Download How well prepared was Britain for war in 1939

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ADVANCED HIGHER HISTORY
Holy Cross High School
PREPARATIONS FOR WAR
THE ARMY
THE RAF
THE NAVY
CIVILIAN PRECAUTIONS
THE SEARCH FOR ALLIES
ECONOMIC PRECAUTIONS
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INTRODUCTION
How well prepared was Britain for war in 1939?
The British Army in 1939 was a small, professional force. It was supported by the Territorial Army. At the
outbreak of war the British Expeditionary Force dispatched to France was 12 divisions in size. This was
from a total force of 50 full and part-time divisions. In addition to the forces of the British Army, also
consider the size of the forces that the British army could draw on from the dominions and British
colonies. These included a number of divisions from Australia, Canada, South Africa and New Zealand
along with a large armed force of approximately 200,000 stationed on the Indian sub-continent. In terms
of immediate preparedness this force was relatively small compared with the forces of other major
combatants. The fully trained professional army was limited in size and it would take some time for troops
from the dominions to reach Europe.
The size of the army is only one indicator of military readiness for war, however. The machinery used by
these forces also needs to be considered. The British forces had the advantage of having a fully motorised
system of troop movement. This enabled relatively fast deployment of forces (The Wehrmacht were not
entirely motorised at this stage). British artillery pieces were of high quality, a British 25 pound artillery
piece was particularly accurate and successful in destroying enemy tanks, for example. However the
armed vehicles of the British army at the time do not compare particularly favourably with those of their
opponents. Tanks such as the 'Matilda' were difficult to destroy but lacked the manoeuvrability to engage
in rapid attacks. Other armed vehicles, such as the tanks initially deployed into Northern Africa, had
insufficient armour and suffered at the hands of an experienced Panzer commander. Other equipment
included the Lee Enfield 303 rifle, the 'Tommy gun' which was a semi automatic sub-machine gun and the
Sten gun. There were some problems with the reliability of some of these weapons, the Mark 2 Sten gun
has been noted as being susceptible to jamming. However this gun could be easily dismantled and
concealed which made it an ideal weapon to provide to resistance forces throughout Europe. The rifles and
semi automatic weapons were supported by use of the 40lb Vickers 303 heavy machine gun which was
extremely accurate and fired over 400 rounds per minute.
The RAF in 1939 consisted of 135 squadrons. This comprised 74 bomber and 24 fighter squadrons. In
addition to the 'fighting' wing of the RAF there were a number of army support squadrons, reconnaissance
squadrons and torpedo bombers. These were assisted by an Auxiliary airforce of some 19 squadrons.
Throughout 1939 preparations were made for a possible air war. This included large exercises in Southern
France and practice blackouts in parts of England. By the outbreak of war, radar had been fitted to a
number of Bleinheim bombers. This increased the chances of the bombers finding their target and
provided early warning of enemy attacks.
The on plane radar was supported by two systems of Radar detection. Chain Home and Chain Home Low
were two networks of Radar station built along the south coast of England in the mid to late 1930's. Chain
Home could detect formations of aircraft flying over the coast of France. This enabled the RAF to scramble
fighter squadrons to intercept bomber formations and would allow the RAF to counter any Luftwaffe
movements in the event of an attack on Northern France, the Low Countries or Britain. Chain Home Low
provided radar coverage against low flying aircraft. The development of this system of Radar (there were
21 Chain Home stations and 30 Chain Home Low stations operational in 1940) meant that defensive
sorties against the Luftwaffe could be easily coordinated. This was of paramount importance during the
Battle of Britain.
The Royal Navy was, in 1939, the largest naval force in the world. The fleet contained 15 Battleships, 7
Aircraft carriers, 66 cruisers, 184 Destroyers, 60 submarines and a number of support vessels. The main
Naval base at Scapa Flow was considered to be impregnable and dominated the passage between the
North Sea and the Atlantic Ocean. Additionally there were navies controlled by British Dominions. Though
impressive in terms of size, the Royal Navy in 1939 had several weaknesses. Many of the capital ships
were old, only 2 post dated the First World War. The air power of the Royal navy was limited to short
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range reconnaissance. Many ships of the Fleet were fitted with ASDIC, a radar system that could detect
submarines. Again, this suffered from having a short range and was not effective when the submarines
had surfaced. This combines to leave the fleet open to attack from German U Boats, with only Depth
Charges available as effective means of attacking enemy submarines from onboard the ships - air cover
was provided by the Coastal Command and British submarines patrolled the North Sea and Northern
approaches.
The White Paper of March 1935
Concern about rearmament began with the Manchurian Crisis. In March 1932 a survey of defence needs
was commissioned. Churchill's earliest references to rearmament in May and November 1932 were ill
received, but the collapse of the Disarmament Conference in October 1933 combined with reports of
German rearmament to influence the government. Defence estimates of £102m in 1932-33 were the low
point, and in 1934 they provided for only four new air squadrons. Churchill criticised Britain's position as
fifth air power, and Baldwin said the government "will see to it that in air strength and air power this
country shall no longer be in a position inferior to any country within striking distance of our shores."
In July 1934 the cabinet accepted the defence survey and it was agreed to revise the air estimates to
increase the RAF from 42 to 75 squadrons. Baldwin was strongly criticised, and replied by stating that the
Rhine was now our defensive frontier. By November, Churchill claimed this programme was being
surpassed by Germany, and Baldwin replied, "It is not the case that Germany is rapidly approaching
equality with us ... our estimate is that we shall still have a margin in Europe alone of nearly 50 per cent."
Not until March 1935, with a `Statement Relating to Defence, was rearmament stated to be necessary.
Locust Years: The White Paper of March 1936
Rearmament began in a very muddled fashion. When Hitler announced his rearmament in March 1935 he
told Simon and Eden that Germany had reached air parity. This was false, but gave rise to much alarm
and reluctance to provoke Germany.
Churchill claimed he had been right about the German air threat, and Baldwin, ignoring Air Ministry figures
which showed Churchill was incorrect, stated in May 1935, "Where I was wrong was in my estimate of the
future. There I was completely wrong. We were completely misled on that subject". However, an election
was likely that year, and Baldwin had no intention of losing it. He supported the League in taking
sanctions against Italy, and said, "I give you my word that there will be no great armaments". However,
the government increased the air estimates and specifications for the Hurricane and Spitfire were followed
by prototypes in November 1935 and May 1936.
After the election, and failure to keep Italy out of the enemy camp, rearmament became more open. In
March 1936 a White Paper and the appointment of Inskip as Minister for Coordination of Defence were
announced, and in July Sir Hugh Dowding took over Fighter Command, and urged the government to
lessen concentration on bombers. The White Paper owed much to Chamberlain. It provided for naval
rearmament (including two battleships, one aircraft carrier and 19 new cruisers) and the increase of the
RAF to a front-line strength of 1750 aeroplanes.
The Loaded Pause
In November 1936, during a debate in which Churchill accused Baldwin of sloth in rearmament, Baldwin
said, "Supposing I had gone to the country and said that Germany was rearming and we must rearm?
Does anyone think that this pacific democracy-would have rallied to that cry at that moment? I cannot
think of anything that would have made the loss of that election from my point of view more certain". This
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was said in reference to East Fulham, but later twisted to imply that Baldwin had deceived the country in
the election of 1935.
It cannot be denied that, in spite of rising expenditure (1935-36, £137m; 1936-37, £186m), the years
1936-38 were ones of wishful thinking, and slow rearmament. In the RAF, the Blenheim and Hampden
bombers were developed, but only a few British planes could reach Germany. Development of new models
was slow. The Hurricane and Spitfire did not enter service until January and August 1938 respectively.
Although Sir Robert Watson Watt explained radar in 1935, it was only in 1937 that the decision to develop
it was taken and 1939 before the chain was complete.
In the autumn of 1937 Chamberlain said, "I must frankly state that progress is not yet as fast as I should
like". Run-down defence industries responded slowly, so that two aircraft carriers had to have
Czechoslovak armour while the Bofors gun was bought from Sweden. Expenditure on the air force and
navy hamstrung the army, and in February 1938 Inskip was unable to persuade the cabinet to alter its low
priority. He admitted the army had only two divisions, and that these were gravely deficient in tanks.
Thus, although defence spending rose (1937, £198m; 1938, £253m) and Britain was spending a higher
proportion of the National Income than France, she was behind Germany and falling further behind, in
some respects, as the years passed. In March 1938 the Defence Staff declared war with Germany would
lead to ultimate defeat, and this should be borne in mind when considering Munich.
Almost Inexhaustible Resources
The crisis over Czechoslovakia brought defence matters to a head. In April 1938 a new programme of air
development without financial restraints provided for 12,000, later 17,500, planes in two years. On 22
February 1939 production to the limit was allowed. Secret aeroplane works were developed and Arthur
Purvis headed a purchasing mission to America which provided 400 planes. As Mowat says, "It was in the
strengthening of her air power that the breathing spell afforded by Munich was of supreme value to Great
Britain". The government began to borrow (£90m in 1938; £380m in 1939), in addition to increasing
defence spending which reached £273m in 1939.
Duff Cooper had been ineffective at the War Office but his successor, Hore Belisha, began to get things
changed. Re-equipping and stockpiling began, including the purchase of Brens from Czechoslovakia, and
the limited role of the army was abandoned in January 1939. A BEF of 21 divisions was to be formed - 10
were ready by January 1940. The Territorial Army was to double in size, and conscription was introduced
in April 1939. Even the long-awaited Ministry of Supply appeared the same month. Hoare declared, "I am
convinced we could not be defeated in a short war by any knock-out blow, and that in a long war our
almost inexhaustible resources will ensure final victory."
Civil Defence
In 1935 talks began at the Home Office, and in 1937 the Air Raid Precautions Act created Civil Defence.
After Sir John Anderson was put in charge in October 1938 it expanded to include 11 million people. Two
million "Anderson" shelters were provided. Provision for gas attack was made with the production of 38
million gas masks. Plans for evacuation and the hospital service were completed by Elliot at the Health
Ministry. Provision was made to move one and three-quarter million children. Land girls, observer corps,
auxiliary fire service and Womens Voluntary Service personnel were recruited. The air-raid warden and
rescue services were organised. A system of regional government was created. In January 1939 the
National Service Handbook was distributed to every household, and in July 1939 the Civil Defence Act
completed initial preparations. It was a meticulous programme, including every aspect of total war. At the
time it excited jokes, and some of the preparations were unnecessary. But Britain was to be the first
major industrial nation to face prolonged air attack.
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THE BRITISH ARMY IN 1939 PART 1
The British army was expected to provide for home defence
and for imperial garrisons but not to produce an
expeditionary force on the continent of Europe. In May 1940
the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) commanded by General
Lord Gort VC had been built up to 394,000 men with 5
Regular and 5 Territorial fighting Divisions on the
Belgian frontier where the main German attack was expected.
As an alternative to a war of attrition, the Germans had
developed the concept of blitzkrieg or ‘lightning war’; an idea
first suggested by British military writers. Blitzkrieg relied on
rapid penetration on a narrow front by armour and motorised
infantry
with
close
air
support.
As in 1914, the British Army which went to war in 1939 was a
small, long-service force which lacked the great reserves of trained soldiers necessary to
bring it up to a size equal to those of its continental allies or enemies. Its main reserve
was the part-time volunteer Territorial Army, which lacked training and was underequipped. Thus it was able to send only 10 divisions to the continent in 1939 to stand
beside the French. However, it had already begun to conscript young men and
eventually built up fifty divisions. And it had an important source of additional
strength in the forces of the empire and the dominions. The Canadian, Australian, New
Zealand and South African Armies would each send several divisions into the field, while
the Indian Army stood ready at the beginning of the war to deploy nearly 200,000 men.
British equipment was of mixed quality. The Army enjoyed a great advantage over
its German namesake in that it was, from the start, able to provide all its divisions
with sufficient motor transport to move their infantry from their own
resources. British field artillery, equipped with the famous 25-pounder gun, was also
good.
But at the outset the medium artillery lacked proper weapons, while the anti-tank and
tank units were notably deficient in modern equipment. In the I Tank (Matilda) the
British began the war with a machine which the Germans could not knock out,
but it was too small and undergunned to be useful as a weapon of support or
exploitation. The cruiser tanks with which the British fought most of the Desert War
were insufficiently protected and it was not really until they acquired the Sherman from
the Americans that the Royal Armoured Corps had a weapon with which it could meet
the Germans on equal terms. Its better home-produced tanks the Churchill and
Cromwell were too few to make a difference.
The British command system, unlike the German or French, devolved considerable
responsibility on to the generals in the field. Churchill, with advice from the Chief of
the Imperial General Staff - for most of the war the able Alan Brooke - decided the main
lines of policy, but left the theatre and battlefield commanders to construct and execute
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their own battle plans. After American entry, British commanders became
increasingly under the control of inter-Allied headquarters, of which the chiefs
were usually American. The cordiality of relationships established between the
headquarters of both armies was remarkable and a major contribution to the winning of
the war.
THE BRITISH ARMY 1939 PART 2
In 1939 Britain had a small professional army. This was backed up by a poorly
trained and ill-equipped Territorial Army. On the outbreak of the War PM
Chamberlain, agreed to send a British Expeditionary Army to France. Under the
command of General John Gort, the force included four infantry divisions and 50 light
tanks.
The British government introduced conscription and by May 1940, too late to
make a real difference to the fighting in France. British Army strength was brought up to
50 divisions. Of these, 10 divisions were in France fighting against the German Western
Offensive. After the evacuations from Dunkirk were complete, the British Army had
1,650,000 men. After the fall of France in June, 1940, the British Army was mainly used
to protect the British Empire. This included sending troops to Egypt, Singapore
and Burma. A small force was also sent to Greece in March 1941 but it was soon forced
to retreat. British Army units also took part in the Allied invasions of Sicily, Italy and
France.
The main rifle used by the infantry was the Lee Enfield 303. A trained soldier using
this rifle was able to put five shots into a four-inch circle at 200 yards. When fitted with
telescopes a good sniper could hit his target at a distance of 1000 yards. In the early
stages of the Second World War the British Army purchased the Tommy Gun from the
United States. These were expensive and in 1940 they switched to the Sten Gun made
by the Royal Small Arms Factory in Enfield. There were several models but the Mark 2
was the most popular. The gun had a massive bolt inside a tubular casing with the barrel
fixed to the front and the magazine feeding from the left side where it could be
supported on the firer's forearm.
During the War the Royal Small Arms Factory supplied 4 million of these guns to the
British Army. It was not popular with the soldiers because its habit of jamming when
being used in battle. However, they were cheap to buy and the British
government distributed them to resistance groups throughout occupied
Europe. The gun could be easily and rapidly dismantled into its component parts for
concealment, a distinct advantage for underground fighters. Britain's early heavy
machine gun was the extremely reliable water-cooled Vickers 303. It was a recoiloperated machine gun, water cooled and belt fed. It weighed 40lb without its tripod and
fired the standard .303 British cartridge at about 450rpm.
The British Army only had 100 tanks left after Dunkirk and Vauxhall Motors were
under instructions to produce the tanks as quickly as possible. As a result, the
early Churchill tank suffered considerable mechanical problems. It performed badly at
the Dieppe Raid but was more successful in North Africa. The armament was also
inadequate and in March 1942 it was produced with a 6-pounder gun. The
following year this was replaced with a 75mm gun.The first Valentine tanks were
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delivered in May 1940 and the following year they were sent to take part in the Desert
War. During the war there were eleven versions of the tank. For example, the tank's
armament changed from a 6-pounder in 1938 to 75mm in 1944. However, the size of
the turret remained a problem and the crew constantly complained about a lack of room.
By June 1945 the British Army had grown to 2,920,000 men. During the Second World
War 144,079 British soldiers were killed, 239,575 were wounded and 152,079 were
taken prisoner.
SIZE AND SRUCTURE OF LAND FORCES
Unit Name
Consists of [1]:
Approx Number of men:
Commanded
by:
Army
2 or more Corps
100,000 to 150,000
Field Marshal or General
Corps
2 or more Divisions
25,000 to 50,000
General or Lt. Gen.
Division
3 or more Brigades or Regiments 10,000 to 15,000
Lt. Gen or Maj. Gen.
Brigade
3 or more Battalions
1500 to 3500
Maj. Gen, Brigadier or Col.
Regiment[2]
2 or more Battalions
1000 to 2000
Col.
Battalion
4 or more Companies
400 to 1000
Lt. Col.
Company
2 or more Platoons
100 to 250
Captain or Maj
Platoon (Troop) 2 or more Squads
16 to 50
1st Lt.
Squad
8 to 24
Sgt.
4 to 12
Sgt.
Section
2 or more Sections
You will often hear that forces are divided in to
regiments and brigades and divisions. This table gives
you an idea of the numbers of troops in each of these
units.
RAF SQUADRONS
Battle of Britain RAF worked on the following basis:
A full strength squadron would have 20 aircraft and two reserves, plus 16 operational pilots, and
would be expected to fly 12 aircraft, either as four flights of three or three flights of four.
If the strength fell below 9 they should have been relieved and posted to another Group, however
some squadrons suffered exhaustion from persistent combat and heavy losses, and were far from
efficient before being withdrawn.
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Some squadrons lasted 4 to 6 weeks, others had to be replaced after only a week to ten days. On
2.9.40 seven squadrons were reduced to less than half strength, and by 7.9.40 it was impossible to
exchange squadrons quickly enough as their strength in operational pilots ran down.
THE RAF IN 1939
In December, 1918, the RAF had more than 22,000
aircraft and 291,000 personnel, making it the world's
largest airforce. Over the next twenty years the RAF was
developed as a strategic bombing force. A fleet of light and
medium monoplane bombers were developed during this
period, notably the Vickers Wellington. The RAF also
obtained two fast, heavily armed interceptor aircraft,
the Hawker Hurricane and the Supermarine Spitfire,
for defence against enemy bombers.
The British government grew increasingly concerned about the growth of the Luftwaffe in Nazi Germany
and in 1938 Vice Marshal Charles Portal, Director of Organization at the Air Ministry, was given the
responsibility of establishing 30 new air bases in Britain. In September 1939 Bomber Command consisted
of 55 squadrons (920 aircraft). However, only about 350 of these were suitable for long-range
operations. Fighter Command had 39 squadrons (600 aircraft) but the RAF only had 96 reconnaissance
aircraft.
