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APD and Rational Choice
OxfordHandbooksOnline
APDandRationalChoice
JefferyA.Jenkins
TheOxfordHandbookofAmericanPoliticalDevelopment(Forthcoming)
EditedbyRobertLieberman,SuzanneMettler,andRichardValelly
OnlinePublicationDate: Sep
2014
Subject: PoliticalScience,U.S.Politics,PoliticalInstitutions
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199697915.013.18
AbstractandKeywords
RationalchoiceandAmericanpoliticaldevelopment(APD)bothemergedasresponsesto(perceived)limitations
withthedominantbehavioraltradition.Whiletheircritiqueswerebasedonverydifferentresearchtraditions,
similaritieswerealsopresent;inparticular,bothrationalchoiceandAPDapproachesfocusedontheimportanceof
institutionsforstudyingpoliticaloutcomes.Overtime,rationalchoiceandAPDresearchhasconvergedtoa
significantdegree,asscholarsinbothtraditionshaveincreasinglybeenexposedtodifferenttheoreticaland
methodologicalperspectivesandthusbecomeconsumersofeachother’swork.Thischapterdocumentshowand
whyrationalchoiceresearchhasmovedinanAPDdirection.
Keywords:rationalchoice,historicalinstitutionalism,anti-behavioralism,equilibriuminstitutions,structures,rules,procedures,processes,defining
Americanpoliticaldevelopment,methodologicalpluralism
Itwasnotsolongagothat“rationalchoice(RC)”and“Americanpoliticaldevelopment(APD)”werealmostwholly
separateresearchenterprisesinpoliticalscience.Interestingly,bothemergedasreactionstothedominant
“behavioralparadigm”ofthemid-twentiethcentury.BothRCandAPDscholarsbelievedthatbehavioralresearch,
whichgrewoutofthesociologicalandsocial-psychologicaltraditionsandassumedthatindividualsresponded
reactivelytolargerforcesandpressuresaroundthem(andthusassumedthatpoliticaloutcomesweretheresultof
socialroles,psychologicalcues,and/orgroup-basednorms),leftoutkeyingredientsthatwereimportantfor
understandingthepoliticalworld.RCscholarsinthe1960sand1970sfocusedonindividualagencyasthemissing
ingredientandrecastpoliticalactorsasproactive(orpurposive)agents,withdistinctpreferences,beliefsabout
thepoliticalworld,andtheabilitytoactonthosepreferencesandbeliefstowardsomechosengoal(s).Bythelate
1970s,RCscholarsidentifiedanothermissingcomponentinbehavioralresearch—thelackofaroleforinstitutions
intheproductionofpoliticaloutcomes.Thefocusoninstitutions(formal/informalstructuresandprocesses)would
cometoplayaprivilegedroleinRCscholarshipand,inshortorder,transformthefield(Aldrich1994;Shepsle
1989).APDscholarsofthe1980sand1990s,ontheotherhand,focusedonadifferentsetof(perceived)
limitationsinbehavioralresearch.Thefirstwasthelackofattentionpaidtohistory,andthewaysinwhichthe
historicalpoliticalcontextorhistoricalpowerrelationshipsinsocietyaffectedoutcomes(andwereshapedby
outcomes).Thesecond,whichwasrelated,wastheabsenceofanyreferenceto(orawarenessof)the“state”;
APDscholarsbelievedthatpolicyprocessesandoutputswereinextricablylinkedtothemacro-political-economic
environmentandtheconstellationofpoliticalandeconomicforcesinsociety(thatdevelopedandevolvedinan
historicalway).Inthisway,APDscholarsalsopointedtoinstitutionsascrucialforafullerunderstandingofpolitics
(Evans,Reuschemeyer,andSkocpol1985;OrrenandSkowronek2004).
WhileRCandAPDscholarshadthesamebehavioralfoil,andseemedtoshareanaffinityforinstitutions,theydid
notregularlyengageoneanother.Muchofthiswaslikelyduetomethodologicaldifferences(seeSwiftandBrady
1994).Rationalchoicescholarshipdescendedfromoperationsresearchandeconomics;researchwasdeductive
innature,oftenemployingformal(mathematical)models,andhypotheseswerederivedandtestedwithlarge-N
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APD and Rational Choice
datasetsusingadvancedstatisticaltechniques.APDscholarship,bycontrast,descendedfromhistory,sociology,
anddemocratictheory;researchwasinductiveinnature,oftenemployingqualitativetechniqueslikethick
descriptionandprocesstracinginanarrative-based,non-hypothesis-testingformat.Ineffect,RCandAPD
scholarsspokedifferentlanguages.Andsincebothwerethenewkidsontheblock,andrelativeadolescentsas
intellectualtraditions,theydidnotalwaysplaywellwiththoseunlikethem.Overtime,RCscholars,thelargerofthe
twogroups,soughttoviewithbehavioralistsfordisciplinaryhegemony.Andwhiletheysucceededinvarious
colonizationefforts,theycouldnotfullyvanquishtheirbehavioralfoes;today,RCandbehavioralscholars
maintainaroughequalityinthehallsofresearchuniversitiesintheUnitedStates.APDscholars,whileconsiderably
smallerinnumber,havegrownsteadilyovertime;moreover,manyAPDscholars(especiallythosefromthefirst
generation)haveembracedtheiroutsiderpositionandhappilyviewedtheAPDenterpriseasanintellectual
“insurgency”(seeBensel2003).
Whileprideofintellectualtraditionisstillstrongtoday,andtensionsbetweenthecampsstillexist,1communication
betweenRCandAPDscholarshasimprovedconsiderably.Someofthisisduetogenerationalreplacement,as
youngerscholarsareoftenexposedtobothtypesofworkintheirgraduateschoolcurricula(whilealsoreceiving
broadmethodologicaltraining).Someisalsoprobablyduetotopscholarsinbothtraditionspayinghomageto
researchendeavorsintheothercamp(see,e.g.,OrrenandSkowronek2002;SwiftandBrady1994).Finally,and
relatedtothepriortwopoints,theintellectual“culturewars,”forallintentsandpurposes,areover.The
“pathologies”ofrationalchoicehavebeenairedanddisputed(GreenandShapiro1994;Friedman1996),the
Perestroikamovementhascomeand(largely)gone(seeMonroe2005forthelastsetoforganizedthoughts),and
aperiodofrelativecalmhasensued.Doeseveryoneagreethattherightlevelof“methodologicalpluralism”has
beenachieved?Probablynot.Butthefeverishdaysofintellectualbattlesseemtobehindus(atleastfornow).In
myview,andthisispurelyimpressionistic,thereseemstobemoretolerancetodaythanadecadeortwoago.
