Download Dancing spatialities around a geopolitical continuity: the Silk Road

Dancing spatialities around a geopolitical continuity: the Silk Road
Igor Filibi1
1. Introduction
The theories of Braudel and Wallerstein are well known, and even more so in this
specialist forum, as are their key concepts of world-economy, world-system and the
structuring power of core - periphery relations. For this reason, rather than outlining
these concepts yet again, I consider it to be more appropriate to point out the principal
problems facing these theories.
Firstly, Eurocentrism, which constantly appears, however much one would like to
transcend it, and even the world-system notion put forward by Wallerstein (1976) is
affected by this bias (Dussel 2002:222-224). For this reason, the study of the Silk Road
and the centrality held for a long time by Asia, carries the advantage that the very nature
of the subject matter of the study tends to reduce this habitual problem. Secondly, even
accepting the explanatory power of the concepts of world-economy and world-system,
there are some points that are still not clear, specifically: a) when did a single worldeconomy emerge from the former plurality? Some authors set the date in the 15th - 16th
centuries (Wallerstein and, with some qualifications, Braudel as well), whilst others
(Frank/Gills 1993; Frank 1998) go back many centuries earlier, suggesting 5000 years
of antiquity instead of just 500; and b) when did a world-system actually come into
being? Although, on this point, there is less debate, with the mid-18th century being the
generally accepted date (Wallerstein).
Thirdly, these approaches revolve around the historical emergence and development of
capitalism. However, given the fact that this is a problematical concept (what is
capitalism? when can a society to be considered to be capitalist? who were the first
capitalists?) some authors such as Frank openly criticise it, whilst others such as
Hamashita prefer to avoid it directly (Arrighi 2003:133). In any case, it seems erroneous
to place the historical origins of capitalism in 16 th century Italy, given the fact that,
whatever criterion is used to define capitalism, these conditions appear to have already
been met in 11th century northern Italy or in some of the commercial cities of Asia, such
as Samarkand, Bukhara, etc. many centuries ago. Perhaps it would be a good idea not to
1
University of the Basque Country, [email protected]
centre so much on the concept of capitalism and to focus instead on describing and
understanding the trading and banking practices, the development of the routes and the
geographical and geopolitical conditioning factors forming the framework for these
routes over the centuries.
Fourthly, despite the notable attempts to transcend the "territorial trap", almost all
studies are to a great extent state-centred (Agnew 1994). In this respect, the innovative
work by geographers over the last decades has been of great help in going some way
towards achieving this, although much work still remains to be done. Related to this,
fifthly, despite the "shift" towards geography, problems are still being experienced with
regard to the way in which space is understood or denied, given the fact that in the
majority of texts, space continues to be an ahistorical category that is understood to be a
“container” (Brenner 1999:41).
Finally, without providing a complete, in-depth study, I would like to mention the
problem of sources, which give almost absolute priority to historiographical studies, and
completely leave out the numerous and highly stimulating recent progress in
archaeology (Wilkinson, Petrie, Larsen, Marfoe, Sherratt, etc.). This implies biases in
period dating which, as shall be seen, can become extremely serious (Christian 2000).
With all their problems, in my opinion, the theoretical approaches of Braudel,
Wallerstein, Frank, Agnew, O‟Tuathail, etc., constitute the best starting point for an
analysis of present day society, being some of the few approaches which base their
analysis on the world as a whole, integrating the historical dimension and also
incorporating matters of inequality and power relations.
In this paper, we would suggest the possibility of adding to this framework, the concept
of space based on the notions of Henri Lefebvre, and we would put forward the need to
refine the mentioned theories based on empirical studies, suggesting the concept of
Space / network. With this aim in mind, we have selected the case of the so-called Silk
Road, to offer an example of continuity over many centuries and with an almost global
geographical coverage.
To now focus on the actual Silk Road, although this name was coined in the 19th
century by a European, the network of routes linking Far East Asia with Europe and
Africa is extremely old and stretches far back over time. It is sufficient to look at a
physical map of Asia, to get an idea of the magnitude and difficulty of the journey
between the East and West (map 1).
The route starts out from the former imperial city of Chang‟an (present day Xi‟an), to
go up-river up to Lanzhou, on the banks of the river Huang He. It then continues
northwest along the fertile corridor of the Hexe (Wuwei, Zhangye, Jiayuguan) to the
Gobi desert. There, at the city of Anxi, the road forks either to the north (Turfan) or to
the south (Khotan) to border the terrible Takla Makan desert, one of the most arid
deserts on the planet. Both branches merge once again at Kashgar to cross the glaciercovered Pamir mountain chain, which is only passable in summer. On the other side lies
the Fergana basin, going on to Samarkand and Bukhara, located between the rivers SyrDaria and Amu-Daria (Sogdiana). The route then continues amidst impressive deserts
(Kizikum, Karakum), passing through the city of Merv, to border the Caspian Sea to the
south, from one oasis to another, crossing the Zagros Mountains at Hamadan to reach
Bagdad. From there the route runs upwards, parallel to the river Euphrates and crosses
the Syrian desert to reach Palmyra, Damascus or Aleppo, it then crosses the mountain
chains running parallel to the coast to reach the Mediterranean ports: Antioquia or Tiro
(Höllmann 2008:28-30).
Map 1. The Silk Road
Source: Höllmann 2008:10-11
Chinese researchers have stressed that there was also another silk road to the south,
which started in south-west China, passed through Sichuan and Yunan and crossed
Burma to reach India. This trade route (2008:31-2) was already operating by at least 400
BC and carried considerable importance (Ma 1998). In addition to this south-western
route, Höllmann indicates the existence of other branches and also other routes
established for specific products, such as the routes for amber, incense or jade (2008:312).
Likewise, mention should also be made of the maritime route connecting the south of
China with the Indian Ocean, which crossed the Persian Gulf or the Red Sea, to reach
the Mediterranean (Höllmann 2008:32-37), and which emerged almost at the same time
as the land route (Ma 1998).
Although the traditional version places the commencement of the Silk Road at around
the 1st century BC, a number of authors have suggested that this trade was probably
much older. It is customary to consider the Silk Route to be no more than the unification
of former regional routes, in particular the union of the western route of Lapis Lazuli
(connecting the Chagai mountains with Mesopotamia) with the western jade route
supplying China through Sinkiang (Sherratt 2004). For this reason, it appears
appropriate to start our research by considering the ancient routes which were to be the
prelude to the much longer, better prepared and more regular Silk Road.
2. The ancient routes: a prelude to the Silk Road
Mesopotamia, the land lying between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, witnessed an
agricultural revolution around 10000 BC, whilst the first urban civilization developed
there around 3500 BC (Ur). The Egyptian civilization was the next to coalesce, with the
unification of the upper and lower Nile around 3150 BC, whilst, around 2500 BC, a
third civilization emerged in the Indus valley. Despite their differences, these three
urban civilizations do have some points in common with regard to technology and
various aspects of their culture, leading historians to assume some type of intercommunication in their early stages of development, contrary to the other great Asian
civilization: China, whose development was more independent (Curtin 1998:60).
Therefore, a constitutive feature of the development of these civilisations was the long
distance trade between Mesopotamia, Egypt and the Indus valley, in addition to the
associated technological and cultural exchanges.
