Download The Impact of Mortality Salience on Religion

Proceedings of The National Conference
On Undergraduate Research (NCUR) 2012
Weber State University, Ogden Utah
March 29 – 31, 2012
The Impact of Mortality Salience on Religion and Spiritual Beliefs in College
Students
Rachel Davis
Department of Behavioral and Social Sciences Psychology
The University of Montevallo
Station 6440
Montevallo, Alabama 35115
Faculty Advisor: John W. Burling, Ph. D, Kristen Gilbert, Ph. D
Abstract
Previous research has clearly demonstrated the human motivation to buffer anxiety concerning death through
investing in cultural belief systems. Individuals who have adopted a “socially dominant” view may be more invested
in believing in good and evil, as this would in part justify their desire to be near the top social strata. This tendency
may be even stronger among participants who also hold strong religious beliefs. The purpose of our research is to
examine the effect of mortality salience on an individual’s beliefs in the existence of an evil entity as a function of
their social dominance orientation and religious beliefs. We hypothesized that when individuals high in both social
dominance orientation and religious beliefs are exposed to mortality salience, they would report stronger beliefs in
the existence of an evil entity compared to control subjects. A volunteer sample of approximately 100 college
students will complete the Social Dominance Orientation Scale,2 the Religious Attitudes Survey,3, 18 the Just World
Scale,25 the Projective Life Attitudes Assessment,7 the Morningness and Eveningness Scale,11 and an experimenter
created scale to assess the extent of belief in an evil entity. The primary analysis was a three-way ANOVA. The
implications and practical applications of these results for college students and society will be discussed.
Keywords: Religion, Mortality Salience, Terror Management
1. Introduction
1.1. Terror Management Theory
Terror Management Theory (TMT), proposed by social psychologists Jeff Greenberg, Tom Pyszczynski, and
Sheldon Solomon, was based upon the writings of Ernest Becker. This theory posits that as human beings, like other
living things, we posses a biological or natural disposition to preserve and prolong our lives. In addition to this,
humans possess a unique cognitive capability allowing for the inescapable awareness that death is inevitable.22 This
biological human instinct combined with the human cognitive capability, allowing for self-consciousness, increases
an individual’s awareness of and anxiety regarding one’s own death.10, 13 The unavoidability and impending
actuality of dying can instill in one a sense of utter confusion and meaninglessness, which could be released into
conscious processes. This has the potential to cause terrifying anxiety, due to knowing that even trying to ensure the
best “security” is illusory.20 Humans are unable to control this overwhelming, unconscious fear using only cognitive
processes. The inability to avoid the potential overwhelming terror associated with death often results in use of
tactics such as profound denial and or immersing oneself with a perception of meaning and value in a context they
believe is meaningful and personally transcendent such as an enduring culture or religious beliefs.
According to TMT theorists, humans reduce the potential experience of existential terror and negative effects of
death anxiety by constructing and maintaining cultural worldviews, which are “humanly constructed beliefs about
the nature of reality” that give individuals a sense of value and significance in a seemingly meaningful reality.22
Cultural worldviews maintained throughout one’s life also provide individuals with a conception of reality that is
ordered, stable, meaningful, and believed at least reasonably permanent. In order for individuals to maintain lifelong psychological composure, one has to have faith in his or her cultural worldview and self-esteem derived from
their respective cultures.22 Having self-esteem, or a sense of importance and value in one’s illusory construction of a
symbolic world allows humans to escape from the terror and finality of death in a meaningless universe.9, 28 Selfesteem develops throughout our lives as a psychological construct, having anxiety-buffering capabilities. This
development is a direct result of being exposed to our “culture’s socially constructed account of the universe and the
standards of value associated with it.”22 Throughout our lives, this humanly constructed fictional reality constantly
reinforces the notions of rewarding good people, punishing bad people, and death-defying heroes, which gives
validity to the assumption that life is meaningful and existence is purposeful. Ultimately, this exposure to and
reinforcement of heroic fiction in the “altered physical reality” in which we live ultimately validates our cultural
worldview, providing an anxiety buffer for the fear of death.22
1.2. Social Dominance Orientation
Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) is a personality dimension defined as “the extent to which one desires that
one’s in-group dominate and be superior to out-groups.”19, 26 This concept is classified as an overall attitude
pertaining to intergroup relations, which suggests the personal preference of an individual to have equal relations
within the group “that is ordered along a superior-inferior dimension.”19 SDO is also characterized as “the central
individual-difference variable” which predicts that person’s specific acceptance or rejection of many ideologies and
policies important in maintaining group relations.19 It is noted that SDO is relevant to the salient group distinctions,
not limited to gender, race, societal status or religion, within a social context.27
Research on TMT has found that when individuals are reminded of mortality, both positive reactions toward
ingroup members and negative reactions toward outgroup members are intensified.23 In addition, research on
mortality salience (MS) exposure demonstrated that the combination of SDO and MS “can influence reactions to an
entire class of outgroup members” corresponding to the ingroup’s pre-existing dispositions of that particular
outgroup.2 When exposed to mortality salience, the tendency for individuals to react more strongly and negatively
towards individuals holding different belief systems demonstrates the intensification of belief in one’s own cultural
worldview, in an ultimate attempt to validate one’s own beliefs and reduce anxiety.
