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Hanna Tuominen
doctoral student
Department of Political Science
University of Helsinki
[email protected]
Paper presented at NISA’s conference
Power, Vision and Order in World Politics,
Odense 23.-25. May 2007.
Panel: The Nature of EU’s Global Actorness
Conscience in EU’s External Relations
One of the most pressing issues the EU faces today is the nature of its relationship with the world.
How Europe defines its role in world politics and even more importantly, how European actorness
is defined by other actors? It seems to be without doubt that the EU wants to be identified as a force
for good, an ethical player in global affairs. But what does this ethical role consist of, and does it
stand up to a critical scrutiny?
The behaviour towards others tells a lot about the actor herself. So the best way to approach EU’s
role in world politics is to examine the conduct of its external relations. What can be found behind
the means and aims of foreign policy is constitutive of the nature of the actor’s identity as such. The
basic features of EU’s external relations express the will to promote the “civilized values” for the
entire mankind and protect the laws of humanity, that is to say, human rights.
EU’s foreign policy has been considered normative or ethical especially as an opposite to US
policies in the world. The problem with this kind of consideration is finding out what differentiates
these policies from each other. What are the basic features in these policies that are thought to be
ethical rather than something else? There seems to be no answer to this question and so the policies
defined ethical will always receive suspicion and doubts.
The main idea of my paper is to present the idea of conscience as a partial answer to these
questions. Approaching the world politics from the perspective of conscience might feel strange
from the beginning. What could the concept of conscience, which is most often used at the
individual level, give to the analysis of foreign policies of different entities like EU? A
straightforward answer to this cannot be given in this paper, because it is the wider aim of my
doctoral studies. Instead I try to offer some preliminary ideas about how the idea of conscience
could help in defining policies ethical, normative, civilizing etc.
This paper is part of the growing normative theorizing in international relations. Normative theory
always presupposes that actors in the practice of world politics do have alternatives and real
choices, and possibility to change their conduct. The core idea in normative research is that people’s
normative ideas have an important impact in shaping the international order1. The research on EU’s
role in global arena needs this kind of normative theorizing that can offer future visions for
conducting policies. So with the research concentrating on the concept of conscience I hope to offer
some vision towards which political practice can develop in the future.
1
Frost 1996, 52.
1
The European Union as an ethical power?
During the recent decades the European Union has gained an increasing attention as an important
and relevant international actor. The problem with the EU’s actorness in its external affairs has been
the lack of unified perspective between the member states. This has given birth to scepticism about
the possibility of even speaking about common European foreign policy. Nowadays the debate has
fortunately turned to analyse rather the possible nature of this kind of common foreign policy. It is
noteworthy that when European role or influence in the world politics is studied, more than simply
the EU’s foreign policy, and more than even EU’s policies in different areas taken together must be
grasped.
One promising starting point for studying the EU’s external action is role theory2. The concept of
role is most often used as a synonym for influence in the literature, but also as an umbrella concept
for general patterns of EU policy behaviour. Roles are referring to patterns of expected or
appropriate behaviour of an actor. It is important to note that roles are determined both by an actor’s
own conceptions about appropriate behaviour and by the expectations of other actors. Focusing on
role allows one to go beyond traditional explanations of foreign policy as the prudent search for
power. In fact, the concept of role helps us understand obligations and commitments that an actor
perceives. A European role conception thus reflects norms about the purpose and orientation of the
EU as an actor in the international system3.
There is seldom, however, a specification of what roles the EU is actually engaged in, and when
there is, they tend to refer to a power dimension. One example of this is the characterizations of the
role of the EU by references to the ‘particularity’ of its power. The argument tends to be that the EU
is distinguished from other actors because it is not only civilian power (in the sense that it does not
have military instruments at its disposal) but also normative, civilizing or ethical power within the
international system4. It is true that the EU has used rather ‘soft’ than ‘hard’ means in international
relations, that is to say, preferred diplomacy and persuasion rather than coercive means.
