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Pure Monopoly CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 Four Market Models Pure Monopoly Pure Competition Market Structure Continuum Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 BACK TERMS Characteristics of Monopoly Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 BACK TERMS Characteristics of Monopoly • Single Seller Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 BACK TERMS Characteristics of Monopoly • Single Seller • No Close Substitutes Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 BACK TERMS Characteristics of Monopoly • Single Seller • No Close Substitutes • “Price Maker” Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 BACK TERMS Characteristics of Monopoly • Single Seller • No Close Substitutes • “Price Maker” • Blocked Entry Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 BACK TERMS Characteristics of Monopoly • Single Seller • No Close Substitutes • “Price Maker” • Blocked Entry • Advertising importance... Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 BACK TERMS Barriers to Entry Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 BACK TERMS Barriers to Entry • Economies of Scale Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 BACK TERMS Barriers to Entry • Economies of Scale • Legal Barriers: Patents & Licenses Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 BACK TERMS Barriers to Entry • Economies of Scale • Legal Barriers: Patents & Licenses • Ownership of Essential Resources Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 BACK TERMS Barriers to Entry • Economies of Scale • Legal Barriers: Patents & Licenses • Ownership of Essential Resources Monopolies are relatively rare Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 BACK TERMS Barriers to Entry • Economies of Scale • Legal Barriers: Patents & Licenses • Ownership of Essential Resources Monopolies are relatively rare There are times when monopoly is desired Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 BACK TERMS Average Total Cost Economies of Scale: The Natural Monopoly Case $20 15 10 0 50 Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 100 Quantity 200 BACK TERMS Average Total Cost Economies of Scale: The Natural Monopoly Case $20 15 ATC 10 0 50 Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 100 Quantity 200 BACK TERMS Average Total Cost Economies of Scale: The Natural Monopoly Case $20 15 ATC 10 If ATC declines over extended output, least-cost production is realized only if there is one producer - a natural monopoly 0 50 Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 100 Quantity 200 BACK TERMS Monopoly Demand 3 Basic Assumptions... Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 BACK TERMS Monopoly Demand 3 Basic Assumptions... • Monopoly Status is Secured Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 BACK TERMS Monopoly Demand 3 Basic Assumptions... • Monopoly Status is Secured • Firm is not Governmentally Regulated Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 BACK TERMS Monopoly Demand 3 Basic Assumptions... • Monopoly Status is Secured • Firm is not Governmentally Regulated • Firm charges the same price for all units Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 BACK TERMS Monopoly Demand 3 Basic Assumptions... • Monopoly Status is Secured • Firm is not Governmentally Regulated • Firm charges the same price for all units Price Exceeds Marginal Revenue example... Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 BACK TERMS Monopoly Revenue and Cost Quantity Price of (Average Total Marginal Output Revenue) Revenue Revenue 0 $172 $ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 Average Total Cost Total Cost Marginal Cost $100 BACK Profit + or loss - - $100 TERMS Monopoly Revenue and Cost Quantity Price of (Average Total Marginal Output Revenue) Revenue Revenue 0 $172 $ 0 ] 1 162 162 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 Average Total Cost Total Cost Marginal Cost $100 ] $162 $190.00 190 BACK Profit + or loss - - $100 90 - 28 TERMS Monopoly Revenue and Cost Quantity Price of (Average Total Marginal Output Revenue) Revenue Revenue 0 $172 $ 0 ] 1 162 162 2 152 3 142 4 132 5 122 6 112 7 102 8 92 9 82 10 72 Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 Average Total Cost Total Cost Marginal Cost $100 ] $162 $190.00 190 BACK Profit + or loss - - $100 90 - 28 TERMS Monopoly Revenue and Cost Quantity Price of (Average Total Marginal Output Revenue) Revenue Revenue 0 $172 $ 0 ] 1 162 162 ] 2 152 304 ] 3 142 426 ] 4 132 528 ] 5 122 610 ] 6 112 672 ] 7 102 714 ] 8 92 736 ] 9 82 738 ] 10 72 720 Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 Average Total Cost Total Cost Marginal Cost $100 ] $162 $190.00 190 BACK Profit + or loss - - $100 90 - 28 TERMS Monopoly Revenue and Cost