Democracy and Prevents Terrorism
Curtis, Senior Research Fellow in South Asian Studies, Heritage Foundation, ‘07
[Lisa, Heritage Foundation Reports, April 4]
Carefully targeted U.S. aid programs can help to counter anti-American sentiment in Pakistan and limit the influence of radicals
who use hatred of the U.S. to mobilize political support. A visible U.S. aid presence in the country will reassure the Pakistani
population that Washington is committed to average Pakistanis, not just to the military leadership. U.S. assistance programs that
focus on building institutions and promoting human rights and democracy and that target the health and education sectors would
show that the U.S. is committed to Pakistan's success as a stable and prosperous country and deflate extremists' arguments that
Washington is interested only in exploiting Pakistan for its own purposes. Washington must work to overcome the suspicions of
Pakistanis who remember when the U.S. abruptly cut off its large-scale aid program because of Pakistan's nuclear program in the
early 1990s.
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US Aid to Pakistan Good – Terrorism
Pakistan is the lynchpin of global terrorism. US Aid to Pakistan is crucial to both short-term and longterm reductions in worldwide terrorism by boosting Pakistani democracy, education and economy
Gordon, Senior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy, Brookings Institution, ‘07
[Philip H., “If Pakistan Prospers, al Qaeda Will Not,” July 25, Originally published in The Financial Times (UK),
http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2007/0725pakistan_gordon.aspx download date: 11-29-07]
that al Qaeda is reorganising in north-western Pakistan brings attention to an
overlooked reality. For all the justified international focus on Afghanistan, the most pressing terrorist challenge comes from the
other side of the border.
It is in Pakistan that Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and other al Qaeda leaders are hiding and plotting, in Pakistan that the
Afghan Taliban are receiving weapons and sanctuary, and in Pakistan that British and other extremists are getting guidance, training
and finance.
Publication of the US National Intelligence Estimate's conclusion
The recent breakdown of an at-tempted deal between Pervez Musharraf's regime and the tribes of north Waziristan increases the prospects that Pakistani forces will
move in and try to deal with the problem. (Under the deal the tribes would have denied sanctuary to foreign terrorists and the Pakistani army would have ceased
operations there.)
Some in the US already say that if Pakistan refuses to do so, George W. Bush, the president, must order "targeted strikes or covert actions by American forces", in
the words of an editorial in The Washington Post. The administration has made it clear that no options are ruled out, "including striking actionable targets".
There can be no doubt that al Qaeda sanctuaries in Pakistan must be disrupted and one can only hope that Gen Musharraf proves willing to get serious about the
problem. In the past, even while the Pakistani government was sending in forces to fight them, other branches of the military establishment were actively
supporting the Taliban to prevent Afghanistan from coming under US and Indian influence.
The breakdown of the tribal deal—spurred by Gen Musharraf's assault on extremists at the Red Mosque last week—may at last prod Islamabad into a wholehearted
anti-terrorist campaign.
In the long run, however, military force cannot solve this problem. US military actions—in a fiercely nationalistic, enormously complex and potentially unstable
country—would only make it worse.
The al Qaeda presence in north-west Pakistan takes the form not of large, identifiable "camps" that could be easily targeted with
air strikes, but of relatively small groups of individuals dispersed across a vast, mountainous region. They receive support and
protection from the local population.
While the US should support, and even continue to pay for, Pakistani military actions against the militants, a more effective longterm US approach would focus on efforts to help Pakistan become prosperous, secure and democratic—and less likely to support
extremism in the first place.
A first step would be for Washington to complement its military aid to Pakistan with more economic and humanitarian assistance.
Greater US and western openness to imports from Pakistan, financial support for its failing public education system (as an alternative
to madrassas) and job-creating development assistance would do more to wean Pakistan's large youth population away from
extremism than any amount of diplomatic pressure or the threat of military force.
Equally important, the US must not let its desire to support Gen Musharraf obscure its long-term interest in a transition to democratic rule. Mr Bush has forcefully
argued that US support for dictators in the Muslim world is the primary cause for extremism there. Yet he fails to see that dynamic taking place today.
In discussions with Pakistani students, journalists, politicians and experts on a recent trip there, I found almost no one willing to support the increasingly
authoritarian general and much anger directed at the US for backing him. In the past few months a genuine democracy movement has developed, stimulated by Gen
Musharraf's crackdown on the media and judicial system, which has led to violent clashes with government forces.
This is precisely the type of explosive situation that Mr Bush has argued produces "stagnation, resentment and violence ready for export"—and that his democracypromotion doctrine was designed to avoid.
Some fear that democratically elected leaders would be less ready to support the US. That fear is not entirely misplaced, but it misses the point that in the long run
repression will create more terrorists than the government could arrest or kill. Islamist parties in Pakistan have never done well in free elections and would not win
today. But if Gen Musharraf ends up clinging to power through repression, support for Islamic extremism could rise.
Finally, the US should use the current period of relative calm between Pakistan and India to launch a diplomatic effort on the disputed region of Kashmir. A deal in
which the "line of control" in Kashmir becomes a recognised border between India and Pakistan, and the Muslim areas of Kashmir constitute a special zone within
India, could form the basis for peace between the two nuclear neighbours. It could also help make it possible for Gen Musharraf to shut down the many Pakistani
extremist groups for which Kashmir is the raison d'être.
In the short run, the US should encourage Pakistan to get serious about fighting the militants within its borders and provide it with
the support to do so. In the longer run, however, helping the country overcome its vast domestic challenges and giving its people a
more hopeful future would do more for the war on terror than any attempt to defeat extremism with military force alone.
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US Aid to Pakistan Good – Terrorism
Pakistani Assistance Key to Prevent Massive Wave of Terrorism against U.S.
Tierney, Congressman, ’07
[John, Democrat from Mass chutes, May 9, Federal News Service, lexis]
All of us hope to support Pakistan and its people in their efforts to achieve for themselves a stable, prosperous and free nation. But our
national security interests in the future of Pakistani children are still more acute. Will we be safe over the next 5, 10, or
15 years as thousands and perhaps -- (audio break) -- the Pakistani people are treading water during a rising tide of
extremism, a tide that exposes our soldiers in Afghanistan to attack and a tide that threatens us here at home
to a gathering new generational wave of terror. In recent polling that was taken - (audio break) – and developmental
assistance to assure that waves of terror never build and never crash again on our shores. That should be our job
that's facing all of us here today.
Pakistan is the Vital Internal Link to Global Terrorism
Kronstadt ‘07
[Alan, Specialist in Asian Affairs, March 1, Congressional Research Service Report, lexis]
South Asia is viewed as a key arena in the fight against militant religious extremism, most especially in
Pakistan and as related to Afghan stability. In November 2006, the State Department's Under Secretary for Political Affairs,
Nicholas Burns, said, "It is in South Asia where our future success in the struggle against global terrorism will
likely be decided--in Afghanistan and Pakistan." (2) The 9/11 Commission Report emphasized that mounting large-scale
international terrorist attacks appears to require sanctuaries in which terrorist groups can plan and operate with impunity. It further
claimed that Pakistan's "vast unpoliced regions" remained attractive to extremist groups. The Commission
identified the government of President Musharraf as the best hope for stability in Pakistan and Afghanistan,
and recommended that the United States make a long-term commitment to provide comprehensive support
for Islamabad so long as Pakistan itself is committed to combating extremism and to a policy of "enlightened
moderation." (3)
In January 2007 Senate testimony assessing global threats, the
outgoing Director of National Intelligence, John Negroponte,
captured in two sentences the dilemma Pakistan now poses for U.S. policy makers: "Pakistan is a frontline
partner in the war on terror. Nevertheless, it remains a major source of Islamic extremism and the home for
some top terrorist leaders." In what were surely well-calculated remarks, he went on to identify Al Qaeda as
posing the single greatest terrorist threat to the United States and its interests, and warned that the
organization's "core elements ... maintain active connections and relationships that radiate outward from their
leaders' secure hideouts in Pakistan." (4) This latter reference was considered the strongest such statement to date by a high-ranking
Bush Administration official.
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US Aid to Pakistan Good – Terrorism
Continued U.S. aid to Pakistan necessary to gain full support against Taliban and Al Qaeda
Lalwani, Policy Analyst, New America Foundation, '07
[Sameer, "Why We’d Miss Musharraf," September, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3974, access date: 11-24-07]
Rather than embracing false harbingers of democracy, the United States should deepen its ties with the Pakistani military through
further commitments in funding, joint officer training, and intelligence sharing in order to procure the full support of the military
leadership against the Taliban and al Qaeda. And for Pakistan’s people, the U.S. government needs to do more to channel visible
development aid and encourage the growth of real democratic institutions instead of feudal patronage networks like those of Bhutto and
Sharif.
With all the political maneuvering going on, it will be difficult for U.S. policymakers to resist their democratic impulses. Instinctually, it feels wrong to back a
military leader over his civilian rivals—and the charges of hypocrisy will sting. Pakistan’s troubles, however, require much more than quick fixes such as elections
and power-sharing deals. The question is, does the United States have the patience to stay engaged for the long haul? There’s a first time for everything.
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US Aid to Pakistan Good - Economy
US Aid key to Pakistani Economy
U.S. Bureau of Intelligence and Research ‘07
[Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Electronic Affairs Publication Office, May 1, US Federal News, lexis]
U.S. assistance has played a key role in moving Pakistan's economy from the brink of collapse to setting
record high levels of foreign reserves and exports, dramatically lowering levels of solid debt. Also, despite
the earthquake in 2005, GDP growth remained strong at 6.6% in fiscal year 2005/2006. In 2002, the United States led
Paris Club efforts to reschedule Pakistan's debt on generous terms, and in April 2003 the United States reduced Pakistan's bilateral
official debt by $1 billion. In 2004, approximately $500 million more in bilateral debt was granted. Consumer price inflation eased
slightly to an average of 8% in 2005/2006 from 9.3% in 2004/2005.
Pakistani Economic decline causes state disintegration, civil war and coup
Bidwai and Vanik 2000
[Praful and Achin, Transnational Institute Fellow, Fellow at Center for Contemporary Studies, editor of Security
Dialogue, Visiting Professor of Political Science at the Academy of Third World Studies, New Nukes, page 19]
Overt nuclearization, which invited sanctions, further aggravated the crisis .
If Pakistan proceeds to manufacture and
deploy nuclear weapons and missiles, the economic consequences could become unbearable. The state could
literally disintegrate and Pakistan become what some commentators have described as a nuclear Somalia. The
Sharif government tried to use Pakistan’s newly acquired weapons status to bargain for help from the US to help stave off this
possibility, but had only limited success. If the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) of Benazir Bhutto were a united and respected force,
then as the major opposition party it would have benefited most from the deep public disillusionment with the Sharif government.
But after its two recent stints in power, the PPP has a serious credibility problem of its own. Indeed, it is in great disarray. Thus,
the real beneficiaries of governmental unpopularity are a variety of Islamic groups, which can play the card
of being an untested alternative that should now be give the chance to rule. Though the nuclear tests were popular,
they also have been strongly demanded by both the PPP and the Islamic opposition to the Sharif government. When the
government finally decided to carry the tests, this did not provide any distinctive dividends to the government, but simply
reinforced the growing swell of sympathy for the Islamic opposition.
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US Aid to Pakistan Good – Musharraf
US backing of Musharraf is key to his political survival
Johnson, 11-28-07
[Jo Johnson, Financial Times’ South Asia bureau chief based in New Delhi since January 2005, "Musharraf must exit
both politics and the army," Financial Times, Published: November 28 2007, accessed: 11-28-07
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9b79c49e-9dca-11dc-9f68-0000779fd2ac.html ]
It is to the credit of the UK and other Commonwealth members that they have not abandoned the lawyers leading Pakistan’s faltering
struggle for democracy. These governments, however, do not matter. The country that counts most, the US, has ignored the fact that Mr
Musharraf has stolen victory in a presidential election he was not eligible to fight and then sacked the Supreme Court judges who were
poised to disallow his candidacy. While the US has pushed for the lifting of the state of emergency and for his retirement from the military, its
decision not to insist on the restoration of the judiciary has allowed Mr Musharraf to cling to power in a way that fatally undermines
the rule of law.
Mr Musharraf’s position, however, is now weaker than ever. As a civilian president, he will be dependent on the loyalty of the man
he has appointed to succeed him as army chief, General Ashfaq Kiyani, for whom he may soon become a liability. Although he will retain
his team of military aides and continue to chair the National Security Council, a body he created that straddles the military and civilian spheres,
Mr Musharraf will rapidly find that loyalty is to the uniform, not to the man. Under the constitution – suspended by the state of emergency
declared on November 3 – his only real power as president will derive from his ability to dissolve parliament.
Pakistan is now poised for a destabilising period of cohabitation between Mr Musharraf and the two former prime ministers, Benazir
Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, he has recently allowed back into the country. They are – at least for now – in confrontational mode. Ms Bhutto,
whose Pakistan People’s party commands about 35 per cent of the popular vote, has pledged to restore the judiciary should it come to power after
the January 8 elections. Mr Sharif, leader of a faction of the more conservative Pakistan Muslim League, has been even more forthright, on
Monday describing the restoration of Iftikhar Chaudhry, sacked twice as chief justice in the past eight months, as “the most important thing” on
his agenda.
It is questionable whether Ms Bhutto would follow through on her commitment to restore Mr Chaudhry and other independent justices to their
old jobs. But any sign that she were planning such a move would be the final straw for the shaky US-backed power-sharing arrangement between
the PPP leader and Mr Musharraf. Things have not yet reached that stage. Ms Bhutto knows that a liberated court would want to throw out Mr
Musharraf’s National Reconciliation Ordinance, a decree waiving corruption charges against politicians, which principally benefited her. Once in
power, though, she may feel it is worth taking that risk to rid herself of a meddlesome general.
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US Aid to Pakistan Good – Musharraf
Coup of Musharraf will lead to an immediate nuclear attack on India
Rogotham, Associate Editor of a Technology Journal from Bangalore, ‘02
[S. “Time to pull Pak’s Nuke Fangs out”, South Asia Analysis Group, paper no. 472, April 6,
http://www.boloji.com/analysis/040.htm ]
More worrying than anything else is the very real possibility of a coup against Musharraf by someone even more hot-headed and
fundamentalistic. Should such a coup happen – and there’s plenty of activity towards it in Pakistan today – India may suffer a pre-
emptive, or even an accidental, nuclear attack much before it has had time to even react to the coup. For, such a coup will probably
have been led by elements of the ISI, senior military generals, the Al Qaeda , Jaish e Mohammed, Lashkar e Taiyyaba and other
terrorist groups. Already, Pakistan, which had supposedly separated nuclear weapon components and pushed them to different places as soon
as US troops landed in that country for the war on terrorism, is said to have brought together these components and moved them to the
borders. Media reports and Pakistani official statements indicate that weapons are ready to be mated with delivery systems and fired
– and the war hasn’t even begun yet!
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US Aid to Pakistan Good – Musharraf
Musharraf’s fall would bring Sharif to power, and Sharif’s rule would increase extremism and
weaken democratic institutions. Musharraf is best option for a soft landing
Markey, Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, November ‘07
[Daniel Markey is a senior fellow for India, Pakistan, and South Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations and a former member of the U.S. State
Department’s policy planning staff. "The FP Debate: Should the U.S. Abandon Pervez Musharraf?" Foreign Policy, November 2007,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4052 access date: 11-26-07]
Musharraf’s fall would not immediately pave the way for Jeffersonian democracy. Pakistan’s Army, as the nation’s dominant
political institution, would almost certainly call the shots and might well choose to delay the democratic process indefinitely. There
is some chance, however, that a post-Musharraf Army would prefer to shield itself from popular protest and would move quickly
to national elections. With Musharraf’s departure, his faction of the PML would fall apart. By most accounts, populist former Prime
Minister Sharif would be the natural beneficiary of this disintegration. He would seize a commanding majority at the polls , leaving
Bhutto’s Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) frozen out.
