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Chapter 6
Economies of
Scale, Imperfect
Competition, and
International Trade
Slides prepared by Thomas Bishop
Preview
• Types of economies of scale
• Types of imperfect competition


Oligopoly and monopoly
Monopolistic competition
• Monopolistic competition and trade
• Inter-industry trade and intra-industry trade
• Dumping
• External economies of scale and trade
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6-2
Introduction
• When defining comparative advantage, the Ricardian
model and the Heckscher-Ohlin model both assume
constant returns to scale:

If all factors of production are doubled then output will
also double.
• But a firm or industry may have increasing returns
to scale or economies of scale:

If all factors of production are doubled, then output will more
than double.

Larger is more efficient: the cost per unit of output falls as a
firm or industry increases output.
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6-3
Introduction (cont.)
• The Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin models also rely
on competition to predict that all income from
production is paid to owners of factors of production:
no “excess” or monopoly profits exist.
• But when economies of scale exist, large firms may
be more efficient than small firms, and the industry
may consist of a monopoly or a few large firms.

Production may be imperfectly competitive in the sense that
excess or monopoly profits are captured by large firms.
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6-4
Types of Economies of Scale
• Economies of scale could mean either that
larger firms or that a larger industry (e.g., one
made of more firms) is more efficient.
• External economies of scale occur when
cost per unit of output depends on the size of
the industry.
• Internal economies of scale occur when the
cost per unit of output depends on the size of
a firm.
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6-5
Types of Economies of Scale (cont.)
• External economies of scale may result if a
larger industry allows for more efficient
provision of services or equipment to firms in
the industry.

Many small firms that are competitive may
comprise a large industry and benefit from services
or equipment efficiently provided to the large group
of firms.
• Internal economies of scale result when
large firms have a cost advantage over small
firms, which leads to an imperfectly
competitive market.
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6-6
A Review of Monopoly
• A monopoly is an industry with only one firm.
• An oligopoly is an industry with only a few firms.
• A characteristic of a monopoly (and to some degree
an oligopoly) is that is marginal revenue generated
from selling an additional unit of output is lower than
the price of output.

Without price discrimination, a monopoly must lower the
price of an additional unit sold, as well as the prices of other
units sold.

The marginal revenue curve lies below the demand curve
(which determines the price of units sold).
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6-7
A Review of Monopoly (cont.)
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6-8
A Review of Monopoly (cont.)
• If monopolistic firms have linear demand curves,

then the relationship between price and quantity may be
represented as:
Q = A – BxP

where A and B are constants

and marginal revenue may be represented as
MR = P – Q/B
• When firms maximize profits, they set marginal
revenue = marginal cost:
MR = P – Q/B = c
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6-9
A Review of Monopoly (cont.)
• Average cost is the cost of production (C)
divided by the total quantity of output
produced (Q) at a time.

AC = C/Q
• Marginal cost is the cost of producing an
additional unit of output.
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6-10
A Review of Monopoly (cont.)
• Suppose that costs are measured by C = F + cQ,

where F represents fixed costs, independent of the level
of output.

c represents a constant marginal cost: the constant cost of
producing an additional unit of output Q.
• AC = F/Q + c
• A larger firm is more efficient because average cost
decreases as output Q increases: internal economies
of scale.
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6-11
A Review of Monopoly (cont.)
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6-12
Monopolistic Competition
•
Monopolistic competition is a model of an
imperfectly competitive industry which
assumes that
1.
Each firm can differentiate its product from the
product of competitors.
2.
Each firm ignores the impact that changes in its
own price will have on the prices competitors set:
even though each firm faces competition it
behaves as if it were a monopolist.
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6-13
Monopolistic Competition (cont.)
• A firm in a monopolistically competitive
industry is expected:

to sell more the larger the total sales of the
industry and the higher the prices charged by
its rivals.

to sell less the larger the number of firms in the
industry and the higher its own price.
• These concepts are represented by the
mathematical relationship:
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6-14
Monopolistic Competition (cont.)
Q = S[1/n – b(P – P)]

Q is an individual firm’s sales

S is the total sales of the industry

n is the number of firms in the industry

b is a constant term representing the
responsiveness of a firm’s sales to its price

P is the price charged by the firm itself

P is the average price charged by its competitors
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6-15
Monopolistic Competition (cont.)
• To make the model easier to understand, we
assume that all firms have identical demand
functions and cost functions.

