Download Spring 2004 Forecast Presentation UK

IMF Fiscal Affairs and Research Departments
Workshop on Fiscal Policy
Washington, June 2, 2009
A couple of issues in automatic stabilisation:
Efficiency effects and medium-term sustainability
by:
Carlos Martinez-Mongay(*)
European Commission
DG ECFIN
(*) The views expressed in this presentation do not necessarily represent those of the European Commission
European Commission
1
OUTLINE
1. Distortionary taxes, the size of
governments and the trade-off between
stabilization and efficiency
2. Asset booms, composition effects and
the trade-off between stabilization and
sustainability
European Commission
2
1. Distortionary taxes, the size of
governments and the trade-off between
stabilisation and efficiency
European Commission
3
A simple model for automatic stabilisation
(European Commission (2001); se also Artis and Buti, 2000, Blanchard, 2000, Buti,
Roeger, in’t Veld, 2001)
A simple AD/AS model:
(1) Yd = f1(d-pb) – f2(i-pe) + ed
(2) Ys = Y* + w(p –pe) + es
(3) d = d* - t(Y –Y*)
f1 , f2 > 0
(1) IS-type schedule
(2) Lucas-Pillips supply function
d
deficit
b
stock of public debt
i
interest
p
inflation (‘e’ expected)
Y*
potential output (Y – Y* is the output gap)
ed, es, demand and supply shocks
(3) d* cyclically-adjusted deficit
t
automatic stabilisers (sensitivity of the deficit to the output gap, Y-Y*)
European Commission
4
Shocks don’t come with labels:
demand, supply, temporary, permanent
Y = Y* + (w ed + bes)/[w(1 + f1 t ) + b]
p = p* + (ed – (1 + f1 t ) es)/[w(1 + f1 t ) + b]
If automatic stabilisers are turned off (t = 0)
Y = Y* + (w ed + bes)/(w + b);
es = 0, Y = Y* + w ed /(w + b);
ed = 0, Y = Y* + bes/(w + b);
p= p* + (ed – es)/(w + b)
es = 0, p= p* + ed/(w + b);
ed = 0, p= p* – es/(w + b);
If automatic stabilisers are turned on (t >0)
es = 0 Y = Y* + w ed /[w(1 + f1 t ) + b];
ed = 0 Y = Y* + bes/[w(1 + f1 t ) + b];
es = 0 p = p* + ed /[w(1 + f1 t ) + b];
ed = 0 p = p* - (1 + f1 t ) es)/[w(1 + f1 t ) + b];
es permanent Y – (Y* + es )= -{(1 + f1 t ) es/[w(1 + f1 t ) + b]};
European Commission
5
Do governments stabilize output?
Automatic stabilizers operate on the demand side. Progressive taxes and benefit (viz. unemployment)
systems make surpluses grow more than output in expansions and less than output in recessions
Automatic stabilizers also operate on the supply side:
•
Avoid under-investment in recessions
•
Keep levels of physical and human capital
•
Growth close to potential
But distortionary taxes and benefit systems affect agent’s decisions to invest, work and
save, which has an impact on economic efficiency.
A policy dilemma?
•
•
Need to induce more flexibility in markets (short-run adjustment) and enhance potential
output (long-run adjustment) by streamlining benefit systems and lowering distorting taxes
Efficiency gains may come at the cost of less stability (more output volatility)
No policy dilemma if distortionary tax-benefit systems would hamper
macroeconomic stability
European Commission
6
Higher tax rates can lead to steeper
aggregate supply curves
(1)
w = f ( L)  T
(2)
 (1  
w
(3)
=
w
(4)
u =u*
T
T
) = (1   ) 1 L
w
w
(1  t )
1 L
(1  t )
(1  t )
 (p  p e )
(1  t )
European Commission
7
An extended AD/AS model with
taxes in the supply curve
Aggregate-demand curve
(1)






y d = f1d  f2 i  p e  f3 p  p *  f4 y  y *  e d
Aggregate-supply curve
(2)


y s = w  t  p  p e  e s
Monetary rule:
(3)
where
i = p  y
p = p  1   p *
and
y = y  1    y *
Fiscal rule (SGP –automatic stabilisation)
(4)
d = ty
European Commission
8
An extended AD/AS model with
taxes in the supply curve
Trade balance
implies:
consistency
p  p * = y  y * f5
(6)
y=
where
f5
f
=
 f4 
f3  f3*
*
4
w  t * w  t d f 2 s
f6 y 
e  e
rt
rt
rt
rt = f2  w  t 1  f6  f1t  f2 
.
and
f6 = f2 1   (f5   )  f4  f3f5 
Inflation can be obtained by equating (6) to (w – t)p + es (i.e. (2) with pe = 0)
European Commission
9
Under a demand shock (ed0, es=0).
 r
w *   *t * f6f6*   f2  f 
y
= e d  t 
1
 