During the 1920s and early 1930s the bomber-fighter debate was largely contained within military and
economic spheres. The British, for instance, invoked a "Ten Year Rule" for approving military
expenditures, based on the probability of war in the next ten years. Events in Germany in 1933 changed
the rules.
In late 1937, the first Vickers Wellington appeared, boasting a speed of 230 mph and a
phenomenal bomb load of 4500 lbs. Of geodetic construction and largely fabric-covered, the 'Wimpey'
was a truly astounding aircraft, and would serve the RAF well for many years. She too carried defensive
armament in the nose and tail turrets to fight of enemy fighters.
Bomber development was amazingly rapid in all countries during the 1930s, Britain introduced the
Blenheim and Battle (both light bombers), and the Hampden and Whitley (medium bombers).
Even more extraordinary was the development of a new generation of fighter aircraft. The Hawker
'Hurricane' and Supermarine 'Spitfire' in Britain, were only some of the fighters developed during the late
30s. Even in their early versions, all but one of these were much faster than previous fighters, with
maximum speeds ranging from 320-380 mph.
PROBLEMS
Despite some innovative initiatives, Britain did not have sufficient trained pilots. In Bomber Command,
this extended to all other air crew: gunners; navigators; wireless operators. The Voluntary Reserve, begun
in 1937, had helped address the lack of pilots, but not nearly quickly enough. And although the RAF had a
fine training school both for ground and air crew, the number of bodies completing the training was below
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requirements. Exacerbating this, there were insufficient aircraft to train even the pilots and crew they
had. Aircraft in existing squadrons were being cannibalized to keep other planes in readiness; to remove
yet
more for training purposes could prove disastrous.
In 1939 there were no accurate, reliable navigation aids. In simple terms, how does a pilot bomb a target
if he cannot find it? How does he find it at night? The third difficulty was related to the second. Even if
reliable navigation devices had been available, pilots and navigators had simply not had enough
experience flying through adverse weather to be successful in the range of conditions to be expected in
northern Europe. Having been 'stood down' in inclement conditions during peacetime - a sensible
precaution in terms of crew and aircraft safety, though not exactly forward-thinking when training for war
- aircrew were totally unprepared for the seasonal hazards of fog, snow, ice and cold.
Whatever the British would learn in 1939 about the limitations of their own air power, there is every
indication that they were still convinced of the devastating power of a strategic enemy air force. Between
Munich and the beginning of the war, thousands of Anderson Shelters were distributed and erected in back
yards across the nation. Plans were put in place for the evacuation of 1,500,000 children and mothers
from London and other likely targets. So many deaths were expected from bombing that the cost of wood
for coffins alone was deemed prohibitive, and it was decided that mass graves and burning with quick lime
would provide the only option to the nation.
During the Second World War the RAF reached a total strength of 1,208,843 men and women. Of these,
185,595, were aircrew. The RAF also had the services of 130,000 pilots from the British Commonwealth
and 30,000 aircrew from Britain's defeated European allies. During the war the RAF used 333 flying
training schools. In all, between 1940 and 1945 the scheme trained out aircrew from Britain (88,022),
Canada (137,739), Australia (27,387), South Africa (24,814), Southern Rhodesia (10,033) and New
Zealand (5,609).
This air campaign killed an estimated 600,000 civilians and destroyed or seriously damaged some six
million homes. A total of 70,253 RAF personnel were lost on operations during the Second World War. Of
these, 47,293 came from Bomber Command.
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THE RAF - A SUMMARY
At this time 1939 Bomber Command consisted of 55 squadrons, which consisted of 920 aircraft. Fighter
command had 39 squadrons with 600 aircraft. However, in 1918, the RAF had more than 22,000 aircraft;
therefore it had been significantly reduced. Also, the RAF only had 96 reconnaissance aircraft (used for
monitoring enemy activity). Moreover, the growth of the Luftwaffe in Nazi Germany meant that the
enemy was gaining an advantage over Britain. Germany had been building up their air force since the
early 1930s in breach of the Treaty of Versailles. They had even trained their pilots inside the Soviet
Union. By 1939 their aircraft numbered 4210 but Britain’s was only approximately 900. This left Britain
extremely vulnerable to air attack.
Yet, Britain’s air force benefited from a number of technological advances. Light and medium monoplane
bombers were developed, such as the Vickers Wellington. It appeared in 1937, had a speed of 230 miles
per hour and a bomb load of 4500lbs. The Hawker Hurricane and the Supermarine Spitfire were heavily
armoured interceptor aircraft, designed to intercept and destroy enemy aircraft. They had speeds ranging
from 320 to 380 mph and were designed by R.J. Mitchel. The Battle of Britain would not have been won
without them. In addition, in 1939 the Government announced a scheme for the production of seventeen
and a half thousand aircraft. This was made possible by the restructuring of industry. Also, aircraft
output rose from 161 in January 1938 to 712 in March 1939.
However, bombers were being developed in all countries, plus there was a real fear of German bombers.
This was evident in 1938 when the German air force bombed Guernica during the Spanish Civil War killing
hundreds. Chamberlain stated, ‘the bomber will always get through’7, in reference to the German
bombers. There was also underlying problems with the RAF personnel and training. Pilots were not
suitably trained nor were gunners, navigators or wireless operators. Also, pilots were insufficiently trained
to fly in bad weather and unknown climates. There was also scarce aircraft to train pilots and was
introduced too late to make a real difference. ‘The Germans had a larger force of trained pilots on which
to call, with an overall military figure of 10,000 in 1939, while Fighter command could only add 50 each
week to its complement’8.
In order to overcome some of the problems, the RAF was reorganised and Lord Swinton was put in charge
of the Air Ministry. In addition, in 1938 Vice Marshal Charles Portal (Director of Organisation at the Air
Ministry) established 30 new air bases in Britain. However, many of Britain’s efforts to prepare the RAF
for war were too late.
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Britain had an advantage over Germany when it came to radar’s however as Britain had a chain of radar
stations from John O’ Groats to Lands end. These gave early warning of incoming aircraft without wasting
fuel or pilot time. This was one of the most important developments for Britain during the war.
On the whole, the British air force was ill-prepared. The government did well in making plans for new
aircraft but they were delayed too long. Apart from the Navy, both the army and the Royal Air Force were
much smaller than Germany’s, putting Britain at a disadvantage. Germany had 2800 front line planes
whereas Britain had fewer than 1000. The fact that Britain had a weak RAF also impaired the other two
military services as it was vital to have a strong, capable air force, especially as Germany was so powerful.
The Wellingtons, Spitfires and Hurricanes were essential in the war against Germany and certainly put
Britain at an advantage but again, issues such and personnel and training greatly hindered the service.
THE SPITFIRE
THE HURRICANE
THE ROYAL AIR FORCE – Bombers
In 1936, whilst based at the Air Ministry, Arthur Harris (later to be known as ‘Bomber’ Harris) successfully
argued that Bomber Command would need larger heavier bombers rather than the existing medium-size
aircraft. He foresaw that to have real offensive power the RAF needed aeroplanes that could carry
significant bomb loads over great distances.
To cope with the larger aircraft, bigger airfields with longer runways were built and training programmes
were organised to produce increasing numbers of skilled aircrews. Many potential aircrew travelled
overseas during wartime to complete basic flying training in the USA, Canada and Southern Africa, or
remained in their native countries to train (e.g. Australia and New Zealand) where plentiful fuel supplies,
relatively good weather and lack of enemy aircraft meant pilots could quickly hone their flying skills before
coming to Britain to finalise their training and then join an operational squadron.
Difficulties of navigation at night
A key part of accurate bombing was accurate navigation. Forced to fly at night to avoid German fighters
and flak, aircrews operating in the early part of the war found their way around Europe in darkness and
frequent bad weather with little more than sextants, the navigator’s estimates of the aircraft’s position
based on speed, direction and wind conditions and occasional radio directional bearings on the return
journey.
A lost bomber!
On one occasion in May 1940 a disorientated crew flying in poor weather at night bombed what they took
to be an enemy airfield in Holland. They later realised to their horror they had actually bombed an RAF
fighter base in Cambridgeshire. Fortunately no-one on the ground was hurt and the bomber got home
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safely. In the typical humour of the time, two Spitfires from the fighter base flew over the errant
bomber’s home airfield the next day and dropped mock German Iron Cross medals.
However comic, this incident was representative of a very serious problem - unpredictable weather, fog,
heavy cloud and lack of navigation equipment meant aircraft were missing their targets and often getting
hopelessly lost trying to reach home, with tragic consequences. Bad weather and navigational errors
caused many young men to be killed and many aircraft destroyed. Training exercises involving
inexperienced crews flying older, poorly equipped training planes at night was another cause of frequent
accidents.
THE LANCASTER BOMBER
THE WELLINGTON BOMBER
THE ROYAL NAVY
In 1939, the British Navy was the largest
Navy in the world.
Its strength was
paramount to the defence of the Empire.
The professional head was the First Sea
Lord, Admiral of the fleet Sir Dudley Pound.
There were almost 200,000 officers and men
including Royal Marines and Reserves.
There were 15 battleships and battle
cruisers, 7 aircraft carriers, 66 cruisers (of
which most were new), 184 destroyers (over
half were new), 60 submarines and a number
of support vessels.
As Robert MacKay
states, ‘The Royal Navy was in a reasonably
healthy state in September 1939’9. However,
the Navy had to defend the world’s oceans (excluding the help of the French Navy) and relied on the
generosity of the Americans to protect the Pacific Ocean. D Dilks agrees and points out that Britain
‘had command of the ocean’10. The Empire proved very difficult to defend especially in the Far East.
As Corelli Barnett states, ‘it was the greatest example of strategic overstretch the world had ever
seen’.
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However, out of all the services, the Navy was the most prepared for war. Under construction were
5 ‘King George V’ class battleships (which helped to sink the German battleship the Bismarck in May
1941), 6 fleet carriers of which 5 were already under construction, 32 fleet destroyers, 20 escort
types, 9 submarines and 9 patrol vessels. Furthermore, 23 new cruiser minelayers were laid down.
On the other hand, only 2 of the 15 battleships were new and there was only one new aircraft carrier.
Also many capital ships were old. In addition it was hard to tackle the threat of the U boats and
ASDIC (the Royal Navy’s submarine), had limited range and was little use against surfaced U boats.
Survival depended upon the Enigma, a coding machine, for the submarine war, which helped to
break German codes.
However the Stern-dropped and Mortar-fired depth charges were the only lethal anti-submarine
weapon available. This was illustrated in the Battle of the Atlantic 1940-1942. Also the Royal Navy
severely underestimated the threat of aircraft to their vessels. This was evident in 1941 off the coast
of Singapore where Britain suffered its biggest naval disaster of the war and lost 2 battleships, The
Prince of Wales and the Repulse. Torpedo bombers sank the two battleships it was the first time
capital ships of any nation had been lost to air attack while in the open sea. ‘Their loss tilted the
balance in the Battle for Malaya and just two months later Singapore surrendered to the Japanese
Army’12. This highlighted the fact that few ships had anti aircraft defence on board. Another problem
was that the German Navy could read the Navy’s operational and convoy codes and the Royal Navy
did not compete when it came to landing large armies onto hostile shores. It was only in 1943 with the
capture of Sicily that Britain, with the support of the USA, overcame this problem. However radars
were fitted onto ships helping them detect enemy vessels quicker and Scapa Flow, a body of water in
the Orkney Islands which holds the UK’s chief naval base, was considered impregnable. This was
proven to be false as the British aircraft-carrier Courageous was sunk by a U-boat in the first major
naval loss.
The Royal Navy may have been the largest in the world but it was almost certainly not fully prepared
for war. The submarine war was particularly deficient on the British side, as stated. Due to Britain’s
outdated shipbuilding industry, many ships were old and not al lot of progress could be made.
However, its strength was imperative to the Second World War, and again, radar proved to be one of
Britain’s main dominances.
Holy Cross High School
Department of History
14
THE ROYAL NAVY
September 1939
"King
George
V"
battleship HMS Anson in
1945. Laid down in 1937
and still the measure of
naval power at the start
of
World
War
2.
(Courtesy Cyberheritage)
By 1945, the battleship
and its large gun had
been superseded by the
aircraft carrier and its
aircraft
The heart of the Royal Navy is its centuries old traditions and 200,000 officers and men including the
Royal Marines and Reserves. At the very top as professional head is the First Sea Lord, Admiral of
the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound.
Royal Navy Warship Strength







The Royal Navy, still the largest in the world in September 1939, includes:
15 Battleships & battlecruisers, of which only two are post-World War 1. Five 'King George V'
class battleships are building.
7 Aircraft carriers. One is new and five of the planned six fleet carriers are under construction.
There are no escort carriers.
66 Cruisers, mainly post-World War 1 with some older ships converted for AA duties. Including
cruiser-minelayers, 23 new ones have been laid down.
184 Destroyers of all types. Over half are modern, with 15 of the old 'V' and 'W' classes
modified as escorts. Under construction or on order are 32 fleet destroyers and 20 escort types
of the 'Hunt' class.
60 Submarines, mainly modern with nine building.
45 escort and patrol vessels with nine building, and the first 56 'Flower' class corvettes on
order to add to the converted 'V' and 'W's' and 'Hunts'. However, there are few fast, longendurance convoy escorts.
Dominion Navies
Included in the totals are the Dominion navies:
Royal Australian Navy - six cruisers, five destroyers and two sloops;
Royal Canadian Navy - six destroyers;
Royal Indian Navy - six escort and patrol vessels;
Holy Cross High School
Department of History
15
Royal New Zealand Navy, until October 1941 the New Zealand Division of the Royal Navy - two
cruisers and two sloops.
Strengths and Weaknesses
The Fleet is reasonably well-equipped to fight conventional surface actions with effective guns, torpedoes and
fire control, but in a maritime war that will soon revolve around the battle with the U-boat, the exercise of air
power, and eventually the ability to land large armies on hostile shores, the picture is far from good.
ASDIC, the RN's answer to the submarine, has limited range and is of little use against surfaced U-boats, and
the stern-dropped or mortar-fired depth charge is the only reasonably lethal anti-submarine weapon available.
The Fleet Air Arm (FAA) recently returned to full control of the Navy, is equipped with obsolescent aircraft,
and in the face of heavy air attack the Fleet has few, modern anti-aircraft guns. Co-operation with the RAF is
limited although three Area Combined Headquarters have been established in Britain. Coastal Command, the
RAF's maritime wing, has only short range aircraft, mainly for reconnaissance. And there is little combined
operations capability.
On the technical side, early air warning radars are fitted to a small number of ships. The introduction by the
Germans of magnetic mines finds the Royal Navy only equipped to sweep moored contact mines. Finally, the
German Navy's B-Service can read the Navy's operational and convoy codes.
Primary Maritime Tasks
These are based on the assumption Britain and France are actively allied against the European Axis powers of
Germany and Italy. The Royal Navy will be responsible for the North Sea and most of the Atlantic, although the
French will contribute some forces. In the Mediterranean, defence will be shared between both Navies, but as it
happens, Benito Mussolini's claimed ownership of the Mediterranean - his 'Mare Nostrum' does not have to be
disputed for another nine months.
Belligerent Warship Strengths in European Waters & Atlantic Ocean
Warship type Royal
Navy French
Navy German
Navy
Home
waters
(a) Atlantic and Channel
European
waters
& Atlantic (b)
+ Atlantic Station
Battleships 9
2
3 + 2(c)
Carriers
4
1
Cruisers
35
3
7
Destroyers 95
20
22
Submarines 25
41(d) + 16
Totals
168
26
73 + 18
plus escorts
plus torpedo boats
Notes:
- Royal Navy is a mix of World War 1, modernised and recently completed ships. The French warships allocated to the
Atlantic and the German are mainly modern.
Holy Cross High School
Department of History
16
(a) Home Fleet commanded by Adm Sir Charles Forbes with 7 capital ships, 2 carriers and 16 cruisers based at Scapa
Flow and Rosyth; Channel Force with 2 battleships, 2 carriers and 3 cruisers; Humber Force with 2 cruisers; and various
destroyer flotillas.
(b) North Atlantic Command based at Gibraltar with 2 cruisers and 9 destroyers; America and West Indies Command at
Bermuda with 4 cruisers; and South Atlantic at Freetown with 8 cruisers and 4 destroyers.
(c) Pocket battleships "Admiral Graf Spee" in the South and "Deutschland" in the North Atlantic.
Threats and Responses - September 1939
OBJECTIVE 1 - Defence of trade routes, and convoy organisation and escort, especially to
and from Britain.
- Until May 1940 the main threat is from U-Boats operating in the North Sea and South Western
Approaches. For a few months two pocket battleships pose a danger in the the Atlantic.
- In the North Atlantic anti-submarine escorts are provided from Britain out to 200 miles west of Ireland
(15W) and to the middle of the Bay of Biscay. For a few hundred miles from Halifax, cover is given by
Canadian warships. The same degree of protection is given to ships sailing from other overseas assembly
ports.
- Cruisers and (shortly) armed merchant cruisers sometimes take over as ocean escorts. Particularly fast or
slow ships from British, Canadian and other assembly ports sail independently, as do the many hundreds
of vessels scattered across the rest of the oceans. Almost throughout the war it is the independently-routed
ships and the convoy stragglers that suffer most from the mainly German warships, raiders, aircraft and
above all submarines that seek to break the Allied supply lines.
OBJECTIVE 2 - Detection and destruction of surface raiders and U-boats.
- Patrols are carried out by RAF Coastal Command in the North Sea, and by Home Fleet submarines off
southwest Norway and the German North Sea bases. RAF Bomber Command prepares to attack German
warships in their bases. Fleet aircraft carriers are employed on anti-U-boat sweeps in the Western
Approaches.
OBJECTIVE 3 - Maritime blockade of Germany and contraband control.
- As German merchant ships try to reach home or neutral ports, units of the Home Fleet sortie into the
North Sea and waters between Scotland, Norway and Iceland. The Northern Patrol of old cruisers,
followed later by armed merchant cruisers have the unenviable task of covering the area between the
Shetlands and Iceland. In addition, British and French warships patrol the North and South Atlantic.
Closer to Germany the first mines are laid by Royal Navy destroyers in the approaches to Germany's
North Sea bases.
OBJECTIVE 4 - Defence of own coasts.
Right through until May 1940 U-boats operate around the coasts of Britain and in the North Sea.
Scotland's Moray Firth is often a focus for their activities. They attack with both torpedoes and magnetic
mines. Mines are also laid by surface ships and aircraft.
