Survey
* Your assessment is very important for improving the work of artificial intelligence, which forms the content of this project
* Your assessment is very important for improving the work of artificial intelligence, which forms the content of this project
Engineering Good Times: Fiscal Manipulation in a Global Economy Angela O’Mahony University of British Columbia Political Science Motivation Gov’ts more likely to be reelected in good times. Will gov’ts engage in pre-electoral fiscal manipulation to engineer good times? Gov’t’s decision to manipulate fiscal policy prior to an election is mediated by its international monetary and trade ties Likelihood of pre-electoral fiscal manipulation Clark & Hallerberg Exchange Trade Openness Rate Low High Flexible Low Low High Fixed High High Low Likelihood of pre-electoral fiscal manipulation Clark & Hallerberg Exchange Rate Based on Mundell-Fleming: Flexible Low Fixed High Perfect capital mobility Constant prices Likelihood of pre-electoral fiscal manipulation Exchange Rate Trade Openness Low High Flexible Low G desire for fiscal manipulation Fixed High Low Likelihood of pre-electoral fiscal manipulation Exchange Rate Flexible Fixed Trade Openness Low High Low International shocks High G desire for fiscal manipulation Likelihood of pre-electoral fiscal manipulation Exchange Rate Flexible Fixed Trade Openness Low High Low International shocks High G desire for fiscal manipulation Likelihood of pre-electoral fiscal manipulation Exchange Rate Flexibility Effectiveness of fiscal manipulation Trade Openness Low High Low High High Low Likelihood of pre-electoral fiscal manipulation Exchange Rate Flexibility Effectiveness of fiscal manipulation Trade Openness Low High Low High High Low Likelihood of pre-electoral fiscal manipulation Exchange Rate Flexibility Effectiveness of fiscal manipulation When exchange rate is flexible, fiscal manipulation only when benefit is high Benefit increases in trade openness Likelihood of pre-electoral fiscal manipulation Exchange Rate Flexibility Effectiveness of fiscal manipulation When exchange rate is flexible, fiscal manipulation only when benefit is high Benefit as trade openness Likelihood of pre-electoral fiscal manipulation Exchange Rate Trade Openness Low High Flexible Low High Fixed High Low Likelihood of pre-electoral fiscal manipulation Exchange Rate When the exchange rate is fixed, fiscal manipulation leads to an appreciation of the real exchange rate Real exchange rate appreciation erodes international competitiveness Likelihood of pre-electoral fiscal manipulation Exchange Rate When the exchange rate is fixed, fiscal manipulation leads to an appreciation of the real exchange rate Real exchange rate appreciation erodes international competitiveness Likelihood of pre-electoral fiscal manipulation Exchange Rate Trade Openness Low High Flexible Low High Fixed High Low Likelihood of pre-electoral fiscal manipulation My Argument Exchange Rate Trade Openness Low High Flexible Low High Fixed High Low Sample: 20 OECD countries, 1974-2000 (437 obs) DV: in gross gov’t debt as a % of GDP Elections Under Fixed Exchange Rate Elections Under Fixed ER x Trade Openness (+) 5.46 ** (2.26) (-) -5.61 * (2.95) Elections Under Intermediate Exchange Rate 0.47 (2.76) Elections Under Intermediate ER x Trade Openness 0.96 (4.85) Elections Under Flexible Exchange Rate (-) -4.06 * (2.13) (+) 6.94 * (3.57) Elections Under Flexible ER x Trade Openness Sample: 20 OECD countries, 1974-2000 (437 obs) DV: in gross gov’t debt as a % of GDP Elections Under Fixed Exchange Rate Elections Under Fixed ER x Trade Openness (+) 5.46 ** (2.26) (-) -5.61 * (2.95) Elections Under Intermediate Exchange Rate 0.47 (2.76) Elections Under Intermediate ER x Trade Openness 0.96 (4.85) Elections Under Flexible Exchange Rate (-) -4.06 * (2.13) (+) 6.94 * (3.57) Elections Under Flexible ER x Trade Openness Sample: 20 OECD countries, 1974-2000 (437 obs) DV: in gross gov’t debt as a % of GDP Elections Under Fixed Exchange Rate Elections Under Fixed ER x Trade Openness (+) 5.46 ** (2.26) (-) -5.61 * (2.95) Elections Under Intermediate Exchange Rate 0.47 (2.76) Elections Under Intermediate ER x Trade Openness 0.96 (4.85) Elections Under Flexible Exchange Rate (-/=) -4.06 * (2.13) (+) 6.94 * (3.57) Elections Under Flexible ER x Trade Openness Sample: 20 OECD countries, 1974-2000 (437 obs) DV: in gross gov’t debt as a % of GDP Elections Under Fixed Exchange Rate Elections Under Fixed ER x Trade Openness (+) 5.46 ** (2.26) (-) -5.61 * (2.95) Elections Under Intermediate Exchange Rate 0.47 (2.76) Elections Under Intermediate ER x Trade Openness 0.96 (4.85) Elections Under Flexible Exchange Rate (-/=) -4.06 * (2.13) (+) 6.94 * (3.57) Elections Under Flexible ER x Trade Openness Pre-electoral fiscal manipulation as trade openness varies Under a Flexible Exchange Rate Government Debt as a % of GDP 20 15 10 5 0 -5 -10 0.0 0.5 1.0 Trade Openness 1.5 2.0 Pre-electoral fiscal manipulation as trade openness varies Under a Fixed Exchange Rate Government Debt as a % of GDP 10 5 0 -5 -10 -15 0.0 0.5 1.0 Trade Openness 1.5 2.0 Conclusion Mundell-Fleming framework Substantive importance: EMU International ties matter