The characterization of the EU as normative power seems to rest simply on the rather vague notion
that EU is ‘doing good’ in the international system. There is a general sense that the EU’s external
policies are not solely derived from a desire to promote its own interests, but must be seen as moved
also by a certain understanding of what “ought” to be done5. Ian Manners writed that “the central
component of normative power Europe is that the EU exists as being different to pre-existing
political forms and that this particular difference predisposes it to act in a normative way”6. Still all
of these definitions lack sufficient precision about the exact nature of this normativity and
peculiarity as an international actor.
The lack of precision and accuracy exposes the arguments of normativity to serious criticism. Is the
claim of normative and peculiar power of the EU only self made references to the ideal role which
is not caught up in reality? If this is so, does it make any difference what the actor herself wants to
be in international setting? The problems of meaning and relevance of self-images are especially
acute in the case of the EU, because its identity and self-image are still highly in-the-making. But
on the other hand the changing nature of political life within Western Europe has come to be
Elgström and Smith have studied the role theory in the EU context in The European Union’s Roles in International
Politics, (2006).
3
Elgström & Smith 2006, 25.
4
Sjursen 2006a, 170.
5
This comes evident especially in the Union’s enlargement policies.
6
Manners 2002,242.
2
2
associated with a distinctive role for the EU in world affairs. As Andrew Linklater claims, the EU
as such can be regarded as a major experiment or new stage of civilizing the relations between
states7. So it could be stated that more important than the definitions and classifications of actors is
the reality of what the actor has been and is like.
The arguments claiming EU’s normativity can be verified or faslified also by studying the opinion
of other actors in the international stage. In an important sense the way others define an actor
influences its self-image and role construction. Even if studies researching perceptions of the EU by
others are rare, existing ones8 seem to support the role of the EU as a normative leader in the world.
The EU was seen as a ‘leader for good’ focusing heavily on issues of international morality such as
environment protection, human rights and sustainable development9. These expectations partly set
limits to the EU’s actorness and give pressures to develop policies to a certain direction. Of course
as an actor the EU is always left with freedom to perform its role the way it finds most suitable.
One example of answering to others expectations in disputable way is the EU’s recent development
in the area of defence policies. Now that the EU is quickly developing its military capabilities it has
been asked is the availability of military force alien to EU’s role as a normative or civilizing power?
There seems to be differing answers to this question among the scholars10, but the discussion could
also be seen misguided. The mere existence of military capability is not a threat to normativity of an
actor as such but rather the ways in which these forces are used. It should be remembered that also
non-military instruments can be used coercively and that is why they cannot on their own be enough
to identify some polity as a normative power. Moreover, with the possession of military capabilities
the EU could defend more credibly its norms even though it would not choose to use them ever.
What would then be the contents of EU’s normativity? Sjursen has proposed that normative power
is such that tries to overcome power politics through a strengthening of international and
cosmopolitan law, emphasizing the rights of individuals, and a power that is willing to bind itself,
and not only others to common rules11. This kind of definition that stresses the importance of
respecting basic human rights and humanitarian principles seems to be a very popular way of
understanding actor’s normativity or morality. The EU’s commitment to protect and promote
human rights in the world is clearly an expression of this kind of normativity. On the other hand EU
has been “a good international citizen” when the respect of international law is considered. Also the
European integration can be seen as a project of enlarging the borders of community which is
restricted by law. EU’s willingness to promote regional co-operation, multilateralism and
democracy could as well be seen as efforts of enlarging the international community and
strengthening the law that binds all humanity.
Respect and responsibility as concepts are very much used in policy agendas etc. As Henri Vogt
writes, speaking about responsibility is an attempt to find moral ground, moral guidelines, moral
legitimacy in an era in which no such a ground or guidelines are believed to exist12. I believe that
the idea of conscience which is linked to these concepts of respect and responsibility could offer
new way of approaching the entire problem of defining an actor’s normativity. Conscience has been
seen as a most important guide in people’s personal life so why not extend the idea to collective,
public life an especially to an analysis of the actorness of the EU?
7
Linklater 2005.
Chaban, Elgström & Holland: “The European Union as others see it” (2006).
9
Chaban, Elgström & Holland 2006, 259-261.
10
Karen Smith believes that they are whereas Ian Manners does not. Sjursen 2006b, 238.