British East Coast convoys (FN/FS) commence between the Thames Estuary and the Firth of Forth in
Holy Cross High School
Department of History
17
Scotland. Southend-on-Sea, the Thames peacetime seaside resort, sees over 2,000 convoys arrive and
depart in the course of the war Defensive mine laying begins with an anti-U-boat barrier in the English
Channel across the Straits of Dover, followed by an East Coast barrier to protect coastal convoy routes.
OBJECTIVE 5 - Escort troops to France and between Britain, the Dominions and other
areas under Allied control.
- An immediate start is made transporting the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) to France. By the end of
1939 the first Canadian troops have arrived in Britain, and by early 1940 Australian, Indian and New
Zealand forces are on their way to Egypt and the Middle East. Troop convoys are always heavily escorted,
and the Dominion Navies play an important part in protecting the men as they leave their home shores.
Australian and New Zealand cruisers are particularly active in the Indian Ocean.
Naval Strength before World War Two
Royal Navy - An Incomplete Victory by John Barrett
On 21 November 1918, as Germany’s once-proud High Seas Fleet sailed into the British naval base of
Scapa Flow to surrender, the Royal Navy seemed at the pinnacle of its long history. With 61 battleships to
France’s 40 and the U.S.A.’s 39, the British fleet appeared incontestably to be the strongest in the world.
But appearances were deceptive. Even at the peak of its strength, the Royal Navy had found it difficult to
provide adequate protection to all of Britain’s world-wide possessions and interests, and Britain itself was
increasingly dependent on seaborne imports, even for some essential foodstuffs and raw materials. But
the huge financial costs of World War I had left Britain unable to maintain her existing levels of defence
spending, with the result that defence planning was based on the assumption that no major war was likely
to occur for ten years, a policy that was renewed annually into the 1930’s.
Financial problems made Britain eager to sign the Naval Agreements of the Washington Conference of
1922, at which the Royal Navy’s position as the largest fleet in the world was quietly abandoned.
Agreement was reached on a 5.5.3 ratio of warships among the three leading naval powers of Britain,
U.S.A. and Japan. Also agreed was a ten-year halt in building new capital ships, with the exception of
some already under construction. One result was that only two new battleships were added to the Royal
Navy in the inter-war years, “Nelson” and “Rodney”, completed in 1927, whose effectiveness was reduced
by their compliance with the Treaty limitations, renewed in the London Naval Conference of 1930.
Financial restrictions also resulted in a decline in the standards of training so that the Royal Navy was in
danger of slipping back into its complacency of the long Victorian peace after the Napoleonic Wars.
The Road to War
In 1933 the rise to power of Adolf Hitler in Germany was quickly seen as a potential threat to world peace,
but although the “Ten Year Rule” was abandoned in 1934, it was expected to be 1943 before the Royal
Navy would be equipped and ready for full-scale war. A massive building programme of twenty capital
ships including 15 aircraft carriers was planned, but was never a realistic possibility, with British industry
unable to cope with such demands. Even the five battleships of the “King George V” class which were laid
down had only 14” guns, compared with vessels of 15” –18” being constructed abroad, though their
armoured protection, (up to 15” on the sides and 6” on the decks) would help make them unexpectedly
successful in combat. The British carrier program was equally disappointing. Instead of a planned total of
7 first class carriers available by 1939, the Royal Navy would actually have only 4 modern vessels and 3
which were obsolescent. And in this field the Navy lagged behind developments in the U.S.A. and Japan,
particularly in aircraft and training.
With increasingly aggressive tactics by Japan in the East, and the menace of Fascist Italy and Nazi
Germany in Europe, Britain was now facing the prospect of a war on three fronts, in the Atlantic,
Mediterranean and Pacific, and having to defend a far-flung Empire with only tiny naval forces of its own..
Holy Cross High School
Department of History
18
To meet this threat in the short term, the Navy could only modernize its World War I–vintage capital
ships, and work on some, including the battlecruisers “Hood” and “Repulse”, would not be completed
before the outbreak of war.
Other vessels were equally unsatisfactory. The Treaty tonnage limitations had meant that, apart from
some older heavy cruisers, most modern vessels of this class carried only 6” guns. Similar problems
plagued the destroyer force. The latest “Tribal” class, begun in 1937, carried only 4.7” guns compared
with the “5.9” weapons of their German counterparts.
Potentially disastrous was the neglect of the threat from submarines, particularly to merchant shipping. It
was assumed that detection equipment such as ASDIC had neutralised the U-boat in any future war. It
was felt in the review of 1934 that no more than 100 escorts in all would be needed, so few new ones had
been built by an essentially conservative naval leadership, which had also largely ignored the potential
role of aircraft in anti-submarine warfare.
The outbreak of war in 1939 left the Royal Navy already dangerously overstretched even faced only with
Germany. Though Britain might appear supreme, with 12 battleships and battlecruisers, 5 carriers and 53
cruisers, appearances were deceptive. Six battleships remained unmodernised; only the “Hood” and
“Renown” were fast enough to catch the latest German ships, and the only modern carrier, “Ark Royal”
still carried obsolete aircraft. The outlook, especially if the war spread, was potentially dire.
GERMANY AND THE KRIEGSMARINE
THE REBIRTH OF A NAVY
The Treaty of Versailles in 1919 left the once proud German Navy a mere shadow of its former glory.
Reduced basically to a Baltic defence force, with six old pre-Dreadnoughts and a small force of lighter
vessels, and forbidden U-boats, Germany never again seemed likely to challenge for control of the seas.
But efforts to circumvent the harshest clauses of the peace settlement, and at least prepare for the
possibility of a revived Navy began almost at once. German–controlled U-boat building facilities were set
up in Holland, and submarines secretly constructed for Spain, Turkey and Finland, so keeping existing
skills alive and helping in design improvements. The Versailles Treaty allowed for the replacement (with a
10,000 ton limit) of existing vessels when they were more than twenty years old, and during the 1920’s
several new light cruisers and torpedo boats were added.
Even before the Nazi regime came to power, more ambitious plans were under development, including the
construction of three panzerschiffes, “armoured vessels” of 10,000 tons, each carrying six 11” guns, and
designed primarily as commerce raiders, able to outfight or outrun any likely opponents. Known to the
Allies as “pocket battleships” they would prove their worth on the outbreak of war. Secret work had also
begun on the Type 1 coastal U-boats of 250 tons.
In 1935, Hitler and the British Government signed the fateful Anglo-German Naval Agreement, which
allowed Germany, if her Government deemed it necessary, to build up to parity with the Royal Navy. It
also allowed her submarines, and the secret U-boat flotilla was immediately unveiled.
The new opportunities for expansion caused some dissension in the German Naval Command. The newly
designated head of the U-boat service, Karl Donitz, favoured a massive expansion of the Submarine force,
with emphasis on the 500-ton Type VII, to give a greater number of vessels within the Treaty limitations,
rather than the larger 800-ton Type IX favoured by the High Command under Grand Admiral Erich Raeder.
Raeder himself, whilst not neglecting the possible role of the U-boat, was a “big ship” man. In this field,
first fruits of the 1935 treaty were the the fast battleships “Scharnhorst” and “Gniesenau”. Classed by the
British as battlecruisers, these 32,000 ton vessels, mounting nine 11” guns, and with a top speed of 31
knots, were a force to be reckoned with. Also laid down were several heavy cruisers and the great 35,000
ton eight 15” gunned battleships “Bismarck” and Tirpitz”
Holy Cross High School
Department of History
19
These were only intended as the first steps in the creation of a formidable new Kriegsmarine. In 1938
Hitler and Raeder drew up the massive expansion program known as the “Z Plan”. This envisaged no war
with Britain before 1945. By that date Raeder hoped to have a fleet including six 50,000 ton battleships,
twelve 20,000 ton battle-cruisers, four carriers, a large number of light cruisers and destroyers and 250
U-boats. Donitz with typical realism felt this program to be completely unviable, making impossible
demands on German manufacturing capacity, and with the problem result of a new naval arms race with
Britain and France.
The premature outbreak of war in 1939 quickly led to the abandonment of the Z-Plan. Of the capital ships,
work would only continue on the two battleships of the “Bismarck” class. Raeder felt that his largely
modern, but greatly outnumbered surface fleet could only hope to “die with honour”. Much would rest on
the U-boat arm, which began the war with only 57 operational vessels instead of the 300 hoped for by
Donitz. Production priority was switched to them, but it remained to be seen whether enough could be
built in time.
Main Wartime Developments
-
-
As the war progresses, the Royal and Dominion Navies expand rapidly with large construction
programmes, particularly escort carriers, destroyers, corvettes, frigates, submarines, landing
ships and craft.
By mid-1944, 800,000 officers and men and 73,000 WRNS are in uniform.
Vastly improved radars and anti-submarine weapons have been introduced, and the tactics to
use them effectively, honed to a fine pitch.
Ship-borne and land-based aircraft become vital in the life and death struggle against the Uboat, the only concern Prime Minister Winston Churchill retained throughout six years of war.
Huge combined operations landings take place with air superiority usually assured.
Although not defeated, magnetic, then acoustic and finally pressure mines are kept under
control.
Perhaps of greatest single significance, the 'Ultra' operation against the German Enigma codes
allows the Allies to penetrate to the very heart of German and Axis planning and operations.
In short, in a war that starts with Polish cavalry and ends with the Anglo-US atomic bomb, the Royal
and Dominion Navies face new and continuing threats and learn to deal with them technically,
operationally and above all, successfully.
But the price paid is high:
-
-
British
Naval
Casualties
not including RAF and Army personnel killed in related circumstances - Coastal Command,
Defensively-Equipped Merchant Ships (DEMS) etc
Royal Navy - 50,758 killed, 820 missing, 14,663 wounded
Women's Royal Naval Service - 102 killed, 22 wounded
Merchant Navy - 30,248 lost through enemy action
and in ships:
Holy Cross High School
Department of History
20
Royal Navy Losses - Total Losses - by Year - by Theatre - by Enemy
TOTAL STRENGTH AND LOSSES
ROYAL
NAVY Strength as of Commissioned
Warship types
Sept 1939
to Aug 1945
Capital ships
15
5
Carriers
7
58
Cruisers
66
35
Destroyers
184
277
Submarines
60
178
TOTALS
332
553
TOTAL
SERVICE
20
65
101
461
238
885
IN TOTAL LOSSES
5
10
34
153
76
278
LOSSES BY YEAR - including not repaired
ROYAL NAVY 1939
Warship types
Capital ships
1
Carriers
1
Cruisers
Destroyers
3
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
Totals
1
3
37
4
2
11
(1 RAN)
22
3
13
(2 RAN)
51
1
4
18
1
3
20
1
-
5
10
34
(3 RAN)
153
Holy Cross High School
2
Department of History
21
Submarines
TOTALS
1
6
(2 RCN)
24
65
(1 RAN) (3 RAN) (2 RCN) (1 RCN)
11
19
13
50
86
36
(2 RCN)
5
29
3
6
(4 RAN)
(7 RCN)
76
278
LOSSES BY THEATRE
ROYAL
NAVY Atlantic
Warship types
Capital ships
1
Carriers
4
Cruisers
4
Europe
1
3
4
Mediterranean Indian & Pacific
Oceans
1
2
2
1
20
6 (3 RAN)
Destroyers
Submarines
TOTALS
53 (2 RCN)
23
84
67 (2 RAN)
45
135
23 (5 RCN)
3
35
ROYAL NAVY German
Warship types
Capital ships
3
Carriers
8
Cruisers
20
Destroyers
114
Submarines (c) 24
TOTALS
169
10 (2 RAN)
5
24
Italian
Japanese French
Other (a) Unknown Total
6
15
37
58
2
1
5
8
4
20
1
3
15
6
25
1 (b)
1
5
5
5
10
34
153
76
278
Analysis of Axis Navy Losses - German Navy - Italian Navy - Japanese Navy
GERMAN NAVY - ALL MAJOR WARSHIPS - Totals and (Due to Royal Navy)
GERMAN
NAVY
Capital
ships
Cruisers
Raiders
Destroyers
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
Total
1 (RN)
-
1 (RN)
-
1 (RN)
1
3 (a)
7 (3 RN)
-
3 (2 RN)
12 (RN)
3 (RN)
-
3 (1 RN)
4 (3 RN)
1
2 (1 RN)
7 (2 RN)
3 (a)
2
6 (2 RN)
7 (4 RN)
27 (18 RN)
Holy Cross High School
Department of History
22
(b)
Submarines 9 (RN)
TOTALS
10 (RN)
22 (17 RN) 35 (28 RN) 86 (34 RN) 237
RN)
37 (31 RN) 39 (32 RN) 93 (38 RN) 241
RN)
(61 242
RN)
(63 250
RN)
(85 149
RN)
(87 157
RN)
(41 780
RN)
(41 827
RN)
(275
(302
ITALIAN NAVY - to 8th September 1943 - Totals and (Due to Royal Navy)
1939
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Warship types
Battleships
Cruisers
Destroyers(a)
Submarines
TOTALS
1940
1 (RN)
1 (RN)
8 (RN)
20 (12 RN)
30 (22 RN)
1941
6 (RN)
14 (10 RN)
18 (14 RN)
38 (30 RN)
1942
3 (2 RN)
8 (4 RN)
22 (17 RN)
33 (23 RN)
1943
2
13 (6 RN)
25 (13 RN)
40 (19 RN)
Total
1 (RN)
12 (9 RN)
43 (28 RN)
85 (56 RN)
141 (94 RN)
JAPANESE NAVY Totals and (Due to Royal Navy)
Warship
types
Battleships
Carriers
Cruisers
Destroyers
Submarines
TOTALS
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
Total
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
4
3
7
2
6
6
18
16 (2.5 RN)
48 (2.5 RN)
1
1
2
34
28 (2.5 RN)
66 (2.5 RN)
4
12
24 (1 RN)
61
53 (3 RN)
154 (4 RN)
4
2
9 (3 RN)
18
27
60 (3 RN)
11
21
41 (4 RN)
135
127 (8 RN)
335
(12
RN)
NOTES: Of 12 Submarines sunk RN: Royal Navy - 4, Australian - 2, Indian - 0.5, New Zealand - 1.5
CIVILIAN PRECAUTIONS
In considering the preparedness for war it is also necessary to consider
civilian precautions, which began in 1938. It was estimated that in the
first 6 months of the war, German bombers would kill one and a half
million people. One civilian precaution was the provision of communal
sheltering. These were built throughout the country in the first 3
months running up to the Munich Agreement. Some people found their
own solutions though, by sheltering in the London Underground which
caused over crowding and there was a high risk of mass casualties.
Stuart Hylton says that, ‘about 60 percent of the population stayed
in their beds during raids and took their chances’, referring to the
lack of use of sheltering. However, a London Home Intelligence Report
stated, ‘Sheltering has become the next best thing to evacuation
Holy Cross High School
Department of History
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for a great many Londoners’, showing that the provision of sheltering was partially effective.
The Anderson Shelter was one of the first shelters to be given to the British public by the government. It
was named after Sir John Anderson who was in charge of civil defence and it cost £5 for those with an
annual income of over £250. In some cases they were free of charge – over 1 and a half million free
Anderson shelters were issued. By 1940 it protected a quarter of the population. It was made from
corrugated iron and could be built in the back garden. It could withstand most explosions but it could not
withstand a direct hit and was uncomfortable.
Paul Addison mentions that Anderson Shelters,
‘undoubtedly saved many lives’.
Another shelter was the Morrison Shelter. This was designed to go inside the house and could be used as
a table during the day. It was good if quick cover was needed. Conversely, it could withstand only
smaller explosions and could not withstand a direct hit. It was proved to be the most successful of the
war.
In 1938 over 38 million gas masks were distributed following the Munich Agreement. Also, by the
beginning of 1937 gas masks were being produced at a rate of 150,000 a week. This was because there
was widespread terror of a gas attack to spread panic. However, these were uncomfortable and there
were none provided for babies. Paul Addison says that when gas masks were first distributed, they
became a ‘minority habit’ but as time went on ‘almost no-one bothered’. In fact for many young men
Stuart Hylton points out that ‘they became a source of ridicule’.
EVACUATION
Another civilian precaution was evacuation. Robert
MacKay says, ‘the daunting task of working out a
scheme for the sudden mass movement of
perhaps five million people was purposefully
addressed’. Many pregnant women, children, and
teachers were evacuated from inner cities to the
countryside for protection. Almost 3 and a half million
children were evacuated at the start of war.
However, there were some flaws.
For example, during the ‘phoney war’ almost 700,000
evacuees returned home.
There was a lack of
organisation: in some cases the diet for 4 days
consisted of milk, apples and cheese and some had to
sleep on straw covered by grain bags.
Other
problems included hostility towards the evacuees; one Home Intelligence Report stated that the friction
between hosts and evacuees was caused by the, ‘untidy and dirty habits of evacuees’.
Many evacuees lacked proper toilet training (between 5 and 10%) and about half were verminous with lice
and scabies. Five percent could not use cutlery, some children had only one set of clothes, and
malnutrition was common. Michael Lynch argues that, ‘Evacuation let the British people see how the
other half lived.
It revealed to the middle classes the sheer depravity of their poorer
counterparts. It pricked the nation’s conscience’. Chamberlain stated, ‘little did I know that
such conditions existed in this country’ revealing the ignorance of the people of Britain to the
poverty that existed’. Furthermore, sometimes it took a long time for people to be evacuated. J.
Stephens describes evacuation as a ‘knee-jerk reaction’. Another issue was that the billeting officers for
evacuation were volunteers.
Angus Calder points out that the volunteers ‘varied in status,
competence, integrity and compassion’.
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One weakness of civil defence during World War Two was that the wealthier had an increased chance of
survival than poorer groups. Tiratsoo argues that, ‘Different classes experience different wars’, and,
that ‘The upper classes got gourmet dinners and underground basements in top class hotels’.
Those who could afford it were able to evacuate overseas, which is another example of the inequalities
that existed between the rich and poor. Stuart Hylton poses another example of how the government
failed as he states, ‘After the first month of bombing, there was considerable anger at the failure
of the authorities to provide sufficient deep shelters, and the shortcomings of other air raid
precautions’.
ANTI AIRCRAFT DEFENCE
Anti-aircraft defence was also an issue.