2
t
rt*
w  t
  w  t 

2
p
ed
=
t w  t 2 C 2



 w *   *t * f6*f6 


2
f
t


1

f

f

wf

1
6
2
1


rt*




rt
w *   *t * f6f6* 


rt*
 w  t 


where C = 
European Commission
10
Under a supply shock (es0, ed=0).
 r * r  w  t w *   * t * f 6f 6*  
 w *   * t * f 6*f 6 
y
= f 2 e s  t t
f
(
w


t
)


(
1

f

f
t

f
)



1
6
1
2
t
rt*
rt*

 

2

f 2e s
 (f2  B) 2 
p
2
=
f1 (w  t ) 

t
(w  t ) 2 B 2 
f2

where


 r *r  w  t  w *   *t * f6f6* 
B= t t

rt*


European Commission
11
Is there an efficiency-stabilization
tradeoff?
Table 1
Effect of a rise in taxes on output and inflation stabilisation
output
inflation
Below tˆ
Above tˆ
demand shock



+
supply shock

+
+
+
Initial level of taxes
Below tˆ
Above tˆ
Shocks
Note:
 stabilising effect
 destabilising effect
European Commission
12
Is there an efficiency-stabilization tradeoff?
The cases of closed and small economies
*
*
* *
* *
*
ˆt = wf1   (1  f2 )  f6 . f2  (w   t )(*1  f1 t  f2 )
2f1
2f1
rt
tˆC =
wf 1   (1  f 2 )
2f1
wf1   (1  f 4 )
tˆS =
2f1
European Commission
13
Is there an efficiency-stabilization tradeoff?
Empirical evidence
Sample of 25 OECD countries over the period 1960-2000 (annual data).
Joint estimation of output and inflation volatility (error terms are correlated; GMM)
Output volatility: standard deviation of the output gap (% of the trend) over the period
Inflation volatility: ratio between the standard deviation and the average of the GDP deflator
Government size is measured as tax revenues (% of GDP)
Other variables:
Trade openness: Average of exports and imports in % of GDP
Country size:
Average of the GDP (PPS)
Specialisation: Average share (%) of manufacturing GVA in total GDP
Additional Instruments (determinants of government size):
Per capita income (in 1995 PPS)
Old-age dependency ratio: people over 65 in percentage of total population
European Commission
14
Alternative ways of measuring the size of governments
Table 3: Correlation between volatility, government size, openness
and country size
Output Inflation
stability stability
(1)
(2)
Inflation
stability
Total
expend.
Current
expend.
Total
revenue
Tax
revenue
Trade
Openness
Country
Size (8)
Total
Current Total
Tax
Trade
expend. expend. revenue revenue openness
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
0.54*
-0.45*
-0.41*
-0.50*
-0.39*
0.99*
-0.40*
-0.36
0.95*
0.93*
-0.44*
-0.38
0.94*
0.91*
0.96*
-0.03
-0.12
0.40*
0.34
0.46*
0.45*
-0.35
-0.15
-0.21
-0.19
-0.29
-0.26
-0.71*
* Significant at 5%. Asymptotic critical value between 2x(1/25)0.5 = 0.40 and
2x(1/22)0.5 = 0.43
(1) Standard deviation of the output gap in percentage of trend GDP over 19602000(a)
(2) The ratio between the standard deviation and the average over 1960-2000(a) of
the annual percentage change in the GDP deflator
(3) Logarithm of the average total expenditures (% of GDP) over 1960-2000(a)
(4) Logarithm of the average current expenditures (% of GDP) over 1960-2000(a)
(5) Logarithm of the average total revenues (% of GDP) over 1960-2000(a)
(6) Logarithm of the average tax revenues (% of GDP) over 1960-2000(a)
(7) Logarithm of the average exports and imports (half % of GDP) over 19602000(a)
(8) Logarithm of the average GDP (PPPs) over 1960-2000(a)
(a)
See footnotes in tables 1 and 2 for the exceptions.
European Commission
15
Stabilization and the tax burden
Table 5. Instrumental variable estimates for macroeconomic stability
Tax
Country
revenues (1) size