11
Sjursen 2006b.
12
Vogt 2006a,1.
8
3
What is conscience?
The concept of ‘conscience’ was already used by the Greek philosophers but the definitions have
varied a lot during the history. The complex idea of conscience can best be understood by dividing
it into three closely interrelated aspects:
1) Conscience is an application of moral rules to particular situations (an act of reason)
2) Conscience is a special ability to know intuitively what is good or bad and to guide reason in
application of the moral knowledge (moral intuition, synderesis) and
3) Conscience is a moral will to virtue (drive to act morally, prudentia).
Conscience appears as a complex capacity to pass moral judgements which includes, firstly, an
intuitive grasp of moral principles, secondly, a deliberation on how these principles have to be
applied in a particular situation, and thirdly, an imperative to act accordingly. Thus, moral reasoning
is an important element of conscience binding together moral intuition and moral imperatives13.
Conscience is often considered as a religious concept, ‘god’s voice inside of man’ and linked to
Christian ethics14. I do admit that religion can have an important role in conscience but at the same
time I believe that conscience does not necessarily depend on religious conviction. But conscience
is something without which it seems to be impossible to be moral. There is a possibility that
consciences conflict or become distorted, but that is a different matter. Conscience might as well be
used as an excuse for driving own interests or abstaining from doing certain things.
The concepts of conscience and law are interrelated as different aspects of human orientation in the
world throughout the history. These aspects can be found at the same time intertwined as well as
contradictory. Law at its best represents the conscience of the people but when these ideas collide,
conscience is often thought to be higher than any law. The supremacy of conscience is shown when
individual refuses to undertake a particular task on grounds of conscience15. At the international
level law can help to maintain morality by compelling actors to respect the law and sanction the
wrongdoers16. At the same time law can be found inefficient and slow means for realizing moral
imperatives. Law can even give permission to inaction when conscience demands action. Reasons
of conscience have ethical or religious basis and in a democratic society these reasons are respected
as much as possible17.
Conscience and world politics
In everyday language conscience usually refers to personal trait and individual ability and will to
act morally18. References to collective conscience are made more cautiously. States, IGOs, NGOs
and international businesses can and do sometimes make adjustments in their behaviour in response
to moral criticism, and may even have something approaching conscience, at least by analogy19.
Collective conscience is connected to an idea that humankind share something common. When
there is a claim to collective conscience, it should have an effect on all of us because of our nature
13
Shytov 2001, 36-37.
The parallel terms being sin, regret and guilt which all refer to religious world view.
15
For example citizen can refuse to serve in the armed forces, scientist can refuse to work for development of biological
weapons or Catholic doctor might refuse to perform an abortion. Of course these refusals are not necessarily against
the law.
16
As Martti Koskenniemi writes, international law was set to be the organ of conscience of the civilized world from the
beginning. This status was lost later on. (Koskenniemi 2001, 511-514.)
17
In Finland for example it is possible to do non-military service in stead of army. If a person does not do either of
these he must go to a prison.
18
Especially in Finnish conscience (omatunto) refers only to individuals.
19
Harbour 2003, 77.
14
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as humans. This is what Smyser has in mind when he writes about humanitarian conscience, “an
idea that human beings deserve to be protected from the effects of war and other forms of conflict.
It holds that the human race can and should act on the basis of common innate standards of
humanism and decency that people understand and appreciate”20. In this sense conscience is
something people share globally.
In world politics appeals to public conscience have become more popular recently for example
during humanitarian crisis, environmental catastrophes and unjust interventions. The idea of
conducting policies which are sensitive to conscience gives an impression of proceeding towards
more ethical orientation in world politics. The concept ‘public conscience’ can be interpreted to
mean that in world politics the conscience of larger public is taken into account. This interpretation
refers to more democratic political practices in which the civil society21 has an important role to
play. It is true that recently the public opinion has become ever more important influencing the
policy makers whether they wanted it or not.
On the other hand ‘public conscience’ refers to expressions of conscience that are made in public.