Thus in equilibrium, all firms charge the same
price: P = P
• In equilibrium,

Q = S/n + 0

AC = C/Q = F/Q + c = F(n/S) + c
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6-16
Monopolistic Competition (cont.)
1. The Number of Firms and Average Cost
AC = F(n/S) + c
• The larger the number of firms n in the
industry, the higher the average cost for each
firm because the less each firm produces.
• The larger the total sales S of the industry, the
lower the average cost for each firm because
the more that each firm produces.
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6-17
Monopolistic Competition (cont.)
2. The Number of Firms and the Price
Q = S[1/n – b(P – P)]
Q = S/n – Sb(P – P)
Q = S/n + SbP – SbP
Q = A – BxP
• Let A  S/n + SbP and B ≡ Sb
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6-18
Monopolistic Competition (cont.)
MR = P – Q/B = c
MR = P – Q/Sb = c
P = c + Q/Sb
P = c + (S/n)/Sb
P = c + 1/(nxb)
• The larger the number of firms n in the
industry, the lower the price each firm charges
because of increased competition.
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6-19
Monopolistic Competition (cont.)
• At some number of firms, the price that
firms charge (which decreases in n) matches
the average cost that firms pay (which
increases in n).
• This number of firms is the number at which
each firm has zero profits: price matches
average cost.
• This number is the equilibrium number
of firms.
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6-20
Monopolistic
Competition (cont.)
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6-21
Monopolistic Competition (cont.)
• If the number of firms is greater than or less
than n2, then in industry is not in equilibrium in
the sense that firms have an incentive to exit
or enter the industry.

Firms have an incentive to enter the industry when
profits are greater than zero (price > average cost).

Firms have an incentive to exit the industry when
profits are less than zero (price < average cost).
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6-22
Monopolistic Competition and Trade
• Because trade increases market size, trade is
predicted to decrease average cost in an industry
described by monopolistic competition.

Industry sales increase with trade leading to decreased
average costs: AC = F(n/S) + c
• Because trade increases the variety of goods that
consumers can buy under monopolistic competition, it
increases the welfare of consumers.

Because average costs decrease, consumers can also
benefit from a decreased price.
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6-23
Monopolistic
Competition
and Trade
(cont.)
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6-24
Monopolistic
Competition and Trade (cont.)
• As a result of trade, the number of firms in a
new international industry is predicted to
increase relative to each national market.

But it is unclear if firms will locate in the domestic
country or foreign countries.
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6-25
Monopolistic
Competition and Trade (cont.)
Hypothetical example of gains from trade
in an industry with monopolistic competition
Domestic
market before
trade
Industry sales
Number of firms
Sales per firm
Average cost
Price
Foreign
market
before trade
Integrated
market after
trade
1,600,000
2,500,000
8
10
150,000
200,000
250,000
10,000
8,750
8,000
10,000
8,750
8,000
900,000
6
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6-26
Inter-industry Trade
• According to the Heckscher-Ohlin model or Ricardian
model, countries specialize in production.

Trade occurs only between industries: inter-industry trade
• In a Heckscher-Ohlin model suppose that:

The capital abundant domestic economy specializes in the
production of capital intensive cloth, which is imported by the
foreign economy.

The labor abundant foreign economy specializes in the
production of labor intensive food, which is imported by the
domestic economy.
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6-27
Inter-industry Trade (cont.)
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6-28
Intra-industry Trade
• Suppose now that the global cloth industry is
described by the monopolistic competition model.
• Because of product differentiation, suppose that each
country produces different types of cloth.
• Because of economies of scale, large markets are
desirable: the foreign country exports some cloth and
the domestic country exports some cloth.

Trade occurs within the cloth industry: intra-industry trade
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6-29
Intra-industry Trade (cont.)
• If domestic country is capital abundant, it still
has a comparative advantage in cloth.