Having opposed Musharraf from his exile in Saudi Arabia and Britain, Sharif has felt little love from Washington since 9/11. In his
desperation to return to power, he has courted the entire spectrum of Pakistan’s political leaders, including the Islamists. His
center-right base of support now has a stronger anti-American, anti-Western streak than in the past. Sharif’s constituents have little
interest in implementing policies designed to tackle the deeper roots of extremism and militancy in Pakistani society or in building
sustainable democratic institutions.
Bhutto’s PPP is the only large party in Pakistan that might conceivably carry the torch for a more progressive, reform-oriented agenda. But for
the time being, she must work with Musharraf and his faction of the PML to win power. For his part, Musharraf needs Bhutto in order to retrieve
a modicum of national and international legitimacy. Assuming he fulfills his promise to leave the Army and become a civilian president,
Musharraf could then serve as a bridge between Bhutto and the uniformed military, gradually completing a “soft landing” out of
power over his term in office.
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Aid Trade-Off Disad
US Aid to Pakistan Good – Musharraf/Military/Afghanistan
Musharraf and military are key to fuel supplies for U.S. military operations in Afghanistan. Fuel cutoff collapses the U.S. campaign in Afghanistan in two weeks.
Bryce 11-16-07
[Robert, Managing Editor of Energy Tribune and author of three books, “The Pakistan Fuel Connection,”
Found at http://www.stwr.net/content/view/2422/1/ download date: 11-26-07 ]
When it comes to America's relationship with Pakistan, remember one thing: it's all about the fuel.
The Bush Administration's muted reaction to the new dictatorial rule of Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf can be traced to
the American military's logistics problems in Afghanistan. Without the cooperation of Musharraf's government, the
24,000 U.S. troops who are stationed in Afghanistan would likely run out of fuel within a matter of days.
The U.S. military is now burning about 575,000 gallons of fuel per day in Afghanistan. And about 80 percent of that
fuel is coming from refineries in Pakistan. Without the support of Musharraf and the Pakistani military, U.S. forces in
Afghanistan would have only one fuel supply, and it would be coming via a precarious logistics line that extends more
than 1,000 miles from northern Afghanistan all the way to refineries in Baku, Azerbaijan and Turkmenbashi, Turkmenistan.
The U.S. military's fuel vulnerabilities in Afghanistan were made clear last year during a conference sponsored by the Defense Energy Support Center, the agency
that purchases and manages the delivery of fuel for the Defense Department. During a briefing on the fuel operations in Pakistan and Afghanistan, Army Colonel
Dan Jennings, who was overseeing fuel delivery for Afghanistan and southern Iraq, told a group of about 75 people that "Fuel support for Afghanistan operations is
what keeps me up at night."
Standing in front of a Power Point map of Afghanistan, Jennings said the agency was hauling hundreds of thousands of gallons of jet fuel per day to America's
main bases in Afghanistan. Some 700 tanker trucks were being used to deliver the fuel and some of the trucks were taking a month or more to make a round trip
delivery from their starting points in Pakistan. According to Jennings, on some occasions, the U.S. military had as much as 4.7 million gallons of motor fuel in
transit between Pakistan and Afghanistan. In addition to the sheer volume of fuel, Jennings and his team were dealing with pilferage, accidents, trucker strikes and
cultural barriers. "We've had trucks show up as much as 90 days after they were initially loaded," Jennings said.
Despite the problems, Jennings was relentlessly upbeat - particularly about the opportunities in the fuel supply business in Pakistan and Afghanistan. "There will be
a military requirement in this area for a long time to come," he declared. "Things are changing in this region. This is the land of opportunity."
Perhaps, but Jennings was also careful to point out that the logistics line that carries fuel from Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan into Afghanistan is somewhat
precarious. The fuel from the refinery in Baku is loaded on rail cars, put on barges that then traverse the Caspian Sea. When they land in Turkmenistan, they follow
a circuitous rail route through Uzbekistan before they arrive at the Afghan border where the fuel is then transferred to trucks.
The long supply lines to the Caspian Sea underscore the importance of the Pakistani fuel. By mid-2006, the total fuel storage
capacity for forces operating out of the air bases at Kabul and Bagram was less than 3 million gallons. Although a contractor working for the U.S. military is now
building an additional 3 million gallons of storage capacity at Bagram Air Base, if the flow of fuel from Pakistan is completely cut off,
American forces could be running on fumes within a fortnight.
Greg Wilcox, a retired Army officer who has written extensively on military tactics and operations, says that
if the fuel from Pakistan gets cut off,
the U.S. would have to try flying fuel into its bases in Afghanistan and that, he believes, would be "mission
impossible." Wilcox told me that when it comes to the Pakistan, "We don't have any choice. We got kicked out of
Uzbekistan so we don't have any bases there. We can't survive in that region without Musharraf. We are tied to him
whether we like it or not."
In short, don't expect any tough rhetoric from the Bush administration when it comes to Pakistan. Thousands of
American lives depend on the continued flow of fuel from that country.
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US Aid to Pakistan Good - Military Relations
Symbol of U.S. Aid is key to Pakistan military’s support in fight against extremists like Al Qaeda and
the Taliban
Ali, Northwestern Medill Journalism School, 11-29-07
[Ambreen, Graduate Student in Journalism at Northwestern University Medill School of Journalism’s Washington DC program,
“U.S. hands tied in influencing Pakistani leader,” Medill Reports, Nov 29, 2007
http://news.medill.northwestern.edu/washington/news.aspx?id=71365 access date: 11-29-07]
Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf’s announcements this week that he would step down as military leader immediately and lift emergency rule on Dec. 16 were
the first signs in four weeks, despite multiple threats from the U.S. that it would halt billions of dollars in aid, that the leader would satisfy Washington’s concerns.
The Bush administration, Musharraf’s strongest international supporter, had difficulty in pressuring the Pakistani leader to lift the emergency rule he imposed on
Nov. 3 despite the announcement of a State Department review of military aid – exceeding $100 million a month – to the nuclear power.
Much of that aid, including the sale of 36 F-16s approved by Congress last year, goes to building Pakistan’s defense against India instead of counterterrorism
efforts, although the resumption of aid in 2001 was based on Pakistan’s needs to bolster its military to help the U.S. fight global terrorism.
The situation had left the American diplomatic hands tied, analysts have said, because the U.S. can’t actually stop supporting a country that is a vital
ally in fighting Taliban and Al-Qaeda operatives in frontier areas near the Afghani border.
“If we had to cut off aid, we’re probably just shooting ourselves,” said Marvin Weinbaum, former Pakistan analyst at the State
Department’s intelligence research bureau. “It’s indispensable to keep Pakistan an ally. If we want to establish this relationship, we
can’t cut off aid.”
For the coming fiscal year, the Defense Department requested nearly 10 times as much aid for Pakistan -- $780 million – as the $81million slated for India, which
is also a regional ally.
The Pakistan aid figure does not include the $1.7 billion the Bush administration has requested in coalition support funds, which goes mainly to Pakistan and
Jordan for counterterrorism operations along the Afghani and Iraqi borders.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice defended the $10 billion Pakistan has received since 2001 in an ABC News interview Nov. 11. She said the funding “has
largely been for” counterterrorism missions, reform of education and the development of a more open political system and economy.
But nearly 75 percent of the aid goes to military and security-related support and half of the remaining aid is in direct cash transfers to the government, according to
the Congressional Research Service.
The Los Angeles Times recently reported that Pakistan has spent the majority of U.S. aid on military equipment and aircraft used in conventional warfare with rival
India, and not for fighting extremists within the country.
Such aid includes the 36 F-16 fighter jets Congress approved last year under the foreign military sales program, lifting a 15-year embargo instituted because of
concerns about Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities. Pakistan ordered F-16 planes in 1989, but those were never delivered because of the military equipment embargo.
These are an additional order of fighter jets.
Since the Reagan administration in the 1980s, the U.S. has sold F-16s and other advanced military technology to many countries including Venezuela, Israel,
Greece, United Arab Emirates, Singapore and Korea.
F-16s are rarely used in counterterrorism operations and are meant to boost Pakistan’s defense against foreign threats like neighboring India, with which it has
fought three official wars since the countries became sovereign.
Delivery of the F-16s – which began this summer – is ongoing. Half are refurbished, and the others are being manufactured by Lockheed Martin under a $144
million military contract. They will be delivered over the next three years.
Defense Department spokesman Mark Wright said those that have not been delivered are part of the State Department’s aid review, which began when emergency
rule was announced.
Larry Goodson, professor of Middle East studies at the U.S. Army War College, warned that backing out of the commitment would
confirm Pakistani suspicions that the Americans are unreliable.
Even though they aren’t directly used to curb Al-Qaeda operations within Pakistan, the aircraft help the U.S. gain the
government’s support in a war unpopular with Pakistani citizens.
“Our traditional relationship has always centered on the Pakistani military,” Goodson said. “Given the relationship Pakistanis have with the Chinese, it’s no longer
critical (for them) that the U.S. supply that military aid.”
Goodson said building up Pakistan’s defense against a regional rival is not ideal, but historically has been the only way for the U.S. to
gain the country’s support. And some support is better than none.
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US Aid to Pakistan Good - Military Relations
Military is key to Pakistani politics – it remains the most powerful institution and it still retains public
support nationwide
Taheri 11-29
[Amir, "CITIZEN MUSHARRAF," New York Post, November 29, 2007, Access date: 11-29-07
http://www.nypost.com/seven/11292007/postopinion/opedcolumnists/citizen_musharraf_233225.htm ]
BETTER late than never: Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf yesterday officially shed his military uniform and will act as a civilian head of state. He had
promised to make the move as far back as 2004; his failure to do so had been a key theme in his critics' campaign against his rule.
Some critics have even pretended that Musharraf's uniform was the central question of Pakistani politics. But the problem isn't Musharraf's uniform. His switch to
civilian clothes will simply transform another uniform-wearer, new chief Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, into a "strongman."
The reasons for the army's special place in Pakistani politics aren't hard to fathom. It is the only national institution that cuts across
ethnic and regional barriers and offers Pakistanis from all sorts of backgrounds a place on the social ladder.
The traditional political parties are ultimately regional in their basic constituencies; the army appeals to all the four provinces that
make up the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Moreover, the army (while taking pride in its role as the "Defender of the Faith") nurtures a
basically secular-nationalist ideology - based on a vision of Pakistan as a distinct nation, rather than a mere chunk of the greater
Muslim community (ummah).
Despite the undoubted attachment of most of its people to some form of electoral politics, Pakistan remains a nation built around an army.
Paradoxically, even the citizens who most talk of democracy often look to the army as potential savior - a kind of deus ex machina that, at
crucial moments, can intervene to bring the nation out of an impasse . In just over half a century as a state, Pakistan has experienced four military
coups - each initially welcomed by a majority of the people.
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US Aid to Pakistan Good – Relations
Cutting aid to Pakistan would harm relations
Curtis, Senior Research Fellow for South Asia, Heritage Foundation, ‘07
[Lisa A. Curtis, Senior Research Fellow for South Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation.
Before joining Heritage in August 2006, she worked on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as a Professional Staff
Member for three years, handling South Asia issues for the then-chairman of the committee, Sen. Richard Lugar (R-IN).
From 2001-2003, she served as Senior Advisor (White House Appointment) in the State Department's South Asia
Bureau, where she advised the Assistant Secretary on India-Pakistan relations. July 13, 2007 "Bolstering Pakistan
in its Fight Against Extremism," WebMemo #1554, http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/wm1554.cfm
download date: 11-24-07]
Members of Congress are considering conditioning U.S. assistance to Pakistan on its specific actions to counter the al-Qaeda and
Taliban threat, a move that would send the wrong message at a time when the Pakistani government needs and deserves U.S.
support. Pakistanis still remember the United States cutting off assistance in 1990 because of Pakistan's nuclear program. Cutting
or conditioning assistance now would be interpreted as a repeat of that situation and further proof that the United States is not a
reliable partner.
A more effective strategy is to pursue the dual tracks of supporting Pakistan in its offensive against terrorism and extremism (including military
operations in the Tribal Areas) as well as pressing for free and fair elections at the earliest possible date. President Bush reiterated in yesterday's
press conference on progress in Iraq the importance of offering an alternative way of life to extremism and terrorism in order to deny terrorists
more opportunities for recruitment. The need for such an alternative is no less true in Pakistan than it is in other parts of the world.
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IMPACT – South Asia Outweighs
US Aid to South Asia outweighs the case – huge impacts and a huge population in Asia means SSA is
smaller in magnitude
Carpenter, Assistant Administrator For Asia, USAID, ‘96
[Margaret, Federal News Service, Lexis]
In addition, if
Asian countries are to sustain current levels of growth, they must address the underlying
problems that threaten long- term prospects. The global impact of poverty, environmental degradation, and
HIV/AIDs is staggering, in part because of the region's share of the world's population and landmass.
USAID-assisted countries in Asia account for 1.43 billion people, or 43 percent of the developing world
(excluding China). Despite gains in recent years, conditions are still particularly acute in South Asia, where female
literacy is abysmally low, and child malnutrition and mortality are unacceptably high. India has a growing middle class, but it also has more
people living in absolute poverty than in all of Sub-Saharan Africa. The number of HIV cases in Asia now
exceeds cases in Africa. Poverty, malnutrition, disease, and illiteracy may undermine the region's generally
bright economic prospects. If these problems are successfully addressed, Asia could make an even more
important contribution to global prosperity and stability.
Despite these persistent problems, trade and investment opportunities are expanding for U.S. businesses in Asia, thanks in part to economic
reform programs that many Asian countries have launched in recent years. In addition, economic growth in Asia, although rapid, has been
natural-resource depleting. With a six-fold growth in industrial capacity expected in the next 20 years and human populations continuing to
increase, problems such as deforestation, degradation of marine and coastal resources, accumulation of greenhouse gases, and lack of sufficient
urban infrastructure to sustain growing urban populations will become even more evident. Rapid population growth also threatens to erode the
per capita gains from the region's economic growth, placing severe stress on existing social infrastructure.
Results
The results of USAID's programs are impressive. For example, USAID helped Indonesia and the Philippines, two key AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum countries, reduce average tariffs by 20-25 percent, and reduce non-tariff barriers on agricultural
imports. The lifting of Indonesia's ban on soybean imports, for instance, opened a $200 million market to U.S. soybean exporters. In addition,
the U.S.- Asian Environment Partnership (US-AEP) program has generated over $800 million in sales of U.S.
environmental goods and services in Asia, and created 6,000 fulltime equivalent jobs in the U.S. environmental sector.
Recent elections in Bangladesh and Mongolia reaffirm the growing commitment to democracy in the region.
USAID supported Mongolia's parliamentary elections in June, which resulted in a landslide victory of opposition
candidates over their communist opponents. The election outcome is expected to accelerate economic reforms that also are
supported by USAID. USAID's sustained investments in family planning in Asia have dramatically lowered fertility in the world's
most populous region. Over the past thirty years, the average number of children born per mother has fallen from 6 to 3.5 today.
USAID is pleased to have helped Asians achieve successes such as these. Our
experience convinces us that even countries that
were once labeled "basket cases" have made significant strides in key sectors and could continue to progress
with targeted outside assistance. Our experience also indicates that even countries with high economic
growth rates may not be able to sustain their recent achievements without targeted assistance, at least in the short
term. Countries in transition may need assistance over a longer period.
