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Università Commerciale Luigi Bocconi
Econpubblica
Centre for Research on the Public Sector
WORKING PAPER SERIES
The Italian pension system in the European
context
Roberto Artoni and Alessandra Casarico
Working Paper n. 75
April 2001
www.econpubblica.uni-bocconi.it
The Italian pension system in the European context*
Roberto Artoni
Alessandra Casarico
Istituto di Economia Politica
Istituto di Economia Politica
Università Bocconi
Università Bocconi
Via Gobbi 5
Via Gobbi 5
20136 Milano, Italy
[email protected]
20136 Milano, Italy
[email protected]
This draft: April 2001
1. Introduction
The aims of this work are to discuss whether there is an anomaly in the Italian pension
system and, if there is, to investigate its causes and its influence on the future prospects of
the system and on the debate on reform issues. In order to address these questions, we first
provide an institutional and quantitative description of the main features of the current
Italian pension system, highlighting the main changes from the recent past; we compare it
with other European pension schemes in order to identify whether there are
common/specific features; we then refer to the last projections of pension expenditure
elaborated by the RGS (Ragioneria Generale dello Stato: Department of General
Accounts) to show where the system is going. We finally conclude, summarising the main
implications of our analysis and comparing more explicitly the UK and the Italian system,
to see what lessons we can draw for the Italian pension reform debate.
2. Main institutional features of the Italian pension system
Until 1992 the Italian public pension system was a defined benefit pay-as-you-go
system with a very large number of funds and schemes, where contribution and benefit
rules differed according both to the sector the worker belonged to (private and public
sector or self-employed) and to the specific job the worker had (special provisions for
railway, public utilities, air transport workers or industrial managers just to mention a
few). A lump-sum transfer known as TFR (Trattamento di Fine Rapporto) and financed by
a severance payment fund managed directly by employers complemented the public
*
Paper prepared for the Conference "The Welfare State, poverty and social exclusion in Italy and Great
Britain" Certosa di Pontignano, Siena, April 6-8, 2001.
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defined benefit pension. Income for retirement came also from means-tested benefits
which provided coverage both to those who satisfied the minimum requirement on
contributory periods and whose pension was below a minimum amount set by INPS
(integrazione al minimo) and to those who did not fulfil the requirement but whose
income satisfied the total income test (pensione sociale).
The reforms in the 1990s remarkably changed the design of the Italian pension system:
they tried both to adjust the traditional pay-as-you-go pillar and to introduce a private
defined contribution component to provide additional coverage via the development of
occupational and private pension funds.
While the Amato Reform (1992) maintained the defined benefit formula to calculate
benefits and promoted pension cost control and harmonisation measures, the main
innovation introduced by the Dini Reform (1995) was the abandoning of the defined
benefit pay-as-you-go system, where benefits depend on some formula related to the
worker's earning history, and the adoption of a Notional Defined Contributions (NDC)
pay-as-you-go system, where benefits depend on contributions paid during the working
life, the conventional return earned on them and life expectancy at the time of retirement.
The specific NDC pay-as-you-go system implemented in Italy requires wage earners to
pay contributions based on a 33% fixed contribution rate until the age (after a statutory
minimum which is set at 57) the individual chooses to retire and go towards paying the
benefits of concurrent pensioners (this is the pay-as-you-go feature). The value of
contributions is accredited the workers' notional accounts and the previous year’s account
values are indexed annually with a nominal per capita GDP index. The benefit is then
calculated by dividing the value on the account at the chosen time of retirement with a
factor based on unisex life expectancy and a real rate of return of 1.5% calculated into the
annuity. Pensions are then indexed to annual changes in prices.
