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January 2011
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Tet Offensive captured flag of Viet Cong unit
attacking Saigon
Creating Chaos: Lawrence of Arabia and the 1916 Arab Revolt
Posted By E Howard On 8/10/2010 In MHQ
The 1916-1918 Arab Revolt was often carried out by mounted Arab tribesmen, who knew the land
intimately and were excellent marksmen (Library of Congress).
This 600-mile, weeks-long
trek was through terrain so
inhospitable even the Bedouin
called it al-Houl (the Terror).
T. E. Lawrence biographer
Michael Asher called it 'one of
the most daring raids ever
attempted in the annals of
war.' The train filled with
Ottoman Empire soldiers and
civilians chugged over a
bridge in the Arabian desert.
A few yards away a British
officer in Bedouin robes
raised his hand toward
Salem, an Arab tribal warrior gripping the plunger of a detonator box. As the train steamed ahead, the
officer dropped his hand and Salem slammed down the plunger. A cloud of sand and smoke blasted a
hundred feet into the sky as sizzling chunks of iron and seared body parts tumbled through the air. The
train crashed into a gorge, followed by an eerie silence. The officer and Arab tribesmen—wielding swords
or firing rifles—dashed toward the smoldering train cars. Within a few minutes the fighting was over, the
dead and the wreck were looted, and the raiding party melted back into the desert. It was summer 1917,
and the Arab Revolt was in full swing.
The revolt, one of the most dramatic episodes of the 20th century, was a seminal moment in the history
of the modern Middle East, the touchstone of all future regional conflicts. Advised by liaison officer T. E.
Lawrence—"Lawrence of Arabia"—Arab troops would play a vital role in the Allied victory over the Ottoman
Empire in World War I. The Arab Revolt of 1916–1918 also saw the development of guerrilla tactics and
strategies of modern desert warfare. And the political intrigues surrounding the revolt and its aftermath
were as significant as the fighting, for Great Britain and France's myopic attempts at nation building
planted the seeds of the troubles that plague the region to this day: wars, authoritarian governments,
coups, the rise of militant Islam, and the enduring conflict between Israelis and Palestinians.
None of today's states in the region existed until the 1920s. Before that, the Middle East was part of the
Ottoman Empire, which included Slavs, Greeks, Turks, Arabs, Berbers, Kurds, and Armenians, as well as
Muslims, Jews, and Christians. Like all great empires, the Ottoman Empire was successful because for the
most part its leaders let their subjects live as they chose.
In the years before World War I, however, the empire had shrunk to what is now known as Turkey, the
Middle East, and much of the Arabian coastline. The Ottomans abandoned their successful multicultural
formula and instituted a "Turkification" policy that made Turkish the official language in schools, the army,
and government. The Arabs—who made up about 60 percent of the empire's roughly 25 million subjects—
and other non-Turkish-speaking groups were furious. The Arabs formed secret nationalist societies and
contacted Sherif (a title bestowed on descendants of the prophet Muhammad) Hussein ibn Ali, emir
(prince) of Mecca in the Hejaz, the western strip of the Arabian Peninsula. Hussein sent one of his four
sons, Abdullah, to link up with Arab nationalists in Syria, and then to Cairo to determine whether the
British might aid an Arab uprising. Britain was reluctant to step in, but when World War I broke out in
August 1914, it changed its tune. The Ottomans had military and economic ties with Germany and joined
the Central powers hoping to regain provinces lost earlier to Britain, France, and Russia. With Ottoman
armies marching toward the Suez Canal in the British protectorate of Egypt, Sir Henry McMahon, the
British high commissioner based in Cairo, wrote to Hussein and asked him to start a rebellion. McMahon
ambiguously promised Hussein that Britain would provide arms and money to the revolt and assist in the
creation of independent Arab states in the Fertile Crescent (present-day Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan,
and Palestine) and the Arabian Peninsula. Hussein didn't trust the British, but when the Ottomans
executed 21 Arab nationalists in 1916, he saw an Allied-supported revolt as the Arabs' only option.
He did not make the decision lightly: Ottoman forces were on the march. They had defeated the Allies on
the Gallipoli Peninsula in 1915, unsuccessfully attacked the British-held Suez Canal, and the next year
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forced an Anglo-Indian army at Kut in Mesopotamia (modern Iraq) to surrender. Meanwhile, on the
Western Front, Allied attempts to break the Germans had degraded into a bloody stalemate while the
Germans smashed Russian forces to the east. To many observers it appeared that Germany and the
Ottoman Empire were ascendant. The British needed a rebellion in the Ottoman rear.