Whether tigers or tortoises, Asian countries will benefit from the kind of assistance USAID has proven to be effective.
We still have a vital role to play in the region, but our ability to do it effectively will depend on the resources
available.
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IMPACT – Nuclear Control
Nuclear weapons safe and secure in Status Quo
Daily Times 12-3-07
[Daily Times (of Pakistan), “Pakistan’s nukes as safe as any other state’s: FO,” download date: 12-5-07
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007%5C12%5C03%5Cstory_3-12-2007_pg7_28 ]
Pakistan’s strategic assets are as safe as that of any other nuclear weapon state and these assets are fully safeguarded and secure
under the protection of a well-established command and control system, a Foreign Office (FO) spokesman said on Sunday.
When his attention was drawn to a news story published by The Guardian on December 1 regarding the safety of Pakistan’s strategic assets, the
spokesman dismissed its contents as “outlandish musings by an academic”.
Commenting further on the irresponsible conjectures about external contingency plans, the spokesman said, “These are very dangerous ideas and
people espousing them should be aware that Pakistan possesses adequate retaliatory capacity to defend its strategic assets and sovereignty.” The
spokesman also rejected the suggestion that there is any danger of Pakistan’s strategic assets falling into the wrong hands.
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IMPACT – Civil War Escalates
Civil war in Pakistan causes immediate nuclear war with India
Ricks ‘01
[Thomas E. Ricks, The Washington Post's Pentagon correspondent, “Worries Over War's Costs, Consequences Some
Fear Regional Destabilization, Retribution Against U.S.,” Washington Post, 21 October 2001,
http://cndyorks.gn.apc.org/news/articles/warconsequences.htm]
The prospect of Pakistan being taken over by Islamic extremists is especially worrisome because it possesses nuclear weapons.
The betting among military strategists is that India, another nuclear power, would not stand idly by, if it appeared that the Pakistani
nuclear arsenal were about to fall into the hands of extremists. A preemptive action by India to destroy Pakistan's nuclear stockpile
could provoke a new war on the subcontinent. The U.S. military has conducted more than 25 war games involving a confrontation
between a nuclear-armed India and Pakistan, and each has resulted in nuclear war, said retired Air Force Col. Sam Gardiner, an expert on
strategic games. Having both the United States and India fighting Muslims would play into the hands of bin Laden , warned Mackubin
Owens, a strategist at the Naval War College in Newport, R.I. "He could point out once again that this is the new crusade ," Owens said. The next
step that worries experts is the regional effect of turmoil in Pakistan. If its government fell, the experts fear, other Muslim
governments friendly to the United States, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, might follow suit. "The ultimate nightmare is a panIslamic regime that possesses both oil and nuclear weapons," said Harlan Ullman, a defense analyst at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies.
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IMPACT – Indo-Pak War Escalation
Any Indo-Pak war will go nuclear immediately
Rogotham, Associate Editor of a Technology Journal from Bangalore, ’02
[S. “Time to pull Pak’s Nuke Fangs out”, South Asia Analysis Group, paper no. 472, April 6,
http://www.boloji.com/analysis/040.htm ]
When one adds other factors like the immense hatred that Musharraf – the ‘guru’ of the Army of Islam, the man who exported terrorists in huge
numbers while heading the Northern Areas army set-up, and the architect of Kargil -- and most of his military feel for India and Hindus and the
fact that all that hatred cannot match up to India’s conventional as well as nuclear superiority, a nuclear attack by Pakistan seems a very real
possibility, notwithstanding all the assurances that Musharraf might now give. If he could raise the nuclear bogey at the height of prebattle tensions, there’s no saying what he might do once war actually begins. Indeed, from a reading of so-called strategic literature, it
becomes clear that as soon as India launches a conventional attack on almost any of its few strategic military assets, Pakistani
military minds will become so hot that they will immediately look for the nuclear button . Because of its extreme inferiority to India’s
conventional strength, Pakistan’s idea of deterrence is using nuclear threats to deter India from even launching a conventional attack. While that
itself lowers the nuclear threshold considerably, Khalid Kidwai’s ‘four conditions’ bring it lower still. It’s almost as if Pakistan is saying, “if
it’s war, it must be nuclear war.” In effect, Pakistani military writers like retired Col EAS Bokhari (Defence Journal) and Rai Muhammed
Saleh Azam (Pakistan Institute for Air Defence Studies) have said since 1998 that Pakistan will go nuclear if its armed forces come under
strain, if the port of Karachi is blockaded and supplies cut off, if its nuclear establishments (especially, Kahuta) are targeted or the Sargodha PAF
airbase is attacked.
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IMPACT – Indo-Pak War Escalation
Indo-Pak War escalates to planetary Nuclear Winter
Business Recorder 2000
[December 17]
India has suffered modest economic sanctions for its muscular nuclear and missile profiles. But the global worry over its
domestically popular aspirations to big power status has rocketed because of the ongoing conflict in Kashmir. Pakistan has sought
to match India bomb for bomb and missile for missile. And the greatest causes belli for warring between the South Asian rivals is
Kashmir, which has already sparked two such clashes. But they came before India and Pakistan could engage in nuclear volleys
that could menace the entire planet with nuclear winter or a variation of that apocalypse. It is the potential for nuclear exchanges
over Kashmir that has prompted President Bill Clinton and his national security advisors to characterize the disputed territory as
the most dangerous place on the earth.
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IMPACT – Deterrence fails to prevent India-Pakistan War
Religious animosity makes deterrence breakdown in South Asia increasingly likely
Krepon, President Emeritus, Stimson Center, ‘04
[Michael, “The Stability Instability Paradox, Misperception and Escalation Control in South Asia,” The Stimson Center,
November 2004, http://www.stimson.org/southasia/pdf/ESCCONTROLCHAPTER1.pdf ]
The concepts of escalation control and stable nuclear deterrence presume rational decisions by rational actors, even in the deepest
crisis. There are, however, extremist groups in Pakistan and India that would view the advent of crisis as an opportunity rather than
as a problem to be contained. Western deterrence theorists never had to address the factors of religious extremism and jihad. Deterrence
optimists also presume that “Murphy’s Law” does not apply to nuclear weapons—at least not to the extent that an accident or a chain reaction of
miscalculation, error, chance, or misuse of authority would lead to a crossing of the nuclear threshold. These presumptions were rather generous
during the Cold War, as have been amply documented. Additional reasons for pessimism are rooted in uncertainties associated with the
nuclear equation in South Asia. It is hard for Indian and Pakistani officials to predict with accuracy the holdings of the other side.
In the early phases of a nuclear rivalry, opacity is considered essential to deterrence. Moreover, India and Pakistan rely primarily on human
intelligence on nuclear matters, since national technical means are minimal. Human intelligence can be spotty and unreliable. The
potential for misestimating an adversary’s nuclear holdings is therefore considerable . One can envision how misestimates might be
stabilizing, if imperfect intelligence reinforces caution in a crisis. Misestimates could also be destabilizing, if the reverse is true. Even if both
adversaries are aware of the nuclear balance and acknowledge its equality, there are no guarantees against adventurism. Indeed, the first tenet of
the stability-instability paradox predicts adventurism.
South Asia is not analogous to the US-Soviet deterrence framework. Any change in military
capabilities could undermine the balance
Shepard, New Content Coordinator, Jane’s Information Group, ‘01
[Ben, “Ballistic Missiles in South Asia: Ramifications for Regional Stability,” Foreign policy Studies, April 5, 2001,
http://www.brookings.edu/fp/projects/south_asia/events/20010405.htm ]
When examining nuclear proliferation between India and Pakistan, it is important to bear in mind that nuclear weapons may have a greater
influence on the regions stability than they had between the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. There has been an ascending view
that nuclear weapons during the Cold War had little effect in keeping the peace because the superpowers were generally satisfied
with the status quo. The successful coexistence between the East and West was possible because there was literally no sphere of influence
where dominance was a truly vital interest to both superpowers at once19. The opposite can be said for India and Pakistan where, with
their territorial dispute over Kashmir, the two countries are by no means satisfied powers. Competition for Kashmir led to a second
war in 1965 and today prompts constant small-arms fire and low level violence20. Both countries consider control over their part of
Kashmir vital to their national character. Centuries old Hindu-Muslim antagonisms remains a central factor, even among the governing
elite's in both countries, and the three wars fought between the two since gaining independence have left a legacy of deep mistrust.
The level of antagonism that exists between the two states combined with the border dispute of Kashmir that threatens to undermine the very
legitimacy the two states were founded in 1947, signifies the two powers are not satisfied with the status quo. The Kargil conflict in 1999 all too
clearly demonstrated the continuing fragility of this region. The level of tolerance that does exist between Islamabad and New Delhi can not be
equal to that existed between the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War where they were essentially satisfied powers.
Considering nuclear weapons look to have a strong influence on the regions security and this role could increase with the demise of the
conventional 'balance-imbalance,' any changes to either sides nuclear capabilities could have significant implications for the regions
security.
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IMPACT - Taliban Bad
Taliban success in Afghanistan leads to a civil war and a coup in Pakistan
Morgan, political psychologist, ‘07
[Stephen John, “Better another Taliban Afghanistan than a Taliban nuclear Pakistan!?” March 4,
http://searchwarp.com/swa136273.htm download date: 11-20-07]
Musharraf probably hopes that by giving de facto autonomy to the Taliban and Pashtun leaders now with a virtual free hand for cross border operations into
Afghanistan, he will undercut any future upsurge in support for a break-away independent Pashtunistan state or a “Peoples’ War" of the Pashtun populace as a
whole, as he himself described it. However events may prove him sorely wrong. Indeed, his policy could completely backfire upon him. As the war intensifies, he
has no guarantees that the current autonomy may yet burgeon into a separatist movement. Appetite comes with eating, as they say. Moreover, should the
Taliban fail to re-conquer al of Afghanistan, as looks likely, but captures at least half of the country, then a Taliban Pashtun
caliphate could be established which would act as a magnet to separatist Pashtuns in Pakistan. Then, the likely break up of
Afghanistan along ethnic lines, could, indeed, lead the way to the break up of Pakistan, as well.
Strong centrifugal forces have always bedevilled the stability and unity of Pakistan, and , in the context of the new world situation, the
country could be faced with civil wars and popular fundamentalist uprisings, probably including a military-fundamentalist coup
d’état.
Fundamentalism is deeply rooted in Pakistan society. The fact that in the year following 9/11, the most popular name given to male children born that year was
“Osama" (not a Pakistani name) is a small indication of the mood. Given the weakening base of the traditional, secular opposition parties,
conditions would be ripe for a coup d’état by the fundamentalist wing of the Army and ISI, leaning on the radicalised masses to
take power. Some form of radical, military Islamic regime, where legal powers would shift to Islamic courts and forms of shira law
would be likely. Although, even then, this might not take place outside of a protracted crisis of upheaval and civil war conditions,
mixing fundamentalist movements with nationalist uprisings and sectarian violence between the Sunni and minority Shia
populations.
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IMPACT - Taliban Bad
Pakistan government collapse bring a Taliban-style government and nuclear war with both India and
Israel
Morgan, political psychologist, ‘07
[Stephen John, “Better another Taliban Afghanistan than a Taliban nuclear Pakistan!?” March 4,
http://searchwarp.com/swa136273.htm download date: 11-20-07]
Should Pakistan break down completely, a Taliban-style government with strong Al Qaeda influence is a real possibility. Such
deep chaos would, of course, open a “Pandora's box" for the region and the world. With the possibility of unstable clerical and
military fundamentalist elements being in control of the Pakistan nuclear arsenal, not only their use against India, but Israel
becomes a possibility, as well as the acquisition of nuclear and other deadly weapons secrets by Al Qaeda.
Invading Pakistan would not be an option for America. Therefore a nuclear war would now again become a real strategic possibility. This
would bring a shift in the tectonic plates of global relations. It could usher in a new Cold War with China and Russia pitted against
the US.
Extremist take-over in Pakistan causes Indian pre-emption, regional instability, and nuclear war
Ricks ‘01
[Thomas E. Ricks, The Washington Post's Pentagon correspondent, “Worries Over War's Costs, Consequences Some
Fear Regional Destabilization, Retribution Against U.S.,” Washington Post, October 21, 2001,
http://cndyorks.gn.apc.org/news/articles/warconsequences.htm ]
The prospect of Pakistan being taken over by Islamic extremists is especially worrisome because it possesses nuclear weapons.
The betting among military strategists is that India, another nuclear power, would not stand idly by, if it appeared that the Pakistani
nuclear arsenal were about to fall into the hands of extremists. A preemptive action by India to destroy Pakistan's nuclear stockpile
could provoke a new war on the subcontinent. The U.S. military has conducted more than 25 war games involving a confrontation
between a nuclear-armed India and Pakistan, and each has resulted in nuclear war, said retired Air Force Col. Sam Gardiner, an expert on
strategic games. Having both the United States and India fighting Muslims would play into the hands of bin Laden , warned Mackubin
Owens, a strategist at the Naval War College in Newport, R.I. "He could point out once again that this is the new crusade," Owens said. The next
step that worries experts is the regional effect of turmoil in Pakistan. If its government fell, the experts fear, other Muslim
governments friendly to the United States, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, might follow suit. "The ultimate nightmare is a panIslamic regime that possesses both oil and nuclear weapons," said Harlan Ullman, a defense analyst at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies.
Coup of Musharraf will lead to an immediate nuclear attack on India
Rogotham, Associate Editor of a Technology Journal from Bangalore, ‘02
[S. “Time to pull Pak’s Nuke Fangs out”, South Asia Analysis Group, paper no. 472, April 6,
http://www.boloji.com/analysis/040.htm ]
More worrying than anything else is the very real possibility of a coup against Musharraf by someone even more hot-headed and
fundamentalistic. Should such a coup happen – and there’s plenty of activity towards it in Pakistan today – India may suffer a pre-
emptive, or even an accidental, nuclear attack much before it has had time to even react to the coup. For, such a coup will probably
have been led by elements of the ISI, senior military generals, the Al Qaeda , Jaish e Mohammed, Lashkar e Taiyyaba and other
terrorist groups. Already, Pakistan, which had supposedly separated nuclear weapon components and pushed them to different places as soon
as US troops landed in that country for the war on terrorism, is said to have brought together these components and moved them to the
borders. Media reports and Pakistani official statements indicate that weapons are ready to be mated with delivery systems and fired
– and the war hasn’t even begun yet!
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Impact Extension: Afghanistan Collapse  US hegemony decline and more terrorism
Failure in Afghanistan guts U.S. credibility, global security, and increases terrorism
L.A. Times, ‘07
[Los Angeles Times, “Don't fail Afghanistan,” August 27, 2007,
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-ed-afghanistan27aug27,0,3029831.story?coll=la-opinion-leftrail ]
The United States is now at risk of "losing" Afghanistan, the predictable result of committing insufficient troops and money to that
catastrophically failed state after the rout of the Taliban in 2001. U.S. forces are suffering sharply higher casualties as Taliban fighters surge back
in, and drug lords are coming to dominate the political and economic landscape. The collapse of the noble nation-building experiment in
Afghanistan would destroy U.S. credibility in the eyes of the world, shake global security and condemn millions of people to
another generation of warfare and terrorism. And it would be all the more devastating if accompanied by U.S. defeat in Iraq. Yet the effort
to build a stable nation atop the wreckage of Afghanistan can still, with great effort, be salvaged.