Partofthattolerance,Ibelieve,hascomefromawillingnesstolearnacrossboundaries,whichhasfostereda
healthyrespectforthosewithalternativeideasandapproaches.Acaseinpoint,inmyownexperience,hasbeen
theCongressandHistoryConference(CHC),thebrainchildofIraKatznelson.Nowadecadeold,theCHCbrings
togethercongressionalscholarsfromtherationalchoice,APD,andhistoricaltraditions.Ihavehadthepleasureof
attendingeachCHC,andtheopportunitytolearnfromscholarslikeKatznelson,RichardBensel,RickValelly,and
ElizabethSandershashelpedshapethewaythatIapproachresearchquestions.Inshort,engagementand
communicationwithAPDscholarshasbroadenedmyintellectualperspectiveandmademeabetterscholar.
IwillhavemoretosayabouttheshrinkinggapbetweenRCandAPDscholarshiplaterinthischapter.Myprimary
focusinthefollowingsectionswillbetodetailtheinroadsthatRCscholarshavemadeintothestudyofAPD,which
Iwillinitiallydefineasthe“inquiryintotemporalaspectsofgovernance”(OrrenandSkowronek2002,722).Two
decadesago,therewasalmostnoRCresearchwithAPDovertones.Nowthereisaconsiderableamount,andthe
trajectoryofRC-basedAPDworkisquitepositive.Partofthisgrowth,asInoteabove,isduetotheblurringof
boundaries,thanksinparttobettercommunicationandactiveengagement.Butforsuchcommunicationand
engagementtotakeplace,aninitialfoundationofRC-basedAPDresearchhadtoemerge.Onceacredible
commitmenttoelementsoftheAPDagenda(sensitivitytohistoricalcontext,respectfortheoretical/methodological
conceptsliketimingandsequence,etc.)wasmade,thebasisforcommongroundwascreated,andaseriousand
fruitfuldialoguecouldthenbegin.
IndescribinghowRCscholarshipmovedinanAPDdirection,IwillmostlydiscussexamplesfromtheCongressand
partiesliteratures,simplybecausethisiswhereRC-basedAPDworkhashaditsgreatestpurchase.2 Butbefore
doingso,apreliminarystepisnecessary;specifically,tounderstandtheRCmovetowardAPD,wemustfirst
understandtheevolutionofRCasafield.
RationalChoiceandthe“Discovery”ofInstitutions
Inthissection,IprovideashortoverviewoftheevolutionoftheRCfield.AstheRCliteratureismorethanahalfcenturyold,mycoveragewillbeobviously(perhapsembarrassingly)brief.3 Butmymaingoalhereisnotto
provideacomprehensiveintellectualhistory,burrathertolayouthow(some)RCscholarsgravitatedtowardAPD.
Theanswerwillbethroughthe(re)discoveryofinstitutions.
Asmentionedpreviously,RChaditsoriginsintheeconomicsandoperationsresearchliteratures.TheRC
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APD and Rational Choice
approachwasinmanywaysthepolaroppositeoftheprevailingbehavioralapproachofthetime.Whileboth
approachestooktheindividualasthebaseunitofanalysis(ortheoreticalbuildingblock),theRCapproach
replacedbehavioralism’s“passiveman,”nudgedbyhissurroundingstowardsomeoutcome,with“activeman,”
whopossessedwell-definedpreferencesandbeliefsabouttheworldaroundhim,andselectedstrategiesthat
maximizedhislikelihoodofachievinghisgoals(most-preferredoutcomes).4 Regardingpreferences,RCtheory
assumedthatanindividualwasself-interestedandpurposive(andsometimesa“maximizer”);“self-interest”did
notnecessarilymean“selfish,”however,asanindividualcouldgreatlyvaluebenefitsthataccruedtothose
beyondhim(i.e.,socialbenefits).Moreimportantwasthatbasicself-interestinagivenstudybeclearlyidentified—
incongressionalstudies,forexample,acommonRCassumptionhasbeenthatamemberofCongressseeksto
maximizehischanceofreelection(Mayhew1974).
RCtheorydifferedfrombehavioralisminanotherimportantway:itwasdeductiveratherthaninductive.RCtheory
wasbuiltabstractly,usingpremisesandassumptions,andhypotheseswerederivedfromthetheory(andoften
tested).Atheoreticaloutcomewassaidtobeanequilibriumifitwasstable,whichtypicallymeantthatnodecisive
coalition—oftenasimplemajorityinmostdecisionsettings—preferredadifferentoutcome.WhilemuchRC
scholarshipovertheyearshasbeeninformal(i.e.,logic-based),thedeductivenatureoftheRCenterpriseledto
variousformal(mathematical)representations.Decision-andgame-theoreticmodelsbecamepopular,whilethe
spatialmodelofdecisionmaking—where,initssimplestform,actors(voters,legislators)andalternatives
(candidates,policies)arearrayedfromlefttorightalongaline—emergedasthe“workhorse”modelinRCstudies.
EarlyRCscholarsfocusedconsiderableattentiononthedynamicsofdemocraticdecisionmaking.Atissuewasan
earlyaxiomaticresultbyArrow(1951)thatsuggestedthatnodemocraticvotingmethod(nomethodofaggregating
preferences)was“fair”—thatindividualrationalitydidnotnecessarilyleadtogrouprationality.5Inresponse,Black
(1948,1958)andDowns(1957)showedthatifthenumberofdecisionmakerswereodd,decisionmakers’
preferenceswerewellordered(“singlepeaked”),anddecisionsweremadealongonedimensionofchoice,then
themedianvoter’smost-preferredpolicy(his“idealpoint”)wasanequilibriumoutcomeinamajority-rulesetting—it
wasa“Condorcetwinner,”inthatitcouldbeatanyotheralternativeinpair-wisevoting.Themedianvoterresult
would,intime,transcendacademiaandbecomepartofthepubliclexicon,aspoliticiansandjournalistswould
discusshowimportantitwasforpoliticalcandidatesto“movetothecenter”or“capturethoseinthemiddle”in
advanceofanelection.