The revolt began in 1916 with an estimated 30,000 Bedouins and other tribesmen. To assemble this army,
Hussein made deals with various families, clans, and tribes such as the Howeitat and Ruwalla. Many of
these irregulars would only fight close to home; all had to be paid. Some tribes would not fight alongside
others because of feuds. Most were capricious warriors, battling furiously when the looting was good and
the enemy weak, drifting back to their villages when they became bored. Though lacking military
discipline, the irregulars knew the land intimately and were excellent shots. They could mount a running
camel with a rifle in hand. Dashing across sharp rock on bare feet, they could travel at great speed
through terrain thought impassable by outsiders. The revolt's leaders employed the Agayl, a group of
fierce, elite warriors, as bodyguards. Arab armament was a motley assortment, ranging from swords and
muzzle-loading muskets to Mausers and Lee-Enfield rifles.
Later, these tribesmen were organized into formations commanded by Hussein's three oldest sons: the
Arab Northern Army, led by Feisal, with around 6,000 fighters; the 9,000-strong Arab Eastern Army,
under the command of Abdullah, made up of camel troops, some artillery, and a cavalry squadron; and
Ali's 9,000-man Arab Southern Army of four artillery batteries, mounted infantry, and other units. By
1918, the British were paying their Arab allies £220,000 a month in gold to fight. Attached to Feisal's force
was the 2,000-strong Regular Arab Army, or Sherifian Army, whose ranks included men from the Levant
and Mesopotamia, POWs, and Ottoman army deserters. They were disciplined soldiers, bolstered by
around 1,500 Egyptian regulars provided by Britain. The Arab army boasted artillery and machine-gun
units as well as mule and camel corps.
Opposing the Arab forces in the Hejaz was the Ottoman Fourth Army, eventually numbering 23,000 men,
commanded by Gen. Mehmed Cemal Pasha. These troops were better trained than the Arabs, and armed
with better and more sophisticated weapons. Cavalry supported them, as did Pfalz single-wing aircraft
from the Ottoman air force, later strengthened by German air force Albatrosses and other fighter planes.
Although exempt from military service, Arabs from all over the Middle East volunteered. (It is a misnomer
to refer to Ottoman forces as "the Turks.") The Ottomans initially viewed the Arab Revolt as a tribal
uprising they could easily crush. Strategically, their plan was simple: Hold all major towns; maintain
telephone and telegraph communications; and keep the 700-mile-Hejaz Railway, running from Medina to
Istanbul, open for transporting supplies and reinforcements. Well-armed garrisons in the important towns
of Medina and Mecca provided additional protection. More troops were stationed in Ta'if to the southeast.
The Arab plan was even simpler: kick the Ottomans out of Arabia. More-visionary Arabian leaders
dreamed of leading their armies north to take Jerusalem, Baghdad, and Damascus, returning these cities
to Arab rule. But without a regular army and heavy artillery, the Arab forces could not take the powerful
Ottomans head-on.
clan's flag was unfurled. The revolt had officially begun.
The landscape for this conflict was
majestically harsh: seas of drifting sand
cresting into yellow dunes; vast
expanses of razor-sharp flint;
thornbushes dotting the plains; deep
valleys gashing the earth; and jagged,
pink-hued rock towers soaring 400 feet
high. This bleak beauty was dappled by
sudden shimmering spots of green—
high grasslands and lush oases packed
with date trees whose fronds draped
over wells of delicious spring water. But
everything baked under the
omnipresent blistering sun;
temperatures often reached 120
degrees Fahrenheit. Early in the
morning of June 10, 1916, just as the
call to prayer trailed off over the
rooftops of Mecca, Sherif Hussein
pointed a rifle out of a window of his
home and fired. Hussein's Hashemite
3
The Arabs seized the initiative, and their well-planned and sustained surprise attack forced 1,500 Ottoman
troops in Mecca to surrender on June 13. The Royal Navy seaplane carrier Ben-My-Chree offloaded
Egyptian artillery to give punch to the next Arab attack, which would be launched against the nearby Red
Sea port of Jeddah. In this combined-force battle, seaplanes bombed Ottoman positions, and the British
cruisers Hardinge and Fox pounded the enemy as tribal forces harried the defenders from inland. The
Ottoman surrender followed on the 16th. In late July, Arab forces overran two more Red Sea ports,
Rabegh and Yanbu. To crown these opening victories, Abdullah and 5,000 men in June laid siege to 3,000
Ottoman troops at Ta'if, in the mountains southeast of Mecca, capturing them in late September.
Throughout the revolt, Arab losses are unknown. But these operations were to the tribesmen's liking:
swift, brief, not costly in lives—and they were getting paid and fed for their efforts.