1.3. Belief in a Just World
The Just World Theory states “People want to and have to believe that they live in a just world so that they can go
about their daily lives with a sense of trust, hope, and confidence in their future.”14 In order for just world beliefs
(BJW) to be consciously available, societal norms and values may have to be adopted in addition to desiring the
guarantee of the environment as “stable, controllable, and benign.”15 Because of the nature of human thinking,
believing in a just world allows people to feel that they can accomplish goals free from the possibility of negative
events.15
Through the lens of previous TMT research, the belief in a just world serves to protect people from the world “in
which bad things can and do happen to good people.”15 As terror management theorists have noted, viewing the
world as a “fair and just place…makes it seem safer, more manageable, and less frightening.”21 Believing in a just
world allows self-esteem in one’s culture to serve as an anxiety buffer, therefore, both the belief in a just world and
self-esteem are needed to protect us from the anxiety associated with death.14, 21 From research on TMT, it is
suggested that the belief in a just world is a “part of the cultural worldview that provides protection from existential
terror.”21 Similar to the anxiety resulting from encountering different cultural worldviews, encountering injustice
also threatens our cultural worldview, causing “defensive reactions” in an attempt to restore feelings of justice.21
1.4. Religion
One of the most vital components of an individual’s cultural worldviews is religion. As Becker states, “religion
solves the problem of death, which no living individuals can solve.”4 According to Becker’s theories, religion
provides humans with the hope of literal immortality by offering one’s existence a “higher meaning” and
explanation for the unknown.4 Although there is a great deal of difference in teachings and practices of many
religions, mostly all offer the possibility of some form of an afterlife, such as “heaven, paradise or reincarnation.”29
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Being embedded in religious beliefs allows members of a given religion to believe that they can achieve both
symbolic and literal immortality, due to the explicit religious values that informs members of how to earn a an
eternally rewarding life after death.29 In addition to hope of an afterlife, possessing a sense of security and control
over one’s life and surroundings is obtained through believing in an omnipotent god or gods and having devotion to
the respective deity or deities.29 Despite variations in cultural worldviews, religion plays a very important role in
helping people cope with the anxiety associated with the finality of death.
From a TMT perspective, belief systems explicitly offering some form of immortality are extremely important to
individuals adopting such beliefs, especially due to the anxiety-buffer resulting from an individual’s strong belief
systems.29 In concordance with Becker’s theories, Vail et al. propose that “religious worldviews provide a uniquely
powerful form of existential security.”4, 29 While examining the effect religion may have on some death attitudes,
Dezutter et al. demonstrated the tendency for religious people to have a stronger belief in life after death.5 Also,
Osarchuk and Tatz demonstrated that belief in an afterlife was heightened when individuals are reminded of the fear
of death.18 When examining previous research, Vail et al. suggested MS “increases the appeal of supernatural
agents” not a part of one’s own worldviews because believing in outside forces “makes faith in one’s own deity
more plausible.”29
1.5. Consequences of Conflicting Worldviews
The previous discussion established the crucial importance of having a worldview giving members of society a
sense of value, direction, and information about what constitutes a meaningful life. It follows that people whose
worldviews don’t match often will feel discomfort due to the realization that their worldview may not only be one of
many, but that it may simply be wrong.22 On many occasions, Terror Management theorists have conveyed the
strong faith held that our beliefs are the only and correct way is undermined by encountering individuals possessing
different beliefs.22 Research has clearly demonstrated the tendency for individuals or groups, holding the same
cultural worldviews, to bolster and validate their beliefs when confronted with differing worldviews.6, 20, 23
Furthermore, research on MS demonstrated that people adhere more closely to their cultural worldviews and have an