Bythe1960sand1970s,formaltheoristsworkingondemocraticdecisionmaking(i.e.,socialchoicetheorists)
soughttomovebeyondthesingle-dimensionalworldofBlackandDowns.Thebeliefwasthatdemocraticpolitics
couldnottypicallybereducedtoonedimensionofpolicychoice,andthatdecision-makingmodels—toberealistic
—neededtoincorporateadditional(higher)dimensions.Whenaseconddimensionwasadded,themedianvoter
resulteffectivelyvanished.Exceptunderveryrarecircumstances(Plott1967),outcomesintwodimensions
exhibitednostability—noequilibriumexisted,asanymajority-preferredoutcomewassusceptibletobeing
overriddenbyanewmajority(composedof,inpart,losersfromthepriorround).Moreover,asMcKelvey(1976)
showed,anyoutcomeinthechoicespacecouldpotentiallybereached.Thepossibilityof“chaos”inmajority-rule
decisionmakingwasreal,asconditionsthatallowedforinstability,agendamanipulation,andcyclingwere
pervasive.
Theproblemwiththesocialchoicetheorists’workwassummedupinthetitleofapaperbyTullock(1981):“why
somuchstability?”Incomparingtheacademicresultstorealworldvotingbodies,Tullocksawadisjuncture:
legislatureswereabletopasspoliciesintolaw,andoncepassed,thoselawswerequitestable.Noneofthe
proceduraldysfunctionalityandendlesscyclingthatMcKelvey’stheoremwarnedaboutwasapparent.Something
seemedtobemissingfromthesocialchoicetheorists’work.
Shepsle(1979)providedananswer:theworkofPlott,McKelvey,andothershadabstractedawaytoomuchofthe
realworld’scomplexity.Intheirstripped-downmodels,wherepoliticalactorsweredeciding(voting)inalargely
structure-freeenvironment,thelackofanequilibriuminpreferencesalonewasindeedtheresult.Buttherealworld
hadstructure.Therealworldhadinstitutions.Withthisinmind,Shepsledevelopedamodelofalegislaturewitha
committeesystem,basedlooselyontheUSHouseofRepresentatives.Thekeyfeaturesrevolvedaroundrulesof
jurisdictionandagendacontrol—ifindividualpolicies(orindividualpartsofcomplexpolicies)wereassignedto
individualcommitteesandonlythoseamendmentsgermanetothepolicydimensioninquestionwereallowed,then
anequilibriumcouldbegenerated.Institutions(acommitteesystemwithjurisdictionalarrangementsand
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APD and Rational Choice
amendmentrestrictions)couldinducestabilityandthushelplegislatorsachievetheirgoals.Shepslecalledthis
structure-inducedequilibrium(SIE)incontrasttothepreference-inducedequilibrium(PIE)ofthelargelyinstitutionfreesocialchoiceresearch.6 Later,otherRCscholarsturnedtoadifferentinstitution—politicalparties—asthe
structuralsolutiontovariouslegislativechoiceproblems(CoxandMcCubbins1993;Aldrich1995).ThisRCtrendof
studyingpreferencechoicewithinaparticularinstitutionalcontext—wheretheinstitutionsconstrainandshapethe
goalsandstrategiesofpoliticalactors—becameknownasthe“newinstitutionalism.”
This“discovery”ofinstitutionsbyShepsleandotherswas,ofcourse,littlemorethanarediscovery.Inthelate
nineteenthandearlytwentiethcenturies,an“oldinstitutionalism”wascentraltothepoliticalsciencediscipline.
Predicatedonconstitutionallawandconstitutionalhistory,this“legal-formalanalysis,”practicedbysuch
luminariesasWoodrowWilsonandJamesBryce,survivedthroughtheearly1950s,whenbehavioralismtookroot
andreduceditspredecessortomarginalstatus.Thisoldinstitutionalismhadmuchincommonwithcontemporary
APD,as“state-based”structuralformsplayedamajorroleinitsintellectualagenda.Oldinstitutionalworkwas
generallyexpository,however,asscholarswerecontentmostlytodescribeinstitutionsindetailandnotpursue
deepertheoreticalorempiricaltreatments(seePeters1996;Rhodes2006).7
Thus,thankstoShepsle’spioneeringefforts,institutionscametobeviewedasasolutiontocollectiveandsocial
choiceproblemsinstylizeddecision-makingbodies.Butweretheythesolutiontosimilarproblemsinrealworld
legislatures?Thatis,wereinstitutionschosenbypoliticalactorstohelpthemtoachievetheirgoals?ForShepsle
(1986,1989),then,thequestionbecame:howwereinstitutionsselectedand,onceselected,howwerethey
maintained?Hecalledthisthesearchforequilibriuminstitutions.Inthisendeavor,Shepsleandotherswerenot
servedbymoremathematicalequationsonablackboard;rather,theyneededtofindempiricalevidence.A
detailedsearchthroughhistorywasneededtodetermineifintellectualconjecturehadabasisinreality,thatis,
whetherthereweregroundsforbelievingthatpoliticalactorsinthepastpurposivelyturnedtoinstitutionstosolve
problemsofdemocraticdecisionmaking.
InstitutionalChoice:Structures
DeterminingtheoriginsofinstitutionsthusbecameRCscholars’entréeintoAPD.Theironlyotheralternative,given
thedirectionthattheirworkhadtakenthem,wastoresorttofunctionalism,i.e.,(a)majority-ruledecisionmaking
wasunstableinmorethanonedimension,(b)institutionswereshowntobeasolutiontothisproblem,and(c)thus
institutionsemerged.Andthat,ofcourse,wasnotanintellectuallysatisfyingalternative.
Inthissection,IdiscussoneformthatRC-basedinstitutional-choiceresearchtook:structuralchoice.Indeed,the
firstmajorAPDforaysmadebyRCscholarsfocusedonthestructuralmakeupofCongress,specificallythe
emergenceofstandingcommitteesandinstitutionalpoliticalparties.Otherquestionsofinstitutionalchoice,likethe
selectionofrulesandprocedures,willbediscussedinthefollowingsection.
