Download 4.2 Tariffs

International Economics
Chapter 4
Tariffs and Nontariff Barriers
Chapter 4 Tariffs and Nontariff Barriers

4.1 Theories for Trade Protection

4.2 Tariffs

4.3 Nontariff Trade Barriers
4.1 Theories for Trade Protection

Infant Industry Argument
This
argument contends that for free trade to be
meaningful, trading countries should temporarily
shield their newly developing industries from foreign
competition.
4.1 Theories for Trade Protection
Some
truth in the infant industry argument
 Once a protective tariff is imposed, it is very
difficult to remove, even after industrial maturity
has been achieved.
 It is very difficult to determine which industries will
be capable of realizing comparative advantage
potential and thus merit protection.
 The argument generally is not valid for mature,
industrialized countries.
 There may be other ways of insulating a developing
industry from cutthroat competition. Rather than
adopt a protective tariff, the government could grant
a subsidy to the industry.
4.1 Theories for Trade Protection

The Terms of Trade Argument
In
some cases, the terms of trade benefits of a tariff
outweigh its costs, so there is a terms-of-trade
argument for a tariff.
The terms of trade argument against free trade, then, is
intellectually impeccable but of doubtful usefulness.
In practice, it is emphasized more by economists as a
theoretical proposition than it is used by governments
as a justification for trade policy.
4.1 Theories for Trade Protection
 The Domestic Market Failure Argument
domestic market failures
theory of the second best
When economists apply the theory of the second best
to trade policy, they argue that imperfections in the
internal functioning of an economy may justify
interfering in its external economic relations.
This argument accepts that international trade is not the
source of the problem but suggests nonetheless that
trade policy can provide at least a partial solution.
4.1 Theories for Trade Protection

Strategic Trade Policy

Because of the small number of firms, the assumptions
of perfect competition do not apply, there are only a
few firms in effective competition in some industries.
This argument locates the market failure that justifies
government intervention in the lack of perfect
competition.
It is possible in principle for a government to alter the
rules of the game to shift these excess returns from
foreign to domestic firms.
Chapter 4 Tariffs and Nontariff Barriers

4.1 Theories for Trade Protection

4.2 Tariffs

4.3 Nontariff Trade Barriers
4.2 Tariffs

A tariff is simply a tax (duty) levied on a product
when it crosses national boundaries.

import tariff/ export tariff
protective tariff /revenue tariff

Types of Tariffs
Specific Tariff
Ad Valorem Tariff
Compound Tariff
4.2 Tariffs

Effective Rate of Protection (ERP)
the
percentage change in the value added in an
industry because of the imposition of a tariff
structure by the country rather than the existence of
free trade.
4.2 Tariffs
Calculation
of ERP (Way I):
value added under protection  value added with free trade
ERP 
value added with free trade
VA ' VA

VA
4.2 Tariffs
Calculation
ERP 
of ERP (Way II):
t j   i aij ti
1   i aij
4.2 Tariffs

Three general rules about the relationship between
nominal rates and effective rates of protection:
 If
the nominal tariff rate on the final good is higher than the
weighted average nominal tariff rate on the inputs, then the
ERP will be higher than the nominal rate on the final goods;
 If the nominal tariff rate on the final good is lower than the
weighted average nominal tariff rate on the inputs, then the
ERP will be lower than the nominal rate on the final goods;
 If the nominal tariff rate on the final good is equal to the
weighted average nominal tariff rate on the inputs, then the
ERP will be equal to the nominal rate on the final goods.
4.2 Tariffs
Two
consequences of the effective rate calculation:
 The
degree of effective protection increases as the value
added by domestic producers declines.
In the formula, the higher the value of aij is, the greater the
effective protection rate for any given nominal tariff rate on
the final product will be.
 A tariff on imports used in the production process reduces
the level of effective protection.
In the formula, as ti rises, the numerator of the formula
decreases and hence ERP decreases.
4.2 Tariffs
Conclusion
 when
material inputs or intermediate products enter
a country at a very low duty while the final
imported commodity is protected by a high duty, the
result tends to be a high protection rate for the
domestic producers. The nominal tariff rate on
finished goods thus understates the effective rate of
protection.
 But should a tariff be imposed on imported inputs
that exceeds that on the finished good, the nominaltariff rate on the finished product would tend to
overstate its protective effect.
4.2 Tariffs
 Tariff
Escalation
 The tariff structures have generally been characterized
by rising rates that give greater protection to
intermediate and finished products than to primary
commodities.
 The tariff structures of the industrialized countries
may indeed discourage the growth of processing,
thus hampering diversification into higher valueadded exports for the less-developed countries,
worsening the potential competitive position of the
less-developed countries in the manufacturing and
processing sectors.
4.2 Tariffs
 Tariff Welfare Effects
Consumer Surplus
 Consumer surplus refers to the difference between
the amount that buyers would be willing and able to
pay for a good and the actual amount they do pay.
Producer Surplus
 Producer surplus is the revenue producers receive
over and above the minimum amount required to
induce them to supply the good.
4.2 Tariffs
P
P
B
Supply
(minimum price)
Consumer
Surplus
A
Producer
Surplus
A
C (actual price)
Total
Expenditure
Demand
(maximum price)
B
O
E
Q
(a)
O
C
(actual price)
Total
Variable
Cost
D
(b)
Q
4.2 Tariffs
 Trade Welfare
Effect of Tariff in a Partial
Equilibrium Setting

