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Engineering Good Times:
Fiscal Manipulation in a Global Economy
Angela O’Mahony
University of British Columbia
Political Science
Motivation


Gov’ts more likely to be reelected in good times.
Will gov’ts engage in pre-electoral fiscal
manipulation to engineer good times?
Gov’t’s decision to manipulate fiscal policy prior to
an election is mediated by its international
monetary and trade ties
Likelihood of pre-electoral fiscal manipulation
Clark & Hallerberg
Exchange
Trade Openness
Rate
Low
High
Flexible
Low
Low
High
Fixed
High
High
Low
Likelihood of pre-electoral fiscal manipulation
Clark & Hallerberg
Exchange
Rate
Based on Mundell-Fleming:
Flexible
Low
Fixed
High
Perfect capital mobility
Constant prices
Likelihood of pre-electoral fiscal manipulation
Exchange
Rate
Trade Openness
Low
High
Flexible
Low
 G desire for
fiscal manipulation
Fixed
High
Low
Likelihood of pre-electoral fiscal manipulation
Exchange
Rate
Flexible
Fixed
Trade Openness
Low
High
Low
 International
shocks
High
 G desire for
fiscal manipulation
Likelihood of pre-electoral fiscal manipulation
Exchange
Rate
Flexible
Fixed
Trade Openness
Low
High
Low
 International
shocks
High
 G desire for
fiscal manipulation
Likelihood of pre-electoral fiscal manipulation
Exchange
Rate
 Flexibility 
 Effectiveness
of fiscal
manipulation
Trade Openness
Low
High
Low
High
High
Low
Likelihood of pre-electoral fiscal manipulation
Exchange
Rate
 Flexibility 
 Effectiveness
of fiscal
manipulation
Trade Openness
Low
High
Low
High
High
Low
Likelihood of pre-electoral fiscal manipulation
Exchange
Rate
 Flexibility 
 Effectiveness
of fiscal
manipulation
When exchange rate is flexible,
fiscal manipulation only when
benefit is high
Benefit increases in trade
openness
Likelihood of pre-electoral fiscal manipulation
Exchange
Rate
 Flexibility 
 Effectiveness
of fiscal
manipulation
When exchange rate is flexible,
fiscal manipulation only when
benefit is high
 Benefit as  trade openness
Likelihood of pre-electoral fiscal manipulation
Exchange
Rate
Trade Openness
Low
High
Flexible
Low
High
Fixed
High
Low
Likelihood of pre-electoral fiscal manipulation
Exchange
Rate
When the exchange rate is fixed,
fiscal manipulation leads to an
appreciation of the real exchange rate
Real exchange rate appreciation
erodes international competitiveness
Likelihood of pre-electoral fiscal manipulation
Exchange
Rate
When the exchange rate is fixed,
fiscal manipulation leads to an
appreciation of the real exchange rate
Real exchange rate appreciation
erodes international competitiveness
Likelihood of pre-electoral fiscal manipulation
Exchange
Rate
Trade Openness
Low
High
Flexible
Low
High
Fixed
High
Low
Likelihood of pre-electoral fiscal manipulation
My Argument
Exchange
Rate
Trade Openness
Low
High
Flexible
Low
High
Fixed
High
Low
Sample: 20 OECD countries, 1974-2000 (437 obs)
DV:  in gross gov’t debt as a % of GDP
Elections Under Fixed Exchange Rate
Elections Under Fixed ER x Trade Openness
(+)
5.46 **
(2.26)
(-)
-5.61 *
(2.95)
Elections Under Intermediate Exchange Rate
0.47
(2.76)
Elections Under Intermediate ER x Trade Openness
0.96
(4.85)
Elections Under Flexible Exchange Rate
(-)
-4.06 *
(2.13)
(+)
6.94 *
(3.57)
Elections Under Flexible ER x Trade Openness
Sample: 20 OECD countries, 1974-2000 (437 obs)
DV:  in gross gov’t debt as a % of GDP
Elections Under Fixed Exchange Rate
Elections Under Fixed ER x Trade Openness
(+)
5.46 **
(2.26)
(-)
-5.61 *
(2.95)
Elections Under Intermediate Exchange Rate
0.47
(2.76)
Elections Under Intermediate ER x Trade Openness
0.96
(4.85)
Elections Under Flexible Exchange Rate
(-)
-4.06 *
(2.13)
(+)
6.94 *
(3.57)
Elections Under Flexible ER x Trade Openness
Sample: 20 OECD countries, 1974-2000 (437 obs)
DV:  in gross gov’t debt as a % of GDP
Elections Under Fixed Exchange Rate
Elections Under Fixed ER x Trade Openness
(+)
5.46 **
(2.26)
(-)
-5.61 *
(2.95)
Elections Under Intermediate Exchange Rate
0.47
(2.76)
Elections Under Intermediate ER x Trade Openness
0.96
(4.85)
Elections Under Flexible Exchange Rate
(-/=)
-4.06 *
(2.13)
(+)
6.94 *
(3.57)
Elections Under Flexible ER x Trade Openness
Sample: 20 OECD countries, 1974-2000 (437 obs)
DV:  in gross gov’t debt as a % of GDP
Elections Under Fixed Exchange Rate
Elections Under Fixed ER x Trade Openness
(+)
5.46 **
(2.26)
(-)
-5.61 *
(2.95)
Elections Under Intermediate Exchange Rate
0.47
(2.76)
Elections Under Intermediate ER x Trade Openness
0.96
(4.85)
Elections Under Flexible Exchange Rate
(-/=)
-4.06 *
(2.13)
(+)
6.94 *
(3.57)
Elections Under Flexible ER x Trade Openness
Pre-electoral fiscal manipulation as trade openness varies
Under a Flexible Exchange Rate
Government Debt as a % of GDP
20
15
10
5
0
-5
-10
0.0
0.5
1.0
Trade Openness
1.5
2.0
Pre-electoral fiscal manipulation as trade openness varies
Under a Fixed Exchange Rate
Government Debt as a % of GDP
10
5
0
-5
-10
-15
0.0
0.5
1.0
Trade Openness
1.5
2.0
Conclusion



Mundell-Fleming framework
Substantive importance: EMU
International ties matter
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