The introduction of a NDC pay-as-you-go scheme was accompanied by the choice of a
flexible retirement age between 57 and 65 both for men and women, with the amount of
the first pension increasing the closer one gets to 65; the reduction of the minimum
contributory years to 5 in order to limit payroll taxes evasion -a rather widespread
phenomenon in Italy- and to give occasional workers incentives to participate into the
social security scheme; the removal of discretionary wage indexation of pensions which
was left over by the Amato Reform and the elimination of the peculiar early retirement
pension scheme for new workers.
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Regarding the second pillar, the funds to finance the defined contribution component
should come from two sources: tax favoured contributions by employers and employees
and, for the largest share, the gradual channelling of contributions which have so far
accrued to the separate severance payment fund known as TFR. At the time of retirement
specified for the public component, the retirees are entitled to the payment of an annuity
from the private funded pillar.
The transition period before the system designed by the Dini reform is fully operative
and involves all workers is very long (2036). In the meantime, income for retirement
comes only partially from the defined contribution component while the old defined
benefit pay-as-you-go system still plays a primary role together with the lump-sum
transfer provided by the TFR.
Income for retirement is currently provided in Italy also via means-tested benefits of
two types: integrazione al minimo and assegno sociale. The former pays to those whose
pension falls below the minimum set by INPS the difference between their own pension
and the set amount, provided they satisfy the test on total income. This means-tested
benefit will disappear once pensions will be entirely paid by the NDC system. The latter is
paid to people above 65 whose total income satisfies the means-test and it provides a
minimum income to those who do not have other sources of income support and it is
characterised by a 100% withdrawal rate.
3. Searching for the Italian anomaly
Now that we have described the main features of the Italian pension system as designed
by the Dini reform and highlighted that current and future pensioners during the transition
will only be mildly affected by the changes it introduced, we provide some figures on
pension expenditure and its composition, trying to identify what elements have
contributed most to the current pension system's stance.
In 1999 the old-age function of the social protection accounts absorbed about 13% of
GDP. Old-age pensions (stricto sensu) are the main component and reach 10% of GDP.
Notice that one fifth of these old-age pensions is represented by the first type of meanstested benefits we have described above, that is by integrazioni al minimo which are not
classified separately. Disability pensions paid to people aged 60 and above are also
included in the old-age function and they represent approximately 1,3% of GDP. Meanstested benefits (pensione/assegno sociale) are of modest amount in terms of GDP (0,2%):
their share is however larger if we take into account the means-tested benefits classified as
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old-age pensions. The whole amount of the TFR is included in the old-age function,
although a significant share of this benefit is paid to people who have not reached yet
retirement age. This tends to increase the amount of resources which supposedly go to old
people. In Figure 1 we also indicate the expenditures attributed to other functions of the
social protection system, namely survivors, disability and unemployment. While the
survivors function absorbs over 2% of GDP, disability and unemployment expenditures
are a very small share of GDP.
To understand the current stance and the prospects of the Italian social security system,
we try to compare the Italian data with those of other European countries, namely
Germany, France and the UK. The analysis is based on the national data provided by
Eurostat (2000a) which include entries up to 1997 and by Eurostat (2000b) which presents
the 1998 data and an update of the 1997 data, on which we focus.
Table 1a and 1b illustrate clearly the so called Italian anomaly in the social security
system. Namely, if we sum expenditures for old-age and survivors, we can rank the four
European countries we are focusing on in descending order in terms of the ratio of
expenditures over GDP: focusing on 1998, we find that Italy spends about 15,6% of GDP
for these two functions while the values for France, Germany and the UK are respectively
12,8%, 11,9% and 11,4%. The differences in expenditures are huge if we focus on these
two functions, especially if we compare Italy and the UK. Notice also that we are
considering countries with similar levels of income per capita. Moreover, according to
Blondell and Scarpetta (1998) the average age of transition to inactivity among older
males in 1995 is very similar in Italy and Germany, slightly earlier in France and later in
the UK, where males leave the labour market when they are on average 62,5, two years
older than in Italy and Germany. By the same token, although women abandon the labour
market earlier in all countries, their average rate of transition to inactivity reflects the same
pattern observed for men, with a delayed transition to inactivity for the UK (see Table 2).