increased negative reaction to people with conflicting worldviews.20
Many studies have examined the numerous anxiety-buffering mechanisms displayed when one’s cultural
worldviews are threatened and during exposure to mortality. Among many observed reactions, differing and
threatening cultural worldviews are often perceived as ‘the enemy’ or ‘evil,’ meaning ‘bad’ or negative.22 However,
research has given very little attention to individuals’ perception of the nature and existence of evil as a force or
entity. The notion of evil is vital for an individual to maintain cultural worldviews, which are grounded in the
concepts of good versus evil.22 Based on TMT findings, it is predicted that following MS, an individual’s
preexisting perception of and belief in evil as an entity would be strengthened in the same ways that other systems of
beliefs are strengthened. Given certain social contexts of living and an individual’s specific cultural worldviews, it is
expected that belief in an uncontrollable outside force, such as evil, would be stronger following the thought of
death. Thus, the present study attempts to investigate the effect of MS on the extent to which an individual believes
in the existence of an evil entity as a function of their religious beliefs and SDO. We hypothesize that when
individuals high in levels of religiosity, separate from and possibly in combination with SDO, are exposed to MS,
stronger beliefs in the existence of an evil entity will be reported when compared to control subjects. The role of
individual’s belief in a just world will also be examined for possible mediating effects of responses to MS, in
varying dimensions of religiosity.
2. Methodology
2.1. Participants
Our sample consisted of 111 students enrolled in selected classes during the spring semester of 2012 at the
University of Montevallo, which is a small, Southern, public liberal arts college. There were 79 females and 33
males in the sample. Of the students sampled, 20 were freshman, 13 were sophomores, 31 were juniors, 39 were
seniors, 3 responded as graduate students, and 6 did not report class standing on the demographics form. The mean
age of the participants was 22.24, ranging from 18 to 42 years of age, while 1 participant did not report age on the
demographics form. The sample included 22 African Americans, 2 Asian Americans, 77 Caucasians, 5 multi-racial
participants, and 5 did not report ethnicity on the demographics form. With regard to current religious orientation,
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the majority of participants denoted Christian Non-denominational, 48.6%, as well as Catholic, 12.6%, Atheist,
7.2%, Pentecostal, 5.4%, and Protestant Eastern Orthodox and Agnostic, both at 4.5%.
2.2. Procedure
Participants in this study were given a questionnaire packet, which included a consent form, a detailed demographic
survey to assess students’ current situations pertaining to age, interests, both occupational and personal, religious
background, religious orientation, as well as 6 additional self-report measures. The item regarding current religious
orientation included selection from 23 major types of religious beliefs. The questionnaire packet consisted of three
pre-measures, the experimental treatment or control item, a distractor task, and an experimenter-created post
measure. Specifically, the questionnaire packets of measures were given to participants in block-randomized order.
In each group of 8 packets, four contained the experimental MS treatment and four contained the control treatment
consisting of questions regarding attitudes about dental pain.
Subject responses were completely anonymous, and the participants were repeatedly instructed not to include their
name on any of the forms and or surveys they were given. Consent forms were immediately collected, following the
student’s signature, and placed in a large envelope to ensure the anonymity of participants was maintained. Upon
completion, questionnaire packets were collected and placed in a separate envelope, also to assure confidentiality of
participants.
2.3. Materials
2.3.1. Pre-measures
The Just World Scale was used to measure the extent to which students feel that others around them, and possibly
themselves, are deserving of their fates and that the universe is governed by a justice code in some form.24 The Just
World Scale consists of 16 items, each of which describes a situation that represents a just or unjust world. An
adjusted 4-point Likert scale was used where 1 = strongly disagree and 4 = strongly agree. Examples of statements
on this measure included “Crime doesn’t pay” and “By and large, people deserve what they get.”
