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IPSec IP Security (IPSec) 1/26 Groep T Leuven – Information department 2003-2004 - Information management 1 IP Security (IPSec) • • • • • • • IPSec overview Authentication Header (AH) Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Main Mode negotiation Quick Mode negotiation Retransmit behavior 2/26 Groep T Leuven – Information department 2003-2004 - Information management 2 Overall Architecture (RFC 1825) • Framework for security protocols to provide: – Data integrity – Data authentication – Data confidentiality – Security association management – Key management 3/26 Groep T Leuven – Information department 2003-2004 - Information management 3 Authentication Header (RFC 1826) IP Header plus Data IP Header plus Data Authentication Data (00ABCDEF) Authentication Data (00ABCDEF) Router • • • • IP HDR AH Data Router Data integrity—no twiddling of bits Origin authentication—definitely came from router Uses keyed-hash mechanism Does not provide confidentiality 4/26 Groep T Leuven – Information department 2003-2004 - Information management 4 Encapsulating Security Payload (RFC 1827) Router • • • • All Data-Encrypted Router Confidentiality Data origin authentication Data integrity Replay protection (optional) 5/26 Groep T Leuven – Information department 2003-2004 - Information management 5 Security Association (SA) Firewall Router Insecure Channel • Agreement between two entities on method to communicate securely • Unidirectional—two way communication consists of two SAs 6/26 Groep T Leuven – Information department 2003-2004 - Information management 6 IKE Policy Negotiation Encryption Algorithm, Hash Algorithm, and Method of Authentication 3DES, MD5, and RSA Signatures, or IDEA, SHA, and DSS Signatures, or Blowfish, SHA, and RSA Encryption IDEA, SHA, and DSS Signatures ISAKMP Policy Tunnel 7/26 Groep T Leuven – Information department 2003-2004 - Information management 7 IPSec Model • Device authentication – Crypto devices obtain digital certificates from CAs • Authorization – Packet selection via ACLs Internal Network Certificate Authority – Security Association (SA) established via ISAKMP/OAKLAY Digital Certificate SA • Privacy and integrity – IPSec-based encryption and digital signature Internal Network Clear Text Encrypted 8/26 Groep T Leuven – Information department 2003-2004 - Information management 8 IPsec Protocols and Formats Headers Authentication • Integrity, authentication Header Encapsulating • Adds confidentiality Security Payload ISAKMP/Oakley • Negotiates security parameters • Uses digital certificates Diffie-Hellman • Generates shared secret keys Transport • IP payload only, Layer 4 is obscured • Both end systems need IPsec Tunnel • Entire datagram • No changes to intermediate systems Key Exchange Modes Encryption • DES, 3DES, RC4, IDEA, AES ... Hashing • HMAC MD5, HMAC SHA1 9/26 Groep T Leuven – Information department 2003-2004 - Information management 9 IPSec Modes IP HDR DATA Tunnel Mode New IP HDR IPSec HDR IP HDR IP HDR DATA Encrypted DATA Transport Mode IP HDR IPSec HDR DATA Encrypted 10/26 Groep T Leuven – Information department 2003-2004 - Information management 10 Tunnel and Transport Modes • Transport mode for end-to-end session • Tunnel mode for everything else Transport Mode Tunnel Mode Joe’s PC 11/26 Groep T Leuven – Information department HR Server 2003-2004 - Information management 11 Ipsec—Standards Based Internet IPsec Dial IPsec VLANs IPsec Firewall Campus 12/26 Groep T Leuven – Information department 2003-2004 - Information management 12 IPSec Overview • Proposed Internet standard for IPlayer cryptography with IPv4 and IPv6 Router to Firewall Router to Router PC to Router PC to Server 13/26 Groep T Leuven – Information department 2003-2004 - Information management 13 IPSec Process • Initiating the IPSec session – Phase one—exchanging keys – Phase two—setting up security associations • Encrypting/decrypting packets • Rebuilding security associations • Timing out security associations 14/26 Groep T Leuven – Information department 2003-2004 - Information management 14 Initiating the IPSec Session Phase One — ISAKMP • Internet Security Association Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP) • Both sides need to agree on the ISAKMP security parameters (ISAKMP SADB) – ISAKMP parameters • Encryption algorithm • Hash algorithm • Authentication method • Diffie-Hellman modulus • Group lifetime 15/26 Groep T Leuven – Information department 2003-2004 - Information management 15 Initiating the IPSec Session Phase Two • Both sides need to agree on the IPSec security parameters (IPSec SADB) • IPSec parameters – IPSec peer • Endpoint of IPSec tunnel – IPSec proxy • Traffic to be encrypted/decrypted – IPSec transform • Encryption and hashing – IPSec lifetime • Phase two SA regeneration time 16/26 Groep T Leuven – Information department 2003-2004 - Information management 16 Encrypting and Decrypting Packets • Phase one and phase two completes • Security Associations (SA) are created at both IPSec endpoints • Using the negotiated SADB information – Outbound packets are encrypted – Inbound packets are decrypted 17/26 Groep T Leuven – Information department 2003-2004 - Information management 17 Rebuilding Security Associations • To ensure that keys are not compromised they are periodically refreshed • Security associations will be rebuilt when: – The lifetime expires, or – Data volume has been exceeded, or – Another SA is attempted with identical parameters 18/26 Groep T Leuven – Information department 2003-2004 - Information management 18 Security Associations • Combination of mutually agreed security services, protection mechanisms, and cryptographic keys • ISAKMP SA • IPSec SAs – One for inbound traffic – One for outbound traffic • Security Parameters Index (SPI) – Helps identify an SA • Creating SAs – Main Mode for ISAKMP SA – Quick Mode for IPSec SAs 19/26 Groep T Leuven – Information department 2003-2004 - Information management 19 IPSec Headers • Authentication Header (AH) – Provides data origin authentication, data integrity, and replay protection for the entire IP datagram • Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) – Provides data origin authentication, data integrity, replay protection, and data confidentiality for the ESP-encapsulated portion of the packet 20/26 Groep T Leuven – Information department 2003-2004 - Information management 20 IPSec Modes • Transport mode – Typically used for IPSec peers doing end-to-end security – Provides protection for upper-layer protocol data units (PDUs) • Tunnel mode – Typically used by network routers to protect IP datagrams – Provides protection for entire IP datagrams 21/26 Groep T Leuven – Information department 2003-2004 - Information management 21 AH Transport Mode IP IP Upper layer PDU AH Upper layer PDU Authenticated 22/26 Groep T Leuven – Information department 2003-2004 - Information management 22 AH Tunnel Mode IP (new) AH IP Upper layer PDU IP Upper layer PDU Authenticated 23/26 Groep T Leuven – Information department 2003-2004 - Information management 23 ESP Transport Mode IP IP ESP Upper layer PDU Upper layer PDU ESP Auth Data Encrypted Authenticated 24/26 Groep T Leuven – Information department 2003-2004 - Information management 24 ESP with AH Transport Mode IP IP AH ESP Upper layer PDU Upper layer PDU ESP ESP Auth Encrypted Authenticated with ESP Authenticated with AH 25/26 Groep T Leuven – Information department 2003-2004 - Information management 25 ESP Tunnel Mode IP (new) ESP IP Upper layer PDU IP Upper layer PDU ESP Auth Data Encrypted Authenticated 26/26 Groep T Leuven – Information department 2003-2004 - Information management 26