Download File - Mr. D`s Tutoring

Joe DeLea
April 9, 2009
Global Seminar
Defeat Versus Surrender, an Atomic Difference
The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are arguably the most historic days in
the history of war in the twentieth century. Never before (and never after) has one country used
nuclear weapons against another, giving the days August 6th and August 9th of 1945 a permanent
spot in history. Amidst the history of the bombs, however, lie layers of controversy, uncertainty,
and ambiguity that persist to this present day, 64 years later. This essay will use the events
preceding the dropping of the bombs as well as the mentalities of American policy makers at the
time to argue that the atomic bombs were not dropped out of shear military necessity. I will
argue that contrary to pro-nuclear rhetoric, the bombs were not needed to put an end to the war
quickly. This essay will go on to argue that the bombs were, however, necessary to achieve the
total victory that American policy makers desired as an outcome to the war. This paper will not
be defending the bombings. It will, however, differentiate between the surrender of Japan and
the total, unequivocal victory that the United States pursued.
The United States did not look to simply end the war in the Pacific as soon as possible.
The reason for this is because this would not ensure the United States as the total victor. In the
eyes and minds of American policy makers, anything less than total destruction of a militaristic
Japan at the hands of the American military was unacceptable. Simply put, the United States
could have ended the war in the Pacific earlier and with less debate had they been willing to
sacrifice their ulterior motives. I will support this idea by examining the desire for the United
States to punish the Japanese for their atrocities committed across Asia, the pummeling sneak
attack of the Imperial Forces at Pearl Harbor, as well as the political “rewards” that the United
States will enjoy following a total victory in the pacific. None of these inclinations would have
been attained had the United States accepted peace terms before Japan’s utter destruction.
Historian’s discussion of the reasons and justification (or lack there of) of the atomic
bombs being dropped has seen viewpoints taken from both extremes of the debate, including
every point in between. Historians that condemn the bombings like Ronald Takaki argue that the
bombings were militarily unnecessary and were used out of racist and political motives.1 More
moderate historians like Robert James Maddox in his book Weapons for Victory2 argue that there
is evidence suggesting that it would have been possible to force the Japanese to surrender
without the use of atomic bombs, but at the cost of many American casualties. More
conservative historians argue that the bombs were military necessities because the mission was
to end the war at the least number of casualties and that is what they did. This argument is most
apparent in Thomas B. Allen and Norman Polar’s Code Name Downfall.3 One essay entitled
Roosevelt, Truman, and the Atomic Bomb, 1941-1945: A Reinterpretation argues that the bomb
was seen as a legitimate weapon; thereby making it justified to be used in order to end the war as
soon as possible.4 Bernstein argues that the ability to use the bomb as leverage in diplomatic
relations was a secondary motive, but not as important as ending the war. Extremely
conservative historians, such as Robert Newman, argue that the bombs were the most appropriate
weapon at the time, and the negative attitudes associated with it are a result of Vietnam era
activism and an anti-government counter culture.5
1
Ronald Takaki, Hiroshima: Why America Dropped the Atomic Bomb. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co. 1995)
Robert James Maddox, Weapons for Victory: The Hiroshima Decision Fifty Years Later. (Columbia: University of
Missouri Press, 1995)
3
Thomas B. Allen and Norman Polar, Code Name Downfall: The Secret Plan to Invade Japan and Why Truman
Dropped the Bomb. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995)
4
Barton J. Bernstein, Roosevelt, Truman, and the Atomic Bomb, 1941-1945: A Reinterpretation, Political Science
Quarterly, Vol. 90, No. 1, 1975 Published by the Academy of Political Science
5
Robert P. Newman, Truman and the Hiroshima Cult. (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1995).
2
These are just a selected few out of a plethora of historians and their views regarding the
bombs. In terms of my argument, it is important to note that none of the historians researched
mentioned the decision to drop the bombs and the events surrounding it as being related to the
American idea of total victory. In other words, the historians have separated the numerous
aspects of the decision, such as American propaganda from the Japanese search for peace,
political statements towards the Soviet Union, and international superiority. I will connect the
numerous aspects of the historiography and show how they are all intertwined in the American
definition of what constitutes total victory and what does not.
After the Manhattan Project became more than a theory, the question rose of what is the
approach towards the bomb. To go about answering this question, Henry Stimson arranged for a
group of scientists to come together and present their findings involving the power and potential
of using atomic bombs. His words were:
“I am appointing an Interim Committee on S-1 to study and report
on the whole problem of temporary war controls and later
publicity, and to survey and make recommendations on post war
research, development and controls, as well as legislation
necessary to effectuate them.”6
Important to note is that Stimson never explicitly said that the committee was to decide whether
or not the bombs should be used; the committee was simply supposed to be a fact gathering
group of scientists who would be able to effectively advise the president and military men on the
capabilities of the atomic bomb project.