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Impact Extension: Taliban Victory  NATO Collapse
A. Taliban success in Afghanistan will be blamed on NATO
New York Times ‘07
[By Sarah Chaves, “NATO Didn’t Lose Afghanistan”, July 10,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/10/opinion/10chayes.html?ex=13 41720000&en=0cfae1f45 ce41eaf&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss ]
WHEN things go wrong — touchdown passes are missed, products come out defective, wars are lost — it is typical to blame the
equipment, or the help. In the case of the unraveling situation in Afghanistan, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has become
the favorite whipping boy of American officials and military personnel. NATO countries aren’t sending enough troops, we hear. Those
who do arrive are constrained by absurd caveats that prevent them from engaging in combat. NATO lost Helmand Province to the Taliban. In
fact, after watching rotation after military rotation cycle through here since late 2001, I see NATO as an improvement over its American
predecessors.
B. The Afghanistan mission is Key to NATO’s survival. Failure there would destroy the credibility of
the Alliance
Scheffer, NATO Secretary General, ‘04
[General Jaap De Hoop, NATO Secretary General, Speech at 2004 European Symposium, National Defense
University in Washington DC, January 29 2004, access date: 10-12-07
http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2004&m=January&x=20040130173028FRllehctiM0.564953 ]
Our first, and immediate priority is to get Afghanistan right. We cannot afford to fail. My predecessor, Lord Robertson, said that if we
don't go to Afghanistan, Afghanistan will come to us. He was right. No country knows that more clearly than this one. NATO's Afghanistan
mission may be halfway around the world, but its success matters to our security right here. If the political process fails, that
country will become, once again, a haven for the terrorists who threaten us, for the drugs that end up on our streets. There is another
problem as well. If we fail in Afghanistan - if we do not meet our commitments to the people of that country to help them build a
better future - then who will have confidence in us again? Our credibility - as NATO, as the Euro-Atlantic community - is on the
line. And credibility is one of our strongest assets. To preserve it, we have no choice but to succeed. Just think of the implications
of success, even if we still have a long way to go. Peace and security for people who have suffered terribly for decades. A major terrorist haven
shut down for good. A more stable region. And an illustration of the power, and the potential, of transatlantic cooperation to achieve
massive change for the better. For all these reasons, Afghanistan is my priority number one. But going to Afghanistan isn't enough. A
simple presence in the capital, while important, isn't enough. We must do more. We have to spread security beyond the capital, to the provinces.
We have to buttress the credibility and the authority of the Karzai Government. We have to protect and nurture the very fragile political process,
to build on the success of the recent Loya Jirga and lay the foundation for free and fair elections to be held in the summer. And as part of that, the
international community has to beat back any attempts by recidivist members of the Taliban to choke the peace and the progress in
Afghanistan that is only now beginning to take root.
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Impact Extension: Taliban Victory  NATO Collapse
C. Collapse of NATO causes multiple escalatory nuclear wars
Duffield, Assistant Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs, Virginia, ‘94
[John Duffield, Assistant Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia, POLITICAL SCIENCE
QUARTERLY 109, 1994, p. 766-7.]
Initial analyses of NATO's future prospects overlooked at least three important factors that have helped to ensure the alliance's enduring
relevance. First, they underestimated the extent to which external threats sufficient to help justify the preservation of the alliance would continue
to exist. In fact, NATO still serves to secure its members against a number of actual or potential dangers emanating from outside
their territory. These include not only the residual threat posed by Russian military power, but also the relatively new concerns
raised by conflicts in neighboring regions. Second , the pessimists failed to consider NATO's capacity for institutional adaptation. Since the
end of the cold war, the alliance has begun to develop two important new functions. NATO is increasingly seen as having a
significant role to play in containing and controlling militarized conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe. And, at a deeper level, it
works to prevent such conflicts from arising at all by actively promoting stability within the former Soviet bloc. Above all, NATO
pessimists overlooked the valuable intra-alliance functions that the alliance has always performed and that remain relevant after the
cold war. Most importantly, NATO has helped stabilize Western Europe, whose states had often been bitter rivals in the past. By
damping the security dilemma and providing an institutional mechanism for the development of common security policies, NATO
has contributed to making the use of force in relations among the countries of the region virtually inconceivable. In all these ways,
NATO clearly serves the interests of its European members. But even the United States has a significant stake in preserving a peaceful and
prosperous Europe. In addition to strong transatlantic historical and cultural ties, American economic interests in Europe— as a leading market
for U.S. products, as a source of valuable imports, and as the host for considerable direct foreign investment by American companies — remain
substantial. If history is any guide, moreover, the United States could easily be drawn into a future major war in Europe, the
consequences of which would likely be even more devastating than those of the past, given the existence of nuclear weapons.
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Afghanistan is the key testing ground for NATO
Sands, ‘07
[David R. Sands, Washington Times correspondent, “Afghan offensive to test NATO 'credibility'; Envoy salutes U.S. alliance,”
The Washington Times, April 18, 2007, Lexis/Nexis]
The United States and its NATO allies are making progress in Afghanistan but face a critical test of the alliance's credibility from an
expected spring offensive from the Islamist insurgency, Dutch Ambassador to the United States Christiaan Mark Johan Kroner said in an interview yesterday.
The U.S. and Dutch armies are among the few NATO countries carrying out the bulk of the military operations against resurgent Taliban and al Qaeda forces in
Afghanistan's restive south and east. The 2,100-member Dutch force has taken command of the volatile southern sector from Canada, but several NATO powers
have placed restrictions known as "caveats" on the deployment of their forces to Afghanistan's more dangerous regions. The war is a "critical test of
NATO's credibility," Mr. Kroner said in a luncheon with editors and reporters at The Washington Times. "If NATO does not succeed there, it will
be a disaster not just for Afghanistan and the region but for NATO itself," the veteran Dutch diplomat said. "It would certainly be a blow
to the credibility of the West to deal with a crisis."
Afghan mission is the crucial test case for NATO’s future
Dale, Director, Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, ’07
[Helle. “Afghanistan is a true test for NATO”, February 22, Heritage Foundation,
http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed022207a.cfm ]
While the attention of Washington is focused on Iraq, the other military front in the struggle against militant Islam is warming up. Afghanistan
has until now shown better promise of success than Iraq. Yet there are clear signs that this spring will be an intensely challenging time for the
Afghan government and for the NATO coalition forces operating to support it. We are being warned that a Taliban spring offensive is in the
works, and how NATO responds will be crucial, both for the future of Afghanistan and for NATO as well. The demise of the
NATO alliance has been pronounced any number of times since the end of the Cold War (and before for that matter), and the
search for reasons for its continued relevance has been on ever since the disappearance of the Soviet Union. As Europe and the
United States have found growing areas of disagreement, particularly in public opinion, the cohesive tissue represented by NATO has
become at once both more important and harder to protect. Furthermore, in the context of growing EU ambitions to have its own foreign
policy and its military chain of command and missions, as distinct from those of NATO, it is an alliance that is under strain. Here, Afghanistan
takes on crucial importance. It really is a test case for NATO's future out of area operations, a fact that no NATO member would
dispute.
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Impact Extension: Afghanistan Key to NATO
Failure in Afghanistan would be the end of NATO
Dale, Director, Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, ’07
[Helle. “Afghanistan is a true test for NATO”, February 22, Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed022207a.cfm ]
A similarly strong message was delivered by Sen. John McCain in Munich the week before, as he challenged NATO members to
lift the caveats on their troop deployments that are preventing them from acting effectively and cohesively. He also agitated for
more troops, at least matching the projected U.S. troop increase of 3,000. Both speakers noted that we need this to provide stability
to increase the size of the Afghan military standing currently at 30,000, less than half of what is needed. Mr. McCain was explicit
about the meaning of Afghanistan for the future of NATO, and his analysis is spot on. "Failure in Afghanistan risks reversion to its
pre-9/11 role as a sanctuary for al Qaeda terrorists with global reach, a defeat that would embolden Islamic extremists, and the rise
of an unencumbered narcostate... If NATO does not prevail in Afghanistan, it is difficult to imagine the alliance undertaking
another "hard security" operation -- in or out of area and its credibility would suffer a grievous blow." In the world of the 21st
century with its less predictable international environment and its asymmetrical threats, preserving alliances is as important as
ever, for the United States and Europe alike.
Failure in Afghanistan would end the NATO alliance
Diehl, 2k4
[Jackson, Washington Post, "NATo's 'Myth' in Afghanistan," July 5, Page A17,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A28163-2004Jul4.html ]
The sad part is that, behind all the spin, the old Pentagon gibe is looking more and more apt. Having expanded to include most of Central Europe, and resolved to
address the threats of the 21st century, America's most important international partnership is on the brink of a crippling failure, one that would
leave a President Kerry as well as a second-term Bush with little to work with. The threat lies not in Iraq -- where continued transatlantic discord in fact makes a
full-blown NATO operation impossible -- but in Afghanistan, which NATO long ago adopted as a major ongoing mission. Last year the allies
resolved to expand a modest peacekeeping force in Kabul to provincial centers around the country, an operation critical to bolstering the authority of the weak proWestern government and making possible the national elections planned for this year. Yet, after months and months of haggling, European governments were only
barely able to commit at Istanbul to staffing three new provincial centers, each with a couple of hundred troops. The cup-rattling forced on Secretary General Jaap
de Hoop Scheffer was humiliating: With 26 nations and 5 million men in arms to draw on, Scheffer struggled to obtain just three helicopters for the Afghan
operation. A desperate appeal for more help by Afghan President Hamid Karzai to the Istanbul summit essentially went unanswered. A promise was
made to supply a couple of thousand more troops at the time of the elections, but no one knows where they will come from. At best, NATO will have 8,400 troops
under its command in Afghanistan by the fall, or about a fifth of the number it dispatched to tiny Kosovo in 1999. The United States has some 14,000 troops in the
country, but none are under NATO's command. It now looks possible that the Afghan elections will be postponed because of lack of security. If
so, NATO will get much of the blame -- and the consequences for the alliance's cohesion may be dire. "Afghanistan is the litmus
test for NATO's new mission," says a European ambassador in Washington. "If we fail in Afghanistan we might as well fold up and go home,
because no one will take us seriously after that."
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NATO Key to Hegemony
NATO is key to maintaining U.S. hegemony
Rühle, Head of Policy Planning, NATO Political Affairs Division, ‘03
[Michael Rühle, PARAMETERES, Summer 2003, http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/03summer/ruhle.htm]
Despite the fundamental need for change, NATO could take on this reexamination of its internal relationships with considerable self-confidence.
After all, 9/11 did not change everything. Despite some American claims that Europe was “fading slowly in the US rearview mirror,” there is a
transatlantic connection that has become too firmly entrenched to be easily jettisoned. First, European stability remains a key US strategic
interest. The consolidation of Europe as an undivided, democratic, and market-oriented space remains a major objective of US
security policy. Only in NATO, the central legitimizing framework for US power in Europe, can the United States play an
undisputed leadership role in advancing this strategic objective. Thus, the United States is not likely to surrender this role. Indeed, many
US critics of Europe have yet to grasp the fact that both NATO enlargement and the war on terrorism have actually increased the United States’
immersion in European security affairs. Consequently, there is no serious political force in the United States advocating a withdrawal from
Europe. Second, Europeans remain the key strategic allies for the United States. This statement does not exclude a stronger US focus on
other regions, nor is it contradicted by the emergence of much wider “coalitions of the willing” along the model provided by the Afghanistan
campaign. Europe’s military capabilities lag behind the United States, yet on a global scale, Europe ranks No. 2 militarily. Moreover,
although the debate preceding the war against Iraq may have suggested otherwise, it is only in Europe where the United States finds a
milieu of countries predisposed to working with the United States. In Asia, by contrast, the United States will have to continue to
rely on bilateral relationships with politically and culturally very different countries. In short, if the United States wants to remain
the world’s predominant power, it will have to remain a “European power” as well. Third, the United States remains Europe’s
most important ally. The United States continues to play a unique role within the transatlantic relationship, as a political crisis
manager as well as a military coalition-builder, both within Europe (e.g., the Balkans) and beyond (e.g., the Persian Gulf). This
unique US role is widely accepted by the Europeans, notwithstanding ritualistic European criticism of US arrogance or heavy-handedness. As in
the United States, there is currently no serious political force in Europe that would advocate a US withdrawal from the continent. On the contrary,
with Central and Eastern Europe rejoining the Atlantic community of nations through the enlargement of NATO, the number of countries arguing
for a strong US role in Europe has only increased.
Europe is the only place we can find allied support for the U.S. – can’t project power without it
Hulsman, Senior Research Fellow, Heritage Foundation, ‘05
[John C. Hulsman, Ph.D. Senior Research Fellow for European Affairs at Heritage, TESTIMONY, February 6, 2005,
http://wwwa.house.gov/international_relations/109/hul021605.pdf ]
Whatever the global issue be it tracking down al-Qaeda, the Doha free trade round, Iran's efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction, the ArabIsraeli conflict, or Iraq the United States simply cannot act effectively without the support of at least some European powers. But neither is
the world one in which a concert of powers dominates. Whatever the issue, the U.S. remains first among equals. The structural reality makes
America's courting of allies vital, for maddeningly the world we live in is not something out of a political science textbook it is
neither genuinely unipolar nor multipolar. So if America is chairman of the board, but there are other board members, where is
the U.S. to find allies? Both now and well into the future there is really only one place. Europe is the only part of the world
where political, diplomatic, military, and economic power can be generated in sufficient strength to support American policies
effectively. The cluster of international powers in Europe led by the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Poland has no
parallel. Given this reality, it is important for American to follow the sage advice offered by a very odd source, the Rolling Stones' Keith Richards. He is
reputed to have said to Mick Jagger during one of their periodic spats when Jagger is reported to have threatened quitting, 'It's bigger than the both of us,
darling. You'll be back tomorrow.' This is the unsentimental, unromantic geostrategic reality of the dawn of the 21st century. We simply need each other
too much to let the genuine disagreements emanating from Iraq derail the only hope for global stability in this dangerous age.
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NATO Key to Hegemony
Europe is key to coalitions that support U.S. hegemony
Hulsman, Senior Research Fellow, Heritage Foundation, ‘05
[John C. Hulsman, Ph.D. Senior Research Fellow for European Affairs at Heritage, TESTIMONY, February 6, 2005,
http://wwwa.house.gov/international_relations/109/hul021605.pdf ]
Only by grounding American policy prescriptions in a new, more realistic view of Europe will it prove possible to escape from the reactive
nature of recent American efforts to deal with the bewildering continent. During his trip, President Bush should follow Burke's adage of looking
at things as they are as a mantra as he visits Belgium, Germany, and Slovakia. By following Burke's adage it becomes clear that "Europe" is less
than its admirers claim and more than its detractors admit. It is clear that European countries remain the foundation of all future coalitions
that the U.S. can assemble well into the future, with the UK playing a critical role in their formation. It is also true that the United States
simply cannot act effectively in the world without at least some European allies, whatever the issue. Furthermore, Europe is not the
monolith many Gaullist centralizers would have Americans believe; it shows amazing diversity, whether the issues are economic,
military, or political. Europe is ultimately a hodgepodge, and this perfectly suits American.
