Download Battle of Navarino

Battle of Navarino
1
Battle of Navarino
The naval Battle of Navarino was fought on 20 October 1827, during
the Greek War of Independence (1821–32), in Navarino Bay
(modern-day Pylos), on the west coast of the Peloponnese peninsula, in
the Ionian Sea.
An Ottoman armada, which, in addition to imperial warships, included
squadrons from the eyalets (provinces) of Egypt, Tunis and Algiers,
was destroyed by an Allied force of British, French and Russian
vessels. It is notable for being the last major naval battle in history to
be fought entirely with sailing ships, although most ships fought at
anchor. The Allies' victory was achieved through superior firepower
and gunnery.
The central factor which precipitated the intervention of the three Great
Powers in the Greek conflict were the Russian Empire's ambitions to
expand in the Black Sea region at the expense of the Ottoman Empire
and Russian emotional support for the fellow-Orthodox Christian
Greeks, who had rebelled against their Ottoman overlords in 1821.
Russia's intentions in the region were seen as a major geostrategic
threat by the other European powers, which feared the disintegration of
the Ottoman empire and the establishment of Russian hegemony in the
Balkans and the Near East. This induced Great Britain and France to
bind Russia in a joint intervention to secure Greek autonomy in a
manner which preserved Ottoman territorial integrity.
The Powers agreed, by the Treaty of London (1827), to force the
Ottoman government to grant the Greeks autonomy within the empire
and despatched naval squadrons to the eastern Mediterranean Sea to
enforce their policy. The naval battle happened more by accident than
by design as a result of a manoeuvre by the Allied
commander-in-chief, Admiral Edward Codrington, aimed at coercing
the Ottoman commander to obey Allied instructions.
Muhammad Ali Pasha, Ottoman wali (governor)
of Egypt 1805-49, whose expedition to the
Peloponnese precipitated Great Power
intervention in the Greek conflict. An ethnic
Albanian, he was born in 1769 in Kavalla,
Greece, the son of the Ottoman district's military
commander. At the head of an Ottoman army, he
fought against the French under Napoleon
Bonaparte during their invasion of Egypt in 1798.
After the French withdrew in 1801, he established
himself as de facto ruler of the country by a
combination of guile and ruthlessness. His rule
saw the first industrialisation of Egypt and the
establishment of a modern army and navy. His
long-term aim was to carve an empire for himself
and his successors out of the ruins of the Ottoman
empire. Ultimately, he had to content himself
with just the hereditary rule of Egypt. He founded
the dynasty which ruled Egypt until the
nationalist-military coup of 1952
The sinking of the Ottomans' Mediterranean fleet saved the fledgling
Greek Republic from collapse. But it required two more military
interventions, by Russia in the form of the Russo-Turkish War of
1828-9 and by a French expeditionary force to the Peloponnese to
force the withdrawal of Ottoman forces from central and southern
Greece and to secure Greek independence.
Background: the Greek revolt
The context of the Battle of Navarino was the Greek War of
Independence. This had begun in 1821 as an uprising by Greek
nationalists against the Ottoman Empire, which had ruled Greece for
over three centuries.
Ottoman territories acquired between 1481 and
1683 (See: list of territories)
Battle of Navarino
By 1827, the Greek rebellion seemed close to failure. In 1825,
Ottoman Sultan Mahmud II (ruled 1808-39) had succeeded in breaking
the stalemate that the war had reached. He persuaded his powerful wali
(viceroy) of Egypt, Muhammad Ali Pasha (ruled 1805-49), who was
technically his vassal but in practice semi-independent, to deploy his
Western-trained and equipped army and navy against the Greeks. In
return, the Sultan promised to grant the rebel heartland, the
Peloponnese, as a hereditary fief to Ali's adopted son, Ibrahim. In
February 1825, Ibrahim led an expeditionary force of 16,000 into the
Peloponnese, and soon overran its western part; he failed, however, to
take the eastern section, where the rebel government was based (at
Nafplion). Ibrahim's forces then moved onto the Greek mainland,
capturing, despite a heroic Greek defence, the pivotal stronghold of
Missolonghi in April 1826.[1] In response to Greek guerrilla attacks on
his forces in the Peloponnese, Ibrahim launched a scorched earth
campaign which threatened the population with starvation and
deported many civilians into slavery in Egypt. He also brought in Arab
settlers, allegedly aiming ultimately to replace the Greek population.
2
Map of Europe in 1815, after the end of the
Napoleonic Wars. Note that since its apogee in
the 17th century, the Ottoman empire had lost
Greater Hungary (including Transylvania) to the
Austrian Empire and the whole of the region
North of the Black sea and Caucasus to the
Russian empire. (The map erroneously fails to
show that the whole of North Africa was still
under Ottoman control at this time)
The Greek revolutionaries, whose motto was ελευθερία ή θάνατος (eleftheria i thanatos: "freedom or death"),
remained defiant, appointing experienced philhellenic British and French officers to command their forces: Maj Sir
Richard Church (C-in-C) and Col C. Fabvier (land); Adm Lord Cochrane (C-in-C) and Capt F.A. Hastings (sea).[2]
By that time however, the Greek provisional government's land and sea forces were far inferior to those of the
Ottomans and Egyptians: in 1827, Greek regular troops numbered less than 5,000, compared to 25,000 Ottomans in
central Greece and 15,000 Egyptians in the Peloponnese. Also, the Greek government was virtually bankrupt. Many
of the key fortresses on what little territory it controlled were in Ottoman hands. It seemed only a matter of time
before the Greeks were forced to capitulate. In June 1827 the Acropolis of Athens, the last Greek fortress on the
mainland, capitulated to Ottoman forces.
At this critical juncture, the Greek cause was rescued by the decision of three Great Powers, Great Britain, France
and Russia, to intervene jointly in the conflict.
Motives of the Great Powers
The Greek revolution took place in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, which ended in 1815. The victorious
Allied Powers were determined to ensure that there could be no repetition of the French Revolution, and Napoleon's
subsequent attempt to export it to the rest of Europe. At the Congress of Vienna was born the Conservative Order,
the principle that the legitimate monarchies of Europe should be inviolable, in both their constitution and territory.
The new order was to be defended by the great powers acting in concert, after negotiations at periodic conferences.
This process became known as the Congress system.
But the Greek revolution presented the new order with a significant challenge. Prima facie, the Greek revolt was a
violation of the principle, as it involved a revolt against a legitimate monarchy and an attempt by a part of its
territory to secede. This was certainly the position adopted by the two chief architects (and enforcers) of the
Congress system, British foreign secretary Viscount Castlereagh and Austrian chancellor Prince von Metternich. But
it was disputed, especially by the Russians, whether the principle applied to a non-Christian "Asiatic" power such as
the Ottoman Empire. The Greek issue thus became entangled in the Eastern Question. The Eastern Question was the
term used to denote the great power diplomacy surrounding the decline of the Ottoman Empire.
Battle of Navarino
Although it is often referred to as the Turkish empire, the name Ottoman, derived from the name of the ruling
dynasty, is more appropriate. The Ottomans conquered the old Greek-controlled Byzantine empire during the Middle
Ages, taking over its territory and its capital, Constantinople, and becoming its effective successor-state.[3] Ethnic
Turks were the "master-nation" of the empire, holding political and military power, but were a minority of the
empire's population even of its Muslim inhabitants, as they were outnumbered by their Arab subjects. Furthermore,
although officially Islamic, its Christian inhabitants (Greek, Balkan, Armenian and Christian Arab) represented
roughly half the total population. Although granted freedom of worship and generally better treated than
non-Christians in most European countries, non-Muslims in the Ottoman empire were required, in accordance with
Islamic law, to pay a special poll tax, the jizya, which in times of poor harvests was a crippling burden on mainly
subsistence-level peasants. Under the hated devşirme (military levy), Christian communities were also forced to
surrender 1 in 5 pre-adolescent boys to the Ottoman military (the finest physical specimens being selected by the
recruiting-sergeants). These would be permanently separated from their families, raised as Muslims and trained to a
high standard to staff the best regiments of the Ottoman army, including the elite Janissary corps.