MED Files: Harrison-Bundy Series, Folder #69, “S-1 Interim Committee.” As found in Walter Smith
Schoenberger, Decision of Destiny. (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1969). 124
6
From an early on, it was apparent that the United States policy makers knew that the
atomic bombs were more than simply destructive. This can be seen when examining notes of the
Interim Committee from May 31st. The notes show how the policy makers fully advocated
producing the “greatest psychological effect,” thereby making the most desirable target “a vital
war plant employing a large number of workers and closely surrounded by workers’ houses.”7 In
other words, it was understood from early on that the bombs needed to be more than simply
destructive physically but dehumanizing psychologically, thereby contributing to the overall
destruction of Japan.
When discussing Henry Stimson and his appointment of the committee, Walter
Schoenberger goes on to say “He [Stimson] made no reference to the necessity for a decision as
to whether or not to use the bomb.”8 This is very significant because it acts as supporting
evidence that the Interim Committee had little say as to if the bomb should be used. However,
the reports of the Interim Committee that cooperated with the wider plans of the bomb were fully
accepted. Knowing what is known now, this could be seen to argue that the American policy
makers knew that an atomic bomb was going to be dropped well before the end of World War 2.
For the president and other members of the project to know that they were going to drop the
bombs acts to support the idea that the United States greatly wanted to pummel their enemies, be
it the Japanese or the Germans. Even early in the development of the atomic bomb, the United
States felt that they could achieve the most reward by achieving total victory, which includes
obliterating the enemy and making a statement to the international community for post war
control. Of course, Truman was not behind the plan from its inception. However, Truman
Notes of the Interim Committee Meeting Thursday, 31 May 1945, 10:00 A.M. to 1:15 P.M. – 2:15 P.M. to 4:15
P.M.," n.d., Top Secret from RG 77, MED Records, H-B files, folder no. 100 accessed on April 19, 2009 from
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB162/index.htm
8
Walter S Schoenberger, Decision of Destiny, (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1969), 125.
7
wanted to carry over Roosevelt’s plans and continue what he sought out to do, motivating him to
maintain Roosevelt’s cabinet members as well as top military officials, thereby continuing the
plan.
Although not meant to make decisions regarding whether or not the bomb should be
used, it was impossible for the members of the committee not to voice their views. In what
became known as the Franck Report, the scientists involved in the Interim Committee came up
with alternatives to using the weapon on a military target. The scientists felt that a
demonstration and the fear of trying to defend against a nuclear arsenal would be enough to force
the enemy into submission. In the words of the report, “We believe that these considerations
make the use of nuclear bombs for an early unannounced attack against Japan inadvisable.”9
That is not to say that the opinions of the numerous civilian members were unanimous. There
were in fact those that felt that the bomb should be used against Japan as to shock them into a
sense of utter defeat. In what was known as the Scientific Panel came a quote saying
“The opinions of our scientific colleagues on the initial use of these
weapons are not unanimous; they range from the proposal of a purely
technical demonstration to that of military application best designed to
induce surrender. Others emphasize the opportunity of saving American
lives by immediate military use…”10
The differing views of the Interim Committee must have caused for a heightened sense of
confusion and self questioning for President Truman simply because there was a lot of
information but not much commonality. Still, Truman was able to pick and choose which advice
9
James Franck, Donald J. Hughes, J. J. Nickson, Eugene Rabinowitch, Glenn T. Seaborg J. C. Stearns and
Leo Szilard, Manhattan Project "Metallurgical Laboratory" (The Franck Report) University of Chicago, June 11,
1945 accessed on April 22, 2009 from http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/ethics/issues/scientific/franckreport.htm
10
Herbert Freis, The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966) 54.
he wanted in order to defend his decision to drop the bomb. When the scientists on the
committee saw military use in the bombs, Truman used them to support his decision. When
there were scientists who argued against its use, Truman simply ignored their opinions. At this
point, Truman was looking for as much support that would allow him to drop the bombs with
justification while also hammering the enemy and leading to total victory for the United States.
Where was the United States to proclaim their dedication to complete and total victory?
Aside from the rhetoric being part of the Allied plan, Truman saw the opportunity at the
Conference at Potsdam to proclaim this decree, just not in those exact words. During the
Potsdam Conference, Harry Truman met with Joseph Stalin and Winston Churchill in order to
discuss post war Europe and how to deal with the reorganization of Germany and her allies.
Although this Conference was meant to be a peaceful, diplomatic way of dealing with defeated
Germany, the United States saw it as a way to pursue their total victory; not just in the Pacific
but in the entire international theater. Truman’s concern was seen in that he wanted to maintain
a monopoly of influence across Europe and the Pacific. In other words, he did not want the
Soviet Union to be equally as powerful as the United States following the end of World War 2.