GammandShepsle(1989)werethefirststudytoexploretheequilibriuminstitutionsideaempirically.Not
surprisingly,giventhestructuralcomponentofShepsle’searlierinstitutional-equilibriumwork,thefocusinGamm
andShepsle(1989)wastheemergenceofastandingcommitteesysteminCongress.Whiletheywereunableto
finda“smokinggun”(intheformofaletter,diaryentry,etc.)intheirhistoricalsearch,GammandShepsleargued
thataRCaccount,revolvingprimarilyaroundthemachinationsofHouseSpeakerHenryClay,providedaplausible
explanationforthesuddenshiftfromselect-committeegovernmenttostanding-committeegovernmentintheyears
between1810and1825.Severalyearslater,Jenkins(1998)presentedasimilarstory,butwithmorespecific
hypothesesandcriticaltests.
Inshort,theGamm–Shepsle–Jenkins(GSJ)accountrestedonchangingexternalfactorsthatdroveentrepreneurial
innovation.ClaybecameSpeakeratatimewhenwarwithBritainwasintheair;hetookadvantageofideological
homogeneitywithinhisRepublicanPartytoestablishastablepolicyagenda,whichheusedtomaintaincontrolof
thespeakership.WhenthewarendedandtheFirstPartySystemcollapsed,however,Claywasunabletoconstruct
anewpolicyagendatoholdhiscoalitiontogether;withouttheFederalistsasaviablefoil,theRepublicanslost
cohesionandstartedtofocusonregionalissues.Thisparochialismledtovoting(decisionmaking)instabilitythat,
ineffect,mirroredthemultidimensionalchaosofthesocialchoicetheorists’world.Tosolvethisproblem,Clay
reorganizedtheHouse’sinternalstructurebyjettisoningtheexistingselectcommitteesystemandcreatinga
systemwherebystandingcommittees,withstrongjurisdictionalcontrolsandpropertyrightsofassignment,would
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APD and Rational Choice
handlethechamber’sbusiness.Withthisshifttostandingcommittees,Clayineffectcreatedelectorallyvaluable
“turf”intheHouse,whichgavemembers“quasi-permanentinfluenceonthoseissuesthatmostconcernedthem”
(AldrichandShepsle2000,36).Clayparceledoutinfluenceinthiswaytohelphimachievehisgoals:maintaining
controlofthespeakershipinanunstableenvironment,which(amongotherthings)kepthimintherunningforthe
presidencyin1824.While,again,GSJuncoverednosmoking-gunvalidation,Jenkins(1998)didfindindirect
empiricalsupport(usingdataonbillreferrals,committeeassignments,andspeakershipvotes)forallthemain
elementsofthisRCaccount.
UnderlyingtheGSJaccountwasanassumptionthatnationalpoliticswasstablebeforethecollapseoftheFirst
PartySystem.Aldrich(1995)enteredheretomakeacaseforthisassumption;hearguedthatinstitutionalpolitical
parties(i.e.,partiesinCongress)werecreatedtosolvecoordinationandcollectivechoiceproblemsthathampered
decisionmakingintheearlyCongresses.Specifically,AldrichcontendedthattheFederalists,ledbyAlexander
Hamilton,recognizedthattheyhadamajorityofsupportforthe“GreatPrinciple”oftheday—howstrongthe
Federalgovernmentshouldbe—butwereunabletotranslatethatsupportintopolicyoutcomes.Thiswasbecause
theRepublicans,ledbyThomasJeffersonandJamesMadison,wereabletoinjectregional(orsecondary)
dimensionsintodebatesandvotes;this,ineffect,madethechoicespacemultidimensional,whichtheRepublicans
usedtotheiradvantageinstymieingtheFederalists.AccordingtoAldrich,Hamiltonrecognizedtheproblemearly
on,andsetaboutcreatinginformalstructures(caucuses,floorleaders,andwhipsystems)thatwouldconvince
FederaliststofocusontheGreatPrincipledimensionandignoreattemptstoaddcomplexitytovotedecisions.Very
quickly,Hamiltonsawhisgoalachieved,astheFederalistsbeganwinningmoreoften.
ForAldrich,Hamiltondidnot“create”partiessomuchashedid“intuit”them.Revolutionaryleadersunderstood
(orcametounderstand)theimportanceofinstitutions.Itwasclear,forexample,thattheweakinstitutionsinherent
intheConfederalsystemledtoitsdemise;asJillsonandWilson(1994)documented,colonialrepresentativeswere
unwillingtocedemuchauthorityinthecreationoftheContinentalCongress,andthisledtoweakinstitutional
structuresthatcouldnoteffectivelycoordinatesharedinterestsorhelpovercomecollectivechoiceproblems.Asa
result,theFoundersbuiltmuchstrongerinstitutionsintothenewFederalsystem.However,withregardto
Congress,nomechanismwasincludedtoaggregatepreferencesinthefaceofpotentialinstability.Asaresult,a
newextralegalinstitutionwasdeveloped,astheseparateinformalstructuresdevisedbyHamiltonwouldformthe
coreofaninstitutionalpoliticalparty.8 TheRepublicansquicklycopiedthesefeatures,inresponsetothe
Federalists’newfoundlegislativesuccess,andaninstitutionalpartysystemwasborn.Aldrichfoundsupportforthis
storybylookingatkeyvotesassociatedwithFederalistfiscalandforeignpolicyissues—overtime,betweenthe
FirstandThirdCongresses,partywasresponsibleforstructuringmoreindividualvotechoicesandreducingthe
influenceofnon-GreatPrincipledimensions.
Aldrich(1995)alsodocumentedtheemergenceofmasspoliticalparties;heretheentrepreneurwasMartinVan
Buren,whosoughttocreateanewparty(andpartysystem)builtaroundAndrewJacksonandbasedon
Jeffersonianprinciplesratherthanpersonalallegiancetoelites.VanBuren’sgoalwastomaximizepartymembers’
likelihoodofretainingoffice.HistacticsincludedbuildinganationalpartyorganizationaroundJackson,bylinking
numerousstateandlocalpartyorganizations,andusingthatnationalorganizationtomobilizetheelectorate
behindcandidatesontheJacksonticket.Electionandre-electionmeantasteadystreamofpolicyandpolitical
spoils.OrganizationandmobilizationwerethusthecollectiveactionproblemsthatVanBurensolvedthroughthe
constructionofamassparty.AldrichuncoveredevidencetosupportthisRCstorybylookingatparty
organizationalandturnoutdatainavarietyofways.