The Ottoman empire had once been the foremost military power in Europe, reaching its apogee in the 16th and 17th
centuries, when it threatened the whole continent. Its armies overran the entire Balkan peninsula and Greece, and
reached the borders of Austria, laying siege to Vienna itself twice (in 1529 and 1683). Its fleets dominated the
Mediterranean. But the Ottomans had gradually fallen behind the other European powers as they failed to modernise
their political institutions, economic system and military forces. During the 18th century, the Ottoman Empire
steadily lost territory in eastern Europe to the neighbouring Austrian and Russian empires (which annexed Hungary
and southern Russia respectively). By the turn of the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire was the most economically
backward and militarily weak of the great powers. But its territory, even after the continuous retreats, remained vast
and strategic: it encompassed the Balkans, Anatolia, and all the Arab lands from Persia to Morocco. The latter were
seen by London as having crucial geo-strategic significance, long before their petroleum deposits became a vital
industrial commodity in the early 20th century, as they constituted the link between the Mediterranean and Britain's
empire in India.
For the Ottoman government, commonly known in diplomatic circles of the time as the "Porte" (from La Porte
Sublime - "The Sublime Gate" - the French name of the gate of the Topkapı Palace through which foreign envoys
were admitted), Greece was a core province. Its loss could not be contemplated, unlike other regions such as the
Romanian Principalities and Serbia, which were seen as peripheral vassal-states. The fear of the Porte was that the
secession of even a small part of Greece such as the Peloponnese would lead to demands by Greek nationalists for
the liberation of all the other regions of the empire containing Greek majorities, including central Greece,
Macedonia, Thrace, Constantinople itself, western Anatolia, the Aegean islands and Crete and Cyprus, threatening
the empire's very existence. In addition, the Greeks were economically critical, as they dominated the empire's trade
through their ownership of much of its merchant shipping. On a personal level, the Sultan (emperor) of the Ottoman
empire, Mahmud II (ruled 1808-39), considered the Greek revolt a monstrous betrayal by a conquered nation that the
Porte had always treated generously. The Sultan vented his fury on the Greeks' spiritual leader, the Patriarch of
Constantinople, Gregory V, whom he suspected of colluding with the rebels. As the Patriarch emerged from his
cathedral, in full regalia, after celebrating Easter Mass in April 1821, he was seized by Janissary Guards and hanged
on the spot, from the cathedral gates. After dangling for three days, his corpse was dragged through the streets and
flung into the Bosporus.
The most pro-Greek power was Russia. As the sole Orthodox Christian great power, Russia had long seen herself as
the protector (and potential liberator) of the Balkan and Greek subjects of the Ottoman Empire, who were
predominantly of the Orthodox faith. The Serbs and Bulgarians were also fellow Slavic-speakers. This emotional
bond dovetailed neatly with Russia's geostrategic interests. Supporting a breakaway Greek state, which would be a
natural ally of Russia, was an obvious way to advance Russian influence in south-east Europe. In addition, wealthy
Greek phanariote aristocratic clans, which largely controlled Russia's Black Sea trade, had substantial political and
commercial influence in Russia. The main problem for supporters of Greece in Russia was that Greece was only one
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Battle of Navarino
of several issues that were in contention between St Petersburg and the Porte: others included Russia's ambition to
impose a protectorate over the Romanian principalities and Serbia, its demands for control of the Principalities'
Black Sea ports, the right of Russian warships to sail through the Bosporus, and Russia's annexation of territories in
the Caucasus.
The decisive Russian triumph in the Russo-Turkish War of 1768-74, which brought enormous lands in the Black Sea
region as far as the Caucasus under Russian control, resulted in a great fear of Russian expansion on the part of the
other great powers, especially Austria and Great Britain. Austrian foreign policy underwent a complete volte-face.
For centuries the Austrians were the Porte's arch-enemies, bloodily contesting every inch of Hungary. From the late
18th century onwards, the Austrians, threatened with encirclement by Russian ambitions in the Balkans, became
strong supporters of the Ottoman empire's integrity. In this they were joined by Britain, whose leaders feared that the
Russians ultimately aimed to relieve Britain of its empire in India and to create a Eurasian superpower. The British
government was concerned that a successful Greek secession could trigger a series of nationalist revolts that could
lead to the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, leaving an enormous power vacuum which the Russians were
best-placed to fill. When the Greek revolution broke out in 1821, the British Cabinet was dominated by the
conservative faction of the ruling Tory party, including Castlereagh, Lord Liverpool (prime minister) and Duke of
Wellington, the victor of the Battle of Waterloo and now Master General of Ordnance. These men were resolute
supporters of Ottoman territorial integrity.
The French government's involvement had somewhat confused motives. France's defeat in the Napoleonic Wars had
confirmed Britain's naval supremacy in the Mediterranean. The guiding motive of French policy in the
Mediterranean thus remained the same as Napoleon's had been before 1815: to challenge Britain's hegemony, but
this time by diplomacy rather than by war.[4] As Napoleon had done with his expedition in 1798, the French
government focused on Egypt. France had equipped and trained a modern army and navy for Muhammad Ali Pasha's
regime, a policy viewed with intense suspicion by London. It was felt that a likely consequence, intended or not, was
Egyptian secession from the Ottoman Empire (which indeed eventually happened).[5] The Paris government also
adopted in the Mediterranean, almost on principle, policies opposed by London, such as favouring great power
intervention in the Greek conflict. Inconsistently, however, Paris shared London's concern about Russian
expansionism and also supported, at least formally, Ottoman territorial integrity.
Despite their lack of enthusiasm for the rebellion, the British and French governments were under mounting pressure
from their home public opinion to assist the Greeks. Whatever the geostrategic implications of their revolt, the
Greeks, in the eyes of most Britons and Frenchmen, were gallant Christian fighters struggling to free themselves
from a corrupt and oppressive Islamic tyranny. In an era when nationalism was inextricably linked to liberalism, the
Greek insurgency became a rallying-cry for liberals all over Europe, and especially for French liberals, whose
political action at home were severely restricted by the Bourbon monarchy restored to power by the Allied powers in
1815. Both London and Paris hosted powerful philhellenic committees, supported by prominent and wealthy
personalities, such as the romantic poet Lord Byron in England (who died fighting for the Greek cause in 1824) and
the writers Chateaubriand and Victor Hugo in France. The Committees raised large sums of money for the Greek
revolutionaries, agitated in the press and equipped and despatched hundreds of volunteers to fight in Greece.[6]
Popular pressure for intervention intensified after Ibrahim Pasha's brutal invasion of the Peloponnese. The atrocities
committed by his forces, loudly advertised and greatly exaggerated in the liberal press, sparked a furore throughout
Europe. Ibrahim was denounced in the French press as Le Sanguinaire ("The Bloodthirsty One").[7] This was acutely
embarrassing to the French government, which had equipped and trained the Egyptian forces. The Greek revolt was
probably the first occasion in European history when public opinion had a significant impact on great power foreign
policy.
Both the Russian and French governments had to contend with the basic strategic fact that providing naval assistance
to the Greeks was not practicable without British consent, because of Britain's naval supremacy in the
Mediterranean.[4] Britain's crushing naval victories over France and Spain in the Napoleonic Wars had turned the
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Battle of Navarino
Mediterranean into a British lake, closely controlled by a string of strategic bases from Gibraltar to the Ionian
islands, which Britain had taken over from the French in 1815 and were the only part of Greece not under Ottoman
rule. This meant that any French intervention was in effect subject to a British veto. But the Russians had an
alternative option, beyond Britain's veto, of attacking the Ottoman Empire by land across the Danube (and by sea in
the Black Sea).
Great Power diplomacy
From the inception of the Greek revolt until 1826, British and Austrian
diplomacy (directed by Castlereagh and Metternich respectively) aimed
at ensuring the non-intervention of the great powers in the conflict.[8]
Their objective was to stall Russian military intervention in support of
the Greeks, in order to give the Ottomans time to defeat the rebellion,
which Metternich was convinced they were capable of doing.[9]
This diplomacy was initially successful because the reigning Tsar,
Alexander I (r.1801-25), was reluctant to support any revolutionary
movement because of his experience during the Napoleonic Wars.