Secretary of State Byrnes was quoted admitting “both he and the President felt the attempt to
reduce or eliminate Soviet influence in South Eastern Europe to be one of the most important
objectives of American diplomacy at Potsdam.”11 Truman’s concern with the power and
influence of the Soviet Union following the war is evidence that victory not only meant the
surrender of the enemy. On the contrary, part of Truman’s definition of victory meant unequal
11
W.D. Leahy I Was There: The Personal Story of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, Based on
His Notes and Diaries Made at the Time (New York: Whittlesey, 1950) as found in Gar Alperovitz, Atomic
Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam and the Use of the Atomic Bomb and the American Confrontation with Soviet
Power, (New York: Penguin Books, 1985) 194.
supremacy in the international community. Truman would not be satisfied with sharing “world
power” status with any other nation, let alone the Soviet Union.
Potsdam is also where the rhetoric of “unconditional surrender” was seen most. The idea
of unconditional surrender was accepted by Nazi Germany, giving the Allies (but especially the
United States) the motivation to seek the same terms towards Japan. However, the definition of
unconditional surrender and the understanding of it were very ambiguous to say the least. In the
words of Truman and his team, unconditional surrender meant:
-The elimination "for all time [of] the authority and influence of those
who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on
world conquest"
-The occupation of "points in Japanese territory to be designated by the
Allies"
-"Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshū,
Hokkaidō, Kyūshū, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine."
As had been announced in the Cairo Declaration in 1943, Japan was to
be stripped of her pre-war empire, including Korea and Taiwan, as well
as all her recent conquests.
-"The Japanese military forces shall be completely disarmed"
-"Stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those
who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners"12
12
Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan (Boston: Harvard University
Press, 2005) 118-119.
These terms signify many agendas, the most prominent of which are the complete
destruction of an imperial, militaristic Japan. However, the words are extremely ambiguous and
undefined. From the Japanese point of view, questions arose about who were considered war
criminals, how much of Japanese territory will be lost, and what is to happen to the Japanese way
of life? It is not surprising to learn that the idea of unconditional surrender was unacceptable by
the Japan because of the fear that they would lose every aspect of their lives, culture, and way of
life. This is another form of evidence that the American policy makers knew the enigmatic
nature of unconditional surrender and saw it as a chance to postpone its acceptance by Japan,
thereby continuing the war. One would ask why Truman was intentionally trying to keep the
terms ambiguous, thereby postponing a probable surrender of Japan. This author sees the series
of events as evidence that Truman wanted to postpone Japan’s surrender in order to:
a) Gain support from others to justify the use of the atomic bomb, arguing that it was the most
efficient way to force Japan to surrender.
b) Maneuver diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union so that the United States is the sole
world power, fulfilling a necessary criterion for total American victory.
It is not as if Truman and his advisors tried to hide to these motives. A quote from Henry
Stimson (as quoted by Ronald Takaki) says “In this international game of poker, the United
States had two powerful cards, economic leverage and the atomic bomb. Together, they are a
royal flush and we mustn’t be a fool about the way we play our hand.”13 The United States knew
it was in a favorable position to get the rewards it sought, so they had to make sure they played
their hand properly in order to secure a large pot, a pot containing not money but international
supremacy.
13
Takaki, 117
International supremacy was not a secondary motive of the United States when deciding
to drop the bomb. Relations with Russia and the rest of the international community seemed to
have equal relevance when choosing to use nuclear weapons on Japan. This can be seen in the
ways in which the United States did not particularly want the Soviet Union to aid in the forced
surrender of Japan. It is true that Stalin agreed to invade Japanese Manchuria three months after
the end of the war in Europe at a conference in Yalta.14 However, that was before the successful
detonation of the atomic bomb at Los Alamos. The United States knew they needed Russia’s
assistance to inflict damaging casualties towards Japan, thereby destroying Japan. After the
successful detonation of the bomb at Trinity, however, it became obvious that the United States
did not want Russia to enter, thereby taking away from their victory and their post war power
including control of territories. Although openly opposed to the dropping of the atomic bomb,
diplomat Joseph Grew was quoted saying “Should the Soviet demand for participation in the
military occupation of Japan be granted?”15 It was this idea that raised the desire to search for
political means before the Soviet Union could get involved. The ensuing conflict with the Soviet
Union was climaxed with the Denunciation of the Neutrality Pact between Japan and Russia,
officially showing Russia’s eventual involvement in the Pacific. The denunciation goes on to
say:
'The neutrality pact between the Soviet Union and Japan was concluded
on April 13, 1941, that is, before the attack of Germany on the USSR and
before the outbreak of war between Japan on the one hand and England
and the United States on the other. Since that time the situation has been
basically altered... 'On the strength of the above and in accordance with
Article Three of the above mentioned pact, which envisaged the right of
14
15
Schoenberger, 75
Len Giovannitti and Fred Freed, The Decision to Drop the Bomb, (New York: Coward-McCann, 1965) 77.
denunciation one year before the lapse of the five year period of
operation of the pact, the Soviet Government hereby makes know to the
Government of Japan its wish to denounce the pact of April 13, 1941.”16
Outside of the explicitly stated parts of President Truman’s definition of victory, I
mentioned international supremacy, unmatched by no other nation as a criterion for total victory
in the Pacific theater. There remains, however, a criterion that needs to be explained to fully
understand why President Truman dropped the atomic bombs on an already defeated Japan.