Quantity Price of (Average Total Marginal Output Revenue) Revenue Revenue 0 $172 $ 0 ] 1 162 162 ] 2 152 304 ] 3 142 426 ] 4 132 528 ] 5 122 610 ] 6 112 672 ] 7 102 714 ] 8 92 736 ] 9 82 738 ] 10 72 720 Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 Average Total Cost Total Cost Marginal Cost $100 ] $162 $190.00 190 142 122 102 82 62 42 22 2 - 18 BACK Profit + or loss - - $100 90 - 28 TERMS Monopoly Revenue and Cost Quantity Price of (Average Total Marginal Output Revenue) Revenue Revenue 0 $172 $ 0 ] 1 162 162 ] 2 152 304 ] 3 142 426 ] 4 132 528 ] 5 122 610 ] 6 112 672 ] 7 102 714 ] 8 92 736 ] 9 82 738 ] 10 72 720 Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 $162 142 122 102 82 62 42 22 2 - 18 Average Total Cost Total Cost Marginal Cost $100 ] $190.00 190 135.00 113.33 100.00 94.00 91.67 91.43 93.73 97.78 103.00 BACK Profit + or loss - - $100 90 - 28 TERMS Monopoly Revenue and Cost Quantity Price of (Average Total Marginal Output Revenue) Revenue Revenue 0 $172 $ 0 ] 1 162 162 ] 2 152 304 ] 3 142 426 ] 4 132 528 ] 5 122 610 ] 6 112 672 ] 7 102 714 ] 8 92 736 ] 9 82 738 ] 10 72 720 Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 Average Total Cost $162 $190.00 142 135.00 122 113.33 102 100.00 82 94.00 62 91.67 42 91.43 22 93.73 2 97.78 - 18 103.00 Total Cost $100 190 270 340 400 470 550 640 750 880 1030 BACK Marginal Cost ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] Profit + or loss - - $100 90 - 28 TERMS Monopoly Revenue and Cost Quantity Price of (Average Total Marginal Output Revenue) Revenue Revenue 0 $172 $ 0 ] 1 162 162 ] 2 152 304 ] 3 142 426 ] 4 132 528 ] 5 122 610 ] 6 112 672 ] 7 102 714 ] 8 92 736 ] 9 82 738 ] 10 72 720 Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 Average Total Cost $162 $190.00 142 135.00 122 113.33 102 100.00 82 94.00 62 91.67 42 91.43 22 93.73 2 97.78 - 18 103.00 Total Cost $100 190 270 340 400 470 550 640 750 880 1030 BACK Marginal Cost ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] ] Profit + or loss - - $100 90 - 28 80 70 60 70 80 90 110 130 150 TERMS Monopoly Revenue and Cost Quantity Price of (Average Total Marginal Output Revenue) Revenue Revenue 0 $172 $ 0 ] 1 162 162 ] 2 152 304 ] 3 142 426 ] 4 132 528 ] 5 122 610 ] 6 112 672 ] 7 102 714 ] 8 92 736 ] 9 82 738 ] 10 72 720 Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 Average Total Cost $162 $190.00 142 135.00 122 113.33 102 100.00 82 94.00 62 91.67 42 91.43 22 93.73 2 97.78 - 18 103.00 Total Cost $100 190 270 340 400 470 550 640 750 880 1030 BACK Marginal Cost ] 90 ] 80 ] 70 ] 60 ] 70 ] 80 ] 90 ] 110 ] 130 ] 150 TERMS Profit + or loss - - $100 - 28 + 34 + 86 + 128 + 140 + 122 + 74 - 14 - 142 - 310 Monopoly Revenue and Cost Quantity Price of (Average Total Marginal Output Revenue) Revenue Revenue Average Total Cost Total Cost Marginal Cost Profit + or loss - 0 $172 $ 0 $100 - $100 ] $162 ] 90 1 162 162 - 28 $190.00 190 ] ] 80 142 2 152 304 + 34 135.00 270 ] ] 70 122 3 142 426 + 86 113.33 340 ] ] 60 102 4 132 528 + 128 100.00 400 ] ] 70 82 5 122 610 + 140 94.00 470 ] ] 80 62 6 112 672 + 122 91.67 550 ] ] 90 42 7 102 714 + 74 91.43 640 ] ] 110 22see the profit Can you 8 92 736 ] - 14 93.73 750 ] 2 130 9 82 maximization 738 880 - 142 97.78 point? ] ] 150 - 18 10 72 720 - 310 103.00 1030 Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 BACK TERMS Monopoly Revenue and Cost Quantity Price of (Average Total Marginal Output Revenue) Revenue Revenue Average Total Cost Total Cost Marginal Cost Profit + or loss - 0 $172 $ 0 $100 - $100 ] $162 ] 90 1 162 162 - 28 $190.00 190 ] ] 80 142 2 152 304 + 34 135.00 270 ] ] 70 122 3 142 426 + 86 113.33 340 ] ] 60 102 4 132 528 + 128 100.00 400 ] ] 70 82 5 122 610 + 140 94.00 470 ] ] 80 62 6 112 672 + 122 91.67 550 ] ] 90 42 7 102 714 + 74 91.43 640 ] ] 110 22see the profit Can you 8 92 736 ] - 14 93.73 750 ] 2 130 9 82 maximization 738 880 - 142 97.78 point? ] ] 150 - 18 10 72 720 - 310 103.00 1030 Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 BACK TERMS Price & Marginal Revenue Under Monopoly P As price decreases from $142 to $132... $142 132 D 1 Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 2 3 4 5 BACK 6 Q TERMS Price & Marginal Revenue Under Monopoly P $142 132 As price decreases from $142 to $132... Revenue losses occur Loss = $30 D 1 Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 2 3 4 5 BACK 6 Q TERMS Price & Marginal Revenue Under Monopoly P $142 132 As price decreases from $142 to $132... but revenue will increase with the additional units sold Loss = $30 D Gain = $132 1 Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 2 3 4 5 BACK 6 Q TERMS Price & Marginal Revenue Under Monopoly P $142 132 As price decreases from $142 to $132... but revenue will increase with the additional units sold Loss = $30 Marginal revenue Gain = $132 will necessarily