Anti-aircraft
defence was poor quality at the start of war. Firstly, there
was a meagre supply of guns. The national stock stood at
100 guns in 1938 yet the estimated minimum for London
alone was 216. In addition, they were very inaccurate. As
Stuart Hylton states, ‘The nation’s anti-aircraft
defences were not in good shape at the outbreak of
war. In a practice exercise they scored just two hits
out of 2935 shots fired’. Clearly these inadequacies
speak for themselves.
To provide extra support, Anthony Eden, the Secretary of
State for War introduced a voluntary scheme of local
defence volunteers, or the ‘home guard’.
These were
members of the public who would be armed to fight off
Germans.
It was part-time and unpaid work.
Unfortunately, many volunteers were very young or very
old. Also, many were unfit. Fitzgibbon states, ‘Out of a
thousand recruits sent to the 31st Anti-Aircraft
Brigade, fifty had to be discharged immediately,
twenty more were mentally deficient, and a further
18 were below medical category B2’.
When it comes to civilian precautions, Britain was mostly
ready. Sheltering and evacuation suitably protected people in vulnerable areas against air raids and gas
masks were widely available. On the other hand, evacuation raised serious social issues, especially
poverty in Britain and the inequalities that existed. Furthermore, the Home Guard and anti-aircraft
defence were not properly prepared but overall, Britain’s civilian precautions were fairly prepared
THE HOME GUARD
Holy Cross High School
Department of History
25
The Home Guard was formed as a backup to the army, to defend the towns and villages of the United
Kingdom should the Germans invade, but they were armed initially with only what could be scrounged up
and private weapons. They eventually were properly armed and usually consisted of men in reserved
occupations, those unable to fight due to a medical condition, or those who were too old to fight.
The Civil Defence forces outside London were disbanded in September 1944, although the stand-down
order did not come until May 1945 and was not completed until 31st December 1944. The London Civil
Defence Force was stood down on 2nd December 1944.
The Home Guard was the army that never fought. Hastily organized in May 1940 as the Local Defence
Volunteers, it was armed with a mixture of outdated rifles, old fowling pieces, shotguns and improvised
weapons and by the end of June the Home Guard numbered some 1.5-million ill-equipped but enthusiastic
men. Shortly a consignment of half a million US-made P17 Enfield and Canadian Ross rifles arrived from
the USA. By November 1941, the Government introduced military ranks and discipline into the Home
Guard, as it numbered 1.5 to 2 million men. It still consisted of volunteer, unpaid and part-time soldiers,
formed into units to defend local communities, airfields and vital infrastructure and traffic routes. Later in
the war, the Home Guard helped to man AA sites and coastal artillery, as well as defend them, releasing
regular troops for other duties.
Strength
of
the
Home
Guard
Home Guard
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
June
June
December
June
December
March
June
September
December
March
June
September
December
March
June
Men
1,456
1,603
1,530
1,565
1,741
1,793
1,784
1,769
1,754
1,739
1,727
1,698
1,685
Women
4
16
22
28
31
32
and
Royal
Observer
Royal Observer Corps
Full-Time
Total
Men
Women
27.9
2.3
33.2
4
34.8
4.4
34
5.1
0.2
32.4
5.5
0.4
32.8
5.7
0.7
32.9
5.9
1
32.9
6.2
1.4
33
6.4
2.1
32.8
6.5
2.5
32.7
6.4
2.6
32.5
6.4
2.8
322
6.4
2.9
32.1
6.5
3
8.7
5.7
2.1
Holy Cross High School
Corps
(Thousands)
Part-Time
Men
Women
25.6
29.3
30
0.4
28.0
0.8
25.6
0.9
25.2
11
24.8
12
24.1
1.3
23.2
1.3
22.4
1.4
22.1
1.5
21.9
1.5
21.4
1.4
212
14
0.9
Department of History
26
Civil Defence Services
In World War One, about 1,400 civilians had died in just over 100 air raids on Britain by German Zeppelins
and later, Gotha bombers. The interwar years saw the Committee for Imperial Defence set up a
subcommittee whose function was to look at the organization for a war of civil defence, home defence,
censorship and war emergency legislation. This group was called the Air Raid Precautions subcommittee.
It met for the first time in May 1924. The subcommittee continued its work for the next nine year in
secrecy. In March 1933, local authorities were chosen as the agencies to be responsible for local
organization. A circular was sent around the local authorities and a new department of the Home Office,
the ARP department, was formed in 1935 under the control of Wing Commander E. J. Hodsall.
When, in March 1935, Germany announced that she had re-established her air force, the ARP department
immediately went to work and began to issue instructions to the local authorities, merchant shipping and
fire precautions.
In January 1937, the first official ARP broadcast was made and an appeal was made for volunteers. Local
progress in the setting up of these services varied widely; in some areas large-scale exercises took place
and in others ARP services had yet to be formed.
For the first years of their existence, the ARP personnel had only a helmet and a silver ARP badge to
denote their role and which service they belonged to. Often the helmets carried some denotation of rank,
as did armbands where provided. An ARP inspector spent some time in Spain during the civil war,
studying the effects of bombing by German and Italian aircraft and evaluating the defences employed.
On 1st January 1938, the ARP act came into force, compelling all local authorities to set up ARP schemes.
It required wardens, first aid, emergency ambulance, gas decontamination, rescue, repair and demolition
services as well as first aid posts, gas cleansing stations and casualty clearing stations. The Auxiliary Fire
Service was also set up. The Act also provided for funding, 65-70% of the bill would be footed by central
government grants, if the local authority submitted plans, which were approved.
In March 1938, war seemed inevitable, as Germany demanded the return of the Sudetenland. ARP
services were put on standby and trenches were dug in public parks.
The ARP workers would, in the main, be part-time volunteers and were expected to work up to 48 hours a
month. In February 1939, full time ARP personnel were paid £3 a week for men, and £2 a week for
women. Skilled rescue workers earned more and part-time pay was introduced later in the year. When
Germany invaded Poland on 1st September 1939, war was impossible to stop. Blackout restrictions came
into force and the Auxiliary Fire Service was mobilized and local APR schemes were brought into
operation.
As the war continued, each new ARP development was followed by new weapons deployed by the Axis
powers. The early air raid warning system sounded an alert in one of a hundred areas warning of
approaching enemy aircraft in five minutes. This meant that factories and areas not immediately
threatened or buzzed by nuisance aircraft all shut down factories as the workers headed to the shelters.
Nuisance raiders caused the ARP to develop an Industrial Warning System, where spotters were stationed
on the roofs of factories and sounded the alert when enemy aircraft were seen approaching. This cut down
enormously on the time spent in shelters by factory workers.
In 1940 some local authorities began to issue a sort of uniform for their Civil Defence services and in
February 1941, a heavy battledress uniform was issued, first to rescue services and later to the other
services. During 1941, the phrase ARP was phased out in favour of Civil Defence. The Civil Defence
services began to be wound up in September 1944 and some blackouts began to be lifted. At the end of
April 1945, the Civil Defence wound up on 2nd May 1945, holding a final parade on 10th June 1945,
reviewed by King George VI.
Holy Cross High School
Department of History
27
Air Raid Wardens
ARP wardens were first introduced in January 17, their duty being to establish and advise on air raid
precautions in their sector. They would be at posts and report the particulars of air raid damage, assist the
inhabitants and warn of unexploded devices and seal off effected areas. The ARP Warden Service was
formed in March 1937. The wardens would perform many jobs and provide immediate help with bomb
damage until the rescue services could arrive. They had to have a detailed knowledge of the local area,
where any dangerous chemicals, petrol or oil were located, where useful rescue materials might be located
and the positions of useful reporting points as well as the location of the local rest centres, first aid posts
and hospitals.
The first posts were in the warden's own front room or a shop, but later these were purpose built
locations, with power, telephone and a shelter for the warden. They were also issued with gas masks,
anti-gas suits and other rescue equipment. The early scheme had one warden per 500 people, but later it
was replaced by a scheme of not more than 10 warden posts per square mile, so a warden should not
have to move more than half a mile to a damaged area. The sectors were each served by five wardens
under a senior or Sector Warden, while several sectors were covered by a warden's post under the control
of a Post Warden. The post areas were grouped under a Head Warden, sometimes known as an Area
Warden, who would be in charge of an area containing six to eight thousand people. Large towns of more
than 150,000 population would be divided into divisions of eight to ten Head Wardens, and all the Head,
Post or Area Wardens had a deputy. Wardens were trained in everything they might need. Rescue work,
organization, elementary first aid and bomb protection as well as ARP procedures. They also had to
oversee the public shelters but these were taken over by a Shelter Marshal, later renamed Shelter
Wardens and under the control of the Warden Service.
Fire
Fire was not considered a high danger before the war. Only fire resulting from bomb damage being a
major problem and the Auxiliary Fire Service was formed to combat this. Mass incendiary raids were not
expected. German heavy bombers could carry a thousand one kilo Electron incendiary bombs, and a single
German bomber with a full load could start up to 150 fires over a three-mile area according to the Home
Office.
A single electron could be easily dealt with by sand, water or covering the small fire, but if left alone could
develop into a major fire. As well as the civilian Fire Service, the Auxiliary Fire Service was formed in
January 1938; the Fire Brigade Act of July 1938 gave local authorities 2 years to bring their brigades up to
strength. Before the war broke out, recruitment was far below its target of 200,000 but when war broke
out recruits flooded in. Auxiliary fire stations sprang up everywhere, dispersed all over cities and rural
areas. Early in the war the fire engines patrolled at intervals to spot fires but the wardens and fire guards
proved more effective and such patrols became unnecessary. As well as the AFS, there was the Women's
Auxiliary Fire Service, whose presence released men from control centre and messenger duties.
War had seen the peacetime bright-red fire engine disappear to be replaced by wartime grey and tin
helmets were issued to the firemen. As well as trailers and vehicles, many fire brigades had fire floats and
boats, with many battling for hours on end along the Thames River to contain the fires on the docksides
and streets of riverside London.
The National Fire Service reached its peak at the end of 1942, numbering 350,000 in 39 fire forces, each
of 4 divisions, with two columns (100 pumps) per division and a reserve of 20 pumps. A company had ten
pumps and a section five. The NFS was controlled by the Home Office but each CD region had its own Fire
Officer, who liased between the CD Regional Commissioner and the Fire Force commanders within the
region. There were also mobile control units at large incidents.
Holy Cross High School
Department of History
28
The Fire Watcher Service was formed in September 1940 in the Fire Watchers Order, which was to spot
and report the fall of incendiaries and their ensuing fires. But all their efforts could not prevent the
devastation of December 1940, and in August 1941 the watchers were reorganized into the Fire Guard.
These would spot incendiary fires, battle them to the best of their ability and send for reinforcements from
the NFS if required.
Gas
The fear of the use of poison gas by German aircraft was one of the paramount concerns of the Second
World War. Although Britain, France and Germany had all renewed the Geneva Gas Protocol (1925), in
September 1939 there were still concerns that the enemy might have employed gas against military or
civilian personnel, and ARP personnel were trained to handle gas attacks and implement anti-gas
measures and protection.
Several arms of the ARP services were directly concerned with gas. The Decontamination Service was the
first, to decontaminate roads, buildings and materials contaminated by liquid or jelly gases, which would
evaporate over time and these would have been dealt with by using a neutralizing agent against the liquid
or jelly. Decontamination of people was carried out as part of first aid, while later decontamination
personnel were trained in rescue work as well. Depots were set up as six depots per 100,000 people, with
two decontamination squadrons per depot, each squadron consisting of six men with their equipment.
The Cleansing Service was to clean people who had been exposed, through showers by mobile units with
special vans and lorries. Clothing had to be boiled, if exposed, for varying lengths of time dependant on
the material. Civilian clothing was the responsibility of the Ministry of Health.
Burning, smoke or other hazardous materials: Each gas presented its own problems and required special
counters, and the Gas Identification Service, with 3 personnel per 100,000 population provided where
possible, was to identify the gas used in an attack.
Medical Services
The expected nature of air raids in the Second World War, led to the First World War trench-warfare style
of triage being adopted for home use. First Aid parties would attend the scene of the destruction, where
they would deal with minor injuries on the spot, prioritizing more serious injuries and sending them back
to First Aid Posts, each with a doctor and trained nurses to treat the more serious injuries. The most
serious cases would be sent to a casualty clearing hospital. Along with the emergency ambulance service
these made up the ARP Casualty Service. After 1938, the casualty services came under the control of the
Ministry of Health.
Each Warden's sector had an assigned doctor, who could be summoned to an incident if there were
casualties. These were called ARP Medical Officer or Incident Doctors. The Medical Services also controlled
the Emergency Mortuaries to deal with the vast number of bodies expected as a result of air raids, a series
of these being set up in each area in commandeered premises. The stretcher-bearers worked exclusively
from hospitals and were made up of volunteers.
Police
In 1938, the duties of the police were envisaged as increasing so enormously when war broke out, that
the numbers of police had to be trebled. The First Police Reserve of Police Pensioners, the Second Reserve
of Special Constables, (part-time and unpaid) and the Third Reserve, which was a war reserve that was
full time and signed up for war service only, were all needed to fill the Police Services manpower
requirements. At first all police were regarded as a reserved occupation, but later increasing demands on
personnel saw police were released up to the age of 30 and war reservists up to 33, leaving more work for
the Special Constables.
Holy Cross High School
Department of History
29
Another source of personnel was the Women's Auxiliary Police Corps, where WAPCS worked in
administrative areas and as drivers. Their numbers were small, not reaching 10,000 at their height, some
forces employing no women at all.
The build-up to war had seen police stations bomb-proofed, while reserve stations were set up and
suitable buildings were converted and equipped to be used if the main station was bombed. The police had
the power to deal with blackout violations, but not the wardens, who referred them. The police also had to
deal with incendiaries, gas, unexploded bombs, crashed aircraft, national registration, loose barrage
balloons, enemy aliens and drunken servicemen.
Rescue Services
The Rescue Services was, in its first incarnation, to rescue survivors and repair or demolish damaged
structures. Much of the training was based on earthquake rescue work. All members of rescue parties
were taught to cut off supplies of gas, water and electricity to damaged buildings. Many members of the
rescue service were trained in resuscitation, as gas masks were useless against domestic (coal) gas.
To enable rescue workers to avoid domestic gas, the remote breathing apparatus was developed. This
was basically a service gas mask with a long hose connected to it, through which fresh air could be
breathed. They were also trained in putting out small fires and tackling incendiaries. At first the standard
rescue party was ten men in two classes; major incidents and smaller incidents as Class A and Class B
respectively with each having different equipment.
The light teams numbered four or five to every heavy team per 100,000 populations but in cities, heavy parties
were in every area. The Borough Engineer or Surveyor acted as Head of the Rescue Service in most cases,
overseeing the organization and administration of the service. In January 1943, a year after London, the
stretcher parties were reformed into light rescue parties and women members were transferred to other Civil
Defence services. Rescues could last for days, continuing throughout bombing and air raid alerts. Rescue
workers were the first Civil Defence unit to be issued with uniforms, the first issue being blue overalls. Helmets
were worn when working, but flat caps or trilby hats were worn at other times.
Women's Voluntary Service
In June 1938 the Women's Voluntary Services for ARP, was formed to provide extra bodies for ARP work.
These women took on all roles and in February 1939 the name was changed to Women's Voluntary
Services for Civil Defence. They worked in every imaginable job; salvage, medical support, staffing public
kitchens, shelters, food drives and also included a Housewife’s Section. Those who were committed with
children or other work and were too busy to give regular time to the WVS or Civil Defence work, worked
for the WVS when they had spare time. The Housewife’s Section was formed in 1938, and early in 1942
had evolved into the National Housewife’s Section of the WVS. It was common practice for Housewife’s
Section members to be trained as Fire Guards, as well as having first aid and anti-gas training.
Civilian and Civil Defence casualties, due to enemy action as reported to 31st July 1945
Civilian
Defence
Workers on duty
Total Civilian
Children
Unidentified Total Men Women
Under 16
and 60,595 26,923 25,399 7,736
537
2,379 2,148 231
Total
Killed
Men
Women
Holy Cross High School
Department of History
30
Missing,
believed
killed
Injured
and
detained
in 86,182 40,738 37,822 7,622
hospital
TOTAL
146,777 67,661 63,221 15,358
-
4,459 4,072 387
538
6,838 6,220 618
Who do you think you are kidding Mr Hitler?
The Story of the Home Guard.
Most of us have, at some time or other, enjoyed the BBC television series
"Dad's Army", with its somewhat light hearted look at the Second World War's
Home Guard. With its memorable signature tune " Who do you think you are
kidding Mr Hitler?” it's usually among the first imagery evoked when thinking of
the Home Guard.
However, despite this portrayal, in its time the Home Guard represented a
formidable force of willing volunteers ready to give up their lives in protection
of their country. Indeed, should Hitler's Germany succeed with its invasion
plans, the Home Guard would be ready and waiting.
So how did it all begin and how did the Home Guard hope to protect Britain from a seemingly unstoppable
Germany?
Churchill - the bulldog "holding the line"
INVASION FEARS AND THE LDV
It was with considerable haste during the spring of 1940, that Britain began to prepare itself for a
potential German invasion. With the government all too aware of how real this threat was becoming and
how it was affecting Britain's morale, it began to think up ways of how the country could be helped should
the unthinkable ever happen.
As a direct result of one of the darkest days of World War Two (on the 14th May 1940), where Germany
had poured into France practically unchallenged, the war minister Anthony Eden gave a now historic radio
broadcast to the nation. In it, he warned of the threat of invasion by means of German parachute
regiments and how this awful scenario would need an established fighting force already in place to see off
these unwanted visitors.
He urged all male civilians aged 17-65* who had (for whatever reason) not been drafted into the services,
to put themselves forward for the sake of their country and help to form a new fighting force called ‘The
Local Defence Volunteers’ or LDV for short, or (as some people later joked), ‘Look, Duck and Vanish’!
Holy Cross High School
Department of History
31
It’s worth noting that this age band was not always strictly adhered to. The oldest member of the Home
Guard (as the LDV was to later become known) was apparently well into his eighties!
Eden had made clear in his broadcast that the passing of a medical examination wouldn't be necessary
and that providing you were male, ‘capable of free movement’ and of the right age, all one needed to do
was enrol at their local police station.
