Download Influence of local temperature in computing global climate change

Influence of local temperature in computing global climate change
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Emilie Dugas1, Annamaria Lammel2 and Sandra Bruno3
12
University Paris 8, Vincennes Saint Denis, 3University Cergy-Pontoise, Laboratory Paragraphe
Abstract
Even if climate change is a verified fact, several studies show that many individuals remain skeptical and
present difficulties of understanding the phenomenon. Joireman et al. (2010) reveal that outdoor
temperatures influence the agreement and the representations of climate change. The present paper, based on
a longitudinal study with adults (N=72 in Paris, France M=31), tests the influence of outdoor temperature on
the cognitive stability of skepticism concerning the reality of global climate change. A questionnaire (sevenpoints Likert scale) was administrated to the same subjects in three different conditions: twice in summer (M
of temperature during the experiments 27, 4°C) and in winter (average temperature during the experiments: 4, 5°C). Data indicate that temperature plays an important role on the degree of skepticism: winter
temperatures correlate with a rise of skepticism in the same subject. Results suggest that low temperature is a
factor that prevents the computation of complex climate information and creates the perception of the
possibility of the reversibility of present climate change. The present study put forward that important
variation of temperature can contribute to the cognitive vulnerability of the individual and inhibited him to
understand the nature of climate change (Lammel, Guillen & Dugas, 2011). Data is discussed in light of
relevant literature.
Keywords: climate change, cognition, environment, representation
1. Introduction
A study conducted by Ipsos, a French polling institute, in 2010 among a sample of 1003 individuals,
representative of the French population more than 18 years old, shows that 84% of French believe in the
reality of global warming. However, one third of them remain skeptical about the fact that global warming is
scientifically proven. These ambiguous results on belief in climate change suggest certain fragility in the
construction of representations that people have of the problem. Several studies in the United States have
shown as well that even if the fact that global warming as a reality has been accepted by a very large number
of U.S. citizens (Leiserowitz, Roser-Renouf & Mailboch, 2009, Nisbet & Myers, 2007), the percentage of
Americans who agree that there are no solid evidence of global warming has dropped from 71% in 2008 to
57% in 2009 (Pew Research, 2009).
Many studies have attempted to identify factors that may influence the belief in global warming,
specifically the significant increase of skepticism. Some studies suggest that belief in global warming is
lower among men and Caucasians subjects (Dunlap & McCright, 2008; O'Connor, Bord, and Fisher, 1999).
The credence in global warming is also correlated with environmental values and pro-environmental
attitudes (Kellstedt, Zahran, and Vedlitz, 2008, Lubell, Zahran & Vedlitz, 2007; Nilsson, Von Bordstede and
Biel, 2004; Bord, O ' Connor and Fisher, 2000; O'Connor, Bord, and Fisher, 1999). All of these studies focus
on specific individual factors, such as gender, political positions or environmental values, ignoring the
influence of direct environmental experiences of the subject. However, environmental psychology has
emphasized since a long time that the physical environment in which an individual lives can shape and even
change his/her cognitive representations (Lynch, 1960, Russell and Ward, 1982 Garling, Book, and
Lindberg, 1984; Denis, 1989 Garling, 1995; Kitchin and Blades, 2002). In a recent study we have
demonstrated (Dugas and Lammel, 2011) that the conceptualization of climate is correlated with
environmental conditions in which an individual lives.
Several studies on public representations of climate change have shown that individuals associate it
mainly with rising temperatures, ignoring other consequences, (Leiserowitz, 2005; Lorenzoni, Leiserowitz,
Doria, Poortinga and Pidgeon, 2006) and they often fail to differentiate climate and weather (Bostrom and
Lashof, 2007, Bostrom et al, 1994; Read, Bostrom, Morgan, Fischhoff, & Smuts, 1994). Other studies
indicate that weather conditions, including temperature, may influence the representation of climate change
(Read et al, 1994; Ungar, 1992; Bostrom & Lashof, 2007). Some articles have identified the correlation
between belief in global warming and the perception of temperature in general (Krosnick, Holbrook, Lowe
and Visser, 2006, Semenza, Hall, Wilson, Bontempo, Sailor & George, 2008). However, very few studies
have directly considered whether the real outside temperature during the experiments is associated or not
with the belief in global warming and whether it can influence the rise or fall of skepticism. To our
knowledge, only two research papers have treated this variable. Schuldt and Schwarz (2008) identified a
positive correlation between belief in global warming and the outside temperature in two days of interval.
The results of the study by Joireman et al. (2010) have also demonstrated a significant positive correlation
between the outside temperatures at the moment of experimentation and the beliefs in global warming.
Joiremann et al. (2010) hypothesize that the relationship between outdoor temperature and the belief in
global warming reflects the heuristic commodity of the mind. The judgments of individuals are based on
concepts that come promptly to mind.
The cognitive dimensions of increasing climate change skepticism in France have not been studied.