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Impact Module: NATO Soft Power
A. NATO is key to US soft power – multiple reasons.
Asmus, Senior Fellow, German Marshal Fund, ‘04
[Ronald D. Asmus, a Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States and a Senior Adjunct
Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is the author of Opening NATO's Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself
for a New Era and served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from 1997 to 2000, 5/27/04,
“A Progressive Blueprint for Repairing the Trans-Atlantic Relationship”, Center for American Progress, date accessed 7/30/06,
http://www.americanprogress.org/site/pp.asp?c=biJRJ8OVF&b=83346 ]
In contrast, there are four reasons why American progressives still view the trans-Atlantic relationship as central to U.S. foreign
policy. First, a progressive foreign policy does not view American power or hegemony as a goal in itself. Rather, we see American
strength as the means both to defend our country and to promote a world order in which liberal democratic principles and
values can thrive. American power and credibility derive from the principles we stand for, not just our innate power. We believe
that America and Europe are natural allies and partners in promoting such a world because we share those principles and
values. Progressives spent much of the 1990s building a post-Cold War trans-Atlantic strategic partnership that could confront the
challenges and threats of a new Europe and a new era. A central premise of the Clinton administration's policy toward Europe was that the
Alliance needed to be transformed and reoriented for an increasingly interdependent and globalized world. For progressives , the lesson of
Sept. 11 is not the need to maximize American power and freedom of action, but to mobilize our allies and the world behind
us. We want to build on the accomplishments of the 1990s, not jettison them. Our vision is one in which America better defends itself by
reinventing rather than discarding our alliances. If the United States cannot cooperate effectively with its closest allies in Europe, with whom
can we work? Second, in addition to a philosophical commitment to the U.S.-European relationship, progressives consider Europe to be a
critical ally of the United States in a very practical sense. It is the single largest potential source of financial assistance and military
manpower in the world – as well as key votes in many multilateral fora. While the United States undoubtedly retains the option of
acting alone, there are very real limits and risks to such an approach (see: Overcoming Iraq). Third, there are domestic reasons for
progressives to support a close U.S.-European partnership. Public opinion polls repeatedly show that Americans are willing to
play an active world role, especially after Sept. 11. However, they do not want to shoulder the burden alone. They want an
effective multilateralist foreign policy and the naturally look to Europe for support. The great lengths to which the administration
has gone to emphasize the coalition of the willing in Iraq and the often modest contributions of its members underscores the political
requirement not to be seen as acting unilaterally. Fourth, progressives view working with Europe and through trans-Atlantic democratic
alliances as providing a unique form of political and moral legitimacy. The United States, Canada and Europe are the leading Western
democracies, and cooperation with and among them can provide the United States the kind of moral legitimacy necessary – at
home and abroad – to achieve its global goals. For progressives, working with Europe must be a cornerstone of any future world order
and central to reform of global institutions such as the United Nations. In sum, progressives reject the intellectual and political logic that has
driven many on the right to downgrade or abandon the trans-Atlantic relationship. While certainly critical of Europe at times, they believe
that the recent crisis across the Atlantic is largely attributable to bad policy and worse diplomacy, rather than to the sudden emergence of
ostensibly incompatible strategic cultures among the world's leading Western democracies. Democratic Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and
Harry Truman created the "arsenal of democracy," the United Nations and the Atlantic Alliance, at a time when the U.S.-European power gap
was far greater than it is today. For these reasons, repairing the trans-Atlantic relationship is a top foreign policy priority for
progressives.
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Impact Module: NATO Soft Power
B. Soft power key to prevent a Nuclear War and create good relations with North Korea
Datta, grad student in political science, U.C. Davis, ‘04
[Monti. “U.S. policy toward a nuclear North Korea” Issue #67, April 2004,
http://bad.eserver.org/issues/2004/67/datta.html ]
What would the United States have to lose in normalizing diplomatic relations with North Korea? The U.S. could avoid the devastating
nuclear holocaust that would ensue if North Korea continues to feel threatened or isolated and decides to retaliate against an
invasion/regime change. What North Korean diplomat would not want to be respectfully, properly received by the White House?
After all, a large part of East Asian culture has to deal with the concept of "saving face," which means that a leader or an official has to
look as if he is being well taken care of, or catered to, in order for someone to get him do to what is needed. There has been enough armtwisting between Washington and Pyongyang, and now is the time for hand shaking.
Second, engage economically with North Korea and gain access to the populace. The U.S. must renegotiate the 1994 Agreed Framework in good
faith and finally deliver on its promise of normalizing economic trade and finishing the construction of the two light water reactors it had
originally promised North Korean over ten years ago under the Clinton Administration. Washington should pursue an aggressive strategy with
Pyongyang to allow American corporations to start investing in business ventures with North Korea . With an infusion of economic support,
America will be able to have a significant amount of influence over North Korea in terms of soft power, such as the media and
popular culture. Through the venue of economic engagement, America will be able to wield a tremendous amount of influence
over the thoughts and opinions and attitudes of North Koreans who come to frequent quintessential American institutions such as
McDonalds and who come to watch popular movies like "Spider-Man." Ultimately, soft power is more effective than hard power.
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Impact Extension Module: NATO stop Terrorism
NATO key to prevent terrorism
Lansford, University of Southern Mississippi, ‘02
[All For One: Terrorism, NATO and the United States p. 6-7 ]
The role of NATO in future operations against global terrorist networks forms the central theme of the conclusion to the study.
It concentrates on the issues involved in deepening and widening the Alliance. The final chapter also explores the growing relationship between NATO and the
EU, especially as the Union endeavors to develop its own autonomous military capabilities. The attacks on 11 September 2001 confirmed the need for a
recalculation of national security policy. The attacks demonstrated that the geographic isolation of the United States no longer served as
its main protection from attack. However, the record of the Alliance demonstrated the utility of cooperation and collaboration
in defense matters. Although the changed security environment has reduced the need for large conventional armies, it has
confirmed the need for specialized military units and increased intelligence assets. It has also affirmed the importance of shared
assets. Fortunately, the policies of cooperation that were instrumental in the evolution of NATO are the same policies that are
optimal in confronting the new security threats faced by the West.
B. Terrorism could cause extinction
Pacotti, ‘03
[March 31, “Are we doomed yet?” http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2003/03/31/knowledge/index.html ]
A similar trend has appeared in proposed solutions to high-tech terrorist threats. Advances in biotech, chemistry, and other fields are
expanding the power of individuals to cause harm, and this has many people worried. Glenn E. Schweitzer and Carole C. Dorsch, writing
for The Futurist, gave this warning in 1999: "Technological advances threaten to outdo anything terrorists have done before;
superterrorism has the potential to eradicate civilization as we know it." Schweitzer and Dorsch are so alarmed that they go on to say,
"Civil liberties are important for a democratic society; the time has arrived, however, to reconfigure some aspects of democracy, given the
violence that is on the doorstep." The Sept. 11 attacks have obviously added credence to their opinions. In 1999, they recommended an expanded
role for the CIA, "greater government intervention" in Americans' lives, and the "honorable deed" of "whistle-blowing" -- proposals that went
from fringe ideas to policy options and talk-show banter in less than a year. Taken together, their proposals aim to gather information from
companies and individuals and feed that information into government agencies. A network of cameras positioned on street corners would nicely
complement their vision of America during the 21st century. If after Sept. 11 and the anthrax scare these still sound like wacky Orwellian ideas to
you, imagine how they will sound the day a terrorist opens a jar of Ebola-AIDS spores on Capitol Hill. As Sun Microsystems' chief scientist, Bill
Joy, warned: "We have yet to come to terms with the fact that the most compelling 21st-century technologies -- robotics, genetic
engineering, and nanotechnology -- pose a different threat than the technologies that have come before. Specifically, robots, engineered
organisms, and nanobots share a dangerous amplifying factor: They can self-replicate. A bomb is blown up only once -- but one
bot can become many, and quickly get out of control. " Joy calls the new threats "knowledge-enabled mass destruction." To cause great
harm to millions of people, an extreme person will need only dangerous knowledge, which itself will move through the biosphere ,
encoded as matter, and flit from place to place as easily as dangerous ideas now travel between our minds. In the information age, dangerous
knowledge can be copied and disseminated at light speed, and it threatens everyone. Therefore, Joy's perfectly reasonable conclusion is that we
should relinquish "certain kinds of knowledge." He says that it is time to reconsider the open, unrestrained pursuit of knowledge that has been the
foundation of science for 300 years. "[D]espite the strong historical precedents, if open access to and unlimited development of knowledge
henceforth puts us all in clear danger of extinction, then common sense demands that we reexamine even these basic, long-held beliefs."
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A. NATO is key to the U.S. Economy
Hillen, Director, Program on National Security Program, Foreign Policy Research Institute, Hertiage Foundation , ‘96
[John, “Getting NATO Back to Basics” The Heritage Foundation – Policy Brief #1067, February 7,
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/BG1067.cfm ]
NATO is needed to provide general economic and political stability in Europe, which is vitally important to the U.S. economy. A major power
threat to Europe would cause economic disruption that would be devastating to U.S. markets and economic stability. The U.S. economy is greatly
dependent on the economic stability of America's principal trading partners, and access to trade and resources in Europe is a vital American
interest. Europe is America's second largest trading region and accounts for billions of dollars in two-way trade per year. Many millions of jobs
in the United States are directly dependent upon American trade with Europe and European investment in the U.S. The prosperity of America
depends in large measure on a free and prosperous Europe.
B. United States is key to the global economy
L.A. Times ‘01
[Los Angeles Times, December 31, lexis/nexis]
Most countries are looking for something to lift them out of their recessions, and their eyes are firmly fixed on the United States.
This year, the world got a glimpse of a life with a recession-wary American consumer, and it was not a pretty sight. As purchasing fell and the
wheels of commerce slowed, manufacturers in the United States, Canada and Mexico laid off hundreds of thousands of workers. Asia's techdependent economies shuttered factories after the tech bubble burst. Even prosperous Scandinavia was forced to tighten its belt as the U.S.
recession crimped exports of Norwegian oil and Swedish mobile phones. Although there are some bright spots, such as China, the global
economy next year is projected to post its slowest rate of growth in eight years. If there is an upside, it is the hope that a recovering U.S.
economy will pull the rest of the world out of the trough by the end of next year or early 2003--but that optimism would be easily shattered
by another terrorist attack or any escalation of the Middle East conflict. One thing is certain: The U.S. is the only country with the fiscal
firepower to jump-start a $30-trillion-dollar global economy. "There is no question the U.S. is the engine of global growth and
U.S. consumers are at the core of that equation," said David Resler, chief economist for Nomura Securities in New York.
C. Global economic collapse would cause nuclear war and extinction
Bearden, 2K
[T.E., Lt. Colonel, U.S. Army (Retired), “The Unnecessary Energy Crisis: How to Solve It Quickly,”
http://www.freerepublic.com/forum/a3aaf97f22e23.htm, June 24]
History bears out that desperate nations take desperate actions. Prior to the final economic collapse, the stress on nations will have increased
the intensity and number of their conflicts, to the point where the arsenals of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) now possessed
by some 25 nations, are almost certain to be released. As an example, suppose a starving North Korea launches nuclear weapons
upon Japan and South Korea, including U.S. forces there, in a spasmodic suicidal response. Or suppose a desperate China-whose
long-range nuclear missiles (some) can reach the United States-attacks Taiwan. In addition to immediate responses, the mutual
treaties involved in such scenarios will quickly draw other nations into the conflict, escalating it significantly.
Strategic nuclear studies have shown for decades that, under such extreme stress conditions, once a few nukes are launched, adversaries
and potential adversaries are then compelled to launch on perception of preparations by one's adversary. The real legacy of the MAD
concept is this side of the MAD coin that is almost never discussed. Without effective defense, the only chance a nation has to survive at all
is to launch immediate full-bore pre-emptive strikes and try to take out its perceived foes as rapidly and massively as possible.
As the studies showed, rapid escalation to full WMD exchange occurs. Today, a great percent of the WMD arsenals that will be unleashed,
are already on site within the United States itself. The resulting great Armageddon will destroy civilization as we know it, and perhaps
most of the biosphere, at least for many decades.
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NATO Good – Peacekeeping Module
A. NATO is key to international peacekeeping efforts
Robertson, former NATO Secretary General, ‘04
[George, 10th Secretary General of NATO and Chairman of the North Atlantic Council from 1999-2003, Defense Secretary of UK,
“Transforming NATO to Meet the Challenges of the 21 st Century, Transatlantic Transformations: Equipping NATO for the 21 st
Century, ed. by Daniel S. Hamilton, p. 35]
Despite the quality and quantity of NATO “tools” potentially on loan, however, it is vital for NATO’s long-term political health
for the Alliance to continue also to lead operations under a NATO flag. This, too, seems inevitable, because NATO is uniquely
capable of carrying out peace-support operations.Literally no other organization can generate and command large numbers of
multinational forces, and sustain them over long periods of time in difficult and dangerous operations far away from home. That is
why the Alliance was asked to lead, and then to expand, ISAF. It is why there is pressure in many circles for NATO to take a more
visible role in Iraq—and why some are already calling for NATO to contribute to the Middle East Peace Process. It is therefore
essential that the Alliance puts the political and decision-making structures in place to allow it achieve its full and unique potential
as a contributor to international peace and security.
B. International peacekeeping is key to solve failed states
Young ‘05
[Jeffrey, VOA News, October 31, http://voanews.com/english/archive/2005-10/2005-10-31-voa25.cfm ]
When a failed state’s problems reach a critical level and threaten the stability of surrounding countries, outside intervention has, at
times, taken place. James Dobbins at the Rand Corporation in Washington says such action has often succeeded, at least in
restoring order.“Namibia, Mozambique, Cambodia, El Salvador, Sierra Leone, East Timor – those are ones where the U.N.'s
intervention led to what has been, to date, permanent peace. If you look at cases where the U-S was the lead, Bosnia and Kosovo in
the 1990s, and Grenada and Panama in the 1980s are all cases where you have had democratic governance since the intervention,”
he says.
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NATO Good – Peacekeeping Module
C. Failed states cause global war and genocide
Krasner, Professor of International Relations, Stanford, ‘04
[Stephen D. Krasner, Graham H. Stuart Professor of IR, Fall 2004 International Security 28(4)]
Many countries suffer under failed, weak, incompetent, or abusive national authority structures. The best that people living in such
countries can hope for is marginal improvement in their material well-being; limited access to social services, including health care and education; and a
moderate degree of individual physical security. At worst they will confront endemic violence, exploitative political leaders, falling life expectancy,
declining per capita income, and even state-sponsored genocide. In the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire), for example, civil
wars that have persisted for more than two decades have resulted in millions of deaths . In Zimbabwe the policies of President Robert Mugabe,
who was determined to stay in office regardless of the consequences for his country's citizens, led to an economic debacle that began in 2000 with falling per capita
income, inflation above 500 percent, and the threat of mass starvation. In Colombia much of the territory is controlled by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC), a Marxist rebel group that derives most of its income from drug trafficking. In Rwanda more than 700,000 people were
slaughtered in a matter of weeks in 1994 as a result of a government-organized genocide. The consequences of failed and
inadequate governance have not been limited to the societies directly affected. Poorly governed societies can generate conflicts
that spill across international borders. Transnational criminal and terrorist networks can operate in territories not controlled by the internationally
recognized government. Humanitarian disasters not only prick the conscience of political leaders in advanced democratic societies but also leave them with no
policy options that are appealing to voters. Challenges related to creating better governance also arise where national authority structures have collapsed because of
external invasion and occupation rather than internal conflict. The availability of weapons of mass destruction and the presence of transnational
terrorism have created a historically unprecedented situation in which polities with very limited material capability can threaten the
security of much more powerful states. These polities can be conquered and occupied with relative ease, leaving the occupying power with the more
challenging task of establishing an acceptable domestic governing structure. Contemporary Afghanistan and Iraq are the obvious cases in point. Left to their own
devices, collapsed and badly governed states will not fix themselves because they have limited administrative capacity, not least with regard to maintaining internal
security. Occupying powers cannot escape choices about what new governance structures will be created and sustained. To reduce international threats and
improve the prospects for individuals in such polities, alternative institutional arrangements supported by external actors, such as de facto trusteeships and shared
sovereignty, should be added to the list of policy options.