The Small-Nation Case
P
Free-trade equilibrium is located at
Point F.
Sd
PW+t
PW
The protective tariff results in a new
equilibrium quantity at point G.
E
PE
G
a
b
c
Sd+w+t
d
F
t
Sd+w
Dd
0
Q1
Q3
QE
Q4
Q2
Q
Figure 4-2 Tariff Trade and Welfare Effects: Small-Nation Model
4.2 Tariffs
 Trade Welfare
Effect of Tariff in a Partial
Equilibrium Setting

The Small-Nation Case
P
Sd
E
PE
PW+t
PW
G
a
b
c
Sd+w+t
d
F
t
Sd+w
Dd
0
Q1
Q3
QE
Q4
Q2
Q
4.2 Tariffs





The redistributive effect (Area a)
 the transfer of consumer surplus, in monetary terms, to the
domestic producers of the import-competing product.
The protective effect (Area b)
 the loss to the domestic economy resulting from wasted
resources used to produce additional cloth at increasing unit
costs.
The domestic revenue effect (Area c)
 the tariff proceeds paid by country A’s consumers to its
government.
The consumption effect (Area d)
 arises from the decrease in consumption resulting from the
tariff's artificially increasing the price.
The deadweight loss (Areas b + d)
 represents a real cost to a community, not a transfer to other
sectors of the economy.
4.2 Tariffs
Welfare Cost of a Tariff Imposed by a Small Nation
 Levying
an import tariff, therefore, reduces a small
country's welfare.
4.2 Tariffs

The Large-Nation Case
International Free-Trade Equilibrium
P
P
SA
SB
PA
PFT
PFT
PB
DA
DB
0
Q1
(a) Nation A

Q2
Q
0
Q 1'
Q 2'
Q
(b) Nation B
The equilibrium world price is defined as the price at which the
quantity that consumers in Country A want to import is equal to
the quantity that producers in Country B want to export. In the
diagram, this price is denoted by PFT.
4.2 Tariffs
P
P
SA
SB
PT
PFT
P'
a
b c
e
d
t
PFT
P'
DA
DB
0
Q1 Q3 Q4
(a) Nation A
The
Q2
Q
0
Q1' Q3' Q4' Q2'
(b) Nation B
Q
size of the tariff equals the difference between the price
consumers in country A pay for the product (PT) and the price
producers in country B receive (P'). That is, the per unit tariff of
t equals PT −P' .
4.2 Tariffs
The redistributive effect (Area a)
the transfer of consumer surplus,
in monetary terms, to the
domestic producers of the import-competing product.
The protective effect (Area b)
the loss to the domestic economy resulting from wasted
resources used to produce additional cloth at increasing unit costs.
The domestic revenue effect (Area c)
the tariff proceeds paid by country A’s consumers to its
government.
The consumption effect (Area d)
arises from the decrease in consumption resulting from the
tariff's artificially increasing the price.
The terms of trade effect (Area e)
the amount of the tariff revenue paid by foreigners because the
world price of their exports has fallen.
4.2 Tariffs

The change in welfare in country A brought about by the
imposition of a tariff equals e−(b+d). This amount could
be positive or negative, depending on the relative sizes
of the two terms.
 Optimal tariff : the tariff would be set to a level that
maximizes the area e−(b+d).
4.2 Tariffs
Trade Welfare
Effect of Tariff in a General
Equilibrium Setting
 The Small-Nation Case
Textiles
C0
IC1
C1
M0
IC0
 PA 


P
1

t

 T
B1
B0
 PA 
 
 PT 1
X0
 PA 
 
 PT 0
Agricultural Goods
4.2 Tariffs

The reduction in welfare comes from two effects:
 The
economy no longer produces at a point that
maximizes the value of income at world prices. The
budget constraint that passes through B1 lies inside
the constraint passing through B0.
 Consumers do not choose the welfare-maximizing
point on the budget constraint; they do not move up to
an indifference curve that is tangent to the economy's
actual budget constraint.
4.2 Tariffs

The Large-Nation Case
Good A
I
I'
TOT2
A2
W
W'
A2'
A1
A1'
O
TOT1
X
X'
B 1'
B 2'
B1
B2
Good B
With the imposition of a tariff, Country I’s offer curve OI shifts
inward to OI'.
4.2 Tariffs
The Impact of a Tariff
Good A
I
I’
TOT2
TOT1
A1
A2
O
E'
B2
E
B1
II
Good B
The equilibrium quantity of exports falls from OB1 to OB2, and the
quantity of imports falls from OA1 to OA2. Country I’s terms of trade
improve from TOT1 to TOT2.
Chapter 4 Tariffs and Nontariff Barriers