be less than price 1 Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 2 3 4 5 BACK 6 D Q TERMS Demand, Marginal Revenue, Total Revenue Imperfectly Competitive Firm Dollars 200 Elastic 150 Inelastic 200 50 MR D 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Q Dollars 750 500 250 Copyright 1999 McGraw-Hill, Inc. TR 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Q BACK TERMS Demand, Marginal Revenue, Total Revenue Imperfectly Competitive Firm Dollars 200 Elastic 150 Inelastic 200 50 MR D 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Q Dollars 750 500 250 Copyright 1999 McGraw-Hill, Inc. TR 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Q BACK TERMS Demand, Marginal Revenue, Total Revenue Imperfectly Competitive Firm Dollars 200 Elastic 150 Inelastic 200 50 MR D 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Q Dollars 750 500 250 Copyright 1999 McGraw-Hill, Inc. TR 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Q BACK TERMS Output and Price Determination • Cost Data Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 BACK TERMS Output and Price Determination • Cost Data • MR = MC Rule Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 BACK TERMS Output and Price Determination • Cost Data • MR = MC Rule • No Monopoly Supply Curve Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 BACK TERMS Output and Price Determination • Cost Data • MR = MC Rule • No Monopoly Supply Curve • Monopoly Pricing Misconceptions Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 BACK TERMS Output and Price Determination • Cost Data • MR = MC Rule • No Monopoly Supply Curve • Monopoly Pricing Misconceptions Not Highest Price Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 BACK TERMS Output and Price Determination • Cost Data • MR = MC Rule • No Monopoly Supply Curve • Monopoly Pricing Misconceptions Not Highest Price Total, Not Unit, Profits Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 BACK TERMS Output and Price Determination • Cost Data • MR = MC Rule • No Monopoly Supply Curve • Monopoly Pricing Misconceptions Not Highest Price Total, Not Unit, Profits Losses Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 BACK TERMS Output and Price Determination • Cost Data • MR = MC Rule • No Monopoly Supply Curve Graphically... • Monopoly Pricing Misconceptions Not Highest Price Total, Not Unit, Profits Losses Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 BACK TERMS Profit Maximization Under Monopoly 200 P 175 150 125 100 75 50 25 0 1 Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 BACK 9 10 TERMS Q Profit Maximization Under Monopoly 200 P 175 150 125 100 D 75 50 25 0 1 Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 BACK 9 10 TERMS Q Profit Maximization Under Monopoly 200 P 175 150 125 100 D 75 50 25 MR 0 1 Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 BACK 9 10 TERMS Q Profit Maximization Under Monopoly 200 P MC 175 150 $122 125 100 D 75 50 25 MR 0 1 Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 BACK 9 10 TERMS Q Profit Maximization Under Monopoly 200 P MC 175 150 $122 125 ATC 100 D 75 50 25 MR 0 1 Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 BACK 9 10 TERMS Q Profit Maximization Under Monopoly 200 P MC 175 150 $122 $94 125 Profit 100 ATC D 75 50 25 MR 0 1 Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 BACK 9 10 TERMS Q Profit Maximization Under Monopoly 200 P 175 150 $122 $94 MC Profit Per Unit 125 Profit 100 ATC D 75 Competitive Price 50 MR = MC 25 0 1 Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 2 3 MR 4 5 6 7 8 BACK 9 10 TERMS Q Profit Maximization Under Monopoly 200 P 175 150 $122 $94 MC Profit Per Unit What About Profit Loss Minimization? 125 100 ATC D 75 Competitive Price 50 MR = MC 25 0 1 Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 2 3 MR 4 5 6 7 8 BACK 9 10 TERMS Q Loss Minimization Under Monopoly 200 P Loss Per Unit 175 MC 150 ATC Loss 125 AVC 100 D 75 50 MR = MC 25 0 1 Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 2 3 MR 4 5 6 7 8 BACK 9 10 TERMS Q Loss Minimization Under Monopoly 200 P Loss Per Unit 175 MC 150 ATC What are the Economic Effects of Monopoly? Loss 125 AVC 100 D 75 50 MR = MC 25 0 1 Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 2 3 MR 4 5 6 7 8 BACK 9 10 TERMS Q Profit Maximization Under Monopoly P S = MC Monopolist will sell less units at a higher price than in competition Pm Pc D MR Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 Qm Qc Q BACK TERMS Cost Complications • Economies of Scale Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 BACK TERMS Cost Complications Unit costs (dollars) • Economies of Scale • X-Inefficiency Quantity Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 BACK TERMS Cost Complications Unit costs (dollars) • Economies of Scale • X-Inefficiency Average Total Costs