That criterion is the victory of democracy. Truman would not want to pummel Japan into
unconditional surrender to set up a new Japan with communist or socialist ideologies. Had this
been the case, there would have been little hesitation to get the Soviet Union involved, possibly
leading to a surrender by Japan earlier than August of 1945. In order for Truman to feel a sense
of complete and total victory, Japan had to be democratically influenced. Gar Alperovitz
explains that many leaders, fearing communist influence in Asia, were motivated to avoid getting
the Soviet Union involved.17 The United States knew that if the Soviet Union assisted in
bringing destruction to Japan, they would be entitled to occupation, leading to a sphere of
influence of communist ideology. Truman’s most recent hopes to keep the Soviet Union out of
Japan were shattered when the Soviet Union officially declared "In view of the above, the Soviet
Government declares that from tomorrow, that is from Aug. 9, the Soviet Government will
consider itself to be at war with Japan."18 It was at this point that Truman’s desire to keep Soviet
involvement in Japan to a minimum became a lost dream.
16
Soviet Denunciation of the Pact with Japan from The Department of State Bulletin Vol. XII, No. 305, April 29 th,
1945 accessed on April 19, 2009 from http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/s3.asp
17
Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb and the Architecture of an American Myth (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1995) 84.
18
Soviet Declaration of War on Japan accessed on April 19, 2009 from http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/s4.asp
It was partly because of this fear of Soviet influence during the reconstruction of the
Pacific that motivated Truman to drop the bomb on Japan. Had Truman been content with
forcing Japan into submission by any means, it would have been militarily and diplomatically
prudent to seek the assistance of the Soviet Union and sacrifice total occupation for joint
occupation with her Allies. As I stated earlier, Truman most definitely would not have been
content with this idea. Harry Truman wanted to destroy the imperial Japanese by American
hands. By doing this, the United States would be seen as the most dominant nation in the world,
giving her a level of power and privilege greater than any other nation on the world’s stage.
Truman wanted to show the power and potential of democracy, ideally leading to an
international adoption of democracy and rejection of communism following World War 2. In
order to do this, Japan could not simply surrender.
An end to the war in the Pacific would not be enough to put the United States at the
apogee of her international presence. For Truman and his fellow policy makers, the only way to
reach that stated apex is through the complete and utter destruction of the enemy at the hands of
America. With the looming threat of Soviet influence, among numerous other factors, the only
way to achieve the goals mentioned was to drop the atomic bombs on Japan.
A question that has been argued when discussing the dropping of the atomic bomb deals
with alternative measures that could have been taken that would not have involved nuclear
weapons. At the time, there most definitely were discussions of alternate ways that could have
induced Japan into surrendering. One major alternative was a live demonstration of the power
and potential of the bomb. In its essence the idea of a demonstration could work because it
would show the Japanese that the United States had capabilities beyond anything ever seen
during war. However, as this paper has argued, Truman and his team were not as interested in
forcing surrender as they were to punish and demoralize the Japanese. Quickly, arguments
against the demonstration were voiced, often citing the possibility of a dud, or the placing of
American prisoners at the drop site.19 It would have been entirely possible to demonstrate the
power and capabilities of the atomic bomb on a desolate area or within the view of the Japanese
leadership. Once the Emperor and his men would have seen the destructive potential of the
atomic bomb, there would have been little question that the Japanese needed to accept the terms
of surrender as soon as possible.
From the American side, however, how could a demonstration effectively dehumanize
and punish an imperialistic, atrocity committing enemy? It would have been impossible for the
United States to achieve the victory that they sought by simply shocking the enemy into
surrender. At the time, it was also argued that a demonstration would not have been sufficient
enough to “impress” the Japanese into surrender. In the eyes of Truman and his advisers, the full
political and military power of the bomb could only be reached with an attack on an
unsuspecting enemy. Giovannitti and Freed, defenders of the bomb, go on to argue against a
demonstration by saying “the Japanese would become psychologically stronger and the
opportunity to give them the maximum shock of the weapon’s power would be lost.”20 In other
words, a demonstration of the bomb would not have the power to beat the Japanese into
submission, resulting in the prolongation of American victory, thereby delaying American goals
of becoming the sole victor.
From a military standpoint, it has been argued that the atomic bombs were the best choice
because they saved American lives by not needing to invade the home islands of Japan. From an
early on, there were plans to invade those home islands, starting with Kyushu, code named
19
20
Maddox, 44
Giovanetti and Freed, 104
Operation Downfall. Although the operation itself was quite complex, it basically was to start at
the southern most island of Kyushu, advancing north towards Tokyo.21 Military leaders knew
that a decisive victory and advancement of Allied forces onto the mainland would almost surely
force the Japanese into defeat. However, much was done in order to argue against a manned
invasion in favor of the atomic bomb, showing more evidence to the United States desire to use
the bomb and claim total victory.