The greatest danger to the revolt lay at Medina, where a garrison of 12,000 troops was well positioned to
strike at the Arabs' rear and flanks. On June 5, Hussein's sons Ali and Feisal had led an attack on the city,
also hitting the Hejaz Railway. They were driven off, however, when the tribesmen, who had never
experienced artillery and machine-gun fire, fled in terror. Gen. Hamid Fakhreddin "Fakhri" Pasha,
commander of the Ottoman force, counterattacked with about two brigades, forcing the Arabs to split their
forces and flee. The failure sapped the revolt's momentum, and it stalled.
Nevertheless, Arab fighters kept arriving at Jeddah, site of the second victory. To provide logistical and
political advice to the Arabs, the British established a military mission there codenamed Hedgehog. The
French mission, operating out of Egypt, consisted of cavalry, artillery, and machine-gun and engineering
units, numbering about 1,170 men. Sensitive to offending their allies with non-Muslim troops, the French
sent North African soldiers, while the British deployed Egyptian and Indian fighters.
British equipment included howitzers, mountain guns, Lewis machine guns, explosives, and 4,000 rifles.
Later the British would supply Stokes mortars and Ford, Rolls-Royce, and Talbot armored cars, each
Talbot sporting a 10-pounder gun. In the air, the Royal Flying Corps initially sent B.E.2 two-seaters and
later the superb Bristol F.2B fighter-bomber and a Handley Page bomber. The Royal Navy would also play
vital transport and offensive roles. The British mission operated closely with Feisal's Northern Army.
Officers enthusiastically led raiding parties and provided demolition expertise. Chief among them was
Capt. Thomas Edward Lawrence.
An Oxford-educated historian, Lawrence had traveled throughout the Middle East before the war. He
spoke Arabic, loved the Arab people, and passionately embraced their dreams of freedom. When the
revolt broke out, Lawrence was a staff officer in the Military Intelligence Department in Cairo. In October
1916, he was sent to Arabia to evaluate the revolt's progress and leadership, which was principally Sherif
Hussein's four sons. As Lawrence later wrote in his remarkable account of the campaign, Seven Pillars of
Wisdom, "I found Abdulla too clever, Ali too clean, Zeid too cool." Then he met the 31-year-old Feisal, who
was "the leader with the necessary fire." It was the beginning of a long friendship based on trust, warmth,
and a shared vision to lead the revolt into Syria. Assigned as Feisal's liaison officer, Lawrence would
blossom into an intrepid guerrilla fighter, operational tactician, and strategic visionary. So closely did he
empathize with the Arabs that Feisal soon presented him with the silken robes of a Bedouin leader, which
had the advantage of being more comfortable than a British uniform for camel riding and desert fighting.
Meanwhile Fakhri Pasha's Ottoman troops had swelled to 12 battalions and were pursuing the Arabs south
of Medina. On December 1, Fakhri and three brigades advanced to recapture Yanbu, defended by 1,500
Arabs. At that moment, HMS Dufferin, the M.31 monitor, and HMS Raven, a seaplane carrier, arrived
offshore and battered the advancing Ottomans, effectively halting them in mid-December. Afterward,
things deteriorated for the Ottomans. With his supply lines stretched thin and continually attacked by the
Bedouins, Fakhri turned south to retake the port of Rabegh. But the Royal Navy dogged his advance down
the coast, and he was harassed by seaplanes and Arab tribesmen. Halting to plot his next move, Fakhri
received the devastating news that Abdullah and his Eastern Army had captured an Ottoman force, along
with £20,000 in gold, and were advancing on the Red Sea port of Wejh. The Ottomans had lost
momentum and would spend the rest of the war reacting to Arab moves.
Behind the scenes, imperial politics were at work. In 1915 and 1916, Sir Mark Sykes, a key British adviser
on the Middle East, and French diplomat François Georges Picot secretly negotiated apportioning the
region after the war. Under terms of the resulting Sykes-Picot Agreement of May 1916, Britain was to
control Mesopotamia, Transjordan (Jordan), and Palestine. The French would rule Lebanon, Syria, and
Cilicia, while the Russians would receive Kurdish and Armenian lands to the northeast. An international
body would govern Jerusalem. Arabia was, in the words of historian David Murphy, to receive only "a
certain level of independence."
4
Naturally, this deal was not revealed to the Arabs. But in November 1917, the Arabs found other cause for
concern in a letter from Lord Arthur James Balfour, Britain's foreign secretary, to Lord Lionel Walter
Rothschild, a leader of the Zionist Federation, which was published in the Times of London. What became
known as the Balfour Declaration stated: "His Majesty's Government view with favor the establishment in
Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people…it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done
which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine."
In the words of historians Arthur Goldschmidt and Lawrence Davidson, "the British government would
control Palestine after the war with a commitment to build the Jewish national home there," while
somehow protecting the rights of the "93 percent of [Palestine's] inhabitants, Muslim and Christian, who
spoke Arabic and dreaded being cut off from other Arabs." Moreover, in the 1918 Declaration to the Seven
(a document Henry McMahon created in response to demands by a group of prominent Syrian
nationalists), the British agreed that Arabs should govern lands that had been free before the war as well
as lands they had liberated, and that the government "would be based principally on consent of those
governed."