It's true to say that if Eden was ever in any doubt about the impetus his broadcast had had on the general
public, his fears were soon to be allayed. For by the end of the following day some 250,000 men had
volunteered, with these volunteers coming from all walks of life including mining, factory working, public
transport and farming to note but a few. Then even more staggering, by the end of the month a total of
750,000 men had come forward. Some problems did exist initially with many police stations soon running
out of the enrolment forms. However, despite this small inconvenience it was good to see that Britain
shared in the governments view that it had best guard itself in some manner and 'better be safe than
sorry'!
LDV UNIFORM AND ARMS
The early LDV uniforms were scarce, but those available consisted quite simply of a denim battledress and
armband proudly displaying the LDV initials. Willing volunteers of the Women’s Voluntary Service (WVS)
were among those who made these LDV armbands.
A CHANGE OF NAME
In a moment of inspiration, Winston Churchill renamed the LDV, the Home Guard, although later it
became affectionately known quite simply as ‘Dad’s Army’. Considering the LDV had only been in
operation for a month and a half at the time of this announcement, it came as a surprise to most.
However, despite this, the role of the Home Guard principally remained the same.
Because the newly named Home Guard still lacked sufficient numbers of weapons, its high-spirited
members often had to improvise. While on patrol they would take with them items such as pikes,
truncheons, pick axes, broom handles and even golf clubs! It was reported that in at least one Home
Guard unit, the guards took with them on patrol duty packets of pepper which would, if required, be
thrown into the eyes of invaders and thus interfere with their vision!
THE DAD'S ARMY ROLE
Being a Home Guard volunteer was far from easy. All but a few members would work all day in their full
time jobs and then (later that evening) take up their Home Guard duties. It was also extremely
dangerous too with some 1206 members killed whilst serving on duty and 557 seriously wounded.
Holy Cross High School
Department of History
32
A
Home
unit's rifles
Guard
member
inspects
his Capturing the enemy - a Home Guard Exercise.
So what did the Home Guard actually do?
Members of the Home Guard were involved in the: Manning of aircraft batteries - Around 142,000 brave men served in this type of post with over 1000
killed whilst on duty
Patrolling of
Waterways (such as canals and rivers)
Railway stations
Coastlines
Factories
Aerodromes
One reason why these Home Guard patrols were so essential was to (as one myth went) "enable them to
intercept German parachutists from landing on British soil disguised as Nuns!"
Clearing up of debris following air raid attacks
Searching through rubble for trapped civilians following air raid attacks
Offering (if required) of fighting assistance to the army - There was even a Home Guard section of
‘Skating Boys’ who could deliver this help speedily by ‘roller-skating’ their way to the place they were
called!
Holy Cross High School
Department of History
33
Construction of concrete pill boxes
Erecting of defence lines including the laying of anti-tank obstacles, barbed wire barriers along beaches
and farming implements acting as road block check points
Placement of obstacles in fields to prevent enemy aircraft from landing
Practising of guerrilla tactics/formations - The Home Guard created special secret auxiliary units so
that if invasion did happen, they would (in the words of Churchill) “fight every street of London and
suburbs and devour an invading army”
Removal of or blacking out of signposts
Improvement of weapons skills by hours of target practice - Believe it or not, but a German
bomber was actually shot down by the rifle fire of the Home Guard after it was sighted flying over a
London district!
Guarding of Buckingham Palace - The Royal Family* had its own Home Guard Company which formed
part of the 1st County of London (Westminster) Battalion. This particular honour befell the Home Guard in
its third year
Bomb Disposal
Of course, while recruits enthusiastically carried out their duties, they would always be listening out for
the ring of church bells - the pre-arranged signal announcing the start of Germany's invasion.
All of these responsibilities helped to release the regular army to do other equally important tasks. It also
helped to boost the morale of troops serving overseas, for they knew a very able force back ‘home’ was
looking after their families.
ONE IN THE EYE FOR HITLER
Despite Hitler and the other fascist armies often sneering at the Home Guard, Hitler (in particular) was all
too aware of the growing strength of British Civil Defence.
HOME GUARD 'CALL-UP'
Under the National Service (Number 2) Act of December 1941, male civilians found that they could be
ordered to join the Home Guard and attend up to 48 hours training a month. This 'call-up' was quite a
surprise especially considering that the numbers of volunteers never fell below one million!
THE HOME GUARD GROWS IN STRENGTH
To mark the first anniversary of the Home Guard, a parade was held at Buckingham Palace on the 20th
May 1941. With its volunteers totalling 1.5 Million at this point in time, the Home Guard was clearly going
from strength to strength.
Holy Cross High School
Department of History
34
In one of Churchill's many speeches, he said of the Home Guard;
"1940. If the enemy had descended suddenly in large numbers from the sky in different parts
of the country, they would have found only little clusters of men mostly armed with shotguns,
gathered around our search light positions. But now, whenever he comes, if he comes, he will
find wherever he should place his foot, that he will be immediately attacked by resolute,
determined men who have a perfectly clear intention and resolve to namely put him to death!"
ALL GOOD THINGS MUST COME TO AN END
This growing of strength was how it was over the next three years until in late 1944, the Home Guard
were finally disbanded. With the Battle of Britain long won and invasion looking less and less likely,
everybody was now preparing for victory and not invasion. And after 'Operation Overlord', a real feeling
of this victory being within Britain's grasp was shared. Even when Hitler unleashed onto the country his
V1 and V2 terror weapons, resulting in thousands of civilian deaths, Britain's earlier belief in a German
invasion was now seen as unrealistic. So on the 3rd December 1944, with a stand down parade of 7000
men in London, the Home Guard finally bowed out.
THE SEARCH FOR ALLIES
It was essential for Britain to ally herself
with other countries. During World War
One it took the might of the British Empire,
the French Empire, the United States and
Russia to overcome and eventually defeat
Germany. Both Chamberlain and Halifax
agreed that allies would be needed to
defeat Germany in the event of a future
war. However, very little seems to have
been done to obtain allies during the run up
to the Second World War. In fact, due to
the policy of appeasement, Czechoslovakia
was sacrificed to the Germans in 1938 and
therefore Britain not only lost the support of
a well-equipped military power but also
isolated Russia, who eventually moved
towards rapprochement with Germany.
RUSSIA
Chamberlain was greatly suspicious of Russia and thought that Russia planned to take over Europe and
impose communism on her. He also believed that Russia wanted to see Britain and at war with other
capitalist states. Russia was viewed as militarily weak. There was some justification in this especially
following the Russo- Finish war of 1938.Chamberlain stated, ‘I must confess a most profound distrust of
Russia. I have no belief whatsoever in her ability to maintain an effective offensive, even if she wanted
to. And I distrust her motives, which seem to me to have a little connection without ideas of liberty’.
Russia’s military weakness was highlighted in 1938 when they attacked Finland. The war did not turn out
as planned and Stalin was forced to sue for peace without the terms she desired. Additionally, his purges
Holy Cross High School
Department of History
35
had resulted in the deaths of 35,000 senior officers. The failure to reach an agreement with Russia can
be regarded as a strategic error. Hence, many people within government did not want to ally Britain with
a totalitarian military incompetent and backward country.
The main criticism for not reaching an agreement with the Russians comes from Churchill. In his book the
Gathering Storm he his very critical of Chamberlain for his failure to come to an agreement over this
issue. On the other hand the Soviet Union, which (as Stalin had not forgotten) Churchill had tried to
strangle at birth, was actually part of the problem, not of the solution; only a mentality as Anglo-centric as
Churchill's could have imagined otherwise.
This was because most of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe only survived, diplomatically, by
balancing between Russia and Germany. Few liked Germany, but even fewer favoured Stalin's communist
alternative. A few rulers, like the wily King Boris of Bulgaria, suspected that Communism was just the
latest excuse for Russian imperialism; no one thought that Stalin was a solution to their problems.
Furthermore, on the military front there were very real doubts about whether the recently purged Red
Army would be a match for the Germans.
In relation to Russia there was also a very obvious geographical problem, which Churchill overlooked.
Russia could not help Czechoslovakia directly because she had no common border - and neither of the two
countries with direct access to Czechoslovakia was likely to offer Russia any help. The Poles, who had
suffered under Russian misrule for more than a century and whose independence had been won at
Russian expense, would be unlikely, understandably, to want Soviet troops on Polish soil. That left only
Rumania, where King Carol, facing a challenge from a strong local fascist movement, was not going to risk
alienating it by co-operating with Communist Russia.
THE USA
Britain always hoped the USA would be an ally of theirs during the Second
World War. However, it took 2 years for the USA to join the war and even
then it was Germany and Japan who declared war on the USA. This was
due to the Neutralities Act, signed by the states after World War One.
The USA had become isolationist and did not want to get involved in any
other conflict in Europe. Britain did receive loans from the USA during the
war though. This was because of the policy of Lend Lease which said that
America would help Britain in paying for war. The failure to ally with
America had a significant effect when war broke out. As Chamberlain
stated, ‘It is always safe to count on nothing from the Americans other
than words’30. Yet at the same time it is important to point out that the
USA, despite its isolationist credentials had shown a willingness to
negotiate with Germany and Britain in 1938 and 1939 in order to resolve
the differences that existed in Europe. In his epic war volume ‘The
Gathering Storm’, Churchill points out that, ‘Chamberlain spurned the
efforts of President Roosevelt in his attempts to reach agreement
with Germany’.
On the other hand however, Contrary to the view promoted by Churchill, Prime Minister Chamberlain did
not reject his plans without taking official advice, but as far as the Foreign Office was concerned,
Churchill's ideas were the equivalent of amateur night at the karaoke bar, and the arguments against
them were very strong.
America, the first part of the 'Grand Alliance', was still an isolationist power. It had no army capable of
intervening in Europe and no politician arguing for such a policy. Britain always hoped the USA would be
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an ally during the Second World War. However, it took 2 years for the USA to join and even then it was
Germany and Japan who declared war on the USA. This was due to the Neutralities Act, signed ratified
after World War One. The USA had become isolationist and did not want to get involved in any other
conflict. Britain did receive loans from the USA during the war through the policy of Lend Lease. The
failure to ally with America had a significant effect when war broke out. As Chamberlain stated, ‘It is
always safe to count on nothing from the Americans other than words’. Yet at the same time it is
important to point out that the USA, despite her isolationist credentials had shown a willingness to
negotiate with Germany and Britain in 1938 and 1939 in order to resolve the differences that existed in
Europe.
ITALY
The question of Italy as an ally was inevitable. In 1935 the Italians had invaded Abyssinia (Ethiopia) and
as a result the anti German alliance (signed by Britain, Italy and France) known as the Stresa Front
collapsed. Britain therefore imposed economic sanctions on Italy. This had major strategic consequences
as it forced the two fascist nations together in what was known as the “Pact of Steel”. They were forced
into the arms of Hitler. Thus, Britain’s attempt to obtain an ally in the Mediterranean failed. It seems
incredible that Britain, who at the time controlled almost one quarter of the earths surface, set about
condemning the Italians who had invaded a country that most westerners had never even heard of.
SPAIN
Britain remained neutral during the Spanish Civil War, and as a result the long term consequences were to
be seen in the fact that Spain remained Neutral also during the Second World War.
Recent evidence
suggests that Britain had supported the nationalists during the conflict in Spain and they allowed the
nationalists to set up listening bases on Gibraltar. They signed trade agreements with the fascists and
even denied that the bombing of Guernica happened. The Spanish thus did not turn to the Germans
during world war two. In 1940 Hitler attempted to persuade Franco to join the axis powers but this failed.
Hitler later stated he would rather have “all his teeth pulled out than go through another meeting with
Franco”32. Again although Spain’s neutrality benefited Britain it is difficult to suggest that this was the
long term intention of Britain. Had Spain turned to the Axis powers’ it would have been disastrous for
Britain and her control of not only the Mediterranean but also the whole of Africa.
THE EMPIRE
During World War One, the Empire had made huge sacrifices for Britain. As tension built up in Europe
there was a growing reluctance on the part of the white dominions to fight for Britain. Australia had
suffered terribly at the ill-fated Gallipoli Campaign in World War One. Canada had also suffered many
casualties during the conflict. At Vimy Ridge in France during World War One many Canadian soldiers
were killed. Andrew Hunt states in ‘The Road to War’, ‘Would the Empire help? Britain already had the
answer. South Africa had indicated that it would help. Australia and New Zealand wouldn’t commit
themselves while only Canada said ‘yes’33. By following the policy of appeasement, the Empire and the
Dominions could see that Britain had tried a peaceful approach in trying to deal with Germany but this had
failed and therefore the dominions and the Empire rallied to the mother country when war broke out.
FRANCE
The Foreign Office analysis also ruled out help from France. Ever since Britain had refused to back the
French in a hard-line anti-German policy in 1923, the French had relied upon a defensive strategy against
Berlin; they were not going to change in the late 1930s at Churchill's behest. France was a badly divided
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country, where many right-wing politicians preferred Hitler to the socialist premier, Leon Blum. That left
only Britain herself to make up the proposed 'Alliance'.
Britain’s search for allies was unsuccessful. Britain did not have many allies and lost important support of
Russia, Italy, and until later in the war, the USA. Britain had small accomplishments in that Spain did not
become an ally of Germany and most of the Empire and Dominions came in on the side of Britain.
Considering the search for allies, Britain made too many strategic errors.
THE ECONOMY
The first eight months of the war are often described as the "Phony
War", for the relative lack of action abroad. Yet at home
Chamberlain and the conservative government did very little to put
the economy on a war footing. As Chamberlain himself stated it was
to be “business as usual”. Yet a major war requires an all out effort
on the part of everyone as was evident in World War One.
Chamberlain however was unwilling to interfere in the workings of
the economy. He was in the end hoping in the end for a negotiated
peace. He himself stated “How he hated this war”.
As Calder pointed out “the Government knew what had to be
done but in the end the havered. They were frightened of
interfering with private firms. They terrified of provoking the
Holy Cross High School
In 1940,
Bevin entered the war
Department
of History
cabinet as Labour Secretary.
From 1945 until 1951, Bevin
served as Foreign Secretary in the
Attlee government
38
unions. They were scared of the middle class reaction to rationing and other belt tightening measures.”
The war machine according to AJP Taylor. “The war machine resembled an expensive motor car
beautifully polished, complete in every detail, except that there was no petrol in the tank”.
Calder argues that the first budget the Chancellor sir John Simon was a “timid affair”.




Income tax increased from five shillings sixpence to seven shillings.
Pint of beer increased by a penny.
Tobacco and sugar were taxed more heavily.
Part of the increased profits made by industry (brought about by rearmament) would be taxed at
60%.
This annoyed the socialist who pointed out that in war companies should not make profits!
This annoyed the conservatives who pointed out that a 60% tax was too excessive!
Calder goes on to state that “such measures were hardly likely to sustain a mighty war effort.”
Rationing was not introduced until January 1940 despite ration books being available since 1938. The cost of
living and the shortage of supplies eventually forced the issue. The price of clothes had risen by a quarter as did
the price of basic household items. Many of the unions were now calling for wage increases to match the rising
prices. One opinion poll suggested that the six out of ten people at the time wanted rationing introduced at the
outset.
When that war broke out Chamberlain also failed to persuade the unions of the struggle for survival. Churchill
on the other hand realised the need to get Bevin on board as a way of achieving national unity. The unions were
concerned with the cost of living and as a result demanded an increase in wages. This worried the government
who feared an increase in inflation. According to Calder the government regarded the Unions as not as potential
allies but as potential enemies. Without consulting the Trade Unions the government forced through through
the “Control of Employment Act”. The aim of this was to ensure that skilled workers could be directed to
where they were needed most. It did not have the desired impact. Skilled Workers were being poached by
companies who were offering bonus rates of up to 100%. The aircraft industry was the main culprit. They
poached skilled workers from the vital Machine tools industry. This was probably the most important
industry in Britain without which no weapons or aircraft could be produced. Again Calder points out that “the
failure to redistribute the supply of Labour was one of key factors limiting the expansion of war
industry”.
At a time when Britain urgently needed to increase its manufacturing output of essential war supplies
unemployment still stood at over one million in 1940, again this highlighted the government’s want of
resolution and a complete waste of manpower.
In his second budget Simon put the standard rate of income tax up to seven shillings and sixpence; there was
another penny on Beer half a penny on more on cigarettes. Postal charges were increased hitting families in a
peculiarly mean way. Again this amounted to a complete failure to realise what was needed to be done.
As Paul Addison points out “the main reason for the fall of chamberlain was his Governments failure to
overcome the distrust of the trade unions, which underlay the disappointing performance of war
industry”
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A key criticism of Neville Chamberlain was his ability to transform the economy.
The coal industry
managed to raise output by only 19%. This was vital as it was an essential means of fuel for the munitions
industry. However, Britain’s competitors did better. Germany for example raised its coal output by 81%
between 1913 and 1936.
Shipbuilding also fell below foreign rivals. Robert MacKay states, ‘Britain entered the Second World War in
1939 with a shipbuilding industry that was rusting, partly dismantled and partly unmanned hulk of essentially
Victorian technology’. C L Mowat argues that, ‘Britain had made a rod for her own back during her period of
absolute domination of the seas in the 19th and early 20th century’. The dated industry was not able to build new
ships quickly and efficiently enough and like the coal industry, strikes were common. Steel also suffered and
Britain had to resort to importing from America. There was also a decline in oil and petrol outputs. D Dilks
says that Britain ‘would still have to trade abroad in order to purchase the necessary raw materials’, which
suggests Britain relied on imports from overseas during the Second World War. This was clearly evident in the
case of ‘Lend Lease’ when by 1940 Britain had to go to the Americans cap in hand.
Conversely, the chemical industry and other modern industries had greater expansion. Thus Britain made more
explosives, industrial gases, and plastics. As C L Mowat states that, ‘Massive advances had been made in the
field of chemical engineering’. Many industries were transformed into ‘shadow factories’ (as Angus Calder
states) where designing and creation of engine parts for aircraft took place, which greatly increased production
of aircraft such as the new Spitfires and Hurricanes. In fact by 1940 production of Spitfires and Hurricanes was
reaching nearly 500 per month compared with the German figure of only 140 for their own similar aircraft. The
economy was more efficient at the outbreak of war than it was before the depression but Chamberlain was still
criticised for managing the economy inefficiently. According to Paul Addison’s book ‘The Road to 1945 the
‘The Times’ stated that Chamberlain’s government, ‘lacked the resolution, policy or energy demanded
by the country and situation itself’4.