However several researches have put forward the important relationship between the acceptance that global
warming is underway, and mitigation behavior (Heath and Gifford, 2006, Lubell, and Vedlitz Zahran, 2007).
This point is essential for all climate change mitigation and adaptation projects. The objective of the present
paper consists in the evaluation of cognitive stability of subject on climate change representation in function
of direct weather conditions. Contrary to the study of Joiremann et al (2010) conducted with independent
groups, the present research is a longitudinal study to assess the stability of subjects' responses over time: at
the same temperature, and with contrasting temperatures. The study tests the hypothesis that outside
temperature constitutes a source of cognitive vulnerability. Low temperature activates in subjects skepticism
about climate change. The results are interpreted within the theoretical model of cognitive adaptation to
climate change, developed in our previous studies (Lammel, Guillen, Dugas & Jamet, in press; Lammel,
Dugas & Guillen, 2011).
2. Method
2.1.
Participants
Participants were French students from the University of Paris 8 Saint Denis-Vincennes (N = 72, SR:
Mail 33, Female 39, M=25.6, SD=2.62, Min = 20, 11, Max = 30.8). They were recruited at random in the
entrance hall of the university.
2.2.
Material and procedure
The materiel consisted in a seven-points Likert scale questionnaire. The items were defined by the
analyses of 23 preliminary interviews with French students chosen by random sampling (M=25.5).
Participants had to list all the reasons why an individual would not believe in climate change. A
harmonization process of these categories with literature’s data on climate skepticism’ arguments permitted
to constitute the final questionnaire. It consists in 13 statements, divided into three clusters representing three
types of arguments for which one can be skeptical concerning climate change (1/. Climate change is not bad;
2/. Climate change is natural; 3/. Climate change is not real, see Table 1.). Statements given in the form of a
seven-points Likert scale (from not at all agree to strongly agree) were presented in a random order.
The same subjects participated in three experimental sessions and completed each time the same
questionnaire. The first experimental session was conducted face to face and took place in July 2010 (mean
of outside temperature = 27.4 ° C, SD: 3.4). The second experimental session was realized by e-mail a month
later with temperatures relatively equivalent (mean of outside temperature = 25.2 ° C, SD: 4.5). The online
questionnaire was available only during ten hours. For the third experimental session (mean of outside
temperature = minus 4.5 ° C, SD: 2.4) subjects completed the questionnaire by e-mail in December 2010 at
the beginning of the cold wave hitting Parisian region (on line questionnaire available during 10 hours).
2.3.
Results
The alphas Cronbach of the three scales (0.88, 0.81 and 0.73) indicate the validity of the instrument.
In the analyses the highest scores reveal highest levels of skepticism. The item content and descriptive
statistical analysis are presented in Table 1.
Results of the first experimental session (average outdoor temperature = 27. 4 ° C) designate that the
degree of skepticism is relatively low: it is below of the mean score (3. 5) in all the scales (Table 2). Result
of correlation analyzes of Pearsons (bilateral) is significant between scales 1 and 2 (.35, significant at p <
0.01).
Results of data’s comparison of experimental sessions 1 and 2 (one month of interval at equivalent
outdoor temperatures) shows that the degree of skepticism decreased for the scale "Climate change is not
bad" (from 2, 43 to 2, 23) and for the scale "Climate change is natural» (from 2.82 to 2.53). However only
the results of scale 2 reveal significant differences between the two experimental conditions (t (71) = 3.36, p
< .001). For scale 3 the standard deviation is less dispersed and the difference is only 0.1 more. The degree
of skepticism seems to be cognitively stable in scale 1 and scale 3. However result of correlation analyzes of
Pearsons (bilateral) presents higher level correlation between scale 1 and scale 2 compared to Session 1 (.53,
significant at p < 0.01). This result suggests the presence of a relatively stable relationship between judgment
and causal reasoning related to climate change, meanwhile the belief in the reality of climate change
constitute an independent field.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for all the items of the questionnaire in the three sessions
Mean (SD)
Categories
Climate
change is not
bad
Climate
change is
natural
Skepticism Items
Session 1
Session 2
Session 3
1. We do not take into account the positive
impacts of climate change.
2,44 (1,43)
2,19 (1,45)
2,69 (1,53)
2. The impact of negative effects of climate
change is often overstated and there is no need
to act quickly.
2,43 (1,44)
2,28 (1,33)
2,01 (1,13)
3. The increases in CO2 in the atmosphere are
the result of the increase in temperature and not
vice versa.
1,83 (0,78)
1,83 (0,75)
2,29 (0,79)
4. Carbon dioxide and climate change are not
related.
2,89 (1,35)
2,79 (1,32)
3,57 (1,76)
5. Climate change is due to water vapor.
2,19 (1,78)
2,12 (1,60)
2,35 (1,60)
6. The C02 is a small fraction of the atmosphere
and can’t be responsible for global change.
3,65 (1,60)
3,57 (1,58)
5,26 (1,47)
Climate
change is not
real
7. The sun is the only cause of climate change,
there is a link between rising temperatures on
Earth and the number of sunspots.