Thus, the great powers, particularly Britain, were making contradictory promises to their erstwhile allies
and surreptitiously carving up lands they had
not even conquered—deals that went against
the promises McMahon made to Hussein in their
1915–1916 correspondence. But the war still
had to be won. On January 24, after a single
day of battle, an Anglo-Arab force seized the
port city of Wejh, which became the Arabs'
logistical and operational base. As the Arabs
gathered victories and adherents, British
general Sir Archibald Murray realized that the
Arabs could provide support for his efforts in
the Sinai to secure the Suez Canal and push
the Ottomans out of Gaza. The Arabs' task:
keep Fakhri's troops bottled in Medina and
sabotage the Hejaz Railway.
Ottoman officers in Jerusalem conduct the last
review of troops in that city before it was captured by Arabs and their allies in late 1917 (Library of
Congress).
In 1917, "line smashing"—as it was called—intensified. Raiding parties of 12 to 200 men were led by Arab,
French, and British officers. After packing camels with explosives and sometimes a Lewis machine gun or a
Stokes mortar, they journeyed for a week or more into the desert. The men deployed exploder boxes as
well as contact and electric mines. "Tulip mines" were popular because they twisted the rails into tangled
ribbons of steel, which Ottoman engineers then had to replace or painstakingly repair. The raiding parties
also blew up bridges, water towers, guns, station buildings, and telephone poles because, Lawrence
explained, this was "more profitable to us than the death of a Turk."
For some attacks, the Arabs spent hours laying 300 to 500 charges over up to five miles of line. This was
stressful work done while on the lookout for spies and Ottoman patrols and with inexperienced tribesmen
as helpers. Then there was the long wait, sometimes overnight, for a train to appear. After one close call,
British lieutenant Stuart Newcombe returned to Egypt, his nerves shot. Nevertheless, as Col. Pierce Joyce
reported, "the noise of the dynamite going was something grand and it is always satisfactory finding one
is breaking things."
Firefights often followed the explosion, as Arabs sniped at the Ottomans on the trains from rock ledges or
sand dunes. Sometimes the trains contained high-ranking officers or money-laden safes. Sometimes they
were filled with women and the wounded. Amid Bedouin whoops of victory, the wreck and the dead were
plundered. The wounded were left to die because the raiders had no medics and no means of transporting
them. It was a thrilling but gory business. "I'm not going to last out this game much longer," Lawrence
wrote in a letter home. "Nerves going and temper wearing thin….This killing and killing of Turks is
horrible." While hit-and-run tactics were traditional for the Bedouins, Lawrence formalized them into a
theory of guerrilla warfare. "Ours should be a war of detachment," he reasoned. "We were to contain the
enemy by the silent threat of a vast unknown desert, not disclosing ourselves till we attacked…and
develop a habit of never engaging the enemy."
5
The revolt's leaders remained focused on the larger strategic goal: push north and link up with tribes and
leaders in Syria and Mesopotamia. This, however, would require a new operational port. While feverish
from dysentery, Lawrence conceived a scheme to take the Red Sea port of Aqaba, which is today part of
Jordan. He declined to attack from the water, where Aqaba was defended by heavy guns. Rather, his bold
plan called for a force to emerge from the Nefudh Desert, which the Ottomans would never expect. The
initial party of Lawrence and 17 Agayl warriors set out from Wejh on May 10, 1917. The men had £20,000
to recruit new tribesmen, and along the way, their numbers swelled to about 700 fighters. This 600-mile,
weeks-long trek was through terrain so inhospitable even the Bedouin called it al-Houl (the Terror).
Lawrence biographer Michael Asher called it "one of the most daring raids ever attempted in the annals of
war." The Arabs launched their assault from the northeast, sweeping up the outlying Ottoman forces for
the loss of only two tribesmen by July 5. The next day the Arabs, now some 2,500 men, entered Aqaba
without a shot, the garrison having scurried away. Gaunt, filthy, and wearing his Bedouin robes, Lawrence
crossed the Sinai to Cairo to inform the new British commander in chief, Gen. Edmund Allenby, of this
stunning victory. As a reward, the Arabs received an additional payment of £16,000, and Lawrence was
promoted to major.