(2)
Industry
share
(4)
Adj. R²
J-test
(4)
[Output-gap volatility(5)]
OG-IV1(6)
OG-IV3(6)
-1.74
(0.26)***
-1.94
(0.37)***
-0.21
(0.07)***
-0.33
(0.05)***
0.43
0.05
(0.03)**
0.51
2.98
[0.39]
5.45
[0.14]
[Inflation volatility (7)]
GD-IV1(6)
GD-IV3(6)
-0.22
(0.07)***
-0.23
(0.08)***
-0.03
(0.01)**
-0.03
(0.01)**
0.20
0.002
(0.003)
0.19
3.48
[0.32]
4.24
[0.24]
Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors in parenthesis; *** significant at 1%; **
significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. All the regressions include an intercept not
shown here
(1) Logarithm of the average tax revenues (% of GDP) over 1960-2000(a)
(2) Logarithm of the average GDP (PPPs) over 1960-2000(a)
(3) Average share of manufacturing gross value added in total GDP over 1960-2000
(4) Test for over-identifying restrictions; p-value between ‘[]’
(5) Standard deviation of the output gap in percentage of trend GDP over 1960-2000(a)
(6) The instruments are trade openness (% of GDP), per capita GDP (1995 PPPs) and
the dependency ratio (% of total population). The three instruments are the logs of
the averages over 1960-2000.
(7) Ratio between the standard deviation and the average over 1960-2000(a) of the
annual percentage change in the GDP deflator
(a)
See footnotes in tables 1 and 2 for the exceptions
European Commission
16
The average effective tax rate
on labor income
LETR = (SSC + PITR*(LETB – NWRV))/LETB
Where:
SSC
social security contributions plus taxes on payroll and workforce
PITR*(LETB – NWRV)
personal taxes on labour, with
PITR = PIRV /(COEL + NOS – NWRV – CORV – PWRV)
LETB
is gross wages and salaries plus the imputed income of the self-employed
European Commission
17
Labor taxes in the sample
Table 6: Labor related tax burden over time and countries
Period 1960-1980
Country
Belgium
Denmark
Germany
Greece
Spain
France
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
The Netherlands
Austria
Portugal
Finland
Sweden
United Kingdom
United States
Japan
Direct
Social
Labour
taxes
security
taxes
1
2
3
11.62
11.31
34.28
24.06
1.81
32.35
11.33
13.03
35.21
3.30
7.67
14.94
3.71
8.76
17.45
6.20
15.18
29.86
9.41
4.88
14.89
6.14
11.38
22.90
15.36
11.53
30.16
14.45
16.05
36.90
10.23
11.20
29.09
4.86
5.30
14.40
13.35
6.78
31.17
18.42
9.06
41.23
15.12
6.33
24.94
13.29
4.60
18.35
8.30
4.72
13.15
Period 1980-2000
Difference
Direct
Social
Labour
taxes
security
taxes
1
2
3
16.83
16.26
42.90
28.70
2.55
41.32
11.87
17.90
40.71
6.27
11.94
23.40
9.26
13.01
28.54
8.90
20.11
39.30
13.70
6.85
24.65
13.93
14.10
34.88
17.06
12.54
33.53
13.58
18.29
40.92
12.42
16.23
37.31
8.66
9.87
24.08
17.25
12.63
41.42
21.18
14.33
47.67
15.95
7.83
25.35
13.09
7.00
22.00
11.12
8.94
20.14
Direct
Social
Labour
taxes
security
taxes
1
2
3
5.21
4.95
8.62
4.64
0.74
8.97
0.54
4.87
5.49
2.97
4.26
8.46
5.55
4.25
11.09
2.69
4.93
9.45
4.29
1.97
9.76
7.79
2.72
11.98
1.70
1.01
3.37
-0.88
2.24
4.03
2.18
5.03
8.22
3.80
4.57
9.68
3.90
5.85
10.25
2.76
5.27
6.44
0.83
1.50
0.41
-0.20
2.40
3.65
2.82
4.22
6.99
1:Direct taxes in percentage points of GDP
2:Social security contributions in percentage points of GDP
3:Labour effective tax rates in % of the tax base
European Commission
18
Is there an efficiency-stabilization tradeoff?
Empirical evidence
Table 7: Macroeconomic stability and the tax mix
Output-gap volatility (1)
Price volatility [GDP deflator] (2)
Government Size
(3)
-2.44
-4.9
-2.58
-2.55
