Download International Politics in a World of Ideals

The Log, the Paper, and the Lighting of the Match
The Implications of International Politics in a World of Ideals
Amber Heyman-Valchanov
Paper Topic #1
International Relations
November 10, 2005
For his pessimistic view about human nature, his emphasis on power, and his
recognition that morality has little place in inter-state relations, Thucydides’ explanation
of the Peloponnesian War serves as a prelude to political realism. In the view of realism
principal actors in the international stage are city-states, who are concerned with their
own security and act in pursuit of their national interests. Thucydides makes a
distinction between the immediate and underlying causes that advocate this view in his
documentation of the Peloponnesian War. He isolates the real cause of the war in the
changing distribution of power between the two main players of Greek city-states,
Athens and Sparta. According to Thucydides, the growth of Athenian power made the
Spartans afraid for their security, and thus compelled them into war. 1
1
Thucydides, History of The Peloponnesian War, (Penguin Books: London, 1954) p. 49
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Thucydides’ argument correlates strongly with neorealist sentiments, such as
Joseph Nye, on how the anarchic structure of the international system effect the
behavior of states. By looking the city-states of ancient Greece and how they interacted
with each other at the onset of the Peloponessian War, Nye draws on parallels of
modern nation-states, to theorize the causes of World War I. Nye states that, “security
dilemmas are related to the essential characteristic of international politics, anarchic
organization: the absence of a higher government.”2 An increase in security in one
nation-state causes an increase of security in another, making both nation-states more
insecure. Thus, Thucydides and Nye both concur, that it was not the idiosyncrasies of
the many small states of ancient Greece that caused the war, it was the increase in
power of major city-states that caused the Peloponnesian War. Nye goes on to assert
that the same governing factors in dealing with a shift of power in Europe, was the
lighting of the fire that ultimately led to the First World War.
The realist perspective finds the absence of a ruler as the defining element of
international politics and primary factor of political outcomes. The lack of common rule
places responsibility on individual state to define its own power interests and its means
for survival. In the words of the Athenians, “if there is no international government,
2
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History, Pearson Education Inc.,(New
York: 2005)p. 16
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international anarchy leads thus to the overriding role of power in inter-state relations
and causes all states to be motivated by fear and mutual distrust.” To maintain security,
states increase their relative power and engage in a form of power balancing for the
purpose of deterring potential power threats. “One does not only defend oneself against
a superior power when one is attacked; one takes measures in advance to prevent the
attack from materializing. And it is not possible for us to calculate, like housekeepers,
exactly how much empire we want to have. The fact is that we have reached a stage
where we are forced to plan new conquests and forced to hold on to what we have got,
because there is a danger that we ourselves may fall under the power of others unless
they are in our power.”3
Some wars are fought to prevent competing nations from becoming stronger.
The negative side of this emphasis on power is the realist skepticism regarding
enforced order, so that by conquering you we shall increase not only in size but the
security of our empire.4 Although, realism is not implied by the Athenians, they do make
reference to three motives that have led them to obtain and keep their empire: fear,
honor, and self-interest. All of which are referenced to Hobbesian realism.
3
4
Thucydides p. 158
Thucydides p. 403
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The Melians took the moral argument based on ideology. They do not wish to
lose their freedom, and dispite the fact that they are militarily weaker than the
Athenians, they are compelled to defend themselves. “If such hazards are taken by you
to keep your empire and by your subjects to escape from it, we who are still free would
show ourselves great cowards and weaklings if we failed to face everything that comes
rather than submit to slavery.”5 They base their arguments on an appeal to justice and
assume it as a “universal” moral principle. They associate justice with fairness and
regard the Athenians as acting unjust. Hence, one can identify elements of the idealistic
view as the belief that nations have the right to exercise political independence, states
have mutual obligations to one another that they will carry out, and a war of aggression
is unjust. The Athenian response is based on such key realist concepts as security and
power, and is informed not by what the world should be but what it is.
Lafore's central thesis is that “a lot of things might have caused the First World
War, but the proximate cause was the conflict between Serbian nationalism and the
Austro-Hungarian Empire that depended on keeping the lid on nationalism.” Of the
Great Powers, Austria-Hungary was the only one that was under threat of breakdown in
a time when nationalism bore the signature of unification and stability within ethnic ties.
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The fear of an imperial breakdown, much like Athens, fear of losing what they had, was
the lighting of the fire. Nationalism posed a problem for Austria-Hungary and the
Balkans, an area comprised of many conflicting national groups. The Austro-Hungarian
leaders ignored the principle of nationalism in favor of attempting to preserve the peace.
The ardent Pan-slavism of Serbia and Russia's willingness to support its Slavic brother
conflicted with Austria-Hungary's Pan-Germanism. The parallels of nationalism
resemble the Delian League and the Peloponnesian League with Sparta and Athens.
These internal oddities had drastic effects on external behavior. Because of the
uniqueness of the state, Austria-Hungary could not act as a nation state; and it was
impossible for its neighbors, they themselves affected by its particular composition, to
act toward it as they could toward other nation states. It was this situation that brought
about the outbreak of the First World War.6
This leaves us to the question, was war inevitable? By looking at Nye’s assertion
that the most remote causes of war are deep-rooted causes, then come the
intermediate causes, and those immediately before the event are the precipitating
causes. By using the analogy of a building fire, we can breakdown the causes of war in
a realistic tone. The logs are the deep cause, the kindling and the paper are the
5
6
Thucydides, p.403
Laurence Lafore, The Long Fuse, An Interpretation of the Causes of World War I, Waveland press, Inc.(Illinois: 1971)p.57
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intermediate cause and the actual striking of the match is the precipitating cause.7
When you believe that war is inevitable according to Nye, you are very close to the last
move. The actual act of declaring war, realistically is the actual cause of war. There is a
time during the escalation of tension that allows for mediation, when nation-states can
come to an understanding of the ultimate cost of war through examination ideology,
principle, realism. However, in the cases of the Peloponnesian and First World War, had
all parties involved made a clear assessment of the situation and included all
implications, there is a possibility that the match would not have been lit.
Athens when faced with fear, honor, and self-interest, decided that they could not
afford to trust the Corinthians or the Spartans. It was better to have to have the
Corcyraean navy on their side than against them when it looked like the last move in the
game. What made Europe so dangerous at the time prior to World War I, was each
nation sate was fearful of the others’ power. The original encircling of France after the
Franco-Prussian War to the untimely encircling of Germany by France, Britain, and
Russia. All nation states were fearful of war, and the unsettling fear led to war as an
impulsive reaction. The fear that drove the nation states of Europe into the entangling
alliances, was also the fear that led to the inflexibility of those alliances. The increased
nationalism spreading across Europe allowed for the alliance between Germany and
7
Nye p. 74
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Austria-Hungary. The reassurance treaty promised German neutrality towards Russia
as long as no one attacked Austria under Bismarck. This concern between alliances
and diplomacy between nation states tends to collapse at the change of individual
power. Leaving the treaty null and void once the leader is out of office. The treaty was
therefore only between leaders and not countries. But this is a discussion for another
day.
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