With the fall of Aqaba, the war in the Hejaz was essentially over. But amid these successes, great-power
politics inserted themselves. "The occupation of Aqaba by Arab troops," Col. Gilbert Clayton had earlier
written to Lawrence, "might well result in the Arabs claiming that place hereafter. It is thus essential that
Aqaba should remain in British hands after the war." Such intrigues tormented Lawrence, who wrote, "I
had to join the conspiracy…. I was continually and bitterly ashamed." He was serving with men who were
fighting for their freedom. In desperation, he scribbled in his diary: "Clayton…we are calling them to fight
for us on a lie, and I can't stand it."
After the Russian Revolution in November 1917, the tsar's secret treaties, including the Sykes-Picot
Agreement, were published, sparking tension and mistrust between the Arabs and their allies. Lawrence
became reckless in his bravery, as if to expunge his feelings of guilt. "I vowed to make the Arab Revolt
the engine of its own success" he wrote, "to lead it so madly in the final victory that expedience should
counsel to the Powers a fair settlement of the Arabs' moral claims." The Arabs fought on. To support his
upcoming offensive in Gaza, General Allenby asked the Arabs to destroy bridges and rail lines. It was
while sabotaging other sections of rail near Deraa, about 60 miles south of Damascus that Lawrence was
captured and sexually abused. He was released because his captors mistook him for a light-skinned
Circassian, but the episode scarred Lawrence for life. Meanwhile, Allenby's offensive pushed the Ottomans
out of Gaza and toward Jerusalem. Feisal's Arab Northern Army provided inestimable diversionary
support, assisted by armored cars armed with machine guns and cannons as well as a battery of French
mountain artillery. When Jerusalem fell on December 11, there was rejoicing in the Allied camp. For the
Arabs it meant that one of Islam's most treasured sites was theirs.
Politically, the Arabs' prospects brightened when American president Woodrow Wilson in a January 1918
speech enunciated "Fourteen Points" for the postwar world order. The 12th point demanded sovereignty
for the Turks but that the "other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an
undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development." That
thrilled the Arabs, who felt they had a friend in America, untainted by colonial scheming. Meanwhile,
Allenby's success in Palestine was fully exploited. Feisal's Arab Northern Army was assigned a key role:
harass the Ottoman forces east of the Jordan River, then push north to Damascus and beyond. Feisal
assembled a force of tribesmen, supported by Indian Gurkhas, the Egyptian Camel Corps, and Algerian
artillery, in all about 1,000 fighters. They blew up railway lines, attacked station houses, and destroyed
bridges.
On September 19, at Megiddo, British forces smashed into the 60-mile Ottoman-German line north of
Jerusalem, ripping open a gap through which Australian cavalry poured. By the 24th, nearly 40,000
Ottoman soldiers had been captured; desertions were running at about 1,100 a month. The war was now
entering a desperate stage. At the village of Tafas near Damascus, Lawrence and his men discovered that
Ottoman and German soldiers had massacred several hundred Arab women and children. Finding
wounded enemy prisoners at Deraa, the enraged Arab tribesmen "murdered in cold blood every Turk they
came across," one witness reported.
The once distant dream of taking Damascus was now reality. Two Australian cavalry divisions raced north
of the Sea of Galilee, other units hooking up with the Arab Northern Army at Deraa. The Australians
neared the city while roughly 1,500 Arab irregulars supported by the Regular Arab Army and British
cavalry destroyed the remnants of the Ottoman Fourth Army. At long last, on October 1 Feisal and his
tribesmen, with Lawrence driving Blue Mist, his Rolls-Royce, entered Damascus, along with sections of
British cavalry. "Damascus went mad with joy," Lawrence recalled. "The men tossed up their tarbushes to
cheer, the women tore off their veils. Householders threw flowers, hangings, carpets into the road before
6
us: their wives leaned, screaming with laughter, through the lattices and splashed us with bath-dippers of
scent." For the first time in centuries, the Arabs were free of Ottoman rule. Acting quickly, Feisal set up a
government. With the military conflict nearing its end, the political war was intensifying. Lawrence—who
was, he recalled, "a very sick man: almost at breaking point"—was granted a leave. Promoted to colonel,
he would soon be back in the Middle East.
Ottoman administrative control essentially collapsed. Arabs everywhere were in open revolt. By midSeptember, 75,000 enemy soldiers—including 3,400 Austrians and Germans—were taken prisoner.
Indeed, by now the revolt had produced 15,000 Ottoman casualties (including those caused by illness)
and had tied down between 23,000 and 30,000 enemy troops. In May alone, Arab raids had destroyed 25
bridges. As the Ottoman forces reeled back to their Turkish homeland, Aleppo in northern Syria fell to
Arab and British forces. On October 30 the Ottoman Empire was granted an end to hostilities, its ally
Germany following suit on November 11. Fakhri Pasha, however, did not surrender the Medina garrison
until January 1919, the last holdout of a lost empire.