(0.56)*** (1.41)*** (0.62)*** (0.59)***
-0.31
(0.18)*
Country size (4)
-0.23
-0.34
-0.29
-0.29
(0.05)*** (0.08)*** (0.09)*** (0.09)***
-0.03
(0.03)
-0.04
(0.02)*
-0.04
(0.02)**
-0.05
(0.02)**
0.07
(0.22)
0.21
(0.12)*
0.23
(0.11)*
0.23
(0.12)**
Specialization (5)
1.43
(0.75)*
Government
Size* Time
dummy (6)
Government
Size* Labor rate
(7)
Government
Size* Direct taxes
(8)
0.20
(0.09)**
Government
Size* Social
Security (9)
A-R² (10)
J (11)
1.04
(0.46)**
0.85
(0.49)*
0.86
(0.49)*
-0.17
-0.46
-0.43
(0.36) (0.14)*** (0.14)***
0.05
(0.03)*
1.45
(0.81)*
-0.16
(0.21)
0.03
(0.30)
0.05
(0.06)
-0.03
(0.30)
0.34
3.76
[0.43]
0.64
7.79
[0.45]
0.56
8.53
[0.38]
0.56
8.80
[0.36]
0.00
(0.07)
0.27
3.76
[0.43]
0.39
7.79
[0.45]
0.39
8.53
[0.38]
Models estimated by IV methods (instruments: trade openness, per capita GDP, dependency ratio. Heteroskedastic-consistent
standard errors in parenthesis; *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. All the regressions include an
intercept not shown here.
(1) Standard deviation of the output gap in percentage of trend GDP over 1960-2000(a).
(2) The ratio between the standard deviation and the average over 1960-2000(a) of the annual percentage change in the GDP
deflator.
(3) Logarithm of the average tax revenues (% of GDP) over 1960-2000(a).
(4) Logarithm of the average GDP (PPPs) over 1960-2000(a).
(5) Average share of manufacturing gross value added in total GDP over 1960-2000.
(6) The corresponding equation is estimated on a sample consisting of averages over the period 1960-1980 and the period
1981-2000. The resulting number of observation is 30. Government size is interacted with a dummy taking the value 1
over the second period and 0 otherwise.
(7) The corresponding equation is estimated on a sample consisting of averages over the period 1960-2000. The resulting
number of observation is 17. Government size is interacted with labor taxes in percentage of total labor costs.
(8) The corresponding equation is estimated on a sample consisting of averages over the period 1960-2000. The resulting
number of observation is 17. Government size is interacted with direct taxes in percentage of GDP.
(9) The corresponding equation is estimated on a sample consisting of averages over the period 1960-2000. The resulting
number of observation is 17. Government size is interacted with social security contribution in percentage of GDP.
(10) Adjusted R².
(11) Test for over-identifying restrictions; p-value between ‘[]’.
0.38
8.80
[0.36]
European Commission
19
Is there an efficiency-stabilization tradeoff?
Additional empirical evidence (Debrun et al, 2008)
European Commission
20
Is there an efficiency-stabilization tradeoff?
Additional empirical evidence (Debrun et al, 2008)
European Commission
21
2. Asset booms, composition effects and the
trade-off between stabilization and
sustainability
European Commission
22
Measuring automatic stabilizers in the presence of
composition effects
Tax revenue
growth
%
(d)
Tax base growth
(c)
(b)
Nominal GDP growth
(a)
Trend GDP growth
Period of analysis
T0
T1
t
a) Cyclical effect (growth at nominal GDP)
(b) Composition effect (growth at base rate)
(c) Discretionary measures
(d) Others
European Commission
23
Automatic stabilizers and asset booms. The case of Spain
The longest expansion of the Spanish economy…
Real GDP growth in Spain and in the Euro Area
10
8
6
%
4
2
0
-2
-4
-6
70
72
74
76
78
80
82
Spain
84