The Religious Attitudes Survey consisted of a compilation of four scales used to measure self-reports of
religiosity. Taken together, this measure assessed different religious orientations and certainty religion, or “overall
religious zeal.”3, 17 The first 24 items were comprised of the Intrinsic, Interactional, and Internal scales, which were
derived from the Religious Life Inventory and the Religious Orientation Scale.1, 3 The Intrinsic scale measured an
individual’s rigidity in abiding by traditional religious beliefs.3 The Interactional Scale assessed an individual’s
religious faith as a spiritual quest for truth outside traditional doctrines and the Internal Scale assessed the extent to
which one’s religious beliefs are “a result of internal needs for certainty, strength, and direction.”3 Examples of
items from these scales include, “My religious beliefs are what really lie behind my whole approach to life,”
“Questions are far more central to my religious experience than answers,” and “My religious development is a
natural response to the innate need of human beings for the devotion of God.” The final 16 items were comprised of
the Augmented Religious Zeal Scale. This scale measured an individual’s Certainty Religiosity or “overall religious
zeal,” which refers to the extent to which a person is generally dedicated, certain and enthusiastic regarding their
religious conviction.12, 16, 17 Examples of items from this scale include, “I aspire to live and act according to my
religious beliefs” and “My religious beliefs are grounded in objective truth.” Participants responded to all 40 items
using a 4-point Likert scale, which denoted answer choices of 1 = Strongly Disagree to 4 = Strongly Agree, where
there was not a neutral choice option. This scale was adjusted for consistency with other measures.
The Social Dominance Orientation Scale (SDO) assessed student’s beliefs concerning student’s “approval of
unequal group relations” and the notion “that some people are inherently superior or inferior to others.”19 Half of the
items on this measure denoted approval of inequality and half denoted approval of equality.19 This 14-item measure
used a modified 4-point Likert scale of 1 = Very Negative to 4 = Very Positive, which represents the “attitudinal
orientation” of SDO.20 The original 7-point Likert scale was modified for consistency with other measures; however,
the instructions and items on the measure were not modified.19 Examples of items from this measure include “Some
people are just more deserving than others” and “If people were treated more equally we would have fewer
problems in this country.”
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2.3.2. Treatment
The Mortality Salience (MS) Manipulation included the experimental MS treatment or the control treatment. The
MS Manipulation consisted of two open ended-questions asking students to reflect on and write about their own
death.23 The two questions on this assessment are “Please briefly describe the emotions that the thought of your own
death arouses in you” and “Jot down, as specifically as you can, what you think will happen to you as you physically
die and once you are physically dead.” The control treatment consisted of an identical assessment, which instead
asked participants about experiencing dental pain.
The Morningness and Eveningness Scale (MES) was utilized as a distracter task following the treatment measure
and was not included as part of the data set during analysis.11 Previous studies have found that immediate
assessment following the MS Manipulation is not as effective as assessing participants on worldviews following a
distracting task.8 The MES is a 7-item self-report questionnaire, which assesses the degree to which participants feel
that they are “morning people” versus “evening people.”
2.3.3. Post-measure
The post-measure, which assessed participant’s conceptions regarding evil as an entity or force, was an
experimenter-created scale entitled “The Spiritual Attitudes Survey” (SAS). The SAS consists of 15 items using a
Likert scale to which participants responded with 1 = Not at all to 5 = To a great extent. This scale contains three
dimensions designed to measure the extent to which participants believe in 1) evil as a force or entity, 2) evil forces
controlling human behavior, and 3) human vulnerability to evil forces. Examples of items from this scale include,
“To what extent do you believe that without the belief in an all-encompassing good being or force, people cannot
escape evil forces?” and “To what extent do you believe an individual’s personality traits make them more or less
susceptible to evil forces?”
3. Results and Discussion
Analysis of variance was the primary statistical procedure used to assess the impact of mortality salience, as
mediated by religiosity and social dominance, on beliefs concerning evil. The goal was to examine the effects of MS
as a function of pre-existing levels of Religiosity, SDO, and BJW. Participants were divided into separate groups for
each dimension, of high versus low levels of religiosity, by using median scores as a cut point for each scale
(Intrinsic, Interactional, Internal, and Certainty).
The 2 (MS vs. Control) by 2 (High Religiosity vs. Low Religiosity) by 2 (High Levels of SDO vs. Low Levels of
SDO) ANCOVA, using BJW as a covariate, did not yield any significant interactions or main effects of MS on the
post-measure. Analyses, consisting of a 2 (MS vs. Control) by 2 (High Religiosity vs. Low Religiosity) ANOVA
were conducted on each dependent variable as a function of each pre-measure of religiosity. Overall, the results of
these analyses confirmed predictions that individuals holding strong pre-existing religious beliefs would report
stronger beliefs in the existence of an evil entity, compared to control subjects.