JenkinsandStewart(2013)alsoplacedVanBureninanentrepreneurialroleadecadeafterhissuccessfulcreation
oftheJacksonianParty.Inthiscase,VanBurencametorecognizethatHouseofficerpositions—principallythe
Speaker,butalsothePrinterandClerk—controlledresourcesthatcouldbeusedinpursuitofpolicyandpatronage;
ifsecuredconsistently,thesepositionscouldprovidesubstantialbenefitsforthemajorityparty.Theproblemwas
thatofficerelectionsexhibitedthesametypeofinstabilitythatplaguedvotingintheearlyFederalCongresses;in
thelate1830s,forexample,dissidentmajority-partymemberssometimesvotedwiththeminorityforideological
reasons,whichonseveraloccasionsresultedinthemajoritypartylosingtheofficerelection.Asaresult,Van
Buren,nowpresident,pushedfortheadoptionofapublicballot(asthesecretballothadgovernedHouseofficer
electionstothatpoint)andthecreationofalegislativepartycaucus,basedonaninstitutionthatheused
effectivelyinNewYorkaspartoftheAlbanyRegency.Withthepublicballotinplace,9 thepartycaucuswouldbe
thevenueforintra-partycoordinationonofficerelections.Theexpectationwasthatdecisionsmadeincaucus
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wouldbehonoredbyallpartymembersonthefloor.Thiswasenforcedbyasystemofcarrotsandsticks:“losers”
incaucuswerecompensatedwithvariousbenefits(policy,committeeassignments),whilethethreatofbeing
expelledfromtheparty—forrefusingtotoethelineonthefloor—wasrepeatedlyunderscored.Aftersomeinitial
successes,theVanBureniteswereunabletomakethepartycaucusoperateeffectively,asslaverybecametoo
strongaregionalpressureforthepartybondtowithstand.Theseedwasplanted,however.AsJenkinsandStewart
showed,onceslaverywasnolongeranissue,beginningduringtheCivilWar,theRepublicansandthenlaterthe
Democratsusedthepartycaucustoeffectivelystructureofficernominationsandfloorelections.Bythelate
nineteenthcentury,thebindingpartycaucusonorganizationalmattershadfullydevelopedintoanequilibrium
institution.
InstitutionalChoice:Rules,Procedures,andProcesses
AsRCresearchonstructuralemergenceanddevelopmenttookoff,aparallelRCliteratureoninstitutionalchoice
dealingwithrules,procedures,andprocessesalsocommenced.ThisliteraturewasdominatedbyRCscholarswho
begantakingthehistoricaldevelopmentofCongressseriously.AnassortmentofsuchRCstudieshasappeared
sincethelate1980s;Ifocusbelowonsomeofthemostimportantones.
AroundthesametimethatGamm/ShepslewerefocusingonstandingcommitteeemergenceinCongress,Stewart
(1988;1989)soughttoapplyaRCframeworktothestudyofbudgetreformpoliticsinCongressbetween1865and
1921.UnlikeGamm/Shepsle,though,whofocusedoncommitteedevelopmentasanempiricalanaloguetothe
formalliteratureoninstitutions,StewartfollowedMayhew(1974)inapplyingabasicRCassumptionofre-electionseekingbehavioronthepartofmembersofCongresstoanearliertimeperiod.Indoingso,Stewartwasawarethat
applyingaRCframeworktothehistoricalstudyofCongresswas“boundtobecontroversial”(1989,9).Thus,apart
fromhisanalysisofchangesintheHouse’sappropriationsprocess,Stewartalsomadeanimportantcontributionin
explicatingwhyanassumptionofgoal-directedbehaviorwastenableinearliercongressionalperiods.
Substantively,inasetofempiricalcaseanalyses,Stewartshowedthatmomentsoffragmentationand
centralizationintheHousebudgetprocessfollowedfromtheinteractionbetweenthedecisioncontextand
members’spendingpreferences.Whentheeconomywasflushandtheexistingcommitteesystemoverworked,
legislatorswithahighdemandforparticularisticpolicy(asawaytomeetconstituents’interests)sought
fragmentation,tobetterincreasespendingandexpandpolicyoutputs.Thiswasthecaseinthe1870sand1880s,
whentheAppropriationsCommitteewasstrippedofmostofitsspendingjurisdictions.Whentheeconomywas
stagnantanddeficitsexisted,legislatorswithalowdemandforparticularisticpolicysoughtcentralization,tobetter
controlspendingandlimitpolicyoutputs.ThiswasthecaserightafterWorldWarI,whentheBudgetand
AccountingActwasconsideredandeventuallypassed.Increatinga“marriage”ofRCtheoryanddetailed
historicalanalysis,Stewartsetastandardforthestudyofinstitutionalchoice(andchange)inCongress.
Binder(1996)shiftedthefocusawayfromprocessbyexaminingproceduralchoiceinCongressfrom1789through
1823.BuildingoffthepurposiveapproachofGamm/Shepsle,sheoutlinedhowamajoritypartythatwasunableto
secureitspreferencesdirectlymightseektochangetherules—inthiscase,byrestrictingminorityrights—to
achieveitsgoals.Inlookingatvotesonthepreviousquestionmotion(whichallowedamajoritytocutoffdebate)in
theHouse,Binderfoundthatpartisanship,andnot“increasedworkload”(whichwastiedtoanoldersociological
literature),wasasignificantdeterminant—specifically,thepreviousquestionmotionwasalteredwhenpartieswere
homogeneousandpolarizedfromoneanother.Binder(1997)expandedthislineofreasoning,bothintermsof
articulatingwhenminorityrightsgenerallyshouldbesuppressed(whenmajoritypartystrengthwashighanda
short-termadvantagecouldbeachieved)andacrossalongerswathofcongressionalhistory(200years).
Moreover,shearguedthatinheritedruleswerealsoimportanttoconsiderasacontextualfactorinstudying
institutionalchange;forexample,thestrongminorityrightsintheSenateresultedfromparticulardecisions(likethe
eliminationofthepreviousquestionrule)madeearlyinthatchamber’shistory.