It should therefore export more cloth than it
imports.
• Suppose that the trade in the food industry
continues to be determined by comparative
advantage.
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6-30
Intra-industry Trade (cont.)
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6-31
Inter-industry and Intra-industry Trade
1. Gains from inter-industry trade reflect
comparative advantage.
2. Gains from intra-industry trade reflect
economies of scale (lower costs) and wider
consumer choices.
3. The monopolistic competition model does
not predict in which country firms locate, but
a comparative advantage in producing the
differentiated good will likely cause a country
to export more of that good than it imports.
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6-32
Inter-industry and
Intra-industry Trade (cont.)
4. The relative importance of intra-industry trade
depend on how similar countries are.

Countries with similar relative amounts of factors of
production are predicted to have intra-industry trade.

Countries with different relative amounts of factors of
production are predicted to have inter-industry trade.
5. Unlike inter-industry trade in the Heckscher-Ohlin
model, income distribution effects are not predicted
to occur with intra-industry trade.
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6-33
Inter-industry and
Intra-industry Trade (cont.)
• About 25% of world trade is intra-industry
trade according to standard industrial
classifications.

But some industries have more intra-industry trade
than others: those industries requiring relatively
large amounts of skilled labor, technology and
physical capital exhibit intra-industry trade for
the US.

Countries with similar relative amounts of skilled
labor, technology and physical capital engage in a
large amount of intra-industry trade with the US.
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6-34
Inter-industry and
Intra-industry Trade (cont.)
• Calculate the importance of Intraindustry trade
within a given industry:
Index = 1 - |[exports - imports]|/[exports + imports]
When exports = imports, the index = 1
When exports (or imports) = 0, the index = 0
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6-35
Inter-industry and
Intra-industry Trade (cont.)
Note: an index of 1 means that all trade is intra-industry trade.
An index of 0 means that all trade is inter-industry trade.
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6-36
Dumping
• Dumping is the practice of charging a lower price for
exported goods than for goods sold domestically.
• Dumping is an example of price discrimination:
the practice of charging different customers
different prices.
• Price discrimination and dumping may occur only if

imperfect competition exists: firms are able to influence
market prices.

markets are segmented so that goods are not easily bought
in one market and resold in another.
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6-37
Dumping (cont.)
• Dumping may be a profit maximizing strategy
because of differences in foreign and domestic
markets.
• One difference is that domestic firms usually have a
larger share of the domestic market than they do of
foreign markets.

Because of less market dominance and more competition in
foreign markets, foreign sales are usually more responsive to
price changes than domestic sales.

Domestic firms may be able to charge a high price in the
domestic market but must charge a low price on exports if
foreign consumers are more responsive to price changes.
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6-38
Dumping (cont.)
• We draw a diagram of how dumping occurs
when a firm is a monopolist in the domestic
market but a small competitive firm in
foreign markets.

Because the firm is a monopolist in the domestic
market, the domestic market demand curve is
downward sloping, and the marginal revenue curve
lies below that demand curve.

Because the firm is a small competitive firm in
foreign markets, the foreign market demand curve
is horizontal, representing the fact that exports are
very responsive to small price changes.
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6-39
Dumping
(cont.)
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Dumping (cont.)
• To maximize profits, the firm will sell a low amount in
the domestic market at a high price PDOM , but sell in
foreign markets at a low price PFOR.

Since an additional unit can always be sold at PFOR , the firm
will sell its products at a high price in the domestic market
until marginal revenue there falls to PFOR.

Thereafter, it will sell exports at PFOR until marginal costs
exceed this price.
• In this case, dumping is a profit-maximizing strategy.
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6-41
Protectionism and Dumping
• Dumping (as well as price discrimination in domestic
markets) is widely regarded as unfair.
• A US firm may appeal to the Commerce Department
to investigate if dumping by foreign firms has injured
the US firm.

The Commerce Department may impose an “anti-dumping
duty”, or tax, as a precaution against possible injury.