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Pakistani Politics
January parliamentary elections will be rigged – Bhutto will win but military will still rule
Harrison, Director of the Asia Program, Center for International Policy, November ‘07
[Selig S. Harrison has covered Pakistan as a journalist and author since 1951. He is director of the Asia Program at the
Center for International Policy. Newsweek, November 12, 2007 International edition. “Beware Pashtunistan” lexis/nexis]
The January parliamentary race, like most Pakistani elections under military rule, will likely be rigged by the Army and intelligence
agencies. EU observers called the 2002 presidential election "deeply flawed," and during the five decades I've covered Pakistan,
I've witnessed repeated cases of intimidation of opposition figures. The country's Election Commission, appointed by President Pervez
Musharraf, has already made an outlandish attempt to cook the books this year. In 2002, 71.8 million voters registered to vote. With the
population growing at 2.7 percent a year and a voting age of 18, the number should have increased to about 82 million this time. Yet when the
electoral lists were announced five months ago, they included just 55 million, and Bhutto alleges many of the "lost" voters were women, her
strongest supporters. The maneuver was ultimately blocked by a court order and U.S. pressure, and last week the commission published new lists
including 80 million Pakistanis. But further shenanigans seem likely; a Pakistani daily, Dawn, has reported on tricks already underway
including the use of "ghost polling booths" to misdirect voters.
The likely result will be that Bhutto gets just enough Assembly seats to become prime minister--but not enough to enforce the
meaningful power-sharing deal that Musharraf promised. That will mean continued military rule, perpetuating the power of key
Islamist sympathizers in the government whom Bhutto would like to remove and fanning discontent among ethnic minorities, including Pashtuns,
in the borderlands where the Taliban holds sway.
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Pakistani Politics - FYI on Pakistani Leaders
The List: After Musharraf
Source: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3842 Posted May 2007. Accessed 11-24-07
Benazir Bhutto
Who is she? Exiled leader of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and prime minister from 1988 to 1990 and 1993 to 1996.
Why she’ll get the job: She’s the face of civilian politics. Even from exile, Bhutto has been the fiercest critic of Musharraf’s clumsy military rule.
More importantly, she remains the vital figure in civilian politics despite years out of the country. If the people of Pakistan decide that now is the
time for the government to return to civilian hands, they will turn to Bhutto and the PPP.
Why she won’t: She’s hated by the right people. Bhutto’s two stints as prime minister both ended in acrimony and accusations of all-pervasive
corruption. Moreover, conservative forces within the religious establishment and the powerful intelligence services are horrified by the idea of
any woman, let alone one as controversial as Bhutto, leading the country. They will go to any lengths—including, but not limited to, throwing the
elections—to keep her out of power.
The odds: She’s the top contender. For all her demonstrated failings and unique ability to divide, she has countrywide support and is poised to
ride the wave of antimilitary sentiment.
Nawaz Sharif
Who is he? Along with Bhutto, one of the two figures who have monopolized civilian politics for the last decade. As leader of his Pakistan
Muslim League party, he served as prime minister between 1990 and 1993 and again from 1997 to 1999. His last term ended miserably, with a
forced departure for Saudi Arabia.
Why he’ll get the job: He’s the palatable civilian politician. With bloody protests against military rule, the Army may reconsider its tactics and
withdraw to behind-the-scenes power. If so, they’ll want a stooge to handle the day-to-day business of government, freeing up the generals to
focus on their core issues of national security, foreign policy, and atomic weapons. Sharif fits the bill perfectly: experienced, inoffensive, and an
undemanding ally.
Why he won’t: Tepid support. Sharif’s reputation is no more pristine than that of his rival Bhutto. But where she has fiery charisma and
countrywide backing, Sharif’s following is limited to the Punjab region, and he has never been anything more than a competent administrator.
Before he made his exit for Saudi Arabia, the Army dragged his reputation through the mud, and his Pakistan Muslim League party tore itself
apart.
The odds: Slim. In such turbulent times, it’s unlikely that the high passions ripping through Pakistan will settle on everyone’s second choice. His
promotion would lead to further protests and prolong instability.
General Ahsan Saleem Hayat
Who is he? Vice chief of staff of the Army. After President Musharraf, he is Pakistan’s top military official: an important man in a nation where
the military is crucial to all things political.
Why he’ll get the job: The chain of command. If the situation in Pakistan escalates, with more deaths and protests, the military will feel obliged
to restore order, even if that means moving against Musharraf, one of their own. In that case, the man on point to take over as president will have
to come from within the armed forces. Hayat will have no choice but to assume power and take steps to suppress the opposition.
Why he won’t: He’s on his way out. The vice chiefs of staff serve three-year terms, and Hayat began his over 2½ years ago. Musharraf originally
scheduled elections for October. They’ve since been indefinitely postponed, and the outgoing parliament will likely elect the next president in
any case. And by the time the moment of truth comes around, Hayat’s chance may well have passed.
The odds: Negligible. Assuming he plays by the rules—always questionable in a country where political promises are routinely broken—Hayat
will not be able to get within touching distance of the top job.
Pervez Musharraf
Who is he? Army chief of staff and president of Pakistan. Musharraf seized power in a bloodless coup in 1999 and has survived protests about his
dual roles ever since.
Why he’ll get the job: Canny politics and foreign support. Musharraf has never been overly concerned by popular opinion, and he knows how to
manipulate the political process. He is more than capable of staging elections to defuse tension, and rigging the results to ensure he comes out on
top. And with the United States heavily invested in the anti-Taliban campaign raging in Pakistan’s tribal territories, Musharraf will have few
problems getting international blessing.
Why he won’t: Military concerns. Musharraf serves at the pleasure of the military. If they decide that Musharraf now creates more security
problems than he solves, the armed forces won’t hesitate to oust him as their chief of staff. Theoretically, he would remain as president of the
nation. But a president that has been rejected by the military would have decidedly bleak prospects—and Musharraf knows it.
The odds: Very good. Musharraf is in a tight spot—he’s never faced such bitter and determined opposition despite years of domestic and
international criticism. Even so, as long as he still dominates civilian and military politics, he’s the man holding the cards.
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Pakistani Politics
Musharraf is in control. No chance of military coup in status quo
L.A. Times 11-29-07
[Los Angeles Times, “Pakistan's Musharraf takes oath as civilian president; Leader's aides indicate that a date
for ending emergency rule may be announced today,” November 29, Lexis-Nexis]
Some other provisions of the decree have already been eased. The government says all but a few dozen opposition activists
rounded up in the wake of the emergency declaration have been freed; human rights groups say they cannot verify that claim. Most
independent news channels are back on the air after being silenced in the early days of the decree, but some restrictions remain in
place. The way for Musharraf's swearing-in as civilian president was cleared when he stepped down as army chief in a
ceremony redolent with colonial-era military tradition. As senior military commanders and members of his caretaker government
looked on, Musharraf passed a ceremonial baton to Gen. Ashfaq Kiani, the former spy chief he anointed as his successor.
Western military officials consider Kiani, 55, to be a professional military man who may turn his attention more fully than
Musharraf did to reining in Islamic insurgents in the tribal borderlands. They also believe he is eager to disentangle the army from
politics. The parties of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, Musharraf's main opponents, welcomed his relinquishing of his
army role, while saying the move should have come sooner. Bhutto, speaking to journalists in her home base of Karachi, called
the end of Musharraf's military tenure a "pleasing moment" in the country's history. Analysts generally agree that Musharraf's
power will be diluted by the transfer of leadership of the army, though the emergency decree temporarily bolsters his authority.
Few believe, though, that the military is likely to make any overt move against him, at least in the near term. "The Pakistan
army sees him as a man they feel comfortable with, a man they can trust," said security analyst Nasim Zehra. "And so
unless major political upheavals take place, I don't think his life in the Pakistan power scene is over."
No Coup against Musharraf in Status Quo – Military supports him
Sethi, November ‘07
[Najam, Editor of Daily Times (of Pakistan), Interview in Foreign Policy, “Seven Questions: Musharraf’s Martial Plan,”
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4042 access date: 11-24-07]
FP: Is there a legitimate risk of Musharraf’s ouster, perhaps by other military leaders?
NS: No, I don’t think there’s any risk at all. The country was awash with rumors [Monday] that perhaps there’d been a coup against him. But that is completely
unlikely. Army high command is totally loyal to Musharraf. The young commanders are all handpicked by him. One recent provocation that played into
Musharraf’s hands in terms of his support within the Army was when one of the judges of the Supreme Court ordered criminal cases to be launched against the
Army commanders who participated in the storming of the Red Mosque in Islamabad. That sent a wave of anger throughout the Army high command. They
thought they were serving the public interests, and here is the Supreme Court saying they committed a criminal act. That is not to say that if there were a prolonged
and bloody protest movement, there might be some who begin to think of Musharraf as a liability. But right now that is not the case.
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Pakistani Politics
Uniqueness: Musharraf Wins in SQ
Disunity of opposition will allow Musharraf to hold power in status quo
Newsweek 11-25-07
[By Ron Moreau, Newsweek Web Exclusive, "The ‘Lion’ Is Back: But can he roar? Exiled former prime minister Nawaz
Sharif returned to Pakistan, pledging to restore democracy." http://www.newsweek.com/id/72209 accessed date: 11-27-07]
Some Pakistanis even argue that Musharraf sees a political value in Sharif's return in that it most likely will further undercut Bhutto's
position and deepen the already wide divide among the opposition parties. A quarrel is already breaking out over whether or not to
participate in the elections. So far Bhutto seems leaning toward having her Pakistan People's Party run in the upcoming polls, while Sharif's
faction of the Pakistan Muslim League, and the tiny party of former cricket star Imran Khan, among others, have said they are leaning toward
boycotting the vote which Musharraf says most likely will be held under emergency regulations without strong constitutional guarantees.
One of the country's most charismatic, opposition lawyers, Aitzaz Ahsan, a PPP stalwart, was released from prison on Saturday, perhaps
temporarily, so he could register as a candidate in the upcoming election. But as he filed his nomination papers Sunday in a stuffy Lahore
courtroom, he said he did not think the vote could be free and fair if held under the emergency. "It's next to impossible to hold an election under
an emergency," he said, wearing a floral wreath around his neck, which was placed there by his supporters. "Martial law and elections are an
oxymoron." He added that he hoped all the opposition parties would be able to decide to take a united stand as to whether they should run or
boycott the polls. Indeed opposition unity is on the minds of many Pakistanis. "We want the opposition politicians to make an alliance to end
Musharraf's dictatorship," says Rafaqat Khan, a Lahore lawyer and Ahsan supporter.
But opposition unity, while widely hoped for, is unlikely to be achieved. Musharraf is counting on it. As long as the opposition
stays disunited, Musharraf and his political allies can probably continue clinging to power.
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AT: Musharraf bad for Pakistani democracy
Strong military blocks true democracy, plus Bhutto & Sharif would undermine democratic
institutions
Lalwani, Policy Analyst, New America Foundation, '07
[Sameer, "Why We’d Miss Musharraf," September, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3974, access date: 11-24-07]
We don’t yet know how the backroom deals will work out, and Pakistani politics are notoriously difficult to predict. (To wit, Sharif landed in Islamabad on
September 10th and found himself deported four hours later.) But observers can count on a couple of time-honored truths remaining true. Despite all the
talk
of elections and civilian rule, meaningful democracy will not emerge in Pakistan anytime soon, nor will the military abandon its
grip on government. Pakistan’s military possesses much greater staying power than most U.S. analysts assume, and it will remain the most potent and
important political institution in the country for the foreseeable future.
Pakistan’s 60 years of history illustrate why this is so. When India and Pakistan parted ways in 1947, most of the British Indian Army’s Muslim officers—who
constituted the bulk of the officer corps—went to Pakistan, while the bulk of civilian expertise went to India. This set the course for the military to dominate not
only decisions of national security, but also domestic policy. Much like in Egypt and Turkey, the officer corps saw itself as the vanguard of Pakistan’s
modernization. Under the military dictatorship of General Ayub Khan, a Nasser or Ataturk of his day, Pakistan witnessed a period of successful leadership and
economic growth in the 1960s. This was followed by Pakistan’s most disastrous period of instability under the civilian government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto,
Benazir’s father.
Today, the younger Bhutto and her successor Sharif are presenting themselves as the saviors of Pakistan’s beleaguered democratic
institutions. This begs the question: How real were these institutions before Musharraf came to power? Pakistan has yet to form
modern political parties that cut across clan and kinship lines. Instead, the country has produced one dynastic party, Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s
Party, and a collection of local bosses and landowners, some of which make up various fragments of the Pakistan Muslim League.
Moreover, as foreign-policy analyst Anatol Lieven has noted, “All civilian governments have been guilty of corruption, election rigging and the
imprisonment or murder of political opponents, in some cases to a worse degree than the military administrations that followed.”
Under the 10 years of civilian rule by Bhutto’s and Sharif’s constantly warring neofeudal parties, Pakistan was a democracy in
name only. Far from building democratic institutions, their governments—bereft of competence and riddled with corruption—
consistently undermined them. Bhutto was run out of the country for skimming millions off the top of government contracts; Sharif orchestrated the
storming of the Supreme Court by street thugs as he was being tried for contempt. In an effort to efface their legacies, both former prime ministers are hoping to
duck the legal charges that await them upon their return.
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Pakistani Politics
AT: Civilian leaders better for War on Terror
Musharraf best option for War on Terror cooperation and avoiding War with India
Markey, Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, November ‘07
[Daniel Markey is a senior fellow for India, Pakistan, and South Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations and a former member of the U.S. State
Department’s policy planning staff. "The FP Debate: Should the U.S. Abandon Pervez Musharraf?" Foreign Policy, November 2007,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4052 access date: 11-26-07]
Why then should Washington hold on to Musharraf, whose popularity in Pakistan has reached a new low and who clearly stiff-armed the Bush
administration’s appeals to avoid emergency rule?
In the immediate term, Musharraf offers Washington continuity in the face of uncertain political transition . He is a familiar face, a
leader with whom the Bush administration has established a sustained working relationship. Under even the smoothest possible transition
scenarios, Musharraf’s departure would interrupt bilateral cooperation on military, counterterrorism, and intelligence matters for
days or weeks—with uncertain consequences for U.S. security.
And it is not hard to imagine that a new Pakistani leader might up the ante with Washington, demanding a better price for bilateral
cooperation. The more than $10 billion in assistance the United States has given Pakistan since 9/11 is no natural limit. New Pakistani leaders
might also back away from some of the bold steps Musharraf has taken during the past several years, not least Pakistan’s aboutface in its relationship with India, a country that not long ago was threatening to go to war over Kashmir.
Civilian leaders would NOT stop Islamic militants nor boost counter-terrorism
Lalwani, Policy Analyst, New America Foundation, '07
[Sameer, "Why We’d Miss Musharraf," September, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3974, access date: 11-24-07]
Some in Washington believe that civilian leaders would do more to crack down on Islamist militants and better cooperate with U.S.
counterterrorism efforts on the Afghan-Pakistani border. That’s a false hope: Civil-military relations and national-security decisionmaking cannot change overnight. In the past, civilian governments have deferred to the Army to manage civil unrest, especially in
the frontier provinces. And as it did with nuclear weapons development, the military often acts without the full knowledge of civilian leaders.
A deeply unpopular United States and the prevailing ethnic fissures also render it politically untenable for a civilian government to
do Washington’s bidding. Neither Bhutto nor Sharif will crack down on the tribal regions, whatever promises they are privately
making these days. Nor will Bhutto or Sharif challenge the military’s strategic calculus , which is to hedge against Indian encirclement via
Afghanistan and U.S. abandonment of Pakistan, as occurred in the early 1990s. Like it or not, the military is the player that matters when it comes to such vital U.S.
interests as fighting al Qaeda, stabilizing Afghanistan, and stemming nuclear proliferation—but military leaders are increasingly nervous that the United States will
desert them again.
