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Globalization, Export-Led Growth and Inequality: The East Asian Story Mah Hui Lim Penang Institute [email protected] Sanya University 22-24 February 2016 1 OUTLINE Stylized facts on rising inequality Forces of Globalization & National Policies Trend & reasons for worsening inequality in each country Limits & Challenges of Export Led Growth Alternative Policies & Strategies 2 Section I - Inequality Issue of inequality return with vengence – failure of trickle down growth –13 of 36 Asian ctries Gini>40 Inequality not just distribution of personal incomes, opportunities & outcomes, technology Focus on functional income distribution – distribution of national income to capital vs labor 3 Functional Income Distribution (FID) worsening Since 1990s, ¾ of 69 countries for which FID data are available experienced declining wage share* (WS) of income. On avg in Asia WS declined by 20 percent since 1994 * Wage share and labor share used interchangeably 4 Wage share in Devpg Econs 1970-2007 (ILO 2012/3) 5 Worsening FID driven by two sets of forces Exogenous - Globalization forces Endogenous - Policy driven forces Export-Led Growth reflects both these forces 6 Globalization – Trade & Financial, Technology Mainstream view– world trade improves equality – exports pull up wages in LDCs with labor endowment Technology > freer flow of capital & info > decrease inequality Above not supported by evidence 7 Heterodox view – political economy Trade openness accompanied by financial openness-worsens inequality Main factor – K more mobile than labor - flow to wherever wages are lower > downward pressure, worsened by national policies Change in bargaining power btw lab & capital. Emph redistribution of rents 8 Heteredox -Globalization Forces Financial liberalization/deregulation > frequent currency and econ crises FX deprcn and econ recession – more negative & lasting effects on labor thru erosion of wages via prices & bargaining power, e.g. Korea during Asian financial crisis 9 Section II – East Asian Story China, Korea, Taiwan (PoC), Malaysia and Thailand High growth rates avg 6%-11% p.a. but Gross export growth higher @ 7%-20% Definition of Export Led Growth (ELG) ELG = periods when gross export growth > GDP growth; can have current account deficit Most periods are ELG 10 Export-Led Growth Periods (in red) = GDP growth – Export Growth 1960s China 1970s 19971999 2000-2007 20082011 13.7 -6.5 2.3 6.4 13.5 -1.0 3.7 1.5 -0.7 0.8 9.3 1.6 -0.1 Malaysia -0.6 0.5 3.3 5.9 4.3 1.3 -2.3 Thailand 2.5 2.9 6.3 2.8 10.6 2.8 2.2 12.1 9.9 3.9 0.6 2.6 5.0 2.1 Korea Taiwan (PoC) N.A. 1980s 19901996 11 Growth with Declining Wage Share (WS) in all 5 economies Because wage growth is lagging behind productivity growth resulting in declining wage share Most productivity captured by capital rather than labor 12 Wage Share for 5 East Asian Economies, 1990-2008 13 Falling Wage Share Steepest for China of over 12% Malaysia & Thailand lowest level of WS (ard 30%), secular decline for Msia & stagnating for Thailand Taiwan significant decline ard 10% Korea – decline after 1996, recovered slightly after 2000 but down again after 2007 14 Reasons for Inequality & Falling Wage Share Trend mirrored in real wage growth falling behind prodtvy growth Not marginal prodtvy but pol, econ, soc forces, at global & national level, can better explain rising inequality 15 Summary of E Asian ELG policy China, Malaysia, Thailand follow labor intensive ELG based on repressing labor & unit labor cost to attract FDI Korea ELG based more on technology r/t wage comptn; nevertheless WS declined after fin libzn & crisis Taiwan – in btw 2 camps. Started off like Korea but > 1990 changed to “cost-down” strategy with opening of China & massive invst moved to Ch 16 China- extreme case of ELG based on pushing down unit labor cost wage competiveness strategy Indzn & export based on cheap lab fr rural sector Explicit policies to discriminate against migrant labor; prohibit trade union except state sponsored 1996-2007 – productivity rose 2x real wages 19% vs 11% Worsened after China joined WTO 17 China: Labor Productivity vs Real Wages in Industry, 1995-2010 1000.0 900.0 800.0 700.0 600.0 Labour productivity index Real average wage index 500.0 400.0 300.0 200.0 100.0 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 18 Chinese ELG policy based on exploitation of agr & rural sectors Massive capital transfer from agriculture to industry plus from rural to urban sectors amounted to a total of Rmb 4.3 trillion btw 1978 & 2000 19 China-Yearly Capital Transfer fr Agr to Industry and Rural to Urban (in Rmb Bn) 450 400 350 300 250 Agr-Ind 200 Rur-Urb 150 100 50 0 -50 Source: Huang,Rozelle,Wang, 2006, Table 6 20 Malaysia and Thailand – also ELG based on wage comptve Msia & Thailand – ELG since 70s but diffnt fr Korea & Taiwan High foreign direct investment High import content; few linkages Dependent on foreign market Poor or no industrial policy 21 Foreign Direct Invst as Percent of Gross Capital Formation FDI as Percent of GFCF 20.0 18.0 16.0 14.0 12.0 AVG 1970s 10.0 AVG 1980s AVG 1990s 8.0 AVG 2000s 6.0 AVG 2010-2012 4.0 2.0 0.0 -2.0 China China, Taiwan Province of Korea, Republic of Malaysia Thailand Japan 22 Msia & Thailand Incentives for FDI –tax holiday, low impt duties, prov infrastrcuture, Repressive lab laws – unions banned in export inds; no minimum wage until 2012/13; right to strike prohibited Lacking technology, participate in low end of global supply chain 23 Policy of high prodtvy & low wages > falling WS of GDP Thailand: Productivity vs Real Wage Growth, 2001-2009 125.0 120.0 115.0 110.0 Real wage index 105.0 Labour Productivity Index per employed persons 100.0 95.0 90.0 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 24 Policy of high prodtvy & low wages > falling WS of GDP Malaysia: Productivity vs Real Wage Growth, 1990-2010 350.0 300.0 250.0 Value Added Per Worker 200.0 Real Wages Per Worker 150.0 100.0 25 Taiwan-From Technology to Labor Competitiveness ELG Up to 1990s, labor reaped large part of prodtvy gains Wage Share rose fr 50% to 54% (1980 to 1994) Gini dropped fr 0.4 to 0.3 in 1990s Things changed > 1990 with opening up of China to FDI Taiwan invsted heavily in China & adopted “cost-down” strategy 26 Taiwan One million skilled workers & professionals moved to China Taiwan imported cheap foreign labor Technology development trailed behind Korea All these put pressure on wage > declining WS 27 Taiwan: Productivity vs Real Wage Growth in Industry 28 Korea- WS declined after financial liberalization & crisis Korea ELG based on domestic cap, technology purchase <1990s, real wages rose with prodtvy WS rose from 33% (1970) and peaked at 49% (1996), then declined Turning point financial liberalization & Asian Fin Crisis – opportunity state & cap to extract concessions from labor > rise in temp emplyt & unemplyt 29 Korea – Wage diverged from productivity growth > 1996 Korea: Labor Productivity vs Wage Growth, 1990-2010 220.0 200.0 180.0 160.0 140.0 120.0 100.0 80.0 199019911992199319941995199619971998199920002001200220032004200520062007200820092010 Labour Productivity Index (1990=100) Real average wages index (1990=100) 30 Section III- Limits & Challenges of Export Led Growth 2007 global fin crisis (GFC) exposed weakness & limits of ELG – higher ext vulnerability; dom rising inequality Wage- not only a cost item; also source of aggr demand Drop in WS impacts negatively dom consumption & aggregate demand ELG is one way to escape stagnating dom demand arising fr declining WS 31 China – falling WS, falling private consptm, rising exports 32 Inequality contributes to global imbalance Current acct surplus of one ctry shows up in cur acct deficit of others CAS of China & CAD of U.S.-2 sides of same coin In U.S. falling WS counteracted with rising household debt > fin crisis In China – falling WS made up for with rising exports Both unstable & unsustainable 33 Korea & Malaysia – also taking the debt route Parallel to fall in WS, Korea’s household savings rate plunged from 26% (1988) to 0.4% (2002). Now hovers around 2%-3% Household debt rose at 13% p.a. twice GDP growth rate > 89% of GDP in 2011 Household debt / HH disposable income at 164% in 2012 34 Malaysia –same story but worse – slowing prodtvy growth WS dropped from 47% (1970s) to 30% in 2008 Private consptm supported by debt, not rising income Msia prodtvy growth is slowing down - early deindustrialization 35 Malaysia – Growth of GDP, HH Consptm & HH Loans 36 Section IV – Alternative Policies & Strategies Ctries esp China trying to orientate to dom demand to stimulate growth But need to restructure their productive, distributive, redistributive systems 37 Restructure Distributive System Align wage rise to prodtvy growth + inflation Instead of race to bottom in wage comptn, coordinate wage policies btw countries 38 Restructure Redistributive System More progressive tax structure Reduce tax bias now favoring capital Increase capital gains tax – esp graduated cap gains tax – higher tax for short term cap gains China sh reduce over invst in phy infrast & incr invst in social infra – health, educn, social safety net 39 Restructure Productive System Productive structure – move away fr just vertical specialization in global supply chain to horizontal specialization More intra-regional trade in final goods 40 THANK YOU 41