This tax equals the difference between the actual and “fair”
price of imports, where “fair” means “price the product is
normally sold at in the manufacturer's domestic market ”.
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6-42
Protectionism and Dumping (cont.)
• Next the International Trade Commission
(ITC) determines if injury to the US firm has
actually occurred or is likely to occur.
• If the ITC determines that injury has occurred
or is likely to occur, the anti-dumping duty
remains in place.

See http://www.itds.treas.gov/ADD_CVD.htm
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6-43
External Economies of Scale
• If external economies exist, a country that has
a large industry will have low costs of
producing that industry’s good or service.
• External economies may exist for a few
reasons:
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6-44
External Economies of Scale (cont.)
1. Specialized equipment or services may
be needed for the industry, but are only
supplied by other firms if the industry is large
and concentrated.

For example, Silicon Valley in California has a
large concentration silicon chip companies, which
are serviced by companies that make special
machines for manufacturing silicon chips.

These machines are cheaper and more
easily available for Silicon Valley firms than for
firms elsewhere.
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6-45
External Economies of Scale (cont.)
2. Labor pooling: a large and concentrated
industry may attract a pool of workers,
reducing employee search and hiring costs
for each firm.
3. Knowledge spillovers: workers from
different firms may more easily share ideas
that benefit each firm when a large and
concentrated industry exists.
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6-46
External Economies of Scale and Trade
• If external economies exist, the pattern of
trade may be due to historical accidents:

countries that start out as large producers in
certain industries tend to remain large producers
even if some other country could potentially
produce the goods more cheaply.
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6-47
External Economies
of Scale and Trade (cont.)
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6-48
External Economies
of Scale and Trade (cont.)
• Trade based on external economies has an
ambiguous effect on national welfare.

There may be gains to the world economy by
concentrating production of industries with
external economies.

But there is no guarantee that the right country will
produce a good subject to external economies.

It is even possible that a country is worse off with
trade than it would have been without trade: a
country may better off if it produces everything for
its domestic market rather than pay for imports.
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6-49
External Economies
of Scale and Trade (cont.)
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6-50
External Economies
of Scale and Trade (cont.)
• We have considered cases where external
economies depend on the amount of current
output at a point in time.
• But external economies may also depend on
the amount of cumulative output over time.
• Dynamic external economies of scale
(dynamic increasing returns to scale) exist if
average costs fall as cumulative output over
time rises.
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6-51
External Economies
of Scale and Trade (cont.)
• Dynamic increasing returns to scale could
arise if the cost of production depends on the
accumulation of knowledge and experience,
which depend on the production process
over time.
• A graphical representation of dynamic
increasing returns to scale is called a
learning curve.
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6-52
External Economies
of Scale and Trade (cont.)
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6-53
External Economies
of Scale and Trade (cont.)
• Like external economies of scale at a point in time,
dynamic increasing returns to scale can lock in an
initial advantage or head start in an industry.
• Like external economies of scale at a point in time,
dynamic increasing returns to scale can be used to
justify protectionism.

Temporary protection of industries enables them to gain
experience: infant industry argument.

But temporary is often for a long time, and it is hard to identify
when external economies of scale really exist.
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6-54
Summary
1. Economies of scale imply that more output at the
firm or industry level causes average cost to fall.

External economies of scale refer to the amount of output
by an industry.

Internal economies of scale refer to the amount of output
by a firm.
2. With monopolistic competition, each firm has some
monopoly power due to product differentiation but
must compete with other firms whose prices are
believed to be unaffected by each firm’s actions.
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6-55
Summary (cont.)
3. Monopolistic competition allows for gains
from trade through lower costs and prices,
as well as through wider consumer choice.
4. Monopolistic competition predicts intraindustry trade, and does not predict changes
in income distribution within a country.
5. Location of firms under monopolistic
competition is unpredictable, but countries
with similar relative factors are predicted to
engage in intra-industry trade.
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6-56
Summary (cont.)
6. Dumping may be a profitable strategy when
a firm faces little competition in its domestic
market and faces heavy competition in
foreign markets.
7. Trade based on external economies of scale
may increase or decrease national welfare,
and countries may benefit from temporary
protectionism if their industries exhibit
external economies of scale either at a point
in time or over time.
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