The two-way ANOVAs for dimensions of religiosity revealed several significant main effects and interactions of
the MS condition on belief in evil as an entity. Specifically, the 2 x 2 ANOVA of the Intrinsic Religiosity Scale
revealed a significant main effect for the belief in evil as a force or entity, F(1, 100) = 58.75, p < .001. Individuals
who reported more rigidity in traditional religious beliefs displayed stronger beliefs in evil as a force or entity (M =
38.49, SEM = 1.19) than those reporting less rigid traditional religious beliefs (M = 24.91, SEM = 1.31). In addition,
a significant interaction of MS on subjects belief in evil as an entity was found, F(1, 100) = 4.10, p < .045, with
means displayed in Table 1. Exposure to MS amplified pre-existing tendencies for Intrinsically religious subjects.
Subjects holding high levels of Intrinsic Religiosity reported stronger belief in evil as an entity and subjects holding
low levels of Intrinsic Religiosity reported less belief, as opposed to subjects in the control conditions. As TMT
would predict, exposing highly traditionally religious individuals to MS strengthened their belief in evil as a force or
entity in the same way other belief systems are strengthened. While MS most likely intensifies general sensitivity
and attention to evil regardless of one’s religious background, highly religious individuals’ possess a specific
conceptualization of evil, such as demons and Satan, which increases the likelihood of belief in those concepts when
exposed to mortality.
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Table 1. Means for Interaction Effects of Condition & Intrinsic Religiosity Scale on Belief in an Evil Entity
High Levels of Religiosity
Low Levels of Religiosity
Mortality Salience (MS)
40.44
23.28
Control
36.53
26.55
In addition to previous research findings, this interaction suggests that exposing less traditionally religious
individuals to the thought of their own death makes them less certain of the possibility of evil as a force in the world.
Correspondingly, several interesting findings resulted from analysis of the Interactional dimension of religiosity on
strength of belief in an evil entity. A 2 (MS vs. control) by 2 (high religiosity vs. low religiosity) analysis of variance
revealed a significant main effect of the MS condition, F(1, 95) = 4.27, p < .041. Those exposed to MS
demonstrated stronger belief in the existence of evil forces (M = 37.16, SEM = 2.35) than the control group (M =
31.08, SEM = 1.76). Given this result, it is not surprising that a significant interaction of MS on beliefs in evil was
found for subjects’ Interactional Religious beliefs, F(1, 95) = 9.33, p < .003, with means displayed in Table 2. When
exposed to MS, subjects reporting strong Interactional religious beliefs demonstrated much stronger belief in an evil
entity, compared subjects in the control condition. Conversely, subjects reporting low levels of Interactional
religious beliefs, in the MS condition, demonstrated less belief in an evil entity than in the control condition.
Table 2. Means for Interaction Effects of Condition & Interactional Religiosity Scale on Belief in an Evil Entity
High Levels of Religiosity
Mortality Salience (MS)
43.67
Control
28.62
Low Levels of Religiosity
30.64
33.54
This finding suggests that individuals holding a strong ‘seeker’ orientation towards religious beliefs will be more apt
to believe in other forces as an explanation to existential questions when exposed to MS. Due to the nature of this
religiosity dimension, these religious “seekers” are more mystical in their quest for the ultimate truth through
beliefs. This allows for more acceptance and openness to other explanations to existential questions, such as that of
demonic possession, aliens, or other sources of belief. The decrease in belief for less religious individuals following
MS exposure suggests less of a concern with seeking truth and answers through various beliefs. It is possible that
MS exposure does not activate the personal need for these individuals to seek out answers through believing in evil
as an active force.
As with previously discussed dimensions of religiosity, the 2 (MS vs. control) by 2 (high vs. low religiosity)
analysis of the Internal and Certainty Religiosity scales yielded similar results. A significant main effect was
discovered for Internal Religiosity Scale, F(1, 95) = 48.67, p < .001. Subjects holding strong internalized religious
beliefs reported higher levels of belief in an evil entity (M = 39.48, SEM = 1.38) than subjects reporting low
internalized religious beliefs (M = 26.42, SEM = 1.26). A trend towards significance for the interaction of MS with
Internalized religiosity was also revealed, F(1, 95) = 2.96, p < .089, with means displayed in Table 3. In accordance
with the main effect, subjects holding high levels of Internal religiosity reported stronger belief in an evil entity
when exposed to MS than subjects in the control condition. Whereas, subjects holding low levels of Internal
religiosity, demonstrated less belief when exposed to MS, compared to subjects in the control condition.
