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Reversal of China’s Demographic Fortune (Fundación Ramón Areces, Madrid, March 22, 2012) Wang Feng o o o o The China Miracle The Demographic Factor in China’s Rise Reversal of Fortune What’s Ahead? The China Miracle Economic growth: second largest, largest exporter and manufacturer, soon to be the largest economy Poverty reduction: 500 million What drove the recent growth? The Chinese Growth Model Growth in the last thirty years has been based on a heavily physical capital and labor intensive model Internal constraints (costs): resources, environment, and inequality External constraints: export market, resources The demographic factor The Demographic Factor: Congruence of Two Booms (population age distribution, China) 30 Population (millions) 25 20 15 10 5 0 0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 33 36 39 42 45 48 51 54 57 60 63 66 69 72 75 78 81 84 87 90 Age 1982 (Mason and Wang 2007) 2000 2050 30 Population (millions) 25 20 15 10 5 0 0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 33 36 39 42 45 48 51 54 57 60 63 66 69 72 75 78 81 84 87 90 Age 1982 (Mason and Wang 2007) 2000 2050 Economic Growth (demographic dividend: divergent paths) (Mason and Wang 2007, Wang and Mason 2008) China’s Demographic Fortune (annual growth rate of effective support ratio, 1982–2000) (Wang and Mason 2008) Reversal of Fortune (annual growth rate of effective support ratio, 2013–2050) (Wang and Mason 2008) New Demographic Era Annual birth number dropped by nearly 10 million from the peak in the late 1980s Growth rate only a third of the level in the late 1980s Driving Force: Low Fertility Anomaly No More 9.0 1975 Saudi Arabia1975 Kuwait1975 2005 Regression Linear 99% CI 6.0 UAE 1975 TFR Equatorial Guinea 2005 3.0 China 1975 China 2005 0.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 9.0 GDP per capita (PPP, log) 10.0 11.0 12.0 Age Structure, China (1982, 2010, 2040) 1 Prospect of Rapid Population Aging Number of elderly (65+) will double in the next 20 years, from 117 to 238 million Share of elderly population will go up from 8.7 to 16.8% in 20 years, and to over ¼ by 2042 Japan: 9.1% in 1980, 22.6 in 2010, and 35% by 2040 How does China’s Aging Differ from Other Societies? Pace Size Weak social and familial infrastructure China’s Accelerated Demographic Transition: Life Expectancy China’s Accelerated Demographic Transition: Fertility Decline Pace of Aging, Selected Countries 140 130 Years 65+ from 9 to 25% 120 110 100 90 80 80 70 75 60 35 40 28 40 30 30 20 0 China Japan South Taiwan Brazil Korea Province Russia U.S. U.K. Italy Germany France Old before Rich, China and its Neighbors 25000 19614 20000 GDP/P, ($) 16855 15000 13428 10000 7500 5000 0 China Japan South Korea GDP per capita when population aged 65+ reach 9%, in 1990 International GearyKhamis dollar. Source: Maddison 2010. Taiwan Province Declining Support Ratio (Number of working persons per 60+, China and other BRIC economies) Declining Support Ratio (Number of working persons per 65+, China and other large economies) Young labor (20-24) reached peak and will decline by nearly 20% in the next one and 1/3 in the next two decades 860 840 820 800 780 760 740 720 700 680 660 640 140 115.57 120 100 80 76.53 60 40 20 0 2000 2005 2010 2015 Year 20-59 2020 20-24 2025 2030 Young Labor (20-24, million)) Total size(20-59) reaches a plateau, moderate increase in the next 10 years Total Labor (20-59, million) Changing Labor Supply Smaller but more productive? Available college age youths actually smaller due to educational expansion – shortage of unskilled young labor A more productive labor force in the long run Fragile Families (share of women aged 35-49 with one or no child, 2005) 38.6% of all women of this age group Fragile Families (share of women aged 35-49 with one or no child, urban China, 2005) 67.2% of all women of this age group What’s Ahead? Aging population: labor, consumption, savings and government spending Growth will slow down Needs a new model driven by domestic consumption Productivity increase and human capital deepening Social infrastructure building These tasks interact and will be extremely challenging