Given that the average rate of transition to inactivity is very similar among continental
European countries, it might play a role only in explaining differences in expenditure
between the UK and Italy. But this is hardly the end of the story.
If we try to single out the causes of the Italian anomaly, we could first focus on the
different institutional mechanisms on which social security systems in different countries
are based. The different institutional features can give rise to heterogeneity in the
classification systems and therefore the definitions of pension benefits do not coincide (in
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which case the joint analysis of the various components of the social security system can
offer a better representation of the transfer to the old than old-age pensions per se). Or, at
a more substantial level, they can reveal structural differences among the national social
security system, which are not eliminated once we correct for classification issues, and
which can generate transfers of substantially different dimensions.
In order to assess the role of classification issues in determining the Italian anomaly, we
first observe that the level of disability and unemployment expenditure over GDP is lower
in our country than in the other three countries we are considering. If we add these two
functions with expenditure for old-age and survivors, the Italian anomaly looks less
alarming: the difference is reduced to 1% with respect to Germany and France and to
2,5% with respect to the UK. However, one might wonder whether, both from an
institutional and an economic point of view, it is legitimate to lump together the four
functions mentioned above. The OECD paper by Blondell and Scarpetta (1998) helps us
to partly address the question: if we focus on the main reasons for leaving last job or
business, normal retirement is the main reason for Italy (where it explains 53,4% of the
cases whilst in the UK it represents only 4,8%), while dismissals, disability and illness and
early retirement explain a limited number of cases (2%, 5,2% and 9,2% respectively). The
opposite holds for the UK for instance, where the last three causes mentioned above
represent the main reasons for abandoning job or business. (See Table 3).
The above observations indicate that, if we aim at measuring the amount of resources
transferred to the old generation, the simultaneous consideration of the four functions
offers a better representation. Adding them up is justified by the fact that the systems seem
to differ in their institutional structure, with different weights given to different portions of
the social protection system and with different implicit and explicit goals given to each
functions. While for a country it is enough to focus on the old-age function to measure the
transfer the old generation receive, for another country the inclusion of the disability
function is essential. It is worth mentioning that the overall size of the social protection
system in Italy is however limited if compared with the other countries here examined
(about 25% of GDP against 30% in the other countries). In Italy the social protection
system is mainly financed by social contributions, which represents 15,2% of GDP, while
general taxation revenues are 9,7% of GDP. In the UK, the social contributions' level is
very close to the Italian one, but general taxation is higher (namely, 13,9% of GDP). In
France and Germany the level of general taxation is slightly lower than in Italy but social
contributions are much higher (See Table 4)
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Eurostat data raise further problems with respect to the definition of pensions and the
extension of the pension system.
For instance, private funded social benefits are an important feature of the pension
system in the UK while they play a very marginal role in Italy. According to the UK
National Accounts (1999), if we distinguish between the two components of private
funded social benefits, private pensions (which we interpret as occupational pensions) in
the UK in 1997 amounted to about 24500 billions pounds corresponding to 3% of GDP
and pensions by life companies were 20400 billions pounds, the 2,5% of GDP. These
amounts do not seem to be entirely included in Eurostat statistics. For instance, in the
Introductory Notes to Eurostat (2000a and 2000b) we read that Appropriate Personal
Pension Schemes are not included. However, any comparison on transfers to old-age
which (partly) omits this component seems inadequate. This is more so if we recall that
the Italian TFR is entirely included in old-age pensions, also when paid to people below
retirement age. One additional component which contributes to the total amount of
resources devoted to old-age people in the UK is represented by other non contributory
benefits like income support, social housing and tax relieves, which are granted both to
elderly and to other disadvantaged people and which are not present in the Italian social
protection system. Taking into account the different components of the UK social
protection system which we believe go to old-age, we calculate the UK transfers to oldage in Table 5. Transfers to the retired are larger than the ones resulting from Eurostat
data.