Map 2 shows how the natural barrier formed by the Himalaya and Hindu Kush
mountain ranges complicated communications between China and the Indus valley. It
also shows the communications by sea between this region and the Persian Gulf, into
which the great rivers of Mesopotamia flow, to then follow the course of the river
Euphrates and cross the Syrian desert to reach northern Egypt.
Map 2 – Early civilizations and their relations
Source: Igor Filibi
The civilization of Mesopotamia stretched along the banks of the Tigris and Euphrates
rivers, with their routes connecting the Persian Gulf with the Mediterranean Sea. In
actual fact, maritime trade in the Persian Gulf (which is age-old, dating back to the late
sixth millennium BC) preceded the appearance of the complex state societies (Carter
2006:61). These maritime routes and their systems of exchange, particularly the supply
of grain and copper, gradually evolved into a political economy in the entire area,
configuring a number of cores and peripheries, which were superimposed with political,
military and cultural cores and peripheries, which in turn created the context for trade
(Edens 1992). The contacts through the Persian Gulf were so intense that some
archaeologists have suggested that "the trade links by land and sea could have been the
cause of the civilization in the Indus valley, and not just the result” (Curtin 1998:66).
Also, right from the start, there were contacts and exchanges between Mesopotamia and
the Levant in the Mediterranean and Anatolia. King Sargon (2300 BC) unified the
territories lying between the coasts of these two seas into a single empire. This initial
moment of unification no doubt strengthened the trade and cultural links and served to
integrate the territory still further.
The shortage of metals in Mesopotamia proved a constant stimulus for seeking new
sources and commerce. Copper was brought in through the Persian Gulf from Oman
and beyond, and, from the north, different metals came from the Caucasus, Anatolia
(gold and silver) and the Iranian plateau (tin). After the fall of the Sargon dynasty and a
brief period of instability, a new political entity emerged around the city of Babylon,
with profound legal changes, such as those introduced by Hammurabi, and also
economic changes, since the temples were no longer the centre of economic commercial activity, the royal monopolies practically disappeared and the Tamkaru, an
independent class of merchants came to dominate trade, brokerage and money lending.
The government continued to maintain a certain control and to charge taxes, but the
majority of trade became a private activity (Curtin 1998:66-68).
Map 3 – Ancient and Middle Egyptian Empire
Source: http://es.wikipedia.org
In the same way as trade between Mesopotamia and the Indus valley was key to the
development of this civilisation, the unification of Egypt must be associated with the
trade contacts between the Nile delta and the route connecting Syria with Mesopotamia
and Anatolia (map 3). In fact, the boom in this trade occurred simultaneously with the
unification of the Egyptian State (3000 BC) within the framework of the wars of
conquest between the three proto-kingdoms of Upper Egypt (Nagada, Hierakonpolis
and Abydos) "for the control of the exchange routes for prestigious goods" (Campagno
cited by Flammini 2005:15). Likewise, it is considered that the monopoly of this
lucrative trade (copper in particular) undoubtedly contributed to the centralisation of the
State (Marfoe 1987;26). Although few details are known, during the Middle Empire
(2050 - 1750 BC) a number of Egyptian settlements were established in the Syrian Palestinian area and diplomatic contacts with representatives of peoples in Asia
revealed the frequency and intensity of some pacific and principally commercial
relations with Asia (González-Tablas 2010:245).
In this way, a complex network of overland trade routes was gradually constructed and
which, at the beginning of the second millennium BC, linked areas as different as
Afghanistan, the vast plateaux of Iran, Mesopotamia, the plains of Syria and Anatolia
(Larsen 1987:47). To this system, the maritime trading routes should be added, which,
despite all the dangers involved, linked the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the west
coast of India (Carter 2001, 2003).
The routes also crossed the Sahara desert, in a north - south direction and east to west,
following the paths of the oases. Caravans transporting gold from Ghana, Senegal and
Mauritania to the north in exchange for essential salt (Sanz Roche 2001). In turn,
communications were established between the great trading centres such as Timbuktu
and Agadez with the Nile delta. Following the river course, gold from Nubia (present
day Sudan) and other products from this contemporary Egyptian civilisation also
reached the Nile delta (Gonzalez-Tablas 2010:240-1). The pharaohs soon sent trading
expeditions to the horn of Africa, where, in the land of Punt, they had access to the
tropical products of sub-Saharan Africa. (Phillips 1997).2
2
The route between Egypt and Punt Land passed through the Red Sea after crossing the desert. The first
expedition, of which there are details, took place at the initiative of queen Hatshepsut (1473 - 1458 BC),
but there is already evidence of the arrival of products from Punt in the period of the fifty dynasty. An
Obligatory transit centres such as oases, mountain passes, caravan crossroads, or
sheltered ports, gave rise to cities which started to make their livelihood from trade
rather than what they produced. In this way, cities arose without an agricultural
hinterland to support them, and therefore also depend on commerce for their
subsistence, as illustrated by the exemplary case of Assur (Bauer 1998:160; Larsen
1987:53). In this way, a network of cities was created which, due to their capacity to
control and exploit the routes passing through them, were to condition the rise and fall
of empires for many centuries to come.
The central area of the Near East, from the Zagros mountains to the Mediterranean and
from the Persian Gulf to the Tauro mountains and, at times, extending as far as the
Black Sea, appears to have formed a natural unit, since few goods needed to be
introduced from outside and there was a highly developed network of routes and
exchanges within the region, undoubtedly connected to Egypt. This region had a
number of centres which did not compete politically amongst themselves, although
there were conflicts within each region (Mesopotamia in the south, Anatolia, Syria) but
which did not affect the interregional trade, regulated by written treaties (Larsen
1987:53). In turn, the Egyptian empire gradually integrated the territory in Upper and
Lower Egypt into a single commercial and economic network which stretched towards
the south and towards the west through the desert.
Neither did it abandon control of the north-eastern trade, and to ensure its safety, by
establishing military posts at strategic places such as Ugarit, Byblos, Gaza, Jerusalem
etc. and with the presence of its fleet. For this reason, between the 16th and 14th
centuries BC, the contact zone for these great centres (Mitanni, Egypt, Hattie), namely
the Syrian - Palestinian corridor, became a "disputed periphery", being the place where
the Near Eastern routes converged and the location of the ports for the exchange of
goods with the Eastern Mediterranean (Gestoso 2006:16). Despite the geo-political
tension between the powers over the control of these routes, there was always a shared
limit to this tension, due to the need to maintain trade. For this same reason, in the
majority of cases, the empires were content to set up a few garrisons to protect their
inscription in the reign of Sahure (2458 - 2446 BC) details the importation of a number of products from
Punt, including myrrh (Phillips 1997:426).
interests and solely had recourse to physical control when the conflicts between the
local powers endangered the route (Gestoso 2006:16).
In this way, for most of the Bronze Age, the Southern Levant comprised a network of
semi-autonomous city-states under the formal jurisdiction of the New Kingdom of
Egypt. The urban nodes prospered as the Mediterranean exchange network increased in
size and intensity, with Cyprus standing out as the hub of this network, which gradually
penetrated inland to form a link with the emerging Arabian trade (Bauer 1998:162-3).
This restructuring, which took place in the 12th century, served as a basis for the
emergence of the Phoenicians in the 11 th century and the considerable boom in trade
also explains the appearance of the unified monarchy of Israel, in order to exploit the
economic possibilities of its location between three of the major routes of the time, and
also to oppose the threatening control of Egypt (Bauer 1998: 162-3).