2,38 (0,98)
2,21 (0,88)
5,06 (1,24)
8. The climate on earth has always experienced
great changes, climate change is a natural
phenomenon.
2,54 (0,85)
2,12 (0,80)
5,88 (0,92)
9. Computer models which predict future
climate are unreliable and are based on a series
of assumptions.
2,74 (1,01)
2,60 (0,83)
5,90 (0,91)
10. Scientists are not 100% certain of climate
change.
3,51 (1,06)
4,21 (0,80)
4,42 (1,04)
11. Scientists are not sure that the earth is
warming because they can’t even predict the
weather after tomorrow.
3,03 (0,93)
2,99 (0,88)
5,65 (0,90)
12. Climatologists have an interest in saying that
the earth will warm up and to alarm the people
to receive money.
2,26 (1,12)
1,87 (0,92)
2,17 (0,95)
13. Conspiracy wants to convince us of climate
change and media is involved.
1,74 (1,05)
1,64(0,83)
2,13 (1,07)
Note. ( N=72) S1 : Experimental session 1 (Summer 2010 - Outdoor temperature – Mean = 27.4 °C ; SD =
3.4) ; Experimental session 2 (one month after Summer 2010– Average outdoor temperature = 25,2 °C; SD =
4.5) ; Experimental session 3 (Winter 2010 – Average Outdoor temperature = -4.5 °C ; SD = 2.4)
As predicted, comparison of data of experimental sessions 1 and 3 (high versus low ambient
temperatures) shows that the degree of skepticism increases when temperature decreases in the three scales.
However significant differences could be observed in scales "Climate change is natural" (t (72) =- 13.8, p =
.000) and "Climate change is not real "(t (72) =- 17.649, p = .000). Once more, the result of correlation
analyzes of Pearsons (bilateral) presents significant correlation between scale 1 and scale 2, even if it
decreased (32, significant at p < 0.01). This data suggests that even if skepticism increases climate change is
considered as a mostly negative phenomenon. However the correlation between scale 1 and 2 shows certain
stability between judgment and causal reasoning. However scale 3, mostly concerning beliefs, stays
independent and shows a constant cognitive vulnerability to environmental modifications.
Table 2. M and SD data for the three scales in the three sessions (N= 72)
Scales
M
S1
SD
Scale 1.
Climate
change is
not bad
2,43
1,36
M
S2
SD
M
S3
SD
2,23
1,3
2,35
1,16
Scale 2.
Climate
change is
natural
Scale 3.
Climate
change is
not real
2.4.
2,82
0,62
2,53
0,69
4,16
0,69
2,65
0,72
2,66
0,35
4,05
0,42
Discussion
Results of the present paper are consistent with previous studies (Joiremann et al. 2010; Schuldt &
Schwarz 2008): local temperature can influence climate change skepticism. However our longitudinal study
permitted to identify cognitive instability in the same longitudinal sample. Our theoretical model (Lammel,
Guillen, Dugas & Jamet, in press; Lammel, Dugas & Guillen, 2011) can give explanatory framework to
interpret results of the study. The immediate environment plays an important role on the computation of
climate change information. In the two summer’s session the maintaining of high temperature could provoke
the decrease of skepticism, meanwhile very low temperature modified cognitive representations in our
longitudinal sample.
The outside temperature can be source of cognitive instability, preventing the individual to construct a
coherent representation on this subject. The cold winter time during the experimental session 3 had an
influence on the way how people considered the origin and the “reality” of climate change. However even in
cold winter time people have difficulties to consider climate change as positive. This data suggest that
climate change information processing is influenced by an isolated view of the weather of the day. The
variation of temperature is then a source of instability for the subjects who do not have solid knowledge on
climate, particularly on the temporal and spatial dimensions of different climatic parameters. Although,
significant differences in the modifications of scales 1, 2 and 3 suggest that most participants have a stable
judgment on climate change as a mainly negative process. This result puts forward a possible explanation:
temperature’s decrease can activate the denying of a negatively judged climate change representation. The
cause of the modification of skepticism is not only related to the fact that the judgments of individuals are
based on concepts that come rapidly to mind (Joiremann et al. 2010) but also to complex cognitive and
emotional factors transforming previous representations.
The present paper can provide some indications for the stakeholders. For example, results show that
skepticism is significantly higher during cold weather periods. We consider that in periods of low
temperature supplementary efforts in global climate change communications are necessary to adjust climate
change representations to global reality. By this fact, we propose that pro environmental behavior can be
reinforced by decreasing the level of skepticism.
Acknowledgment
Thanks are firstly to be given to all of the persons who have provided valuable information, as well as to
Elisa Guillen for her participation in discussions. This work forms part of a larger research project financed
by the French National Agency of Research (ANR) on “cognitive adaptation to climate change” (directed by
Annamaria Lammel). The Ph. D. of Emilie Dugas is financed by a PH. D. grant of University Paris 8,
Vincennes-Saint Denis, Laboratory Paragraphe.
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