Download Cognitive Modelling of Human Social Signals

Cognitive Modelling of Human Social Signals
Isabella Poggi
Francesca D’Errico
Roma Tre University
Via Manin 53
00185 Roma - Italy
+3957339136
Roma Tre University
Via Manin, 53
00185 Roma - Italy
+3957339136
[email protected]
[email protected]
ABSTRACT
The paper defines as “social signal” a communicative or
informative signal that, either directly or indirectly, conveys
information about social actions, social interactions, social
emotions, social attitudes and social relationships. It proposes a
conceptual definition of these social facts and some examples of
relevant social signals.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
A.1 INTRODUCTORY AND SURVEY
General Terms: Theory
Keywords:
Signals, Social signals, social emotions, social
interaction, social relations
1. TOWARD A DEFINITION OF SOCIAL
SIGNAL
The field of Social Signal Processing has been first designed by
Computer scientists, expert in signal processing, who, deeply
impressed by thin slices of literature in Social Psychology, created
a new research area, by applying signal processing to social
phenomena. Topics that attracted their attention most were, for
example, mimicry [1], the detection of “honest signals” [2],
agreement and disagreement [3], dominance [4], backchannel and
floor management have been tackled. But Social Signals are not
only there: they make up the very texture of our everyday life, and
the time has come to have a clearer and more comprehensive
picture of what they are, what might be the object of Social Signal
Processing, and what the use of systems for social signals analysis
and synthesis.
The purpose of this paper is to define the notion of Social Signals
and to delimit the borders of Social Signals research. We will do
so within a theoretical framework that views the mechanisms of
mind and social action in terms of goals and belief [5].
We first provide a definition of signal, then we restrict ourselves
to what “social” signals may be.
2. SIGNALS
In general terms, a signal may be a perceivable stimulus PS: a
behaviour, a morphological trait, a chemical trace, but also an
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event or a particular sequence of events (for instance, cough, cold
and fever appearing simultaneously), that allows someone, that we
call the “Receiver”, to get some information, the meaning of the
signal. The signal may be produced by an Emitter E (an
individual, a group of people, a virtual character, an animal, a
machine) in either a deliberate and conscious way or not (i.e., the
emitter may not want to produce the signal but inadvertently leak
it, like when my muscle become tense since someone offended
me), but it may even simply emerge from a sequence of events
(cough + cold + and fever may mean flu).
We distinguish two types of signals, informative and
communicative. A signal is simply informative 1) if the individual
or collective system that produced the signal did not have the
intention, nor an unconscious goal or a biological function, of
conveying that information to the Receiver, or 2) if the
information is drawn not from a behaviour or morphological trait
of someone, but simply by the combination of particular events
(for example, five persons in the middle of the road all looking in
the same direction). Instead, we define a signal as communicative
when it is produced by the Emitter in order to the goal of having a
Receiver come to get some belief. This “goal of communicating”
may be a conscious intention of an individual, like in a sentence
or a symbolic gesture; an unconscious goal, like in a neurotic
symptom, a slip of the tongue; a tacit goal, like in an eyebrow
raising of emphasis or a batonic gesture, that are performed
automatically, at a low level of awareness. A signal may be also
ruled by a social goal, one on behalf of society – see the regional
accent of a person, that unmasks her cultural roots – or finally by
a biological function – see the animal’s mating displays. A signal
by definition has a meaning; but beside a literal meaning – the
belief that is connected to that perceivable stimulus in the minds
of the Emitter and of the Receiver, it may also convey one or more
indirect meanings: beliefs that can be inferred from the literal
meaning, through interaction with contextual and previously
shared knowledge.
3. WHAT IS SOCIAL IN SOCIAL
SIGNALS?
From a certain point of view, if we define a signal as any
perceivable stimulus PS produced by some entity E that provides
some kind of information B to an entity R, all communicative
signals, and a great part of the informative ones, are “social”. So
we distinguish “social” signals among signals tout court by taking
their content into account.