The first Phoenician route connected its bases in Levant with Egypt, with its vessels
even entering the Nile as far as the port of Memphis. The height of Phoenician
prosperity took place between 1200 and 700 BC. Although a number of peoples from
the east (Babylonians, Assyrians, etc) gradually dominated these cities, they still
continued to be major maritime trading centres. Around 800, the Phoenician expansion
started to give shape to its principal routes towards the western Mediterranean, partly in
response to the demand for Iberian silver and other metals, although trade was not
restricted to this and also included slaves, wine, olive oil, etc. On the western side of the
sea, their bases were at Utica, Malta, Cadiz and, above all, Carthage, which would soon
become independent and would become a power in itself (Curtin 1984: 76). At around
this time, following the decline of Egypt, the Phoenicians also controlled the maritime
traffic in the Red Sea (Hourani 1995:8).
A decisive moment occurred when the area around the Aegean Sea, after a period of
much internal turbulence, re-entered the commercial world of the Mediterranean at
around 800 BC. In the 5th century BC, the rise of Greek culture (occurring in the
Aegean area as a result of the exchange of ideas, products and persons moving along the
routes which converged at the Levant) led to the establishment of a series of crosscultural or ecumenical trade practices which spread right along the eastern
Mediterranean coast. In this way, the slow work of centuries, developed by the different
trade diasporas, gradually opened up areas of intercommunication which initially were
merely commercial and then, with the expansion of the Greek language and culture,
became homogenized (Curtin 1984:77, 80-1, 88).
Attention should be drawn to the role played by the Empire of Alexander (334-323 BC),
which, despite its short duration, was to have long-lasting consequences. On the one
hand, it spread the influence of Greek culture into the heart of Asia (with even a
"Greek" empire in the north of India), making this culture prestigious and causing Greek
to become an international (commercial and diplomatic) language. On the other hand,
from the point of view of the Silk Road, for the first time the Aegean civilisation was
firmly and permanently connected with the area of central and western Asia (including
Egypt). In this way, these regional circuits were incorporated into a larger area. Now
only China needed to be connected, in order to create the Great Silk Road, which would
cross Asia from east to west.
Map 4. The Empire of Alexander the Great (334-323 BC)
Source: Igor Filibi
In the western Mediterranean, the same thing occurred with Latin and the Roman
culture, completing the homogenization of a trading area created long before by the
Phoenicians up to Carthage. In this way, it can be seen how the regional areas were
gradually consolidated thanks to the activities of the traders and the empires, and how
these areas, over time, extended in size to culminate firstly in Alexander's empire in
central Asia and then with Mediterranean world of the Roman empire and the first great
Chinese empire of the Han. And finally, these great partial areas united as links in the
same trans-continental trading chain: namely the Silk Road.
All these routes and their variants, over the millennia, and their problematical unions
and datings, appear to be clearer thanks to the interesting synthesis made by David
Christian. This author, starting from the work of Frank and Gills (1993), upholds that
the exchange networks crossing Eurasia from east to west are much older than was
actually thought and that, in particular, those routes termed the "Silk Roads" are nothing
more than the routes which interconnected the great agrarian civilisations. Christian
suggests that the exchange networks between the pastoral nomadic and semi-nomad
societies were established much earlier, as were the contacts between these societies and
the primitive agrarian societies, long before the direct inter-connection of the great
agrarian empires. Therefore, the trans-ecological commerce (between pastoral and
agrarian societies) is just as, if not more, important than the trans-civilizational
exchanges (Egypt - Aegean - Mesopotamia - China - India). This claim is supported by
extensive archaeological evidence, which reveals the intensity of the exchanges of
objects, technologies and religious practices between the peoples of northern Europe
and to the north of China, for many millennia, through the steppes. The domestication
of horses (fourth millennium BC) was decisive in this process, giving these people a
mobility which they obviously made good use of.
Furthermore, Christian explains how, even after the emergence of the traditional Silk
Road between China and the Roman Empire, these pastoral peoples continued to be
decisive (Parthian and Kushan Empires) and even after the 16th century, when the Silk
Road appears to have been abandoned in favour of the maritime routes controlled by
the Europeans. Christian points out that it is not possible to talk of a decline, but of
profound change in the route brought about by the expansion of the cultivated surface
area to include areas in the steppe which historically had been inhabited by nomadic
peoples. Even in these new conditions, the nomadic peoples successfully maintained
their trade, by offering the agrarian peoples products that they needed and did not have.
In short, this author is suggesting that there was a profound inter-relation and synergy
between the lifestyles of two types of societies that were very different, yet
economically complementary: the agrarian and pastoral societies (Christian 2000).
Christian himself summarises his general argument:
By 2000 B.C.E., this world-system linked two distinct systems of exchange: an embryonic
system of trans-civilizational exchanges, whose hub was the cities of the Oxus civilization;
and an extensive and well-established system of exchanges within and beyond the Inner
Eurasian steppes.
All in all, it seems reasonable to conclude that by 2000 B.C.E. the network of exchanges we
know as the "Silk Roads" was already functioning as a system of vigorous and widespread
exchanges within and sometimes beyond the Inner Eurasian steppes. And these early
systems of exchange depended largely on the role of pastoralist communities.
Thus, “in reality, Han [Emperor] Wudi, like the Achaemenids and Macedonians before
him, merely entered, by force, into already established systems of trans-Eurasian
exchanges”. Or, more precisely,
What really happened as a result of the conquests of Wudi, at the end of the second century,
is that a new branch of the Silk Roads was created. This bypassed the older routes, through
the steppelands of Xiongnu-controlled Mongolia. What is reflected in the written record, as
in accounts of the sixth-century conquests of the Achaemenids, is really an attempt by
agrarian empires to secure a greater degree of control over trade routes that had previously
passed through the Inner Eurasian steppes, and had been dominated by pastoralist
communities. (Christian 2000)
3. The phases of the Silk Routes
The works of Frank, Gills and Christian appear to be slowly convincing the scientific
community. Recently, it has been pointed out that certain sections of the future Silk
Road, responsible for the dissemination of persons, objects and ideas, started to function
at least by the latter half of the third millennium BC, and intensified considerably in the
second millennium BC. (Kuzmina 2008:118).
In any case, although it is not precisely known when the regular trading of goods started
between China and the Mediterranean, it is certain that there were contacts, although
sporadic, around 500 BC, as this is when silk fabric started to appear in Europe.
However, there is only evidence of regular trade from the Han dynasty onwards (202
BC - 220 AD). Given the fact that this piece of information come from official sources,
it is certain that this marked the start of the trade protected by the States, however there
were undoubtedly private commercial contacts long before this time.
From that initial moment onwards, during the Han dynasty, various phases can be
identified in the trading and activity along the Silk Road, at least as far as historical
evidence is concerned, and we shall now discuss these phases, following the lines
established by Ma (1998).
FIRST PHASE (1st century BC - 3rd century AD)
In 138 BC, the emperor Wudi sent Zhang Chien, one of his trustworthy militiamen, on a
mission to explore the western border with a view to establishing alliances to contain
the barbarians in the north and to expand his empire. Thanks to the information gained
from these expeditions, China expanded westwards in around 120 BC, for the purpose
of obtaining some horses which were so well suited to war that the Chinese called them
"heavenly horses" (being the only ones capable of halting the barbarians in the north). A
further aim was to establish bases for trading with rich, developed areas such as the
Sogdiana and Bactria regions.