Despite fervent support for the Greek cause in Russian nationalist
circles, Alexander proved unwilling to defy Metternich and Castlereagh
and offer the Greeks more than (limited) diplomatic support.[10] Indeed,
at the Congress of Verona (1822), Castlereagh persuaded Tsar
Alexander to ignore the Greek cause altogether, even refusing to admit
George Canning, British foreign secretary
[11]
1822-7
and prime minister April–August 1827,
a Greek delegation to the conference.
In the same year, Alexander
architect of the Treaty of London, which
also forced the resignation of his ethnic Venetian/Greek foreign
launched European intervention in the Greek
minister, Count Giovanni Capo d'Istria (Ioannis Kapodistrias, later
conflict
president of the First Hellenic Republic), for his passionate advocacy of
the Greek cause. In 1824 the Tsar proposed a plan for Greek autonomy to the other powers.[12] But it was clear that
he was simply not prepared to act unilaterally.[13]
In 1822, Castlereagh was succeeded as foreign secretary by George Canning, to Metternich's dismay. Canning was a
liberal Tory, and hostile to the conservative faction led by Wellington. He had even fought a duel with Castlereagh in
1809 over policy disagreements. He detested Metternich's intrigues and was more sympathetic to the Greeks, having
joined the London Philhellenic Committee. Nevertheless, until 1826 his policy remained the same as Castlereagh's:
non-intervention.[14]
But the Ottomans proved unable to suppress the revolt during the long period of non-intervention secured by British
and Austrian diplomacy. By the time the Ottomans were making serious progress, it was too late. In December 1825,
the diplomatic landscape changed with the death of Tsar Alexander and the succession of his younger brother
Nicholas
I
(r.
1825-55).
Still
only
30
years
old,
Nicholas
was
a
more
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Battle of Navarino
decisive and risk-taking character than his brother, as well as being far
more nationalistic. In foreign policy, he adopted a two-faced stance. In
western Europe, he became notorious as a ferocious defender of the
established order, earning the sobriquet of "the gendarme of Europe"
by his willingness to despatch troops as far away as Italy to help crush
liberal revolutions. But in the Balkans, he eagerly adopted the mantle
of Orthodox crusader and liberator. In this regard, he did not share his
brother's aversion to unilateral action. In diplomatic circles, it was now
widely believed that it was only a matter of time before the Russians
went to war against the Porte.
Canning's response to the new situation was to move towards joint
intervention: if intervention by Russia was inevitable, then he intended
to ensure that it be constrained within parameters acceptable to Britain.
He promoted a solution essentially the same as Tsar Alexander's:
Greek autonomy under Ottoman suzerainty.[15] The formula was
Tsar Nicholas I of Russia, (r. 1825-55). A
enough to satisfy the Russians, while for the British it had the
Russian nationalist and Orthodox crusader, he
prodded Britain into giving naval assistance to
attraction of preserving Ottoman territorial integrity. A protocol
the
Greeks and then launched the Russo-Turkish
centred on this proposal and envisaging the powers' mediation was
War of 1828-9, which finally secured Greek
signed by Britain and Russia in April 1826. This was a turning-point in
independence and Russian hegemony in the
British policy, as it envisaged intervention for the first time. The Tsar
Black sea region
then surprised the British by making the protocol public (although it
was intended only as a first step in a process leading to a formal treaty) and using it as a lever to pressure the Porte.
However, neither the Tsar nor the Porte were yet ready for war. Both governments were in the process of
modernising their armies, and the Tsar was also concerned with internal unrest in the wake of the Decembrist coup
attempt which had nearly prevented his accession.[16] As a result, both settled for a compromise, signing the
Convention of Akkerman in October 1826. In return for the Tsar dropping the Greek issue from the negotiations, the
Sultan conceded long-standing Russian demands as regards the Romanian Principalities and Serbia.[17]
The Porte probably believed it had bought off Russian support for the Greeks, neutralising the Anglo-Russian
protocol of April. But Tsar Nicholas had no intention of forgetting Greece. Negotiations proceeded on a formal
treaty based on the protocol, now with France included. (Metternich refused an invitation to participate, and
continued to support the Porte). But progress stalled, largely because of continuing opposition within the British
Cabinet to intervention, led by the Duke of Wellington. The Tsar became impatient, stepping up pressure on Britain
by despatching in October 1826 a naval squadron to the Mediterranean from St Petersburg, which pointedly visited
the British naval base of Portsmouth en route. This implied threat of unilateral action by Russia strengthened
Canning's hand in the Cabinet: when, in April 1827, Liverpool was obliged by illness to step down as prime minister,
Canning won the contest to succeed him. Wellington promptly resigned, clearing the way for a treaty to be
concluded.[18]
Treaty of London
The three Powers signed the Treaty of London on 6 July 1827. Citing the disruption of trade in the Mediterranean
caused by the war as the justification for allied intervention, the treaty called for an immediate armistice between the
belligerents, in effect demanding a cessation of Ottoman military operations in Greece just when the Ottomans had
victory in their grasp. It also offered Allied mediation in the negotiations on a final settlement that were to follow the
armistice.[19]
6
Battle of Navarino
7
The treaty called on the Porte to grant the Greeks autonomy. The treaty envisaged Greece remaining under Ottoman
suzerainty, and paying an annual tribute to the Sultan.[20] The amount of tribute was to be negotiated and fixed
permanently, to avoid the situation which had developed in the Romanian Principalities, where variable tributes had
become crushing burdens and kept those two countries in poverty for two centuries.
A secret clause in the agreement provided that if the Porte failed to accept the armistice within a month, each
signatory Power would despatch a consul to Nafplion, the capital of the Hellenic Republic, thereby granting de facto
recognition to the rebel government, something no Power had done hitherto.[21]
The same clause authorized the signatories in concert to instruct their naval commanders in the Mediterranean to
"take all measures that circumstances may suggest" (i.e. including military action) to enforce the Allied demands, if
the Ottomans failed to comply within the specified time limit. However, the clause added that Allied commanders
should not take sides in the conflict.[22]
The treaty was thus a contradictory document, reflecting the conflicting priorities of the signatories, with the
Russians demanding a harder line with the Ottomans than their allies. It called for a negotiated settlement, but
predetermined what the end result of those negotiations should be. It offered mediation, but threatened the use of
force. It authorized force to be used, but forbade joining in the hostilities. Above all, although it was couched in
neutral language, in reality it favoured the Greek position. The critical point is that it committed the European
powers to armed intervention and effectively guaranteed a successful outcome for the Greek revolution. It was
signed just in time, as its architect Canning died in office just a few weeks later.
Prelude
On 20 August 1827, the British naval commander-in-chief in the
Mediterranean (i.e.. commander of "Blue" Squadron), Vice-Admiral
Sir Edward Codrington (1770–1851), veteran of 44 years at sea and a
popular hero for his role in the Battle of Trafalgar, received his
government's instructions regarding enforcement of the treaty.
Codrington could not have been a less suitable character for a task
which required great tact. He had joined the Royal Navy at age 13 as a
midshipman and worked his way to the top by sheer merit and courage.
An impetuous fighting sailor, he entirely lacked diplomatic finesse, a
quality he despised and derisively ascribed to his French counterpart,
H. de Rigny. He was also a sympathiser with the Greek cause, having
joined the London Philhellenic Committee.[23]
His instructions were to impose and enforce an armistice on both sides
and to interdict the flow of reinforcements and supplies from Asia
Minor and Egypt to Ottoman forces in Greece. He was to use force
only as a last resort.[24]
Vice-Admiral Sir Edward Codrington, Allied
commander-in-chief at the Battle of Navarino
On 29 August, the Porte formally rejected the Treaty of London's stipulations, triggering the dispatch of Allied
representatives to Nafplion. On 2 September, the Greek provisional government accepted the armistice. This freed
Codrington to concentrate on coercing the Ottoman side.[25]
Navarino Bay is a large natural harbour on the west coast of Messenia (SW Peloponnese). It is approximately 5 km
long
(between
the
Battle of Navarino
8
headlands) and 3 km wide. The bay is sheltered from the open sea by a
long, narrow islet (Sphacteria). This islet leaves two entrances to the
bay. Because of a sandbank, the northern one is very narrow and
shallow, 100 m wide and just 1 m deep in places, impassable to large
boats. The southern one is much wider, 1500 m, with an effective
passage of 1000 m width because of rocks. The southern entrance was
at that time guarded by an Ottoman-held fort, at Navarino (Pylos).