THE ECONOMY AT WAR
Policies and instruments
Coalition government had come to seem inevitable. So, too, it was thought likely that war would bring
increased government control of the nation's economic life: the First World War had shown that while
"Business as Usual" might be good for morale, it was unsuitable as a formula for victory. The earlier conflict
had also acted as a warning to government of the dangers of unchecked inflation and profits on popular feelings
in general and the Labour force in particular. This time it would not be necessary to learn by experience that
ensuring the supply of the huge armed forces of modern war required nothing less than a centrally-managed
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40
economy; practically all civilian activity would be directed to some degree by officials based in Whitehall.
Planning for this had in fact been well under way from the 1930s and an impressive weight of enabling
legislation was put through parliament in the first days of war.
The transformation from a largely free-market economy to a centrally-directed economy did not come about
overnight, however, nor even in the first 12 months of the war. Rather, the transition to a thorough-going
economy for total war was an uneven process, as much the product of external events as of the steady
implementation of a comprehensive strategy. Those events correspond to two distinct periods in the
development of Britain's war economy: from September 1939 to mid-1940, and from mid-1940 to the end of the
war. The first period, the Phoney War, began with an impression, at least, of a government moving quickly to
take control of the economy.
Already armed through the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act to issue Statutory Rules and Orders, which it did
by the score, it set up new ministries for Supply, Food, Shipping, Economic Warfare, Home Security and
Information; all this before the actual declaration of war. But the Phoney War was in fact more characterized by
the unhurried pace of the adjustments Chamberlain's Government thought it necessary to make to the economy
now that war had finally come. This was deliberate. The calculation was that since Britain was unready for
offensive action against Germany, and France was locked into a largely defensive posture, "the long game" was
the best strategy. France would hold the Germans, and in the meantime Anglo- French strength would be built
up to the point of overwhelming superiority and economic warfare would weaken the enemy's capacity and will
to fight. It followed that there was no need to convert the economy at a pace that would cause disruption; the
timescale for the strategy, after all, was three years. Such complacent presumption of Hitler's willingness to play
the role assigned to him has occasioned much criticism of Chamberlain and his Cabinet. But equally
blameworthy is their failure to think through the economic implications of their strategy. As has been shown,
the rearmament programme began late, and when war came much remained to be done. If Britain was to field
the promised 32 division army before the end of the first year of war and at the same time reach its targets of
aeroplane and ship production, a much more rapid and. extensive imposition of economic controls was required.
Instead of concerning itself with comprehensive planning of the nation's resources, the government focused on
the supply of the armed forces. Sir John Simon's first war budget showed concern to limit the growth of
government expenditure and control inflation. An export drive was promoted in the belief that a balance of
payments surplus might provide the resources needed for the war. The leisurely speed of mobilization was
evident in the fact that government expenditure was running only a third higher in the sixth month of the war
than in the first. After eight months of war, there were still over one million people unemployed. Movement
towards husbanding resources and curbing waste was slow and uneven, too. The government did move early on
to take over the importation of raw materials, but allocations to industry allowed too many inessential goods to
continue to be made. Inessential goods could be imported only under licence, but licences were not difficult to
obtain. Shipping space was not rigorously rationed, though all knew that in total war this would be a vital
resource.2 Ration books, ready since 1938, were issued at the end of September but food rationing did not begin
until January 1940, and only then because an opinion poll showed that, Press hostility notwithstanding, most
people thought it would be the best way of ensuring fair shares of scarce essentials.
The explanation for this sluggish response to the state of war does not lie in official ignorance. Chamberlain, his
ministers and his advisers had all lived through the First World War, after all. They knew, therefore, that
modern war involved the mobilization of the nation's entire resources. Indeed, in opting for the "long game"
they were confirming a belief in the efficacy of a war of attrition, in which victory went to the side that did
better at maximizing its resources. Logically, the sooner a start was made to convert fully to an updated version
of the total war economy of 1917-18, the more likely it would be that Britain would be that winning side. But
Chamberlain's belief that Hitler had been bluffing and had "missed the bus" led him to hold back from this
course. He covertly hoped that there would soon be an opportunity to extricate Britain from her situation by
diplomatic means, without the necessity for all-out war and the disruption of the economic order this would
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entail. In any case, he and his colleagues had a horror of upsetting the vested interests of that order. In the
words of Angus Calder:
They were frightened of interfering with private firms. They were terrified of provoking the trade unions. They
were scared of the middle-class reaction to "belt-tightening" measures which would help divert workers,
factories, raw materials and shipping space from peacetime amenities to war-like manufactures. 3
He knew that it would involve a greater degree of co-operation with the trade unions, something he was loath to
initiate because he believed they would try to use the situation to further their sectional interests. Co-opting
prominent industrialists was one thing, bringing the ruc into the corridors of power was another. Should it turn
out that his gamble on a short war was mistaken, the official "long game" strategy would smooth the path to the
inevitable. As a more charitable historian put it: "He preferred to proceed as if waiting for events in Europe to
convince labour, management and public of the need for self-sacrifice".4
The events of April-June 1940, as it happened, provided the stimulus for this to be brought about. Hitler's
hugely successful western offensives, especially the crushing of France, jolted Britain's leaders out of the
complacent belief that they had control of the way the war would be fought. In place of an even matching of
forces was a preponderance of German military power, further enhanced by the capture of huge economic
resources. The evacuation of the expeditionary force at Dunkirk, the threat of invasion, the fight for control of
the English Channel air space, and the start of the bombing of Britain's cities, all served to concentrate minds on
the urgency of creating an all-out war economy as a crucial element in what had now become a struggle for
survival. Naturally, the willingness of the people to accept the burdens and dangers of this struggle, the socalled "Dunkirk spirit", would have helped any government in this task. As it happened, this crisis also gave
Britain the much more vigorous leadership of Winston Churchill. That he led a coalition government, moreover,
ensured the support of the whole people for the austerity he now imposed upon them. Unlike Chamberlain, he
could make extraordinary demands and know that by and large they would be accepted. The sharpness of the
disruption of the strategic plan to which the war economy had been geared produced a period of hyperactive
improvisation. Orders and controls descended thick and fast on industry, labour and consumers. Only gradually,
over the following years, did a coherent, integrated total war economy take shape. The basic strategy remained
unchanged: assuming the crisis would be weathered; Britain and her allies would build up their strength to the
point where German power could be successfully challenged. But with no free allies left in Europe, the USA
sympathetic but still neutral, the USSR apparently a lost hope and only the distant Dominions as committed
sources of succour, the long-term strategy looked unreasonably optimistic. In any case, finding the means for
survival came first. For a short time in 1940, therefore, the concept of the "crash programme", to make good a
pressing deficiency of supply for some key item of war materiel, became operational. Ordnance and aircraft
were high priorities in the summer of 1940, and this was recognized in the rapid expansion of factory space and
a concentration on the making of only five aircraft types, mainly fighters. Using methods described by Hugh
Dalton as "constant banditry and intrigues against all colleagues", the Minister of Aircraft Production, Lord
Beaverbrook, presided over a doubling of fighter production between April and September.5
Churchill readily recognized that crash programmes were not the solution to the underlying task of rearming
Britain for victory. Alongside improvisations like that which produced the nation-saving machines of the Battle
of Britain, steps were taken to ensure three things: the equipping of an army of three million that would defend
Britain and her empire, and ultimately invade Europe; the building of a modem long-range bomber fleet with
which to strike directly at the enemy; and the expansion of the Royal Navy and the Merchant Navy both to keep
Britain supplied with the imported raw materials and food she needed, and to choke off those of the enemy.
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42
The institutional heart of the conversion to a full-blown war economy was a revamped Lord President's
Committee. A small group consisting mainly of cabinet ministers, chaired by the Lord President of the Council
(initially Chamberlain, then from October, Sir John Anderson), it had assigned to it the general supervision of
the nation's economic effort. It co-ordinated the work of the other home Cabinet committees with an economic
remit (Home Policy, Food Policy) and from January 1941 it oversaw the activities of two other groups, the
Production Executive and the Import Executive. The former was chaired by the Minister of Labour and
National Service, Ernest Bevin, and its functions included the allocation of labour, raw materials and factory
space, and the setting of priorities, when necessary. Sir Andrew Duncan, Minister of Supply, chaired the Import
Executive, whose task was "to animate and regulate the whole business of importation in accordance with the
policy of the War Cabinet".6 Over the next 18 months, owing mainly to the skill and effectiveness of Anderson,
the Lord President's Committee gained in standing and power, becoming the real powerhouse of wartime
economic policy, while other committees gave up part of their functions to it or disappeared entirely.
The picture of "muddling through" giving way to expertise and scientifically-devised planning is completed by
the swelling presence and importance of economists and statisticians in the work of the committees and
ministerial departments concerned with the war economy. Anderson's committee had working for it the
Cabinet's Economic Section, which included some distinguished university economists. The Central Statistical
Office, formed at the same time as the Economic Section January 1941), had also recruited several leading
academics in the field, and the Treasury had engaged the services of John Maynard Keynes, an economist of
international repute, and of Hugh Henderson and Dennis Robertson, both future professors of economics. From
the experts came plans for a total war economy: mobilization of all available labour, drastic curtailment of
consumer goods production, complete control of imports, expansion of dollar-earning exports, and measures to
ensure fairness in the financial burden that would load the people. A few voices had been raised in favour of
instituting a "siege economy" in which the state would direct, feed and house the entire pop lation. But more
moderate counsels prevailed. While it is true that the revised Emergency Powers Act of May 1940 placed
almost limitless powers in government hands, in practice the conversion to a total war economy proceeded by
consent rather than compulsion. Little direct control of industry occurred; ownership remained in private hands
and there was no programme to create a state sector. Some basic industries and services, such as the railways
and the ports, did come under direction amounting to government control, and the Board of Trade made detailed
directives to consumption goods industries, e.g. hosiery, pottery, floor-coverings.7 For the most part, however,
control was indirect. Owners and managers of private firms were left to work out their own ways of adapting to
an operational environment in which the government determined prices centrally, allocated raw materials and
labour, licensed capital equipment and varied the tax burden.
The general restrictions on civilian production that resulted from the limitations of Supplies Order of June 1940
and various raw material controls had by early 1941 revealed scope for further diversion of labour and other
resources into war production. Many firms were working well below capacity. In the hosiery industry, for
instance, the restrictions led to the wasteful development of workers being put onto short time. The
concentration of production policy, begun in March 1941, aimed to concentrate the reduced production of the
restricted industries in a designated number of factories. This would ensure that every working factory operated
at full capacity and the remaining factories were released for war production or storage. By July 1943
concentration had been largely completed, covering 70 branches of industry.8 In the process, many
manufacturers of clothing and household goods had had to conform to the Board of Trade's "Utility" standards.
This involved a simplification of design and reduction of product types in order to cut down the amount of raw
materials used. In this way it was hoped that the nation's needs might be met from a reduced consumer goods
industry.
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Of all resources targeted by the concentration of production policy, none was more vital than labour. The
acuteness of the problem was all at once apparent in the post-Dunkirk period: not only would the raising of a
mass army remove from the workforce millions of men at the most productive stage of their lives, but the
equipping of that army would require increased production from a potentially shrinking workforce, once the
pool of unemployed had been drained. At the same time, the Axis, starting with a larger population-base than
Britain, had through conquest vastly increased its productive capacity. It was widening the gap still further by
successfully attacking the merchant ships that brought in imports to beleaguered Britain. All this pointed to the
need to make labour the top priority in the organization of the war economy. Over the period to the end of 1942
the government established a system of manpower budgeting and allocation that became its principal planning
device. A series of National Service Acts made men aged 18 to 50 liable for military service or essential civilian
war service, and women aged 20 to 50 liable for service in the Women's Auxiliary Services or the Civil Defence
Services. The Schedule of Reserved Occupations ensured that skilled workers in vital war industries were not
called up for the armed forces, and the Essential Works Orders controlled the supply and movement of labour.
Employers were prevented from "poaching" the workers of rivals by the requirement that labour might be taken
on only through the employment exchanges and the trade unions. The skills shortage was targeted in an
expansion of government training centres where skills were taught.
Limited food rationing had begun in January 1940 but increasing pressure on shipping space, together with the
switch from production of consumer goods to war goods, led the government progressively to establish a more
thorough-going system of rationing, taking in clothing, furniture and furnishing. Basic foodstuffs were rationed
by prescribed minimum quantities per week (although bread and potatoes were never rationed); workers in
"heavy" industries were allowed supplements; subsidized milk was given to expectant and nursing mothers and
children under five. For less essential foods and for clothing a flexible system of "points" rationing was devised.
This allowed the consumer to choose between a range of goods carrying a different "points" score.
To support food rationing a drive to raise agricultural production was instituted; its main feature was the
conversion of pasture-land to arable, thereby reducing meat production in favour of the more efficient
production of cereals and vegetables for human consumption. Farmers were given subsidies to plough up
grassland, raise the quality of the reduced pasture, improve drainage and remove unnecessary hedges. Further
encouragement came in the form of guaranteed prices and markets, drawing in even the high cost or marginal
producers. The organizers of all this were the County Agricultural Executive Committees ("War Ags"),
consisting of eight to twelve voluntary members appointed by the Ministry of Agriculture from among local
residents, mostly farmers, but including estate agents, seed and feed merchants, -dairy-produce retailers,
agricultural trade unionists and Women's Land Army representatives. These, together with their small district
subcommittees and full-time paid staff, oversaw the production and conversion drive, inspecting farms, giving
detailed advice or instructions, allocating machinery, fertilizers, feedstuffs and labour. Under the Defence
Regulations they could dispossess tenants who resisted their instructions and send in their own labour to carry
out the work, drawing on the pool of the Women's Land Army, conscientious objectors and prisoners of war.
Alongside this serious attempt to reduce dependency on imported foodstuffs, and probably still more for
purposes of popu1ar morale, the Ministry of Food urged everyone to reduce waste and those who cou1d to grow
their own vegetables or keep backyard hens and pigs.
From May 1940 physical planning remained the chief means of managing the war economy: finance was
subordinated to strategy. Nevertheless, for several reasons, finance continued to be an important instrument of
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44
government policy for the war economy. In the first place, controls had not removed the basic financial
incentive from employers and employees. It followed that manipulation of the financial and fiscal regime cou1d
help to maximize output and productivity. Secondly, intervention was necessary to maintain the value of the
pound abroad and to channel foreign exchange reserves towards essential imported war needs. Lastly, both for
the sake of justice and for the sustaining of popular morale, the government needed to use the fiscal system to
ensure that the financial burden of the war fell equitably on the nation.
The military reversal of mid-1940 was, as in so much else, the catalyst of change in fiscal policy. It brought
Keynes into the Treasury and with him the adoption of his ideas for achieving the above aims and paying for the
war without unleashing uncontrollable inflation. Keynes had been arguing from the start of the war against the
Treasury's way of assessing revenue on the basis of what the taxpayer could bear. He said it shou1d start at the
other end: first work out the national income to ascertain the war-making potential of the economy; then
calculate the level of taxation and forced savings needed to allow the government to absorb a greater share of
the national income without stimu1ating inflation.9 As Keynes explained it, inflation was inherent in a war
economy of reduced consumer goods production and expanded war production. Unless government intervened
to stop it, an "inflationary gap" would open up between demand and supply. His solution, properly realised in
Kingsley Wood's April 1941 budget, was for the government to absorb the inflation threatening excess demand
through taxation and forced savings. 10 The budget estimated the inflationary gap to be about £500 million.
This would be closed by £250 million from additional taxation and £200-300 million from forced savings.
Income tax went up to 50 per cent (it had been 9 per cent at the start of the war); personal allowances were
reduced; purchase tax was increased to 100 per cent (from 60 per cent). Government bonds were offered at
attractive rates, while some other investment outlets were suspended. Banks were pressed to lend their idle
balances to the government and made to restrict advances for capital construction. In the remaining wartime
budgets these principles were maintained and refined. In September 1943 Pay As You Earn was introduced to
make collection easier and more efficient, and purchase tax was developed into an instrument for reducing or
diverting consumption.
Hand in hand with the policy of increased taxation and forced savings went that of cost-of-living subsidies,
designed to prevent wage inflation in a full employment economy. Food subsidies, begun in November 1939,
became an integral and expanding part of the policy of controlling the cost-of-livifig index for the rest of the
war. Since food represented 60 per cent of the index, the control of food prices was the first priority, but the
government held down rents, too, and under the Goods and Services (price Control) Act of July 1941, checked
price rises in a wide range of items such as clothing, household durables, fuel and fares.
Performance
Consideration of the degree of success achieved by the policies and instruments described above might begin
with the national income. Like all the other belligerents, Britain could only sustain its huge war production
expenditures by increasing the national income. Between 1939 and 1945 national income increased by twothirds, the most rapid period of growth occurring between 1939 and 1943. Within this growth was a large shift
in the distribution of national expenditure. The government sector accounted for 12.5 per cent of total national
expenditure in 1938; by 1943 it was 52 per cent. This increase was achieved at the expense of investment in
non-war-related activity and of consumption of non-war goods and services. In effect, the war was being paid
for by a massive capital investment programme undertaken by the State; the economy became a market where
the State financed production and consumption.11 Gross domestic product grew at an average annual rate of 6.2
per cent, reaching a peak in 1943, 27 per cent higher than in 1939, though falling back by 1944 to below the
1940 level. This compared favourably with the expansion in real output achieved in the First World War: then,
the peak year (1917) was only 1 per cent above the pre-war level. Of the principal combatant countries in the
Second World War only the United States surpassed Britain's increase in real domestic product. 12
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How efficiently Britain mobilized its enlarged national product is a complex question that continues to
generate argument, much of it concerned with the post-war consequences of exaggerated claims made about
the wartime performance.13 A study by Mark Harrison, however, commands general respect for its
pioneering attempt to overcome the difficulties of evaluating wartime economic performance
comparatively.14 He concludes that in mobilizing its domestic resources for war Britain did less well than
the other main belligerents. The peak percentage on military spending (47 per cent) trailed that of the USSR
from 1942 on, of the USA from 1943 on, and that of Germany throughout the war. In terms of labour
mobilization alone, however, he concludes that Britain was bettered only by the USSR. Taking 1943 as the
point of comparison, Britain had 45.3 per cent of its working population in war-related work, alongside the
USSR'S 54 per cent, the USA'S 35.4 per cent and Germany's 37.6 per cent.15 Also, only the Soviet Union
outdid Britain in exploiting the potential of female labour: in Britain 2.2 million of the 2.8 million increase in
gainfully-occupied persons between 1939 and the peak year of 1943 were women.16 Success in getting
women into the workforce was matched by success in deploying them into previously male-dominated
sectors. In 1939 only 19 per cent of the insured workforce in engineering was female, 27 per cent in the
chemical industry, 34 per cent in the metals industries; by 1943 the proportions had increased to 34 per cent,
52 per cent and 46 per cent, respectively. The pressing need for staff in local and national government was
met by the taking on of an additional 500,000 women, raising their proportion in the workforce from 17 to 46
per cent. In addition to the 470,000 women taken into the armed forces, over 80,000 became full-time
members of the Women's Land Army. At the peak of female mobilization in 1943 an estimated 7.75 million
women were in paid work, and another one million were in the wvs. This growth was achieved, it should be
noted, in a singularly unpromising culture medium. Opportunities for women to find steady paid work
outside the home were not great in pre-war Britain. They consisted largely of low-skilled, low-paid work for
young women without family commitments. Once those commitments appeared, few employers were willing
to keep them on. At a time of high unemployment, moreover, there was social pressure on women to make
way for men in the job market, a pressure as strong in the home as in the factory. When the wartime labour
shortage made women's labour-power essential, therefore, a major change in attitude was required not just of
employers, male workers and husbands, but of women themselves, so pervasive was the old mindset that the
proper sphere of women was the home and the family. This is reflected in the disproportionate prominence in
official propaganda of appeals to women to take up war work, and of publicity about the crucial importance
to the war effort of the work being done by women. A Ministry of Labour recruiting advertisement rather
heavy-handedly got the message across thus:
When Marion's boy-friend was called up, she wanted to be in it too. So she asked the employment exchange
about war-work. . . In next to no time they had fixed her up at a government Training Centre, learning to make
munitions. . . And before long she was in an important war job. At last she felt she was really "doing her bit" . . .