This Chinese expansion completed the network of ancient routes connecting the
Mediterranean with Sogdiana, making it possible to trade not only with Central Asia but
also with the distant Roman Empire. A number of official delegations were sent
between both empires and trade agreements were established, giving rise to the Silk
Road.
Map 5. The Silk Road (3rd Century AD)
We would highlight the interrelationship between the different routes which formed part
of a single trading system. Such that the intensification of the overland conflicts
between the two major centralised empires (Persian and Roman) brought about an
increase in maritime trade in the Persian Gulf. (Daryaee 2003).
The Silk Road enjoyed a period of splendour up to the fall of the Han dynasty (220 AD)
which was followed by the end of the Parthian empire (227 AD). Then the Kushan
empire collapsed (330 AD) and, finally, the Roman empire. The stability guaranteed by
these four powers, along the thousands of kilometres covered by the route (map 5), was
replaced by a period of major political fragmentation. From that time onwards, the
intensity of traffic on the route depended, amongst other factors, on the ability of the
Chinese governors to control their north-western border, with the crucial Pamir
mountain pass and the Tarim basin, the door of central Asia (Ma 1998).
The cyclical problems to guarantee contact between China and central Asia served to
strengthen trade between Persia and Byzantium, which were capable of maintaining
powerful empires, particularly from the time when silk technology spread to these
regions, around the 6th century.
SECOND PHASE (7th - 8th century AD)
The 7th and 8th centuries, the first two centuries of the Tang dynasty (618 - 960 AD)
correspond to the second period of prosperity of the road, with the expansion of China
westwards and the establishment of new oasis settlements along the route. This period
was also marked by the rise and expansion of Islam.
Year 751 represented a turning point in the period of Chinese hegemony, with a
decisive Muslim victory over the Chinese army at the battle of the river Talas, which
limited the Chinese influence in Central Asia and opened this region up to the
expansion of Islam. In the opinion of Debin Ma, this battle led to a profound change in
the silk trade. On the one hand, it led to the weakening of the Chinese empire, a process
which would partially close the route for almost four centuries, until the era of the
Mongol empire, due to the migration of the inhabitants from the western territories
towards the Yangtze River valley and coastal regions. This meant that the major silk
producing centres moved away from Xian, the starting point of the old silk route, and
towards to the coast, leading to increased used of the sea route. On the other hand, in the
battle of the river Talas, the Arabs captured many Chinese prisoners and obtained access
to the silk cultivation technology, which they widely diffused through Asia towards
Persia, Anatolia and regions controlled by Byzantium. The conquest of the Sassanid
empire and parts of the Byzantine empire allowed Islam to absorb the major silk
producing regions and to spread sericulture technology to North Africa and Southern
Spain. In this way, two different commercial circuits were created: Chinese silk
controlled the markets of Japan, Southeast Asia and certain parts of Central and
Southern Asia, whilst Persian silk principally supplied the Middle East, Europe and
North Africa (Ma 1998).
THIRD PHASE (12th - 14th centuries AD)
The emergence of the Mongol empire of Genghis Khan (1167-1227), to create the
largest empire ever to have been seen, led to the political unification of almost all of
Eurasia. The Mongol rulers were concerned about the safety of the trade routes, leading
to the construction of forts and enhanced infrastructures, they also introduced paper
money and eliminated artificial trade barriers. This all led to a revival of the overland
route as a whole. The Mongol empire started to collapse by the mid-fourteenth century,
whilst in China the Ming dynasty had begun (1368 - 1644), a dynasty which was not
able to maintain such a forcible control of the forever problematical North-western
territories. Due to this cyclic instability, until the 16th century, trade with central Asia
and the Middle East alternated between periods of much activity and periods in which
trade was interrupted.
FOURTH PHASE (17th - 18th century)
As usual, the absence of powerful empires capable of ensuring stability and safety along
the route threatened its continuity. For this reason, the establishment of the powerful,
centralised Manchurian Qing empire (1644 - 1911) brought effective stability to the
North-eastern territories (Ma 1998).
The silk road was more stable at its western end, given the fact that the vacuum left by
the collapse of the Mongol empire was quickly filled by the expansion of the Ottoman
empire in the 14th century, in its concern to guarantee trade in a period in which Persia
was becoming the most important silk producer and exporter, placing the Ottoman
power in an ideal strategic situation for controlling this trade.
These centuries witnessed yet another division of the work, with Persia as the major
producer of raw silk, which was then processed by centres in Southern Europe and
Syria. In this way, the trading circuit started in Persia and the silk was basically
transported by overland caravans which, on occasions, were combined with the use of
the Black Sea, Persian Gulf and Red Sea, to its destinations in the Mediterranean. These
routes were maintained until the mid-eighteenth century, until the end of the Safavid
Persian state.
4. The end of the Mediterranean area and the creation of new areas
The prominent historian on the end of the Roman world and the start of the Middle
Ages was Henri Pirenne. Although some of his ideas have now been transcended by
time, his overall view is still valid today.
1) Firstly, the unity of the Roman Empire was replaced by a plurality of States.
Although "the appearance of Europe was changing, the fundamental character of its life
remained the same" because these States are "merely fragments of the great unity that
they had replaced. There was no profound transformation except in Britain" (Pirenne
2008:196-7). Translating this into the spatial language of Lefebvre (1974) we could say
that the spatial complexity of the Roman world was replaced by a complex series of
overlapping spaces and that, as a whole, they maintained continuity in commerce, in a
number of legal and monetary spheres, etc. Although the political coherence that
maintained the unity of this spatial complexity was lost, even without its co-ordinating
bodies, the inertia of the Roman unity continued and this situation was to persist from
the 5th to the 8th century (Pirenne 2008: 196-7).
At the end of the 6th century, trade with the East took on considerable importance, and,
due to their use in daily life, emphasis was on "the importation of spices. One cannot
insist too strongly on their importance. The Roman Empire had already received all
types of spices from India, Arabia, and China. It was the trade in spices that had built up
the prosperity of Palmyra and Apamea (…). Their diffusion throughout the Roman
Empire was not interrupted by the invasions, and continued afterwards, forming part of
the everyday diet.” (Pirenne 2008:77).
2) Secondly, given the fact that, as has been seen, the Mediterranean unit survived the
fall of Rome, the turning point was marked by the Moslem expansion. Islam split the
Mediterranean in two, North and South, taking over the African coast and the Levant,
and controlling maritime communications with the exception of the Aegean Sea and the
Eastern coast of Italy as far as Venice. This divided the Christian Mediterranean into
two basins, a western basin, blockaded, and another eastern basin, which was able to
maintain its sea connections. Therefore, the old Roman world was divided into three
distinct spaces: a) Islam, b) the West, and c), the East.
a) Islam
Pirenne pointed out that the "Christian Mediterranean was divided into two basins: The
East and the West, surrounded by Islamic countries". This was the geo-political
constraint for Christianity. The salient point is that the Moslem countries "the war of
conquest having come to an end by the close of the 9 th century, constituted a world
apart, self-sufficing and gravitating toward Baghdad". It was towards this central point
that the caravans of Asia made their way and here ended the great trade route which led
to the Baltic, by way of the Volga. It was from Baghdad that products were exported to
Africa and Spain. The Moslems themselves did not trade with the Christians, but they
did not close their ports to the latter. They allowed them to frequent their harbours, to
bring them slaves and timber, and to carry away whatever they chose to buy." (Pirenne
2008:154-5, my italics).
