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The Counterfeit Parts & Materials Challenge 15th Annual CQSDI Cape Canaveral, FL March 26-27, 2008 Lloyd Condra, Boeing Phantom Works Tony Marino, Boeing Integrated Defense Systems Art Mester, Boeing Integrated Defense Systems Bill Procarione, Boeing Integrated Defense Systems Bill Scofield, Boeing Phantom Works 1 Outline Engineering, Operations & Technology | Phantom Works • Scope of the Problem • Internal Controls • External Activities • Supply Chain Controls 2 Scope of the Problem Engineering, Operations & Technology | Phantom Works Almost anything can be counterfeited • • • • Fasteners (bolts, nuts, rivets, fluid bolts) Electronics (capacitor, resistor, Integrated Circuits) Materials (titanium, composite chemicals) Anything else (Electronic Assemblies, Pumps, Actuators, Batteries, etc.) Counterfeiters are very creative • Darwin rules • There is no “final” solution There are many sources of counterfeit parts and materials • The supply chain is large and complex • Aerospace has limited control Impact of using counterfeit parts or materials • • • • • • Potential loss of life Monetary loss Liability Lack of availability of our products for customer use Loss of customer/public trust and image Brand damage 3 Scope of the Problem Engineering, Operations & Technology | Phantom Works Counterfeiting accounts for more than 8% of global merchandise trade and is equivalent to lost sales of as much as $600B and will grow to $1.2T by 2009. Ref: Dept of Commerce Counterfeit parts are usually ½ or less of the street price for genuine goods. The intense pressure on cost adds to the attractiveness of counterfeit parts. The true numbers are not known. Industry is attempting to quantify the costs. 4 A “Typical COTS” Microcircuit Product Flow Engineering, Operations & Technology | Phantom Works The COTS microcircuit chain is….circuitous. The number of potential combinations of links is large, and growing. The level of “control” is shrinking. μcircuit design Dist. Test Ass’y Fab Avionics OEM 5 The Electronics Supply Chain Engineering, Operations & Technology | Phantom Works Parts mfrs. OEMs Distributors Design Fab Ass’y. Aftermarket suppliers Aerospace captive Aerospace Integrators Aerospace Operators Brokers Commercial Test Aerospace captive Customers Source facilities Beyond aerospace control Commercial Aerospace repair shops Every arrow is a potential source of counterfeit parts!! Within aerospace control 6 Potentials Sources of Electronic Components Engineering, Operations & Technology | Phantom Works 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. Original manufacturers Authorized distributors Unauthorized distributors After-market suppliers Third-party test houses Component source facilities Other programs (excess inventory) Other OEMs (excess inventory) Emulators, etc. Contract assemblers Etc. 7 The Boeing Approach Engineering, Operations & Technology | Phantom Works Counterfeit Product Executive Steering Committee Art Mester Tony Marino Lloyd Condra/ Bill Scofield 8 Internal Controls Engineering, Operations & Technology | Phantom Works • Requirements • Develop enterprise-wide procedures and requirements • Flow down to all appropriate links in the supply chain • Implement verification processes and criteria • Source Selection • Lists of approved sources/ parts • Other sources by exception and with specific approvals • Confirmation • Quality, Supplier Quality Labs • Communication/Reporting • • • • • • • • IBA (Inter Boeing Alert) Legal Reporting Authorities (FBI) Treasury Dept GIDEP NASA FAA IP Team (if required) 9 External Activities Engineering, Operations & Technology | Phantom Works • Develop Industry Standards and Tools • • • • • AIA (Boeing delegates) GEIA IAQG (International Aerospace Quality Group) IEC (International Electrotechnical Commission) Benchmark with Underwriter Laboratories with their Counterfeit organization • Implement with Customers • FAA and commercial airline customers • DoD and service operators • NASA • Verify Compliance • Processes • Criteria • Report Occurrences • • • • Authorities (FBI) Treasury Dept GIDEP NASA FAA 10 Supply Chain Controls Engineering, Operations & Technology | Phantom Works At each portal of entry, we need assurance that the pedigree of a given part is traceable through all of the previous links in the supply chain to a known, credible, and “authorized” source. That assurance must be based on: 1. Aerospace industry consensus rules (documents, etc.) that are 2. Applied consistently across all programs, and 3. Verified by agreed-upon processes and criteria. 11 How Do We Do This? Engineering, Operations & Technology | Phantom Works • Involve all stakeholders • Aerospace: – Supply Chain: OEMs, integrators, operators, repair shops, industry organizations, government, airlines and other operators, etc. – Market Segments: commercial, military, space – Geographic regions: North America, Europe, Asia • Non-aerospace: part mfrs., distributors, industry organizations • Develop rules • • • • Address issues within aerospace control Insure a “level playing field” Address issues unique to aerospace Assure pedigrees of all parts • Communicate • Within aerospace • Between aerospace and other industries 12 13