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Dollarization in the Philippines: The way in; the way out Cayetano W. Paderanga Jr. Okinawa, Japan 8 April 2005 Outline I. II. Determinants of dollarization Dollarization and the growth of the financial sector III. Dollarization, sudden stops & economic consequences I. Determinants of dollarization in the Philippines Background: - In 1970 Peso’s exchange rate was allowed to “float” - During the late 1970’s, monetary authorities allowed foreign currency denominated deposits in offshore banking units of foreign banks and foreign sections of local banks - The Philippine Dealing System was introduced in the late 1980s - Full deregulation of foreign exchange earnings was fully accomplished in 1992 The Philippines has experienced two large foreign exchange episodes in the last 20 years Government deficits were substantial during the 1980s and the current account deficit worsened Sudden stop: Capital flowed out of the ASEAN countries during the Asian Crisis. In case of the Philippines, capital flows also dropped in 1983. - Inflation rates rose substantially during the 1980s - Although inflation rate has dropped significantly, dollarized deposit ratio still persist Almost 50 percent of the total NG debt are foreign currency denominated, 60 percent of which are in US$ … National Government Outstanding Debt (in million pesos) 2002 TOTAL NG debt as a fraction of nominal GDP Domestic Direct Liabilities Assumed Liabilities Foreign Direct Liabilities Assumed Liabilities Source: Bureau of Treasury 2003 2004 2,815,468 3,355,108 3,811,954 66.7% 72.6% 73.4% 1,471,202 52.3% 1,462,950 8,252 1,703,781 50.8% 1,701,484 2,297 2,001,220 52.5% 1,998,926 2,294 1,344,266 47.7% 1,334,451 9,815 1,651,327 49.2% 1,643,342 7,985 1,810,734 47.5% 1,804,942 5,792 Foreign Debt Composition by Type of Currency (in percent) 2002 2003 2004 US dollar 58.1 58.5 60.1 Japanese Yen 32.9 31.2 29.5 Euro 3.7 5.3 5.5 French Franc 0.5 0.5 0.5 Deutsche Mark 0.3 0.2 0.2 Other Currencies 4.5 4.3 4.2 Source: Bureau of Treasury • Dollarization accelerated starting 1992 to 1996. This is partly explained by the full deregulation of foreign exchange earnings in 1992. • The post-crisis period saw a steeper decline in FCDU loans, relative to decline in deposit liabilities, as domestic borrowers shifted away from this type of loan in favor of local currency borrowings to minimize foreign exchange risk. II. Dollarization and the growth of the financial sector B a n k in g A s s e ts a n d D e p o s it D o lla r iza tio n 1 0 0 .0 0 1983 1991 1996 8 0 .0 0 1997 1985 Y OY Grow th Rates 6 0 .0 0 4 0 .0 0 2 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 1 982 1 983 1 984 1 985 1 986 1 987 1 988 1 989 1 990 1 991 1 992 1 993 1 994 1 995 1 996 1 997 1 998 1 999 - 2 0 .0 0 - 4 0 .0 0 - 6 0 .0 0 D e p o s it M o n e y B a n k s A s s e ts " D o lla r " D e p o s its 2000 2001 2002 2003 B S P G IR a n d D e p o s it D o lla r iza tio n 1 4 0 .0 0 1983 1991 1 2 0 .0 0 1996 1997 1985 1 0 0 .0 0 Y OY Grow th Rates 8 0 .0 0 6 0 .0 0 4 0 .0 0 2 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 1 982 1 983 1 984 1 985 1 986 1 987 1 988 1 989 1 990 1 991 1 992 1 993 1 994 1 995 1 996 1 997 1 998 1 999 - 2 0 .0 0 - 4 0 .0 0 - 6 0 .0 0 B S P G ros s Res erv es " D o lla r " D e p o s its 2000 2001 2002 2003 III. Dollarization, sudden stops & economic consequences 1. 1. 2. 2. 1. 2. 3. Effects on the banking & corporate sector Asset-liabilities mismatch – currency risk masquerading as credit risk Sudden stop leads to capital adequacy & balance sheet effects Dollarization & government debt Foreign liabilities of government held by domestic banks Fiscal deficits, ratings downgrades & balance sheet effects Banking contraction leads to credit crunch Bank Assets and Dollar Loans and Discounts Growth of Bank Assets vs. Dollar Loans and Discounts T=1984 Growth of Bank Assets vs. Loans and Discounts T=1997 40.0 140.0 Bank Assets g.r. 30.0 Loans and Discounts (Net) g.r. Bank Assets g.r. 120.0 Loans and Discounts (Net) g.r. 20.0 100.0 10.0 80.0 0.0 T-2 T-1 T T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4 T+5 60.0 -10.0 40.0 -20.0 20.0 -30.0 0.0 -40.0 -50.0 -60.0 T-5 -20.0 -40.0 T-4 T-3 T-2 T-1 T T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4 Dollarization and Capital flow Internal Public Debt and Fiscal Deficit 50 5 4 3 30 2 1 20 Fiscal Deficit Internal Public Debt 40 0 10 Internal Public Debt Fiscal Deficit 0 -1 -2 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Source: BSP and BTr Debt Deficit Current Sovereign Ratings of the Philippines Agency Rating Outlook Standard & Poor's BB stable Moody's B1 stable Fitch BB stable R&I BBB - negative Source: http://asianbondsonline.adb.org Date Jan-05 Jan-05 Oct-03 Feb-05 Public Claims in Banks and the Public Deficit -Philippines 10 5 4 3 6 2 1 4 0 2 -1 0 -2 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Public claims/total claims 1997 1998 1999 Public deficit/GDP 2000 2001 Public deficit/GDP Public claims/total calims 8 III. Dollarization, sudden stops & economic consequences 3. Dollarization & market bubbles 1. 2. 3. Dollarization & short-term capital inflow Stock prices Sudden stops & credit crunch PHISIX vs FCDU T=1997 PHISIX vs FCDU T=1984 900.0 2,500.0 3,500.0 16,000.0 Composite Index (end of period) 800.0 FCDU 14,000.0 3,000.0 2,000.0 700.0 12,000.0 2,500.0 600.0 10,000.0 1,500.0 2,000.0 500.0 8,000.0 400.0 1,500.0 1,000.0 6,000.0 300.0 1,000.0 4,000.0 200.0 500.0 500.0 2,000.0 Composite Index (end of period) 100.0 FCDU 0.0 T-3 T-2 T-1 T T+1 T+2 T+3 Stock market index T+4 0.0 T+5 0.0 T-5 T-4 T-3 T-2 T-1 T T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4 0.0 T+5 Growth of REER vs. FCDU T=1984 100.0 REER 2000=100 g.r. FCDU g.r. 80.0 60.0 40.0 20.0 0.0 T-2 -20.0 -40.0 -60.0 Philippines, 1984 and 1997 Latin America Adopted from “Unlocking Credit” T-1 T T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4 T+5 Dollarization in the Philippines: The way in; the way out Cayetano W. Paderanga Jr. Okinawa, Japan 8 April 2005