Table 3. Means for a Trend Towards Significance for Interaction Effects of Condition & Internal Religiosity Scale
on Belief in an Evil Entity
High Levels of Religiosity
Low Levels of Religiosity
Mortality Salience (MS)
41.00
24.71
Control
37.96
28.12
Due to the need for these individuals to find “firm, clear answers to existential questions,” it is expected that those
high in this religiosity dimension would turn towards the belief that evil is a present and active force in the world.3 It
could also be suggested that the amount of negativity in current world events might have an impact on the extent of
these beliefs for high internally religious individuals. Additionally, a significant main effect was found when
analyzing subject’s Certainty Religiosity, F(1, 94) = 34.78, p < .001. Subjects reporting lower levels of certainty
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towards religiosity demonstrated lower belief in evil entities (M = 26.53, SEM = 1.33) when compared to subjects
high in Certainty Religiosity (M = 38.10, SEM = 1.44).
Results from all religiosity scales suggest validity for the proposed functions of cultural worldviews, specifically
religious beliefs in TMT and MS research. Such previous research has demonstrated the tendency for individuals to
bolster and affirm cultural worldviews, and seek out answers to existential questions when confronted with lifethreatening thoughts or events.22, 23 As a general conclusion, exposure to MS increases the belief in evil as an entity
for individuals holding strong pre-existing religious beliefs, whether Intrinsic, Interactional, Internal, or Certainty
Religiosity, possibly a result of prevailing and inherent religious teachings of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ in all aspects of
religion, despite various conceptualizations.29 It cannot be confirmed by the present research; however, the
possibility exists that to decrease anxiety associated with the inevitability of death highly religious individuals will
turn toward believing more in the existence of evil. In addition, our results demonstrated that MS exposure amplifies
pre-existing tendencies in both directions, despite the strength of those beliefs. Exposure to MS lessened the extent
to which individuals reporting lower levels of religiosity believed in evil as a force or entity. The possibility exists
that these individuals who are low in religious beliefs are not as threatened by the thought of one’s life ending, and
thus do not find it essential to seek out other anxiety-buffering beliefs. These individuals may find comfort in not
believing in an evil force or an entity in the world, due to the lack of belief in religious teachings, such as that of
good and evil. Generally, the tendency for individuals holding low levels of religiosity to believe less in evil as a
force or an entity was simply amplified by exposure to MS, when compared to those in the control condition.
A limitation of the research can be attributed to the unavoidable nature of assessing beliefs at a small, Southern,
liberal arts university. The possibility exists that southern college students’ cultural values could be different from
college students’ in another area of the country, especially with the majority of our sample denoting Christian
religious orientation. However, specific differences of belief among various religious orientations were not
examined as a part of the analysis in our research. Future research should examine types of religious orientation for
possible differences on responses to pre and post measures. Additionally, we suggest interesting possibilities for
collecting data in other regions of the country to assess whether cultural differences in the extent to which religion is
the foundation of life affect responses to both pre-measures and post measures.
The results of this study suggest important implications for future research. In addition to previous research
findings on MS and TMT, our results suggest an additional direction for research regarding cultural belief systems
and the underlying factors contributing to those beliefs. In order to better understand cultural worldviews and the
function in human motivation, a necessity exists to investigate additional responses to MS exposure, such as the
belief in evil as an entity. Results suggest individuals holding strong pre-existing beliefs have a strong tendency to
seek out additional explanations for existential questions in beliefs, such as the belief in an evil entity.
Understanding the origin of these beliefs, which has not been previously emphasized in TMT and MS research,
could lead to a more encompassing conception of cultural worldviews and the function in human motivation and
behavior. Given the preliminary results, further research will be conducted in order to gain a deeper understanding
of these belief systems and the human motivation to buffer those in response to MS. The continued study of human
motivation and resulting belief systems is vital to the field of psychology and to society, holding ultimate
implications for understanding and resolving conflict among differing belief systems.
4. Acknowledgments
The author wishes to express her extreme gratitude to Dr. John Burling and Dr. Kristen Gilbert, faculty advisor and
mentor from the department of Psychology at the University of Montevallo, for all the time and effort put into
providing the author with direction and support during research and in writing. She also wishes to express
appreciation to the McNair Scholars Program, Dr. Ruth Truss, Dr. Tidwell, and Ms. Tonja Battle for all of the
support and assistance provided during this process.
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