During the Greek insurgency, the bay was used by the Ottoman navy
as its main operational base in the Peloponnese.
A large Ottoman-Egyptian fleet, which had been warned by the British
and French to stay away from Greece, left Alexandria on 5 August
1827 and joined other Ottoman units at Navarino on 8 September.[26]
In response, Codrington arrived with his squadron off Navarino on 12
September. In talks on 25 September with Ibrahim Pasha and the
Ottoman admiral, he extracted verbal promises that they would cease
offensive operations by land and sea.[27] After these talks, Codrington
withdrew to the nearby British-controlled Ionian island of Zante
(Zakynthos), leaving a frigate off Navarino to keep watch on the
Ottoman fleet.
Ibrahim Pasha, the son of a renegade
ethnic-Greek mother from Thrace, who was
adopted as a child by the Egyptian ruler
Muhammad Ali when the latter married his
mother and brought up as a Muslim. He
commanded the Egyptian expedition to the
Peloponnese (1825-8). The atrocities committed
by his forces against the Greek population made
him the most reviled figure in Europe. But he was
an able general and later (1831-9) inflicted
crushing defeats in Syria on his nominal overlord,
the Ottoman Sultan Mahmud II
But the Ottomans soon violated these undertakings. Ibrahim was
outraged that, while he was expected to observe a ceasefire,
Codrington seemingly allowed the Greeks to continue military
operations unhindered. The Greeks' British commanders were on the
offensive at the entrance of the strategically vital Gulf of Corinth.
Church's army lay siege to the Ottoman-held port of Patras, while
Cochrane organised a revolt behind Ottoman lines in Epirus. By sea, Hastings' steam-powered warship, the Karteria,
launched a daring night-raid (29/30 September) at Itea on the northern shore of the Gulf, sinking 9 Ottoman
gunboats. The problem for Codrington was that these officers were acting on their own initiative, largely ignoring
the often contradictory directives of their employer, the Greek provisional government. Recognising that appeals to
the latter were ineffective, Codrington despatched aides directly to the British commanders to demand that they
cease operations, but with little result.[28]
After a vain protest to Codrington, Ibrahim decided to act. On 1 October, he despatched a naval squadron to
reinforce the Patras garrison. It was intercepted by Codrington's squadron at the entrance to the Gulf, and forced to
return to Navarino, shadowed by Codrington. Ibrahim tried again on the night of 3/4 October, this time leading the
squadron in person. Using the darkness, he succeeded in slipping past the British picket-ship unobserved, but was
prevented from entering the Gulf by a strong headwind. His squadron was obliged to anchor in the lee of Cape Papas
and wait out the storm. This gave Codrington time to catch up, and the British squadron, after a whole day of
fighting the wind, arrived off Papas on the evening of 4 October. Codrington fired a series of warning broadsides,
and Ibrahim reluctantly decided to turn back.[29]
In the meantime, Ibrahim's scorched-earth policy continued unabated on land. The fires of burning villages and fields
were clearly visible from Allied ships standing offshore. A British landing party reported that the population of
Messena was close to mass starvation.[30]
On 13 October Codrington was joined off Navarino by his allied support, a French squadron under De Rigny and a
Russian squadron under L. Heyden. On 18 October, after futile attempts to contact Ibrahim Pasha, Codrington, in
conference with his Allied colleagues, took the fateful decision to enter Navarino bay and anchor his ships
Battle of Navarino
9
face-to-face with the Ottoman/Egyptian fleet. It was decided that with winter approaching, it was impracticable to
maintain an effective blockade of Navarino and that in any event, the population of the Peloponnese had to be
safeguarded.[31] Although this was highly provocative act, Codrington claimed that there was no intention to engage
in battle, but only to make a show of force to induce the Ottomans to respect the armistice and to desist from
atrocities against the civilian population.[32]
Relative strength of the two Fleets
Allies
The Allied navies at this time were still deploying essentially the same
technology as during the Napoleonic Wars: sailing ships, unarmoured
wooden hulls and muzzle-loading smoothbore cannon. The navies,
especially the British one, had ignored the new technologies that were
to transform them by the 1850s: steam propulsion, ironclad hulls, rifled
guns and explosive shells. All these had been invented by 1827, but
their development for naval warfare, let alone introduction, met dogged
resistance from senior naval echelons. In the words of one scholar:
"The great admirals of the 18th century would have had no difficulty in
taking over Codrington's command at short notice."[33] The British
navy did not deploy steam warships until the 1840s. Ironically, the
fledgling navy of the Greek revolutionaries was far ahead of the field:
they possessed a small warship propelled by steam-powered paddles
(as well as sails) called the Karteria. Entering service in 1826, it was
the first steam warship to see combat in history.[34]
However, the Royal Navy's warships had seen some improvements.
Ships with triple gun-decks such as Nelson's famous HMS Victory had
been phased out. Triple-deckers had been found to be too unstable and
difficult to manoeuvre. The standard Canopus-class battleship was now
a double-deck 74-84 gun boat, based on the successful "74" French
design. In addition, gun-calibres had been upgraded. The
Napoleonic-era Fame-class battleships had been equipped with
32-pounders on the main gun-deck, 18-pounders on the upper deck and
9- and 12- pounders on the super-structures (quarterdeck and
forecastle). In contrast, the guns were now all 24- or 32-pounders (plus
a couple of massive 68-pounder carronades on the super-structures).
Frigates were either double-deckers of 50-60 guns (known as large
frigates); or single-deckers with 24-44 guns.[33]
Satellite picture of the Peloponnese. Navarino
bay is visible below the legend "Messinia". Click
on picture to enlarge
Map of Navarino bay. The diagram of the order
of battle contains inaccuracies
Most of the Allied ships, however, were still veteran Napoleonic-era warhorses (e.g. HMS Albion). Codrington's
only Canopus-class battleship was his flagship, HMS Asia (launched 1824), although Genoa (an impounded French
"74") was also post-Napoleonic (1816). In the French squadron, De Rigny was so appalled by the state of the 3
battleships sent to him that he decided to keep his flag on the Sirène, a modern frigate.[35]
Battle of Navarino
10
Ottomans
Overall at Navarino, the Allies had 22 ships and 1,258 guns against the
Ottomans' 78 ships with 2,180 guns (figures exclude smaller boats and
fireships).[36] But the numbers masked major Allied advantages in
ship-types, gun-calibres and crew quality. As a result of these, Allied
gun-crews could fire more powerful, more frequent and more accurate
cannonades than their Ottoman counterparts.
The Allies had a substantial superiority in front-line combat vessels: 10
battleships to the Ottomans' 3. This advantage was only partially offset
by the Ottomans' 7 double-deck frigates against 1 Allied vessel of this
kind. The great majority of the Ottoman-Egyptian fleet were smaller
vessels – 58 corvettes and brigs – which were of little use against the
Allied heavyweights: they had much smaller firepower, and, their
decks being lower, could easily be dismasted by raking fire. In
addition, the Ottoman-Egyptians mainly deployed smaller-calibre guns
than the Allies (often the guns discarded by the Allies when they
upgraded their own calibres). Most of the Allied crews had gained
extensive combat experience in the Napoleonic Wars, which had only
ended 12 years previously, and were service professionals. In contrast,
the Ottoman crews only had combat experience against the Greek
revolutionary naval forces, which although gallant and effective, bore
no resemblance to the navies of the Great Powers. In many cases,
Ottoman crews impressed men. Some Ottoman crew were even found,
after the battle, to have been shackled at their posts (convicts, Greek
prisoners or other involuntary recruits).[37]
Flames engulf Ottoman triple-gundeck battleship
Mansur al-Liwa, flagship of Kara-Ali Pasha,
Kapudan Pasha (Grand Admiral) of the Ottoman
Navy, after it was struck by a Greek fireship in
Chios harbour on the night of June 6/7, 1822.