The consolidation of Islam was responsible for breaking with the old world, by creating
a new "world", a new space which was completely separated from the former one: in
terms of politics, religion and culture. However, in the same way that the fall of Rome
did not signify the end of the Mediterranean economic unit, neither did the invasion by
Islam imply the end of the long-standing trade between East and West. The Muslims
merely controlled it and improved some aspects of it, however, above all, they tried to
maintain it. This is probably the principal structural cause to account for the survival of
Islam throughout the centuries. From a global point of view, the Muslim expansion
almost appears to follow the Road towards the source of the silk and spices, reaching
China and South-east Asia, as far as Indonesia and the Philippines.
b) The West
In the North, the former Empire, which had already been divided into two de facto
sections for some time, formalised the division with the coming of Charlemagne and the
creation of the Carolingian pole. Byzantium was unable to prevent this division and
both empires made this situation official in 812, when the emperor of Byzantium
recognised the new power but in exchange for the return of the city of Venice and the
south of Italy. This consolidated two spaces within Christianity. On the one hand, the
Carolingian Empire in the west, isolated, land-locked, and therefore with no contact
with the great Eastern trade 3, restricted to an agricultural economy and, being
extremely weak, would collapse and would shortly be the mark of the Middle Ages
(Pirenne 2008:196-7).
c) The East
On the other hand, the Byzantium Empire, in the east, was upheld as a Mediterranean
and commercial power. It was the link between the Christian world and the East. Only
Byzantium withstood Islam and maintained maritime trade between Venice, Southern
Italy, the Adriatic coast and the Aegean Sea. Furthermore, once the period of expansion
had passed, Moslem prosperity attracted Italian vessels to its ports, allowing them to
connect to the Eastern routes (Pirenne 2008:154-5).
Despite the fact that Byzantium withstood the Moslem siege in 719 and maintained
control of the eastern part of the Mediterranean, the Moslem advances greatly limited
the emperor's sphere of action On the one hand, the Italian cities which resisted (Naples,
Gaeta, Amalfi, Salerno, Bari, Venice) "continued to recognise the emperor of
Constantinople, but with increasingly weaker political ties" Furthermore, "with the
Norman conquest of Italy and Sicily (1029 - 1091) the empire lost control of that
region". With things as they were, "Venice, located at the dead end of the Adriatic sea,
remained as a strategic Byzantine enclave, and as a result the Basileus (emperor)
granted this merchant city much autonomy and allowed it to gradually become an
independent republic". This was no more than the consequence of the imperial
dependence on Venetian vessels which "supplied the enormous market of
Constantinople, with close on a million inhabitants, and returned loaded with silks and
spices" (Pirenne 1986:19).
d) Northern Europe
This division into three distinct spaces, proposed by Pirenne, can be completed with the
work of Wickham, who suggested the existence of a fourth space in the north of Europe
(Wickham 2009:1174). In point of fact, Pirenne himself, when indicating the division of
the Christian Mediterranean into two basins (East and West), surrounded by the
3
In point of fact, "from the 8th century onwards, western Europe experienced three hundred years of
separation from all "overseas" countries, which signified (with few exceptions, such as Flanders) "an
almost total interruption of trade (…), the disappearance of industrial activity and monetary circulation"
(Pirenne 1995:72). The best indicator of this situation was that, from the end of the 7th century and early
8th century, spices disappeared from everyday food and were only to reappear from the 12th century
onwards, with the re-opening of the sea. (Pirenne 2008:145).
countries of Islam, also mentioned in passing how this Northern Europe was able to
connect Bagdad, the heart of Islam, with the Baltic Sea by way of the Volga river (the
old amber route) and, from there, to export the products from the caravans of Asia,
through France and Spain (Pirenne 2008:154-5). This would therefore be a fourth space,
which was also connected to the Silk Road.
3) Thirdly, the Crusades marked a new stage for the Mediterranean end of the Silk
Road, with the withdrawal of the Moslems and the gradual rise of the Italian merchant
cities. The first crusade, initiated in 1096, retook control of the Tyrrhenian Sea and
established Christian posts at Antioch, Jerusalem, St John of Acre and a number of
enclaves along the Syrian coast. The Italian cities of Pisa, Genoa and Venice took the
opportunity to secure advantageous conditions in trade with the Levant.
4
From that
time onwards “communications were re-established in all this essentially European sea”
and “the conquest of the strategic isles of Cerdeña (1022), Corsica (1091) and Sicily
(1058 - 1090) put an end to the Moslem control of the routes”. Pirenne pointed out that,
despite the subsequent Turkish and Moslem counter-attacks in Christian territories,
"The new offensive of Islam extended only to the mainland. The Turks had no fleet and did
not attempt to create one. Far from harming them, Italian trade on the coasts of Asia Minor
was to their advantage, for by it the spices brought by the caravans of China and India to
Syria continued to be carried to the West by Italian ships. Nothing could have been more
profitable than the persistence of a navigation which served to maintain the economic
activity of the Turkish and Mongolian lands.". (Pirenne 1986:29-30)
4) Fourthly, the emergence of the Fairs marked a European economic boom. Pirenne
observed that “The Fairs arose with the re-birth of commerce” and indicated that their
origin “had nothing to do with the small local markets which by the beginning of the
ninth century were appearing in ever increasing number over the whole of Europe.”
Very different from the markets established for the purpose of supplying the provisions
necessary for daily life to the local population, “fairs are periodic meeting places of
professional merchants, centred on wholesale exchange” This was a new phenomenon
4
These cities were very well positioned, given the fact that during the Middle Ages in Europe, trade with
the East and the redistribution of the products brought from the Levant was dominated by Genoa and
Venice. Venice already frequented the ports of Egypt and Palestine before year 1000 and Genoa was
present at least from 1065 onwards, although the city's development was due to the first Crusade (1095 1099). Venice organised important official expeditions which returned from the ports of the East
principally loaded with spices (Feliu 1988:690-1).
which arose in the 11th century, increased in the 12th century and continued to develop
in the 13th. The most active ones, the famous "Champagne and Brie fairs" are located
more or less half-way along the great trading route which runs from Italy and Provence
to the coast of Flanders". In the early 14th century, fairs started to decline as merchants
became more sedentary and with the development of direct shipping links between the
ports of Italy and Flanders and England (Pirenne 1986:75-7, 80). In this way, with the
Italian cities leading the way, the European routes were connected, as an extension, to
those linking West with East.
5. The re-incorporation of Western Europe into the long distance trading chain
(11th - 14th centuries).
Increased European prosperity was brought about by its re-incorporation into long
distance trade and, most importantly, into the great routes coming from the East and
controlled by the Moslems. The cities of Italy, particularly Venice and Genoa, were
primarily responsible for this re-incorporation. In the mid-twelfth century, Genoa saw
its considerable efforts rewarded, when it achieved a stable position on the Levant coast
and started to move inland towards Aleppo and Damascus. Furthermore, over the
following decades, Genoa changed from purchasing eastern products with gold and
silver to increasingly selling in the Levant, textile products produced in France, England
and Flanders (Byrne 1920:212, 215-6), becoming a leading international distributor and
export centre.
