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New Growth Model in Serbia: New Investment Opportunities Diana Dragutinović Main Themes • Serbian economy has gone through the crisis well • Financial sector is resilient and well managed – No signs of direct Greek contagion • Macroeconomic management further strengthening – Monetary policy based on IT (inflation targeting) – Efforts to increase transparency of budgetary procedures and implement a rule-based medium-term fiscal sustainability framework – Campaign to reduce euroization of the economy • Large investment opportunities – Exchange rate depreciation has sheltered the economy during the crisis, while at the same time adding to the attractiveness of domestic assets – Investors to bring technology, infrastructure investments Before the Crisis • The growth of 6.5% in period 2004-2008 was one of the strongest GDP in CEE • Like in other countries in the Region, the growth came from big capital inflow – – – – donor support (2001 -2003) FDIs, mainly privatization bank privatization and recapitalization from abroad cross - border lending • High growth, but also high CAD – CA deficits huge by regional standards – Only meaningful if used to build an export base and generate future savings Growth record impressive? • Judging against the past – the growth rate was impressive: judging against the potential – not impressive at all • The catch-up growth potential should be much bigger given the starting conditions of – Low productivity – Low capital base – Relatively highly educated labor force Previous growth model not sustainable • Based on domestic consumption – share of private consumption close to 75%, largely covered by imports – low (virtually zero) private sector domestic savings flows – Investment share in GDP low, in particular in the export sector – Low export base • Based on non-tradable sector • While three non-tradable sectors (trade, transport and telecommunications and the financial sector) grew rapidly (15% on average) generating 75% of the overall growth, industry was mainly stagnant (growth of 2% per year) –growth model which resulted from the structure of FDI inflows: 20% in tradable and 80% in non-tradable in 2004-2008 period Weak points, but also strengths • In October 2008, Serbia suffered a sudden stop and strong ER depreciation, but trigger was more psychological, less fundamental – After the news spun that a company with the name resembling the name of one local bank failed, the reaction of households was panicky; – household started to withdraw their deposits; – they withdrew almost one billion (20% of HH savings) Weak points, but also strengths • Crisis showed us weak points, but also strengths – Weak points • External imbalance • Financial system vulnerable to E.R. fluctuations • Procyclical fiscal policy – Frequent elections led to loose fiscal policy – Strengths • Low level of public debt • Adequate level of FX reserves • Very robust financial sector, with strong liquidity and capital base Serbia has gone through crisis well • Serbia did not avoid the downturn, like China and Poland, but frequent crises in the past made Serbia more resilient and adaptable • Better growth performance than the region – Decline in GDP was bellow 3% in 2009, but with enormous CA adjustment (deficit decreased from 18.5 to 5.7%) • Net exports recovering fast in response to exchange rate depreciation Serbia has gone through crisis well • Relatively small drop in output Real GDP grow th in 2009 (%) 2,0 0,0 -2,0 -4,0 -6,0 Poland Macedonia Serbia Bosnia and Herzegovina Czech Republic Turkey Bulgaria Croatia Hungary Montenegro Romania -8,0 Serbia has gone through crisis well • Inflation on the target during the crisis – Only recently undershooting – expected to be back on target in 2011 – First time in years inflation is on a similar level as in regional peers Inflation developments (y-o-y, in %) Inflation rate and the target band (%, y-o-y) 14,0 12,0 12,0 10,0 10,0 8,0 6,0 8,0 6,6 4,0 6,0 2,0 4,0 4,3 Czech Republic Hungary Poland Romania Croatia Serbia feb.10 mar.10 jan.10 nov.09 dec.09 okt.09 sep.09 jul.09 avg.09 jun.09 apr.09 maj.09 mar.09 feb.09 jan.09 dec.08 nov.08 okt.08 sep.08 apr.10 feb.10 dec.09 okt.09 avg.09 jun.09 apr.09 feb.09 dec.08 -2,0 avg.08 0,0 2,0 Sound macroeconomic management during the crisis • Flexible IT monetary policy • Responsible fiscal policy striking a balance between the cyclical deficit and debt sustainability • IMF program Sound macroeconomic management during the crisis • Flexible IT monetary policy – NBS increased interest rate to defend ER and intervened at F/X market provided floor for ER and FX liquidity, but allowed moderate exchange rate depreciation – Prudently managed and resilient financial (banking) sector Sound macroeconomic management during the crisis • Responsible fiscal policy striking a balance between the cyclical deficit and debt sustainability – Government froze public sector wages, pensions and purchasing goods and services, to make more room for fiscal stimulus: • Investment in major road network Corridor 10 • subsidized loans to provide liquidity / investment for companies • subsidized loans for newly built apartments to boost construction industry • measures focused on keeping people in work – extending subsidies / lending to companies with perspective – covering the part of labor costs to support current and new jobs Sound macroeconomic management during the crisis – Government agreed on program with IMF providing support for f/x reserves and giving the credibility to policies • Based on 3 pillars: 1.Fiscal adjustment in Serbia – to lower domestic demand, and to ease pressures to the CAD 2.Commitment of the foreign banks to continue supporting Serbia (Vienna accord – prevents potential capital outflows, and ease pressures to corporate BS 3.Role of the IFI’s – project loans and budget support, provide FX inflows, liquidity to the budget and infrastructure projects that stimulates the economy Good initial position for addressing a possible Greek contagion • Greek scenario is not a threat – Deficits of 4%, public debt of 30% • Greek contagion possible only indirectly – through parent banks – through general aversion to risk • But we are not seeing any signs of a serious contagion – Banking sector is liquid, profitable, with high capital buffers, share of Greek banks relatively small – Newly introduced auctions of 18M T-bills met with a great interest of both domestic and international investors Resilience of the banking system: well capitalized • CAR regularly stress tested Capital adequacy ratios ( in %) Comparative overview of the capital adequacy ratio, 2005 - 2009 ( in bln RSD) (in %) 30 500 25 450 400 350 20 30 25 22 300 15 250 20 200 10 150 100 5 50 0 0 2005 2006 2007 2008 17 15 17 16 17 16 14 13 13 10 2009 5 Banking sector capital - right scale Capital adequacy - left scale Tier 1 capital/total risk assets - left scale Capital/assets - left scale Source: NBS, national central banks 0 SRB MNE MAC ALB ROM BiH BUL CRO HUN Resilience of the banking system: liquid Banking sector liquid assets 3,0 45,0 40,0 2,5 35,0 2,0 30,0 25,0 1,5 20,0 1,0 15,0 10,0 0,5 5,0 0,0 0,0 2005 2006 2007 2008 Average monthly liquidity indicator - left scale Share of liquid asset in total asset - right scale (in %) Source: NBS 2009 Resilience of the banking system: well funded Loans to deposit ratio (in %) 110,0 105,0 100,0 95,0 90,0 85,0 80,0 2005 Source: NBS 2006 2007 2008 2009 Resilience of the banking system: profitable despite rising NPLs RoA and RoE of the banking sector Share of NPL in total loans (in %) (in %) 16 16 14 12 14 12 10 8 10 8 6 4 6 4 2 0 2 Q4 Q1 Q2 2006 Q3 Q4 2007 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 2008 Return on asset (RoA) Return on equity (RoE) Source: NBS Q3 Q4 2009 Q1 0 Q4 2006 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 2007 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 2008 Q1 Total Households Corporate Q2 Q3 Q4 2009 Q1 Resilience of the banking system: share of Greek banks small • Greek owned banks well capitalized and relatively limited exposure Share of Greek banks in total balance sheet of banking sector-Q1 2010 Capital adequacy ratios ( in %) 30,00 25,00 20,00 15,00 10,00 5,00 0,00 Q3 2008 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 2009 Q4 Q1 2010 16% Banking sector Source: NBS Average of greek banks Financial system vulnerability: high FX exposure 846 Credits and Deposits - private non-financial sector (RSD bn, current exchange rate) Credits and Deposits - households (RSD bn, current exchange rate) 682 617 74% 489 456 419 62% 418 382 364 351 287 92% 305 61% 307 256 207 138 90% 203 132 92% 68 91% 91% 310 280 78% 91% 35% 78% 67% 70% 81% 63% 138 78% 63% 74% 190 130 39% 42% 39% 43% 64% 2004 2005 2006 2007 Dinar Credits FX (and indexed) Credits Dinar Deposits FX (and indexed) Deposits Source: NBS 2004 2005 2006 2007 Dinar Credits FX (and indexed) credits Dinar Deposits FX (and indexed) deposits Agenda for Going Forward • Make growth more robust • Ensure sustainable external balance • Make the financial system more resilient with respect to exchange rate risks • Make monetary and fiscal policies more effective and transparent Serbia faces four interlinked transitions • From consumption to export led expansion • From using foreign savings to generating domestic savings • From a highly euroized to a dinar based economy and financial system • From a traditional fiscal system based on rolling deficits and discretion to a rule-based framework and sustainable structural deficit 1. Moving to Export-led Growth • • Why? – we need growth that is consistent with external balance – Successful export led strategy generates sustainable demand for other sectors and services How? – improve formal sector business environment – Upgrade infrastructure needed to support the export led strategy – Tax system conducive to growth and employment, while remaining tax competitive – Sustainable fiscal policy – Weeker dinar may be of help in rebalancing economy – Serbian mentality and competitive labor force (half of population speak some English); efforts to contain wage growth below productivity growth – revive privatization – foster trade flows (Western Balkan Trade Pact, EU SAA, WTO) – FDI in tradables (the clear vision of which non-financial sector will drive growth in the future) 24 1. Moving to Export-led Growth: Foreign investments • Capital inflows of all sorts and maturities are welcome – Capital inflows needed even in the new growth model • But we give preference to such flows and arrangements in which the risks are shared by the foreign investor and not left with the domestic economy and its financial system – Before the crisis, much of the currency, credit and maturity risk was born by domestic consumers, businesses and the local banking sector • Ideal examples are FDIs, joint-ventures or direct purchase of T-bills In such investments – the investor is expressing the faith into the domestic economy and share its potential 2. Encouraging savings • Gross domestic savings – Domestic savings would increasingly be a source of domestic investment (foreign savings are too high and unstable in Serbia); – Serbia seems to save (and invest) much less than peers (Rom, Bul, Cro) % of GDP 20.00 15.00 10.00 5.00 0.00 -5.00 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Peer countries 2007 2008 • How? – – – – – – Serbia Gross capital formation 35.00 % of GDP Why? 30.00 25.00 Sustained growth acceleration Public saving Privatization (corporate savings) Deeper capital markets? Pension system pillar II? Other incentives? – at least make the level play field for savings 20.00 15.00 2001 2002 2003 2004 Peer countries 2005 2006 2007 2008 Serbia 26 2. Encouraging savings: ongoing • We are developing the government T-bill market – Main current constraints can be sorted out soon • Low volumes • Short maturities • Absence of foreigners – Currently most buyers are local banks whose needs are not yet satiated – i.e. have no interest to sell on the secondary market • Remaining technical/legal constraints on OTC trading • We are building institutions: – Secondary T-bill market – Corporate / municipal bond market – FX hedging and derivative market • We are building a yield curve – We shift from short maturity (3 or 6 months) to longer maturity (12, 18, 24 months) 3. Trimming Euroization: a tall order? • • Why? – To make monetary policy more effective and resilient; re-establish key IT links (interest rate and credit channels) – Enhance benefits from the flexible exchange rate regime (i.e., for trade) – Protect balance sheets from ER shocks – strengthening exporters’ hand – Achieve balanced financial market development How? – Flexible exchange rate IT monetary policy – Educational campaign – Promotion of T-bill, bond and hedging markets – Facilitation of FX to dinar credit conversions – Government provides only dinar based credits (with only one exemption – mortgage loans); provides subsidies only to dinar based credits and deposits or for FX to dinar conversions Loans to Private Sector , excl. banks, in millions RSD Non-indexed RSD loans FX and FX-indexed loans Cross border FX loans Share of FX and FX-indexed Loans in Total Loans 30-Sep-08 208,084 420,896 825,182 84.4% 31-Dec-09 212,674 627,524 1,042,311 88.3% 28 4. Fiscal policy for the stable future • We are aware that the fiscal policy should be the magic wand that we are looking for • On the expenditure side, fiscal responsibility legislation is on our agenda • How to achieve medium-term fiscal sustainability? – Base monetary and fiscal policies on the same principles – For a fiscal framework to be credibly sustainable it must be based on: • Transparency in targets and instruments • Simple rules • Clear mandate and independence of analysis 29 Medium-term fiscal sustainability: Targets and Instruments • Targets – aim at fiscal balance over the cycle • Instruments – Based on expenditure rather than revenue • Revenues based more on indirect than direct (especially labor) taxes – Simple expenditure ceilings and rules • Allow for easy monitoring and individual accountability • May be countercyclical by design: if growth is on the upside, use the revenues for debt reduction 4. Medium-term fiscal sustainability: Adjustment period – Adjustment period: 2011 – 2015 – Bring the deficit down gradually to 0%-1% GDP in 2015 – Key issues – 2011 fiscal adjustment, particularly wage and pension policy (real growth below GDP growth) – After 2015 – balanced (over the cycle) rules • aim at fiscal balance over the cycle: the primary structural deficit close to zero 31 Medium-term fiscal sustainability: Transitional rules • Transitional rules – We set a path for public expenditures cuts (by 0.75pp per year), but excluding investments – We set a rule for public sector wages / pensions adjustment (expected inflation plus 50% of real growth) – We set corrective mechanisms (in case we do not make public expenditure cuts that we planned, the taxes will be increased) – We set the limit on public debt (including guarantees) to 40% – We set the limit on new net borrowing (including guarantees) to max 2.5% Medium-term fiscal sustainability: Transparency and Mandate • A more efficient and transparent budget process – Already partly implemented – Clear procedural rules allowing for all information to be available on time – Enhances discipline and accountability • More comprehensive and detailed information gathering and analysis • Independent fiscal council • Legal proposals on the new rule-based system are on the table – Should also include a reform on a municipal level Is fiscal consolidation appropriate in the post-crisis situation? • Consolidation can be successful both in stabilizing debt levels as well as being pro-growth – Especially if the program is decisive and based on expenditure cuts (and eventually) indirect taxes – Decisiveness and sense of urgency (wrt to Greece fallout) may help to make consolidation popular with the electorate • Channels – People’s expectations of an even worse situation in the absence of consolidation create a positive wealth effect of consolidation – Lower costs of borrowing – both private and public – Higher attractiveness of domestic stocks and bonds – Induce higher labor supply Is fiscal consolidation feasible? • Political will to embrace these proposals is critical – Credible rules cannot be imposed from outside – The program needs to be made equitable – Improve the efficiency of the social safety nets Fiscal policy for the stable future • On revenue side – Tax system reform – Shift towards consumption taxation, diminishing taxation of factors of production – Downsize the tax wedge on wages – effects on competitiveness, employment – Better property taxation – Rethought fiscal decentralization 36 Thank you! 37