Our definition of “social signals” is then the following. A Social
signal is a communicative or informative signal that, either
directly or indirectly, conveys information about social actions,
social interactions, social emotions, social attitudes and social
relationships.
Let us illustrate each aspect of this definition.
4. INFORMATIVE VS. COMMUNICATIVE
SOCIAL SIGNALS
“Social signals” are not simply an inclusion of communicative
signals but an intersection of communicative and informative
signals. Let us take an example of an informative social signal: a
case in which a Receiver perceives some Perceivable Stimulus
and interprets it by drawing some “social” meaning from it, but
the stimulus is not intended as a Signal – it is not produced out of
a conscious intention of the Sender, nor even an unconscious goal
or a biological function, of having the Receiver understand that
meaning. Suppose that during a class break, among the children
playing in the garden I see that some are talking in a circle, but
one is slightly out of the circle; I might possibly predict that this
child is at risk of being bullied or rejected by the group. The
spatial location of children is a social signal in that it conveys
information about a social relation between that child and the
others in the circle, but not necessarily does anyone in the group
want to communicate to each other or to that child that he is
isolated. So this is an informative, not communicative, social
signal: a signal simply informing, not communicating on purpose,
about some social relation. In other cases, a stimulus can be
viewed as a communicative signal, but one in which the goal of
communicating is unconscious or biological. Take the insulting
gesture unconsciously performed by a student during an offensive
interview in Ekman’s work [6], or take blushing, the involuntary
facial display of shame or embarrassment, working as a biological
signal of apology for a state or behaviour that fell short of some
social standards [7]. The nice thing with unconscious and
biological communicative signals is that, not being under
conscious control, they are typically “sincere” signals [8], that can
be trusted more than conscious deliberate signals, and even
unmask deliberate deception.
5. DIRECT VS. INDIRECT SOCIAL
SIGNALS
In some cases information about a social relation is not conveyed
explicitly but indirectly. Any verbal or body signal – gesture,
facial expression, gaze, posture, physical contact – qua signal by
definition has a meaning. The relation between signal and
meaning may be either “codified” or “creative” [9]. In the former
case, for both Emitter and Receiver, a connection between
perceivable stimulus and corresponding belief is stably
represented in their long-term memory, and a list of these signalmeaning pairs makes a “lexicon”, very much like the mental
lexicon of words for a verbal language. In the latter case, the
signal – meaning link is not represented once for all, but can be
deduced on the basis of systematic rules: for instance, in iconic
gestures, the gesture is constructed (and a meaning is drawn from
the gesture) on the basis of the similarity between shape and
movements of hands and the content referred to by the gesture.
This meaning codifed or creatively constructed is the “literal
meaning” of a signal. But when the signal is produced (and
understood) in context, information coming from context may
combine with that literal meaning and, through inferential
processes, give rise to further “indirect” meanings that differ
across contexts. Moreover in some cases, with very recurrent
contexts, inferences can be routinized, and the “indirect”
meanings be conventionalized and become somewhat codified
meanings in their turn. Thus, for every signal we may have
1.
2.
its literal meaning
a set of, so to speak, “free-floating” possible indirect
meanings, depending on the inferences that can be
drawn from context
3. its “conventionalized” indirect meaning.
Some examples of indirect meanings. B is expressing sadness, and
A expresses sadness too, because she is empathic with B. This is
not a social signal in itself, because sadness is not a “social
emotion” in itself – whereas being “sorry-for” someone [10] may
be one. So in this case B’s sad face is only the expression to B of
the fact that A is feeling the same emotion being felt by B. But if
by showing sad A aims at tightening her bond with B (a signal of
a social relation), then empathy is indirectly also a social signal.
Again: a peremptory order is, in itself, simply requests an
interlocutor to do something; but since one who gives an order
implies he has power over the interlocutor [9], the order, as well
any form of imperiousness [4] is also an indirect idiomatic social
signal of dominance (another social relation). Finally, suppose A
displays a haughty face. This at first sight simply conveys a
personality trait. But being naughty means feeling superior to
another person: again a dominance signal. The very existence of
indirect meanings poses a big challenge to systems for the analysis
and synthesis of social signals, in that it requires consideration of
the inferential processes employed in their production and
understanding.