Dion(1997)coveredsimilargroundasBinder,bylookingatminorityrightsrestrictionsfromthe1830sthroughthe
1890s.Usingnewlycollecteddata,Diontestedformallyderivedhypotheses—inboththetraditionalstatistical
sense,aswellasthroughdetailedcasestudies—andfoundthatcohesivemajoritiesweremorelikelytoprovoke
obstructionfromtheminority,andaccordingly,cohesivemajoritieswerethenmorelikelytopushforprocedural
changetolimittheminority’srighttoobstruct.WhereDiondifferedfromBinderwasonhowthesizeofthemajority
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APD and Rational Choice
correlatedwithproceduralrestrictions;forBinder,largermajoritiessoughttorestrictminorityrights,whileforDionit
wassmallermajorities.Binder’sfinding(usingalongertimeseries)waspurelyempirical,whileDion’sempirical
findingwasconsistentwithformally-derivedhypotheses.BeyondhiscarefulformalandempiricalRCanalyses,
DionactivelyreachedouttotheAPDcommunity,statingthathe“[tried]hardtotakethehistoricalsideofthe
enterpriseasseriouslyastheformalside”(xii–xiii).
Adler(2002)tackledtheissueofinstitutionalchoiceinadifferentwaybylookingatfailedchanges.Indoingso,he
exploredadifferentelementoftheequilibriuminstitutionsquestion:whyinstitutionsmaintainthemselves(inthe
faceofreformefforts)overtime.Specifically,AdlerinvestigatedwhythebasicstructureoftheHousecommittee
systemremainedlargelyintactsinceWorldWarIIdespitesignificantattemptsatreforminthe1940s,1970s,and
1990s.Adler’sthesis,likeStewart’s,revolvedaroundtheelectoralconnection;hearguedthatsincereelectionseekingmembersofCongresshadlearnedhowtoservetheneedsoftheirconstituentsthroughthecommittee
system,theywereunwillingtosupportanyeffortstoshakeupthecurrentarrangement.Usingavarietyof
socioeconomicandfinancialdata,Adlershowedthatdistributivebenefitsandcommitteemembershipwereindeed
linked.Andusingcasestudies,heshowedthatmembersofCongresswereriskaversewhenitcametoreform,
willingtoacceptasuboptimalstatusquosystemratherthanincurthecostsoflearninganew,potentiallybetter
system(withonlytwoyearsbetweenelectioncycles).Adlerthusarguedthatuncertainty(andthepotentialcosts
therein)ledtoinstitutionalstasis.
CoxandMcCubbins(2005)investigatedtheemergenceoftheReedRulesintheearly-1890sHouse.Atissuewas
thechamber’soutdatedsystemofproceduralrights,whichtheminorityusedeffectivelyinthe1870sand1880sto
thwartthelegislativemomentumofthemajority.CoxandMcCubbinsreferredtothisperiodasa“dualveto
system,”asboththemajorityandminoritypartiesostensiblypossessedagendavetoes,andmajoritygainsoften
cameonlywithminorityconcessions.ThomasReed,afterbecomingHouseSpeaker,reformedthesystemby
remakingtherules—minorityrightswererestrictedandmajorityrightswereenhanced.Thisdestroyedthe
prevailingdualvetosystem,andthemajoritypartywasquicklytransformedfromaprocedurallightweightintoa
proceduralheavyweight.AndasCoxandMcCubbinsshowedinatime-seriesanalysis,themajorityparty’sability
tocontroltheagendainanegativeway,bypreventinglegislativechangethatamajorityofitsmemberswouldfind
distasteful,spikedwithReed’sinnovationsandhasremainedstrong(regardlessofotherproceduralchangesmade
overtheyears)throughthepresentday.
WawroandSchickler(2006)revisitedtheearlierproceduraldebate,byexploringthelawmakingenvironmentinthe
Senateacrosstime.AtissuewashowtheSenatewasabletolegislateinthenineteenthandearlytwentieth
centurieswhentherewasnoruleinplacetocutoffdebate.Theyarguedthatlawmakingduringthistimewasakin
toagame-theoretic“warofattrition,”wherebyminoritiesandmajoritieswouldconveyinformationand“preference
intensity”duringdebate.Exceptinraresituations,majorities(evennarrowones)wouldeventuallyworktheirwill
becausethethreatthatamajoritycouldchangetherules—directlyinaformalwayorindirectlythroughprecedent
—andweakenordestroyminorityrightswasveryreal.EventuallythegrowingsizeoftheSenateanditsincreasing
workloadmadecontinuedoperationundertheexistinginformalsystemtoocostly,andaformalruletoinvoke
cloture(shutoffdebate)wasadoptedin1917.Tosupporttheirargument,WawroandSchickleruseda
combinationofspatialmodels,quantitativetechniques,andqualitativecasestudies.AndinarguingthatSenate
ruleswereineffectgovernedbymajoritychoice,theytookaprovocativestance,opposingBinder(1997)and
otherswhoemphasizedpathdependenceandinheritedrulesthatenabledSenateminoritiestopreventrules
changespreferredbymajorities.
MovingtheGoalPosts?RedefiningAPD
RecallthatIhadinitiallyadoptedOrrenandSkowronek’s(2002,722)definitionofAPDasthe“inquiryintotemporal
aspectsofgovernance.”Thisdefinitionhadaninclusivequality,andallowedforafairlyseamlessdiscoveryofRCbasedworkwithanAPDflavor.Morerecently,OrrenandSkowronek(2004)proposedamoreexclusivedefinition
ofAPD.Thiswasdueinparttotheirdesiretoestablish(orperhapsbetterclarify)APDasauniqueintellectual
enterpriseandsubfield.InrespondingtovariouscritiquesofAPD,OrrenandSkowronek(2004,121)notedthat“in
APDresearchtoday,thereismoreatstakethanpoliticalchangeinthepastandstrategicinteractionsinhistorical
context.”10 Assuch,theyshiftedgearsandredefinedpoliticaldevelopmentas
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APD and Rational Choice
adurableshiftingoverningauthority.By‘governingauthority’wemeantheexerciseofcontrolover
personsorthingsthatisdesignatedandenforceablebythestate.By‘shift’wehaveinmindachangein
thelocusordirectionofcontrol,resultinginanewdistributionofauthorityamongpersonsororganizations
withinthepolityatlargeorbetweenthemandtheircounterpartsoutside.