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No Musharraf  Sharif Wins
Sharif is more popular than Musharraf and Bhutto
Newsweek 11-25-07
[By Ron Moreau, Newsweek Web Exclusive, "The ‘Lion’ Is Back: But can he roar? Exiled former prime minister Nawaz
Sharif returned to Pakistan, pledging to restore democracy." http://www.newsweek.com/id/72209 accessed date: 11-27-07]
Most of Sharif's appeal seems to come from his defiance toward, and his apparent refusal to cut a political deal with, Musharraf. "We hope that
he doesn't make General Musharraf his godfather," says one Sharif supporter at the airport. "He needs to continue firmly opposing him." Bhutto,
who returned to Pakistan scot-free after she negotiated a back-channel pact with the president that gave her a blanket amnesty from
a host of corruption charges, has seen her popularity eroded as a result. Recent polls have shown that the defiant Sharif's popularity
rating is double that of Musharraf's and Bhutto's. Sharif played to that audience Sunday when he told the BBC that he had struck no political
deal with the president to pave the way for his return. "We have a different agenda to [Musharraf's] agenda," he said.
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Musharraf On The Brink
Musharraf’s standing is fragile. Any development could lead to his ousting
Van Engelen ‘07
[Angelique, “Pakistan: Are General Musharraf’s Days Numbered?”, August 11,
http://globalpolitician.com/articledes.asp?ID=3240&cid=6&sid=20 ]
In the next months Pakistan’s leadership is likely to fly by the seat of their pants all the more, in a situation fraught with obsessions
of what the future will hold.
Musharraf’s days might soon be over, some observers say. They explain the recent desperate actions by the Pakistani leader as his
swan song. Consultations with the US president and Foreign Secretary and high ranking officials were frantic a week ago but President
Bush reiterated his support for free and fair elections. For the past years the implications of the internal strife have been largely ignored because of Pakistan’s
important role in the war against terror, but the expiry of Mr Musharraf’s self appropriated tenure is all the more pressurized for it.
***MCA Trade-Off DA***
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Aid Trade-Off DA (MCA) - 1NC SHELL
Funding for African aid is limited. Spending on new programs will force budgetary trade-offs
Volman, Executive Director, Africa Research Project, ’98
[Daniel P. Volman, “The Clinton Administration and Africa: Role of Congress and the Africa Subcommittees,” Issue: A Journal of Opinion is
currently published by African Studies Association. Volume XXVI, Number 2, JSTOR, Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0047-1607%281998%2926%3A2%3C14%3ATCAAAR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-P ]
Appropriations for Foreign Operations
In contrast, the activities of the congressional appropriations committees have had a substantial, and measurable, impact on the conduct of foreign policy
toward Africa under the Clinton administration. While the Republican-dominated Congress has expressed its support for a policy of U.S.
involvement in Africa, it has also demonstrated a conspicuous unwillingness to provide the money that is needed to pay for it.
The most important action taken since the Republicans took control of Congress was the decision in 1995 to eliminate funding for the Development
Fund for Africa. Since it was created by Congress in 1987, the fund served as a mechanism by which a specific level of funding was earmarked for development
programs in Africa. This provision for earmarking of funds, however, did not prevent a gradual decline in the level of funding for development assistance to
Africa as part of the overall cutback in foreign aid following the end of the Cold War. But the existence of a separate line item in the budget for the fund helped to
protect development programs in African countries from disproportionate reductions and ensured that there would be a certain minimum level of funding for
African countries in the federal budget each year.
Since the provision of earmarking funds for African countries was eliminated, proposals for assistance programs in Africa have to
compete with those for other parts of the world for a share of the bilateral development assistance that is appropriated by Congress each
year. Moreover, the United States has established a number of new programs that earmark bilateral assistance for countries in Eastern Europe and in the former
Soviet Union. This, along with the earmarking of development aid for Middle Eastern countries such as Israel and Egypt, has further reduced the
amount of money that is available for programs in Africa and in other parts of the developing world.
In recent years, Congress has also imposed deep cuts in appropriations requested by the Clinton administration for multilateral investment programs.
The largest reductions have been made in U.S. contributions to the International Development Association-the concessional loan program of the World Bard-which
is an important source of capital for major infrastructure projects in Africa. Taken together with reductions in funding for bilateral development aid and for other
multilateral programs, these congressional actions have significantly restricted the administration's efforts to promote economic
development in Africa.
Millennium Challenge initiative is the prime target for budget cutters. New assistance programs would
cause cuts and destroy the program’s pro-reform signal
Washington Post '07
[Editorial, "The Millennium Challenge; The president's foreign-aid innovation needs time and money before it can be judged,"
July 16, 2007, Regional Edition; Pg. A14; l/n]
When President Bush announced the Millennium Challenge initiative in 2002, it sounded like a promising new approach to foreign aid. The idea was to supply U.S.
taxpayer dollars only to governments that could meet strict standards of efficiency and accountability. The proposal would do so based on the countries' own
expressed needs, not development fads or political fealty to the United States. Money would be provided in substantial amounts, over substantial periods, so as to
make a genuine impact on poverty. And the whole project would be administered outside the traditional aid bureaucracy, by a congressionally established
Millennium Challenge Corp. (MCC). Typical of the Millennium Challenge approach is the five-year compact signed Friday with Mozambique. It will supply $507
million to help one of Africa's poorest countries build much-needed roads and improve access to safe drinking water.
It's still a sound concept. But the Millennium Challenge may be approaching an institutional crossroads. Mr. Bush originally said that he
hoped to be sending $5 billion a year to poor countries by 2006, a pledge that never came close to being realized. Congress took two years to pass
legislation setting up the program. Since then, the administration's annual budget requests have never reached $5 billion, and Congress has
consistently shaved them even further. Most of the roughly $6 billion that has been appropriated so far has been committed to specific countries. But
budget-cutters on Capitol Hill note that only about $71 million has actually been spent. The slow rate is an unfortunate consequence of the
MCC's sensible policies: It won't write a check until recipients can document their capacity to use it appropriately, and for many poor countries making reforms and
dealing with the MCC's paperwork take time -- a lot of time. Meanwhile, urgent and expensive new U.S. overseas priorities -- from securing U.S.
embassies to fighting HIV-AIDS -- keep coming up.
The administration asked for $3 billion for the MCC in its fiscal 2008 budget. House appropriators have cut that to $1.8 billion, about what the MCC got last year,
while Senate appropriators have gone even lower, to $1.2 billion, a figure that the MCC says will cripple its ability to make new agreements with countries that
have recently qualified for its programs. One benefit of the Millennium Challenge is that it creates an incentive for poor countries to improve
their practices and procedures, but that could be lost if the impression spreads that the United States is pulling the plug.
Given the intense competition for foreign-aid resources, impatience with the Millennium Challenge is understandable and even
helpful, if it forces the MCC to fix its sometimes burdensome procedures. But it is too early to start slashing a program that has been in business
for only three years and still deserves a chance to show what it can do.
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Aid Trade-Off DA (MCA) - 1NC SHELL
MCA criteria strengths judicial independence in Africa, which is key to conflict resolution
Lesirela '03
[LETSEBE PIET, LLM student at THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL AFRICA, YAOUNDÉ, CAMEROON, "PROVIDING FOR THE
INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY IN AFRICA: A QUEST FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS," DATE SUBMITTED: 27
OCTOBER 2003, download date: 9-20-07 https://www.up.ac.za/dspace/bitstream/2263/1049/1/letsebe_pl_1.pdf pages 32-34]
The absence of separation of powers, which in practice leads to the subordination of the judiciary, has both direct and indirect
implications. Directly, it leads to violations of basic human rights of individuals who once aggrieved by government action can
hope for no remedies as the perpetrator would itself be the arbiter . Indirectly, it has the inevitable consequence of government corruption, with the
result that public wealth is amassed into fewer individuals to the detriment of the larger public. It also discourages potential investors. Put in the words of
Akonumbo, “international investors simply stay away from countries perceived as being incompetent and corrupt.”
The following passage is equally worth quoting:
Adherence to the rule of law is a fundamental precondition for the realisation of development in all sectors. The absence of the role of the rule of law
continues to constrain market development, public confidence in the legal system, and the security and general wellbeing of the people. A competent
and independent judiciary is vital to the development. The lack of judicial independence and the level of corruption impedes
peoples’ confidence in formal conflict resolution and encourages reliance on informal and sometimes violent means of
dispute resolution. Moreover, the absence of the independence of the judiciary discourages foreign investment.
The doctrine of separation of powers also serves as an important criterion for the United States (US) government in the selection of
foreign states which merit developmental assistance as reflected in its “The Millennium Challenge Account.”
The scourge of human suffering in Africa requires no-more debating about what the appropriate and capable measures are to bring this to a lasting end.
The collapse of institutional installations for the protection of human rights is of great concern. This will remain so for as long as governments continue to hold
reservations about the central role the judiciary has to play in vindicating fundamental rights and freedoms of Africa’s defenceless masses. Quite correctly, in the
pre-independence era the colonial masters established western-kind courts not for the benefit of the communities, but for the entrenchment of colonial rule and
domination. This is what induced the liberation wars and the eradication of injustices perpetuated by the courts which disguised the administration of justice for
colonial domination. The irony, however, is that the same liberation fighters have become perpetrators, through the same courts, of injustices against their own
people. The latter are now engaged in multifaceted modes of liberation against injustices of their ruthless rulers
African conflicts can draw in major powers and go Nuclear. Escalation risk is high
Deutsch ’02
[Jeffrey, Ph.D. in Economics from George Mason University and founder of the Rabid Tiger project (a political risk consulting firm), November 18, ,
The Rapid Tiger Newsletter, Volume 2, Number 9, http://mysite.verizon.net/jeff_deutsch/newsletterv2n9.html accessed: 7-16-07 ]
The Rabid Tiger Project believes that a nuclear war is most likely to start in Africa. Civil wars in the Congo (the country formerly
known as Zaire), Rwanda, Somalia and Sierra Leone, and domestic instability in Zimbabwe, Sudan and other countries, as well as occasional
brushfire and other wars (thanks in part to "national" borders that cut across tribal ones) turn into a really nasty stew.
We've got all too many rabid tigers and potential rabid tigers, who are willing to push the button rather than risk being seen as wishywashy in the face of a mortal threat and overthrown.
Geopolitically speaking, Africa is open range. Very few countries in Africa are beholden to any particular power.
South Africa is a major exception in this respect - not to mention in that she also probably already has the Bomb. Thus, outside powers can more easily
find client states there than, say, in Europe where the political lines have long since been drawn, or Asia where many of the countries (China, India, Japan)
are powers unto themselves and don't need any "help," thank you.
Thus, an African war can attract outside involvement
very quickly. Of course, a proxy war alone may not induce the Great
Powers to fight each other. But an African nuclear strike can ignite a much broader conflagration, if the other powers are
interested in a fight. Certainly, such a strike would in the first place have been facilitated by outside help - financial, scientific, engineering, etc. Africa is an ocean
of troubled waters, and some people love to go fishing.
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Link: New programs ↓ MCA
New initiatives trade-off with MCA
Sesssions, program coordinator, Center for Global Development, '06
[Myra, "The PMI Turns One - How Will We Measure Success?" July 6, download date: 10-24-07,
http://blogs.cgdev.org/globalhealth/2006/07/the_pmi_turns_o.php ]
Myra comments: It is clearly true that the PMI [President's Malaria Initiative] has helped increase international attention to malaria and has transformed a
notoriously under-funded and under-appreciated area of US foreign assistance for global health. However, measuring the success of this initiative should not be
confined to a discussion of health outcomes and implementation strategies, although these elements are crucial. Evaluators should also look at the aid mechanism
itself: is this model effective? What are the trade-offs for those countries that receive the concentrated funding and those who don't? What are the trade-offs for US
global health and foreign assistance overall? Are the gains that are made cost-effective?
What we need going forward is increased transparency in decision-making processes, including country selection, as well as better public knowledge about the
inputs and results. We also need an understanding that this is a new and different way of doing business - a grand experiment in foreign aid - and one that needs
healthy scrutiny from time to time.
Comments
For me, one of the most encouraging parts of the PMI is its effort to involve the host government and other development partners from the initial stages
of program planning. Hopefully, early success using this more inclusive model will have spillover effects to other USAID programs.
Myra - when you ask about the possible tradeoffs for global health, what exactly are you referring to? Do you believe PMI spending is crowding out
other potential health spending?
Posted by: Michael Bernstein at July 6, 2006 02:04 PM
Thanks for the comment and question, Michael. I have not done the analysis of the data to see if the PMI is having a negative impact on the funding levels of other
health initiatives-- and given all of the other changes in the US foreign assistance budget I am not sure it would ever be possible to isolate the impact of the PMI.
However, during a recent CGD event, Congressman Kolbe talked at length about the future challenges in maintaining foreign assistance
funding levels in light of increasing domestic federal expenditures. Mark Lippert, the Director of Foreign Policy for Senator Barak Obama
also touched on this key issue at an April CGD event about the future of MCA. The message from each of these speakers was that funding
levels for any particular initiative or priority should be looked at in the broader context-- and that the appropriations process is
essentially a zero-sum game full of trade-offs.
In today's tight budget climate, I think that there is no doubt that funding for the PMI and other new intiatives will detract from real or
potential funding for other areas of the foreign aid budget-- and that that reality should be a part of the conversation about the
successes and opportunities of the initiatives.
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***AFFIRMATIVE ANSWERS***
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Non-Unique: Food Aid to Ethiopia
25 million in new food aid to Ethiopia
AFP 11-25
[Agence France-Presse, a global news agency, "US pledges 25 mln dollars for restive Ethiopian region,"
http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5hc52wZjGcBEKKnO_k0Z_MmaclG7Q download date: 11-25-07]
The United States has pledged 25 million worth of food aid for Ethiopia's restive Ogaden region amid reports of a humanitarian crisis
fueled by the army's crackdown on separatist insurgents.
"We have committed 25 million dollars worth of food, grains and others supplies which
way," Henrietta Fore, director of US Foreign Assistance, said Saturday.
"We have a great deal of assistance going to the Ogaden," she added.
have already been purchased and are on their
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PAKISTAN IMPACT TURN: Aid Cut-Off Good
TURN: US assistance to Pakistan fuels the military and militarism – it does not solve the roots of the
problem, it actually increases the political instability and risk of war
Sachs, Professor of Economics, Columbia, 11-26-07
[Jeffrey D., Professor of Economics and Director of the Earth Institute at Columbia University, “Counterpoint: America’s
failed foreign policy," Daily Times (of Pakistan), download date: 11-26-07,
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007%5C11%5C26%5Cstory_26-11-2007_pg3_5 ]
A more peaceful world will be possible only when Americans and others begin to see things through the eyes of their supposed enemies, and realise that today’s
conflicts, having resulted from desperation and despair, can be solved through economic development rather than war
Many of today’s war zones — including Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, and Sudan — share basic problems that lie at the root of their
conflicts. They are all poor, buffeted by natural disasters — especially floods, droughts, and earthquakes — and have rapidly growing populations that are pressing
on the capacity of the land to feed them. And the proportion of youth is very high, with a bulging population of young men of military age (15-24 years).
All of these problems can be solved only through long-term sustainable economic development. Yet the United States persists in responding to
symptoms rather than to underlying conditions by trying to address every conflict by military means. It backs the Ethiopian army in
Somalia. It occupies Iraq and Afghanistan. It threatens to bomb Iran. It supports the military dictatorship in Pakistan.
None of these military actions addresses the problems that led to conflict in the first place. On the contrary, American policies
typically inflame the situation rather than solve it.