4.1 Theories for Trade Protection

4.2 Tariffs

4.3 Nontariff Trade Barriers
4.3 Nontariff Trade Barriers

An Introduction to Nontariff Trade Barriers

Import Quota
 An import quota is a physical restriction on the quantity of
goods that may be imported during a specific period; the
quota generally limits imports to a level below which
imports would occur under free-trade conditions.
 A common practice to administer an import quota is for the
government to require an import license. Each license
specifies the volume of imports allowed, and the total
volume allowed should not exceed the quota.
 Import quotas on manufactured goods have been outlawed
by the World Trade Organization.
4.3 Nontariff Trade Barriers
 Tariff-Rate
Quota: A Two-Tier Tariff
a tariff-rate quota displays both tariff-like and
quota-like characteristics. This device allows a
specified number of goods to be imported at one
tariff rate (the within-quota tariff rate), whereas
any imports above this level face a higher tariff
rate (the over-quota tariff rate).
 a tariff rate quota is a two-tier tariff.

4.3 Nontariff Trade Barriers

Orderly Marketing Agreements
 An orderly marketing agreement (OMA) is a marketsharing pact negotiated by trading partners.
 Its main purpose is to moderate the intensity of
international competition, allowing less efficient domestic
producers to participate in markets that would otherwise
have been lost to foreign producers who sell a superior
product at a lower price.
 A typical OMA consists of voluntary quotas applied to
exports. These controls are known as voluntary export
restraints (VERs); they are sometimes supplemented by
backup import controls to ensure that the restraints are
effective.
4.3 Nontariff Trade Barriers

Domestic Content Requirements
 To limit the practice of outsourcing, organized labor has
lobbied for the use of domestic content requirements.
 The effect of content requirements is to pressure both
domestic and foreign firms who sell products in the home
country to use domestic inputs (workers) in the production
of those products.
 Manufacturers generally lobby against domestic content
requirements, because they prevent manufacturers from
obtaining inputs at the lowest cost, thus contributing to
higher product prices and loss of competitiveness.
4.3 Nontariff Trade Barriers
 Subsidies

National governments sometimes grant subsidies to their
producers to help improve their trade position.
 Governmental subsidies assume a variety of forms,
including outright cash disbursements, tax concessions,
insurance arrangements, and loans at below-market interest
rates.
 Two types of subsidies:
– a domestic subsidy which is sometimes granted to
producers of import-competing goods
– an export subsidy which goes to producers of goods that
are to be sold overseas
4.3 Nontariff Trade Barriers
 Dumping

Dumping is recognized as a form of international price
discrimination.
 It occurs when foreign buyers are charged lower prices than
domestic buyers for an identical product, after allowing for
transportation costs and tariff duties. Selling in foreign
markets at a price below the cost of production is also
considered dumping.
 Commercial dumping is generally viewed as sporadic,
predatory, or persistent in nature. Each type is practiced
under different circumstances.
4.3 Nontariff Trade Barriers

The effects of an Import Quota
In
P
the absence of trade,
equilibrium would occur at
Point E with the domestic price
of cloth equaling P.
S
S+Q
E
P
The
G
PQ
a
b
c
d
PW
F
Q1
Q3
Q4
Q2
The
imposition of the quota
changes the amount of cloth
Q supplied to the importing
country, a new equilibrium is
reached at G.
D
Quota
0
free-trade equilibrium is
located at Point F, the domestic
price of cloth would fall to the
world price PW.
4.3 Nontariff Trade Barriers
The
country loses Areas b+c+d under a quota.
The redistributive effect (Area a)
The protective effect (Area b)
The domestic revenue effect (Area c)
Area c accrues to the foreign producers and makes
them more profitable.
The consumption effect (Area d)
The deadweight loss (Areas b + d)
4.3 Nontariff Trade Barriers
 Two
methods available for a government or
community to capture Area c from foreign producers
under a quota.
– The domestic government could auction quotas to
importers in a free market. The limited quota
supply would go to those importers most in need
of the product who would pay the higher price.
– Convert the quota into an equivalent tariff.
4.3 Nontariff Trade Barriers

Quota and equivalent tariff

The losses for consumers and community are much larger in
the case of a quota than in the case of a tariff when demand
increases.
P
S
S+Q
E
P
PQ'
PT=PQ
G
t
b
c
PW
O Q1
d
F
Quota
Quota
Q3
Q4
D
Q2
D'
Q
4.3 Nontariff Trade Barriers

The Effects of an Export Subsidy
P

S
S'

Subsidy=t

PW+t
PW
a
b
c
t
d
SW

D
O Q0
Q1
Q2
Q
Consumers lose Area a+b
in the form of higher taxes.
Producers gain Area a in
profits.
The cost to the community
is Area b, that is the
production deadweight
cost of the subsidy.
Subsidies are superior to
protection in another way:
they are more visible.