86
88
Euro area
90
92
94
96
98
00
02
04
06
08
10
Average diff. Spain-Euro area
Source: AMECO
European Commission
24
Automatic stabilizers and asset booms. The case of Spain
… domestically led, especially by the housing sector (and
consumption).
SPAIN-INVESTMENT CONTRIBUTION TO GDP GROWTH
1.80
1.60
1.40
%
1.20
1.00
0.80
0.60
0.40
0.20
0.00
1971-1975
EQUIPMENT
19982-1991
DWELLINGS
OTHER CONSTRUCTION
1995-2007
OTHER INVESTMENT
Source: AMECO and own calculations
European Commission
25
Automatic stabilizers and asset booms. The case of Spain
The expansion 1995-2007 was underpinned by a substantive fall of
the risk premium, and unprecedented demographic growth, …
%
%
Interest rates, exchange rates and demography
2.0
12
1.8
10
1.6
8
6
1.4
4
1.2
2
1.0
0
0.8
-2
0.6
-4
Population
Real short term interest rate (rhs)
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
-10
1989
0.0
1988
-8
1987
-6
0.2
1986
0.4
Reer (rhs)
European Commission
26
Automatic stabilizers and asset booms. The case of Spain
…which induced a boom in asset markets
500
800 000
450
700 000
Index base 1995=100
400
600 000
350
500 000
300
250
400 000
200
300 000
150
200 000
100
100 000
50
0
0
1990 19911992 1993 19941995 1996 19971998 1999 20002001 2002 20032004 2005 20062007 2008
Housing starts in Spain (rhs)
Spanish housing prices
Euro area housing prices
Spanish stock market (IBEX-35)
Euro area stock market (Dow Jones Euro STOXX)
27
European Commission
Automatic stabilizers and asset booms. The case of Spain
Asset markets have also driven the downturn
SPAIN-INVESTMENT CONTRIBUTION TO GDP GROWTH
0.50
0.00
-0.50
-1.00
%
-1.50
-2.00
-2.50
-3.00
-3.50
-4.00
-4.50
2008
EQUIPMENT
2009
DWELLINGS
2010
OTHER CONSTRUCTION
OTHER INVESTMENT
Source: AMECO and own calculations
European Commission
28
A tax-rich expansion,
6
5
% GDP
4
3
2
1
0
TOTAL
IND. TAXES
DIR. TAXES
SOC.SEC.
-1
1995-2007
1995-2008
3.5
2.0
3
1.5
2.5
2
% GDP
1.0
1.5
0.5
1
0.5
0.0
0
-0.5
INDIRECT TAXES
HOUSING VAT
OTHER VAT
OTHER
-0.5
DIR TAXES
Diff %GDP 2007-1995
Diff %GDP 2008-1995
CORPORATE
Diff %GDP 1995-2007
PERSONAL
Diff %GDP 1995-2008
European Commission
29
Automatic stabilizers and asset booms. The case of Spain
… apparently of a structural nature…
General Government Tax Revenues
(indirect and direct taxes and social contributions, ïn %GDP)
38.0
1.0
37.0
0.5
36.0
0.0
35.0
-0.5
34.0
-1.0
33.0
-1.5
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
32.0
Cyclical component (RHS)
Cyclically-adjusted tax revenues
Tax revenues
European Commission
30
Automatic stabilizers and asset booms. The case of Spain
…but probably just reflecting a significant divergence between national
accounts and ‘actual’ tax bases, especially in indirect and
corporate taxes
103
TAX BASES FOR INDIRECT TAXES
TAX BASES FOR CORPORATE TAXES
350
800
101
300
700
200
93
150
91
100
89
87
50
600
Index 1991=100
95
Index 1980=100
250
97
500
400
300
200
100
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
20
08
Index 1980=100
99
0
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Private consumption (%GDP)
Private consumption and dw ellings (%GDP)
Dw ellings (%GDP)( (rhs)
CORPORATE PROFITS
NET OPERATING SURPLUS
Source: AMECO and own calculations
European Commission
31
Automatic stabilizers and asset booms. The case of Spain
which led to large composition effects
Decomposing changes of indirect taxes and selected
categories of indirect taxes (% of GDP)
5.0
3.5