6. THE “OBJECT” OF SOCIAL SIGNALS:
POSSIBLE CANDIDATES
What characterizes “social signals” as “social” is not that they
convey information from one entity to another, but that their
“object” – the type of information they convey – is “social”.
Looking for these types of object, two possible candidates might
be, at a first sight, “social actions” and “intentions”. But we think
that including all signals conveying intentions and social actions
in the class of “social signals” would make our definition too
loose or too overlapping with that of “communicative signals”.
So we propose to define a social signal as one that conveys
information about the following subjects: social interactions,
social emotions, social attitudes or social relations. A brief
reflection on each of these fields might provide an Agenda of
future research on Social Signals. Here we propose some tentative
definitions of these objects and some examples of signals for each
object, while foreshadowing questions to ask and lines of
conceptual research.
6.1. Social interaction
To define social interaction requires a notion of “social action”.
An action of an Agent A can be defined as a social action if it is
addressed by A to some Agent B (i.e., Agent B is mentioned in
A’s mental representation of that action) and if, while doing that
action, A views B not as an object but as a self-regulated Agent,
one having and pursuing goals of one’s own [5]. Social
interaction is a sequence of social actions addressed by two or
more agents to each other, while being actually or virtually
present. A social interaction may be either a communicative
interaction or not.
Signals. A typical example of social signals concerning a
communicative interaction are backchannel signals: Agent B nods
to Agent B to inform he is following and understanding what B is
saying. Here A communicates some information concerning, for
example, a discussion or a conversation, which is typically a
communicative interaction. Yet, some social signals inform about
non-communicative interactions. Suppose B has just tried to hit
A, but A has skipped B’s blow, and tells him: “You didn’t hurt
me!” In this case, two interpretations are possible. One is that by
this sentence A wants to imply he is not going to submit to A,
which would be a social signal about a relation, not an interaction.
But if he says the sentence as a feedback to B about B’s action,
this would be a social signal concerning an interaction.
6.2. Social emotions
Within emotions we can distinguish “individual” from “social”
emotions, with “social emotion” defined as an emotion fulfilling
at least one of two conditions [11]. The fist condition is that the
emotion is felt by an Agent A toward an Agent B. Happiness and
sadness, for instance, are individual emotions, while admiration,
envy and contempt are social ones: I cannot admire without
admiring someone, I cannot envy or contempt but someone, while
I can be happy or sad myself. An alternative condition to be a
”social” emotion is that it is precisely functional to social relations
or social interaction. Shame, for example, is typically a social
emotion, but not so much because I can be ashamed “before”
someone (I can even be ashamed only before myself, about
something that no one will ever know); it is social because it
concerns our goal of image or self-image, that are typically
important goals for our interaction and relations with other
people.
Empathy – defined as the fact that one is feeling some emotion
just because someone else is feeling it – may belong to this field.
Here it is important to distinguish between internal feeling and
communication of empathy: if I am a judge or a policeman I may
be very impressed and have strong internal feelings about a
murder’s story, but conceal my empathy. Seen as an internal
feeling, in some sense empathy can be viewed as a social emotion:
I feel close to you in that I am feeling the same feeling as you.
Signals. Based on the distinction between social and individual
emotions, we can say that a facial expression concerning a social
emotion is a social signal, while one of an individual emotion is a
signal, but not a “social” one. So, gaze fixed on the Interlocutor
with frowning eyebrows expressing hate is a “social signal”, while
oblique eyebrows with eyes staring off into space expressing
sadness are not. Further, according to the distinction between
internal empathy and empathy communication, the latter is
typically a chance for social signals. And in this case even
expressing an individual emotion (e.g. showing sad myself), to the
extent to which it is a way to display similarity to you, or to show
I am “sorry-for” you [10] (i.e., to express empathy), it is a “social”
signal.
The many facets of empathy and mimicry. The domain of
empathy cuts across many subjects relevant for social signals.