Jim was proud of her when he came home on leave. He knows how much equipment counts in modem warfare.
More imaginatively, the government backed the making of Launder and Gilliatt's 1943 feature-film Millions
like us, in which a not too idealized picture of women on the factory front was conveyed to potential recruits
and unreconstructed male chauvinists alike. But persuasive films and slogans like "Go to It" were of little use to
mothers of pre-school children without access to day nurseries, or to married women contemplating the
feasibility of managing both a full-time job and shopping for the family. Hence the official afterthoughts of
nursery provision in factories on government contracts, and priority shopping-cards for working women with
families. The cheerful working housewife in a 1941 publicity film goes from workplace to grocer's shop, with
the voice-over saying: "Her things are ready for her. No queuing. No waste of time. . . One of the ways of
solving the problems of the Home Front. . . the people on the spot getting together, seeing what has to be done
and then doing it." With, it might be added, the facilitating hand of the Ministry of Labour smoothing their path.
Even so, the inducements and appeals did not persuade as many as were needed from the pool of potential
workers. The National Service (No. 2) Act of December 1941 makes it plain that even among the young singlewoman category too many had been resisting the call. The Act was initially aimed at unmarried women aged 20
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to 30, the lower limit being reduced to 19 in 1942 and the upper raised to 40 in 1943. About 200,000 women
were formally directed into industry under the Registration of Employment Order or its successor the National
Service (No. 2) Act, although many more entered the services or did war work because they expected to be
directed to do so. As for married women with family or domestic responsibilities, who were not liable under the
Act, few came forward to participate in war work. "Most felt that their domestic responsibilities, especially
under the trying conditions of shortages and "make do and mend", gave them more than enough to occupy their
time, even when there was no objection in principle to the idea of going out to work. A report of the Royal
Commission on Equal Pay, published after the war, recorded that nearly 10 million women remained
"unavailable" even for part-time work. The limits of women's willingness to come forward were equally
exposed in relation to voluntary war service, notwithstanding the remarkable feats performed in this field by, for
example, the members of the Women's Voluntary Services. As a pamphlet produced in 1944 by the Ministry of
Information concluded: "The registrations of women have shown the number available for war work to be
largely restricted by domestic responsibilities. The numbers available with no employment and no household
duties have been small". While there was general acceptance, approval even, of female conscription, there was
no sudden change in the way most women thought about their "natural" role. For many of those formally
ineligible the question did not really arise, since the sheer weight of domestic duties left no time for paid work
or voluntary service; but even among those for whom it was a possibility, the hold of the traditional role-model
appears to have been tenacious. It must be added, however, that despite the real need for female labour, the
reactionary attitudes of government, employers and, at least initially, trade unions, on the question of equal pay,
obstructed a very obvious way in which more women might have been encouraged into paid work. In the
engineering industry, for example, the average wage for women in 1944 was only half that for men. Women in
the war industries were typically confined to low-paid, low-status work with few prospects for promotion or
access to training and apprenticeship. From the standpoint of the effectiveness of the war economy this
prejudice against women workers was counter-productive, since skilled work was desperately needed regardless
of the gender of the person doing it.
As Minister of Labour, Ernest Bevin had virtually unlimited power to conscript and direct but he resisted the
pressure from some quarters to move swiftly down that road. He understood the workers' dislike of compulsion
and resolved to reserve it as a last resort. He was therefore acting exceptionally when, in December 1943, he
directed ten per cent of eighteen-year-old conscripts ("Bevin boys") to work in the coal mines, which had been
failing to maintain workforce numbers for this essential war work.
Behind the growth in national income and employment lies a remarkable expansion of the war sector of
industry, with a corresponding contraction of the consumer sector, and an equally notable growth in agricultural
production. Although the planning was short term and the pace rather slow, the Coalition Government neverthless succeeded in manipulating the economy into fitness for total war. Official statistics published after the war
testify to an eight-fold increase in the total output of munitions of all sorts between 1939 and the end of 1943.17
For example, production of 303 rifles went from 34,416 in 1939 to 909,785 in 1943; machine carbines from
6,404 in 1941 to 1,572,445 in 1942; tank and anti-tank guns from 1,000 in 1939 to 36,324 in 1942; tanks from
969 in 1939 to 8,611 in 1942; aircraft of all types from 7,940 in 1939 to 26,461 in 1944; destroyers from 12 in
1939 to 73 in 1942; submarines from 6 in 1939 to 39 in 1943. Machine-tool production rose from 37,000 in
1939 to 95,800 in 1942 and small-tool production from 17,000 in 1942 to 42,000 in 1943. The achievement
represented by such figures is the more remarkable if allowance is made for the constant modifications made in
weapons design, the increasing complexity of weapons, and the disruption caused by air-raids and relocation of
factories. In addition, the steady drive towards armament in depth for all the armed forces had to accommodate
the sudden need to respond to unexpected strategic imperatives, such as the priority for fighter aircraft in the
summer of 1940, or for submarine destroyers in 1942. In both cases the demand was met by a switch of
resources: production of light bombers and fighters went from 703 in the first quarter of 1940 to 1,901 in the
third quarter; the 73 destroyers built in 1942 represented a 92 per cent increase on the previous year. 15 What
these figures obscure, however, is unevenness of development in the war industries as a whole and numerous
inefficiencies in particular sectors. The dramatic success of the Beaverbrook programme in the aircraft industry
was achieved only through the impoverishment of other sectors: labour, skill and materials were channelled
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towards aircraft production to the point where other important areas of production were set back; in tanks,
small-arms and anti-aircraft guns, for example. And even the aircraft industry, the most successful in the war
economy, could not keep up the pace it set in 1940; by the end of 1942 targets and delivery dates were not being
met. Nor did preferential supplying of other industries necessarily produce satisfactory results. The design and
production of tanks was a case in point. Numbers produced look impressive, but British tanks compared
unfavourably with those produced by the Germans and the Americans; they were slower, less powerful, less
well-armed, and were mechanically faulty. Although some of these problems were overcome in time, by the end
of the war the British army had effectively made American Sherman tanks its mainstay.
The policy of reducing consumer goods production reached its projected levels in most branches by the end of
1943. For example, production of shoes for civilian use from 129 million pairs in 1935 to 87.4 million pairs in
1944; blankets from 6.49 million in 1935 to 2.26 million in 1943; women's stockings and socks from 280
million pairs in 1935 to 131.3 million pairs in 1944. To an important degree this reduction followed from the
control of raw materials. This was, theoretically, a straightforward problem for Britain: because a high
proportion of raw materials were imported, the government's controls over imports and shipping space would
serve as control over raw materials. In addition, the fact that the main source of imported raw materials was the
USA meant that after March 1941, when LendLease came into effect, practically all imports came under
government control. Another way in which raw materials controls came about was through the need to act in
concert with partners. By 1942 Britain was constrained by its participation in the Combined Production and
Resources Board, formed with the USA, and in the Raw Materials Committee of the Commonwealth Supply
Council. Inside Britain raw materials control was rather casual. It was left to the trade associations to allocate
imported materials as they became scarce, and, in the case of non-imported materials, the business organizations
of the industries that used them. While the expertise of these supernumerary civil servants was an asset, the
system did put a unjustified reliance on the willingness of businessmen always to set the national interest in
reducing consumption above the trade's interest in increasing it. The civil servants of the Raw Materials
Department of the Ministry of Supply had not the technical expertise to enable them to query the
recommendations of the trade and business associations. In practice the sheer scarcity of materials, together
with the labour shortage and labour controls, acted to prevent business from exploiting its position. By a
combination of circumstance and design, therefore, raw materials control worked sufficiently well to enable the
production priorities to be achieved.
Food production was an equally successful feature of the war economy. Before the war, Britain relied on
imports from abroad for 70 per cent of its calorific needs. This was reduced to 60 per cent during the course of
the war, thereby saving valuable shipping space for war goods. The planned contraction of livestock numbers
(excluding cattle for milk production) went ahead: pig numbers went down by 58 per cent, sheep and lambs by
24 per cent, poultry by 45 per cent. Arable increased from 11.9 million acres in 1939 to 17.9 million acres in
1944, and output rose by 81 per cent for wheat, 92 per cent for potatoes, 30 per cent for vegetables and 27 per
cent for fodder. Yield per acre was increased for nearly all crops, with cereals doing especially well: wheat rose
from 17.7 cwt per acre in 1936-8 to 19.7 in 1942-5, oats from 15.7 to 16.7 cwt and barley from 16.4 to 18.5 cwt.
These remarkable gains in output and yield were mainly a result of the greater use by farmers of fertilizers and
machinery. The financial inducements of government grants and guaranteed prices, together with the activities
of the War Agricultural Committees, brought about an acceleration of the process of agricultural modernization,
through mechanization and the application of science to methods of production and farm management. 19
None of this reduced the need for import controls. Whether home-produced or imported, food supplies would
never be enough to make rationing dispensable. If anything, full employment and rising earnings increased
demand. As has often been said, the best testimony to the success of the rationing system was the health of the
people. For the population as a whole, the level of health was rather higher during the war than before it. In
terms of the war economy, rationing achieved its goal of reducing total food imports to release shipping space
for war materials, while at the same time ensuring for the average citizen a diet sufficient and varied enough to
maintain good health and working efficiency. Basic and monotonous it may have been, but an under-nourished
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workforce was not a problem the government had to face, thanks to the combined effects of its policies of
simultaneously expanding home production, controlling prices, and rationing the reduced amounts of essential
foods.
To the extent, moreover, that the economic strategy depended on national solidarity, rationing and price controls
were generally seen as fair. The wartime Social Survey in 1942 found that only one person in seven was
dissatisfied with rationing, and among housewives the figure was one in ten.20
That the mobilization of resources and expansion of output may be counted as achievements, none would deny.
The productivity of labour, however, is an aspect of Britain's wartime performance that has elicited critical
comment. Statistics for output per worker show that although it was 15 per cent higher in 1941 than in 1939,
this was in fact the best year of the war; thereafter, productivity declined to a point in 1945 only 4 per cent
better than the last year of peace. Even this is probably an overestimate, since official figures assume fewer
hours were worked on average than was actually the case. This assumption artificially inflates output per
hour.21 A similar distortion arises from the failure of the statistics to take full account of the effort contributed
by several categories of worker: the one million men and women over the retirement age; the 900,000 part-time
women workers; full-time workers who did part-time munitions work in their spare time; the one million
voluntary workers; the 224,000 involuntary workers (pows); refugee and immigrant (mainly Irish) labour.
Further, the average performance figures conceal the fact that in some industries, notably coal and shipbuilding,
productivity declined in the war years. It has been pointed out, moreover, that other countries' productivity
record was much better than Britain's. In the Soviet Union, output per labour unit of time has been estimated to
have increased 28 per cent by 1943; in the United States labour productivity rose by 25 per cent between 1939
and 1944; in Germany it rose by 10-12 per cent during the war.22
Post-war explanations for what must be counted a relatively disappointing record of industrial productivity have
in recent years focused on poor management, unco-operative trade unions, and government failure to invest in
industrial restructuring.23 However, while the apportioning of blame for what happened may be in some
respects justified, there were a number of factors conducive to poor performance for which no group or
institution could reasonably be held responsible. Disruption, delay and dislocation were inherent in the state of
all-out war. Of greatest significance were the qualitative changes to the workforce. Dilution of skilled labour
continued throughout the war, and while there were doubtless instances where the skill barrier was artificial,
and where the introduction of unskilled labour therefore actually improved productivity, it was more often the
case that untrained workers could not match the productivity of their skilled or semi-skilled colleagues. The
Schedule of Reserved Occupations husbanded skilled labour, but in the context of greatly expanded output
needs there was nevertheless a real shortage of skilled labour. This was a problem that a more vigorous
exploitation of training facilities might have mitigated, but there was no escaping the reality that the
productivity of the wartime workforce was held back by its changed composition.24
A brake on productivity inevitably followed from the vulnerability of industry to air attack. To the obvious
effects of direct damage from bombs must be added the diversion of effort involved in maintaining air-raid
precautions, repairing damage and relocating plant. The bombing of Coventry in November 1940, for example,
destroyed or seriously damaged 70 per cent of its 180 largest factories and all major areas of industrial activity
were disrupted. By the time the raids of April 1941 came many firms had dispersed their activities to safer
locations away from Coventry. 25
In any industry productivity was at the mercy of its supply of raw materials or spare parts. The general
disruption of war could stop this supply or erode its quality. But it was also inherent in the situation of official
controls in which managers had to work to secure their supplies. Temporary shortages of raw materials occurred
from time to time despite the elaborate machinery established to give smooth, prioritized allocation. Production
delays were the result, with knock-on effect on production and delivery of key items in the manufacturing
chain. For example, in January 1941 the Austin Company in Birmingham was forced to cancel subcontract
work making aircraft components such as wings, tails and rudders, because of shortages of machinable items.
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26 Frequent modification of design specifications was another check on productivity. Military requirements
changed, and research and development constantly produced possible improvements to products.
The Coventry works of the Rover Company was practically halted for several months early in 1941, both
because of the failure of the Gloster Company to fulfil its contract to supply essential material for production of
the Albermarle, and because of constant changes in the Air Ministry's specification for the aircraft.27 It could
be argued, as Mass Observation did in 1942, that these changing requirements grew out of the basic failings in
the government's planning for war production. It was always more or less incoherent and improvised in
character; this was even how the government presented the war effort, as Mass Observation pointed out:
Production propaganda has been overwhelmingly ad hoc. The emphasis first on planes and then on tanks has
added a special ad harness. Production has to be based on steady rhythms, routines, methods, moods. It does not
lend itself to catchphrases and sudden spurts. Industrial work requires steady continuous effort. In the nature of
things, it must be firmly based on understanding, background information, and appreciation of the process in
which one is engaged. No serious attempt has been made to approach the industrial problems of war production
in this way.28
Some industries were at the point on their growth curve at which further productivity improvements were
unlikely. The introduction between the wars of mechanical picks and cutting machinery had made great
productivity gains for coal mining, for example, but by the start of the war the possibilities of further
mechanization were used up and the inherent tendency of ageing mines to become less productive asserted
itself. The best productivity performance tended to be in the newer industries, where technological and
organizational change was more easily brought about.29
Such change naturally required enterprising and flexible managers: yet another area in which there was
unfortunately a shortage of supply. It was all too easy for employers, faced with the difficulties brought by airraids, government controls and shortages of skilled workers and raw materials, resignedly to retreat into inertia.
Inefficient organization of the shop floor too often held back output and productivity. At the machine-tool
manufacturer Herbert's of Coventry, for example, production blockages were allowed to persist well into 1941
before the management thought fit to investigate the reasons. Improvement resulted from the investigation, but
since managers believed labour shortages were the real problem, and this
The Coventry works of the Rover Company was practically halted for several months early in 1941, both
because of the failure of the Gloster Company to fulfil its contract to supply essential material for production of
the Albermarle, and because of constant changes in the Air Ministry's specification for the aircraft.27 It could
be argued, as Mass Observation did in 1942, that these changing requirements grew out of the basic failings in
the government's planning for war production. It was always more or less incoherent and improvised in
character; this was even how the government presented the war effort, as Mass Observation pointed out:
Production propaganda has been overwhelmingly ad hoc. The emphasis first on planes and then on tanks has
added a special ad hocness. Production has to be based on steady rhythms, routines, methods, moods. It does
not lend itself to catchphrases and sudden spurts. Industrial work requires steady continuous effort. In the nature
of things, it must be firmly based on understanding; background information, and appreciation of the process in
which one is engaged. No serious attempt has been made to approach the industrial problems of war production
in this way.28
Some industries were at the point on their growth curve at which further productivity improvements were
unlikely. The introduction between the wars of mechanical picks and cutting machinery had made great
productivity gains for coal mining, for example, but by the start of the war the possibilities of further
mechanization were used up and the inherent tendency of ageing mines to become less productive asserted
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50
itself. The best productivity performance tended to be in the newer industries, where technological and
organizational change was more easily brought about.29
Such change naturally required enterprising and flexible managers: yet another area in which there was
unfortunately a shortage of supply. It was all too easy for employers, faced with the difficulties brought by airraids, government controls and shortages of skilled workers and raw materials, resignedly to retreat into inertia.