Moments later, the vessel's gunpowder magazine
exploded, killing everyone on board, including
the admiral himself and 2,000 crew and guests at
an official reception. The fireship's sails are
visible to the rear; in foreground, the fireship's
crew make their escape in a lifeboat, with their
commander Constantine Kanaris at the helm.
During their struggle for independence, the
Greeks destroyed some 40 Ottoman warships in
this manner, neutralising the Ottomans' massive
naval superiority. Adopted by the Ottomans,
fireships were potentially their most dangerous
weapon at Navarino
The Egyptian contingent, the largest and best-equipped of the Ottoman
fleet at Navarino, had been trained by a team of French officers, under
the overall direction of Capt J-M. Letellier. These officers acted as
"shadow-captains" of the large Egyptian vessels, each advising the
nominal Egyptian captain. The day before the battle, De Rigny persuaded these officers to withdraw from the
Egyptian fleet so as to avoid the possibility of fighting against their own navy (they moved to an Austrian brig that
was in the bay, ostensibly neutral but in reality providing logistical support for Ottoman operations). Letellier
himself was sick and also took no part.[7] This deprived the Egyptians of experienced command.
For the Allies, probably the Ottomans' most dangerous weapon were their fireships. The latter, the "poor man's
battleship", had long been deployed to devastating effect by the Greek revolutionaries against the Ottomans, who had
learnt how to use them through hard experience.[38] Fireships were posted on the wings of the Ottoman formation,
and could, if effectively deployed, wreak mayhem on Allied boats concentrated in enclosed waters, especially as
Allied sailors had no experience of this kind of warfare. The danger was graphically demonstrated in the early phase
of the battle, when the French battleship Scipion narrowly escaped being destroyed by a fireship.[39]
The Ottomans possessed a shore battery on each side of the main entrance to the bay, in Navarino fort and on the
southern tip of Sphacteria island. These could seriously have impeded Allied entry into the bay, but Codrington was
clearly confident that the Ottomans would not start a shooting war. (Or, in an alternative interpretation, he hoped that
they would, to give him an excuse to destroy the Ottoman fleet).
Battle of Navarino
11
Strategies
Following an elaborate defensive plan proposed by Letellier, the Ottoman-Egyptian fleet was anchored in a
horseshoe formation, in three lines, extending from Navarino fort to the southern tip of Sphacteria island, where the
Ottoman shore battery lay. The front line consisted of the heavy boats, battleships and large frigates; the 2nd line
contained the remaining frigates and larger corvettes; the 3rd consisted of the remaining smaller boats. The idea was
that the small boats could fire through the gaps in the frontline, whilst being protected by the large boats from Allied
attack. On the ends of the horseshoe were stationed corvettes and fireships.[40] The latter could be towed by small
boats into position covered by the smaller corvettes and shore batteries.[41][42]
The Allied plan was to anchor in the free water inside the crescent. Codrington's squadron would take up position
facing the centre of the Ottoman line; the French and Russian squadrons would face the Ottoman left and right wings
respectively. The French position in the line had been specifically determined so that they would face the Egyptian
fleet, which had been trained by the French and might be reluctant to fight against Egypt's closest European ally.[43]
In conventional naval doctrine, Codrington's plan would have been regarded as an unacceptable risk, as it would
have invited the enemy to try to surround the Allies.[44] Furthermore, with the prevailing wind blowing from the SW,
straight up the entrance, Codrington risked becoming trapped, unable to extricate his squadrons quickly if necessary.
The adoption of this high-risk plan shows the total confidence of the Allied commanders in the tactical superiority of
their vessels.
Battle
At 1.30 PM, 20 October 1827, off the entrance to Navarino bay, Codrington signalled to the Allied fleet: "PREPARE
FOR ACTION" and Allied crews were ordered to stand to their guns.[45] Gun-ports were left half-open, but Allied
captains were under strict orders to open fire only if attacked. At 2.00 PM, Allied warships, with Codrington in the
lead in Asia, began filing into the bay through the southern entrance, proceeding in two lines, British followed by
French to starboard (SE, closest to Navarino) and Russians to port abreast but slightly behind the French. There was
no attempt to prevent their entry by the Ottoman shore batteries or their corvettes posted at the entrance, but
Codrington received a launch carrying a message from Ibrahim Pasha. This stated that he had not given permission
for the Allies to enter the bay, and demanded that they withdraw. Codrington dismissed Ibrahim's objection, replying
that he had come to give orders, not to take them. He warned that if the Ottomans opened fire, their fleet would be
destroyed.[45][46]
As his flagship cast anchor in the middle of the Ottoman line,
Codrington ordered a brass band to play on deck to emphasize his
peaceful intentions. By 2.15 PM, the 3 British battleships had dropped
anchor in their allotted positions.[47] Meanwhile as the Allied vessels
moved into position, along the Ottoman lines trumpets sounded action
stations. Ottoman crews scrambled to meet the unexpected intrusion
into their base.
At this point, at the entrance, fighting broke out. Codrington claimed
that hostilities were started by the Ottomans. The outbreak, according
to Allied sources, occurred in the following manner:
Ottoman fleet ablaze in Navarino bay, 20 Oct
1827
At the entrance to the bay, Capt Thomas Fellowes on the frigate Dartmouth had been detailed, with six smaller boats
(2 brigs and 4 schooners) to keep watch on the group of Ottoman corvettes and fireships on the left flank of the
Ottoman
line.
As
the
Allied
ships
Battle of Navarino
continued moving into the bay, Fellowes noticed that an Ottoman crew
was preparing a fireship and sent a boat to instruct them to desist. The
Ottomans fired on the boat and lighted the fireship. Fellowes sent a
cutter to tow the fireship to a safe distance, but the Ottomans fired on
the cutter, inflicting casualties. Fellowes opened musket fire on the
fireship crew to cover his men. At this point the French flagship
Sirène, which was just then entering the bay on the tail of the
British-French line, opened fire with muskets to support Dartmouth.
An Ottoman corvette then attacked Sirène with its guns. This chain
reaction spread along the line, so that within a short time, there was
general engagement.[48]
12
Action at close quarters during the battle. This
detail shows Codrington's flagship, HMS Asia
(centre, flying Blue Ensign), simultaneously
demolishing two Ottoman flagships
The battle thus began before the Allies could complete their
deployment. In fact, this proved to be a tactical advantage, as it meant
some Allied ships were not yet at anchor and could therefore
manoeuvre more swiftly. Nevertheless, most ships fought at anchor.
There was naturally very little scope for manoeuvre, except to change
the orientation of the boat by hauling on the springs on the anchor
chains.[49] With ships blasting each other at very close range, the
encounter was mostly a matter of attrition, in which superior Allied
firepower and gunnery were critical.
Combat action may be summarised as follows:
1. The French battleship Scipion (80 guns), behind De Rigny's Sirène
(60), immediately came under intense attack, by a combination of
Egyptian frigates on both sides, the shore batteries and a fireship.
The latter was nearly fatal. The fireship jammed under Scipion's
bowsprit, the fore sails caught fire and the fire spread onto the upper
gun-deck. Men flung themselves on the fire to prevent it spreading
to the forward powder magazine, with inevitable horrendous burn
injuries. Nevertheless, the gunners continued to fire on the attackers.
Scipion was saved from destruction by her sister ship Trident (74),
which succeeded in attaching a tow-line to the fireship and, with the
assistance of Dartmouth and 2 other British boats, pulling it
clear.[39]
2. De Rigny's Sirène fought a lengthy duel with the 64-gun frigate
Ihsania, which finally blew up. Sirène suffered significant casualties
and damage. Sirène, with the support of Trident and Scipion, then
bombarded the fort of Navarino and eventually silenced its shore
battery.[50]
Battle of Navarino, by Ivan Aivazovsky, showing
the Russian squadron, in line ahead (left-centre,
white flags with blue transversal crosses)
bombarding the Ottoman fleet (right, with red
flags)
Burning and beached hulks of Ottoman warships
under the cliffs of Navarino. Painting by Auguste
Mayer
3. The captain of French battleship Breslau (84), Capt De la Bretonnière, seeing that De Rigny did not need further
support, decided on his own initiative to break away from the French formation and move into the centre of the
bay, at the junction of the British and Russian lines, to reinforce British battleship Albion (74) and Russian
battleship Azov (80). Both were hard pressed. Albion, which had wrecked an Ottoman frigate as she anchored,
was under fire from all 3 Ottoman battleships simultaneously. Fortunately for her, the enemy gunnery was inept.