First, it can be communicated in various ways, besides verbal
expression: by patting on your shoulder, by showing you attentive
listening, through mimicry, by expressing one’s own emotion…
Several social and non-social signals can express empathy, and
this can provide information non only about ongoing interaction,
but also about social attitudes and social relations. Empathy is
sometimes conveyed by mimicry. But the high importance
attributed to mimicry in social interaction and communication of
empathy must not obscure that mimicry is not always and solely
an unconscious behaviour, but it can be deliberately displayed. So
the problem arises of distinguishing when mimicry is “honest”
[2]– or better, sincere [8] – from when it is a deliberate strategic
way to gain acceptance or approval, or to induce rapport with the
other; in other words, the problem of unmasking insincere
mimicry.
6.3. Social attitudes and social evaluation
A third type of information that social signals may convey is
about social attitudes. The notion of attitude has been widely
investigated in Social Psychology. Here we can define a social
attitude as the tendency of a person to behave in a certain way
toward another person or a group. Social attitudes include
cognitive elements like beliefs, evaluations, opinions, and social
emotions. All of these appraisals and representations determine,
and are determined by, preferences and intentions [12].
Evaluating a person means to assess whether and how much her
characteristics respond to standards of beauty, intelligence,
strength, justice, altruism… We judge other people and elicit
judgments from them, because depending on our evaluation of
people we decide what types of social actions to perform toward
them and what relations to entertain with them. From this stems
the necessity for self-presentation. People strive to present an
image of themselves that is functional to the relations and
interactions they want to engage in with others. Also agreement
and disagreement are types of cognitive stance that tend to
become social attitudes. That I agree with someone means that my
opinion is similar to his/hers, while if I disagree my opinion is
different from or opposite to another’s opinion. But since having
the same or an opposite opinion generally implies that one is
willing to carry on the same or a different course of action, then
agreeing (or disagreeing) with an opinion may imply that one
commits oneself to work in the same (or opposite) direction with
respect to the other. Hence agreement somehow entails alliance,
commitment to cooperation, while disagreement entails
opposition and conflict, thus stating or claiming a social attitude.
An important domain linked to social attitude is persuasion, a
kind of social influence aimed at changing peoples attitudes, by
changing their opinions and evaluations, and gaining agreement.
A persuader aims at triggering or enhancing the other’s
motivation to do or not to do something, and to do so must raise
the value of the proposed course of action, but also elicit positive
evaluations of oneself, to be trusted by the person to be
persuaded. This is the “ethos” aspect of persuasion. We are not
persuaded only by what the other tells us, but also (or even more)
by who is the one that tries to persuade us.
Signals. Evaluations are an important object of social signalling,
on the part of both evaluating and evaluated people. From the
evaluator’s side, displaying his evaluation, for instance with
signals of approval or disapproval, may be a first step to anticipate
how he is going to relate to the other; on the part of the evaluated
one, various signals may attempt to elicit the desired evaluation.
Signals of pride, self-confidence or boasting – like looking down
to others, raised head or erected posture, or conversational
strategies like “name dropping” (“as I was telling Barack
yesterday…”) – aim to convince others of our value.
On the other hand, head nodding and head shaking are typical
signals of agreement and disagreement, respectively, but also
index shaking, crossing arms, stepping back convey disagreement,
while lightly closing eyes means acceptance [13]. Finally, the
complex act of persuading, aimed at gaining others’ agreement,
can make use of persuasive words, but also of persuasive gestures,
gaze, postures; and to rely on the other’s trust, it can exploit the
evaluations elicited through appropriate self-presentation. But
every time the persuader’s signals are conscious and deliberate,
they can be used with a misleading or deceiving intent; hence the
importance of setting apart those signals that can be controlled by
conscious will from those that inadvertently leak from the
persuader’s behaviour, thus unmasking insincerity.