In the 13th century there existed a series of sub-systems or spaces (defined as sharing a
language, religion or empire) dominated by cities or imperial courts, which acted as
centres. What is of interest here is that their respective interactions, although not as
intense as present day ones, defined the outlines of a wider system. These 13th century
sub-systems were more self-sufficient than present day regional systems and, therefore,
depended less on each other for survival. Following this scheme, Abu Lughod has
identified eight inter-locking sub-systems which, in turn, can be grouped or condensed
into three key circuits: Western Europe, the Middle East and the Far East (Abu-Lughod,
1989:33) (map 6).
Map 6. Trading circuits of 13th Century
Source: Abu-Lughod, 1989:34
i) Description of the trading circuits
Abu-Lughod points to the growing importance of a European "centre" formed by the
Fairs of Champagne, the cities of Flanders and the ports of Italy, which acted as a real
trading circuit or network. A key aspect of this European centre was the
communications network with the exterior, and which connected the European subsystem with the more general system of exchanges. For this reason, this circuit cannot
be understood without framing it in the Mediterranean system which, in turn, served as
an interface with the general system. At this point, a major economic - political actor
emerged: the city states of northern Italy, particularly Venice and Genoa. These Italian
merchant towns were the ones to maintain, after the fall of the Roman empire, the small
umbilical cord of trade that prevented the complete disappearance of commerce in
Europe and upheld its only trading link with the East. From the 12 th and 13th centuries
onwards, slowly and laboriously, these merchants managed to establish a connection
with the three principal terminuses of the great trading route with the East (China,
India).
Firstly, they established trading posts in the Black Sea, connecting Constantinople to
China over the old Silk Road, which passed through the key nodes of Tabriz, Bukhara
and Samarkand. This important overland route re-emerged primarily after the
unification of Central Asia by the Mongols and, in particular, when the Mongols
managed to conquer China itself.5
Secondly, the Crusader kingdoms along the Palestine coast enabled the Europeans to
access a fourth sub-system that went overland as far as Baghdad, where the Route split
into two branches, one going north-east to join the Central Asian caravan circuit and the
other going south to access the Indian Ocean via the Persian Gulf.
Thirdly and finally, the Europeans, principally the Italians, attempted to establish a third
beachhead on the North-African coast at Egypt, at the port of Alexandria. However,
after the crusade of St Luis in 1250, they had to resign themselves to a very limited
trade as a result of the control exercised by the Egyptian rulers. This allowed the Italians
solely indirect access to the fifth sub-system connecting Egypt with the Indian Ocean
through the Red Sea (Abu-Luhod, 1989:35-36).
ii) Gradual incorporation of Europe into the great current of exchanges and key role
played by the city states of Northern Italy: Venice and Genoa.
Chaudhuri identified a general trend, by which “the port-towns and caravan cities which
acted as commercial emporia in the trans-continental traffic of Asia prospered and
declined in a pendulum motion of long-term cycles”. Likewise, the fortunes of the
groups of merchants varied through time, depending on whether they were able to
extend the routes or whether they were forced to give the routes up. In this way, in the
11th and 12th centuries the Jewish communities settled in Cairo and Alexandria and were
as active in trade in the Indian Ocean as the Arab merchants on the Red Sea. With the
approach of the 13th century, the Mediterranean group disappeared. The Christian
European merchants (Greeks, Genoese, Venetians and Catalans) were to be found in all
the major ports of the Levant, and played a key role in the development of trade in the
Mediterranean and also in the Atlantic, “but they did not, and were not allowed to,
venture beyond Suez or Aleppo in the period before the Portuguese discovery of the
5
Although it appears that the safety of the route beyond Trebisond, was never fully guaranteed, the Italian
merchants never stopped trying to establish advance posts and even a castle on the outskirts of Tabriz. For
an overview of these many attempts, Vid. Kedar 1981:187-90.
Cape route.” For their part, the great merchant families of Southern China regularly
faced serious political impediments which prevented them from maintaining or
increasing their trade with India and beyond. Chaudhuri observed that, after 1433 these
Chinese merchants were no longer seen in Calicut or in any other Indian port, although
they continued to be as active as ever in the internal Chinese market, which cannot do
without them. However, it is significant that “Chinese junks still sailed to Malacca, to
the numerous islands of the Java Sea, to Manila, but not to India, the Red Sea, or East
Africa. The explanation remains elusive.” (Chaudhuri 2005:99-100).
However, Lo already demonstrated in 1958 that Ming China experienced a profound
economic crisis in the mid-fifteenth century, which could go a long way to explaining
the Chinese withdrawal from the Indian Ocean. Based on this work, Abu-Lughod, in her
magnificent book Before European hegemony, offers quite a plausible explanation on
the new restrictive policies of the Ming dynasty. To do so, she goes back to the Mongol
invasion of China, which already brought great changes with it. Firstly, the reunification
of North and South China under the Yuan dynasty. Secondly, the new regime
complemented the Chinese internal economy, which was basically agricultural, with
two systems of foreign trade which acted synergically. On the one hand the revived
"Silk Road" crossing Central Asia and ending at Peking. On the other hand, the Indian
Ocean trade route which ended at Canton, Zaytun and, less importantly, at Hangchow.
“Thus, China constituted a crucial link between the land and sea trades and, in her
domain of influence at least, became a formidable power in an increasingly integrated
world system.” The causes for the fall of the Yuan dynasty included the succession of
plagues and other epidemics which devastated China from 1313 to 1368, when the very
demographically weakened Mongols lost power to the Ming dynasty. Therefore the
Mings inherited a China which, although unified, was in a highly delicate geo-political
situation given the fact that, in addition to the deaths caused by the epidemics
devastating the production and commercial centres of the South, Tamerlan had closed
the overland Silk Road which ended in Peking. The Indian Ocean maritime road was
still in operation, however, despite the efforts to revive it, trade in the Indian Ocean was
also declining. Faced with this situation, Ming China, with no resources to continue to
maintain its political and commercial ambitions across the seas, decided to withdraw
and concentrate on the reconstruction of its agrarian base and on domestic production.
Paradoxically, “what is viewed in Chinese history as a restoration of a legitimate
dynasty must be viewed in world system perspective as the final fragmentation of the
larger circuit of thirteenth-century world trade in which China had played such an
important role” (Abu-Lughod 1989:342, 346-7, 345). Abu-Lughod summarizes the
argument pointing out that
China‟s geographic position in the thirteenth century world system was crucial because it
linked the northern overland route with the equally if not more important Indian Ocean sea
route. When both of these pathways of trade were fully functioning, and particularly when
China was unified and could therefore serve as a “frictionless exchange medium” to
connect them, the circuit of world trade was complete. Indeed, it was only when this circle
was completed in the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries that one could speak of a
premodern “world system”.
As was true in other subregions of that world system, the economic health of China rested
primarily on (...) her ability to harness her local resources. But another part of her economic
vitality (...) came from her ability to extract surplus from the external system. When the
external system underwent retrenchment and fragmentation, it was inevitable that all parts
formerly linked to it would experience difficulties, including China. (Abu-Lughod
1989:348)
With the two routes blocked (the Central Asian one was closed and the maritime one
was declining rapidly) from the late 14th century and through the entire 15th century, the
only remaining contact between Europe and Asia was the one maintained between the
Venetians and Egyptians with their marriage of convenience, strengthened by the lack
of alternative routes.6 Thus, “the “Fall of the East” preceded the “Rise of the West”, and
it was this devolution of the preexisting system that facilitated Europe‟s easy conquest”
(Abu-Lughod 1989:360-1).