Also the extension/coverage of the pension system can contribute to generate social
security systems of different dimensions. For instance the coverage of self-employed
workers is very different across the pension systems of the countries here examined.
While Italy has a fully fledged system, in Germany the participation to the public system
is voluntary and modest but compensated by the concession of fiscal rebates.
We try to summarise these observations in Table 6, indicating which share of the total
pension expenditure on old-age and survivors goes to private and public sector employees
and to the self employed. For the UK all of the old-age and survivors benefits paid by the
national insurance fund are attributed to either private or public sector employees because
we are not able to identify the exact amount going to the self-employed. For the UK we
also indicate the expenditure on personal pensions by life companies. Our table suggests
that, indeed, the share of expenditure going to the self-employed is higher in Italy than in
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the other countries where the comparison is feasible. However, the share of old-age and
survivors pensions going to workers in the private sector is not very different across
countries, while the Italian anomaly seems partly explained by the higher amount of
expenditure going to central and local governments’ employees.
The last issue which we believe to be relevant in cross country comparisons and which
can contribute to reduce the differences between Italy and the other countries here
examined is the taxation of pension benefits. Adema (1999) shows that the direct taxation
of these benefits in Italy is particularly high, as one can see in Table 7. This result is
confirmed by calculations based on 1999 national tax schedules for three of the four
countries under analysis (See Econpubblica [2000]): as Figure 2 shows, the Italian average
tax rate is systematically and significantly higher than the ones observed in the other
countries.
Now that we have highlighted some of the specific and some of the common features of
the pension systems under analysis, what can we conclude on the Italian anomaly? Table 8
summarises the implications we derive from our analysis. The first row reports Eurostat
data on old-age and survivors pensions: the Italian anomaly is fully evident. The second
row is based on our reading of the national account statistics. Namely, for Germany we
shift anticipated pensions from the unemployment function to old-age; for the UK we
draw from Table 5. The amount of expenditure for France and Italy is basically
unchanged. The differences are reduced but the Italian case still stands out. Still
considering the total of old-age and survivors pension payments, we can take into account
direct taxes paid on benefits: if we do this we obtain the data reported in the fourth row,
where the difference between Italy and the UK and France is about 1% while it is larger
between Italy and Germany. If we finally take into account the two complementary
functions, that is, disability and unemployment, Germany and Italy are aligned on a lower
level of expenditure over GDP than UK and France.
Our conclusions are certainly influenced by our assumptions (which we nonetheless
consider reasonable) and by the lack of adequate information. It is however fair to say that
the international comparison of social expenditure data is not a settled matter and that, in
general, it requires a serious interpretative effort. What we can safely say is that countries
at the same level of development have social security systems of similar dimensions if all
the functions they perform are jointly considered.
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This potential convergence in terms of dimensions should not obscure the existence of
important institutional differences. The UK is the only country with a consolidated funded
portion and with an important role attributed to occupational pension schemes. In
Continental Europe the public component is absolutely dominant and although, for
instance, our TFR is dimensionally not so far from the UK personal pension benefits, it
cannot be completely assimilated to them.
If one believes that the way the social security system is structured is crucial to
determine both its micro impact (because it can affect the incentives to save, to work, to
invest in human capital or to insure, just to take some examples) and its macro effects
(because it influences total savings, growth, risk sharing, income distribution or poverty,
again just to mention a few), the result according to which countries at similar level of
development spend similar shares of their GDP for social security is relevant to evaluate
the Italian anomaly, but it leaves the harder issue of the appropriate model to manage
income for retirement open. We go back to these issues in the conclusions.