The most common detail of an Allied invasion that was used to favor the bomb was the
estimated number of casualties that would result from the intense fighting that would come out
of an invasion. There have been numerous different estimates by different people, but they
average in the several hundred thousands. There has even been a quote by General Marshall that
argues the bomb saved a million American lives.22 At this point in history it is still impossible to
estimate how many casualties there would have been had the United States landed on the main
islands of Japan; showing that pro-bomb propaganda was the main proponent of these statistics.
Historians and military men have used previous battles in the Pacific as the basis for their
estimates. In their book Code Name Downfall, Thomas B. Allen and Norman Polmar show how
the estimate of roughly 500,000 casualties arose from examining casualty rates from Leyte,
Luzon, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa.23 They support the argument that the heavy fighting on the
islands prior to the invasion was a small sample of what the Allies would face if they went along
with Operation Downfall; an argument used quite successfully to make the bombs seem to be the
better choice.
The models estimating the casualty rates of an invasion were scrutinized in an essay by
D.M Giangreco. In the essay, he mentions how many historians have discounted the estimated
21
Robert B. Frank, Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire (New York: Penguin, 2001) 340
Feis, 12
23
Allen and Polmar, 206-207
22
casualty rates as fraudulent because the reports didn’t take into account the relative weakness of
Japan. It goes on to say that General Marshall’s quote to President Truman about a million lives
was a “postwar creation” to justify the bombs.24 What this evidence shows is that Truman
picked the estimates that would make the bombs justifiable without looking into their reasoning
or derivatives, strengthening my argument that the United States wanted to use the bombs to
totally defeat Japan, thereby dismissing pro-bomb arguments of being militarily prudent and
necessary.
There are other problems with this invasion rhetoric, all of which lead this author to
believe that the United States overestimated the number of casualties to bolster more support for
use of the atomic bomb, bringing the United States closer to her goals mentioned earlier. One
such problem is that it’s a counterfactual argument. There is no real way to estimate how many
soldiers would have been killed during an invasion, so to perpetuate numbers that are pure
estimates as if they were scientific figures was a misleading ploy. It was used so that the events
that were about to transpire were justified and supported by those both outside and within the
decision makers.
Another major problem is seen with the rhetoric that supported the bomb over an
invasion. An important aspect of that said rhetoric was ineffectiveness of continued aerial
bombing and growing use of air attacks on Japan. Many felt that instead of a foot invasion of
Kyushu, the superior air power of the Allies on an already weakened Japan would be enough to
force the Japanese to submit. American military men, however, often argued that it takes more
than continuous aerial bombardment to force a country into surrender. Brigadier General
William Mitchell argued that the non stop bombing of Britain by the Luftwaffe failed to force
24
D.M Giangreco, A Score of Bloody Okinawas and Iwo Jimas": President Truman and Casualty Estimates for the
Invasion of Japan from The Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 72, No. 1 (Feb 2003) University of California Press, 96
Britain to surrender; similar events were seen with the combined aerial assault on Germany by
the United States Air Force and Great Britain’s Royal Air Force were not enough to get the
enemy to surrender.25
The argument was incredibly inappropriate to be used because it assumes that Japan was
in the same position that Germany or Britain were years earlier. At this point in the war, the
Japanese did not have any allies left, which the Germans had. In terms of military strength, the
Japanese were actually in a worse off position than the Germans were. This was because of the
combination of the Soviet threat in Manchuria as well as the deteriorating industrial capabilities
of Japan due to American bombardment. For those historians that defend the use of the bombs
as militarily more prudent than an invasion, there seems to be that certain facts have been
omitted. A main fact that is often not mentioned is that the Japanese were by no means prepared
to defend the home islands.
With the blockading of Japan by Allied forces, the Japanese industries were decreasing
their output, resulting in the void of effectiveness of the Japanese Imperial Navy. Even if the
Japanese had the planes and ships to defend the islands, the crumbling economy and the lack of
resources (such as fuel, iron, and steel) would have made them useless!26 These facts are not
meant to say that an invasion of Kyushu and the other main islands would not have been long
and costly. On the contrary, they should be used as proof that arguments against an invasion in
favor of atomic bombings were mostly half truths and distorted in order to project the views of
the bomb that wouldn’t result in a backlash towards Truman and his administration.
The fact is that there is no way to tell what an invasion of Japan would have resulted in.
It is fair to say that there was potential for a long, bloody battle with casualties on both sides, but
25
26
Allen and Polmar, 77
Frank, 81
to fabricate information in order to support a controversial decision is both misleading to the
people as well as historically inappropriate to be used by scholars that defend the use of the
bomb. For Truman and his advisers, however, the possibility of a long and arduous battle was
enough for them to see that an invasion was not the best way to achieve total, undisputed victory.