The problem of publicity is that conscience can be very selective bringing attention only to some
crises and injustices happening in the world. Conscience is connected to knowledge about the
caused harm. If nobody knows about the harmful consequences of particular act or policy, nothing
will surely happen to remedy the situation. That is why the question of representation of public
conscience is most important. This representation should ensure that we really are approaching
more ethical politics instead of something else. Who or what can then carry such responsibility?
Obviously the list of candidates who claim to represent public conscience in world politics is long.
Some individuals can make crucial initiatives for answering global wrongs by co-ordinating
different activities22. But individuals alone cannot cope with the problems the world faces
nowadays, the situation demands collective action. The first thing to do is then the identification of
those entities that have the capability to respond to the ethical imperatives of conscience. If the
discussion of moral responsibilities cannot come into conclusions about who should act and when,
the critical task of discussion is reduced to mere rhetoric23.
Traditional sovereign states may not be the best possible representatives of public conscience
because there is always some tension between obligations to their own people and to the entire
humanity in their policies. Probably some larger organisations with wider membership can more
credibly represent global conscience. Already many non-governmental organizations claim that
they act as a global conscience, representing broad public interests beyond the purview of
individual states. Kofi Annan like many others has called them ‘the conscience of the world’24.
These statements are not made without reason. NGO’s have offered flexibility, commitment and
capacity to respond to crises in a way that the interstate system could not have done. Even though
these organisations are said to represent ‘soft’ power – the ability to implement their own policies
through attraction rather than coercion – they cannot be ignored by state’s governments. Many of
these groups began their work with very specific and limited purposes, but over time these goals
have widened as well as the groups they try to help25.
20
Smyser 2003.
Even if we might be sceptical about its very existence.
22
This was shown for example when rockstars planned and made real the Live Aid project and Make Poverty History
campaign. Of course people that can have such impact are usually equipped with extraordinary capabilities (money,
status, prestige) for doing this.
23
Erskine 2003,2.
24
Willetts 1996.
25
Most of the humanitarian NGOs at first (during and after the World Wars) represented religious groups. Smyser
21
5
There will surely be different interpretations of bearers of global responsibilities and representatives
of global conscience. But already dealing with these issues might help to overcome the fact that
appeals to conscience and responsibilities are made usually only after the worst has already
happened. Conscience can then only be used to remedy the situation and offer compensations
instead of preventing the harm. If there would be some agreement also beforehand, more effective
work could be done to prevent the crises to escalate. The question of representation of public
conscience remains also very important for another reason. Conscience led policies always include
the risk of becoming distorted: egoistic or paternalistic policies may be masked with a claim to
conscience. That is why claims to conscience should always be legitimated somehow with certain
precision. Otherwise they will only give rise to suspicions of hypocrisy and hidden agendas.
Conscience and Divided EU Actorness
Could EU then be seen as a credible representative of global conscience aiming to promote the
wellbeing of entire humanity? If the EU is said to represent public conscience, it is important to ask
first who or what part of the complex bureaucratic entity called EU is actually doing the job. In this
sense it could be useful to utilize the habermasian division of political institutions to unofficial
public sphere and formal administrative sphere26. In the case of the EU formal sphere would refer to
official EU institutions and informal sphere to the activities and organisations of European civil
society. Obviously formal institutions such as the European Council, Parliament and Commission
can bear responsibilities and make policy directions towards more ethical future. But also the public
opinion of Europeans must have great impact on policies, which is a sign of working democracy.
Of course it could be argued that there does not exist such entity as European civil society yet and
maybe never will. But as Habermas and Derrida note the demonstrations against the war in Iraq can
be seen as signs of the birth of a European public sphere27. Also Linklater sees this phenomenon as
an expression of global conscience by European public28. If common European values29 are taken
seriously, it can be said that conscience of the EU means the conscience of all its constitutive parts.
The demands of public conscience should touch all of us as Europeans.
But officially the institutions of EU can do most in bearing the responsibilities of certain policies
and in responding to possible moral wrongs. The disagreements between member states should not
effect too much on the external policy directions that are chosen. The EU should appear as coherent
and consistent actor in moral issues or otherwise its ethical power is diminished. Moreover the
fragmented nature of the EU does not necessarily have a strong effect on the image others have of
it. Surprisingly in the studies about outsiders’ perceptions of the EU, it was considered to be one
actor in world politics30. That is why others might as well claim all Europeans of inaction and
indifference towards suffering when failures to meet moral demands happen. This could be
irrespective of the fact of differing policies within member states, unofficial organizations etc.
