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FROM REGRESSIVE FINANCIERISM TO PROGRESSIVE PRODUCTIVISM Ricardo Ffrench-Davis UNIVERSIDAD DE CHILE CEPAL:LAC-UE ECONOMIC FORUM, 2013 January 21,2013 1 Success in exports growth up to 2008, but meager performance in nonexported GDP. Real instability has focused heavily on GDP directed to domestic markets rather than to foreign markets: this implies that effective demand has been the most unstable. The latter depends on domestic macroeconomics, which has failed for the real economy. Latin America (19) and World: Exports and economic growth, 1990-2012 (annual average rates of growth, %)) Latin America (19) GDP 1990-1997 1998-2003 2004-2008 2009-2012 3.3 1.4 5.4 3.1 Exports World Non -exported GDP 8.4 2.5 (1.1) (2.2) 5.1 0.7 (0.9) (0.6) 6.8 5.0 (1.3) (4.0) 2.6 3.3 (0.5) (2.5) GDP Exports 2.9 6.2 3.3 4.9 3.4 7.5 2.3 3.2 Fuente: Ffrench-Davis (2005) y actualizaciones, sobre la base de cifras oficiales de América Latina, y FMI y OMC para el mundo en dólares constantes. Entre paréntesis las contribuciones al crecimiento total de la economía del PIB no exportado y exportado, respectivamente. El valor agregado exportado fue estimado descontando desde las exportaciones brutas de bienes y servicios, su contenido importado. Este último se asumió igual a la participación de bienes importados de capital e intermedios en el PIB total. Para la maquila mexicana se utilizaron datos efectivos de valor agregado. 2 Financial Liberalization in LA Led to a Regressive “Financierism” Boom in financial savings without an increase in domestic savings (DS crowdedout). Financial markets dominated by agents especialized in short-term finance (“overnight”) and not in GKF (“overdecade”: crucial role of influential agents, which --by training and reward-- are away from productive investment. 3 MEDIUM-TERM CYCLES OF CAPITAL FLOWS ARE UNFRIENDLY TO GKF • Weak link with domestic GKF. • Even by FDI, because of a surge in M&A, rather than greenfield investment. Volatile capital inflows have generated macro instability, with large output gaps between actual and potential GDP. Discourages GKF,employment and SMEs. 4 Capital flows and terms of trade, both cyclical,--instead of relative productivities a la B&S-- have determined RER and aggregate demand behavior in Latin America. RER medium-term instability has tended to weaken value-added in exports and its links with the rest of the economy. Latin America (19): Net capital inflows and RER, 1990-2011 (RER index 2000=100, inflows in % of GDP) 140 5.5 5.0 4.5 130 4.0 3.5 120 3.0 2.5 RER 2000=100 110 2.0 1.5 100 1.0 0.5 0.0 90 -0.5 -1.0 80 -1.5 -2.0 70 -2.5 -3.0 TCR 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 -3.5 1990 60 Flujo Neto de Capitales 5 Source: Author’s calculations based on ECLAC figures. Real exchange rate defined in terms of local currency per dollars Real instability of volatile financial flows and of terms of trade have led fluctuations in aggregate demand that generate changes in GDP. That is possible only if potential GDP is being underutilized. Latin America (19): Aggregate Demand AND GDP, 1990-2012 (annual growth rates, %) 10.0% 8.0% 6.0% 4.0% 2.0% 0.0% -2.0% Aggregate demand GDP Fuente: Ffrench-Davis (2005) and updates based on ECLAC (2012) for 19 countries. 5 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 -4.0% Real instability has also been unfriendly to the productive sector via its negative impact on capital formation. As a result, the investment ratio sharply declined in the eighties and remained low in the 90s and 2000s. Ups-anddowns are significantly correlated with the evolution of the recessive gap". Latin America: Gross Fixed Capital Formation, 1970-2012 (% GDP, constant dollars 2000) 27 25 23,5 23 21,5 21 18,5 19 17,6 17,6 17 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 15 7 Fuente: ECLAC data for 19 countries In fact, high real instability generates underutilization of potential GDP, which along with the incompleteness of the factor markets, are significant explanations