(OrrenandSkowronek2004,123,emphasisadded)
Somemightcontendthatthisshiftisakinto“movingthegoalposts.”Basedonthisnarrowerdefinition,for
example,manyoftheRCstudiesofintra-institutionalchangethatIdescribedearlierwouldprobablynotbe
recognizedas“APDresearch.”Indeed,RCworkisnotnaturallysuitedtothe“sweepingimpact”thatseems
necessaryunderOrrenandSkowronek’snewdefinition—becauseRCresearchisoftentheoreticallytiedtoformal
conceptslike“equilibrium”andempiricallytiedtoestablishingclearcausalrelationships,itsscope(orframe)is
oftenlimited(ormodestlydrawn).Thatsaid,andapartfromotherconcernsrelatingtothenarrowingofthe
definition,mygoalinthissectionistoasksimply:doesRCworkthatsatisfiesthismoreexclusiveAPDdefinition
exist?Theansweris“yes,”andIprovidetwoexamplesbelow.
Thefirstexampleisasubstantiveone,anddealswithhowtheRepublicanswereabletoprotectthepoliciesthey
enactedduringtheCivilWarandReconstructionastheDemocratsreemergedasamajorplayeronthenational
stageinthe1870s.StewartandWeingast(1992)couchedtheiranalysisinthegrowinginstitutionalliteratureofthe
time,butemphasizedtheroleofelectoralinstitutions(ratherthanlegislativeinstitutionsoftheSIErevolution).
TheyarguedthattheRepublicans,beginningintheCivilWarera,used“statehoodpolitics”—ortheprocessof
bringingnewstatesintotheUnion—inastrategic(partisan)waytoincreasetheirshareofcongressional
representation.This“artificialrepresentation”inCongressallowedtheRepublicanstocountertheDemocrats’
growinginfluenceinthenation(whichwasalsopartiallyartificialduetoeffortstodisenfranchiseAfricanAmericans
intheSouth).Engstrom(2006)extendedtheStewart/WeingastargumentbydetailinghowRepublicans’strategic
decisionsatthestatelevel—notablygerrymanderingeffortsintheredistrictingprocess—weredesignedtoprovide
apartisanbiasandincreasetheGOP’srepresentationinthelate-nineteenth-centuryHouse.Finally,Jenkins(2007)
describedhowtheRepublicansinthelate-nineteenth-centuryHouseused“disputed”elections(basedonalleged
votingirregularities)tostrategicallyflipDemocraticseatsintoRepublicanseats,therebyincreasingtheirworking
majorityinthechamber.Thesecontested(disputed)electioncasesalsoservedasan“equalizer”tocombatthe
Democrats’useoffraud,corruption,andviolenceinSouthernelectionsandhelpedtheRepublicansmaintaina
footholdintheformerConfederacy.
ThesecondexampleisrelatedtoCongress’simpactonotherfacetsofthestate.Inparticular,aliteraturehas
emergedtoinvestigatehowandwhyCongresshashelpedtodeveloptheExecutivebranchovertime.Thepathof
suchdevelopmenthasoftenbeentiedtomembers’goals.Forexample,JohnsonandLibecap(1994)arguedthat
membersofCongressfirstpassedcivilservicereform(viathePendletonActof1883)asastrategicinitiativeto
facilitatetheirre-electionefforts—withskilledpoliticiansinthecivilservice,membersofCongresscouldbetter
managetheirremainingpoliticalappointeesandensurethattheneedsoftheirconstituentsweremet.Theriault
(2003)builtonJohnsonandLibecapbyrecastingtheroleoftheelectoralconnection;hefoundthatcivil-service
reformwasdrivenasmuchbydirectpublicpressure(followingPresidentGarfield’sassassinationbyadisgruntled
bureaucraticofficeseeker)asbythestrategicmachinationsofmembersofCongress.KernellandMcDonald
(1999)alsoweavedanelectoralconnectionstoryindiscussingthetransformationoftheU.S.PostOfficefrom
patronagetoserviceinthelatenineteenthcentury—fourthclasspostofficesweredismantledandreplacedwith
“ruralfreedelivery”asawayformemberstomeettheneedsoftheirconstituentsandcurryelectoralfavor.
GailmardandPatty(2013),ontheotherhand,focusedonmembers’policygoalstoexplainwhyCongresshas
delegatedsubstantialauthoritytotheExecutivebranchovertime(andcreated“theinstitutionalpresidency”).
Becausethepresidentandfederalbureaucratspossessinformationaladvantages,Congresshashadanincentive
toensurethatExecutivebranchofficialsacquireexpertisesothat“good”publicpolicies(consistentwith
Congress’spreferences)areproduced.
WhatDoestheFutureHold?
RegardlessofhowAPDisdefined,RCscholarswillalmostcertainlycontinuetakinghistoryseriously—bothin
generalandasamethodologicalconcept.Thus,thesortsofworkthatIhavediscussedoninstitutionalchoicewill
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APD and Rational Choice
onlyincreaseinnumber.AndthecontinuedeffortsofRCscholarstoproduceworkthatmightspeakto“adurable
shiftingoverningauthority”willonlyincreaseaswell.RC-basedAPDwork,inwhateverform,isheretostay.
Butthelargerandmoreimportantpoint,inmymind,isthatthegapbetweenRCscholarshipandtraditionalAPD
scholarshipisshrinking.AsInotedpreviously,whereasscholarsofinstitutionsagenerationortwoagomighthave
sortedprettyseamlesslyintoRCorAPDcamps,todaythestoryisdifferent.Studentsnowreceivebroadtraining
almostasamatterofcourse,andareexposedtoarangeoftheoreticalandmethodologicalperspectives.