The invasion was seen as lacking a guarantee of shocking, awing, and humiliating the Japanese
because of the possibility of losing soldiers and dragging the war on longer. So, in the eyes of
those in charge, the most prudent choice was to use the atomic bomb, achieving more than an
invasion could and allowing the United States to be where she wanted to be in terms of political
and military relations. The atomic bomb sent a message that was not able to be sent with simply
an invasion or continued aerial bombardment, thereby making the atomic bomb the “prudent”
choice.
There remains an additional important concept that motivated Truman to drop the bombs
in order to achieve an undisputed victory over Japan during World War 2. In the eyes of the
Americans, the Japanese needed to be punished for their actions and atrocities committed
towards others. It can be argued that these feelings were somewhat justified in that the Japanese
did in fact commit atrocities towards her enemies. However, the ways in which the American
people viewed the Japanese were manifestations of propaganda, which assisted in gathering
support for the use of the bombs from both policy makers as well as the public. This next section
will show how propaganda was generated by the United States, leading to the “need” to totally
annihilate Japan, as opposed to accepting other terms for surrender.
Arguably the biggest act during the war that would motivate American opinion against
the Japanese would be the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor. Americans still remembered the way in
which thousands of young men were killed by the Japanese at Pearl Harbor, unprovoked and
unsuspecting. It was these memories that allowed many Americans to see the Japanese as
uncivilized, militaristic savages. As put by one historian, the Japanese were the antagonistic
savages, making it necessary to punish them for their trespasses and send them a message.27 In
the rhetoric of the justification of the bombs, to allow the Japanese to accept anything other than
unconditional surrender would be ignoring the cowardly sneak attack on Pearl Harbor, proving
necessity in totally pummeling Japan with the atomic bombs. It was entirely common to see
propaganda posters with the words “Avenge Pearl Harbor” or “Remember Pearl Harbor.” One
particular poster shows an American Sailor in tattered clothes holding his fist up with the words
“Avenge December 7th” in the foreground.28
The success that Truman enjoyed with his policy towards Japan is epitomized in a quote
from the New York Times which says “By their own cruelty and treachery our enemies had
invited the worst we could do to them.”29 President Truman did not try to hide Pearl Harbor
during his speeches or justification of his policy towards the Japanese. In a radio address, he is
quoted saying
“We have used it against those who attacked us without warning at Pearl
Harbor…against those who have abandoned all pretense of obeying
international laws of warfare. We shall continue to use it until we
completely destroy Japan’s power to make war. Only a Japanese
surrender will stop us.”30
Truman realized the potential of using Pearl Harbor to gain support for his policy of complete
destruction and punishment of the Japanese. It was one of the most close to home feelings that
27
Maddox, 12
Bernard Perlin, Avenge December 7, U.S. Office of War Information, 1942 accessed on April 19, 2009 from
http://bss.sfsu.edu/internment/posteravenge.html
29
Editorial, “One Victory Not Yet Won,” The New York Times, August 12, 1945, p. 8E.
30
U.S Department of State Bulletin, August 12, 1945 found in Feis, 130
28
the United States citizens would have felt, thereby giving Truman and his men the ability to
manipulate their goals into messages that would be supported by the people. Still, to say Pearl
Harbor was the sole use of propaganda used by the United States to justify the total destruction
of Japan would be entirely inappropriate. The treatment of American prisoners by the Japanese
was used as powerful rhetoric to help “prove” that the Japanese deserved no mercy or leeway in
making conditions for surrender.
In one of the most iconic photographs of World War 2 an Allied soldier is seen on his
knees, blindfolded and bound by rope. Above him is a Japanese officer with a kitana sword in
motion of beheading the solider. In the background scores of Japanese soldiers can be seen
watching, most of which are smiling or cheering.31 It was later revealed that the soldier was an
Australian, but it was originally believed he was an American pilot, which infuriated the
American public. Although this particular soldier was an Australian, there remained numerous
Americans who saw their demise at the hands of a sword or some other gruesome form of
murder. The most prominent of these occurrences were in Bataan during the campaign in the
Philippines.
United States propaganda thrived on the images of Bataan. Reports of the torture and
murder of American prisoners at Bataan began to come to the public in April of 1943 because a
group of soldiers were able to escape and describe what they have seen.32 Quickly thereafter,
accounts of American soldiers being tortured, maimed, starved, and forced to march for miles
without proper nutrition were used to portray the Japanese as animalistic, thereby warranting
complete punishment and destruction. A poster that epitomized these feelings saw a Japanese
soldier battering an American soldier who has his hands tied behind his back. In the foreground
31
Photograph taken on 24 October 1943 in Aitape, New Guinea accessed from http://www.awm.gov.au/ on April
19, 2009
32
Allen and Polmar, 159
is a newspaper article headlined “5200 Yank Prisoners killed by Jap Torture in Philippines; Cruel
March of Death described.”33 Americans who heard of these stories were so appalled that they
were led to agree with Truman’s policies, thereby warranting the need to impose a complete
destructive victory by the Americans over the Japanese.