With the war over it was time to mourn the dead, care for the wounded and, for the victors, divide the
spoils. Feisal, Lawrence, and Arab leaders attended the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, expecting to
enjoy the fruits of their sacrifices and feats. Instead, Feisal discovered his name had been omitted from
the official list of delegates. But in meetings and speeches he made his presence felt. "The Arabs have
long enough suffered under foreign domination," Feisal proclaimed, resplendent in robes of white silk and
gold. "The hour has at last struck when we are to come into our own again."
President Wilson, meeting the Arab leader, said, "Listening to the emir, I think to hear the voice of
liberty." France, Great Britain, the United States, and Italy dominated negotiations. The French, who had
suffered grievously in the war, wanted to punish Germany and the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian
empires. The British acquiesced in this. All three empires disappeared, and soon the conquerors had sown
the seeds of modern discontent. Feisal's claims were brushed aside. The French and British resented
Wilsonian idealism about the end of imperialism. "I have returned," gloated British prime minister Lloyd
George with flippant arrogance after signing the Treaty of Versailles, "with a pocket full of sovereigns in
the shape of the German Colonies, Mesopotamia, etc.," giving little thought to future world security or
peace.
At the San Remo Conference in 1920, France and Britain sliced up the Middle East, drawing sometimes
ruler-straight borders, disregarding ethnic, linguistic, and religious affiliations as they conjured up new
countries. They called these states "mandates" instead of what they really were: colonies. The French
army entered Syria and drove Feisal and his men out of Damascus in July 1920. Wishing to divide and rule
this region more easily, imperial draftsmen expanded Lebanon into an explosive hodgepodge of ethnicities
and religious groups. Abdullah, who had once dreamed of ruling Damascus, occupied Amman in what is
now Jordan with 500 warriors, and threatened war against the
French. It appeared that the war would continue in the Middle East,
which neither Britain nor France could afford. Winston Churchill,
Britain's colonial secretary, invited Lawrence and other experts to a
conference in Cairo in March 1919. The cheapest way for the British
to wash their hands of this business was a Hashemite solution
rewarding Feisal and Abdullah with kingdoms fabricated from "lines
drawn on an empty map," as historian David Fromkin describes.
Churchill and his staff renamed Mesopotamia as Iraq, apparently
based on what some Arab tribes called this region, derived from
Uruk, the name of an ancient Sumerian city. Ignoring the orderly
Ottoman system's divisions, they crammed Christian, Jewish,
Muslim, Arab, and Kurdish groups into Iraq's artificial borders.
Moreover, its tip was snipped off, made into Kuwait, and the tribe most willing to work with the British
found itself elevated to kings. The British then rigged Iraqi "elections" and Feisal was proclaimed king. To
his credit, Feisal pressured his British overlords for independence, behavior they found ungrateful.
Abdullah was made king of Transjordan, which outraged Zionists, who believed this land had been
promised to them. Regarding Palestine, Feisal and Lawrence made carefully worded public statements
about its future. Privately, they were convinced that there would be "chronic unrest, and sooner or later
civil war in Palestine." The Arabian delegation to the Paris Peace Conference in early 1919 included Emir
Feisal Hussein (Front, center) and an already disillusioned Lawrence (third from right). He would use his
fame to launch a campaign to force Britain to honor its wartime pledges to restore Arab rule (National
Archives). Unsurprisingly, throughout the 1920s and '30s Middle Easterners rebelled. As the cost of this
fighting rose, the British and French hastily gave their mandates independence, although with treaties
highly favorable to their own interests. These states have known cycles of war, revolution, political
7
repression, and social conflict ever since. Although Abdullah's descendants still rule in Jordan, Feisal's line
was extinguished in a coup after his death.
Lawrence's deeds were transformed, with his help, into the legend of "Lawrence of Arabia." He used his
fame to launch a press campaign to compel Britain to honor its wartime pledges. "Our government [in
Iraq]," he charged in a letter to the Sunday Times, "is worse than the old Turkish system." These barbs hit
home but Lawrence spent the rest of his life trying to escape the media monster he had created to achieve
his political aims. The psychic cost to him was immense, producing name changes, bouts of depression,
and ritual beatings administered by others to exorcise, perhaps, "some of the evil of my tale," as he
wrote.
In military terms, the Arab Revolt was a harbinger of modern warfare, particularly in the Middle East:
operations combining air, land, and sea forces; fast-moving armor supported by mobile troops; and
targeted strikes focusing not just on destroying the enemy but also on immobilizing him by severing
communication and supply lines, often utilizing powerful improvised explosives. War in the desert, like
war at sea, takes place over a vast, often inhospitable landscape, where flanks can be turned indefinitely;
intelligence and agility are essential. Furthermore, in modern warfare as in the revolt, leaders must have
military and political skills. Perhaps most important, as successive invaders have learned, while it is
relatively easy to enter Middle Eastern countries, tribes and other groups will rise up and fight smart and
hard until the enemy withdraws, licking his bloody wounds. Thus, it is of paramount importance to win
over the tribes, for they hold the keys to ultimate victory.