Inefficient organization of the shop floor too often held back output and productivity. At the machine-tool
manufacturer Herbert's of Coventry, for example, production blockages were allowed to persist well into 1941
before the management thought fit to investigate the reasons. Improvement resulted from the investigation, but
since managers believed labour shortages were the real problem, and this was something they had no control
over, they remained largely negative towards finding compensating efficiencies.3O Corelli Barnett, in a broad
critique of the way one of the more successful industries was organized, set management's failings against a
general muddle:
The wartime British aircraft industry, again true of an older industrial tradition, had no clear operational
doctrine as such, no coherent professional philosophy: its way of doing things was the cumulative outcome of
countless ad hoc answers by "practical men" to the problems posed by rushed pre-war expansion and then by
the urgent demands of war.31
On the other hand, employers did have a genuine problem: major reorganization of production methods would
invariably cause a stoppage in the work, and while in the longer term this might make a factory more efficient,
the, short-term pressure was for volume production rather than output per worker. From the managers' point of
view there were stoppages enough from changes in specifications and interruption to the flow of supplies for
them readily to invite another. In any case, changes required co-operation from the workforce and this could not
be taken for granted, especially in those industries where labour relations had been disputatious before the war.
The generally unhappy story of labour-employer relations during the war clashes uncomfortably with the broad
picture of a nation more or less united and committed to a common goal. This picture is not a piece of
retrospective sentimentality: the nation did rise to the challenge of resisting fascist aggression, accepting the
dangers and hardships this entailed. And yet, in the workplace little changed, it seemed. The sense of corporate
solidarity within a wider, united community was rarely to be found. As Mass Observation remarked:
"everything suggests extensive industrial inefficiency" and "psychological friction and disunity of outlook". 32
On the employers' side there was a general reluctance to alter a system in which workers were seen as units of
production motivated only by the wages they got, and management were seen as the facilitators of company
profits and shareholders' dividends. Largely impervious to Ministry of Labour suggestions for improving
factory welfare and morale, most employers went no further than to conform to the minimum statutory
requirements in these areas. To do more, it was thought, would impair profitability after the war. In any case,
while the war lasted profits were easily made; government contracts on a "cost plus" basis removed much of the
competition and all of the financial risks. There was no incentive, therefore, to promote efficiency through
welfare, consultation, and the like. The cash nexus was delivering comfortable profits, so why tinker with it?
In representing the workers' interests the trade unions were no less unwilling to modify traditional attitudes.
Their whole approach was defensive. Every proposal for change in working practices was treated as a potential
threat to hard-won rights, even when their source was no less a figure than that personification of workers'
rights, Ernest Bevin. The rank and file, like their representatives, were acutely conscious that the employers
were doing well: profits were healthy and there were plenty of rumours circulating about profiteering and
avoidance of excess profits tax. Wartime wage rates were an improvement on pre-war for the most part, but war
work had its strains, too, and it was easy enough to feel that capital was as exacting as ever in its claims upon
the individual. As Mass Observation put it: "Cutting right across industrial morale today is the feeling of the
worker that his or her work for the war effort is still for an employer who is making profits out of it".33
Depressingly for the war economy, then, industrial relations seemed petrified in the grievance-laden, disputeHoly Cross High School
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ridden mould of the pre-war years, despite the assertions of patriotic commitment made by all involved, and
despite the general context of national solidarity. Reporting on the situation among industries in the North of
England, Mass Observation was devastatingly blunt:
The most striking feature of the industrial situation here is the survival of strictly peacetime procedure in
conflict between employers and men. . . One looked and listened in vain for any sign of unity binding all parties
in the fight against Germany. From the men, one got the fight against management. From the management, one
experienced hours of vituperation against the men. Both sides claimed to be concerned only with improving the
situation to increase the strength of the struggle against Fascism, but nevertheless, the real war which is being
fought here today is still pre-war, private and economic.34
But in this war labour relations were not simply left to the bosses and unions to manage. From the start the
Coalition Government recognized that there would be a labour shortage and that the bargaining power of
civilian labour would increase. It followed that if war output was to be maximized and the war economy
develop smoothly, labour and labour-relations must be subjected to State regulation.
That this must proceed with the consent and co-operation of the trade unions went without saying. Churchill's
invitation to Emest Bevin to take charge of the Ministry of Labour was as practical as it was symbolic. Bevin
was the leading trade unionist of his time and there was no-one more likely than he to succeed in persuading organized labour to accept the constraints on traditional labour rights that all-out war would inevitably bring.
One of Bevin's first actions was to set up a Joint Consultative Committee of representatives from unions and
employers. At its first meeting he suggested the formation of national machinery for wages arbitration. The
Committee approved the idea, and the National Arbitration Tribunal was accordingly established in July 1940
within the framework of the Conditions of Employment and National Arbitration Order (Statutory Rules and
Orders No. 1305). This retained all the existing negotiating machinery for dealing with disputes over wages and
conditions of employment, but added the National Tribunal for situations where agreement could not be
reached, or where there were no adequate arrangements for reaching agreement. The order made strikes and
lock-outs illegal, and the Tribunal's ruling, or that of any other existing arbitration body, was binding on both
sides. In the four years that followed the order, although the effect was not dramatic, there was an increase in
the use of arbitration in the settlement of disputes. But industrial disputes did not go away; after a significant
fall in 1940 the number of strikes rose, and the number of days lost through strikes increased from 1,077,000 in
1941 to a peak of 3,696,000 in 1944. Absenteeism, too, was a persistent feature of the industrial scene, adding
its own drag on productivity, especially in the coal, steel, shipbuilding and aircraft industries. It should be noted
here that absenteeism was arguably more a product of the strain of working abnormally long hours than of
indolence or lack of public spirit. The emotional toll on people living lives of extended danger, disruption of
relationships and sheer physical fatigue makes nonsense of the attempt to draw a line between voluntary and
involuntary absenteeism. What is astonishing is that however calculated, the rate did not increase in the last
three years of the war, when the cumulative effect of multiple strains and anxieties might have been expected to
show.
This generally negative picture of wartime labour relations masks the fact that much of the conflict was
concentrated in one industry: coal mining. It accounted for 46.6 per cent of the strikes, 55.7 per cent of the
working days lost and 58.5 per cent of the workers involved. In coal, as elsewhere, the main cause was to do
with pay. Miners' wages rose more quickly than average after the start of the war, but they continued to earn
less than other workers in munitions and other heavy industries. The coal industry's reputation for poor
industrial relations was carried into the war years and in 1942 serious unrest over pay and an alarming shortfall
in coal output caused the government to set up a Ministry of Fuel and Power to regulate and supervise the
industry. At the same time it appointed a board of investigation under Lord Greene with a brief to study and
report on wage levels and procedures for settling wages and conditions in the coal industry. On the advice of the
"Greene Committee" a substantial pay award was made to the miners and a national minimum wage established.
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New negotiating machinery was set up that brought the coal industry under the National Conciliation
Scheme. This produced further improvements in miners' pay during the course of the war. Unrest among miners
nevertheless persisted because the awards failed to take account of the claims of particular groups within the
workforce, such as the piece-workers in the low-pay areas of South Wales, Scotland and the North East in
January 1944, or the craftsmen in Scotland in March 1945.35 Right to the end of the war labouremployer
relations in the coal industry continued to be blighted by mutual distrust and resentment, despite the efforts of
the government, Bevin in particular, to manoeuvre the parties towards the cooperation required for the national
effort. Some criticized Bevin for being unwilling to use his powers to enforce the compliance of unofficial
strikers. True, Bevin was always loath to resort to compulsion if there was a chance of succeeding by other
means. But even he had no time for the Trotskyist agitators he believed to be at work in the unrest of 1944 and
1945. He acted on his belief by introducing Defence Regulation 1AA, which made it a punishable offence to
"instigate or incite" a stoppage of essential work. In the event the new regulation was never used. There
undoubtedly were a tiny number of Trotskyists (members of the Revolutionary Communist Party) active in
some of the strikes of the last 12 months of the war, but Bevin's common sense in the end prevailed, in his
recognition that political motivation was absent from the actions of most strikers. It was perhaps his sense of
frustration at being unable fully to master the problem of strikes that had led him to cast around for this scarcely
credible way of accounting for them.
One aspect of labour relations that many expected to generate conflict was the dilution of skilled labour, that is,
the upgrading of semi-skilled workers to skilled work and the employment of more unskilled workers. The
expectation was largely born of memories of the First World War, when the policy had indeed caused
significant unrest. There had been friction not only between employers and workers but between workers and
trade union leaders who had negotiated dilution terms with employers. This time, however, the apprehensions
turned out to have been needless. Even before the war began, and without the prodding of government, the key
actors, the Amalgamated Engineering Union and the Engineering and Allied Employers' National Federation
had worked out an agreement on the terms under which there could be a temporary relaxation of the existing
arrangements relating to skilled work. They agreed that semiskilled workers might be employed "where it can
be shown that skilled men are not available and production is prejudiced". At the local level a joint committee
representing both sides would by agreement implement the policy, keeping a register of the changes, so that
pre-agreement practices could be restored as soon as skilled labour again became available. In September 1939
this agreement, which, unlike the First World War precedents, covered the whole engineering industry, was
renewed for the duration of the war. Only the gentlest of urgings was needed from Bevin to get the parties to
work out together an agreement to facilitate female participation in the dilution process. This was achieved in
May 1940. While it is true that in practice it was difficult, especially in some industries such as shipbuilding, to
overcome the prejudice of both employers and male workers towards the introduction of women in any
numbers, the policy of dilution as a whole was successful: "who does what" disputes fell from 29.4 per cent of
all disputes in 1938 to 13.3 per cent over the 1940-44 period.36 The role of the government, moreover, was
unobtrusive and non-coercive. It was able to leave the negotiating to the representatives of those who would be
most affected by the policy, limiting itself to giving it a helpful steer, as when, in February 1942, it put through
the Pre-War Trade Practices Bill. This laid upon employers the obligation to restore, and retain for 18 months
after the war, trade practices that had been relaxed during the war. It was this as much anything that speeded the
progress of the policy of getting more women into industry. The shabbiness of an arrangement, however, that
would first exploit then stand down women workers when their services were no longer needed, seemed to have
occurred to neither the government nor the trade unions.
Entirely in keeping with Bevin's preference for voluntarism combined with compulsion as the route to increased
output and productivity, was the creation of joint production committees. These originated in initiatives made in
engineering, coalmining and other industries. Some of the initiatives were the response of Communist shop
stewards to the German invasion of the USSR and the subsequent offer made by Britain to send supplies to the
beleaguered Russians, but the earliest (in the aircraft industry) pre-dated the war. They sought ways of
preventing strikes and achieving higher output. Some employers were at first reluctant to respond, since a joint
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production committee would be sure to reduce the area of management's prerogative. But with government
pressure on industry to become more efficient this attitude changed. Symbolically, the Engineering Employers'
Federation approached the already converted leaders of the Amalgamated Engineering Union with a proposal to
act upon the principle of consultation to increase production.37 And so, although they never became
compulsory, joint production committees came into being in a majority of larger enterprises. In small and
medium-sized firms the widespread refusal of management to participate in the scheme disadvantaged the
workers in those enterprises, since these were where standards of safety and welfare were typically minimal.
They were in place in all 40 Royal Ordnance factories by mid-1942 and there were nearly 4,500 in the
engineering and allied industries by the end of 1943. Yard committees existed in nearly all the shipyards, joint
site-committees on most of the larger government building sites, and there were 1,100 pit production committees in the coal industry. Of the last, the Minister of Fuel and Power conceded that only a quarter were
working to any effect. And while a quantitative evaluation of their contribution to output and productivity is
impossible, it can be said that their effect was at the very least positive. The actions that followed the decisions
of joint production committees, whether concerned with workers' welfare or streamlining the process of
production, always went with the grain of national policy and to the extent that they promoted mutual
knowledge and understanding of the positions of managers and workers, they reduced industrial conflict and
thereby losses to the war effort through stoppages.
Less than perfect labour relations, it may be concluded, played a part in the relatively disappointing wartime
record of industrial productivity. To accord to them the prime position, however, would be to underestimate the
parts taken by the disruptions to the material resources for production, the deficiencies of management, and the
general unreadiness for a productive surge that was the legacy of the Depression. It would ignore, moreover,
what was probably the most important factor of all: the level of capital expenditure. The capital-to-labour ratio
declined by 13.1 per cent during the war.38 In the USA, whose wartime productivity was more than twice that
of Britain, there were massive capital inputs, notably in the form of specialpurpose machine-tools.39 Such
capital investment that was made in Britain was geared to the government priority of expanding the capacity to
produce munitions; the emphasis was on volume rather than on output per worker. In any case, the situation of
government by coalition was a constraint: productivity touched issues of economic policy, upon which Labour
and the Conservatives were not agreed. This fact limited the policy to that which both sides were willing to
accept, thereby ruling out any attempt at a major restructuring of economic policy, however conducive that
might have been to greater efficiency.
Even while the war was on, the performance of the economy drew different conclusions from observers on the
Left and Right. To the former, the planning and controls that the coalition introduced in the pursuit of efficiency
implied that a logical next step was the nationalization of essential industries. The case seemed to be
strengthened by the persistence of waste, inefficiency and profiteering. Public opinion, moreover, seemed
generally to lean towards this viewpoint. Mass Observation found in 1942 that 28 per cent of "the upper and
middle-class" thought that profits were "too high"; that most respondents in all classes thought efficiency would
be improved if essential industries were taken into public control; and that 86 per cent favoured conscription of
private assets and wealth. Predictably, on the Right the problems of war production pointed to very different
solutions: the removal of the excess profits tax and bureaucratic regulation, an end to restrictive labour
practices, curbs on wage increases and on the incremental expansion of social welfare. There was clearly no
common ground between these two positions. Inevitably, therefore, the government followed an equidistant
line, retaining the planning, the controls and the tax on profits, but leaving essential industries in private hands,
and limiting its conscription of private assets and wealth. If it was nothing else, the war economy was an
exercise in "the art of the possible".
Commentators have been on the whole kinder to Britain's wartime leaders in evaluating the outcome of their
financial policies. The weapons of taxation, forced savings, rationing and the stabilization of the cost of living
brought rigorous austerity, but were the means by which financial disaster was averted. Receipts from direct
taxation quadrupled and those from indirect taxation tripled; forced savings increased seven-fold; the cost of
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living index, after a sharp increase between 1939 and 1941, stabilized thereafter; real personal consumption
was reduced to 79 per cent of the pre-war level. 40 The extent to which Britain battled to pay its way is
reflected in the proportion of government expenditure borne out of current revenue. It was 37.6 per cent in
1940-41 but had actually increased to 54.2 per cent by 1944-5Y This still left nearly 46 per cent to be met by
other means. Initial government hopes that increased expenditure could be met by an export drive soon proved
illusory: export earnings began to decline at once and by 1943 were half the level of 1938. Meanwhile the cost
of imports had risen by one-third. Nor was the forced savings policy equal to the need: the deficit was £10
billion by the end of the war. In the first year the gap was managed by running down gold and hard currency
reserves and selling overseas assets. Another recourse was the accumulation of external debt. Fortunately, much
of this was held in the form of sterling balances, that is, the credits of Sterling Area countries held in blocked
accounts in London, accumulating through exports to Britain. Of Britain's £3.4 billion external liabilities in
1945 £2.7 billion was accounted for in this way.
These policies together would still have been insufficient to finance the protracted war in which Britain was
engaged; it took the economic and financial collaboration of the United States to save the situation. In March
1941 the Lend-Lease Act allowed Britain to have what goods it needed without having to find the money at
once. From this point Britain effectively had free access to the products of the United States' war economy. In
total, Lend-Lease aid to the British Empire was £5.5 billion, amounting to 17 per cent of its munitions needs.
Britain also received aid from the Empire; Canada alone supplied three billion Canadian dollars-worth of
Mutual Aid (written off as a gift at the end of the war). The significance of the American intervention is clear:
Lend-Lease was the life-line desperately needed and sought in 1941. Without it Britain would have been unable
to carry on the struggle.
Notes
1 S. Pollard, The development of the British economy, 2nd edn (London: Edward Arnold,
1969), p.157.
2 Ibid., p.157.
3 A. Calder, The people's war (London: Jonathan Cape, 1969), p.69.
4 K. Middlemas, Britain in search of balance 1940-61, vol. 1 of Power, competition and the
State (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1986), p.18.
5 Central statistical office, Fighting with figures (London: HMSO, 1995), p.170.
6 Announcement in The Times, 2 January 1941.
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7 A major crisis in the coal industry Ied to government control under the new Ministry of
Fuel and Power in June 1942.
8 G. Alien, "The concentration of production policy", in Lessons of the
British war economy, D. N. Chester (ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1951), pp.167-81.
9 Pollard, Development of the British economy, pp.324-5.
10 R. Stone, "The use and development of National Income and Expendi
ture estimates", in Chester, Lessons of the British war economy, pp.87-8.
11 A. Milward, War, economy and society 1939-1945 (London: Alien
Lane, 1977), p.60.
12 M. Harrison, "Resource mobilization for World War 11: the U.S.A., U.K.,
U.S.S.R., and Germany, 1938-1945, The Economic History Review (May 1988), p.185.
13 See especially C. Barnett, The audit of war (London: Macmillan, 1986).
14 Harrison, "Resource mobilization for World War 11", p.185.
15 Ibid., p.186.
16 CSO, Fighting with figures, p.38.
17 Ibid., pp. 148-79.
18 Ibid., pp.151, 170.
19 Pollard, Development of the British economy, pp.314-17.
20 Calder, The people's war, pA05.
21 CSO, Fighting with figures, p.56.
22 Milward, War, economy and society, p.230.
23 See especially Barnett, Audit of war.
24 Altogether, 23,383 men and women in equal numbers completed training in government
training centres and emergency training establishments between July 1940 and September 1949
(excluding coal-mining training centres). CSO, Fighting with figures, p.63.
25 D. Thorns, War, industry and society: the Midlands 1939-1945 (Lon
don: Routledge, 1989), p.1O8.
26 Ibid., p.54.
27 Ibid., p.52.
28 Mass Observation, PeoPle in production (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1942), p.59.
29 Milward, War, economy and society, p.230.
30 Thorns, War, industry and society, p.59.
31 Bamett, Audit of war, p.153.
32 Mass Observation, People in production, p.72.
33 Ibid., p.256.
34 Ibid., pp.24-5.
35 C. Wrigley, A history of British industrial relations 1939-1979 (Chel tenham: Edward Elgar,
1996), pp.30-31.
36 Ibid., p.28.
37 Ibid., p.36.
38 CSO, Fighting with figures, p.25.
39 Milward, War, economy and society, p.187.
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40 CSO, Fighting with figures, p.221; Pollard, Development of the British
economy, p.327.
41 CSO, Fighting with figures, p.221.
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