4. The future prospects of the Italian pension system
We here tackle the second main issue of our work, namely we discuss the prospects of
the Italian pension system. The main question we address refers to the sustainability of our
system in the long run. We focus on two interpretation of sustainability: on the one hand,
we look at the amount of resources absorbed by the pension system; on the other, we focus
on the adequacy of pension transfers at an individual level. To measure the former we
present the macroeconomic projections on public pension expenditure (which includes
means-tested benefits but excludes the TFR) over GDP formulated by the Italian RGS
using its forecasting model; to capture the latter we calculate the replacement rate, that is
the ratio of the first pension to the last income, for different types of workers and under
different assumptions on their career.
The main assumptions on which the RGS forecasts are based are summarised in Table
9 and 10. We here briefly comment on some of them. The assumption on the rate of
growth of GDP is very conservative and, as we know, very crucial for the results on the
dynamics of pension expenditure over GDP, especially when pensions are only indexed to
prices. The participation rate is at the moment very low in Italy, if we believe official
statistics, when compared with other European countries. According to the main variant of
the demographic projections by ISTAT, the fertility rate increases from 1,23 to 1,45 in
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2020 and then it remains stable. Population ageing shows up in an increase in the share of
old age people of about 10% in the first half of the simulation horizon.
Starting from a level of 14% in 1999, public pension expenditure over GDP is expected
to rise until 2031 when it will reach its maximum value of 15,9% and then to fall sharply
and to reach 13,3% of GDP at the end of the forecasting period in 2050 (See Figure 3).
The ratio of average pension to labour productivity is responsible for the rise in pension
expenditure during the first five years of the forecasting horizon, while the ratio of
pensions to employment is the main responsible for the increase in the next ten years. The
slowdown in pension expenditure in the central years of the forecasting period comes from
the decline in the ratio of the average pension to average productivity caused by the
gradual introduction of the NDC system. According to the RGS projections, this effect is
so large that it basically offsets the rise in the ratio of pensions over employment caused
by the demographic changes. In the last years of the simulation horizon, both ratios tend to
decline, causing the decrease in pension expenditure over GDP.
We now turn to discuss the issue of individual adequacy of retirement income. This is
certainly not an absolute but a relative concept whose discussion requires a preliminary
definition of the role of pensions. According to Diamond (1998), "a pension should
guarantee a target income for participants during retirement. The target is generally
expressed as a replacement rate that gives the ratio of real benefits to real earnings
towards the end of a worker's career" . According to others (see the many works by
Feldstein for instance), a pension is equivalent to mandatory savings which transfer
individual resources between the working and the retirement period of an agent's life and
which are remunerated at the (risky) financial market rate of return. Depending on where
one stands between these two different interpretation of the role of pensions, the
assessment of pension's adequacy changes. The latter is also affected by the presence of
public and private components in the pension system and by the different views on their
respective roles.
Given these general premises, let us focus on the replacement rate that the reformed
Italian system is likely to guarantee. As the amount of the pension depends on the age of
retirement, on the length of the contributory period, on the average rate of growth of GDP
at which individual contributions are capitalised, on the rate of increase of the individual
wage and, finally, on being an employee or a self-employed, we focus on some individual
profiles which can illustrate the implicit guarantees of the Italian reformed pension
system. As Table 11 shows, an employee who retires at 62 after 40 years of work receives
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a pension whose amount depends on the relationship between the individual wage growth
rate and the rate of return on contributions: namely, the replacement rate is 73% of the last
wage if the individual wage growth rate is the same as the rate of return on contributions
(and both are set at 1,5%) and 55% of the last wage if the individual wage growth rate is
higher (3% versus 1,5%). As Table 12 shows, for a self-employed, the replacement rate
decreases from 44% to 33% under the same assumptions as above: the lower level of
replacement rates comes from the lower level of contribution rates (20% against 33%).
We now try to translate the replacement rates in pension income in absolute terms in
order to understand the value of the promises our society is making to future retirees. We
consider three different profiles, two for employed and one for a self-employed individual.