Even so, Breslau's intervention was later acknowledged by the captain of Albion as having saved his ship from
Battle of Navarino
annihilation. Breslau then proceeded to play a leading role in the destruction of Ottoman admiral Tahir Pasha's
flagship, the Ghiuh Rewan (84), and at least 4 frigates.[51]
4. Codrington's Asia (84) was anchored between Ottoman admiral Capitana Bey's flagship, battleship Fahti Bahri
(74), and Egyptian Moharram Bey's frigate Guerrière (60). Capitana Bey opened fire, but Moharram Bey sent
word to Codrington that he was not going to attack. This enabled Asia to concentrate its fire on Fahti Bahri,
which was in a poor condition and inadequately manned. Asia's deadly fire shortly disabled her. Codrington then
sent an interpreter, Greek P. Mikelis, to parley with Moharram Bey; but Mikelis was shot dead as he went aboard.
Guerrière then opened fire, but was reduced to a burning wreck within 20 minutes by crushing broadsides from
Asia and Azov.[52] However, Asia suffered severe casualties and damage due to a concentration of heavy fire from
smaller Ottoman boats in the second and third lines of the Ottoman formation: as Letellier had planned, these
boats fired through the gaps in the front line. Codrington also believed that Asia had taken serious hits by mistake
from sister battleship Genoa.[53]
5. The Russians under Heyden were the last to take up station, as was planned. Their position, on the right end of
the Ottoman crescent, was the most exposed. The fighting in this sector was even more intense than elsewhere.
Azov sank or disabled 3 large frigates and a corvette, but herself took 153 hits, several below the waterline.[54]
6. The British frigates Armide and Talbot initially had to face the frigates on the Ottoman right wing and the island
shore battery unsupported, as the other two frigates were away and arrived later. They were saved from
annihilation by the arrival of the Russian frigates.[55]
7. The British and French small boats (brigs and the schooners Alcyone and Daphne), under the overall direction of
frigate Dartmouth, had been allotted the vital task of preventing fireship attacks. Their success was complete:
apart from the initial fireship attack on Scipion, not a single fireship struck a target during the battle. A number of
small boats greatly distinguished themselves, suffering casualties as great, in proportion, as the battleships.[56]
By about half-time in the battle (circa 4 p.m.), all 3 Ottoman battleships and most of the large frigates of the 1st line
had been despatched. This left the mass of smaller boats in the 2nd and 3rd lines at the mercy of the Allied
battleships, all of which were still operational. During the ensuing massacre, Codrington tried twice to order a
ceasefire, but his signals were either invisible because of the thick smoke or ignored in the heat of the battle.[57]
Within the following two hours, virtually the entire Ottoman fleet was destroyed, despite the signal bravery of the
Ottoman crews, which was praised by Codrington himself in his despatches. Three quarters were sunk: many of
them, dismasted but still afloat and reparable, were blown up or set on fire by their own crews to prevent them
falling into Allied hands.[58]
This contributed to the horrendous Ottoman and Egyptian casualty figures, as many men were trapped in burning or
exploding vessels. Some, as mentioned, were shackled to their posts. Ottoman casualties given to Codrington by
Letellier were approx. 3,000 killed, 1,109 wounded, although Codrington claimed the reverse was more likely. Of
the entire Ottoman-Egyptian armada of 78 vessels, just 8 remained seaworthy: 1 dismasted battleship, 2 frigates and
5 corvettes.
Allied casualties were given by Codrington as 181 killed, 480 wounded (including Codrington's youngest son,
midshipman H. Codrington, serving on Asia under his father, who was badly injured but made a full recovery).[59]
Several Allied ships were severely damaged: the 3 Russian battleships Azov, Gangut and Iezekiil were disabled. The
three British battleships had to be sent to England for repairs.[60] In fact, given the rough handling all the battleships
had endured and the danger from exploding Ottoman vessels, it was miraculous that not a single Allied vessel was
sunk.
As the guns fell silent at dusk in Navarino Bay, news of the outcome raced over the Peloponnese and to the rest of
Greece. In village after village, church bells started a continuous peal in the night. People rushed into village squares,
to be greeted by the news that the Ottoman Sultan and his hated vassal Ibrahim Pasha no longer possessed a
Mediterranean fleet. In a maritime country like Greece, the implication was evident, that the fledgling Greek state
was saved. Wild rejoicing broke out, and lasted through the night and for days after. Huge bonfires were lit on the
13
Battle of Navarino
14
mountaintops of the Peloponnese and Mt Parnassos in central Greece.[61] Celebrations swept even the occupied
regions, which the demoralised Ottoman garrisons made little effort to prevent.
Some bronze from the sunken Ottoman ships was bought by Anton Samassa in Trieste and was used for the main
bell of St. Judoc's Church in Sveti Jošt near Kranj, Carniola (now Slovenia).[62][63] It bears an inscription by the
Slovene Romantic poet France Prešeren: "My bronze was found at the bottom of the sea, when the kingdom of
Turkey was ended in Helade by Navarino. It was bought by a pilgrim; cast into a bell by Samassa, now I announce
God's honour from St. Jodocus's embrasures."[62]
Aftermath
Despite the celebrations, the Sultan still disposed of a total of around
40,000 troops in central and southern Greece, entrenched in powerful
fortresses. The final liberation of Greece was still far off, unless the
Porte could be induced to accept the Treaty of London.
The Sultan, however, refused to concede defeat in Greece. On the
contrary, his response to the Navarino disaster was to raise the stakes
dramatically, in effect challenging Russia to decide the whole issue on
the battlefield. A few weeks after the battle, in a symbolic gesture, he
proclaimed jihad (holy war) against the European powers in his
claimed role as khalifa (caliph, or spiritual leader) of all Muslims.
More concretely, he closed the Bosporus to international shipping, a
move certain to provoke Russia, whose entire Black Sea trade had to
pass through the Straits. He also revoked the Convention of Akkerman,
signed with Russia the previous year.
The Sultan also ordered his vassal Muhammad Ali not to withdraw his
army from the Peloponnese. But the Allies despatched envoys to
Alexandria to demand that the Egyptian prince do precisely that. This
left Muhammad Ali in a dilemma. On the one hand, as an experienced
statesman, he knew that with the Great Powers backing Greek
autonomy, the game was up in the Peloponnese. On the other, he was
reluctant to be seen as betraying his overlord, especially now that he
had declared jihad, and also to inflict on his son Ibrahim the
humiliation of a forced withdrawal.[64] So he played for time, engaging
the Allies in lengthy but inconclusive negotiations, in the hope that in
the meantime the Sultan would himself reach an agreement with the
Allies that would permit Ibrahim a face-saving departure.
Mahmud II, Ottoman sultan 1808-39, who
struggled for eight years to defeat the Greek
revolution, ultimately in vain
Russian land and sea forces assail the Ottoman
Black Sea fortress of Varna in Rumelia
(Bulgaria), September 1828. The assault was
successful, but the two other main Ottoman
fortresses in Rumelia held out, extending the
Russo-Turkish War for a further year
But any chance of a negotiated settlement disappeared with Russia's
long-expected declaration of war on the Porte in April 1828, starting the 11th Russo-Turkish War (1828–1829) and
signalling the ultimate failure of British diplomacy. With the Tsar himself present in nominal command (actual
command was in the hands of veteran German-born career-soldier Count Wittgenstein), a Russian army of 100,000
men, supported by the Black sea fleet, swept aside the Ottoman forces in the Romanian Principalities, crossed the
Danube,
and
laid
siege
to
Silistra,
Battle of Navarino
Varna and Shumla, the key Ottoman-held fortresses in Rumelia
(Bulgaria). But despite substantial Russian successes by land and sea
(including the capture of the crucial seaport of Varna), the 1828
campaign ended inconclusively. Silistra and Shumla remained in
Ottoman hands because of their fierce defence, and the main Russian
army was obliged to withdraw to Russian territory by supply shortages
and disease.