Britain's and France's conflicting promises and supercilious fabrication of "states" created deep mistrust
and cynicism in Middle Easterners that persist to this day. For modern would-be state builders, the
aftermath of the Arab Revolt clearly illustrates the impossibility of outsiders attempting to create or even
"fix" inorganic states. As long as these artificial, colonial-created borders remain, there will be instability in
the Middle East. That legacy bodes ill for global security concerns as radicalized leaders—secular or
religious, governmental or terrorist—seek ways to right historical wrongs. Indeed, the struggle has already
set the stage for conflict in the 21st century, and poses one of the greatest security challenges of our
time. Saddam Hussein's 1990 invasion of Kuwait, as monstrous as it was, had historical grounds. More
chilling, Osama bin Laden has specifically blamed the Sykes-Picot Agreement for breaking "the Islamic
world into fragments." MHQ
Battle of San Juan (1625) or how I could had been Dutch
The Netherlands was a world military and commercial power by 1625, competing in the Caribbean with the
British. The Dutch wanted to establish a military stronghold in the area, and dispatched Captain Balduino
Enrico (Boudewijn Hendricksz) to capture Puerto Rico. On September 24, 1625, Enrico arrived at the coast
of San Juan with 17 ships and 2,000 men. Enrico sent a message to the governor of Puerto Rico, Juan de
Haros, ordering him to surrender the island. De Haros refused, he was an experienced military man and
expected an attack in the section known as Boqueron. He therefore had that area fortified. However, the
Dutch took another route and landed in La Puntilla.
De Haro realized that an invasion was inevitable and ordered Captain Juan de Amezquita plus 300 men to
defend the island from El Morro Castle and then had the city of San Juan evacuated. He also had former
governor Juan de Vargas organize an armed resistance in the interior of the island. On September 25 Enrico
attacked San Juan, besieging El Morro Castle and La Fortaleza (the Governor's Mansion). He invaded the
capital city and set up his headquarters in La Fortaleza. The Dutch were counterattacked by the civilian
militia on land and by the cannons of the Spanish troops in El Morro Castle. The land battle left 60 Dutch
soldiers dead and Enrico with a sword wound to his neck which he received from the hands of Amezquita.
The Dutch ships at sea were boarded by Puerto Ricans who defeated those aboard. After a long battle, the
Spanish soldiers and volunteers of the city's militia were able to defend the city from the attack and save the
island from an invasion. On October 21, Enrico set La Fortaleza and the city ablaze. Captains Amezquita
and Andre Botello decided to put a stop to the destruction and led 200 men in an attack against the enemy's
front and rear guard. They drove Enrico and his men from their trenches and into the ocean in their haste to
reach their ships. Enrico upon his retreat would leave behind him one of his largest ships, stranded, and
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over 400 dead. He then tried to invade the island by attacking the town of Aguada. He was again defeated
by the local militia and abandoned the idea of invading Puerto Rico.
Seventeenth-century Spanish painting commemorating Enrico's defeat at San Juan de Puerto Rico
by Eugenio Caxés, Museo del Prado
The Battle of San Juan was fought on 29 September
1625, and was an engagement of the Eighty Years' War. A
Dutch expedition commanded by Boudewijn Hendricksz
failed to seize after several months the island of Puerto
Rico from Spain. Seventeen Dutch ships put sail to San
Juan de Puerto Rico, whose Spanish governor—naval and
military veteran Juan de Haro—has been in office less
than a month. Nevertheless, he prepares to receive the
enemy as best he can, sending his predecessor, Juan de
Vargas, to nearby Boquerón with militia to hinder any
landings in Escambrón Inlet.
Area where the "Battle of San Juan of 1625" took place
Yet Hendricksz implements a much bolder plan. At 1:00 P.M. the next day the entire Dutch fleet sails
directly into San Juan’s harbor:Roode Leeuw,Witte Leeuw, Leyden, Blauwe Leeuw, Goude Valck, Utrecht,
Nieuw Nederlandt, Hoop van Dordrecht, Kleyne Tijger, Hoorn, Medemblik, Gouden Molen, Vlissingen,
West Kappel, Goude Sonne, Koningin Hester, and Jonas. They exchange shots with the harbor castle,
inflicting superficial damage and slaying four Spaniards while gaining a safe anchorage within the
roadstead off Puntilla Point, beyond range of de Haro’s artillery. However, shoals prevent an immediate
disembarkation, allowing Spanish noncombatants to flee inland while the governor marshals his slender
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strength within San Felipe del Morro citadel. Six additional bronze 12-pounders are installed in its
embrasures, 330 men gathering inside (220 effectives, but with abundant supplies).