The rate of return on contributions is set to 1,5% while the individual wage growth rate is
respectively 1,5% and 3% for the employees and 3% for the self-employed. If the initial
gross wage is 800 Euro (this is more or less the starting wage for people with average
qualification), the final gross wages after 40 years of work are 1451 and 2609 Euro and
the first gross pensions they will receive are respectively 1029, 1445 and 870 Euro. (See
Table 13)
Any evaluation of adequacy is, as we have already mentioned, necessarily subjective.
We can however add that the above replacement rates from the public pillar should be
integrated via the development of a second funded pillar based on the contributions
currently financing the TFR, if the last policy efforts in this direction are successful. This
integration should be particularly relevant for people in the higher wage groups. As a
reference, we present in Table 14 the current Italian, German and British replacement rates
for an average worker.
5. Conclusions
Our analysis highlights that the anomaly in the Italian pension system is not large in
quantitative terms if one consider the total transfers to old-age people in the different
countries here examined. The focus on pensions which characterises the Italian social
security system represents however a peculiar structural feature. This feature is associated
with a relatively limited size of the overall social protection system for reasons that should
be carefully analysed.
The last reforms seem successful in controlling the evolution of pension expenditure in
the long run, even in the presence of strong population ageing. The determination of
pension benefits on the basis of contributions, the abandonment of wage indexation and
11
the introduction of an endogenous adjustment parameter to reflect demographic changes
are the main responsible for the achievement of pension cost control. The lower bound of
the flexible retirement age appears to be low and might not deliver a significant increase in
the average retirement age with respect to the current one, if the adjustment in the amount
of annuity is not perceived as too penalising: an increase in the minimum retirement age
seems conceivable in the presence of improvements in life expectancy.
Our analysis also points out that the reduction in pension expenditure is associated with
a significant reduction in replacement rates, especially for workers with dynamic careers.
The development of a second pillar should guarantee higher protection to this group.
The presence of a very large public component in the pension system is a common
feature of Italy and of other Continental European countries. The UK system is different
from ours for the importance of occupational pensions and of the private funded
component. However, the fact that the occupational pensions currently paid are of the
defined benefit type reduces the differences in terms of protection that the two systems
guarantee to current retirees. Nonetheless, the increase in defined contribution plans for
current workers signals a switch in terms of risk-sharing between future retirees and
pension funds: in the future the differences could become more relevant.
Another feature which is common to Continental European social protection systems is
that a relatively high level of pension is guaranteed to the whole population. On the
contrary, in the UK a profitable access to occupational and personal pensions which
integrate the low level (for Continental European standards) of the basic state pension is
somehow limited to medium and high income groups with an almost uninterrupted
working career.
Defined benefit systems financed on a pay-as-you-go basis were, and probably still are,
the dominant model to manage income for retirement. Although in the 1990s both OECD
and middle income countries have changed in some important respects their mandatory
public pension systems, the reform process is not over yet, nor is the debate on the
appropriate model to manage income for retirement and on the aims public pension
systems should pursue. In our opinion, the choice between alternative models should stem
from the role attributed to the pension system in a specific society and it should take into
account the risks different systems are subject to. Pay-as-you go systems are often
associated with political, demographic and occupational risk, while funded systems seem
to be characterised by investment and inflation risk (also the demographic risk can be
12
relevant for them if the pension system has to provide a target income). The superiority of
a funded privatised system to a traditional public pay-as-you-go one is not
uncontroversial, nor is the superiority of mixed systems, which have become rather
popular as of late. Although there is no wide consensus on the ideal system to manage
income for retirement, the individual opinions are very clear-cut. We believe that some
further progress is necessary in theoretical models (Casarico [2000] discusses these issues
in some detail) and in the availability and comparability of data in order to improve the
framework of analysis and to have adequate tools to contrast different systems. This seems
particularly urgent in view of the increasing degree of globalisation and, focusing on
Europe, of the realisation of the EMU.
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