Meanwhile, in Paris, a more liberal government under the Vicomte de
British admiral Codrington (centre) negotiating
Martignac took office in January 1828, after an election in which the
with Muhammad Ali Pasha in the latter's palace
Bourbon kingdom of France's tiny electorate of 74,000 mainly
in Alexandria, Egypt (1828). In the aftermath of
Navarino, Codrington pressed for an Egyptian
aristocratic voters turned against the ultra-conservative faction. Eager
withdrawal, but it took a year to achieve this
to court popularity, de Martignac announced in April 1828 that, in
view of the failure of diplomatic efforts, France would despatch an
expeditionary force of 13,000 elite troops to expel the Egyptian and Ottoman forces from the Peloponnese. The news
was greeted with wild enthusiasm by the Parisian public. As urgent preparations began in France's Mediterranean
ports, Ibrahim Pasha told his father that he felt confident he could repel the French. But since the sinking of his
expensive modern fleet, Ali had lost all appetite for military confrontation with the Great Powers. Ibrahim's motley
force of Egyptian peasants and Albanian mercenaries, he felt sure, would stand no chance against the French
professionals, who were largely officered by battle-hardened veterans of Napoleon's army. Ali now engaged in
serious negotiations with Codrington, who had been despatched by London to Alexandria to try to forestall the
French intervention. In August, Ali agreed terms with Codrington for the withdrawal of his forces from the
Peloponnese. Ibrahim initially refused to comply with his father's evacuation orders, but gave way shortly after the
French troops landed in Navarino Bay at the end of August, to a jubilant reception by the Greeks. The Egyptians
finally left in October 1828, a year after the naval battle. The French proceeded to clear the remaining Ottoman
garrisons in the Peloponnese, which offered only token resistance, by the end of 1828. In the subsequent months,
Greek forces regained control of central Greece in a lightning campaign.
For the 1829 campaign on the Danube, Tsar Nicholas dismissed the ailing Wittgenstein and handed the Russian
command to his more aggressive compatriot, Count von Diebitsch, who succeeded in capturing Silistra and then
surprised the Ottomans with a high-speed drive for the Ottoman capital Constantinople (Istanbul), bypassing Shumla
and routing an Ottoman army sent to intercept him. In September 1829, with the Russian army camped just 40 miles
from his palace, the Sultan was forced to capitulate. By the Treaty of Adrianople, he conceded a long list of Russian
demands, one of which was acceptance of Greek autonomy as defined in the Treaty of London. However, Tsar
Nicholas and his ministers were careful to avoid the more extreme demands advocated by Russian nationalists, such
as a Russian military occupation of the Straits or annexation of the Danubian principalities, that would risk war with
Great Britain and Austria. As a consequence, London and Vienna were relieved that the outcome was not worse and
reluctantly acquiesced in Russia's strategic gains.
However, the Sultan's acceptance came too late to save Ottoman sovereignty over Greece. Buoyed by the Ottoman
disasters on land and sea, and their own military successes, the Greeks refused to accept anything less than full
independence. Finally, at the London Conference of 1832, the Allies dropped their policy of Ottoman suzerainty and
accepted Greek independence, but insisted that the new state should be a monarchy not a republic. Later that year,
the Sultan was forced by the Allied powers to sign the Treaty of Constantinople (1832) formally recognizing the new
Kingdom of Greece as an independent state. The latter's territory, however, was restricted to just those regions from
which Ottoman forces had been expelled, namely the Peloponnese, the Cyclades islands of the Aegean Sea and
central Greece. Many regions with an ethnic-Greek majority (Thessaly, Epirus, part of Macedonia and Thrace, the
remaining Aegean islands, Crete and Cyprus), remained under Ottoman rule.
15
Battle of Navarino
The disastrous secession of Greece was by no means the end of the Sultan's tribulations. Ironically, the gravest threat
to the Ottoman empire's integrity that emerged was not from Russia, but from Egypt. Having lost his fleet and the
hereditary fiefdom promised to his son, Muhammad Ali now demanded as compensation that Ibrahim be appointed
wali (viceroy) of the Ottoman province of Syria (which included modern Syria, Lebanon and Palestine). When the
Sultan refused, Muhammad Ali sent an army under Ibrahim into Syria in 1831. Swiftly defeating the local Ottoman
forces and overrunning the province, Ibrahim crushed an Ottoman army in Anatolia and prepared to march on
Constantinople. He was forced to stop by the intervention of Britain and France, which, however, obliged the Porte
to grant Ibrahim control of not only Syria, but also the island of Crete and of the Hijaz region of Arabia. His rule was
characteristically oppressive and sparked a series of indigenous revolts, notably the Palestinian Arab revolt of 1834.
In 1839, the Sultan launched a military attempt to oust him, but the Ottoman army was again routed by Ibrahim, who
again invaded Anatolia. At this critical juncture, the exhausted Mahmud II died and was succeeded by his teenage
son, Abdulmecid I. Faced with the spectre of the disintegration of the Ottoman empire, the British and Austrian
navies intervened directly in the Levant by blockading the Nile Delta coast and forced Ali to withdraw his forces
from Syria (1840). In return, the Allies obliged the young Sultan to grant Ali an unprecedented hereditary
vice-regency over Egypt. The dynasty that Ali founded ruled Egypt until the nationalist/military coup of 1952. But
de facto independence from the Ottomans was soon replaced by de facto rule from Whitehall. After the construction
of the Suez Canal in 1869, which instantly became the main shipping-route to British India, successive British
governments decided that Egypt was simply too strategic to be left to its own devices and imposed a military
protectorate over the country. British troops were stationed in Egypt from 1875 to the end of the Second World War
in 1945 and Ali's successors were reduced to puppets of British imperial policy.
Codrington controversy
The news of Navarino made Codrington a hero twice over in the eyes of the general British public. But in Whitehall,
senior naval and diplomatic echelons were appalled by the outcome of his campaign. It was considered that
Codrington had grossly exceeded his instructions by provoking a showdown with the Ottoman fleet, and that his
actions had gravely compromised the Porte's ability to resist Russian encroachment. At a social event, King George
IV was reported as referring to the battle as "this untoward (i.e. undesirable) event". Codrington's political situation
in London became even more precarious with the return of Wellington to government in January 1828, this time as
Prime Minister at the head of the Tory Government 1828–1830. The coincident launch of Tsar Nicholas' war on the
Porte realised the worst fears of British policy-makers and deepened their anger at Codrington.
Initially, official disapproval of Codrington had to be restrained because of the admiral's huge popularity with the
public. The Admiralty's revenge took petty form, such as its refusal, despite repeated requests by Codrington, to pay
his crews their traditional prize-money from the sale of captured Ottoman treasure and goods. Meanwhile,
Wellington was biding his time until he felt it was politically safe to remove Codrington from the Mediterranean
theatre. Finally, in June 1828, the Admiralty announced that Codrington was being relieved of his command
(although he remained in acting-command until his replacement arrived in August). Although the King felt obliged
by public opinion to grant Codrington the high honour of the Grand Cross of the Bath, the Admiralty's failure to give
him another operational command in his remaining decade of service or to promote him to full Admiral until shortly
before his retirement from the Navy in 1837, were eloquent testimony to his fall from favour.