6.4. Social relations
To define the notion of social relation is not an easy task, and here
we only put forward some hypotheses. A social relation may stem
from a set of subsequent social interactions, but it differs from
interaction because, while a social interaction is a concrete and
contingent event, something that you may perceive while it
occurs, a social relation is long-lasting and, more importantly, is
something abstract.
A social relation is a relation between two or more persons, but
not every relation between persons is a social relation. If two
persons have the same first name – a relation of similarity –, or if
A sits close to B on the bus – a relation of physical proximity –,
this does not imply they are in some social relation, although, of
course, one can rise from this [14; 15]. Rather, two persons are in
a social relation when there is a relation of dependency or
interdependency [16] between their goals: that is, when the
pursuit, achievement or thwarting of a goal of an Agent A in some
way determines or is determined by the pursuit, achievement or
thwarting of another Agent B. This relation between Agents’
goals can either simply hold “objectively” or be assumed by them.
Suppose two pirates are looking for the same treasure, while not
knowing of each other: there is an objective conflict between their
goals (if pirate A finds the treasure, pirate B will not, and
viceversa) hence they are objectively – not subjectively – in
concurrence with each other. But suppose they come to know of
each other: here the relation of concurrence between their
respective goals comes to be believed, possibly each one starts
striving to find the treasure himself as against the other, and they
enter a relation of competition. Again, suppose one pirate needs a
spade to dig the treasure and the other has one: here is a relation
of dependency of the former from the latter. To the extent to
which the latter comes to assume this dependency, this can give
rise to a relation of power of him over the other. To sum up, we
can speak of an “objective” social relation when a relation holds
between the goals of two or more Agents (the pursuit or
achievement of goal GA by A may determine the achievement or
thwarting of goal GB of B), irrespective of whether this relation is
assumed by A and/or B or not. A “subjective” social relation
holds between A and other possible Agents B, C, n, when A
believes that a social relation holds between oneself and the other
Agents. This subjective relation may exist whether or not the
objective relation really holds, and whether or not A, due to his
assumption of this relation, starts behaving in some particular way
toward Agents A, B, n. Of course, typically when an Agent
subjectively assumes some social relation holds with another
agent s/he tends to do actions that are congruent with that relation.
Moreover, if I do something which is completely contrasting with
what I should do given our relation, this may change my relation
to you, or at least be a message that I would like to change it. But
this is not necessarily so: whatever relation I think I have with
you, I may comply with it or not, I may or not behave as predicted
or prescribed by it; and still the relation is there. In other words,
the actions one performs toward someone else may be a
consequence but they are neither a necessary nor a sufficient
condition for entertaining some relation to that person.
Types of social relations. Generally from particular types of
objective relations some specific subjective relations stem. For
example, from objective social relations of concurrence or
conflict subjective relations of competition may stem, i.e. Agent A
may behave in such a way as to prevent Agent B from achieving
or effectively pursuing his goal. On the other hand, from objective
relations of reciprocal dependency subjective relations of
exchange or cooperation may arise. Moreover, in cooperation a
division of labour may be of use, thus leading to the distribution
of roles, i.e., sets of prescriptions that an agent must fulfil for the
sake of another agent, and hence to the rising of role relations.
Finally, unilateral dependency of B on A may lead to either a
relation of power, where A can induce B to do what A wants, or
to help relations, where A, due to affect or altruism, does
something for A without any exchange or reward. Exchange
Theory [17; 18] has attempted to describe all relations – including
love and friendship – in terms of costs and benefits: according to
Homans, a person stays in a relation until it is a satisfying
relation, with factors of this satisfaction being rewards (material
and symbolic rewards computed in terms of costs and benefits),
evaluation of possible alternatives (that affects commitment), and
investment (of time, effort and resources). Several critics have
challenged this view as too close to classical utilitarianism, which
does not account for the difference between material and symbolic
rewards, for the difficulty in computing incommensurable
resources like affect and money, and finally for its definite ruling
out any chance for altruism [19]. Then, many different typologies
of relations have been distinguished, that classify them in terms of
criteria like public vs. private, cooperation vs. competition,
presence vs. absence of sexual relations, social-emotional support
oriented vs. task oriented [20]. Based on the notions presented
so far, we propose a tentative distinction between two types of
social relations: instrumental relations and affective relations.