On 26 September,Hendricksz leads 700–800 men ashore and occupies the empty city plus its smaller
Cañuela Fortress two days later; the main citadel proves impossible to storm, so the Dutch begin digging
saplines and installing a six-gun battery atop Calvario Heights by 29 September. At 9:00 A.M. the next day
Hendricksz calls upon de Haro to surrender but is rejected, so action resumes. Capt. Jan Jasperz de Laet of
West Kappel exits on 1 October to chase away a Spanish ship arriving with supplies, and on the night of
Friday,3–4 October, the Spaniards sally out of their citadel in two companies of 40 men apiece under
Capts. Sebastián de Avila and Andrés Botello, accomplishing little. They enjoy better fortune at noon on 5
October, when 50 men under Capt. Juan de Amézquita y Quixano destroy the advance Dutch works, killing
a captain, a sergeant, and eight sappers.Guerrillas from the interior under Capt. Andrés Vázquez Botello de
Carrera also begin plaguing the besiegers. On the night of 5 October they slay Nieuw Nederlandt’s captain
and a 20-man boat party in the harbor; ten days later they destroy a similar force up Bayamón River.
By 16 October the guerrillas have grown so bold as to reconquer Cañuela Fortress, using two launches and
30 men to kill two of its Dutch occupiers, capturing another 14. Faced with this increased pressure,
Hendricksz finds himself trapped inside the harbor. Once more he calls upon de Haro to capitulate on 21
October, threatening to burn the city, but he is rebuffed. San Juan is therefore put to the torch, and the
Dutch reembark at 10:00 A.M. the next day, hotly pursued by Puerto Rican units.The invaders must now
run the gauntlet of Spanish artillery in order to escape, hesitating for a full fortnight before finally dashing
past on 2 November.
The 30-gun, 450-ton Medemblik runs aground and is left behind for the exultant Spanish, Juan de
Amézquita boarding and extinguishing the slow fuse that is burning toward its magazine. De Haro is unable
to savor the victory because a cannon explodes near him during these final exchanges, spraying him with
two dozen fragments and eventually causing his death.Hendricksz, meanwhile, retires into San Francisco
Bay for a month to recover from the setback. In addition to Medemblik, numerous other Dutch vessels have
sustained damage, and 200 men have perished (as opposed to 17 Spanish fatalities during the siege).
Hendricksz nonetheless detaches his five best vessels on a privateering cruise toward Santo Domingo
before attempting to lead his entire fleet west again in late November. Driven back by storms, he cruises
south toward Margarita (Venezuela), despite advance warnings preceding him.
Juan de Amezquita. Captain Juan de Amezquita (born c. 1595, birth name: Juan de
Amézquita y Quijano), was a Puerto Rican soldier who defended Puerto Rico from an
invasion by the Dutch in 1625 in San Felipe del Morro Castle. He fought and
wounded Captain Balduino Enrico (Boudewijn Hendricksz) who was ordered by the
Dutch Government to capture Puerto Rico.
Amezquita was born and raised in the
town of San Sebastián, when the island was a Spanish colony. He joined the Puerto
Rican Militia and after he was promoted to the rank of Captain, was assigned to
protect and defend the capital city of San Juan. Captain Amezquita received 1,000
ducats (gold coins), and in 1632 was appointed Governor of Cuba and given
command of the Spanish forces in Santiago de Cuba. On March 15, 1635, the Dutch
forces had an invasion of Cuba in mind. The Dutch naval forces sent crew members
on a reconnaissance mission disguised as Spanish soldiers ashore. One of
Amezquita's men became suspicious and a small skirmish ensued. Under Amezquita's
command, 14 men manned their guns and attacked the Dutch crew who in turn withdrew and fled. Amezquita resigned
his position in 1636 and returned to Puerto Rico. The Spanish government honored the actions of Amezquita with a
monument on the grounds of El Morro. It is the oldest known monument to honor a Puerto Rican military hero. In the
1940s, the United States inaugurated Fort Amezquita, in Isla de Cabras. During World War II, this fort served as a
military reservation, or a "concrete gun battery" for the US Army. (Monument at El Morro, the grounds of former U.S. Army
Fort Brooke, honoring Capt. Juan de Amezquita).
The editorial opinions and articles in The Cannon Report do not represent any official position of the Michigan Company of Military
Historians and Collectors (MCMH&C) only the various neuroses of the editor. The MCMH&C is a non-partisan, non-ideological
association. All members are welcome to submit material, letters, “for the good of the company items”, etc. MEETINGS take place
the second Monday of every month at (Socializing begins at 6:00p.m. followed by business meeting and dinner 7:00p.m., and program
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