Codrington spent much time in his later years defending his actions in Greece. His enemies accused him of
deliberately plotting the destruction of the Ottoman fleet because of his Hellenophile sympathies, a charge that
Codrington vehemently denied. The issue turned on whether he knew that his move into Navarino Bay would result
in a battle. The evidence is mixed. On the one hand, there are Codrington's clear orders to his captains to engage only
if attacked. On the other is Codrington's private correspondence, notably to his sister, which suggests that he
regarded a military showdown as inevitable.[65]
16
Battle of Navarino
17
Table of combatant ships
GREAT
BRITAIN
FRANCE
Battleships Asia (FF) (84)
Genoa (76)
Albion (74)
Breslau (84)
Scipion (80)
Trident (74)
Gangut (84)
Azov (F) (80)
Iezekiil (80)
Aleksandr Nevskii
(80)
10 (796)
Ghiuh Rewan (FF) (84)
Fahti Bahri (F) (74)
Burj Zafer (70)
3 (228)
Frigates
Glasgow (50)
Cambrian (48)
Dartmouth (42)
Talbot (28)
Sirène (F)(dd)
(60)
Armide (44)
Provornyi (48)
Konstantin (44)
Elena (38)
Kastor (36)
10 (438)
Ihsanya (dd) (64)
Surya (dd) (56)
Guerrière (F)(dd) (60)
Leone (dd) (60)
Fevz Nusrat (dd) (64)
Ka'íd Zafer (dd) (64)
1 other dd
10 single-deck frigates
17 (818)
Other*
2 brigs
2 (24)
30 corvettes
28 brigs
58 (1134)
Total
9
22 (1258)
78
78 (2180)
5
RUSSIA
8
Allied Powers
Total
OTTOMANS/EGYPTIANS**
Ottoman/Egyptian
Total
Source: Compiled from information in W. James Naval History of Great Britain (London, 1837) Vol.VI,
pp. 476–89.
Note Exact figures for the Ottoman/Egyptian fleet are difficult to establish. The figures given above are mainly those
enclosed by Codrington in his report. These were obtained by one of his officers from the French secretary of the
Ottoman fleet, a M. Leteiller. However, another report by Leteiller to the British ambassador to the Porte gives 2
more frigates and 20 less corvettes/brigs for a total of 60 warships. W. James in Naval History of Great Britain
(1837) Vol. VI, p. 478, assesses the Ottomans' "effective" strength as even lower: 3 battleships, 15 large frigates and
18 corvettes, totaling just 36 ships.
Key
* Other excludes schooners, fireships and launches
Figures in brackets indicate no. of guns
FF = Flagship (Commander-in-Chief)
F = Flagship
dd = double-deck frigate
** Ottoman Empire/Egypt/Algeria/Tunisia (Ibrahim Pasha)
•
•
•
•
•
Capitan Bey Squadron (Alexandria): 2 battleships, 5 frigates, 12 corvettes
Moharram Bey Squadron (Alexandria): 4 frigates, 11 corvettes, 21 brigs, 5 schooners, and 5 (or 6?) fireships
Algiers Squadron: Several battleships
Tunis Squadron: 2 frigates, 1 brig
Tahir Pasha Squadron (Admiral commanding) (Constantinople): 1 battleship, 6 frigates, 7 corvettes, 6 brigs
Battle of Navarino
Commemoration of the battle
There are a number of memorials to the battle around Navarino Bay. The main square of Pylos, Three Admirals'
Square (Greek: Πλατεία Τριών Ναυάρχων), has as its centrepiece a three-sided marble monument, with profiles of
Codrington, Heyden, and De Rigny on the three sides.
Memorials to the dead of the three allies are to be found on the islands in the bay: Helonaki islet (British), Pylos islet
(French), and Sphacteria island (Russian). The Russian memorial is the most impressive, consisting of a small
wooden chapel in the Russian Orthodox style. Additionally, there is a memorial to the philhellene Santarosa, who
was killed in an earlier battle, on the rocky shore of Sphacteria.
The battle is commemorated each year on 20 October by all day celebrations in Three Admirals' Square in Pylos,
hosted by the Mayor of Pylos. The Russian, French and British governments send representatives to the ceremonies,
and in the case of the Russians, a warship and its crew.
Citations
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
Woodhouse (1965) 22
Woodhouse (1965) 39
Runciman (1965) 29-33, 133-159
Dakin (1973) 142
[5] Dakin (1973) 151, 174
[6] Woodhouse (1965) 24
[7] Woodhouse (1965) 108
[8] Dakin (1973) 64, 144, 147
[9] Dakin (1973) 142, 154
[10] Dakin (1973) 143, 149
[11] Dakin (1973) 148
[12] Dakin (1973) 65, 153
[13] Dakin (1973) 63, 147, 153
[14] Dakin (1973) 153, 155, 175
[15] Dakin op cit 178
[16] Dakin (1973) 153, 178, 180
[17] Dakin (1973) 180-1
[18] Dakin (1973) 182
[19] Treaty of London (1827) Article I
[20] Treaty of London (1827) Article II
[21] Treaty of London (1827) Additional Clause (I)
[22] Treaty of London (1827) Additional Clause (II)
[23] Woodhouse (1965) 32-4
[24] Letter to his senior officers from Codrington Sept 8 1827 reproduced in James (1837) 473 (London, 1837)
[25] Woodhouse (1965) 58-60
[26] Woodhouse (1965) 56
[27] Woodhouse (1965) 75-81
[28] Woodhouse (1965) 82-3
[29] Woodhouse (1965) 83-6
[30] Report to Codrington from Capt Hamilton (HMS Cambrian), reproduced in James (1837) VI.476
[31] Protocol of conference of Allied commanders 18 Oct 1827 reproduced in James (1837) VI.489
[32] Codrington's report on battle to Admiralty 21 Oct 1827 reproduced in James (1837) VI.486-8
[33] Woodhouse (1965) 28
[34] Woodhouse (1965) 31
[35] Woodhouse (1965) 70
[36] James (1837) VI.473-89
[37] Woodhouse (1965) 121
[38] Woodhouse (1965) 22, 117
[39] Woodhouse (1965) 117-8
[40] Woodhouse (1965) 98
[41] Codrington's report reproduced in James (1837) VI.486
18
Battle of Navarino
[42] Woodhouse (1965) 100
[43] Woodhouse (1965) 106
[44] James (1837) VI.483
[45] Woodhouse (1965) 112
[46] James (1837) VI.480
[47] Woodhouse (1965) 114
[48] Codrington's report reproduced in James (1837) VI.486-8; Dakin (1973)
[49] Woodhouse (1965) 127
[50] Woodhouse (1965) 119
[51] Woodhouse (1965) 120
[52] Codrington's report reproduced in James (1837) VI.486-8
[53] Woodhouse (1965) 134
[54] Woodhouse (1965) 137
[55] Woodhouse (1965) 139
[56] Woodhouse (1965) 139-40
[57] Woodhouse (1965) 124
[58] Codrington's report rep. in James (1837) VI.486-8.
[59] Woodhouse (1965) 33
[60] Codrington's report rep. James (1837) VI.486-8
[61] Dakin (1973) 230
[62] Kolar, Ivan (1957). "Literarni sprehod po delu stare Ljubljane [A Literary Walk Through a Part of the Old Ljubljana]" (http:/ / www. dlib. si/
details/ URN:NBN:SI:DOC-DI95EBTF?=& language=eng). Jezik in slovstvo 2 (2): 297–298. .
[63] "Srez Kranj" (http:/ / www. scribd. com/ doc/ 41938463/ 9/ Srez-Kranj) (in Slovene). Krajevni leksikon Dravske banovine [Lexicon of Place
Names of the Drava Banovina] [Kranj District]. Administration of the Lexicon of Place Names of the Drava Banovina. 1937. p. 402. .
[64] Dakin (10973) 226
[65] Woodhouse (1965)
References
•
•
•
•
Dakin, D. (1973) The Greek Struggle for Independence
James, W. (1837) Naval History of Great Britain (Vol. VI)
Runciman, S. (1965) The Fall of Constantinople 1453 Cambridge University Press
Woodhouse, Christopher Montague (1965) The Battle of Navarino
Further reading
• Naval wars in the Levant 1559–1853 (1952), R. C. Anderson. ISBN 1-57898-538-2
External links
• Extract from W. James Naval History of Great Britain (1837) Vol VI 471-90 (http://www.pbenyon.plus.com/
Naval_History/Vol_VI/P_471.html) Includes reproduction of several original documents, esp. Codrington's own
report on the battle
• Aerial View of Navarino Bay (http://www.pylos.net/album/area/pylos02.JPG)
• Navarino Bay (Aerial View) (http://www.csad.ox.ac.uk/mellon/LSAG/tour-page07.html)
• Navarino with Location Map (http://www.ipta.demokritos.gr/erl/navarino.html)
19
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