4.0
%of 1991 and 2006 GDP respectively
4.0
3.0
2.5
in % of 2006 GDP
Decomposing changes of direct taxes and selected categories of direct taxes (% of GDP)
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
-1.0
-2.0
-0.5
-3.0
-1.0
1982-1991
Indirect taxes 82-91
Indirect taxes 95-07
VAT Housing 95-07
Other VAT 95-07
1995-2007
Composition
Composition
Others
Personal 95-07
Corporate 95-07
Other 95-07
Others
Discretionary
Discretionary
European Commission
32
Automatic stabilizers and asset booms. The case of Spain
… explaining between 2/3 and ¾ of the accumulated increase in tax
revenues
% GDP
Estimations of excess collection associated with the composition effect
6.0
5.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
4.4
3.0
5.0
3.6
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Estimation by econometric model
Observed changes
∆REVt = d0 + α 1(REV – a - β GDP - t TREND)t-1+ δ1 ∆GDPt + δ2 ∆GDPt-1 +
δ1 ∆(HOUSE/GDP)t-2 + δ2 ∆(MGVA/GDP)t + g1 I1t + … + gm Imt + εt (1)
European Commission
33
Automatic stabilizers and asset booms. The case of Spain
Enough fiscal consolidation in good times?
40
6
39
4
38
37
2
35
0
% GDP
% GDP
36
34
-2
33
32
-4
31
30
-6
1995
1997
1999
CA tax revenues (lhs)
2001
2003
CA balance (rhs)
2005
2007
Interest Payment (rhs)
European Commission
34
Automatic stabilizers and asset booms. The case of Spain
A sustainable fiscal expansion?
PUBLIC DEFICIT AND DEBT
65
5
3
60%
60
1
55
-1
50
-3%
-3
45
-5
40
-7
35
-9
forecast
-11
2006
2007
2008
Public surplus/deficit (% GDP, lhs)
2009
30
2010
Public debt (% GDP, rhs)
European Commission
35
References
Andrés, J. R. Domenech and A. Fatás, 2004, The Stabilising Role of Government Size, ISEAD, 2004/44/EPS
Artis, M. J. and Buti, M., 2000, « Close to balance or in surplus » -A policy maker’s guide to the implementation of
the Stability and Growth Pact, Journal of Common Market Studies, 38(4), 563-592.
Blanchard, O., 2000, Commentary, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review, 6(1), 69-74.
Brunila, A., M. Buti and J. in’t Veld, 2001, Fiscal policy in Europe: how effective are automatic stabilisers?,
European Economy, Economic Papers, N° 177.
Buti, M., W. Roeger, J. in’t Veld, 2001, Stabilising output and inflation: Policy conflicts and coordination under a
stability pact, Journal of Common Market Studies, 39, 801-828.
Buti, M. C. Martinez-Mongay, K. Sekkat and P. van den Noord, 2003, Automatic Fiscal Stabilisers in EMU: A
Conflict between Efficiency and Stabilisation, SESifo Economic Studies, VoL. 49, 123-140. (see also OECD
Ecocomics Department Working Papers, N° 335).
Debrun, X., J. Pisani-Ferry and A. Sapir, 2008, Government size and output volatility: Should we forsake
automatic stabilisation? European Economy Economic Papers N° 316.
Gali, J., 1994, Government size and macroeconomic stability, European Economy Review, 38, 117-132.
Fatás, A. and I. Mihov, 2001, Government size and automatic stabilisers, Journal of International Economics, 55,
3-28.
Martinez-Mongay, C. and K. Sekkat, 2005, Progressive Taxation, Macroeconomic Stabilization and Efficiency in
Europe, European Economy Economic Papers, N° 233
Martinez-Mongay, C. J. L. Maza Lasierra and J. Yaniz Igal, 2007, Asset Booms and Tax receipts: The case of
Spain, 1995-2006.
Roeger, W. and J. in’t Veld, 2009, Fiscal Policy with Credit Constrained Households, European Economy
Economic Papers, N° 357.
European Commission
36