of reduced productive investment ratios; it is a depressive and regressive dynamic effect. América Latina (9): Brecha de producto y tasa de inversión bruta 1970-2009 26,0 10,0 25,0 9,0 8,0 24,0 Tasa de inversión (% PIB) 6,0 22,0 5,0 21,0 4,0 20,0 3,0 19,0 2,0 1,0 18,0 0,0 17,0 Brecha de producto (% del PIB*) 7,0 23,0 -1,0 16,0 -2,0 Tasa de inversión 15,0 Brecha de producto -3,0 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 1985 1984 1983 1982 1981 1980 1979 1978 1977 1976 1975 1974 1973 1972 1971 -4,0 1970 14,0 8 Fuente: Ffrench-Davis (2005) y actualizaciones, basado en datos de CEPAL y Hofman y Tapia (2004). Incluye Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, México, Perú y Venezuela. • Predomina la creencia, equivocada, de que la autoridad económica no tiene capacidad de afectar el tipo de cambio, pues sería ir “contra el mercado”. El argumento central alternativo es que hay segmentos diferentes en el mercado y se trata de operar a favor del segmento más relevante para el desarrollo productivo (esto es, el de productores de transables). Se evita así que agentes cortoplacistas o shocks transitorios de términos de intercambio lleven el tipo de cambio de corto plazo fuera de niveles sostenibles a mediano plazo. Por lo tanto, implica una intervención a favor del mercado más relevante para el crecimiento económico. • En breve, la permanencia de una política de tasa libre-libre implica la renuncia a hacer política macroeconómica sostenible. 9 Latin America (19): Evolution of exports and imports of goods and services, 20042011 (annual real growth rates, %) 25.0% 22.2% 20.0% 15.0% 14.5% 14.3% 12.9% 12.2% 10.0% 12.8% 11.2% 7.6% 10.3% 9.8% 7.9% 7.4% 6.1% 5.7% 5.4% 5.0% 1.5% 0.0% -5.0% -10.0% -9.8% -15.0% -15.1% -20.0% 2004 2005 2006 2007 Exports 2008 2009 2010 2011 Promedio Imports 10 Sources: Based on ECLAC for 19 countries. Exports and imports cover volume (quantum) of goods and services. The horizontal lines correspond to the simple average of the growth rates in the period 2004-11; imports and exports show an annual average of 9.8% and 5.4%, respectively. Four severe expresions of the costly consequences of financierism for EE • Unstable real exchange rates, led by pro-cyclical capital flows and terms of trade. • Large capital inflows and financial domestic savings with low capital formation. Poor “financing for development” à la Monterrey. • Aggregate demand and economic activity extremely dependent on swinging (roller coaster) external shocks. • Insufficient compensatory financing, frequently with pro-cyclical conditionality. 11 A PROGRESSIVE POLICY APPROACH 1. To take account of great Structural Heterogeneity of diverse agents or factors: heterogeneity of their productivities, their access to markets, and their capacity to respond to policy changes and reforms. 2. Asymmetries in the capacity to respond are stressed by neo-liberal policies with the pro-cyclical bias of financierism. 3. Compensate or counter asymmetric effects: a) seeking to avoid abrupt changes in capital flows and terms of trade, b) leveling off capacities with reforms of domestic capital markets, and c) impose coordination in domestic macro policies and 12 rebalance of its objectives. Latin America (19): Terms of trade indices for goods and services, 1990-2012 (index1990=100) 160 150 149.6 140.6 140 130 133.5 120 111.6 110 100 98.0 90 13 Sources: Based on ECLAC for 19 countries (2012) 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 80 Double divergence in economic development Latin America vs Developed Countries, Per capita GDP and Income Distribution, 2011 (US$, PPP) 45,000 Per capita GDP 40,000 20% richest v/s 20% poorest 41,189 35,000 30,000 25,000 Per capita GDP 7 VECES* 20% richestv/s 20% poorest (USA. 9 Times) 19 Times USA 48.442 20,000 15,000 11,863 10,000 5,000 0 G-7 Latin America 14 Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database (2012), World Development Indicators (2012). G7 includes: USA, Japan, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Canada and Italy.