In an instrumental relation, A’s doing something for B is
instrumental to some other goal of A. For example, A may cook
for B due to a number of reasons: B hired him as a cook, and A
cooks to earn money (exchange); B is A’s master, and A cooks
not to be beaten (power); in the monastery where B lives, A is
Brother Cook and thus complies to monastery norms (role).
In an affective relation, like passionate love, friendship or parental
bonds, the social relation entertained is aimed at fulfilling each
other’s affective needs and is sustained by the social emotions felt
for each other. In both kinds of relations Agents tend to relate to
each other by taking their respective goals into account, but there
is a crucial difference between the two. According to classical
literature, in exchange relations (a prototype of what we call
instrumental relations), for each partner, his/her own interest is
prevailing [21], while in communal relationships (also called
close, intimate or meaningful relationships; our affective
relations), the interest and wellbeing of the other is prevailing.
One more difference stems from the one just mentioned.
Instrumental relations are “resource oriented” in that Agents,
besides the goals of oneself and the other, also take into account
their resources, their respective values, and their feasibility to
social exchange. This is very clear in commercial exchange
relations, the prototype of instrumental relations: I decide to
exchange if and only if, by computing the resources the other can
give me in exchange, my cost – benefit computation results
rewarding. The same holds in power relations, where the liability
of an agent to be subject to the other’s influence depends on
his/her resources, skills, capabilities, and calculating them
becomes very relevant. Before competing with you, I must
accurately assess your strength; if you are very strong I can’t
afford obliging you to do what I want. Also in the relations of
cooperation where task distribution entails role attribution,
people’s skills and competences are strictly functional to success.
In both power and role relations, then, evaluation of the other’s
strengths and weaknesses is very important. In affective relations,
on the contrary, the other’s needs are salient, while the other’s
(and possibly one’s own) resources are not so crucial in an
Agent’s decision on how to behave toward the other. A mother
may strive to fulfil her child’s needs without wondering if he
deserves this, or computing how difficult this is for herself. In
love relations, the other’s desires become ours and we strive to
fulfil them, possibly without wondering how strong or smart the
other is. Further traits that distinguish affective versus
instrumental relationships are selectivity [22], intimacy and trust
[19]. On the one hand, I care the other’s interest and wellbeing,
but on the other hand I can choose to have a relation with him/her.
Personal vs. group relations. Social relations can be entertained
not only with a single person, but with a group. In this case,
beside role and power relations also the relations of identity,
belonging and self-identification with the group or the leader
importantly interact with the nature of leadership and the leader’s
charisma. Personal identity and group belonging are strictly
intertwined, since a person’s identity is highly affected by his/her
feeling a member of some group. If I shave my head as a
Skinhead, I may be claiming I belong to the Skinheads’ group: a
social relation. But this is also an identity signal, because it
characterizes me among others. Finally, if self-identification with
the group leader – which is per se an internal individual affective
process – occurs at the same time in various group members, this
may tighten their bond to each other. Within group relations,
specific relations of power, dominance and leverage hold [23],
governed by complex and interesting mechanisms for the
allocation, change and enhancement of power relations through
alliance, influence, and the spreading of reputation. An important
type of relation with a person or group are cooperation and
helping relations, that may be governed by individual motivations,
institutionalized roles (see the professional roles of help like
teacher, nurse, psychotherapist) and biological functions (parental
and reciprocal altruism [24; 25; 26; 27; 28]).
Relations between relations. Sometimes social relations may
enhance or interfere with each other. If in a group I identify
myself with the Leader, this may enhance my sense of belonging.
Reciprocal interference between affective and instrumental
relations can make things difficult. If I am a judge, and I must
judge my son, my role relation will interfere with my affective
relation, and my decisions will possibly be affected by conflicts of
interests.