Atrocities committed against the American prisoners were not the only acts by the
Japanese used by American propaganda to constitute complete retribution. The American public
was well aware of what the Japanese did to Chinese prisoners and Chinese civilians following
the conquering of Nanking. Images of decapitated heads, raped and murdered women, tortured
babies, and smiling Japanese soldiers circulated across the world. American propagandists did
not hesitate to use the atrocities committed by the Japanese in China in order to further their
argument of the savage nature of the enemy and the need to demand unconditional surrender in
order to prevent anything similar happening in the future. It was the images of tortured human
beings, reports of American soldiers describing the hellish conditions of Japanese death camps,
and even reports of the Japanese using biological and biological weapons against civilians 34 that
were used as support to the rhetoric of complete and total victory. To accept anything less would
be allowing the Japanese to get away with what they have done while simultaneously letting the
American people down in terms of seeking retribution and vengeance for what has transpired.
One final propaganda technique that was exploited heavily by the Truman administration
was the attitude and stereotypes of the Japanese soldiers and their “samurai mentality.” It was
intentionally projected to the American people that the Japanese would be willing to fight to the
very last man before they accepted defeat. Schoenberger reiterates this idea when he writes
33
United States Army Official Poster, Stay on the Job Until Every Murdering Jap is Wiped Out accessed on April
19, 2009 from http://bss.sfsu.edu/internment/posters.html
34
Allen and Polmar, 173
“For whatever reason, whether in reaction to the original underestimate
of Japanese capability, to the willingness of some Japanese soldiers to
fight on after all hope was gone, or to the misunderstanding of the
Japanese suicide rite of hara-kiri and its more recent manifestation, the
Kamikaze, those responsible for United States policy steadfastly adhered
to the stereotype of the Japanese who would accept death rather than
surrender.”35
Truman and his policy makers knew that by using the samurai mentality as a way to
stereotype the Japanese soldiers they would be able to better justify their use of the atomic
bombs and succeed in their mission of total and complete annihilation of the Japanese. Truman
went as far as to include the Emperor as the proprietor of the never surrender mentality, which
strengthened his argument for unconditional surrender and justified why he could not deviate
from the original demands of the Potsdam Conference. In his memoirs, Truman writes “There
had been many of us who felt that the Emperor was an integral part of the Japanese system which
we were pledged to destroy. Could we continue the Emperor and yet expect to eliminate the
warlike spirit of Japan?”36
When examining these stereotypes of the Japanese deeper, one will see the outlandish
“examples” of Japanese fanaticism in the alleged use of women and children to defend the home
islands, as well as an all out Kamikaze attack on invading personnel. In fact, one primary
document from the United States Naval Technical Mission to Japan summarizes alleged plans of
underwater human guerillas known as Fukuryu who had the capabilities to plant mines in Tokyo
35
36
Schoenberger, 163
Harry S. Truman, Memoirs (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1955), I, 428.
Bay, going as far as blowing themselves up if they find the opportunity.37 Enclosures A-D show
diagrams of the Fukuryu suit, pointing out where the bombs would go, as well as ways in which
the guerillas would follow through with their attack. Although released after the dropping of the
bombs, it is important to see how this document was but one way to support the claim that the
Japanese were not going to surrender. It was apparent that those who made the decision to drop
the bomb relied heavily on the stereotype of the Japanese as being fanatical warriors who were
more likely to accept death than surrender, thereby making the use of the bombs most practical.
Combine this propaganda with the desire for the United States to be the most powerful
nation following the war (which was part of Truman’s definition of total victory) and the result is
the total “justification” of using atomic weapons. In the eyes of the policy makers, the atomic
bombs would be able ensure complete victory, thereby punishing treacherous Japan, destroying a
militaristic government, fighting the spread of communism, encouraging the spread of
democracy, as well as placing the United States at the top of the world stage. With these results
in mind, the atomic bomb was made out to be the best choice that Truman could have made.
It would be historically unfair to argue that the United States dismissed the idea of ending
the war before total victory without mentioning Japan’s search for peace. Had the Japanese
explicitly told the United States that they were not interested in putting an end to the war, it
could be argued easily that the United States was justified in trying to find a decisive way to end
the war, using the argument that they saved countless American casualties. However, Japanese
officials have sent out peace feelers to the Soviet Union in hopes of mediation between the
United States and Japan. In fact, Secretary of the Navy Forrestal described intercepted cable
37
United States Naval Technical Mission to Japan, Care of Fleet Post Office, San Francisco California dated
September 4th, 1945 accessed on April 16, 2009 url: http://www.fischertropsch.org/primary_documents/gvt_reports/USNAVY/USNTMJ%20Reports/USNTMJ-200I-07430766%20Report%20S-91%20N.pdf
messages as “real evidence of a Japanese desire to get out of the war.”38 It was not a secret that
Japan was willing to find a way to end the war. Takaki explains that U.S intelligence had
intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages seeking peace as Russia as a mediator.39
There was one common argument that was made by the Truman administration as to
why they rejected earlier attempts at peace. That argument was the idea that the Japanese were
looking to seek a favorable set of conditions to end the war. This includes maintaining the
emperor as well as allowing Japan to keep territories claimed as a result of her imperialism. Had
this been the case the whole time, Truman’s argument that the Japanese were not looking to end
this war could have been better justified. However, evidence proves otherwise in an intercepted
MAGIC message dated July 12th, 1945. In the message, Japanese Foreign Minister Togo urged
Ambassador to the Soviet Union Sato to let the Soviet Union know that Japan was willing to lose
its territories annexed over the course of the war and that Japan considers “the maintenance of
peace in East Asia to be one aspect of the maintenance of world peace.” The message later says
“Japan, as a proposal for ending the war, has absolutely no idea of annexing or holding the
territories which she occupied during the war.”40 This intercepted message shows that Japan was
seeking peace terms that were not particularly favorable for them.