Quantity Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 BACK TERMS Cost Complications • Economies of Scale Inefficient internal • X-Inefficiency Unit costs (dollars) operation leads to higher-thannecessary costs Average Total Costs Qc Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 Quantity Qm BACK TERMS Cost Complications Unit costs (dollars) • Economies of Scale Inefficient internal • X-Inefficiency ATCX ATC’X Qc Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 operation leads to higher-thannecessary costs Quantity Average Total Costs Qm BACK TERMS Cost Complications • Economies of Scale • X-Inefficiency • Rent-Seeking Expenditures Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 BACK TERMS Cost Complications • Economies of Scale • X-Inefficiency • Rent-Seeking Expenditures Technological Progress: Dynamic Efficiency Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 BACK TERMS Cost Complications • Economies of Scale • X-Inefficiency • Rent-Seeking Expenditures Technological Progress: Dynamic Efficiency • The Competitive Model Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 BACK TERMS Cost Complications • Economies of Scale • X-Inefficiency • Rent-Seeking Expenditures Technological Progress: Dynamic Efficiency • The Competitive Model • The Monopoly Model Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 BACK TERMS Cost Complications • Economies of Scale • X-Inefficiency • Rent-Seeking Expenditures Technological Progress: Dynamic Efficiency • The Competitive Model • The Monopoly Model • A Mixed Picture Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 BACK TERMS Cost Complications • Economies of Scale • X-Inefficiency • Rent-Seeking Expenditures Two Policy Options Technological Progress: Antitrust Dynamic Efficiency Public Utility Regulation • The Competitive Model • The Monopoly Model • A Mixed Picture Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 BACK TERMS Price Discrimination Conditions... Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 BACK TERMS Price Discrimination Conditions... 1 - Monopoly Power Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 BACK TERMS Price Discrimination Conditions... 1 - Monopoly Power 2 - Market Segregation Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 BACK TERMS Price Discrimination Conditions... 1 - Monopoly Power 2 - Market Segregation 3 - No Resale Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 BACK TERMS Price Discrimination Conditions... 1 - Monopoly Power 2 - Market Segregation 3 - No Resale Consequences... Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 BACK TERMS Price Discrimination Conditions... 1 - Monopoly Power 2 - Market Segregation 3 - No Resale Consequences... 1 - More Profits Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 BACK TERMS Price Discrimination Conditions... 1 - Monopoly Power 2 - Market Segregation 3 - No Resale Consequences... 1 - More Profits 2 - More Production Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 BACK TERMS Price Discrimination Conditions... 1 - Monopoly Power 2 - Market Segregation Graphically... 3 - No Resale Consequences... 1 - More Profits 2 - More Production Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 BACK TERMS Single Price Vs. Price Discrimination MC Price and Costs P ATC D MR Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 Q1 Q BACK TERMS Single Price Vs. Price Discrimination MC Profits with a single price Price and Costs P ATC D MR Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 Q1 Q BACK TERMS Single Price Vs. Price Discrimination Price and Costs P Profits with price discrimination MC ATC D = MR Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 Q1 Q2 Q BACK TERMS Regulated Monopoly Price and Costs P ATC MC D MR Q Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 BACK TERMS Regulated Monopoly Price and Costs P Socially Optimum Price Price = MC ATC MC D MR Q Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 BACK TERMS Regulated Monopoly Price and Costs P Fair Return Price Price = ATC ATC MC D MR Q Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 BACK TERMS Regulated Monopoly Price and Costs P Monopoly Price MR = MC ATC MC D MR Q Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 BACK TERMS Regulated Monopoly Price and Costs P Monopoly Price MR = MC Dilemma of ATC Regulation MC D MR Q Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 BACK TERMS Questions & Discussion Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 BACK TERMS pure monopoly barriers to entry X-inefficiency rent-seeking behavior price discrimination socially optimal price fair-return price dilemma of regulation Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999 BACK END Monopolistic Competition & Oligopoly Is Next... Chapter 25 Copyright McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1999