Actually the EU’s (moral) leadership problems have been associated rather with role ambiquity than
with internal dissension. So maybe it is not important to differentiate what the different actors inside
the EU do, but rather the contradictory role conceptions and expectations of the entire entity. It is
still worth remembering that there can be contradictory viewpoints inside the complex.
2003, 53.
Habermas 1999.
27
Habermas and Derrida 2003, 291.
28
Linklater 2005, 373.
29
Human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights. Lucarelli 2006, 49.
30
Chaban, Elgström & Holland 2006, 246.
26
6
The EU – an Ethical Actor in World Politics?
As was already noted the EU has been considered a ‘leader for good’, playing a moral role in world
politics. But how do we know that this claim is not only a form of Eurocentric imperialism invented
by those in power? And in what sense (if any) does the EU differ from other great powers?
The EU is often considered an ethical player in world affairs as an opposite force to the United
States. It is said that the EU is more interested in respecting international law, promoting human
rights and solving crises by long-term structural changes whereas the US uses rapid military
operations and then disappears. Europeans have the role of cleaning “the mess” which means
reconstruction, peace building and humanitarian assistance. But is this so only because Europeans
do not have similar military capability than US? Are Europeans considered more ethical only
because of their current weakness as Robert Kagan claims31? Or is there some possible difference in
their way of being ethical?
During the history the United States has categorized itself as normative power led by universal
values of liberty, equality and prosperity. United States has recently even made references to
conscience in its policies. Unfortunately the concept of conscience is normally used as a means to
ignore others opinion and international law as well as a justification to follow its own path. One of
the problems of its “politics by conscience” is that it stresses religious elements, making the policies
somehow missionary. The forceful use of military might in crises makes it also less credible. In the
political leadership of the US there does not seem to exist will to fight fairly and openly towards
presumed enemies, nor a real freedom of criticism towards chosen action. Outsiders often perceive
this as a lack of real commitment and promotion of its own interests.
So there is a lesson to be learned from the activities of US and hopefully Europeans will bear this in
mind. The minds and hearts of third parties are not won by force but rather with softer means. The
EU’s more civilian image should not be endangered, even if it acquires military capabilities. Being
ethical in European way could mean respect for legal principles, promotion of negotiation and
diplomacy and respect for difference. Conscience led policies could mean that the Europeans would
have good conscience about the political directions, which were heavily informed and studied
alternatives. Certain basic critical attitude towards the prevailing world system and values should
prevail. Ethical principles should be followed also when they are contrary to the interests of the EU.
Why would the Europeans act morally? What could motivate them to moral action instead of
something else? Obviously the most important motivation for moral action comes from the shared
history of Europeans. It is shown already in the initial raison d’être of integration, or what has been
called the EU’s telos. The dramatic experiences of World Wars reinforced Europeans’ faith in the
value of democratic systems, human dignity and solidarity. So the integration process started as a
nearly utopian project of peace through co-operation among former enemies, economic
development and democratic consolidation of the member states. Although the Union’s telos is not
as strong and visible as it was at the outset, the founding values of the Union were never abandoned
in the political system and continue to be visible in its foreign policy performance32. The EU wants
to promote sustainable peace, which must include ethical attitude towards others. It is important to
note also that the European values are not cultural or religious, but rather political values. They do
not give permission to missionary politics but rather demand respect towards otherness.
31
32
Kagan 2003.
Lucarelli 2006, 56-57.
7
Also the history of colonization has left its mark on Europeans. Even if many of today’s member
states do not share the historical experience with former empires, there is shared knowledge of this
period. This historical exploitation is seen as a cause for many pressing problems of third world
countries even nowadays33. At the same time it is seen as an explanation for the present unequal
world situation. The historical bad conscience of Europeans might be expressed as an interest in
promoting the needs of third world countries. The problem with this view is that there are regions in
the world largely untouched by European exploitation needing help very badly. So the help should
not be directed only towards those former objects of colonization. Otherwise large part of the
humanity is left suffering.