Time and again, this military approach comes back to haunt the US. The US embraced the Shah of Iran by sending massive
armaments, which fell into the hands of Iran’s Revolutionary Government after 1979. The US then backed Saddam Hussein in his
attack on Iran, until the US ended up attacking Saddam himself. The US backed Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan against the
Soviets, until the US ended up fighting bin Laden. Since 2001 the US has supported Pervez Musharraf in Pakistan with more than
$10 billion in aid, and now faces an unstable regime that just barely survives.
US foreign policy is so ineffective because it has been taken over by the military. Even postwar reconstruction in Iraq under the US-led
occupation was run by the Pentagon rather than by civilian agencies. The US military budget dominates everything about foreign policy. Adding up the budgets of
the Pentagon, the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, the Department of Homeland Security, nuclear weapons programs, and the State Department’s military assistance
operations, the US will spend around $800 billion this year on security, compared with less than $20 billion for economic development.
In a stunning article on aid to Pakistan during the Bush administration, Craig Cohen and Derek Chollet demonstrated the disastrous nature of this militarised
approach — even before the tottering Musharraf regime’s latest crackdown. They show that even though Pakistan faces huge problems of poverty,
population, and environment, 75 percent of the $10 billion in US aid has gone to the Pakistani military, ostensibly to reimburse Pakistan
for its contribution to the “war on terror,” and to help it buy F-16s and other weapons systems.
Another 16 percent went straight to the Pakistani budget, no questions asked. That left less than 10 percent for development and humanitarian assistance. Annual
US aid for education in Pakistan has amounted to just $64 million, or $1.16 per school-aged child.
The authors note that “the strategic direction for Pakistan was set early by a narrow circle at the top of the Bush administration and has been largely focused on the
war effort rather than on Pakistan’s internal situation.” They also emphasise that “US engagement with Pakistan is highly militarised and centralised, with very
little reaching the vast majority of Pakistanis.” They quote George Bush as saying, “When [Musharraf] looks me in the eye and says...there won’t be a Taliban and
won’t be al-Qaeda, I believe him, you know?”
This militarised approach is leading the world into a downward spiral of violence and conflict. Each new US weapons system
“sold” or given to the region increases the chances of expanded war and further military coups, and to the chance that the arms will
be turned on the US itself. None of it helps to address the underlying problems of poverty, child mortality, water scarcity, and lack
of livelihoods in places like Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Province , Sudan’s Darfur region, or Somalia. These places are bulging with
people facing a tightening squeeze of insufficient rainfall and degraded pasturelands. Naturally, many join radical causes.
The Bush administration fails to recognise these fundamental demographic and environmental challenges, that $800 billion of
security spending won’t bring irrigation to Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sudan, and Somalia, and therefore won’t bring peace. Instead of
seeing real people in crisis, they see caricatures, a terrorist around every corner.
A more peaceful world will be possible only when Americans and others begin to see things through the eyes of their supposed enemies, and realise that today’s
conflicts, having resulted from desperation and despair, can be solved through economic development rather than war. We will have peace when we heed the words
of President John F. Kennedy, who said, a few months before his death, “For, in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small
planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children’s future. And we are all mortal.” —DTPS
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PAKISTAN IMPACT TURN: Aid Cut-Off Good
TURN: Continued backing of Musharraf increases Islamic extremism, terrorism, and the Taliban.
Cut-off of aid to Musharraf and the military would improve nuclear security and anti-terrorism
cooperation
Haqqani, Professor of International Relations, Boston University, November '07
[Husain, "The FP Debate: Should the U.S. Abandon Pervez Musharraf?"
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4052&page=1 access date: 11-26-07]
In fact, Musharraf himself is part of the problem. He has dithered in shutting down homegrown jihadi networks that were created
during the 1990s by Pakistani intelligence for its proxy war in Indian-controlled Jammu and Kashmir. He has been unwilling to treat the
Afghan Taliban as a terrorist threat, and his decision to make distinctions between al Qaeda and the Taliban has resulted in the
Afghan group’s comeback in recent years. Overall, Musharraf’s mistakes have made the border region between Afghanistan and
Pakistan a terrorist safe haven, leading to the creeping Talibanization of Pakistan.
Meanwhile, unqualified U.S. backing has encouraged Musharraf to suppress dissent at home while posing as a relatively liberal dictator
abroad. Mainstream political parties and moderate civil society groups have borne the brunt of Musharraf’s repression while
Islamist parties have been given carte blanche to expand their influence . Incredibly, jihadi groups have had a freer hand than Musharraf’s
civilian detractors.
The analytical mistake at the heart of U.S. support for Musharraf is the view that Pakistan’s Army is the most influential institution in the country
(which is true) and that U.S. interests are best served by buying leverage with Pakistan’s generals through foreign aid (which is false). During the
past 53 years, the United States has provided some $21 billion in overt aid, about $17 billion of which has been given to military regimes and
primarily for military purposes. The Army is Pakistan’s most influential institution precisely because of U.S. support, not independent of it.
For years, the generals have told the Americans that the United States needs Pakistan more than the reverse, and key U.S. policymakers clearly
believe this story—to Musharraf’s great benefit. There is, however, a long history of the United States’ attempting to purchase influence
with the Pakistani Army only to find that Pakistan’s generals do not keep their end of the bargain. The Americans assume that they
run the relationship because they are the more powerful party, but in fact it is Pakistan’s military rulers who end up calling the
shots.
By abandoning Pervez Musharraf, the United States could signal that it will not tolerate Pakistan becoming “Myanmar lite,” a
nation permanently dominated by its military. Once Washington makes it clear that it will no longer support Musharraf, Pakistan’s
military will have to start negotiating with the country’s political parties and civil society instead of dictating to them. Only then
will Pakistan be able to emerge as a normal country with predictable patterns of political change, which will make it easier to
ensure the security of its nuclear weapons and to fight the terrorists who benefit from the country’s present chaos. It is time for
Musharraf to go and for civilian rule to return.
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AFF Answer – Afghanistan Aid
Aid to Afghanistan is wasted, ineffective
Hemming '07
[Jon Hemming, Reuters UK, “Too Much Aid to Afghanistan Wasted, Oxfam Says,” 21st November 07
found at: http://www.stwr.net/content/view/2441/1/ download date: 11-25-07 ]
Too much aid to Afghanistan is wasted -- soaked up in contractors' profits, spent on expensive expatriate consultants or squandered
on small-scale, quick-fix projects, a leading British charity said on Tuesday. Despite more than $15 billion of aid pumped into
Afghanistan since U.S.-led and Afghan forces toppled the Taliban in 2001, many Afghans still suffer levels of poverty rarely seen
outside sub-Saharan Africa.
"The development process has to date been too centralised, top-heavy and insufficient," said a report by Oxfam.
By far the biggest donor, the United States approved a further $6.4 billion in Afghan aid this year, but the funds are spent in ways that are "ineffective or
inefficient", Oxfam said.
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) allocates close to half its funds to the five largest U.S. contractors in Afghanistan.
"Too much aid is absorbed by profits of companies and sub-contractors, on non-Afghan resources and on high expatriate salaries
and living costs," the report said.
A full-time expatriate consultant can cost up to $500,000 a year, Oxfam said.
More money needed to be channelled through the Afghan government, strengthening its influence and institutions.
Aid also needed to be better coordinated to avoid duplication, it said.
Only 10 percent of technical assistance to Afghanistan is coordinated either with the government or among donors.
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MCA - AFF ANSWER
Millennium Challenge program will fail – the economic study that was its foundation has been refuted
New York Times '03
[By Daphne Eviatar, "Do Aid Studies Govern Policies or Reflect Them?" July 26 2003,
found at http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/ffd/2003/0726govern.htm download date: 11-12-07]
When President Bush promised to channel billions of dollars in aid — but only to countries that were committed to "ruling justly, investing in their people and
encouraging economic freedom" — it was an extraordinary example of how an idea hatched by scholars could wend its way into mainstream politics.
The plan, which Mr. Bush announced as the Millennium Challenge Account at the 2002 United Nations International Conference on Financing for
Development in Monterrey, Mexico, was largely based on the work of two economists , Craig Burnside and David Dollar. After completing an
elaborate statistical analysis, they concluded that yes, foreign aid did promote economic growth, as long as the recipient government had solid fiscal, monetary and
trade policies in place; their article, "Aid, Policies and Growth," was published in The American Economic Review in 2000.
But new research that uses the same methodology, though more up-to-date and comprehensive data, says those findings don't hold
up. "We no longer find that aid promotes growth in good policy environments," write three researchers : William Easterly, a former
principal economist at the World Bank who is now an economics professor at New York University; Ross Levine, a finance
professor at the University of Minnesota; and David Roodman, a research associate at the Center for Global Development in
Washington.
In a forthcoming article, also for The American Economic Review, these
authors do not claim to prove that aid is ineffective, but they do argue that
"policymakers should be less sanguine about concluding that foreign aid will boost growth in countries with good policies. " Because
the new research has not yet been published, it is too soon to say just how influential it will be. But the conflicting studies highlight the often fraught and puzzling
relationship between the world of professors and the world of politics. Why can one study trigger the flow of millions or even billions of dollars while another,
equally valid work sits on the shelf? Often, the answer is that that is the way policymakers want it. Mr. Burnside and Mr. Dollar's work caused a sensation when
their paper first began circulating, in 1997. Ever since President Harry Truman, at his inauguration in 1949, announced a "bold new program" to alleviate world
poverty, economists and others had been trying to figure out how to use aid to turn poor countries around. Here, finally, seemed to be the answer.
Soon, the British and the Canadian development agencies began saying that the idea that foreign aid reduced poverty in countries that were well governed was
backed up by solid research. Most important, the Burnside-Dollar study became the cornerstone for a 1998 World Bank report that White House officials cite as the
"key study" supporting the Millennium Challenge. Steven Radelet, who helped design the Millennium Challenge program as a deputy assistant secretary of the
Treasury from 2000 to 2002, said that Mr. Burnside and Mr. Dollar's work was unusually influential, partly because it "resonated with an idea that a lot of
development practitioners had come to believe, independent of the research."
Research that confirms what policymakers already believe is, not surprisingly, going to have greater impact than research that does not. As the economist Henry J.
Aaron noted 25 years ago in his study of the Great Society programs, "Research reflects prevailing moods at least as much as it influences them." Mr. Levine said
of the Burnside and Dollar study: "It gave a reason for foreign aid and a strategy for giving it out. That's great for one paper. People grabbed this like I've never
seen any other academic article grabbed before. It became the pretext for why the World Bank exists, and for the Millennium fund. One of the reasons for the
World Bank is to funnel money to less developed countries and have them grow faster as a means for alleviating poverty. So it's nice to have evidence that suggests
the money is linked to growth and hence the alleviation of poverty. Prior to the Burnside-Dollar finding, it was difficult to make that claim."
As Mr. Easterly chronicles in his book "The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists' Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics" (M.I.T. Press, 2001), for
decades economists have been on an "audacious quest" for the magic formula that would make poor countries rich. Yet each time
they thought they had found the elixir, he writes, they were disappointed.
Whether it was more investment, better technology, lower birth rates, broader education or debt relief, each once-fashionable theory of how to end third
world poverty has ultimately fallen flat. Sub-Saharan Africa, the area most tended to by Western economists since their search began, has barely
grown at all. Although some directed forms of aid have been highly effective — like health programs providing oral rehydration therapy or vaccinations for
children — the key to the overall development puzzle has remained a mystery. "When you're talking about development, you're talking about
wholesale transformation of a society," Mr. Roodman said. "You're trying to recreate the history of the Western world over the last 200 years, to put other countries
through that process. No one knows how to do that."
Even if someone did, it would be tough to prove on paper. Cross-country statistical studies may be inaccurate because, as Mr. Dollar pointed out, "there are a
relatively small number of countries in the world" and so many potential variables. For one thing, aid is not always aimed at promoting growth. During the cold
war, for example, much of American foreign aid was funneled toward American allies in the fight against Communism, regardless of its likely effect on
development. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the amount of American foreign aid has declined, and its focus has shifted.
As Mr. Radelet, now a senior fellow at the Center for Global Development, noted: "Our two largest aid recipients are Israel and Egypt. The main reason for that aid
is to support the Camp David Accords, not for economic development." He continued, "In the last two years we've provided huge amounts of foreign aid to
Pakistan, Jordan, Egypt and Turkey because they are frontline states in the war on terrorism."
Even when aid does seek to promote development, though, how recipients spend it is only part of the story. Mr. Easterly stressed problems on the donor end: "You
have bloated, inefficient bureaucracies that don't really know what they're doing as far as achieving results," he said in an interview. He compared agencies like the
United States Agency for International Development and the World Bank to "companies that get no customer feedback." The customers are the poor, and the poor
often have little say in their own governments, let alone in international organizations, he said, adding, "It's as if Hollywood was making movies but never had any
information about ticket sales."
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MCA - AFF ANSWER
Millennium program profess is too slow, it will fail
Makwana ‘07
[By Rajesh Makwana, “International Aid and Economy Still Failing Sub-Saharan Africa,” June 11, 2007
found at http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/develop/africa/2007/0611subsaharanafrica.htm download date: 11-14-07]
A recent report by the United Nations has revealed that not a single country in sub-Saharan Africa is on track to achieve the
internationally agreed target for halving extreme poverty by 2015 . This dire failure is unsurprising given the G8’s undelivered aid commitments,
the inability of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) to negotiate development-friendly trade rules, and the financial burdens imposed on many African countries
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and The World Bank.
According to the report, published at the midway point in the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) process, the number of people
living on less than one dollar a day has barely changed over the past seven years, declining less than 5 per cent to 41.1%. As much of a
concern is the increasingly slow rate by which the number of people living in extreme poverty is reducing. In line with this disappointing trend there has been little
change in the number of children under five who remain hungry and underweight; a mere four per cent decrease was observed between 1990 and 2005. Over the
same 15 year period, mortality rates for children under five dropped by less than three per cent and only an additional five per cent of the population have gained
access to basic sanitation, leaving 37% of people without this necessity. The number of deaths from AIDS is also accelerating - a staggering two
million people in 2006.
The report also highlights the impact of global warming which is already being felt throughout the region. Recent examples include the intensification of droughts
and desertification in Kenya, the accelerated melting of ice field peaks in Tanzania, and the increased flooding experienced in the Niger Delta. The effect of
climactic change in sub-Saharan Africa inevitably heightens the scarcity of resources such as food and water, fuels conflict and exacerbates poverty. For instance,
only 42% of the rural population presently have access to clean water but this, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), could soon
include up to 250 million Africans. Despite important yet limited improvements in education, healthcare and agricultural productivity in a few countries, the overall
trends for poverty reduction, access to clean water and basic healthcare are continuing to plummet. The G8 leaders concur in theory that nothing could be more
important than preventing the imminent deaths of millions of Africans who are being indirectly denied the right to these essential resources. Yet as the failed
Gleneagles promises for increased aid to Africa demonstrate, global political priorities and economic policy address poverty indirectly, if at all, focusing instead on
creating economic growth and a strong corporate sector.
G8 ministers managed to placate many campaigners at the end of the 2006 Gleneagles Summit with inflated promises for more aid. The conclusion of this year’s
Heiligendam summit, however, has once again united civil society in its condemnation of the G8’s apparent self interest. According to the UN, the MDG to half
extreme poverty will only be achieved if the current pace of aid donation is doubled. Not only is such commitment extremely unlikely, but research also shows that
economic growth and international aid will never be sufficient to address poverty to any meaningful extent. The Chronic Poverty Research Centre has
calculated that even if the Millennium Development Goal for poverty and hunger is achieved by 2015, 900 million people will still
be living on less than one dollar a day.
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