This“narrowingofthegap”betweenRCandtraditionalAPDcanbeillustratedintwoways.First,whilethischapter
hasdocumentedthemovementofRCinanAPDdirection,thereversehasalsobeentrue.SomeofthebestAPD
workinrecentyears,whilefirmlyensconcedinhistorical-institutionalistorhistorical-interpretivisttraditions,has
alsoembracedsomeRCtenetsaswell.Forexample,theacceptanceofindividualagency,orpurposiveactionon
thepartofpoliticalactors,isprettystandardnow—andcanbefoundinJames’s(2000)workonpresidentsandthe
politicsofregulatorychoice,Schickler’s(2001)workontheinstitutionaldevelopmentofCongress,Carpenter’s
(2001)workonbureaucraticautonomy,OrrenandSkowronek’s(2004)foundationalAPDwork,Valelly’s(2004)
workonblackenfranchisementacrosstime,Galvin’s(2009)workonpresidentsandnationalparties,andCrowe’s
(2012)workonthedevelopmentofthefederaljudiciary.
Second,RCandtraditionalAPDscholarsareoftenworkingonthesamequestions,andincreasinglyengageeach
otherintheirresearch.Forexample,justasRCscholarslikeGamm/Shepsle,Aldrich,andJenkins/Stewarthave
focusedon“politicalentrepreneurship”tohelpexplaininstitutionaldevelopmentovertime,sotoohavetraditional
APDscholarslikeSheingate(2003),Strahan(2007),andCrowe(2007),whohaveexploredthetopicindepth.
Indeed,itisfairtosaythatAPDscholarsarefurtheralongthanRCscholarsinthedevelopmentofatheoryof
politicalentrepreneurship.Inaddition,justasShepsle/Weingast,Engstrom,andJenkinshavefocusedtheirefforts
onaparticularshiftinpostbellumgoverningauthority,sotoohaveAPDscholarslikeJamesandLawson(1999)and
Gillman(2000),whohaveexaminedtheRepublicans’strategicdeploymentofFederalelectionofficialsanddeputy
marshalsandstrategicexpansionandstaffingofthefederalcourtsystem,respectively,inthelatenineteenth
century.TheJames/LawsonandGillmananalysesnicelycomplementtheRCanalysesandhelpprovideafuller
viewoftheGOP’sstrategicinitiativesinthedecadesafterCivilWarandReconstruction.
Insum,thefutureforRC-basedAPDworkisbright.However,Ialsobelievethatwearenotfarawayfromdropping
theadjectivesthatadornoursubstantiveinterests.Thatis,whilewemaycurrentlyemploylabelslike“rationalchoiceinstitutionalists,”“historicalinstitutionalists,”and“institutionally-focusedAPDscholars,”Ienvisionatime
whenwesimplycallourselves“institutionalists.”11And,asinstitutionalists,thefactthatwepossesshistorical
sensibilitieswillbeassumed.
Inplanningthischapter,IbenefittedfromconversationswithDanGalvinandEricSchickler.IalsothankRob
LiebermanandRickValellyforfeedbackonanearlierversionofthechapter.
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Notes:
(1)Onesuchtensionisinthewaypoliticalactors’preferenceshavebeentreatedbyRCandAPDscholars.APD
scholarshavecriticizedsomeRCscholarsfortreatingpoliticalactors’preferencesasgiven(orimputed)rather
thanashistoricallysituatedandconstructed;likewise,RCscholarshavecriticizedsomeAPDscholarsfor
downplayingtheroleofpoliticalactors’preferencesinfavorof(outsized)attentiontomacro-leveltracingofhistory
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APD and Rational Choice
andprocess.KatznelsonandWeingast(2005,6)acknowledgethistensionbutalsocontendthatthe
aforementionedcriticismsare“outofdate,”asscholarsinbothtraditionshaveincreasinglyconvergedthankstoa
greaterfocusoninstitutions.
(2 )RC-basedAPDworkinotherfieldsclearlyexists,suchasMoe’s(1985)workonthedevelopmentofthe
institutionalpresidency,Harvey’s(1998)workonthedevelopmentoforganized/electoralinterests,andCameron’s
(2005)workonjudicialstatebuilding.
(3 )ShortoverviewscanbefoundinRiker(1990),Ordeshook(1990),andAldrich(1994).Foradetailed,accessible
primeronRCtheory,completewithsubstantiveapplications,seeShepsle(2010).
(4 )Shepsle(1989)referstotheseindividualsas“sociologicalman”and“economicman.”
(5)ThisisobviouslyaverysimpledescriptionofArrow’sTheorem.
(6 )SeealsoShepsleandWeingast(1981).
(7 )ForaRCtakeonthe“oldinstitutionalism,”anditsrelationtothe“newinstitutionalism,”seeAldrichandShepsle
(2000).
(8 )InadifferentRCtreatment,Jenkins(1999)lookedattheflipsideofpartyemergence:partydestruction.
Specifically,heexaminedwhyDemocrat–Whigdivisions,whichhadformedthebasisoftheSecondPartySystem
andexistedatthestate-levelintheSouththrough1860-61,vanishedintheConfederacy.Lookingatroll-callvotes
intheConfederateConstitutionalConvention,JenkinsfoundthatDemocrats—whocomprisedamajorityof
conventiondelegates—votedtoprohibittwooftheWhigs’majorissues:protectivetariffsandfederalfundingfor
internalimprovements.Thiseliminatedtheseissuesfromthelegislativeagenda,andthuserasedthesourceof
Democrat–Whigdivisions.Asaresult,theConfederacybeganitsexistencewithoutparties,anditdidnotsurvive
longenoughforanewpartysystemtoemergearoundsomedifferentsetofissues.
(9 )Thepublicballotsolvedthe“hiddenshirking”problembyallowingleaderstoidentifypartisanrecalcitrantsand
(potentially)punishthem.Theproblemwasthatconstituentscouldalsonowobserveindividualvotesinofficer
elections.Consequently,aspressurewasbuildingoverslavery,Housemembersoftenfoundthemselvescaught
betweenpartyandregion.
(10 )Onthesegeneralpoints,seealsoSkowronek(2003).
(11)Whilequiteoptimisticabout“pointsofintersectionandoverlap”betweenhistoricalandRCinstitutionalists,
KatznelsonandWeingast(2005,20–1)arelesssanguineaboutthefullconvergenceoftheinstitutional
approaches:“Thereislittledangerthatcommunicationandcollaborationwillproducemethodologicaluniformity.”
JefferyA.Jenkins
JefferyA.JenkinsisassociateprofessorofpoliticsattheUniversityofVirginia.
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