The words prove that Japan knew it was in a dire situation and wanted to find a way out
of it. Even if prior messages were sent that showed Japan wanted favorable conditions to end the
war, it should be seen that had Truman in fact wanted to end the war as quickly as possible, he
38
J. V. Forrestal, The Forrestal Diaries. Edited by W. Millis, (New York: Viking, 1951) p. 74 found in Gar
Alperovitz’s Atomic Diplomacy p. 12
39
Takaki, 33
40
War Department, Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, Magic – Diplomatic Summary, G-2, No. 1204 – July 12,
1945, Top Secret Ultra, Document 29, accessed on April 19, 2009 from
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB162/index.htm
would have opened up for conversation well before August of 1945, possibly leading to an end
without the deaths of hundreds of thousands at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
One final piece of evidence that will be used to show that Truman looked for any reason
to prolong surrender in order to follow through with his “mission” is seen with the term
mokusatsu. Although difficult to translate into English, Truman and his policy makers saw it as
an ignoring, or rejection of Allied demands, thereby using it as evidence that the Japanese were
not actually seeking peace nor were they willing to accept the Potsdam declaration. The term,
which literally translates into “to kill with silence,” was meant to project that the Japanese
cabinet “was withholding comment on the Declaration, that a decision was not yet to be
announced.”41 When discussing this issue, Japanese historian Kazuo Kawai mentions that “it
was no revelation that Japan was moving toward surrender long before the issuance of the
Potsdam Declaration in July of 1945…By the time the Suzuki cabinet assumed office, the
securing of peace on any terms was the unannounced by clearly recognized aim of the Japanese
government.”42 It was the use of the word Mokusatsu that was insisted on being interpreted as a
rejection that caused for the prolongation of surrender.
Still, Truman knew that negotiating terms for peace would not give the United States the
complete victory that was desired to ensure supremacy in the world theater, nor would it avenge
the deaths of the American soldiers (and any other group) that suffered at the hands of Japanese
atrocities, leading him to justify the use of atomic weapons.
It remains immensely important for anybody discussing the events surrounding the
atomic bombs during World War 2 be very careful in the words they used to describe and
interpret the facts. A thorough debate of the justification of the bombs needs to clarify what
41
Schoenberger, 249
Kazuo Kawai, Mokusatsu, Japan’s Response of the Potsdam Declaration from The Pacific Historical Review,
Vol. 19, No. 4 (Nov 1950) University of California Press, 409
42
victory fully meant as well as differentiating between achieving victory and achieving surrender.
In the eyes of the top United States policy makers, victory meant more than simply forcing Japan
to surrender. Victory meant utter destruction of Japan, thereby punishing Japan for her atrocities
committed across the pacific (including Pearl Harbor). Victory also meant the unchecked
dominance of the United States following World War 2, void of Soviet intervention or
competition. Finally, victory meant the prevalence of democracy across the globe. This was to
beeventually manifested in a democratically ruled Japan, with the rejection of Soviet Socialism
or any other political system that conflicted with that of the United States.
In the eyes of Harry Truman and his top advisers, the only way to achieve this victory
was by dropping Little Boy and Fat Man on Japan in August of 1945. When looking at all
aspects of Truman’s idea of total victory, history has shown us that, despite the use of the atomic
bombs, total victory was never achieved.
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Index of Images
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4&simplesearch=&v_umo=&v_product_id=&screen_name=&screen_parms=&screen_type=R
IGHT&bvers=4&bplatform=Microsoft%20Internet%20Explorer&bos=Win32
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http://bss.sfsu.edu/internment/postermurder.html
Enclosure A- Diagram of Fukuryu underwater guerillas from United States Naval Technical Mission to Japan, Care
of Fleet Post Office, San Francisco California dated September 4th, 1945 accessed on April 16, 2009 url:
http://www.fischer-tropsch.org/primary_documents/gvt_reports/USNAVY/USNTMJ%20Reports/USNTMJ-200I-07430766%20Report%20S-91%20N.pdf