6. The Silk Road as a product of the "long term”
The history of this ancient unit, which is the Mediterranean, "has frequently been
determined by the triumph of a route, a city, at the expenses of another route and
another city, even in the 16th century, when everything appeared to belong, although it
did not yet belong to the great Empires and to the territorial States” (Braudel 1980:368).
6
In 1370, Tamerlan started the reconstruction of the Mongol empire. In 1395 he plundered the Genoese
colony of Tana in the Crimea and, in 1401 Damascus, taking many of the city's artisans into inland Asia.
After his death (1405) the empire was torn apart by internal wars which definitively ruined central Asia
and severed the contacts with China. The steppes route practically disappeared, in prelude to the collapse
of the Byzantine Empire (1453). These events led to increased activity on the southern routes through
Damascus and Egypt, which remained the sole contacts with Eastern trade (Feliu 1988:699).
Fernand Braudel, with his innovative subject-matter of study, a "sea" instead of the
habitual "national territories", radically questioned the traditional way of analysing
societies and their different spheres. The space in question was not any of the current
States, many of which either did not yet exist or had different borders from their present
ones, but the Mediterranean space as a whole. In turn, within this area, the routes are the
principal explanatory factors: on each route, "the commerce, cities and States either
decline or prosper with it", without forgetting that "all goods, material and immaterial,
flowed into the cities along the routes", therefore these communications "are the
infrastructure of all coherent history" (Braudel 1980:418-9).
The importance given to flows, to communication channels between specific "nodes",
represents something like a nervous system which gives orders and reacts to stimuli or a
blood system which constantly feeds and keeps the whole of the unit alive, in this case a
spatial unit. These metaphors suggest two constituent aspects of social reality, two sides
of the same coin: an active network which focuses on command, supply and protection
nodes; and a space which the elites controlling these routes (particularly the most
important routes, the long distance trade routes) try to impose so that, from some nerve
centres, they can reach out to all relevant places (mines, markets, strategic passes, etc)
that do not control other alternative centres, or which are governed by weak centres and,
therefore, become opportunities for commercial or military conquest (and often both).
In our opinion, although social space appears to be something static and state-run, its
true nature is dynamic (adaptable) and it is opposed to being captured in unchanging
territories or with fixed boundaries (a precise "inside" that is opposed to an equally
specific "outside") as national States try to appear (Walker 1993; Agnew 1994). Space
is, therefore, a dynamic duality, space / network. To understand the logic of a specific
social space it is necessary to understand which networks (economic, political, social,
religious etc) are involved in its construction.
This is a key point, given that "(social) space is a (social) product" (Lefebvre 1974:35).
The fact that space is constructed implies interests, which are generally diverse, and
therefore each particular space is generally contested. This is the first element of
complexity. The second consists in the overlapping of different spatialities and which
can at times be complementary but are very often contradictory and cause conflicts. The
complexity of (social) space shows that, although space is generally considered in the
singular, it would be more correct, from an analytical point of view, to distinguish the
various overlapping spaces. Although merely for analytical purposes, since actual space
is multilayered and inseparable. The spatial unit, which can be compared to a flaky
pastry cake [millefeuille], is the real object.
The overlapping of religious, linguistic, political spaces etc., shapes social spatiality at
any given time. The Mediterranean unit was based on "religion, language and the
remains of the Roman occupation" which caused "the European population to be
culturally more homogeneous than any other area in the world, with the exception of
China" (Tilly 1992:24). It was precisely religion (Islam) that also caused the former
Roman - Mediterranean space to take different historical directions, to the north and to
the south (Pirenne).
Braudel made an important contribution by pointing out the existence of a number of
temporal rhythms. In the same way as space is multi-layered and complex (Lefebvre),
time can be broken down into a number of rhythms, depending on the phenomenon or
process that is to be analysed (Braudel). There is a fast rhythm, very close to the
surface, rapidly changing and which hardly affects anything deeper down. A second,
intermediate term rhythm, makes it possible to distinguish a specific period having a
certain internal coherence (i.e. the Cold War) from the vast historical continuum.
However, here it is interesting to focus on a third, deeper level, which the French master
termed "long term" (longue durée). Here time appears to stand still, unless observed
from the perspective of centuries.
Few phenomena can withstand this level of analysis. Like a sieve, the longue durée
perspective filters all the millions of small events, the hundreds of relevant events in
each century and, finally, like gold nuggets, we are able to view a very small number of
elements that remain almost unchangeable, from one century to another. Only this long
term perspective makes it possible to capture, in all its grandeur, the constant flow of
gold and silver, first from the Mediterranean and later from America, always towards
the East, advancing along the thousands of stopping points on the Silk Road to
invariably end up in China. It could be said that the Silk Road is a product of the longue
durée.
It is not contradictory to affirm, on the one hand, that the routes and social spaces are
variable and constantly adapting, whilst, on the other hand, pointing to the continuity of
the Silk Road over more than two millennia. The reason is that routes tend to remain in
use for long periods of time, which is undoubtedly a result of the stable structure of the
landscape. However the density of routes does change through time, as materials and
people flow in different amounts at different times (Wilkinson 2009). Likewise, the Silk
Road is not a single route, but various routes (although not just any route) which, when
available, compete and lower the prices and earnings and, when one of the routes is
blocked or transit is difficult, then the flow of caravans with their merchandise is
immediately redirected towards the alternatives available. This is a historical constant of
the Silk Road or, more exactly, of the network of routes making up the Silk Road: when
China is unable to control the passes in the northeast, then the maritime route takes on
greater prominence, which reaches the same destination but passes through the Indian
Ocean; when the Red Sea or Strait of Malacca are plagued with pirates, then the silk
returns to the mountain passes in the Pamirs, to the oases of Turfan, passing through
Samarkand and Bukhara. In addition to silk, new products have gradually appeared over
time: cotton, tea, spices, etc. However, observed from the perspective of centuries, these
routes have remained virtually unchanged. In this respect, we can say that the Silk Road
is a product of the long term.
Geographical continuity is the most important structural element sustaining the
continuity of the routes. Only a truly exceptional event would alter this, such as a
radical climate change or the desiccation of a great inner sea. Likewise, the discovery of
a new route, either as a result of new technology, or because the political and economic
conditions required to open it are fulfilled (circumnavigation of Africa), or due to the
discovery of a new continent (America), can also affect the old routes. This is what
happened between the late 15th century and early 16th centuries.
7. The new Silk Routes in an "extended world”
The late 13th and early 14th centuries witnessed the entry of Genoese galleons into the
Atlantic to avoid the overland route crossing France and which was no longer safe and
profitable. With the progressive decline of the Champagne Fairs, the Genoese became
increasingly more involved in the Atlantic, reacting to the changes in the European
economic sub-system. Subsequently, the closure of the Central Asian route and the de
facto monopoly held by Venice on the Alexandria route, forced the Genoese to seek
other alternatives. The expulsion of the Moslems from Andalusia in the second half of
the 15th century during the Christian reconquest, meant that the ports of the Straits of
Gibraltar were now safe, giving definitive access to the Atlantic. Therefore, the
Genoese, backed by the material resources of the Portuguese and Spanish States, set out
to explore the vast ocean and to seek direct routes to China and the spice islands. The
accidental "discovery" of America and the incorporation of this "New World" into the
now "Old World", marked the start of the process to construct a truly global economy,
involving a structural change which would differentiate the ancient world from the
modern “World-System” (Abu-Lughod 1989:362-3)
The Portuguese expansion commenced in 1415 with the conquest of the Moslem trading
port of Ceuta. In 1487-8 Bartolomeu Dias bordered the Cape of Good Hope to open the
doors of the Indian Ocean to the Portuguese crown and give direct access to the Spice
Islands (Moluccas).