The EU as Humanitarian Conscience of the World
If we want to examine EU’s representation of conscience in actual politics, maybe the many times
mentioned humanitarian dimension is a good starting point. This is particularly visible in crises
management, development policies and human rights protection. The EU is a major donor of
humanitarian assistance and development aid in the world. Even if the amount of given aid varies
according to the different member states, most of the European countries and institutions tend to be
sensitive to moral claims of helping those in need34. It is somehow constitutive of the self-image of
Europeans as civilized people. Because the Europe has material capabilities as well as knowledge
about the situations of others, it could be claimed to be even immoral not to help. Inaction could be
also disapproved and seen as a neglect of responsibilities.
But especially in the development policies there are contradictions35, and that is why others do not
necessarily conceive the EU’s actions as positively as it itself does. The EU has made its help
conditional of certain basic values and norms it prefers and tries to promote. But can this kind of
pursuit of norms and values be legitimate? Can the EU really choose to help some but not others
because of differing value basis? Europeans should be reflexive about the values they promote and
more flexibly accept differing interpretations. This is something the EU really is lacking. If the EU
really wants to be representative of humanitarian conscience of the world it should bear in mind that
it is ordinary people, often under aged, that mostly suffer from misery.
The EU’s possibility to alleviate problems in third countries and combat inequality depends on real
political processes but also on the perceptions and images that others have of it36. That is to say, not
only actual political decisions but also the ways in which they are put into practise makes a
difference. EU’s normative impact often underestimates the question of how the Union justifies its
policies, its demands and criticisms vis-à-vis third countries. Others have to believe in the EU’s real
will to help, which cannot be tied only to its own interests.
The EU has also voluntarily raised expectations of others by using the kind of language37 it does in
its treaties, constitution draft etc. That makes the EU responsible for making its promises true. So if
there is no intention or possibility to fill the promises, they should not be made. It is also immoral to
promise things that cannot be done. The EU’s credibility in humanitarian issues is constantly in
danger of becoming mere rhetoric if nothing relevant is to happen in near future.
33
Of course there is awareness about other reasons for degradation as well.
Even if there is a lively discussion in many countries about the possibilities to give much more than nowadays is
given.
35
For example protectionism and substitutes for member states in agricultural policies.
36
Vogt 2006b, 160.
37
The EU has for example defined itself as a champion of Third World interests.
34
8
Can World Politics Follow the Dictates of Public Conscience?
Is more ethical world politics better guaranteed by references to public conscience? Obviously the
impact of such claims depends on who is claiming this conscience and how it is stated. In the case
of the EU economic status as well as ‘politics of scale’ might help in making such claims. The EU
is truly transnational and even becoming more and more multicultural entity. Democratic values are
its core defining features making the milieu more promising for influencing through public opinion.
These characteristics may help to make the EU’s actorness more credible in the area of conscience.
If conscience is used as a guide for politics, it should be openly justified. Without public support
conscience led politics can be abused to override others’ opinions or for political gain. That is why
it should be carefully employed in the language and as consonant with legal principles as possible.
When applied to world politics, conscience could also be something that drives for action even
when international law gives permission to inaction. Unfortunately good intentions do not either
necessarily lead to hoped-for consequences. Then real ethical attitude would mean taking
responsibilities for failed action as well.
The concept of public conscience can better explain some of the defining features of the EU’s
global actorness as well as differences to other actors. It explains the EU’s nature as an ethical
undertaking as well as the dangers in such policy direction. Conscience also gives encouragement to
believe in shared common humanity and work on behalf of it, even if this work is only partial.
I hope that this paper has shown that the concept of conscience has many interesting implications
when applied to world politics and to the politics of the EU particularly. I believe that the concept
has truly transformational power and it could help to direct policies towards more ethical direction.
So conscience remains relevant concept for the well-being of humans, society and world system at
large and worth a more comprehensive study in the future. In the end I could say that conscience
can complicate world political practice, but it still in one form or another stays essential part of
them.
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