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Results of the 2005 debt relief agreement between the Paris Club and Nigeria An evaluation conducted by ECORYS/OPM in 2010/11 for IOB Presentation by Geske Dijkstra, team leader (Erasmus University Rotterdam and IOB) Methodology: Theory-based Stock Inputs Flow US$ 18 billion cancellation and US$ 12 billion payment Conditionality Conditions for policy and governance Outputs Reduction in debt stock Reduction in debt service Policy change Outcomes Creditworthiness FDI, private investment Government investment Investment, MDGs, etc. Impact Economic growth Debt stock in US$ billion, by creditor 35 30 25 20 multilateral bilateral private 15 10 5 19 78 19 80 19 82 19 84 19 86 19 88 19 90 19 92 19 94 19 96 19 98 20 00 20 02 20 04 20 06 20 08 0 The 2005 agreement with the Paris Club • 1999: President Obasanjo; promise UK, US.. • Second term Obasanjo 2003: policy changes • The 2005 agreement: – Nigeria paid arrears plus buyback, US$ 12 billion – Paris Club cancelled US$ 18 billion, in 2 phases – Conditions: • IMF Policy Support Instrument (PSI) • Virtual Poverty Fund (VPF) Outputs: Stock and flow effects • Most likely counterfactual: US$ 1 billion paid out of US$ 3 billion due (2005) → flow effect still negative by end 2009, positive only by 2016 → stock effect positive External debt stock in US$ billion, actual and counterfactual 60 Counterfactual debt stock 50 Actual debt stock 40 Difference = stock effect (output) 30 0 20 10 0 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Conditionality effect • Very effective before 2005 – – – – Debt management Macro-economic policies Anti-corruption policies Improved poverty reduction policies • To some extent also after 2005 – PSI with strict fiscal and monetary targets – Virtual Poverty Fund was established • Money: US$ 750 million annually, 75% spent • Institutional effect: planning, implementation, M&E 4. Outcomes • Debt sustainability – External debt very sustainable – Domestic debt increased • Macroeconomic stability – Lower inflation – Cushioning 2009 crisis • Creditworthiness, higher FDI • Poverty reduction – Improvement in some indicators External debt sustainability ratios, actual and counterfactual, in % 2004 2009 Threshold NPV debt/GDP 40 2 40 NPV debt/Exports 90 7 150 NPV debt/Revenues 116 10 250 Debt service/Exports 8 1 15 Debt service/Revenues 13 6 25 NPV debt/GDP 31 40 NPV debt/Exports 98 150 NPV debt/Revenues 138 250 Debt service/Exports 9 15 Debt service/Revenues 13 25 Some poverty indicators 2003 2008 Poverty headcount (’04) 52 Primary enrolment (’04 and ‘08) Ratio girls to boys in primary education (’04 and ‘08) 81 89 81 85 Infant mortality 100 75 U5 mortality 201 157 36 39 800 545 Skilled birth attendance Maternal mortality 5. Impact and conclusions • Positive outcomes → debt relief had some impact on economic growth • Indirect effect on income poverty reduction – Via high agricultural growth • Sustainability? • Better result than in other studies: – Stock fully eliminated – Pre-conditions effective Growth rates, in % 30 GDP 25 GDP oil 20 Agriculture 15 10 5 0 -5 -10 -15 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009