Venice, and the Spanish crown, were equally concerned about these new developments.
At that time, Spain was trying to find a direct route across the Atlantic to the Spice
Islands, before Portugal. Christopher Columbus set sail with the intention of achieving
this sole objective and, in 1492, he accidentally came across a new continent: America.
There was intense competition to see who would finally achieve control of the spice
trade: Venice, Portugal or Spain.
The Portuguese burst violently into the Indian Ocean, putting an end to a long era of
pacific trade and freedom at sea. From 1500 to 1515 they rapidly took control of the
best ports to the east of Africa, Malabar, Konkan, the Persian Gulf and the strategic
Strait of Malacca. From 1515 to 1560, “the viceroyalty of Goa reached the height of its
sea-power and was able to enforce a semi-monopoly in the pepper and spice trade”.
From 1560 to 1600, the Portuguese were unable to maintain the situation and, due to the
maritime power of the north Sumatran Sultanate in Acheh, they failed to prevent a
revival of the spice trade through the Red Sea and the Mediterranean. Furthermore, in
this period, the government of Goa, the important Portuguese base in the Indian Ocean,
established a commercial network with the ports of Macao, Nagasaki and the
Philippines, which was more profitable than the pepper monopoly (Chaudhuri 2005:66).
The Spanish were quick to respond. The initial voyages to the Caribbean were followed
by a whole series of expeditions, in an attempt to get round the new continent and
discover the way to the Far East. In 1513, Vasco Nuñez de Balboa discovered the
"Southern Sea" (Pacific Ocean). In 1519 Magallanes set sail to try and find a direct
route to the spices and, three years later, the vessel Victoria returned to Spain, captained
by Elcano, having made the first round-the-world journey.
At around this time, in 1521, Legazpi founded Manila, initiating direct trade with the
Spanish crown and East Asia, however the decisive moment occurred in 1565, when the
Basque explorers, Legazpi and Urdaneta, discovered the "Tornaviaje", the winds and
currents which made it possible to return from Manila (Philippines) to the west coast of
America (Acapulco). From that moment onwards, it was possible to travel from
America to the South-east Asian islands and then return with merchandise to America
and then send it on to Spain across the Atlantic. In 1573 direct trade started between
Spain and China, through the exchange of gifts, including silks and spices, a trade
which was to last 242 years (Ponce Aguilar 2002: 93). The whole world was finally
connected. Here lies the origins of global unification, achieved through the routes which
would progressively create a single world economy (Braudel 1980: 1985) and, from the
18th century onwards, a World-System (Wallerstein 1976).
The age of the European empires (first the Portuguese and Spanish, then the Dutch,
English and French) could be understood to represent a new phase in the Silk Road.
However, we are dealing with a different Route, given the fact that the old Euro-Asian
routes now had to adapt to the circumstances of an "extended world" to which the
American continent had been added. As has already been discussed, when the Asian
overland route was blocked, the Maritime route through the Indian Ocean immediately
became more popular, now there were even more options, with the option of a new
route crossing the Pacific to reach America, and go on to Europe.
Since the early 16th century, the Spanish had been trying to open a canal through
Central America, aware that this would alter the world geo-political situation, although
this was only made possible in the 20th century. Likewise, the Pharaohs tried to open a
canal in Suez, although this too was only achieved last century. These two passages led
to the rethinking of the maritime routes, as the relative costs of some routes were
reduced to the detriment of others.
With regard to the overland routes, these did not disappear when the European empires
gained control over the control of the seas. The other actors reacted and tried to seek
alternatives. In the mid-seventeenth century, the Manchurian Qing Empire (1644 1911) finally managed to stabilise the North-east pass and the great traditional route
started to re-open. And safety was once more fully ensured with Tsarist Russia in the
18th century and early 19th century, when the tsars extended their influence towards the
east. From that time onwards, the route underwent a change of direction, due to the fact
that the silks from the Yangtze river were taken northwards and reached the north of
Central Asia through Siberia, territories under Russian control. The northern caravan
route gained importance over the old route thanks to this complete safety guaranteed by
the Chinese and Russian empires, which made it possible to even reach Europe without
leaving the territory controlled by the tsars (Ma 1998).
The following phase of the overland Silk Road occurred when, following the NorthAmerican example, the tsars managed to link both ends of their empire, through the
Trans-Siberian railway. This colossal route finally displaced the older route, which was
further south, and established Russian influence in Central Asia up to these present
times. The Asian "Great Game" was adversely affected and Russia was consolidated to
the detriment of Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire.
In the beginning of the 20th Century an analyst observed the decisive Russian move and
pointed out that “trans-continental railways are now transmuting the conditions of landpower, and no where can they have such effect as in the closed heartland of Euro-Asia,
in vast areas of which neither timber nor accessible stone was available for roadmaking.” (Mackinder 1998:30)
To end this brief review of the European - Asian routes, over the millennia, mention
should be made of the "new routes" which transport the equivalent of silk or spices in
our times: petrol and gas flowing through the immense oil and gas pipelines from the
deposits in Central Asia, which some of the largest available in the world, to the global
markets. Yet again, Russia was the one to push forward with the construction of these
infrastructures, when the Central Asian republics were part of the Soviet Union.
At present, any geo-political analysis must primarily take account of two factors: the
end of the Cold War and the rise of South-east Asia (Arrighi 2003). Spatialities change
and discourses should follow suit. At the fall of the Soviet Union, the new Russian State
was obliged to re-define its priorities. After a transitional period, in which official
discourse indicated the need to re-unite with western civilisation, Russia has repositioned itself on the geo-political scene with a discourse which emphasises that it is
part of the Euro-Asian space, its own sphere of civilisation which is neither European
nor Asian (Smith 1999). There is no doubt that geo-politics is “a discursive practice by
which intellectuals of statecraft „spatialize‟ international politics in such a way as to
represent it as a „world‟ characterized by particular types of places, peoples and
dramas.” The connection between geo-politics and national identity is also well
established. In this way, in the same way as geopolitics, “national identity is moulded
by political elites and does not exist separated from political discourse and competition
and, for this reason can not be static or eternal (Zevelev 2001; Bashkirova 2003;
Khasanova 2004).” (O‟Loughlin et al 2005:322).
The main alternative to the Russian oil pipelines is the TRACECA project, which is
directed at extracting petroleum from the Black Sea region through an east - west axis,
passing through Georgia and Turkey. This plan has already experienced an opposing
action with the project to complete the North - South axis to connect the north of
Europe with Russia, Iran and to reach the coast of the Indian Ocean, from where it could
be taken to India by boat. The boom experienced by South-east Asia, in particular China
and India, and the growing demands made by these countries for the limited energy
resources, put a new (energy based) Silk Road scenario at the centre of global geopolitics. This framework alone will make it possible to put the still recent intervention
of Russia in Ossetia into context.
In this same way, the North-American military operations in Iraq or Afghanistan and
the threats to Iran, place this region yet again at the heart of international relations.
If all this is taken into account, the precedent geo-political definition takes on its full
meaning: “a discursive practice by which intellectuals of statecraft „spatialize‟
international politics in such a way as to represent it as a „world‟ characterized by
particular types of places, peoples and dramas.”
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