Signals of social relations. Among signals concerning social
relations, some inform about an individual’s role in a group or
institution (a policeman’s uniform or a nun’s suit), others convey
the social identity – then group belonging – that one has or
claims: such is, for instance, the nazi salute, but also a person’s
regional accent, that displays her geographical-cultural origin: the
former triggered by a conscious intention, the latter by a social
goal that impinges on the individual even in spite of his deliberate
will. Number of stars on an uniform, body size, a king’s crown,
convey rank and status – hence, power relations – within group
hierarchy. Finally, physical proximity or physical contact may
express intimate relationships. More subtle, but perhaps more
effective signals that convey, but also influence power relations,
are the “signals” of charisma and the strategies of self
presentation, impression management, reputation.
Types of Social Signals. Signals conveying social relations may
be distinguished as to their content, according to various criteria
1. relation with whom: a signal may concern a relation with either
the interlocutor or a third person. By saying “Hello!” I tell you I
want to have a positive social relation with you; buy saying “I
introduce you Professor X” conveys (to you) a social relation of
submission of myself to a third person.
2. relation with a person/group: if I mirror your gestures while
talking to you, I am signalling my similarity to you; if I wear the
right fashionable suit I am stating my belonging to my teenager
group.
3. type of relation. Different signals convey different types of
relations. Spatial position, e.g. sitting at a higher desk, signals a
role relation – who is the formal leader in a group. Touching a girl
on her hip in public tells she is your girl-friend (affective
relation), but doing so, at a party, with the most beautiful girl of
the night may be a signal of dominance (power).
7. THE CASE OF DOMINANCE. FROM
SOCIAL SIGNALS TO SOCIAL
RELATIONS
Social relations and social signals are intertwined in a recursive
loop, as shown by the case of dominance signals. Dominance
entails power comparison, and can be defined as the fact that one
has more power than another [6]. A “signal of dominance” may
be defined as any signal, in whatever modality, through which A
conveys the belief “I have more power than B” to either B himself
or to C. Of course, according to context and personality traits,
there may be various dominance strategies, that is, different
patterns of dominance signalling: from the aggressive ones of
imperiousness, judgement, invasion, norm violation and defiance,
to more subtle ones like victimhood and hypersensitivity to
offence, ending up with the distancing ones of haughtiness and
other ways of showing superior, like irony and ridicule, easiness,
carelessness and assertiveness. Each strategy carries peculiar
social signals that can be analyzed in depth and possibly predicted
taking various contextual and personality variables into account.
Dominance is a relation, not necessarily a social relation yet; but
to the extent to which having more power than another leads you
to have power over another, a social relation between you and the
other stems. Moreover, signalling this relation (that I have more
power than you) makes it survive and enhances it: if you believe I
am dominant, you will feel / be dominated by me. So it will be my
concern to present an image of a dominant person, since showing
dominance makes me dominant: the social signal creates the
social relation.
8. AN AGENDA OF SOCIAL SIGNALS
RESEARCH
Based on this overview of social phenomena we can state an
agenda of future studies on social signals and their contents, as to
both conceptual modelling and automatic analysis and synthesis.
Within signals of interaction, the roles and effects of deliberate
and unconscious mimicry should be studied. The types of social
relations and their signals should be investigated, as well as their
relationship with social emotions and the ways and strategies of
their expression and sharing. In the field of social attitudes,
important issues are the expressions of agreement and
disagreement, self-presentation and its effects on persuasion. The
description, detection, interpretation and synthesis of signals
requires building repertoires of social signals for codified signals,
and finding the rules of inference to extract their indirect
meanings on the basis of contextual information and combination
with other signals.
Distinguishing controllable from uncontrollable social signals will
help to set apart deceptive vs. sincere signals. New systems for
social signals analysis and synthesis will be able to employ
sophisticated methods for inferential processing and reasoning
only if social and cognitive scientists help engineers in
disentangling the complexity and subtlety of social signals, while
bewaring of oversimplification.
Acknowledgements
This work is supported by the 7th Framework Program, European
Network of Excellence SSPNet (Social Signal Processing
Network), Grant Agreement Number 231287.
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